Molotov RIbentrop pact and USSR's territorial acquisitions

[garrus]

If my sources are corrrect:
USSR claimed a part of Poland , annexed the baltic states of Latvia,Estonia and Lithuania and parts of Finland and Romania.

I'd like to ask anti-revisionists , how was this justified from a non-aggression pact?

I'm reluctant to rely on wikipedia, as it names the paragraph " the secret protocol" :tt2:.

Thanks in advance.

[ind_com]

This question might not be exactly suited for anti-revisionists. After all, we consider the USSR to have been socialist during that period, and like every communist tendency, we advocate the spreading of the revolution to as many countries as possible. Socialist aggression is always justified against capitalist regimes.

[Broviet Union]

But don't anti-revisionist always make a big deal of Brezhnevite social imperialism?

[garrus]

Socialist aggression is always justified against capitalist regimes.
Are you joking?
I know you consider USSR to have been socialist, but do you really think that annexation is "spreading the revolution" ?

If cuba today annexes miami, would you name that as "expansion of the revolution to the north american continent" ?

The question is precisely directed to you, because i would imagine that you would also find that method extremely non-socialist, and extremely unmarxist.

[Geiseric]

In the case of Nazism, the USSR was appeasing as much as the other Allies. Trade between the USSR and Germany was huge in the years preceeding WW2. Russian raw materials and oil were used for a while to build the Nazi army, in exchange for military secrets used to modernize the red army. The process also happened during the Weimar Republic to an extent.

So collaboration between the USSR and Nazi Germany, in Trotsky's opinion, should of ended as soon as the Nazis gained state power, and a pre emptive war against a still largely disarmed Nazi germany would of been preferable to the bloodshed that they spread across Europe. I don't think the Halocaust would of happened if the USSR invaded Nazi Germany in 1933, seeing as Hitler needed about a decade to build up the Wehrmacht, with its most dedicated sections already training in the SS and SA.

[Nevsky]

@Broody You mean the same Trotsky who would have rather seen the USSR defeated by fascism than with Stalin in power? The man who would have thrown away millions of lifes and several hard years of socialist progress for his idealism?

[Anti-Traditional]

@Broody You mean the same Trotsky who would have rather seen the USSR defeated by fascism than with Stalin in power? The man who would have thrown away millions of lifes and several hard years of socialist progress for his idealism?

Actually Trotsky spoke favourably about the Soviet annexations and called for a defence of the USSR against outside aggression.

[Anglo-Saxon Philistine]

One thing that should be kept in mind is that the imperialist powers appeased Hitler in order to form a fascist glacis against Bolshevism; the Soviet Union, for all its faults, appears to have made agreements with Germany in order to secure a better position once the inevitable invasion happened. The partition of Poland seems to have achieved just that.


@Broody You mean the same Trotsky who would have rather seen the USSR defeated by fascism than with Stalin in power? The man who would have thrown away millions of lifes and several hard years of socialist progress for his idealism?

Not a single paragraph in Trotsky's opus suggests that he would rather have seen (or ruled over, as the authors of the anonymous Programme of Revolutionary Communists (Bolsheviks) suggest) a fascist Russia than a Soviet Union "under Stalin", which he considered a workers' state.

[LOLseph Stalin]

I don't think the Halocaust would of happened if the USSR invaded Nazi Germany in 1933, seeing as Hitler needed about a decade to build up the Wehrmacht, with its most dedicated sections already training in the SS and SA.

I'd say that's stretching it since there were already concentration camps by 1933. Sure, lives would have been saved but saying it would have not happened at all is a huge stretch imo.

[Invader Zim]

http://static.newworldencyclopedia.org/thumb/4/4c/Ribbentrop-Molotov.svg/750px-Ribbentrop-Molotov.svg.png


One thing that should be kept in mind is that the imperialist powers appeased Hitler in order to form a fascist glacis against Bolshevism; the Soviet Union

While it may be fun, ideologically soothing, or whatever else, to believe conspiracy theories; history is, like any other academic field, be it scientific of literary, an evidence based discipline. And there is no evidence to support this hypothesis. The fact is that the evidence, of which there is a copious amount, provides plenty of reasons for appeasing the Axis powers, but in the final analysis the western powers appeased the Nazis because they feared another major European conflict with a generation of the most bloody war seen in the history of the continent. That is why they appeased Hitler, for so long, because they weren't willing to stare down Hitler in the hope that he was bluffing, when they believed they lacked the military power to win and win decisively and quickly.


The partition of Poland seems to have achieved just that.

Hardly, signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was perhaps the singles biggest blunder the Stalinist Regime had made to date. It provided the Nazi regime with a God-sent lifeline - the ability to trade with the USSR, allowing it to circumvent the Western Allies blockade of the occupied territories. If the Soviet Union had told Hitler that they weren't having any of it, then Germany would have been starved of resources just as it had been in the First World War twenty-one years earlier. There would have been no Barbarossa, without the goods to feed German industry that facilitated the invasion.

And of course the irony of your comment, suggesting that the Allies wanted to force the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany into conflict, is that they went to war over Poland, the penultimate step before any such war with the Soviet Union could be fought.

[conmharáin]

I don't know that a preemptive invasion would've been feasible. It's easy to think the whole world saw Hitler as the worst thing ever right from the get-go, but imagine the Soviet Union invading a Western European state without provocation. Wouldn't that have changed the entire course of the war? I can't speak to the subtleties of forming international alliances in war time, but an attack like that could easily be construed as Communist world conquest. And what of embargos against Germany? That affects not only Hitler, but the workers of the country as well.

[Anglo-Saxon Philistine]

While it may be fun, ideologically soothing, or whatever else, to believe conspiracy theories; history is, like any other academic field, be it scientific of literary, an evidence based discipline. And there is no evidence to support this hypothesis. The fact is that the evidence, of which there is a copious amount, provides plenty of reasons for appeasing the Axis powers, but in the final analysis the western powers appeased the Nazis because they feared another major European conflict with a generation of the most bloody war seen in the history of the continent. That is why they appeased Hitler, for so long, because they weren't willing to stare down Hitler in the hope that he was bluffing, when they believed they lacked the military power to win and win decisively and quickly.

Right; it's not as if the European imperialist powers had covertly supported fascists in the name of neutrality and peace. No, wait, that's what actually happened in Spain. And it's not as if the Locarno treaties deliberately allowed for changes in Germany's eastern borders. No, that also happened. And it's not as if the imperialist bourgeoisie were vociferously anti-Bolshevik and ambivalent or supporting of fascism. Except they were.


Hardly, signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was perhaps the singles biggest blunder the Stalinist Regime had made to date. It provided the Nazi regime with a God-sent lifeline - the ability to trade with the USSR, allowing it to circumvent the Western Allies blockade of the occupied territories. If the Soviet Union had told Hitler that they weren't having any of it, then Germany would have been starved of resources just as it had been in the First World War twenty-one years earlier. There would have been no Barbarossa, without the goods to feed German industry that facilitated the invasion.

That would make sense if the Soviet Union were the only German trading partner; they were not, not nearly.


And of course the irony of your comment, suggesting that the Allies wanted to force the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany into conflict, is that they went to war over Poland, the penultimate step before any such war with the Soviet Union could be fought.

And they went to war with such enthusiasm that their involvement up to the invasion of France is widely considered token at best.

[Zealot]

While it may be fun, ideologically soothing, or whatever else, to believe conspiracy theories; history is, like any other academic field, be it scientific of literary, an evidence based discipline. And there is no evidence to support this hypothesis. The fact is that the evidence, of which there is a copious amount, provides plenty of reasons for appeasing the Axis powers, but in the final analysis the western powers appeased the Nazis because they feared another major European conflict with a generation of the most bloody war seen in the history of the continent. That is why they appeased Hitler, for so long, because they weren't willing to stare down Hitler in the hope that he was bluffing, when they believed they lacked the military power to win and win decisively and quickly.

It's not only a historical question but also a political one.


Hardly, signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was perhaps the singles biggest blunder the Stalinist Regime had made to date. It provided the Nazi regime with a God-sent lifeline - the ability to trade with the USSR, allowing it to circumvent the Western Allies blockade of the occupied territories. If the Soviet Union had told Hitler that they weren't having any of it, then Germany would have been starved of resources just as it had been in the First World War twenty-one years earlier. There would have been no Barbarossa, without the goods to feed German industry that facilitated the invasion.

