Can we dismiss Berekely?

[Pedro Alonso Lopez]

What do you all think of Berekely?

He puts a good case for immaterialism dont you think?

For example if we take Locke's Representative Realism as false as it leads to scepticism and atheism then we conclude that Locke is not consistent in his empricism. He posits the existence of an unpercievable and hence unkowable 'material substratum'.

But if we are consistent in our empricism we are lead to the conclusion that what exists are minds and their contents, or subjects and their experiences, essentially all we can know are ideas. Thus immaterialism Berekely style.

Ideas dont adhere in material objects but can only exist in our minds they do not represent independently existing physical qualities actaully present in an object.

Berkeley argues that every physical object is a collection of sensible qualities and every sensible quality is an idea. So, physical objects are just collections of sensible ideas. No idea can exist unpercieved. Therefore no physical objects can exist unpercieved.

Thus matter has no independant existence.

Any thoughts, refutations, affects for sciectific Marxists if we cant refute immaterialism or does it matter. Just a case of interpeting the world and not changing it.

[Wenty]

From what i know what you say about Berkeley is right, he would say though that matter can exist independently though. Although nothing can exist without being perceived God perceives everything. This would allow things to exist when you don't look at them. Otherwise we would have a jolty existence where things only exist when we perceive them.

Without a belief in God his mind-dependence of reality can't work, sort of a get out of jail free card really. I know little about Locke's representative realism so i can't comment on that.

[hazard]

as far as immaterialism is concerned, this fringe lunacy of philsophy as it rejects material cannot ever be useful for communism

mostly because communism has a reality basis for material, especially in regards to its distribution

the radical immaterialists, sucha s berkeley as you have interpreted, and other madmen like Ayer, and to a lesser degree, Russell, really only result in strange persepctives that matter does not or cannot be proven to exist outside of individual perception. there is only an abstract application of these thoughts that can ever be useful towards communism. such as forcing people into such a fucked up mindset, which is a difficult process in itself, and then "reprogramming" the into accepting socialist ideas.

the average person cannot simple accept that the cup that sits in front of them need not necessarilly exist outside of their own percepetion. mostly because they have no reason to accept such a notion.

communism should really look t pre-renaissance catholic philosophers for any useful anti-material doctrine. especially that of Accam, the franciscan monk who is the basis for this sort of philosophy. taht, in conjunction with the franciscan pious rejection of property, is itself alos key to the institution of socialism, whether the modern communist wants to think so or not.

[Wenty]

isn't it occam?

surely we're just talking philosophy here, we don't always have to apply it to communism.

[Trissy]

Admitedly I don't know a lot of Berkeley's philosophy but from my limited understanding of it, it seems to me that it raises an interesting point in the argument about the problem of evil and God.


Although nothing can exist without being perceived God perceives everything
If everything exists because God perceives it then what about natural evils such as earthquakes, famines, volcanoes and the such like? A popular argument put forward by theists is that these could be explained by the actions of invisible demons/devils and that as such they are not the work of God, but if they exist because of God's perception of them then why doesn't he chose to not perceive them (if he is an omnipotent and all loving being)? This seems to be an odd point raised by Berkeley's philosophy especially considering he was religious himself...

[Wenty]

perhaps this would be reason to doubt his philosophy then.

[Helmholtz]

re: Trissy's post

My knowledge of Berkeley only comes from reading Sophie's World, so I am not as well-versed in his philosophy as many of you probably are, but I think Berkeley would argue that evil does not result from the actions of devils. Berkeley, being Catholic (if I remember correctly), would probably go along with the Catholic philosophy about suffering: that suffering has value (i.e. Jesus' suffering and death were what redeemed mankind). The idea is that God allows "evil" to happen not because He is only partially-loving (as opposed to all-loving), but because He sees value in the suffering that results. This belief in the value of suffering is not masochistic; it follows logically from the belief that the crucifixion was the source of mankind's redemption. This is why Catholic mothers often say, "Offer it up," when their children are thirsty or bored (my mom always used to do that).

So basically, Berkeley does not contradict himself if evil is seen as something that God allows to happen.

[Trissy]

From my understanding of the value of suffering argument, suffering only had value in connection with moral evils that we're commited due to humans having freewill and abusing it (such as a thief experiencing guilt if he saw the consequences of his actions). If this is the case then I still fail to see how natural evils can be accounted for because they cause seemingly indiscriminate suffering. If we take the example of the recent Iranian earthquake, has a small child really commited a sin worthy of being killed in its sleep? Has someone really been so wicked as to deserved losing 50 members of their family?

I know my views are biased being a born again ateist but I struggle to account for both needless suffering and the existence of an omni-benevolent God.

[Helmholtz]

The value in suffering is not only the guilt that results - think back to 9/11. Our "sins" against the people of the middle east are debatable, but surely no one in the building, or related to someone who died, did anything that would deserve that. But somehow it affected us positively. My father was in New York a month or so afterwards, and when someone braked to let his taxi merge, he said to the taxi driver, "Wow, I thought this was New York." The taxi driver said, "This is 9/11." That story aside, September 11 seems to be a good example of the value of suffering outside of guilt.

