Kodzoquo
4th December 2001, 18:59
CHECHNYA
Key developments since May 2000: Use of antipersonnel mines by Russian and Chechen forces has continued. Hundreds of new mine victims have been identified. Since June 2000, in close cooperation with UNICEF, UNHCR’s mine awareness project has reached 15,000 youth and children in Ingushetia and Chechnya. The Chechen Minister of Public Health has said that some 8,000 people are in need of artificial limbs.
Background
In September 1991, Chechnya declared independence from Russia, and adopted the name Chechen Republic “Ichkeria.” On 11 December 1994, the Russian Federation sent troops into Chechnya where mines were used extensively in the fighting by both sides. Although peace agreements were signed in August 1996, relations remained tense and deteriorated to the point of Russia sending troops back into Chechnya in September 1999. Chechen forces evacuated Grozny in February 2000 and the conflict entered a guerrilla war phase. Fighting, replete with massive violations of human rights and laws of war, including widespread use of mines by both sides, continues.
Mine Ban Policy
Chechnya is not an internationally recognized state, and therefore could not sign the Mine Ban Treaty, even if so inclined. While at one point officials had said that the Chechen Republic would be ready to sign the Mine Ban Treaty immediately,[1] with the resumption of the war in 1999, that position has reversed.
In response to queries by Landmine Monitor about current landmine policy, the Chechen representative in the US wrote in June 2001, “The position of the Chechen government has already been voiced by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1998, an announcement was made expressing support for the Ottawa process and the readiness of the Chechen Republic to sign the Ottawa Convention of 1997.... But, very regretfully, as a result of the aggression of the Russian Federation and the renewal of military actions on the territory of the Chechen Republic, now the active, wide-scale use of antipersonnel mines of various types and other explosive devices by the Russian army is again taking place.”[2]
A Chechen commander noted that the Chechen military recognizes the “necessity of prohibition of use of mines,” but that it is “compelled” to use “self-made fougasses” (improvised explosive devices) in its “struggle against the armed aggressor.”[3] Other Chechen fighters echoed this view.[4]
Production
It is unclear if, or how much, landmine production capability was located in Chechnya before the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It is believed that there had been no domestic production of mines in Chechnya although some plants have produced military materiel.[5]
In the current war Chechen forces are not believed to have mass-produced conventional antipersonnel mines, but are skilled at manufacturing homemade mines or improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The Chechen representative in the US, while acknowledging use of IEDs, said, “The Chechen Republic has no factories for making mines and consequently it is impossible to call the manufacturing of radio-controlled self-made explosive devices a real industry.”[6]
Regular monitoring of public sources by the Chechen NGO “Refugees Against Landmines” for this report indicates extensive use of radio controlled explosive devices by the rebel forces; one site details safety precautions during the manufacture of an explosive and details the characteristics of various types of mines and other kinds of weapons.[7]
According to the commander of a Russian engineers brigade who participated in mine clearance in Grozny and numerous other areas in Chechnya, sites for fabricating IEDs and other weapons were operating in Argun Gorge and Grozny until the moments of occupation.[8]
Transfer
Chechnya is not known to have exported mines. The landmines in Chechnya were brought in during Soviet times. During the first war, it appears that Chechens obtained antipersonnel mines from Russian soldiers and officers, and mines are also believed to have come from the Trans-Caucasus, delivered by groups on horseback across the mountains. Russian media regularly contends that weapons pass through Georgia to the rebels. On 18 December 2000, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze categorically denied these allegations.[9] Russian sources contend that with Argun Gorge blocked by Russian forces, the only way for rebels to obtain weapons is by pack animals.[10]
Landmine Monitor Report 2000 reported that rebels received mines through contacts in the Russian military.[11] A Chechen commander and various rebels told Landmine Monitor for this report that such supply of mines continue.[12]
One Russian report stated that among other things Chechens used “serial landmines of Western manufacturing.”[13] AVN, the military news agency, reported that Russian troops encounter mines of NATO origin, as well as World War II-vintage German antitank and antipersonnel mines. The Russian forces assume the modern mines came from Turkey.[14] There has been no independent confirmation of these allegations.