Alternatively: the Nazis annex the whole of Poland themselves and other vital territories that were resource-rich as they had already been doing. An Operation Barbarossa is launched against a relatively weak USSR that possibly was successful on account of the anti-Bolshevik, pro-Nazi appeasement politics of the western powers. The outcome of WWII has completely changed and the future Invader Zim is not only an apologist of imperialism but also of Nazism.


And of course the irony of your comment, suggesting that the Allies wanted to force the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany into conflict, is that they went to war over Poland, the penultimate step before any such war with the Soviet Union could be fought.

And the other irony is that they only done so because their military alliance obliged them and, despite declaring war, they didn't do much more than cleaning their monocles over a game of cards behind the Maginot line. So much for the "penultimate step".

[Invader Zim]

Right; it's not as if the European imperialist powers had covertly supported fascists in the name of neutrality and peace.

Nobody is arguing that they weren't anti-Communist during the interwar period. That is a strawman you have constructed. And there was nothing 'covert' about it, British and French Policy towards Republican Spain was overtly passive-aggressive, and it was widely reported upon at the time. However, failing to support a a legitimate government in Spain, and perusing a policy which favored Franco, is a far cry from what you are suggesting (without evidence) that they were engaging in a policy to orchestrate a war between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.


And it's not as if the Locarno treaties deliberately allowed for changes in Germany's eastern borders.

Which again, does not prove that there was a plan to orchestrate a war between the Soviet Union and the fascist bloc. Indeed your entire argument is now becoming woefully anachronistic. You said:

"the imperialist powers appeased Hitler in order to form a fascist glacis against Bolshevism"

Yet now you are talking about the Locarno Treaties, which were signed in 1925. Are you suggesting that Stanley Baldwin, and presumably Ramsey MacDonald before him, had some keen sense of the future, predicting that fascists would come to power in Germany sometime in the 1933s, and that this fascist power would keenly wish to start a massive war of mutual destruction against the Soviet Union?


And it's not as if the imperialist bourgeoisie were vociferously anti-Bolshevik and ambivalent or supporting of fascism. Except they were.

And its not as if they went to war against Nazi Germany, fascist Italy and Imperial Japan - while the Soviet Union provided the fascists with key supplies. Oh wait, they did.


That would make sense if the Soviet Union were the only German trading partner; they were not, not nearly.

Actually, in a number of key resources, they were after 1939. Maybe you should pick up a book and look up the German-Soviet Credit Agreement of 1939 and the Commercial Agreement of 1940? In fact, I'm feeling generous, I'll even tell you where to look:

Edward Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 1933-1941 (1999).

The fact is that the Soviet Union provided the Nazis the oil and food it would use to sustain the Wehrmacht's rampages across Europe, including, and here is the irony, the Soviet Union.


And they went to war with such enthusiasm that their involvement up to the invasion of France is widely considered token at best.

And what precisely would you have had them do? I want to see just how little you know about this subject.

[Invader Zim]

It's not only a historical question but also a political one.

Only if your politics are built on fantasy as opposed to historical fact - and given that you are a Stalinist, I guess that goes without saying.


Alternatively: the Nazis annex the whole of Poland themselves and other vital territories that were resource-rich as they had already been doing. An Operation Barbarossa is launched against a relatively weak USSR that possibly was successful on account of the anti-Bolshevik, pro-Nazi appeasement politics of the western powers.

Resource rich Poland? Poland is know for a lot of things, its vast oil-fields are not among them. The fact is that only the Soviet Union was in a position capable of supplying the resources, such as oil, that it required to wage war on the scale it did, with Germany and the occupied territories under blockade. The British and French knew it, and so did the Germans. Why else do you suppose they formulated the agreement in the first place?

As for relatively weak, are you trying to suggest that the Soviet Union required the lands it imperialistically annexed from Poland to actually fight the Wehrmacht, and that it would have been weak without them? You're delusional. If anything, the Soviet Union was weak because Stalin and his goons murdered 70% of the Red Army's officers, and refused to listen to Soviet Intelligence when Operation Barbarossa did come around.


The outcome of WWII has completely changed

You see, your problem is that if you want to play at counter-factual history, you actually have to know something about what actually happened first.


And the other irony is that they only done so because their military alliance obliged them

Really? You're going to make that argument? You realize that appeasement led Britain and France to break formal agreements repeatedly throughout the 1920s and 30s? And you realize that the Anglo-Polish military alliance was signed in March 1939? What am I saying; of course you don't.


and, despite declaring war, they didn't do much more than cleaning their monocles over a game of cards behind the Maginot line.

Firstly, the Maginot Line did not extend across the entire British and French sector. So that is inaccurate. Secondly, as I said to the other guy, what precisely should they have done. What were there options? Really, have a go. I always enjoy it when you humiliate yourself.

Secondly, unlike the Soviet Union which, invaded Poland as well, and then proceeded to ship 900,000 tons of oil to the oil deprived Nazis, to whom they extended a generous credit of 400 million marks. You realize that 'sitting' behind their lines would actually have been a successful strategy had it not been for Soviet supplies, right?

[ind_com]

Are you joking?
I know you consider USSR to have been socialist, but do you really think that annexation is "spreading the revolution" ?

Yes, and if a socialist country attacks a capitalist one, then the strategy for every communist in the attacked capitalist country should be national-defeatism, and turning the war into a revolutionary civil war.


If cuba today annexes miami, would you name that as "expansion of the revolution to the north american continent" ?

The question is precisely directed to you, because i would imagine that you would also find that method extremely non-socialist, and extremely unmarxist.

I do not consider Cuba to be socialist, so no.

[Prof. Oblivion]

Secondly, unlike the Soviet Union which, invaded Poland as well, and then proceeded to ship 900,000 tons of oil to the oil deprived Nazis, to whom they extended a generous credit of 400 million marks. You realize that 'sitting' behind their lines would actually have been a successful strategy had it not been for Soviet supplies, right?

Do you have a source for this? I've never heard of this before.

[Kalinin's Facial Hair]

Yes, and if a socialist country attacks a capitalist one, then the strategy for every communist in the attacked capitalist country should be national-defeatism, and turning the war into a revolutionary civil war.

Wait a sec. You are saying that if a socialist country (for the sake of the argument) aids another country's revolutionaries, it is spreading the revolution, or are you saying that a socialist country annexing another country, shoving 'socialism' right down their throat is 'spreading the revolution'?

I can understand the former, but the latter is just an invasion. Plain and simple.

EDIT: In a war scenario, I probably would not fight socialism as well, as said by Angelic Upstarts "I don't wanna fight the soviet, I don't believe he is a threat". But if the soviet is invading 'my' country, well, things get more complicated. (I'm sounding like too much of a nationalist and I don't like it).

[Invader Zim]

Do you have a source for this? I've never heard of this before.

That surprises me, nothing I've said is remotely revelatory. It is all information I assume to be common knowledge.

But, which part? The fact that even after the Nazis had occupied a large chunk of Eastern Europe, massively overhauled the German oil-industry in a drive for self sufficiency, introduced massive rationing, 10% of German oil still had to come from the Soviet Union? Or the fact that Western strategy was built on the tried and tested strategy of starving their enemy of resources - a plan which failed because the Nazis simply bought the resources from the Soviets?

In either case, there are a vast number of books which will all tell you the same thing. But, to direct you to the book I noted earlier, which is all about this subject:

Edward Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 1933-1941 (1999).

For more basic information, I just checked Richard Overy's basic textbook on WW2, and note that he also discusses Germany's innate susceptibility to blockade and its trade with the Soviet Union to avoid that fact:

Overy, Why The Allies Won (1995), p. 230.

And so do a great many others. I also note that these points, with detailed statistics also appear on wikipedia. Like I said, this is not revelatory information. Indeed, wikipedia has an interesting graph which partially illustrates the point, though only includes over-seas imports:

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/11/GermanImports_USSRPerCent.jpg/600px-GermanImports_USSRPerCent.jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nazi–Soviet_economic_relations_(1934–1941)

[Zealot]

Only if your politics are built on fantasy as opposed to historical fact - and given that you are a Stalinist, I guess that goes without saying.

Hah. So pre-WW2 politics are not relevant to politics, only bourgeois history?


Resource rich Poland? Poland is know for a lot of things, its vast oil-fields are not among them. The fact is that only the Soviet Union was in a position capable of supplying the resources, such as oil, that it required to wage war on the scale it did, with Germany and the occupied territories under blockade. The British and French knew it, and so did the Germans. Why else do you suppose they formulated the agreement in the first place?

