Tim Cornelis
9th February 2013, 01:23
Forgive me if it's a bit chaotic, I don't feel like reading it again.
Kurds & Socialism in the Syrian Revolution
Introduction
The KCK-(Union of Kurdish Communities, a supposed grassroots, anticapitalist network spearheaded by the PKK)-affiliated PYD has been at the forefront of the political upheaval against Assad's regime in West-Kurdistan. The PYD was founded in 2003 and is often referred to as the PKK due to their close relations. Its military wing, the YPG was founded in 2004 after a revolt against the Syrian regime in the Kurdish city of Qamishlo which was crushed by brute force. Although “they did not officially declare themselves until the revolution started in 2011, and only made themselves known to the media in 2012, when they revealed their camps and brigades.” (source: http://www.vice.com/read/meet-the-ypg )
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What are we to make of their involvement and what have they achieved so far?
The Aim of the PYD
For years the Syrian people, along the Kurds, have living under the yoke of the oppressive Al-Assad regime. The Syrian revolution was a compulsive response of the Syrian people that were massacred by the Syrian Arab Army commanded by Al-Assad. The Syrian revolution caused the collapse of formal state structures when Syrian government forces withdrew from much of the Kurdish areas—what is referred to by Kurds as West-Kurdistan (located in the North-East of Syria)—which allowed the Kurdish socialists of the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat), the PYD (“the largest and most powerful Kurdish organization in Syria, , affiliated with the PKK”, source: http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2013/01/18/261137.html) to construe an alternative proto-workers' state of popular control and direct participation by the Kurdish workers in the running of collective affairs. Both the PKK and PYD are constituent members of the KCK. It is not, contrary to popular belief, the aim of the PYD to establish a nation-state coinciding with the borders of Kurdistan. In their official documents the PYD says
“The reality we live in today and all the historical facts clearly point to the failure of the centralised nation-state project … This is because the nation-state project represents a colonialist, chauvinist and nationalist project … we have reached the conclusion that the nation-state system … is bankrupt.” (The Project of the Democratic Self-Governance in Western Kurdistan p. 3-7).
Although some (Kurdish rivals of the PYD as well as Marxist-Leninists) insist that the PYD supports Assad, at least moderately, this is not the case. Syrian flags have been widely removed and replaced by the PYD-flag all throughout West-Kurdistan. The PYD is part of the anti-Assad 'National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change'.
The proto-workers' state is known as the 'TEV DEM' which is derived from (Tevgera Civaka Demokratik, and is described as a republican system, or “democratic republic”. This contradicts the notion of the KCK which claims (wrongly) that it is a 'non-state' system. TEV DEM and the PYD controls at least up to 400 villages and towns (source: http://www.jpost.com/Features/InThespotlight/Article.aspx?id=291764 ):
the Democratic Union Party, known by its Kurdish-language acronym P.Y.D., seized control of many towns and villages in the Kurdish majority northeast. The group also holds territory in a few Aleppo neighborhoods and some towns around the city
Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/07/world/middleeast/syrias-kurds-try-to-balance-security-and-alliances.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
Politically, the PYD advocates that this democratic republic or state be minimalistic: “The principle of the democratic solution is not aimed at sharing authority, in principle, but rather staying away from power because authority is inconsistent with democracy.” (p. 9, The Project of the Democratic Self-Governance in Western Kurdistan) The democratic republic is to be build through “public participation” (p. 9 The Project of the Democratic Self-Governance in Western Kurdistan) which implies participatory democracy.
The leader of the PYD, Saleeh Muslim Muhammed, confirms this interpretation in an interview in which he says:
Democratic self-governing is the project, which we adopted in our third conference in 2007 and considered most suitable solution to the Kurdish issue in western Kurdistan and Syria. This project differs from the Autonomy. It is based on the organization of the people in the civil institutions which are interdependent with each other in a collective self-administration with the unit that may be a city or several contiguous villages or a particular region or province. These regional units practice actual democracy in the implementation of its resolutions and decisions from the bottom to the top, so that people are the decision-maker of everything, while reducing the role of the central authority completely, and it remains the central role of the state.
The objective of the project is to create a free society to think and make decision freely and make this society capable to manage themselves. In addition to that the time has exceeded the nation-state, and nation-state is the central alien to the Middle East primarily, and not commensurate with the nature and heritage of the Middle East.
(soure: Interview with Mr Saleh Muslim Mohamed the leader of Democratic Union Party PYD, http://www.pydrojava.net/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=79:interview-with-mr-saleh-muslim-mohamed-the-leader-of-democratic-union-party-pyd&catid=34:news&Itemid=53 )
His criticism of the nation-state and advocacy of democratic self-administration reiterates Abdullah Öcalan's advocacy of democratic confederalism as you can read here: http://www.freedom-for-ocalan.com/english/download/Ocalan-Democratic-Confederalism.pdf
Socially, the PYD advocates “social unity” which includes non-sectarianism and anti-nationalism (p. 8 The Project of the Democratic Self-Governance in Western Kurdistan)
Militarily, the PYD advocates self-protection and defence. (p.12-13 The Project of the Democratic Self-Governance in Western Kurdistan)
The aims of PKK and KCK (and thus PYD) are always twofold, it should be stressed, on the one hand they declare commitment towards (liberal) democracy and demand autonomy, and on the other they display a more 'hidden' radical politics of antistatism (though this is mostly nominally), grassroots democracy, and anticapitalism.
http://www.jpost.com/HttpHandlers/ShowImage.ashx?ID=207329
The above describes the political attitude in the here and now in the context of the Syrian Civil War. The PYD's constitution, articulated well before the civil war, identifies the following goals:
The aims and objectives of the party:
· Resolving the Kurdish question in Syria on the basis of democratisation and right to
self-determination.