Stockpiling
It is not possible to get accurate information on the quantity or types of mines in Chechen stockpiles today. According to Mr. M. Arsaliev, the chief deminer of the Chechen Republic, the pre-war arsenal stored in the Chechen Republic consisted mainly of PMN, OZM-72, MON-50, MON-90, and MON-100 antipersonnel mines, and TM-62 antitank mines.[15]
Rebel forces appear to rely increasingly on IEDs, which would seem to indicate depleted stocks from the Soviet period. The Chechen representative in the US claimed, “The Chechen Army does not have and has never had antipersonnel mines in its arsenal, although army diversionary groups and guerrilla groups carrying out the struggle against the occupying regime rather frequently use, predominantly against armour, various kinds of self-made explosive devices.”[16]
Use
Although the conflict transitioned into a guerrilla-style war following the evacuation of Grozny in February 2000, both Russian and Chechen forces have continued to use antipersonnel landmines extensively. Fighting and mine use continues as this report goes to print. (For details on past use in the 1994-1996 conflict and the fighting post-September 1999, see relevant reports in Landmine Monitor Report 1999 and 2000.[17])
Use of Mines by Russian Forces[18]
Landmine Monitor Report 2000 noted that Chechens had made unverifiable claims that Russia has used between 200,000 and 300,000 mines since the fighting broke out in September 1999.[19] Subsequently, a Russian military official reportedly said at a press conference that Russian forces had sown more than 500,000 landmines in Chechnya.[20] More recently a Chechen commander and the Chechen representative in the US have contended that Russian troops have used 1.8 million mines in Chechnya. Accurate assessments are impossible while fighting continues.[21]
Russian officials, including at the highest military levels in the operation in Chechnya, admit the large-scale use of mines throughout the operations, but reject allegations of the indiscriminate use of landmines by the Russian forces in Chechnya. They contend that only “controllable minefields” and landmines equipped with self-deactivation and self-destruction mechanisms are being used in the area of conflict. They have also said that minefields have been mapped and in some cases marked and that mines used in temporary positions are removed when units change position.[22]
The Defense Ministry says that Russian engineers “carefully follow international landmine use requirements including those added during the International Convention in Geneva (1980). Federal units generally use transportable set of landmines TSL-1 and TSL-2 [VKPM-1 and VKPM-2 transportable sets of antipersonnel mines] to protect their positions. Moreover, dirigible [command-detonated] minefields DM-3 [UMP-3], signal mines and non-explosive obstacles were used.”[23] (For an analysis by the Russian military of mine warfare in operations in Chechnya, see the Use section of the country report on Russia).
Serious questions can be raised as to whether the methods of mine warfare and types of antipersonnel mines used by Russian forces have been consistent with Protocol II and Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons. Russia is a state party to the former and says it now bases its mine use on the latter.
Use of Mines by Chechen Rebels
On 20 April 2001, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution that “strongly condemns all...breaches of international humanitarian law perpetrated by Chechen fighters such as hostage-taking, torture and the indiscriminate use of landmines, booby-traps and other explosive devices aimed at causing widespread civilian casualties.”[24]
In comparing Chechen mine use in 1994-1996 to that since 1999, Russian Colonel-General N. I. Serdtsev acknowledged that the engineer units of the Chechen army have become highly proficient.[25] He said the rebel base stations are highly fortified, and while there was no real system of obstacles, booby-traps and IEDs were used more than ever. The increase in efficiency of the mine war is demonstrated by the increase of casualties among personnel and the destruction of machinery.
In a radio interview in March 2000, Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov stated that the decision to use mines is taken by junior commanders, in both Chechen and Russian forces, and that the use of antipersonnel mines and antitank mines would only increase with the beginning of the partisan war.[26]
In November 2000, the supreme commander of Chechen forces, General of Army Khalid Maskhadov, in an order “About prime tasks of the commanders of mobile battle groups” said: “To All commanders, having conducted the careful analysis of actions of the opponent to reveal the most probable locations of divisions of the Russian armies participating in this mayhem, mine these places around villages, observing safety measures. Mine roads leading to a village, already in the feature directly contiguous to occupied item, widely using radio-controlled mines.”[27]
Chechen rebels using guerrilla tactics rely heavily on mines and IEDs. The Chechens reportedly have used PMN, PMN-2, OZM-72, MON-100, and MON-200 mines, improvised cluster devices, grenades with tripwires and booby-traps.[28] Chechen fighters have used mines to retard the advance of Russian troops, as well as to complicate rebuilding of communication infrastructure, and along railroads, electrical supply lines and other such sites. Rebels are reported to regularly target railroads and trains accompanied by Russian forces. [29]
According to the commander the Russian Engineer troops, rebels mine highways with controllable and uncontrollable landmines of different types, antitank mines, and antipersonnel mines. He stated that they generally use ammunition they have found on the battlefields, and that mining usually takes place at night, but if the road is not well traveled, then also during the day. He noted that high authorities in Russia believe that the level of preparation, ammunition accumulation, deployment of workshops, laboratories producing self-made explosive devices and radio-activated fuzes, and elaboration of mine-explosive obstacles demonstrate the high level of organization of Chechen separatists.[30]
Landmine Problem
With the renewed fighting, it is impossible to get accurate information about mined areas, but given that very limited mine clearance took place after the 1994-96 war, the current situation can only be worse.[31]
For this report, the organization “Refugees Against Landmines” began interviewing Chechen refugees in the Pankisi Gorge of Akhmeta district in Georgia, in Azerbaijan, in Turkey and a small number of refugees in Ingushetia and Chechnya. Interviewing was carried out between November 2000 and March 2001. It is planned to continue such monitoring in the future.