The guard dogs of imperialism on this site constantly hound about Soviet oil supposedly being the whole backbone of the German war effort without realising that Soviet oil imports were actually quite minimal. As a matter of fact, one of the prime factors motivating Operation Barbarossa was the fact that the Soviets weren't supplying them enough oil.


As for relatively weak, are you trying to suggest that the Soviet Union required the lands it imperialistically annexed from Poland to actually fight the Wehrmacht, and that it would have been weak without them?

Nope.


If anything, the Soviet Union was weak because Stalin and his goons murdered 70% of the Red Army's officers, and refused to listen to Soviet Intelligence when Operation Barbarossa did come around.

Would you have preferred the Soviet war effort to have been sabotaged by counterrevolutionaries and foreign agents within the Red Army? Who am I kidding, you probably would.


You see, your problem is that if you want to play at counter-factual history, you actually have to know something about what actually happened first.

Perhaps it is you who needs to know something before parading your counter-factual history that there "would have been no Barbarossa".


Really? You're going to make that argument? You realize that appeasement led Britain and France to break formal agreements repeatedly throughout the 1920s and 30s? And you realize that the Anglo-Polish military alliance was signed in March 1939? What am I saying; of course you don't.

Boo hoo.


Firstly, the Maginot Line did not extend across the entire British and French sector. So that is inaccurate. Secondly, as I said to the other guy, what precisely should they have done. What were there options? Really, have a go. I always enjoy it when you humiliate yourself.

You've already completely humiliated yourself not only by your imperialist apologism but because, as you argue below, the Sitzkrieg was supposedly a "successful strategy". I mean, no one has to read Sun Tzu before realising that this is the exact opposite of a successful strategy.


Secondly, unlike the Soviet Union which, invaded Poland as well, and then proceeded to ship 900,000 tons of oil to the oil deprived Nazis, to whom they extended a generous credit of 400 million marks. You realize that 'sitting' behind their lines would actually have been a successful strategy had it not been for Soviet supplies, right?

Even if the Soviet had continued supplying Germany with the same minimal amount of oil there would have been a deficit and perhaps your "successful strategy" of bumming around by the Maginot line would have come to fruition.

[Prof. Oblivion]

And so do a great many others. I also note that these points, with detailed statistics also appear on wikipedia. Like I said, this is not revelatory information. Indeed, wikipedia has an interesting graph which partially illustrates the point, though only includes over-seas imports:

I've never actually studied this portion of Soviet-Nazi collaboration. I know of the political and military issues. Thanks for the info.

[Anglo-Saxon Philistine]

Nobody is arguing that they weren't anti-Communist during the interwar period. That is a strawman you have constructed. And there was nothing 'covert' about it, British and French Policy towards Republican Spain was overtly passive-aggressive, and it was widely reported upon at the time. However, failing to support a a legitimate government in Spain, and perusing a policy which favored Franco, is a far cry from what you are suggesting (without evidence) that they were engaging in a policy to orchestrate a war between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.

In fact, I said that the imperialist powers tried to form "a glacis against Bolshevism". Given the amazingly consistent and well-thought-out Nazi ideology, and the eminently sane German leadership, as well as the economic interests of German industry, the invasion of Soviet Union seems to have been fairly inevitable. The imperialist powers did their best to strengthen Nazi Germany and to weaken the Soviet Union.

The situation in Spain demonstrates that, for all their rhetoric, the imperialist states were more than willing to assist the fascists in order to fight real or imagined "communism". Your claim that they simply "failed to support the legitimate government" is false; instituting a blockade and only letting fascist arms through means actively supporting the fascists.


Which again, does not prove that there was a plan to orchestrate a war between the Soviet Union and the fascist bloc. Indeed your entire argument is now becoming woefully anachronistic. You said:

"the imperialist powers appeased Hitler in order to form a fascist glacis against Bolshevism"

Yet now you are talking about the Locarno Treaties, which were signed in 1925. Are you suggesting that Stanley Baldwin, and presumably Ramsey MacDonald before him, had some keen sense of the future, predicting that fascists would come to power in Germany sometime in the 1933s, and that this fascist power would keenly wish to start a massive war of mutual destruction against the Soviet Union?

The Locarno treaties demonstrate the continuing imperialist policy of supporting reactionary states against the Soviet Union. In 1925, these states were social-fascist Germany, proto-fascist Poland and so on. In 1938, those states were Nazi Germany and so on.


Actually, in a number of key resources, they were after 1939. Maybe you should pick up a book and look up the German-Soviet Credit Agreement of 1939 and the Commercial Agreement of 1940? In fact, I'm feeling generous, I'll even tell you where to look:

Edward Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 1933-1941 (1999).

The fact is that the Soviet Union provided the Nazis the oil and food it would use to sustain the Wehrmacht's rampages across Europe, including, and here is the irony, the Soviet Union.

And without an agreement and temporary peace, what would have happened? Germany could have pushed the unprepared Red Army further east and seized key oilfields and so on.


And what precisely would you have had them do? I want to see just how little you know about this subject.

I am by no means an expert on military strategy; nor do I need to be. The token nature of Allied involvement in the war was widely commented upon at the time. Even after the fall of France, the Soviet Union destroyed more German units and suffered more casualties than all of the allies combined.

[ind_com]

Wait a sec. You are saying that if a socialist country (for the sake of the argument) aids another country's revolutionaries, it is spreading the revolution, or are you saying that a socialist country annexing another country, shoving 'socialism' right down their throat is 'spreading the revolution'?

I can understand the former, but the latter is just an invasion. Plain and simple.

EDIT: In a war scenario, I probably would not fight socialism as well, as said by Angelic Upstarts "I don't wanna fight the soviet, I don't believe he is a threat". But if the soviet is invading 'my' country, well, things get more complicated. (I'm sounding like too much of a nationalist and I don't like it).

By spreading the revolution I mean both. It can happen through annexation as well. During the strategic offensive in one country, the communist army can march into territories where the revolutionary forces are locally weak, and defeat the capitalist forces there. Being proletarian internationalists, I don't see why we will differentiate between countries and not generalize this situation for the whole world. Socialists must strike capitalist regimes wherever victory is possible.

[kashkin]

Would you have preferred the Soviet war effort to have been sabotaged by counterrevolutionaries and foreign agents within the Red Army? Who am I kidding, you probably would.

You are kidding right? Three out of five marshals of the Soviet Union were traitors and collaborators? We can see how well the new and ideologically pure Red Army did Finland in 1940. But it spread the revolution to Karelia!


And without an agreement and temporary peace, what would have happened? Germany could have pushed the unprepared Red Army further east and seized key oilfields and so on.


I'm not sure you understand this, Nazi Germany would not have attacked the USSR while the war was still raging on in the west. During that period the Soviet Union could have re-armed and re-organised without sending raw supplies to Germany, hell the last trains to cross the border did so only hours before Barbarossa.

[Anglo-Saxon Philistine]

I'm not sure you understand this, Nazi Germany would not have attacked the USSR while the war was still raging on in the west.

Why not? The German general staff might have had some sense, but given how much the political leadership overruled them, and given the grandiose ambitions of the said leadership, an early attack was probably likely without some sort of agreement.


During that period the Soviet Union could have re-armed and re-organised without sending raw supplies to Germany, hell the last trains to cross the border did so only hours before Barbarossa.

Even assuming that Nazi Germany had no intention of attacking the Soviet Union before France had fallen - which is, as I said, questionable - how should the Soviet leadership have known? Based on the over ideology of the Nazi state, on troop movements and rearmament, an invasion of the Soviet Union seemed likely.

Not to mention repeated incursions into Soviet territory by Japan, a German ally by that point.

[kashkin]

Why not? The German general staff might have had some sense, but given how much the political leadership overruled them, and given the grandiose ambitions of the said leadership, an early attack was probably likely without some sort of agreement.

Considering how little import Hitler gave to the M-R Pact, beyond extracting more resources from the USSR, the amount of credit extended to Germany is amazing, not having the agreement probably wouldn't have changed much.




Even assuming that Nazi Germany had no intention of attacking the Soviet Union before France had fallen - which is, as I said, questionable - how should the Soviet leadership have known? Based on the over ideology of the Nazi state, on troop movements and rearmament, an invasion of the Soviet Union seemed likely.

The same way they knew they were going to attack in real life. Stalin had received detailed reports of the timetable for Barbarossa from multiple sources, not least Richard Sorge. Patrols and border guards were reporting heavy movement on the border weeks in advance and German aircraft had penetrated Soviet airspace on multiple occasions.