· Officially recognise the national existence of the Kurds in Syrian constitution
· Granting to return the Syrian nationality certificate to all people who have been deprived
of one since 1962 census and to give back the agricultural land to the original owners
· Guaranteeing the freedom of political parties, the freedom of expression and press.
· Release of all political prisoners and compensate to whom may have been suffering.
· Enable the Kurdish children to learn Kurdish language in schools.
· Organising the community in West Kurdistan on the basis of a democratic confederation
· Strengthen the brotherhood among peoples and ethnic groups in a framework of free
union
· Support the democratic liberation struggle in all parts of Kurdistan
· Solve the issue of national unity on the principle of democratic confederation, without
prejudicing the political border
· Forming an ecological, democratic and liberal society and to work towards the Middle
Eastern democratic confederation.
Source: The Constitution and Programme of the Democratic Union Party (PYD)
Note again the twofold in aims. On the one hand a list of liberal aims (even avowedly using that word) and on the other the advocacy of democratic confederalism as theorised by Abdullah Öcalan which advocates communal sharing instead of profits and the market economy, grassroots democracy instead of parliamentarianism, and self-governing communes instead of a state structure. Although they may use “liberal” not in the context we have in Western society, but simply as the political expression of liberty, freedom, in general.
For more on the KCK's advocacy of democratic confederalism, see: http://www.freemedialibrary.com/index.php/Declaration_of_Democratic_Confederalism_in_Kurdist an or Öcalan's 'Democratic Confederalism' brochure, linked to above.
The PYD-control of society
According to this source:
The Kurdish territory in Syria has relative peace. Since Assad's troops holed up in their buildings, or left the area all together, a whole new democratic system has come out into the open. Police, courts, women activist groups, political parties, elections. This Social Democratic Movement is called TEV DEM and is based on the philosophy of jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocelan.
TEV DEM organises a weekly demonstration against Assad's regime. Since the revolution started they see more participants every week
The Women's House takes in women that are threatened with violence. They also educate women in first aid, kurdish language, women's history. The poster in the background shows Kurdish female martyrs who fought and died for the Kurdish homeland.
The lady on the left divorced 4 years ago. She is alone with her children. In Assad's court she has no rights. The Women's House helps her get aid from her ex-husband by talking to his family and putting pressure on the court.
…
They have car's, radiosystems, weapons. A complete police system is in place. At the moment they are unpaid volunteers, working 12 hour shifts.
Source: http://www.ruigphotography.com/following/ruigphotography.com/TEV-DEM-Syrian-Kurdistan-PYD
The police system mentioned is known as the Public Security.
The activities of the PYD have been summed up as follows:
In a remarkably short time, the PYD has succeeded in setting up a well-armed military of about 10,00 fighters, known as the Popular Protection Units (or Yekineyen Parastina Gel, or YPG), as well as local, self-organized civilian structures under the label of the “Movement for a Democratic Society” (Tevgera Civaka Demokratik, or TEV-DEM).
Source: http://turkishcentralnews.com/2013/02/06/syrias-kurds-pkks-strategy-toward-syria-pyd-pkk-and-others/
The direct participation takes place in so-called “mala gels” or “people's houses” that also function as dispute-mediation courts. They consist of a number of deputies, reportedly elected by popular vote.
Though prices have risen, Derik's cafes are still full and people linger in the streets with little fear. Kurdish flags now fly from shops and houses, Kurdish police forces known as Asayish patrol the streets and community organizations known as People's Houses, “mala gels” in Kurdish, have been set up to solve disputes and act as de facto government institutions.
Source: http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/10/29/14756648-after-decades-of-oppression-kurds-get-taste-of-freedom-as-assads-troops-flee?lite
In areas under their control, Kurdish groups began setting up the institutions of self-governance. A mala gel or “people’s house” was set up in each town and city to handle small disputes and act as a gathering place for citizens. A new volunteer police force called the Asayish was set up along with Kurdish-language schools, which were illegal under Assad control.
Source: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2012/al-monitor/syria-kurds-derek-protest.html#ixzz2KMN0SIQA
It is unclear whether this direct participation in the running of affairs extends to the economic realm and the workplace. If there had been implementations of workers' self-management or collectivisations of land or workplaces, especially on a substantial scale, this would have surely been mentioned by any news source as it is quite noteworthy. As such I doubt this has taken place, and we can only guess why. Perhaps it's because the PYD has no intent in socialising the economy, despite their adored leader Öcalan advocating so, or because this would add to the chaos of civil war making social collapse even more probable.
The armed wing of the PYD, the YPG, is ostensibly well organised.
The YPG is outgunned and outnumbered by the Assad regime and the FSA, but whereas the FSA is an umbrella organization for a variety of groups that lacks a strong central command, the YPG is a unified fighting force. Additionally, as the Iraqis, Iranians, and Turks can testify, guerilla fighting seems to be an innate quality in the Kurds.