Without a proper Level One Impact Survey, it is not possible to give an accurate assessment of the landmine problem. Estimates of the size of the problem varied widely, but in interviews carried out for Landmine Monitor, Chechen military and civilians claim that 80% of the territory is either mine-contaminated or can be presumed to have such a threat. Inhabitants of fifteen areas consider the problem to be urgent and a threat to themselves. These areas include: Groznenskii, Urus-Martanovskii, Shatoiskii, Itum-Kalinskii (former Sovetskii), Sharoiskii (former Sovetskii), Vedenskii, Galanchezhskii (former Vedenskii), Cheberloevskii (part of Vedenskii), Shalinskii (now separated from Kurchaloevskii and Argun), Kurchaloevskii, Achkhoi-Martanovskii, Nozhai-Yurtovskii, Gudermesskii, Novogroznenskii, and Staroyurtovskii
One Chechen commander said he estimates that some 9,000 square kilometers of foothills and mountainous regions have been mined. He said vacant houses and office buildings are mined, urban areas, villages, roads, fields and woods are mined, even on small mountainous paths, “so-called goat tracks.” He said that “huge” areas of agricultural land cannot be used.[33]
Overall, 92% of those interviewed for this report were aware of agricultural and forested areas that are mined. Some 56% knew of various buildings (i.e., apartment buildings, schools, hospitals) that are mined. Thirty-eight percent were aware of mined roads, bridges, and railroads. When asked if mined areas were marked, 80% answered that they were not marked. When asked if they knew of mine-free areas, 70% answered “no.” Some 34% said mines were cleared by Chechen forces, 14% by international organizations, 9% by Russian forces, 3% said by civilians and 15% had no answer.
Responses about specific mined areas included the following. Landmine Monitor was not in a position to verify any of these reports.
Male from Stariye Atagi village on 23 February: in January 2000 the forest near the village of Chiri-Yurt was mined; in January 2000 the area of dachas at the Shatoyskaya motorway was mined by Russian troops; in January 2000 Soip-Molla bridge was mined; in September 2000, the road between Argun and Gudermes was mined by Russian troops; in October 2000 a hospital in the Stariye-Atagi village was mined by Russian troops; in January 2001, school number 41 in Grozniy was mined. None of the mined areas was marked.
Ruslan from Avturi village, Shalinskiy region on 3 march 2001: On 13 April 2000, 3 square kilometers of pasture land at the northern outskirts of Avturi village was mined by Russian troops; on 3 of October 2000, 10 square kilometers of woodlands between Avturi and Serjen-Yurt villages was mined by Russian troops; on 17 November 2000 cottage camp was mined by Russian troops; on 15 November 1999, the house at 24 Ioseliani Str. in Grozniy was mined by Russian troops; on 27 November 1999 school number 8 in Grozniy was mined by Russian troops; on 20 December 1999 the surgery ward of the hospital number 9 in Grozniy was mined by Russian troops; on 1 January 2000 the road to the Serjen-Yurt was mined by Russian troops; on 12 January 2000 the railway station in Grozniy and on 11 January 2000 bridge in Germenchuk village was mined by Russian troops. None of the mined areas was marked.
Malika from Gudermes city on 26 February 2001: In July 2000 on the north of Gedermes city, 20 square kilometers of sovkhoz field was mined; in April 2000 pasture on the western outskirts of the Gedermes (1.5 square kilometers) was mined by Russian troops. In May 2000 the school and in March 2000 the regional hospital in Gudermes city were mined. In June 2000 the road between Rostov-Baku on the section near Jalka was mined by Russian troops. In September 2000 ailwal on exit from Gudermes city and a bridge over the Gums River were mined by Russian troops. None of the mined areas was marked.