Not to mention repeated incursions into Soviet territory by Japan, a German ally by that point.

Repeated incursions? The last incursion of significance was in 1939 where the Japanese were soundly thrashed by Zhukov. To think that Japan would have tried to invade again is crazy, there were getting stuck in China, the Army had lost face and the Navy was gaining influence and they signed a non-aggression pact with the USSR barely weeks before Barbarossa. The Japanese did not invade even when the Soviet Union was at its weakest point, there is no evidence that they would have done so without the M-R Pact existing.

[Invader Zim]

Hah. So pre-WW2 politics are not relevant to politics, only bourgeois history?

Of course they are. However, it is my contention that you don’t know or care about “what actually happened” (to quote von Ranke), but instead construct, or buy into, myth narratives designed to support your politics. This, of course, is fundamentally anti-Marxian, a political paradigm that operates on scientific principles, and employs historical evidence as data-points. Corrupting the data invalidates the study.


The guard dogs of imperialism on this site constantly hound about Soviet oil supposedly being the whole backbone of the German war effort without realising that Soviet oil imports were actually quite minimal.

Guard dogs for imperialism? Says the guy championing Soviet imperialism in the late 1930s. Regardless, you’re wrong. As I noted earlier, Soviet oil was key to German military campaigning during the first half of the Second World War. Hitler and his inner circle were well aware of Germany’s limited resource supply, including but by no means limited to oil, and quite rightly feared the prospect of blockade and embargo.[1] It had been precisely this which had led to German defeat in WW1. There were three means of alleviating this inherent logistical problem:

1. Develop methods of generating synthetic oil. The German’s were actually highly successful in this enterprise, and had, by 1939, the means to generate a quarter of Germany’s oil from synthetic methods. By 1944 this had increased to three quarters. However, at the time of the invasion of France and even the invasion of the Soviet Union, these methods were not even close to bringing Germany into a position of self-sufficiency, let alone capable of waging a long term war.[2]

2. To annex oil-rich regions. To this purpose they annexed Romania. However, even with this supplement, Germany was still not oil self-sufficient. [2]

3. Trading with foreign powers. Until 1939, Germany conducted trade with numerous foreign nations, primarily the United States. However, the promise of embargo by the Royal Navy meant that Germany could only trade with foreign nations friendly to her, and largely via land routes. Primarily this meant Italy, Scandinavian countries, and, if it could be negotiated, the Soviet Union. The Molotov Ribbentrop Pact ensured that the Nazi regime would be able to circumvent the blockade. Between 1939 and 1941 the Soviet Union shipped many hundreds of millions of tons of vital supplies to Nazi Germany. These included 10% of all Germany’s oil, but also massive quantities of manganese ore, iron ore, rubber, timber and grain. Overy describes this 10% as ‘small quantities’, which in relative terms it is, but given the importance of that oil and other supplies shown by other historians, and the fact that 10% is actually a large amount, it is clear that it certainly is relative.[2]

It has been conclusively shown that the Nazi Regime would, without Soviet supplies, have exhausted its oil and grain reserves within weeks of launching Barbarossa, that it would have already exhausted its manganese months before. These are vital supplies in which it was not possible to wage war without. Oil was necessary to power German military vehicles, manganese was key component in aircraft production, munitions and incendiaries, and grain was a staple in the German food supply.
The result was that, between 1939 and 1941 the Soviet Union was Germany’s singles largest trade partner, comprising at different times 50-70% of all German imports.[3] This leads us to the question: were these supplies were vital to the German war effort? The answer is indisputably that it was. Statistical data shows that, as of June 1941, without Soviet imports, the German’s would have operated at a deficit of 4,900 tons of rubber and 256,100 tons of grain. By October, these figures had increased to 6,700 tons and 867,100 tons respectively. However, this also included 7,000 tons of oil products and nearly 20,000 tons of manganese. And German imports of crude oil amounted to 150,000 tons per month by July 1941.[4] Within the first year of the agreement the German’s had received 900,000 tons of crude oil.[5] This excludes the amount of oil delivered after that date.

Other additional supplies included 100,000 tons of cotton, 500,000 tons of phosphates, 500,000 tons of wheat, and many hundreds of thousands of tons of other vital resources. The total cost of the 1940 agreement, excluding the £150,000,000 agreement of the previous year, came to 640,000,000 Reichsmarks. [5]
The German’s knew full well the impact that these agreements would have on their ability to circumvent the British blockade. The man who actually drew up the agreement, Dr. Karl Schnurre, an economic expert from the German Foreign Office, actually wrote that ‘The Agreement means a wide-open door to the East for us […] The effects of the British blockade will be decisively weakened.”[5].

So I think we can conclusively state, without fear of exaggeration, that the Nazi-Soviet trade agreements played a vital role in the German economy, that they facilitated the economic build-up necessary to actually invade the Soviet Union, and that they rendered the British blockade of Germany, a strategy which had been a war winner in 1918, ineffective – which is exactly what I told you earlier.


Nope.
Well, that is what you said:

“Alternatively: the Nazis annex the whole of Poland themselves and other vital territories that were resource-rich as they had already been doing. An Operation Barbarossa is launched against a relatively weak USSR that possibly was successful on account of the anti-Bolshevik, pro-Nazi appeasement politics of the western powers.”

You are clearly suggesting that the Soviet Annexation of half of Poland was necessary for Soviet security.


Would you have preferred the Soviet war effort to have been sabotaged by counterrevolutionaries and foreign agents within the Red Army? Who am I kidding, you probably would.

Wait, so you actually believe that there was a genuine threat, in the form of a Fifth Column, that had infiltrated the Red Army to the tune of 70% of all officers? You do realise that the Firth Column was imaginary, right?


Perhaps it is you who needs to know something before parading your counter-factual history that there "would have been no Barbarossa".

I think anybody who reads this thread can see which of us needs to hit the books.


Boo hoo.

I guess that this is your own dishonest admission that you realise that your “point” was stupid.


You've already completely humiliated yourself not only by your imperialist apologism but because, as you argue below, the Sitzkrieg was supposedly a "successful strategy". I mean, no one has to read Sun Tzu before realising that this is the exact opposite of a successful strategy.

So, cutting away the dishonesty, the irrelevances, the bullshit, and references to military philosophers who absolutely define outmoded given that he died 2,500 years ago and whom you certainly have not read (perhaps you should try something a little more contemporary, like Liddell-Hart or Fuller, whom you also most certainly have not read), it is clear that you have no alternative strategy that the Western Allies should have pursued. I didn’t think so. I also note that you dishonestly claim that I suggested that the defensive strategy, designed to embroil Germany into a long term war in which she was economically ill-equipped to wage, was a success. I did no such thing, I suggested that it would have been successful had the Soviet’s not provided the German’s with a lifeline. The fact was that the strategy was sound. It was an unmistakable fact that the French and British were able to out produce Germany in the long term, which meant that the policy with the best hope of successful outcome was to engage Germany in a war of attrition. It was also a fact that British and French intelligence analyses suggested that Germany was far more powerful than was actually the case. [6] The chiefs-of-staff developed the strategy on the basis that they thought an offensive war against Germany would be lost, and were the primary champions of appeasement on the basis that they believed that Germany was far more powerful than they were. [7].


Even if the Soviet had continued supplying Germany with the same minimal amount of oil there would have been a deficit and perhaps your "successful strategy" of bumming around by the Maginot line would have come to fruition.

There was no deficit precisely because of the vast quantities of Soviet resources sent to Nazi Germany. And it was not ‘my strategy’ it was the one formulated by the leading military strategists of the day, based on the material realities of the situation as it was perceived at the time. Indeed, ‘Blitzkrieg’, which actually was built on the Fuller 1919 Plan, was designed based on the same assessment – that Germany lacked the resources to commit to a war of attrition. That is why they developed doctrine and strategy built on mobile armour and air power. But these require oil and manganese respectively – neither of which the German’s had in abundance. Of course, plenty of historians, looking back at the Battle of France, have emphasised that the British and French should have done far better, and instead pin the blame squarely on inept leadership and organisation, and good luck on the part of the Germans. To quote one of the leading military historians of France during this period:

“The military defeat is now considered by historians to result from poor force dispositions by the French (and British), and from German strategic boldness, operational dash and a good measure of sheer luck. In many ways the French and Allies should have been able to fight the German offensive that opened on 10 May 1940 (code-named ‘Plan Yellow’) to a standstill. German generals, and Hitler, were worried this might happen, and reproduce the stalemate of the Western Front in the First World War, preventing Hitler turning east to engage the real enemy of Nazi ideology, the USSR and Bolshevik Communism.” [1]

[1] M. Alexander, ‘The Fall of France’, in M. Evans and E. Godin (eds.) France 1815-2003, supplementary interviews (2004).
[2] R. Overy, Why the Allies Won (1996), p. 230.
[3] E. Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 1933-1941 (1999), pp. 208-209.
[4] Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle, p. 202-205.
[5] W. L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (1991), p. 668.
[6] W.K. Wark, The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939 (2010).
[7]Paul Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (1976), p. 290.