Source: http://www.vice.com/read/meet-the-ypg
Reportedly, in elections and people's houses 40% is female, 40% is male, and 20% is neutrally elected. The People's Houses usually consist of over half PYD-members, under half other party-members (numbering around ten to thirty deputies).* The People's Houses are described by a pro-PYD source as:
the home of people(mala gel) had a qualitative leap in the community of western Kurdistan and turned into an attracting people centers as a part of the democratic system of self-management, which form an alternative system instead of countries system which known in the Middle East. The home of people in the western Kurdistan services for Kurdish people and the rest of the components in the region along with political and cultural activities and charity work and solve problems of the people..
It noticed noteworthy that many of the issues and problems being sent to the stations asayish (police station) in the city of Qamishlo and then be transferred to the People’s Court in the city in order to be considered and judged.
Source: http://rojhelat.info/en/?p=4305
*
At Derik's newly opened Mala Gel, or People's House, set up to arbitrates in local disputes, 20 of the 30 council members belong to the PYD, according to one council member. The party also runs the new local police station and town checkpoints, which are manned by armed civilian volunteers.
Source: http://www.pukpb.org/en/news/147/115/The-War-for-Free-Kurdistan
It also briefly mentions “people's committees” and “people's councils” but does not specify what they are.
Indoors People's House:
http://sphotos-d.ak.fbcdn.net/hphotos-ak-ash3/550897_431587703525670_1330810635_n.jpg
Picture reportedly depicting outdoors assembly attending the opening of People's House:
http://sphotos-f.ak.fbcdn.net/hphotos-ak-ash3/548439_431589530192154_2102459797_n.jpg
(source: facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ALAR.TV?sk=photos )
Relations with Other Groups
Kurds frequently assert that the only ally the Kurds have is the mountains. In relation to predominantly Arab groups this is certainly true. The PYD, although it is not entirely dismissive of the Free Syrian Army (source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/07/world/middleeast/syrias-kurds-try-to-balance-security-and-alliances.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 ) refuses to cooperate with them, as it does with the Syrian Arab Army. It has clashed with both in several occasions. It does not attack FSA unless it is being attacked. PYD-leader Saleeh Muslim Muhammed said “The Free Syrian Army, locally we have some relations with them, but this FSA is not one body. There are many bodies and they have many heads… There are no clashes between us, and we respect each other.” (source: http://www.vice.com/read/meet-the-ypg )
Later, however, the FSA attacked a civilian demonstration of Kurds when entering the Kurdish-controlled neighbourhoods of the Syrian city of Aleppo. The YPG repelled the attack. Such skirmishes occur more often. The PYD has alleged that the Turkish government has instructed these armed groups, as well as Islamists such as those of the Al-Nusra Front, to intrude into Kurdish territory. Relations with the FSA have thus degenerated.
The YPG has said to have altercations with rival Kurdish armed groups as well. For an extended period of time it was the only sizeable armed Kurdish group.
Some claim that the PYD has forged an alliance with Bashar Al-Assad's troops, but this does not seem to be the case as they have clashed frequently, particularly in Aleppo. Where recently the YPG is said to have captured “strategic positions” in neighbourhoods of Aleppo and disposed the Syrian Arab flag and replaced it with the PYD-flag, as can be seen in this video: http://www.firatnews.com/gallery/halep-te-kurtler-stratejik-noktalari-ele-gecirdi
The Kurds, for the most part, have tried to prevent the catastrophic violence of the civil war from entering their region. In Kurdish cities in the northeast, demonstrations against the regime have been ongoing, and Assad forces pulled back with minimal conflict a few months ago, leaving the Kurds with some sense of independence. Some have accused the Kurds of making a deal with the regime, but it appears that both groups are simply acting practically. Assad does not wish to open up a new front, and the Kurds simply want to protect their cities and their people. Though some media outlets have reported that there is an official truce between some Kurds and the regime, there is no evidence of this being true.
Source: http://www.vice.com/read/meet-the-ypg
Aldar Xalil, co-leader of TEV DEM movement, co-leader of the PYD, member of the Higher Kurdish Council.
“The Free Syrian Army is out of control. What started as a peaceful Syrian revolution changed to a radical islamic war, with Al-Nusra extremist being instructed by Turkey to attack Kurds. The FSA gets support from the world community and from Turkey. They are islamic radicals, who's revolution will result in a war between Sunni, Shi'a and Kurds. As TEV DEM we take the third line. We try to provide Kurdistan with peace. We do not want the FSA on our territory, nor Assad's forces. We hope Assad's forces will leave peacefully. If not, we will fight them, and the FSA if necessary.”
source: http://www.ruigphotography.com/TEV-DEM-Syrian-Kurdistan-PYD
The YPG is not free of criticism, of course:
Not all Kurds in Syria support the PYD and the YPG though. Activists and opposition parties have accused the PYD of kidnapping rivals, assassinations, and general intimidation of opponents, using the YPG as an enforcement arm.
Source: http://www.vice.com/read/meet-the-ypg )
The PYD and YPG do not receive external support, and declined aid from the Kurdish Autonomous Government in Iraq.
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/j/MSNBC/Components/Photo/_new/121029-syria-kurds-demo.photoblog600.jpg
Prospects for Socialism
Some speculate that the proto-workers' state may propel a more radical direction to the forefront of PKK's and KCK's politics.