But the attacks of September 11 were done by people. So how can we explain natural disasters? The argument goes that God created natural laws - like gravity, wind, and shifting of tectonic plates. These facts of life for the most part operate well and for good - we don't fly off the earth, we have nice, cool winds, we have volcanoes, etc. But there are times when the operation of these mechanisms leads to disasters like earthquakes. It's due to no one's sins, but Catholics believe God allows it to happen because, first, He sees value in the positive results, and also because they happen according to the rules He laid down.

That's my understanding of it. As I said, I haven't looked much into Berkeley's philosophy, but I think this is how he would argue.

[Trissy]

Interesting, very interesting indeed. In answer to the initial post on this topic I now feel that I can dismiss Berkeley or at least dismiss him until I know more about his works. After all he is often presented as one of the classic British empiricist philosophers and yet when you begin to follow his intial ideas through then you soon find yourself delving into the regions of rationalism.

As for the whole natural disaster point then whether a God means for them to happen or whether he does not, I still think it holds a problem for theism because if a limited human being can picture a world without such dangers then it seems odd that a supposedly omni-benevolent and omnipotent being cannot create it in such a way. The only plausible explanation I can think of is the old 'The lord works in myseterious ways' cop out argument that I often hear.

It's sad that it takes something the scale of 9/11 to bring such things about. People like Marx and Hegel would say that it was merely a necessary step in History as it winds towards its necessary goal which seems a tad horrific if one thinks about the consequences of that notion...

[Wenty]

my only response to your post is about the marx and hegel comment. I don't think Marx would have seen 9/11 as a necessary step in history. It has nothing to do with dialectical (or historical) materialism, which is marx's take on hegelian philosophy.

[Trissy]

Well I admit my knowledge of both is quite basic but my thoughts were along the lines of the Hegelian dialectic is moving towards an end which is the total knowledge of everything, and so every step is a necessary step and a step forwards since we cannot in theory unlearn things. Marx's dialectic on the other hand may be different but it still has an end and that is the creation of a communist world which is the necessary end of the dialectic. If this is the case then every step is also a necessary step as we must be moving forwards towards a goal. It could be argued (and this isn't my own view I'd like to point out) that Capitalism had led to an unequal distribution of material and consequencially power between the bourgeois and the proletariat. It could then be argued that the actions of 9/11 were the attempt of a small section of less powerful and wealthy bourgeois to lead their fellow proletariat to rise up against their opressors. Of course the aims of the terrorists on that day wouldn't be the end (since that would be a world organised in the Communist vission), but it could still be argued that this was a necessary step forward in bringing about the collapse of capitalism.

But we're getting off topic again I fear...

[honest intellectual]

With regard to the theory of epistemological dualism, I think it's basically neither true nor untrue, but it's just an unnecessary abstraction of reality. There is no reason to seperate the concept of the sensible, spiritual presence of an object from its physical form. Sure, you could say they both exist and you wouldn't be exactly in the wrong, but the epistemological view of reality is indistinguishable from the 'convential' view.

If you see the colour purple, you may as well just call it purple, rather than dividing it into red and blue. It's not wrong to say it's red and blue, but why not just call it purple?
If you see an object, why not just call it the object as it is, rather than splitting it into seperate spiritual and physical presences?

[Wenty]

for berkeley though, we need to seperate them becasue thats what he believes! The fact that you see an object doesn't mean it exists, that is the whole crux of his argument, more or less.

but hey, maybe your right since you're the intellectual around here.

[Trissy]

Well I was going from the what appears to me to be his starting point, esse est percipi, to be is to be perceived. If we take this as his starting point then his argument makes a leap of logic when it starts talking about God since we cannot perceive God directly through the senses (just like Descartes Cartesian doubt seems a bit rich when he later calls upon the use of a God to guarantee that what he clearly thinks is true). If he starts by declaring the importance of the senses then it seem odd for him to have to resort to the power of reason so soon...

I never claimed to be right or to be an intelectual. I fully realise how little I know and how fallible I am as a human, I merely express my views because I have a passion for swinging a hammer to test these idols man has built in the twilight <_<

[Wenty]

i wasn&#39;t talking to you tristan.

when does he have to resort to the power of reason anyway?

[Trissy]

Okay, then I apologise for replying Adam, I only did so because I thought you were addressing me.

Berkeley has to resort to the power of reason after he has stated &#39;esse est percipi&#39; because if something only exists so long as I perceive it then as soon as I stop perceiving it it ceases to exist. If this were the case then when I closed my eyes then this computer screen would stop existing, and then start existing again as soon as I opened my eyes once more. He then introduces God to account for why this doesn&#39;t happen and why objects exist independant of our perception. He has to resort to the power of reason because human beings cannot perceive God directly (if he does exist) and so hence he wouldn&#39;t exist if we used his initial arguement. So therefore his argument is not strictly empiricist because it has to assert certain a priori ideas.