[Invader Zim]

In fact, I said that the imperialist powers tried to form "a glacis against Bolshevism". Given the amazingly consistent and well-thought-out Nazi ideology, and the eminently sane German leadership, as well as the economic interests of German industry, the invasion of Soviet Union seems to have been fairly inevitable. The imperialist powers did their best to strengthen Nazi Germany and to weaken the Soviet Union.

It might surprise you to note that British intelligence and military officials placed Germany at the top of their most dangerous list in 1934, describing Nazi Germany as Britain's 'ultimate enemy'.



The situation in Spain demonstrates that, for all their rhetoric, the imperialist states were more than willing to assist the fascists in order to fight real or imagined "communism". Your claim that they simply "failed to support the legitimate government" is false; instituting a blockade and only letting fascist arms through means actively supporting the fascists.That isn't how I described it at all:

"And there was nothing 'covert' about it, British and French Policy towards Republican Spain was overtly passive-aggressive, and it was widely reported upon at the time. However, failing to support a a legitimate government in Spain, and perusing a policy which favored Franco,"

I have highlighted the parts you avoided while cherry picking my sentence to represent my comment as something it never was.

But again, you are engaging in your strawman, you have still yet to provide a single scrap of evidence that Britain and France wished to push Germany into a war with the Soviet Union. I'm waiting.


The Locarno treaties demonstrate the continuing imperialist policy of supporting reactionary states against the Soviet Union. In 1925, these states were social-fascist Germany, proto-fascist Poland and so on. In 1938, those states were Nazi Germany and so on.You're describing 1925 Wiemar Germany as 'social-fascist'? Sorry, but no.

And, what do you see Locarno as being about the Soviet Union? The Soviet Union was not on Germany's eastern border in 1925. You are clutching at straws.


And without an agreement and temporary peace, what would have happened?In all likelihood? Nothing, or swift German defeat. The Nazis were well aware that they would have to deal with the West before they turned east, an they also required vast quantities of resources they did not have at that time: both required a friendly Soviet Union.


Germany could have pushed the unprepared Red Army further east and seized key oilfields and so on.They barely had enough oil and resources in 1941 to mount Barbarossa, why do you imagine that they would have been able to wage the same war in 1939, while simultaneously requiring massive armies on two fronts? I don't think you've thought this through, or even looked at a map of Europe while considering this question. You should try it, it will be instructive.


I am by no means an expert on military strategyI got that, when you tried to suggest that the Soviet Union would have fared worse fighting a Nazi Germany without adequate fuel, munitions and supplies, while also stationing a major army on its western flank.


The token nature of Allied involvement in the war was widely commented upon at the time. I have already outlined the Allied strategy in this thread, and why they pursued it, I'm not going to do so again. However, like I said - you are unable to proffer an alternative strategy.

So, let us conclude. You have no evidence what-so-ever, to support your contention that the western powers actively pursued a policy to push Germany into a war with the Soviet Union. Indeed, it is clear that you have no read idea what their policy actually was or the position in which they found themselves. You think that Locarno, of 1925, was about German fascism. You think that passive-aggressive anti-communism regarding Spain = a desire for a major war in Eastern Europe. And you can't think of an alternative strategy the Allies should have pursued during the Bore War.

I'm not sure that this discussion is going anywhere, I'm not going to be able to convince you of anything while you labour under such manifestly wrong-headed misapprehensions.

[conmharáin]

Wouldn't a construction like "overtly passive-aggressive" be something of an oxymoron?

I don't find it unreasonable at all to say that the global capitalists had an interest in building a wall of fascism against the Soviet Union. But I'm convinced that Soviet supplies made Barbarossa and, indeed, much of Germany's aggression possible. What would the political purpose of allowing Nazi access to Soviet oil have been? I'm certain it's not because the Soviet government had any vested interest in supporting fascism. Perhaps this question was answered earlier in the thread, but, comrades, I'm having trouble making myself sit here and wade through the cattiness of some of these posts. Fuckin' behave yourselves, would you?

[Invader Zim]

Wouldn't a construction like "overtly passive-aggressive" be something of an oxymoron?

Yes and no. On the one hand, the British and French formed their anti-Republican stance via a hostile application of non-intervention policies. So, on the face of it they held the pretense of neutrality, but in reality, and as was abundantly clear at the time, that policy was designed to aid Franco.




I don't find it unreasonable at all to say that the global capitalists had an interest in building a wall of fascism against the Soviet Union.But as noted, when push came to shove in 1939, the western powers drew a final line in the sand and declared war on Germany when she crossed it. It is worth noting that they did not do so when it came to the Soviet Union when she invaded Poland or Finland - though certain parties, most notably Winston Churchill, did call for it. The fact is that the Chamberlain government had, while being anti-Communist, come to fear Germany, Italy and Imperial Japan far more than they feared the Soviet Union. This was a break in a policy which had endured since the First World War right through until the mid-1930, in which the precise opposite was true. This was because Germany, and to a lesser extent Italy and Japan, had become a far greater threat to their interests and security.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, continued to appease Hitler on the proviso that they share the spoils from the carcass of Poland and engage in friendly relations and trade. In doing so the Soviet Union paved the way for the Nazi invasion of their own territories in 1941 and laid ruin to Western strategic planning for the war which broke out over Western guarantees to Poland.

Wesley Wark, an eminent historian of this topic, wrote in a lengthy historiographical article words which I think rather nicely sum up the holes in the conspiracy theory rampant within this thread, and which were voiced a few years ago in a 'madcap' (to use Wark's description) book by Clement Leibovitz:

"Leibovitz is concerned to establish the fact (usually it appears as The Fact) that Chamberlain made a deal with Hitler to give him 'a free hand to pursue his aggressive ambitions in Eastern Europe'. This notion is a wee bit difficult to square with the policies of a government that issued unprecedented guarantees to Poland, Romania,
Greece, and Turkey in the spring and summer of 1939, but no matter. And it does seem a matter of fact that it was Stalin, not Chamberlain, who made a deal with Hitler, but again no matter."

Wark, 'Appeasement Revisited', The International History Review, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Aug., 1995), p. 560.


What would the political purpose of allowing Nazi access to Soviet oil have been?That is a very good question. There are several answers, firstly the Soviet Union wished for territorial expansion in Europe, and the Nazis conceded them a free hand in exchange for the same being provided to them and the resources they desperately required for their own militant expansionism. Secondly, the Soviet Union also made Germany pay rather dearly for the resources it provided in terms of financial remuneration and military technology. Aside from money, the German's also paid for these supplies in the form of aircraft, artillery pieces, a naval cruiser, plans for the Bismark, weapons technology, and Armour, among other things.

At the time, I'm sure it looked like they were getting a good deal. However, what baffles me is why the Soviet's did not conclude that they would be next on Hitler's hit-list. Of course, they, like everybody else, were astounded and dismayed when France fell in just six weeks. But why they continued the policy after that time can only be testament to the Stalinist regime's delusions regarding their own military power and German intentions in the East.


I'm certain it's not because the Soviet government had any vested interest in supporting fascism.And you would be right. It was about self interest, a vulture foreign policy, pitting Germany westward and buying time. I do not think that Stalin, personally, was under any illusion that sooner or later the Red Army would have to fight the Wehrmacht, but he doubtless believed that after a war with France and Britain that would be a far less capable force than it was in 1939. I can see his logic, but undoubtedly the better strategy would have been to tell Hitler, after the Western line in the sand had been drawn regarding Poland, that Germany would have to face the Allies without Soviet resources and with a potentially hostile Soviet Union on his border.


Perhaps this question was answered earlier in the thread, but, comrades, I'm having trouble making myself sit here and wade through the cattiness of some of these posts. Fuckin' behave yourselves, would you?I'll admit that discussion in this thread has hardly been civil, but civility goes out the door when I read comments like this:

"and the future Invader Zim is not only an apologist of imperialism but also of Nazism."