These developments [in the Syrian Civil War] appear to have added new dynamics to the long-standing struggle for leadership within the PKK, between its acting leader Murat Karayilan and Bahoz Erdal/Fahman Hussein (often referred to as “Dr. Bahoz”), the former commander of the People's Defence Force (Hêzên Parastina Gel, HPG) [the armed wing of the PKK] from 2004 until he was sacked by Karayilan in 2009. Erdal, a younger leader who supports military action, appears to have made a comeback in 2011, as events in Syria improved the margin for such an approach. Time and age are clearly on the side of Erdal (provided he continues to successfully avoid being captured or killed), and so is his Syrian background—and control of a quasi-state is bound to boost the weight of the Syrian element in the overall PKK structure. Thus, it can be expected that the Syrian crisis will accelerate the generational change within the PKK toward a younger, more radical leadership.
Socialism, however, is unlikely to be the result of the Syrian revolution—even if there were movements towards workers' self-management and socialisations. There is a nihil chance of an international revolution to liberate Kurdistan from the tentacles of capital. Even leaving this out of the equation, the Syrian Civil War is going to end in either a victory by the secularist and moderate Islamist dominated FSA and ultra-reactionary Islamist groups on the one hand, or the Syrian Arab Army and the Al-Assad regime on the other. Either way, it does not seem it will end well for the Kurds and their self-governed territory. Both camps will seek to enforce their political hegemony in every inch of Syrian territory, and thus once either camp has been defeated they will direct the full brunt of their armed power towards massacring the YPG and other Kurdish armed groups (that at this point will form a strategic alliance that, optimistically estimated will garner 35,000 armed Kurds against 100,000 FSA or Syrian Arab Army personnel).
Conclusion
The Kurdish territories controlled by the PYD and YPG enjoy the greatest amount of freedom since what seems like forever. Women's rights have surged, and there are public platforms for direct participation by the population in running their communities, although no doubt their directly democratic character is curtailed and not fully developed and matured. The PYD, despite its excesses, can uncontroversially be declared the most progressive collective actor in the Syrian Civil War, and I am personally tempted to critically support them on the one hand, though recognise they don't seem intent on challenging capital or, for that matter, whether they are even capable of challenging it even assuming they want to, on the other.
Cohesive, Factional Report by Carnegie Middle East Center
http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=48526
The Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) is a Syrian affiliate of the militant Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). It is one of the most important Kurdish opposition parties in Syria as well as a charter member of the National Coordination Body for Democratic Change and the People’s Council of Western Kurdistan.
The PYD calls for the constitutional recognition of Kurdish rights and “democratic autonomy,” rejecting classical models such as federalism and self-administration. While condemning authoritarian rule in Damascus, the PYD is responsible for disrupting Kurdish efforts to form a united opposition front.
Major Figures
Saleh Muslim Mohammed: chairman
Asiyah Abdullah: co-chairman
Background
Founded in 2003 as an offshoot of the PKK, the PYD suffered years of violent repression at the hands of the Syrian regime, following the signing of the Adana agreement with Turkey (1998) and the expulsion from Syria of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. Following the start of the uprising in Syria, the PYD joined the Kurdish Patriotic Movement in May 2011, but declined to join the bulk of Kurdish opposition parties that formed the Kurdish National Council in October 2011. Since July 2011, it has played a limited role as a founding member of the National Coordination Body for Democratic Change and has joined the PKK opposition body known as the People’s Council of Western Kurdistan, which was founded on December 16, 2011.
While critical of the regime, the PYD has adopted an ambiguous stance toward the revolution. It stands alienated and hostile to the large majority of the organized opposition; it accuses the Syrian National Council of acting as Turkey’s henchman, while also disapproving of the Kurdish National Council due to long-standing tensions between Massoud Barzani, head of the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq and an eminent supporter of the Kurdish National Council, and Abdullah Ocalan. Furthermore, following its violent attacks against Kurdish demonstrators in Erbil and Aleppo and its alleged role in the assassination of Mashaal Tammo (leader of the Kurdish Future Movement), the PYD has been accused of tacitly cooperating with the Syrian regime and acting as its shabiha (thugs) against Kurdish protesters.
However, as the Assad regime gradually weakens, the PYD has been increasingly willing to negotiate with its Kurdish opponents. On June 11, 2012, the People’s Council of Western Kurdistan signed a cooperation agreement with the Kurdish National Council, forming a joint Kurdish Supreme Council. A supplementary agreement initialed on July 1 committed both sides to establishing security committees and unarmed civilian defense forces to protect Kurdish areas. Despite these agreements, the Kurdish National Council has accused the PYD of attacking Kurdish demonstrators, kidnapping members of other Kurdish opposition parties, and setting up armed checkpoints along the border with Turkey.
Chemical engineer Saleh Muslim Mohammed became chairman of the party in 2010. He was originally based in Iraq to avoid political persecution, but returned to Syria in order to take direct part in unfolding events. His leadership was reconfirmed at the extraordinary fifth party congress of the PYD, held on June 16, 2012, at which the party’s Central Committee was expanded and dual leadership was introduced. Asiyah Abdullah was elected co-chairman of the party.
