MarxSchmarx
25th June 2013, 12:35
In elections held on June 23rd, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) managed to elect 17 representatives that doubled their share of seats in the 127 seat Tokyo assembly. Although the ruling coalition made up of neoliberal hawks LDP and Buddhist fundamentalists managed to win the majority of seats, the JCP came in third The victory of the LDP came mostly at the expense of the previously dominant center-left Democratic party (JDP), which dwindled to 15 seats from 43. The nationalist japan renewal party, backed by the asshole former mayor/governor Ishihara also failed to gain any traction.
The election is seen by some as foreboding of the coming upper house elections. Although turnout was the second worst since the end of WWII at 43.5%, there are apparently some disagreements among analysts about how the commies managed to surge.
One prosaic explanation is that apparently the JCP failed to improve more than 1% on their previous support base, but the other parties outside the ruling coalition divided their votes and lowered the support of the JDP, which worked to the JCP's advantage.
A related account that is often cited is that the JCP has gained some traction as the default opposition party, particularly as Cold War fears of a once (roughly pre-1960s) Soviet-backed party fade. Unlike the (genuinely pretty pro-eastern bloc, but dying) social democrats, the JCP refused to join the failed DPJ led coalition. The JCP then becomes the default protest vehicle as a perennial outsider party, and when the opposition to the ruling hawk-neoliberal-fundamentalist coalition is fractured, becomes a competitive beneficiary.
Indeed, a variant of this analysis is that the JCP in exit polls won a majority of voters who are opposed to and skeptical of the economic policies of the (national) ruling coalition. There's some evidence to suggest that the ruling coalition's economic policies combining fiscal stimulus, quantitative easing and export-oriented monetary policy has rather soft support and opposition to it in the 40-50% range despite relatively high overall approval ratings.
A final, and for us rather relevant account, is that the JCP actually built on a network of supporters among the poor, who rely on JCP-backed hospitals, food banks, and other community organizations and that for this growing segment of Tokyo residents the JCP. In a low-turnout election, the beneficiaries of such JCP mediated organizations are likely to comprise a larger share of the electorate. The JCP has somewhat spotty involvement in the labor movement, focusing more on community organizations than unions.
Interestingly, the JCP did the worst among younger residents (<30) who had awful turnout but are also probably the most precarious economic group, and strongest among elder residents, for whom reliance on the services provided by the JCP can be huge.
These are apparently some of the theories being circulated in the local press. It's possible there could be some backlash in the national elections to be held shortly. Despite its success, the JCP still has rather high unfavorability ratings and people opposed to the ruling coalition may be less inclined to vote at all if the JCP is seen as the only alternative.
The election is seen by some as foreboding of the coming upper house elections. Although turnout was the second worst since the end of WWII at 43.5%, there are apparently some disagreements among analysts about how the commies managed to surge.
One prosaic explanation is that apparently the JCP failed to improve more than 1% on their previous support base, but the other parties outside the ruling coalition divided their votes and lowered the support of the JDP, which worked to the JCP's advantage.
A related account that is often cited is that the JCP has gained some traction as the default opposition party, particularly as Cold War fears of a once (roughly pre-1960s) Soviet-backed party fade. Unlike the (genuinely pretty pro-eastern bloc, but dying) social democrats, the JCP refused to join the failed DPJ led coalition. The JCP then becomes the default protest vehicle as a perennial outsider party, and when the opposition to the ruling hawk-neoliberal-fundamentalist coalition is fractured, becomes a competitive beneficiary.
Indeed, a variant of this analysis is that the JCP in exit polls won a majority of voters who are opposed to and skeptical of the economic policies of the (national) ruling coalition. There's some evidence to suggest that the ruling coalition's economic policies combining fiscal stimulus, quantitative easing and export-oriented monetary policy has rather soft support and opposition to it in the 40-50% range despite relatively high overall approval ratings.
A final, and for us rather relevant account, is that the JCP actually built on a network of supporters among the poor, who rely on JCP-backed hospitals, food banks, and other community organizations and that for this growing segment of Tokyo residents the JCP. In a low-turnout election, the beneficiaries of such JCP mediated organizations are likely to comprise a larger share of the electorate. The JCP has somewhat spotty involvement in the labor movement, focusing more on community organizations than unions.
Interestingly, the JCP did the worst among younger residents (<30) who had awful turnout but are also probably the most precarious economic group, and strongest among elder residents, for whom reliance on the services provided by the JCP can be huge.
These are apparently some of the theories being circulated in the local press. It's possible there could be some backlash in the national elections to be held shortly. Despite its success, the JCP still has rather high unfavorability ratings and people opposed to the ruling coalition may be less inclined to vote at all if the JCP is seen as the only alternative.