And I see no reason to be civil to an individual who supports a regime which would have had a considerable portion of this board shot.

[conmharáin]

Yes and no. On the one hand, the British and French formed their anti-Republican stance via a hostile application of non-intervention policies. So, on the face of it they held the pretense of neutrality, but in reality, and as was abundantly clear at the time, that policy was designed to aid Franco.

You also may have explained this somewhere else in the thread, but that troubles me. What was the political utility of aiding Franco at the time? I guess we really don't think of Spain as "fascist," even though they were ruled by one right up until the Seventies, right? You'll have to forgive me; I came into this world only shortly before the Soviet Union dissolved.


But as noted, when push came to shove in 1939, the western powers drew a final line in the sand and declared war on Germany when she crossed it. It is worth noting that they did not do so when it came to the Soviet Union when she invaded Poland or Finland - though certain parties, most notably Winston Churchill, did call for it. The fact is that the Chamberlain government had, while being anti-Communist, come to fear Germany, Italy and Imperial Japan far more than they feared the Soviet Union. This was a break in a policy which had endured since the First World War right through until the mid-1930, in which the precise opposite was true. This was because Germany, and to a lesser extent Italy and Japan, had become a far greater threat to their interests and security.

It's interesting that they did, although I'd be less willing to believe that they were arbitrarily hostile to, say, British nationhood. I mean that in that the ideology of fascism plays lip-service to national sovereignty, but only for those races deemed "worthy" of it. The Italians, Spaniards, and Germans had all been classified as "Aryan" by the top expert racists; perhaps had Britain been more sympathetic to fascist conquest, they'd have been "Aryan" too? If I'm straying off topic, don't bother to respond to this part.


Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, continued to appease Hitler on the proviso that they share the spoils from the carcass of Poland and engage in friendly relations and trade. In doing so the Soviet Union paved the way for the Nazi invasion of their own territories in 1941 and laid ruin to Western strategic planning for the war which broke out over Western guarantees to Poland.

Holy shit!


That is a very good question [regarding the Soviet Union's political purpose for providing Nazi Germany with supplies conducive to military conquest]. There are several answers, firstly the Soviet Union wished for territorial expansion in Europe, and the Nazis conceded them a free hand in exchange for the same being provided to them and the resources they desperately required for their own militant expansionism. Secondly, the Soviet Union also made Germany pay rather dearly for the resources it provided in terms of financial remuneration and military technology. Aside from money, the German's also paid for these supplies in the form of aircraft, artillery pieces, a naval cruiser, plans for the Bismark, weapons technology, and Armour, among other things.

Would this mean that, in a similar vein to how the Union supplied Germany with the means of invading it in '41, that Germany supplied the Union with the means of pushing back that invasion? I'm not trying to say that anything "cancelled out," or something; I'm just trying to get a clearer picture.



At the time, I'm sure it looked like they were getting a good deal. However, what baffles me is why the Soviet's did not conclude that they would be next on Hitler's hit-list. Of course, they, like everybody else, were astounded and dismayed when France fell in just six weeks. But why they continued the policy after that time can only be testament to the Stalinist regime's delusions regarding their own military power and German intentions in the East.

Maybe we're committing the historian's fallacy here? I mean, they say hindsight is 20/20. I can't really imagine how things looked to people as they developed, even though Hitler made no secret about his mad ambitions. It may be like how we treat neo-Nazis and Teabaggers here in the States: "Oh, like they're gonna try to pull anything." I guess we're not building a big war machine for them, though.


And you would be right. It was about self interest, a vulture foreign policy, pitting Germany westward and buying time. I do not think that Stalin, personally, was under any illusion that sooner or later the Red Army would have to fight the Wehrmacht, but he doubtless believed that after a war with France and Britain that would be a far less capable force than it was in 1939. I can see his logic, but undoubtedly the better strategy would have been to tell Hitler, after the Western line in the sand had been drawn regarding Poland, that Germany would have to face the Allies without Soviet resources and with a potentially hostile Soviet Union on his border.

I can't really speak to what world leaders ought to have known several decades ago, but what I'm having trouble with is why he didn't go for the better strategy. What would've caused such delusions about Soviet military power and Hitler's ambitions aside from people just being generally shitty and stupid?


I'll admit that discussion in this thread has hardly been civil, but civility goes out the door when I read comments like this:


"and the future Invader Zim is not only an apologist of imperialism but also of Nazism."

And I see no reason to be civil to an individual who supports a regime which would have had a considerable portion of this board shot.

I don't mind people being shot, but I think he was trying to suggest that you, in an alternate timeline, are some kind of neo-fascist. I could totally buy that. I could also buy that I'm some kind of flower child in an alternate timeline. Really, the appropriate response would've been explaining multiverse theory to the fellow.

[Luís Henrique]

And what precisely would you have had them do? I want to see just how little you know about this subject.

What would be the chances of the Wehrmacht militarily defend the Ruhr while at the same time overwhelming Poland through Blietskrieg?

Luís Henrique

[Invader Zim]

What was the political utility of aiding Franco at the time? I guess we really don't think of Spain as "fascist," even though they were ruled by one right up until the Seventies, right? You'll have to forgive me; I came into this world only shortly before the Soviet Union dissolved.

Basically, the same reason that they Faught a war in Korea and Vietnam afterWW2 - containment. They, and France in particular which was undergoing a period of particular internal strife, feared that if another communist power was to emerge in Europe, then communism in Europe would be that much stronger. Moreover, they viewed communism as something not entirely dissimilar, to use an analogy, to a pathogen. If you don't nip it in the bud then it will spread further, potentially even to your own country.


It's interesting that they did, although I'd be less willing to believe that they were arbitrarily hostile to, say, British nationhood. I mean that in that the ideology of fascism plays lip-service to national sovereignty, but only for those races deemed "worthy" of it. The Italians, Spaniards, and Germans had all been classified as "Aryan" by the top expert racists; perhaps had Britain been more sympathetic to fascist conquest, they'd have been "Aryan" too?

Well, the Nazis did believe that the British were 'Aryan', and Hitler entertained the delusion right until 1940 that Britain would eventually 'come round' and side with Germany. Of course, the reason that Britain didn't, was because it was contrary to British interests to allow Germany to become the major dominant power in Europe - and it was certainly contrary to France's interests. British and French interests were dependent upon the status-quo being maintained - and Nazi hegemony across Europe posed a very serious threat to that.


Holy shit!

Well, as I noted earlier, Soviet oil, foods, timber, magnesium, rubber, etc., all powered the German military machine which would so devastating attack the Soviet Union in 1941. We know that, without Soviet supplies, that Germany would have had a major unplugged deficit in these key resources had it not been for Soviet trade. As regards territory, see the map I posted earlier.


that Germany supplied the Union with the means of pushing back that invasion? I'm not trying to say that anything "cancelled out," or something; I'm just trying to get a clearer picture.

Partially, however the German's provided only limited numbers of these armaments - for instance it provided only 30 aircraft. And we are talking about a period in which the nations in question were already producing thousands of aircraft each year. The biggest advantage that the Soviets gained, from these arms, was in terms of noting methods in which they could improve their own weapons and observe the weaknesses of German arms. In the final analysis, the greatest gift to the Soviet union was probably the Cruiser, but given that the Great Patriotic War was not really fought at sea....


Maybe we're committing the historian's fallacy here? I mean, they say hindsight is 20/20.

Yes, you're right about that. It is very easy to sit back in our armchairs and postulate how Stalin, Chamberlain, etc. should have behaved regarding the Nazi regime. Indeed, I've made that same criticism of others plenty of times. But I think that, on balance, given what the Stalinist regime knew, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and the subsequent trade agreements, were foolhardy and shortsighted. Similarly, while I can see the merits of appeasement based on what the British knew, or at least believed at the time, you have to question why they so blindly believed it when we now know that Germany was, in fact, very weak in terms of actual resources.


What would've caused such delusions about Soviet military power and Hitler's ambitions aside from people just being generally shitty and stupid?