Platform
Policy Toward the Crisis
Rejects external military intervention
Rejects arming the opposition
Supports dialogue with the regime
Supports the Annan peace plan
Political Objectives
A pluralist democracy
Constitutional recognition of Kurdish rights and “democratic autonomy” for the Kurdish people
Foreign Policy Issues
Open hostility toward Turkey for its imprisonment of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, its denial of Kurdish rights, and its influence over the Syrian National Council
Strained relations with Massoud Barzani’s Kurdish Regional Government for negotiating with Turkey at the expense of the PKK
Kurds & Socialism in the Syrian Revolution
Introduction
The KCK-(Union of Kurdish Communities, a supposed grassroots, anticapitalist network spearheaded by the PKK)-affiliated PYD has been at the forefront of the political upheaval against Assad's regime in West-Kurdistan. The PYD was founded in 2003 and is often referred to as the PKK due to their close relations. Its military wing, the YPG was founded in 2004 after a revolt against the Syrian regime in the Kurdish city of Qamishlo which was crushed by brute force. Although “they did not officially declare themselves until the revolution started in 2011, and only made themselves known to the media in 2012, when they revealed their camps and brigades.” (source: http://www.vice.com/read/meet-the-ypg )
0Gw9QMNFSsc
What are we to make of their involvement and what have they achieved so far?
The Aim of the PYD
For years the Syrian people, along the Kurds, have living under the yoke of the oppressive Al-Assad regime. The Syrian revolution was a compulsive response of the Syrian people that were massacred by the Syrian Arab Army commanded by Al-Assad. The Syrian revolution caused the collapse of formal state structures when Syrian government forces withdrew from much of the Kurdish areas—what is referred to by Kurds as West-Kurdistan (located in the North-East of Syria)—which allowed the Kurdish socialists of the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat), the PYD (“the largest and most powerful Kurdish organization in Syria, , affiliated with the PKK”, source: http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2013/01/18/261137.html) to construe an alternative proto-workers' state of popular control and direct participation by the Kurdish workers in the running of collective affairs. Both the PKK and PYD are constituent members of the KCK. It is not, contrary to popular belief, the aim of the PYD to establish a nation-state coinciding with the borders of Kurdistan. In their official documents the PYD says
“The reality we live in today and all the historical facts clearly point to the failure of the centralised nation-state project … This is because the nation-state project represents a colonialist, chauvinist and nationalist project … we have reached the conclusion that the nation-state system … is bankrupt.” (The Project of the Democratic Self-Governance in Western Kurdistan p. 3-7).
Although some (Kurdish rivals of the PYD as well as Marxist-Leninists) insist that the PYD supports Assad, at least moderately, this is not the case. Syrian flags have been widely removed and replaced by the PYD-flag all throughout West-Kurdistan. The PYD is part of the anti-Assad 'National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change'.
The proto-workers' state is known as the 'TEV DEM' which is derived from (Tevgera Civaka Demokratik, and is described as a republican system, or “democratic republic”. This contradicts the notion of the KCK which claims (wrongly) that it is a 'non-state' system. TEV DEM and the PYD controls at least up to 400 villages and towns (source: http://www.jpost.com/Features/InThespotlight/Article.aspx?id=291764 ):
the Democratic Union Party, known by its Kurdish-language acronym P.Y.D., seized control of many towns and villages in the Kurdish majority northeast. The group also holds territory in a few Aleppo neighborhoods and some towns around the city
Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/07/world/middleeast/syrias-kurds-try-to-balance-security-and-alliances.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
Politically, the PYD advocates that this democratic republic or state be minimalistic: “The principle of the democratic solution is not aimed at sharing authority, in principle, but rather staying away from power because authority is inconsistent with democracy.” (p. 9, The Project of the Democratic Self-Governance in Western Kurdistan) The democratic republic is to be build through “public participation” (p. 9 The Project of the Democratic Self-Governance in Western Kurdistan) which implies participatory democracy.
The leader of the PYD, Saleeh Muslim Muhammed, confirms this interpretation in an interview in which he says:
Democratic self-governing is the project, which we adopted in our third conference in 2007 and considered most suitable solution to the Kurdish issue in western Kurdistan and Syria. This project differs from the Autonomy. It is based on the organization of the people in the civil institutions which are interdependent with each other in a collective self-administration with the unit that may be a city or several contiguous villages or a particular region or province. These regional units practice actual democracy in the implementation of its resolutions and decisions from the bottom to the top, so that people are the decision-maker of everything, while reducing the role of the central authority completely, and it remains the central role of the state.
The objective of the project is to create a free society to think and make decision freely and make this society capable to manage themselves. In addition to that the time has exceeded the nation-state, and nation-state is the central alien to the Middle East primarily, and not commensurate with the nature and heritage of the Middle East.
(soure: Interview with Mr Saleh Muslim Mohamed the leader of Democratic Union Party PYD, http://www.pydrojava.net/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=79:interview-with-mr-saleh-muslim-mohamed-the-leader-of-democratic-union-party-pyd&catid=34:news&Itemid=53 )
His criticism of the nation-state and advocacy of democratic self-administration reiterates Abdullah Öcalan's advocacy of democratic confederalism as you can read here: http://www.freedom-for-ocalan.com/english/download/Ocalan-Democratic-Confederalism.pdf
Socially, the PYD advocates “social unity” which includes non-sectarianism and anti-nationalism (p. 8 The Project of the Democratic Self-Governance in Western Kurdistan)
Militarily, the PYD advocates self-protection and defence. (p.12-13 The Project of the Democratic Self-Governance in Western Kurdistan)
The aims of PKK and KCK (and thus PYD) are always twofold, it should be stressed, on the one hand they declare commitment towards (liberal) democracy and demand autonomy, and on the other they display a more 'hidden' radical politics of antistatism (though this is mostly nominally), grassroots democracy, and anticapitalism.
http://www.jpost.com/HttpHandlers/ShowImage.ashx?ID=207329
The above describes the political attitude in the here and now in the context of the Syrian Civil War. The PYD's constitution, articulated well before the civil war, identifies the following goals:
The aims and objectives of the party:
· Resolving the Kurdish question in Syria on the basis of democratisation and right to
self-determination.
