MarxSchmarx
30th March 2013, 04:06
As is generally acknowledged, Pyongyang played a shrewd, if incredibly dangerous and risky tightrope act during the cold war by seeking to maintain good relations with both Moscow and Beijing.
But this observation invites a natural question - why? One possibility is that the North understands it can be quite useful to both the USSR and China, as a buffer state against capitalist America and Japan. This gives Pyongyang considerable leverage. The Sino-Soviet split added another ingredient to the mix - both the Soviets and the Chinese wanted a state that would be friendly if something ever went awry between the two. Early on, the Russians had secured Mongolia, and perhaps the Chinese to a lesser extent had secured Pakistan. Quite reasonably the two were evenly matched, especially given that the Americans (and by extension the Japanese) were largely on the side of Beijing as well if it came to a real match. North Korea therefore became the great tipping point.
The fall of the USSR changed all that. North Korea played its hedged bets for all they were worth, but this was a double-edged sword. Closely aligning with China out of mere survival instinct in the years immediately following, the North became as dependent on China as the Korean peninsula once was on America or Japan. But Beijing took the opportunity to reconcile itself with Seoul, Mongolia and Delhi, albeit with disgruntlement.
The elite in Pyongyang must realize that continued dependence on China is, at best, unwise. China has historically proven to be a far less trustworthy neighbor than even Japan, and Chinese behavior against e.g. the Philippines and Vietnam does not go unnoticed. America and Japan, and to a lesser extent, South Korea, are liberal democracies that, in the militarist, nationalist north, "suffer" from the inability of its populace to prosecute a less than successful war (although the North isn't so stupid as to underestimate the ability of the Americans and the like to carry out a war effectively for short time).
But importantly, by contrast, the North is concerned that China, particularly if it is not plagued by internal rebellion, could outmanouever the North and claim Korea the way it claims Tibet or Xinjiang.
The North therefore, I suspect, thinks that its most promising avenue is to play the Americans against the Chinese the way they played the Russians against the Chinese. Only then could they avoid the fate of Pakistan or perhaps shortly some central and south east Asian nations by becoming so dependent on China for survival that they will have to operate at the mercy of Beijing. The nuclear threats and whatnot are aimed not at the Americans, who they know they cannot seriously defeat. Instead, they are a warning to the neighbors, and which other neighbor than China is as much of a concern, that going after the North will be too costly for any regime.
The Americans, and to a lesser extent Japanese, provide a convenient excuse to arm the country to the teeth and develop deterrents against invasion. But any idea that the north would abandon such efforts if the Americans withdraw is misguided. For as bad as the troops on the otherside of Panmunjon appear, those waiting on the otherside of the Yalu river are incredibly more ominous.
This is just my reading of why the North is behaving as it is. Ordinary people (unless they live in the PRC , and even then) cannot realistically affect it, but it is IMO necessary to understand the modus operandi of a fascist regime.
But this observation invites a natural question - why? One possibility is that the North understands it can be quite useful to both the USSR and China, as a buffer state against capitalist America and Japan. This gives Pyongyang considerable leverage. The Sino-Soviet split added another ingredient to the mix - both the Soviets and the Chinese wanted a state that would be friendly if something ever went awry between the two. Early on, the Russians had secured Mongolia, and perhaps the Chinese to a lesser extent had secured Pakistan. Quite reasonably the two were evenly matched, especially given that the Americans (and by extension the Japanese) were largely on the side of Beijing as well if it came to a real match. North Korea therefore became the great tipping point.
The fall of the USSR changed all that. North Korea played its hedged bets for all they were worth, but this was a double-edged sword. Closely aligning with China out of mere survival instinct in the years immediately following, the North became as dependent on China as the Korean peninsula once was on America or Japan. But Beijing took the opportunity to reconcile itself with Seoul, Mongolia and Delhi, albeit with disgruntlement.
The elite in Pyongyang must realize that continued dependence on China is, at best, unwise. China has historically proven to be a far less trustworthy neighbor than even Japan, and Chinese behavior against e.g. the Philippines and Vietnam does not go unnoticed. America and Japan, and to a lesser extent, South Korea, are liberal democracies that, in the militarist, nationalist north, "suffer" from the inability of its populace to prosecute a less than successful war (although the North isn't so stupid as to underestimate the ability of the Americans and the like to carry out a war effectively for short time).
But importantly, by contrast, the North is concerned that China, particularly if it is not plagued by internal rebellion, could outmanouever the North and claim Korea the way it claims Tibet or Xinjiang.
The North therefore, I suspect, thinks that its most promising avenue is to play the Americans against the Chinese the way they played the Russians against the Chinese. Only then could they avoid the fate of Pakistan or perhaps shortly some central and south east Asian nations by becoming so dependent on China for survival that they will have to operate at the mercy of Beijing. The nuclear threats and whatnot are aimed not at the Americans, who they know they cannot seriously defeat. Instead, they are a warning to the neighbors, and which other neighbor than China is as much of a concern, that going after the North will be too costly for any regime.
The Americans, and to a lesser extent Japanese, provide a convenient excuse to arm the country to the teeth and develop deterrents against invasion. But any idea that the north would abandon such efforts if the Americans withdraw is misguided. For as bad as the troops on the otherside of Panmunjon appear, those waiting on the otherside of the Yalu river are incredibly more ominous.
This is just my reading of why the North is behaving as it is. Ordinary people (unless they live in the PRC , and even then) cannot realistically affect it, but it is IMO necessary to understand the modus operandi of a fascist regime.