That's the million dollar question. I guess it in part lay in the fact that Stalinist upper-echelons were largely comprised of 'yes' men. This results in circular thinking and presents an unrealistic assessment of the situation. Of course, the British and French leaders also did it, in regards to appeasement until 1939 as well. Like I said, I'm sure it seemed at the time to be a good deal. We now know it wasn't, but like you I find it astounding that they didn't see the serious potentially, and as would actually occur, devastating ramifications. It wasn't a good policy. Though, perhaps one can argue that it allowed the Red Army time to prepare, but I don't buy the argument. It seems to me that had Stalin sided with the Western powers, rather than the Nazis, then the Nazi regime would have found itself in an impossible position - fighting a two-front war without the resources to adequately fight on one front.But, of course, the counter argument would be that nobody, Stalin included, expected the French and British to be defeated in six weeks.

[conmharáin]

That's the terrifying thing about fascism. It challenges aspects of the status quo while reinforcing other aspects of it (mostly in the sense that it presents a challenge to politics but not to capitalism in general), and it seems to behave rather unpredictably. In any case, this has been a very enlightening thread. Again, in many ways I do lean "Stalinist," but, as I said in another thread, there's no two ways about it: the Union did some fucked up shit in its day.

[Invader Zim]

What would be the chances of the Wehrmacht militarily defend the Ruhr while at the same time overwhelming Poland through Blietskrieg?

Luís Henrique

Slim. But that option wasn't open open for a variety of reasons. These include the fact that the Western Allies had not prepared to fight an offensive war, because their strategy was built on a defensive strategy (see my previous posts). Secondly, there did not exist the political, popular or military will to deviate from the existing strategy. And thirdly, because of the former two points, there was not the material means to launch an invasion. You cannot launch an invasion without adequately equipped modern army. And the French were not adequately equipped for offensive warfare and the British, who were, didn't have an army worthy of serious mention. So the answer is psychological and material, the latter stemming from the former. Fourthly, the British and French vastly overestimated Germany's military power. This created the illusion of substantially greater risk than actually existed. In short, in the game of international poker the West failed to call the Nazi bluff, while the Nazis until 1939 had successively called the west's bluff. However, regarding Poland, for the first time, Hitler was wrong about Allied resolve - at least to a degree. While they weren't willing to invade Germany, for the reasons outlined above, they were willing to actually go to war to defend the status-quo. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, took advantage of them for it - but as noted, that was a catastrophic error.

But your right. We, with the benefit of hindsight, know that they should have prepared for an offensive war in 1937 as opposed to an defensive one. But hey didn't have the benefit of hindsight. of course, it would have been even better to have invaded Germany in 1938, but, again, they lacked the requisites for an offensive war.

[Anglo-Saxon Philistine]

It might surprise you to note that British intelligence and military officials placed Germany at the top of their most dangerous list in 1934, describing Nazi Germany as Britain's 'ultimate enemy'.

And? Military and intelligence officials do not decide state policy in any of the bourgeois imperialist states. Senior parliamentarians and ministerial officials in both Britain and France considered fascist states a "bulwark against Bolshevism", as Churchill put it.


But again, you are engaging in your strawman, you have still yet to provide a single scrap of evidence that Britain and France wished to push Germany into a war with the Soviet Union. I'm waiting.

As if the continuing policy of intervention against Bolshevism, with many senior state officials in Britain, the USA and France being associated with the Entente intervention, statements about fascist states being "bulwarks against Bolshevism", treaties that explicitly allowed eastward German expansion, dismemberment of the Stressa front, appeasement, and so on, are not evidence.


You're describing 1925 Wiemar Germany as 'social-fascist'? Sorry, but no.

Sorry, but yes. The reactionary bourgeois Weimar government turned to the peasantry, the urban petite bourgeoisie and to the declassed in order to initiate a covert civil war against the labour movement. This is the Marxist definition of fascism (and not bourgeois nonsense about "totalitarianism").


And, what do you see Locarno as being about the Soviet Union? The Soviet Union was not on Germany's eastern border in 1925. You are clutching at straws.

Yes, I am quite sure the imperialist powers did not have the Soviet Union in mind when they wrote that clause; perhaps they had in mind bourgeois proto-fascist Poland, practically an imperialist puppet by that stage. Or perhaps reactionary bourgeois Lithuania, the puppet of the puppet Poland.


In all likelihood? Nothing, or swift German defeat. The Nazis were well aware that they would have to deal with the West before they turned east, an they also required vast quantities of resources they did not have at that time: both required a friendly Soviet Union.

They barely had enough oil and resources in 1941 to mount Barbarossa, why do you imagine that they would have been able to wage the same war in 1939, while simultaneously requiring massive armies on two fronts? I don't think you've thought this through, or even looked at a map of Europe while considering this question. You should try it, it will be instructive.

Thank you, comrade eminent historian, I was not familiar with maps or Europe before your kind instruction. I would congratulate you, but that might require you to dislodge your head from your esteemed posterior in order to respond to my plebeian self.

I have looked at the map; I am also somewhat familiar with the history of the Second World War. The German general staff, whose expertise in military matters probably ranks somewhat above mine, intended to invade the Soviet Union before the actual date on which operation Barbarossa began. And in fact, the Red Army was severely disorganised after the case of the "Trotskyist military organisation".


I have already outlined the Allied strategy in this thread, and why they pursued it, I'm not going to do so again. However, like I said - you are unable to proffer an alternative strategy.

This is ridiculous; I am not obliged to provide an alternative military strategy. I have no intention to play Stavka. Nor do I need to, in order to acknowledge the widely commented on passivity of the imperial states.


The same way they knew they were going to attack in real life. Stalin had received detailed reports of the timetable for Barbarossa from multiple sources, not least Richard Sorge. Patrols and border guards were reporting heavy movement on the border weeks in advance and German aircraft had penetrated Soviet airspace on multiple occasions.

That is how the Soviet leadership could have known that an invasion was imminent; what I would like to know is how on Earth they could have justifiably concluded that Germany would not have invaded until after the fall of France. The presence or absence of military planning is hard to detect, particularly in a state of turmoil that prevailed after the Yezhovshchina and so on; and given the overtly racist and expansionist character of official German doctrine, erring on the side of caution was justifiable.


Repeated incursions? The last incursion of significance was in 1939 where the Japanese were soundly thrashed by Zhukov. To think that Japan would have tried to invade again is crazy, there were getting stuck in China, the Army had lost face and the Navy was gaining influence and they signed a non-aggression pact with the USSR barely weeks before Barbarossa. The Japanese did not invade even when the Soviet Union was at its weakest point, there is no evidence that they would have done so without the M-R Pact existing.

It still demonstrates the hostility of the fascist block to the Soviet Union.

[Luís Henrique]

Slim. But that option wasn't open open for a variety of reasons. These include the fact that the Western Allies had not prepared to fight an offensive war, because their strategy was built on a defensive strategy (see my previous posts). Secondly, there did not exist the political, popular or military will to deviate from the existing strategy. And thirdly, because of the former two points, there was not the material means to launch an invasion. You cannot launch an invasion without adequately equipped modern army. And the French were not adequately equipped for offensive warfare and the British, who were, didn't have an army worthy of serious mention. So the answer is psychological and material, the latter stemming from the former. Fourthly, the British and French vastly overestimated Germany's military power. This created the illusion of substantially greater risk than actually existed. In short, in the game of international poker the West failed to call the Nazi bluff, while the Nazis until 1939 had successively called the west's bluff. However, regarding Poland, for the first time, Hitler was wrong about Allied resolve - at least to a degree. While they weren't willing to invade Germany, for the reasons outlined above, they were willing to actually go to war to defend the status-quo. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, took advantage of them for it - but as noted, that was a catastrophic error.

But your right. We, with the benefit of hindsight, know that they should have prepared for an offensive war in 1937 as opposed to an defensive one. But hey didn't have the benefit of hindsight. of course, it would have been even better to have invaded Germany in 1938, but, again, they lacked the requisites for an offensive war.

Well, you are right that Chamberlain or Daladier didn't have the benefit of hindsight. Neither had Stalin, though.

The political history of Europe in the 30's is a long list of political, ideological, and military mistakes, that lead Hitler to power, and Nazi Germany to significant geopolitic and military victories, until its enemies finally found the resolve to put an end to the madness (with a big help of Nazis and their allies, and their disastrous - for themselves - political and military decisions) and give Hitler a two-front war. "Social-fascism" third periodism, appeasement - from the remilitarisation of the Ruhr to Munich and the drôle de guerre - and the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact are all comical episodes within the big tragedy.

Evidently Stalin wasn't more prescient than Chamberlain, but neither was Chamberlain more prescient than Stalin. The only difference is that there are still people who think the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact should be defended as an intelligent diplomatic maneuver, while no one still argues in favour of Munich. But I think we can object against Stalin's zig-zag diplomacy without rehabilitating Franco-British appeasement.