· Officially recognise the national existence of the Kurds in Syrian constitution
· Granting to return the Syrian nationality certificate to all people who have been deprived
of one since 1962 census and to give back the agricultural land to the original owners
· Guaranteeing the freedom of political parties, the freedom of expression and press.
· Release of all political prisoners and compensate to whom may have been suffering.
· Enable the Kurdish children to learn Kurdish language in schools.
· Organising the community in West Kurdistan on the basis of a democratic confederation
· Strengthen the brotherhood among peoples and ethnic groups in a framework of free
union
· Support the democratic liberation struggle in all parts of Kurdistan
· Solve the issue of national unity on the principle of democratic confederation, without
prejudicing the political border
· Forming an ecological, democratic and liberal society and to work towards the Middle
Eastern democratic confederation.
Source: The Constitution and Programme of the Democratic Union Party (PYD)
Note again the twofold in aims. On the one hand a list of liberal aims (even avowedly using that word) and on the other the advocacy of democratic confederalism as theorised by Abdullah Öcalan which advocates communal sharing instead of profits and the market economy, grassroots democracy instead of parliamentarianism, and self-governing communes instead of a state structure. Although they may use “liberal” not in the context we have in Western society, but simply as the political expression of liberty, freedom, in general.
For more on the KCK's advocacy of democratic confederalism, see: http://www.freemedialibrary.com/index.php/Declaration_of_Democratic_Confederalism_in_Kurdist an or Öcalan's 'Democratic Confederalism' brochure, linked to above.
The PYD-control of society
According to this source:
The Kurdish territory in Syria has relative peace. Since Assad's troops holed up in their buildings, or left the area all together, a whole new democratic system has come out into the open. Police, courts, women activist groups, political parties, elections. This Social Democratic Movement is called TEV DEM and is based on the philosophy of jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocelan.
TEV DEM organises a weekly demonstration against Assad's regime. Since the revolution started they see more participants every week
The Women's House takes in women that are threatened with violence. They also educate women in first aid, kurdish language, women's history. The poster in the background shows Kurdish female martyrs who fought and died for the Kurdish homeland.
The lady on the left divorced 4 years ago. She is alone with her children. In Assad's court she has no rights. The Women's House helps her get aid from her ex-husband by talking to his family and putting pressure on the court.
…
They have car's, radiosystems, weapons. A complete police system is in place. At the moment they are unpaid volunteers, working 12 hour shifts.
Source: http://www.ruigphotography.com/following/ruigphotography.com/TEV-DEM-Syrian-Kurdistan-PYD
The police system mentioned is known as the Public Security.
The activities of the PYD have been summed up as follows:
In a remarkably short time, the PYD has succeeded in setting up a well-armed military of about 10,00 fighters, known as the Popular Protection Units (or Yekineyen Parastina Gel, or YPG), as well as local, self-organized civilian structures under the label of the “Movement for a Democratic Society” (Tevgera Civaka Demokratik, or TEV-DEM).
Source: http://turkishcentralnews.com/2013/02/06/syrias-kurds-pkks-strategy-toward-syria-pyd-pkk-and-others/
The direct participation takes place in so-called “mala gels” or “people's houses” that also function as dispute-mediation courts. They consist of a number of deputies, reportedly elected by popular vote.
Though prices have risen, Derik's cafes are still full and people linger in the streets with little fear. Kurdish flags now fly from shops and houses, Kurdish police forces known as Asayish patrol the streets and community organizations known as People's Houses, “mala gels” in Kurdish, have been set up to solve disputes and act as de facto government institutions.
Source: http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/10/29/14756648-after-decades-of-oppression-kurds-get-taste-of-freedom-as-assads-troops-flee?lite
In areas under their control, Kurdish groups began setting up the institutions of self-governance. A mala gel or “people’s house” was set up in each town and city to handle small disputes and act as a gathering place for citizens. A new volunteer police force called the Asayish was set up along with Kurdish-language schools, which were illegal under Assad control.
Source: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2012/al-monitor/syria-kurds-derek-protest.html#ixzz2KMN0SIQA
It is unclear whether this direct participation in the running of affairs extends to the economic realm and the workplace. If there had been implementations of workers' self-management or collectivisations of land or workplaces, especially on a substantial scale, this would have surely been mentioned by any news source as it is quite noteworthy. As such I doubt this has taken place, and we can only guess why. Perhaps it's because the PYD has no intent in socialising the economy, despite their adored leader Öcalan advocating so, or because this would add to the chaos of civil war making social collapse even more probable.
The armed wing of the PYD, the YPG, is ostensibly well organised.
The YPG is outgunned and outnumbered by the Assad regime and the FSA, but whereas the FSA is an umbrella organization for a variety of groups that lacks a strong central command, the YPG is a unified fighting force. Additionally, as the Iraqis, Iranians, and Turks can testify, guerilla fighting seems to be an innate quality in the Kurds.
