Crixus
29th March 2013, 07:55
Dispossession, primitive accumulation, dependence on the market and and fast food! This is a great excerpt from Micheal Perelman's book "The invention of capitalism" which illustrates how Marx was wrong to imply primitive accumulation stopped once a proletariat class was formed. The overall point of the book is to dispel classical liberal myths and to strengthen Mrax's historical materialist theory of primitive accumulation.
"In reality, primitive accumulation did not suddenly occur just before the
transition to European capitalism. Nor was it confined to the countryside of western Europe. Primitive accumulation may be seen as occurring even well before the age of capitalism.
For example, land was already scarce for the majority of people during
the middle ages.
About one-half of the peasant population had holdings insufficient to
maintain their families at the bare minimum of subsistence. This
meant that in order to subsist the average smallholder had to supple-
ment his income in other ways. . . . [I]ndustrial and trading activities
might sustain entire villages of smallholders. . . . Most of the oppor-
tunities for employment must, however, have lain in agriculture. . . .
[I]n almost all the villages some villagers worked for others.
Other factors reinforced the pressure of land scarcity. For example, the
twelfth-century Danes levied tribute from the British. This extortion was
not primitive accumulation, since it was not intended to coerce workers
into the labor market and foster market relations. However, it did impel
Britain to monetize its economy in a way that bore some resemblance
to primitive accumulation (Sohn-Rethel 1978, 107). Similarly, medieval
usury, often simply dismissed as a parasitic intrusion into the economy,
prodded the economy to advance (Marx 1967, 3:596–97).
The process of primitive accumulation does not merely extend back-
ward before the epoch of classical political economy. It lasted well into
more modern times. In England, as well as in the other countries of ad-
vanced capitalism, the conversion of small-scale farmers into proletarians
continued throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth.
This transformation involved more than the ‘‘silent compulsion’’ of mar-
ket forces. In the case of the destruction of small-scale farming in the
United States, the federal government was central in developing the trans-
portation and research systems that tipped the balance in favor of large-
scale agriculture (see Perelman 1977; 1991b).
The continuity of primitive accumulation stands in stark contrast to its
usual image as the one-time destruction of the peasant economy, the
immediate effect of which was to create a society with capitalists on the
one side and workers on the other. This perception is understandable, but
misleading. Indeed, on the eve of capitalism, the majority of people were
peasants or at least had some connection to farming.
Moreover, primitive accumulation was not limited to agriculture. It
extended across many, if not all, sectors of the economy (Berg 1986, 70). It
took place in the city as well as the countryside. After all, urban people
still provide for themselves directly in a multitude of ways other than the
growing of food. Depriving people of these means of provision forces a
greater dependence on the market just as surely as restricting their access
to the means of food production.
theory of primitive accumulation
35
Take a relatively modern example. Packing people into crowded urban
quarters left little space for doing laundry. As a result, people become de-
pendent on commercial laundries. After World War II, the ability of the
typical U.S. family to produce for its own needs continued to diminish,
despite the widespread availability of household appliances, such as wash-
ing machines, that should have made many types of self-provisioning
easier. Likewise, Paul Sweezy (1980, 13) interprets Japan’s huge enter-
tainment sector as a partial result of people being forced to live in such
cramped quarters that they are unable to socialize in their homes.
The need to purchase such services compels people to sell more labor.
We see that the share of life years available for wage labor for the average adult
has expanded from 39 percent in 1900 to 44.4 percent in 1970, despite
rising education levels, better child labor laws, and a shorter workweek.
Since that time, work has demanded a rapidly escalating share of the
typical family’s time. Juliet Schor (1991, 29) estimates that the average
person worked 163 more hours in 1987 than in 1969.
This process can feed on itself. Because people have to earn more wages
to compensate for the increased difficulty of providing for certain of their
own needs, they have less time to do other sorts of work on their own,
inducing families to transfer still more labor from the household to the
commercial sector. Child care centers are an obvious outcome of this
process. In addition, the fast-food industry is predicated on the difficulty
of working a job and performing a multitude of other household chores in the same day."
"In reality, primitive accumulation did not suddenly occur just before the
transition to European capitalism. Nor was it confined to the countryside of western Europe. Primitive accumulation may be seen as occurring even well before the age of capitalism.
For example, land was already scarce for the majority of people during
the middle ages.
About one-half of the peasant population had holdings insufficient to
maintain their families at the bare minimum of subsistence. This
meant that in order to subsist the average smallholder had to supple-
ment his income in other ways. . . . [I]ndustrial and trading activities
might sustain entire villages of smallholders. . . . Most of the oppor-
tunities for employment must, however, have lain in agriculture. . . .
[I]n almost all the villages some villagers worked for others.
Other factors reinforced the pressure of land scarcity. For example, the
twelfth-century Danes levied tribute from the British. This extortion was
not primitive accumulation, since it was not intended to coerce workers
into the labor market and foster market relations. However, it did impel
Britain to monetize its economy in a way that bore some resemblance
to primitive accumulation (Sohn-Rethel 1978, 107). Similarly, medieval
usury, often simply dismissed as a parasitic intrusion into the economy,
prodded the economy to advance (Marx 1967, 3:596–97).
The process of primitive accumulation does not merely extend back-
ward before the epoch of classical political economy. It lasted well into
more modern times. In England, as well as in the other countries of ad-
vanced capitalism, the conversion of small-scale farmers into proletarians
continued throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth.
This transformation involved more than the ‘‘silent compulsion’’ of mar-
ket forces. In the case of the destruction of small-scale farming in the
United States, the federal government was central in developing the trans-
portation and research systems that tipped the balance in favor of large-
scale agriculture (see Perelman 1977; 1991b).
The continuity of primitive accumulation stands in stark contrast to its
usual image as the one-time destruction of the peasant economy, the
immediate effect of which was to create a society with capitalists on the
one side and workers on the other. This perception is understandable, but
misleading. Indeed, on the eve of capitalism, the majority of people were
peasants or at least had some connection to farming.
Moreover, primitive accumulation was not limited to agriculture. It
extended across many, if not all, sectors of the economy (Berg 1986, 70). It
took place in the city as well as the countryside. After all, urban people
still provide for themselves directly in a multitude of ways other than the
growing of food. Depriving people of these means of provision forces a
greater dependence on the market just as surely as restricting their access
to the means of food production.
theory of primitive accumulation
35
Take a relatively modern example. Packing people into crowded urban
quarters left little space for doing laundry. As a result, people become de-
pendent on commercial laundries. After World War II, the ability of the
typical U.S. family to produce for its own needs continued to diminish,
despite the widespread availability of household appliances, such as wash-
ing machines, that should have made many types of self-provisioning
easier. Likewise, Paul Sweezy (1980, 13) interprets Japan’s huge enter-
tainment sector as a partial result of people being forced to live in such
cramped quarters that they are unable to socialize in their homes.
The need to purchase such services compels people to sell more labor.
We see that the share of life years available for wage labor for the average adult
has expanded from 39 percent in 1900 to 44.4 percent in 1970, despite
rising education levels, better child labor laws, and a shorter workweek.
Since that time, work has demanded a rapidly escalating share of the
typical family’s time. Juliet Schor (1991, 29) estimates that the average
person worked 163 more hours in 1987 than in 1969.
This process can feed on itself. Because people have to earn more wages
to compensate for the increased difficulty of providing for certain of their
own needs, they have less time to do other sorts of work on their own,
inducing families to transfer still more labor from the household to the
commercial sector. Child care centers are an obvious outcome of this
process. In addition, the fast-food industry is predicated on the difficulty
of working a job and performing a multitude of other household chores in the same day."