Luís Henrique

[Invader Zim]

Military and intelligence officials do not decide state policy in any of the bourgeois imperialist states.

Are you attempting to suggest that policy makers exist in a vacuum without input or influence from expert opinion? If so, you are sorely mistaken. Appeasement, particularly in the 1930s was based on appallingly misleading military assessments. Such as the following assessment by the British chiefs-of-staff in 1937:

“we cannot foresee the time when our defense forces will be strong enough to safeguard our trade, territory and vital interests against Germany, Italy and Japan at the same time … We cannot exaggerate the importance from the point of view of Imperial Defense of any political or international action which could be taken to reduce the number of our potential enemies and to gain the support of potential allies.”

Paul Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London, 1976), p. 290.


Senior parliamentarians and ministerial officials in both Britain and France considered fascist states a "bulwark against Bolshevism", as Churchill put it.

This is nonsense on so many levels. Firstly, you cite Winston Churchill's views in the 1920s regarding the role of Weimar Germany - not Fascist Nazi Germany. Secondly, Churchill famously changed his view on the matter in the 1930s and was one of the most ardent supporters of forming a bloc against Nazi Germany with none other than the Soviet Union. Thirdly, Churchill spent most of the 1930s as a backbench MP, who was neither a 'Senior parliamentarian or ministerial official'. Fourthly, official position was that Germany would act as a deterrent against Soviet expansionism, very few actually suggested that the two should go to war and nor did they have the power to orchestrate such a conflict even if wanted it. Fifthly, and I'm going to repeat this again, Britain and France went to war with Germany when they felt she had overstepped the limit eastward. Finally, in 1920, Churchill called for a "moral bulwark" against the Soviet Union, which is entirely different to what you are suggesting, and did not involve a fascist state. And what he also wrote, to Lloyd George, during the same period was:

"we must trust for better or worse to peaceful influences to bring about the end of this [The Soviet Union] awful tyranny and peril."

See Martin Gilbert, Churchill: A Life (1991), pp. 420-421.


As if the continuing policy of intervention against Bolshevism,

The irony is that minus the sarcasm, you are actually correct, having a broad anti-communist policy does not for a moment entail that there was a serious desire within government or an actual government policy to orchestrate a war between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. If you wish to argue that there was such a policy, show it to me. Provide the cabinet minutes which make this plain. Show me Hansard entry in which this is debated. Provide me the quote from Chamberlain's copious letters and correspondence. He would know, he was the Chancellor of the Exchequer and later Prime Minister for almost the entire 1930s - you know a 'Senior parliamentarian' and senior minister. However, you won't find the documentary evidence - it does not exist because it was never policy.


treaties that explicitly allowed eastward German expansion

Which was about Danzig and the Polish Corridor - nothing, as you concede later in your post, what-so-ever to do with the Soviet Union.


Stressa front

Really? You want to explain how that proves that the west was involved in orchestrating a war between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union? This should be amusing.


appeasement,

Wait, so appeasement, as a long term policy, was actually about creating a war rather than preventing or delaying one? I can see that we need to re-write the entire history of the inter-war period.


are not evidence.

Certainly not of what you are claiming.


This is the Marxist definition of fascism

No, it is not. And 'Social fascism' is a spurious term coined by the Stalinist regime to justify the repression of socialists and social democrats. It is amusing the see a self proclaimed Trotskyist regurgitate Stalinist nonsense. But it is as worthless now as it was then. Trotsky quite rightly rubbished the notion, and provided his perhaps most prophetic comment:

“Should fascism come to power, it will ride over your skulls and spines like a terrific tank. Your salvation lies in merciless struggle. And only a fighting unity with the Social Democratic workers can bring victory.”

http://www.socialistviewpoint.org/july_04/july_04_04.html

http://www.solidarity.net.au/30/trotsky-fascism-and-the-united-front/


Thank you, comrade eminent historian, I was not familiar with maps or Europe before your kind instruction. I would congratulate you, but that might require you to dislodge your head from your esteemed posterior in order to respond to my plebeian self.

Well, given that you seem to think that Germany was capable of fighting a two-front war against three major powers in 1939-40, with the two fronts thousands of kilometers apart, when it only just about had the resources to fight a single-front war, it does indeed appear that you need to consult a map of Europe. I don't say that to be condescending, but rather to illustrate the material point you refuse to accept.


I am also somewhat familiar with the history of the Second World War.

Given that you think that Germany, which ran at a deficit of key military material resources, and was utterly reliant upon trade with the Soviet Union, could have fought its chief supplier and the Western powers simultaneously in a two front war across fronts thousands of kilometers apart, and hundreds of miles in length, then I'm more than willing to go out on a limb and suggest that you are not as familiar with the facts as you believe.


The German general staff, whose expertise in military matters probably ranks somewhat above mine, intended to invade the Soviet Union before the actual date on which operation Barbarossa began.

Certainly, a few weeks, perhaps even couple of months earlier, not a year let alone two years earlier.


And in fact, the Red Army was severely disorganised after the case of the "Trotskyist military organisation".

It was also disorganised in 1941, and suffered massive losses throughout the war - during Barbarossa in particular. However, this is about material resources. Had the Nazi regime been forced to place massive reserves of forces and supplies in the east, do you imagine for even a second that the British and French would have been defeated in as little as six weeks? It doesn't require a massive leap of imagination to suggest that the answer would have been a resounding no. Indeed, that is why the Nazis formed the Pact in the first place -precisely so they would not have to worry about their eastern flank when they turned west after carving up Poland. It isn't rocket science, you know.


This is ridiculous; I am not obliged to provide an alternative military strategy.

You said that they were wrong for adopting the strategy that they did throughout the 'bore war', and I'm asking you to tell me what they should or even could have done during the 'Bore War'. The fact is that your charge, that they adopted the strategy they did because of anti-communism and the forlorn hope that the Nazis would invade the Soviet Union, if there was a viable, indeed militarily preferable, alternative strategy that they forsook. Without that alternative you have no argument. So, unless you are conceding the point, I want to know what you would have had them do.

But, anyway, I can see that refuse to admit that you can't justify your position because you don't have actually have a viable alternative. I also doubt that you fully appreciate the state of the British and French military position in 1939 and 1940. The simple fact is that the French and British lacked the military resources to launch an offensive war, primarily because they began rearming far later than Germany. But you don't have to take my word for it:

“The most common cry […] Why can’t we have some plan which would take him [Hitler] by surprise?
The answer to these questions is simple enough, […] It is Because [sic] we are not yet strong enough. […] We have plenty of manpower but it is neither trained nor equipped. We are short of many weapons of offence and defense. Above all we are short of airpower.”

Chamberlain, ‘Neville Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 4 May 1940’ in Robert Self (ed.), The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters: Volume 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934-1940 (Aldershot, 2005), p. 526.

[Invader Zim]

Well, you are right that Chamberlain or Daladier didn't have the benefit of hindsight. Neither had Stalin, though.

The political history of Europe in the 30's is a long list of political, ideological, and military mistakes, that lead Hitler to power, and Nazi Germany to significant geopolitic and military victories, until its enemies finally found the resolve to put an end to the madness (with a big help of Nazis and their allies, and their disastrous - for themselves - political and military decisions) and give Hitler a two-front war. "Social-fascism" third periodism, appeasement - from the remilitarisation of the Ruhr to Munich and the drôle de guerre - and the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact are all comical episodes within the big tragedy.

Evidently Stalin wasn't more prescient than Chamberlain, but neither was Chamberlain more prescient than Stalin. The only difference is that there are still people who think the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact should be defended as an intelligent diplomatic maneuver, while no one still argues in favour of Munich. But I think we can object against Stalin's zig-zag diplomacy without rehabilitating Franco-British appeasement.

Luís Henrique

Well, I think that is true by degrees. Appeasement was, without question, with what we now know about the German economy and the Nazis intentions, a policy which failed in its main aim and that British and French priorities should have been different. However, I don't see any way of justifying the conclusion that appeasement was as a short sighted policy as Moscow's active collaboration with Berlin in 1939 when the Allies were on the cusp of going to war. Appeasement, based on the information available was one of very few policies to hand. I cannot see a way of saying the same thing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The Soviet's effectively armed the man they knew was going to stab them in the back sooner or later, and fucked over the only two powers capable and, by 1939, willing to fight on a second front.