Source: http://www.vice.com/read/meet-the-ypg
Reportedly, in elections and people's houses 40% is female, 40% is male, and 20% is neutrally elected. The People's Houses usually consist of over half PYD-members, under half other party-members (numbering around ten to thirty deputies).* The People's Houses are described by a pro-PYD source as:
the home of people(mala gel) had a qualitative leap in the community of western Kurdistan and turned into an attracting people centers as a part of the democratic system of self-management, which form an alternative system instead of countries system which known in the Middle East. The home of people in the western Kurdistan services for Kurdish people and the rest of the components in the region along with political and cultural activities and charity work and solve problems of the people..
It noticed noteworthy that many of the issues and problems being sent to the stations asayish (police station) in the city of Qamishlo and then be transferred to the People’s Court in the city in order to be considered and judged.
Source: http://rojhelat.info/en/?p=4305
*
At Derik's newly opened Mala Gel, or People's House, set up to arbitrates in local disputes, 20 of the 30 council members belong to the PYD, according to one council member. The party also runs the new local police station and town checkpoints, which are manned by armed civilian volunteers.
Source: http://www.pukpb.org/en/news/147/115/The-War-for-Free-Kurdistan
It also briefly mentions “people's committees” and “people's councils” but does not specify what they are.
Indoors People's House:
http://sphotos-d.ak.fbcdn.net/hphotos-ak-ash3/550897_431587703525670_1330810635_n.jpg
Picture reportedly depicting outdoors assembly attending the opening of People's House:
http://sphotos-f.ak.fbcdn.net/hphotos-ak-ash3/548439_431589530192154_2102459797_n.jpg
(source: facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ALAR.TV?sk=photos )
Relations with Other Groups
Kurds frequently assert that the only ally the Kurds have is the mountains. In relation to predominantly Arab groups this is certainly true. The PYD, although it is not entirely dismissive of the Free Syrian Army (source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/07/world/middleeast/syrias-kurds-try-to-balance-security-and-alliances.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 ) refuses to cooperate with them, as it does with the Syrian Arab Army. It has clashed with both in several occasions. It does not attack FSA unless it is being attacked. PYD-leader Saleeh Muslim Muhammed said “The Free Syrian Army, locally we have some relations with them, but this FSA is not one body. There are many bodies and they have many heads… There are no clashes between us, and we respect each other.” (source: http://www.vice.com/read/meet-the-ypg )
Later, however, the FSA attacked a civilian demonstration of Kurds when entering the Kurdish-controlled neighbourhoods of the Syrian city of Aleppo. The YPG repelled the attack. Such skirmishes occur more often. The PYD has alleged that the Turkish government has instructed these armed groups, as well as Islamists such as those of the Al-Nusra Front, to intrude into Kurdish territory. Relations with the FSA have thus degenerated.
The YPG has said to have altercations with rival Kurdish armed groups as well. For an extended period of time it was the only sizeable armed Kurdish group.
Some claim that the PYD has forged an alliance with Bashar Al-Assad's troops, but this does not seem to be the case as they have clashed frequently, particularly in Aleppo. Where recently the YPG is said to have captured “strategic positions” in neighbourhoods of Aleppo and disposed the Syrian Arab flag and replaced it with the PYD-flag, as can be seen in this video: http://www.firatnews.com/gallery/halep-te-kurtler-stratejik-noktalari-ele-gecirdi
The Kurds, for the most part, have tried to prevent the catastrophic violence of the civil war from entering their region. In Kurdish cities in the northeast, demonstrations against the regime have been ongoing, and Assad forces pulled back with minimal conflict a few months ago, leaving the Kurds with some sense of independence. Some have accused the Kurds of making a deal with the regime, but it appears that both groups are simply acting practically. Assad does not wish to open up a new front, and the Kurds simply want to protect their cities and their people. Though some media outlets have reported that there is an official truce between some Kurds and the regime, there is no evidence of this being true.
Source: http://www.vice.com/read/meet-the-ypg
Aldar Xalil, co-leader of TEV DEM movement, co-leader of the PYD, member of the Higher Kurdish Council.
“The Free Syrian Army is out of control. What started as a peaceful Syrian revolution changed to a radical islamic war, with Al-Nusra extremist being instructed by Turkey to attack Kurds. The FSA gets support from the world community and from Turkey. They are islamic radicals, who's revolution will result in a war between Sunni, Shi'a and Kurds. As TEV DEM we take the third line. We try to provide Kurdistan with peace. We do not want the FSA on our territory, nor Assad's forces. We hope Assad's forces will leave peacefully. If not, we will fight them, and the FSA if necessary.”
source: http://www.ruigphotography.com/TEV-DEM-Syrian-Kurdistan-PYD
The YPG is not free of criticism, of course:
Not all Kurds in Syria support the PYD and the YPG though. Activists and opposition parties have accused the PYD of kidnapping rivals, assassinations, and general intimidation of opponents, using the YPG as an enforcement arm.
Source: http://www.vice.com/read/meet-the-ypg )
The PYD and YPG do not receive external support, and declined aid from the Kurdish Autonomous Government in Iraq.
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/j/MSNBC/Components/Photo/_new/121029-syria-kurds-demo.photoblog600.jpg
Prospects for Socialism
Some speculate that the proto-workers' state may propel a more radical direction to the forefront of PKK's and KCK's politics.
These developments [in the Syrian Civil War] appear to have added new dynamics to the long-standing struggle for leadership within the PKK, between its acting leader Murat Karayilan and Bahoz Erdal/Fahman Hussein (often referred to as “Dr. Bahoz”), the former commander of the People's Defence Force (Hêzên Parastina Gel, HPG) [the armed wing of the PKK] from 2004 until he was sacked by Karayilan in 2009. Erdal, a younger leader who supports military action, appears to have made a comeback in 2011, as events in Syria improved the margin for such an approach. Time and age are clearly on the side of Erdal (provided he continues to successfully avoid being captured or killed), and so is his Syrian background—and control of a quasi-state is bound to boost the weight of the Syrian element in the overall PKK structure. Thus, it can be expected that the Syrian crisis will accelerate the generational change within the PKK toward a younger, more radical leadership.
Socialism, however, is unlikely to be the result of the Syrian revolution—even if there were movements towards workers' self-management and socialisations. There is a nihil chance of an international revolution to liberate Kurdistan from the tentacles of capital. Even leaving this out of the equation, the Syrian Civil War is going to end in either a victory by the secularist and moderate Islamist dominated FSA and ultra-reactionary Islamist groups on the one hand, or the Syrian Arab Army and the Al-Assad regime on the other. Either way, it does not seem it will end well for the Kurds and their self-governed territory. Both camps will seek to enforce their political hegemony in every inch of Syrian territory, and thus once either camp has been defeated they will direct the full brunt of their armed power towards massacring the YPG and other Kurdish armed groups (that at this point will form a strategic alliance that, optimistically estimated will garner 35,000 armed Kurds against 100,000 FSA or Syrian Arab Army personnel).
Conclusion
The Kurdish territories controlled by the PYD and YPG enjoy the greatest amount of freedom since what seems like forever. Women's rights have surged, and there are public platforms for direct participation by the population in running their communities, although no doubt their directly democratic character is curtailed and not fully developed and matured. The PYD, despite its excesses, can uncontroversially be declared the most progressive collective actor in the Syrian Civil War, and I am personally tempted to critically support them on the one hand, though recognise they don't seem intent on challenging capital or, for that matter, whether they are even capable of challenging it even assuming they want to, on the other.
Cohesive, Factional Report by Carnegie Middle East Center
http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=48526
The Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) is a Syrian affiliate of the militant Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). It is one of the most important Kurdish opposition parties in Syria as well as a charter member of the National Coordination Body for Democratic Change and the People’s Council of Western Kurdistan.
The PYD calls for the constitutional recognition of Kurdish rights and “democratic autonomy,” rejecting classical models such as federalism and self-administration. While condemning authoritarian rule in Damascus, the PYD is responsible for disrupting Kurdish efforts to form a united opposition front.
Major Figures
Saleh Muslim Mohammed: chairman
Asiyah Abdullah: co-chairman
Background
Founded in 2003 as an offshoot of the PKK, the PYD suffered years of violent repression at the hands of the Syrian regime, following the signing of the Adana agreement with Turkey (1998) and the expulsion from Syria of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. Following the start of the uprising in Syria, the PYD joined the Kurdish Patriotic Movement in May 2011, but declined to join the bulk of Kurdish opposition parties that formed the Kurdish National Council in October 2011. Since July 2011, it has played a limited role as a founding member of the National Coordination Body for Democratic Change and has joined the PKK opposition body known as the People’s Council of Western Kurdistan, which was founded on December 16, 2011.
While critical of the regime, the PYD has adopted an ambiguous stance toward the revolution. It stands alienated and hostile to the large majority of the organized opposition; it accuses the Syrian National Council of acting as Turkey’s henchman, while also disapproving of the Kurdish National Council due to long-standing tensions between Massoud Barzani, head of the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq and an eminent supporter of the Kurdish National Council, and Abdullah Ocalan. Furthermore, following its violent attacks against Kurdish demonstrators in Erbil and Aleppo and its alleged role in the assassination of Mashaal Tammo (leader of the Kurdish Future Movement), the PYD has been accused of tacitly cooperating with the Syrian regime and acting as its shabiha (thugs) against Kurdish protesters.
However, as the Assad regime gradually weakens, the PYD has been increasingly willing to negotiate with its Kurdish opponents. On June 11, 2012, the People’s Council of Western Kurdistan signed a cooperation agreement with the Kurdish National Council, forming a joint Kurdish Supreme Council. A supplementary agreement initialed on July 1 committed both sides to establishing security committees and unarmed civilian defense forces to protect Kurdish areas. Despite these agreements, the Kurdish National Council has accused the PYD of attacking Kurdish demonstrators, kidnapping members of other Kurdish opposition parties, and setting up armed checkpoints along the border with Turkey.
Chemical engineer Saleh Muslim Mohammed became chairman of the party in 2010. He was originally based in Iraq to avoid political persecution, but returned to Syria in order to take direct part in unfolding events. His leadership was reconfirmed at the extraordinary fifth party congress of the PYD, held on June 16, 2012, at which the party’s Central Committee was expanded and dual leadership was introduced. Asiyah Abdullah was elected co-chairman of the party.
Platform
Policy Toward the Crisis
Rejects external military intervention
Rejects arming the opposition
Supports dialogue with the regime
Supports the Annan peace plan
Political Objectives
A pluralist democracy
Constitutional recognition of Kurdish rights and “democratic autonomy” for the Kurdish people
Foreign Policy Issues
Open hostility toward Turkey for its imprisonment of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, its denial of Kurdish rights, and its influence over the Syrian National Council
Strained relations with Massoud Barzani’s Kurdish Regional Government for negotiating with Turkey at the expense of the PKK