Luiza from Vedeno village on February 2001: In 2000, 10 square kilometers of agricultural lands Sovkhoz “Rodina” were mined; on 15 May 2000 4 square kilometers of pasture was mined by Russian troops. The forest near the Serjen-Yurt village was mined by Russian troops. In September 1999 the dacha in Khankala was mined by Russian troops. In October 2000 “Stigl” airport in Grozniy was mined; in November 2000 the railway stations in Grozniy and Gudermes, and the bridge over the Bas River in Germenchuk village were mined by Russian troops. In November 2000 hospitals number 9 and 7 in Grozniy and in December 2000 the house for the blind at 8 March Str (9 floor) and schools 9, 18, 41 were mined by Russian troops. None of the mined areas was marked.
Rustam from Grozniy on 24 February 2001: On 20 August 2000, the vegetable garden near the house at 120 Avtorkhanov Ave. in Grozniy was mined by Russian troops. On 15 June 2000, at a cottage along Sovetskaya route 400 square meters was mined by Russian troops. On 9 May 2000, the house at 36 Gudermesskaya Str. in Grozniy was mined by Russian troops. On 6 May 2000, School number 30 (40 square meters) in Oktiabrskiy district in Grozniy was mined by Russian troops. In September 2000, the bridge over the Sunja River in Grozniy was mined by Russian troops. None of the mined areas was marked.
Albert from Grozniy on 25 February 2001: In April 2000, 800 square meters in District 96 in Grozniy was mined. In March 2000 the house at 4 Garajnaya Str. in Grozniy was mined by Russian troops. In July 2000 Town Hospital number 9 was mined by Russian troops. In March 2000 Staropromislovskaya motorway was mined by Russian troops. None of the mined areas was marked.
Akhmed from Vedeno village on 1 March 2001: In the Vedeno village: On 16 May 2000 a large agricultural plot in the Vedenskiy region near Eshelkhatoy and Neftianka villages was mined by Russian troops. On 20 June 2000, the regional rest park and areas bordering it were mined by Russian troops. In May 2000 Russian troops mined forests in the Vedenskiy region especially near Neftianka village. At the end of the May 2000 “Sovkhoz” fruit nursery and former building of the district committee of the Communist Party were mined by Russian troops. In May 2000, the Culture House of the Vedenskiy region and former boarding school building were mined by Russian troops. All schools in Vedeno village were destroyed. In May 2000 the regional hospital was mined by Russian troops. In June 2000, the bridge and road to Tsa-Vedeno village was mined by Russian troops. None of the mined areas was marked.
Eskerkhan from Duba-Yurt village, on 22 February 2001: In January 2001 Khankala cottage camp was mined by Russian troops; houses at 21, 19, 29, 30 Gudermesskaya Str. and 17, 19, 20 Avtorkhanov Ave. in Grozniy were mined by Russian troops. The bridge over the Sunja River in Grozniy was mined by Russian troops. None of the mined areas was marked.
Mine Clearance
HALO Trust conducted a mine assessment mission in January 1997 and proposed a demining project in cooperation with the Chechen army. For most of 1998 and 1999, it carried out programs in Chechnya and by the time of the 1999 Russian military offensive, HALO had trained both manual and mechanical clearance teams and had some 150 personnel working.[34] Operations were based in southwestern Chechnya. HALO was preparing to hand over management to Chechen personnel when the fighting began again. Operations were suspended in December 1999.
In August 2000, it was reported that Russia had accused HALO Trust of espionage and arrested several employees of the organization. The organization was charged with gathering military intelligence and providing it to Chechen rebels and field commanders.[35] Accusations also included illicit transit of engineering, communication, and military materiel for the rebels.[36] HALO flatly and vehemently denied the charges.[37]
Russian military have made contradictory statements about areas of Chechen territory they have cleared. For example, on 3 April 2000, the Russian Military News Agency reported that “160 hectares of land has been cleared of mines and prepared for plowing in the Pravoberezhny district. Engineers have surveyed 653 hectares of land in the Urus-Martan district.”[38] And on 24 April 2000, Russia – not long after declaring it had gained control over Grozny – declared the city “completely cleared of mines,” stating that “[o]ver 177,000 explosive devices and rounds of ammunition were rendered harmless.”[39]
Yet in July 2000, a Russian engineer being interviewed on Russian television described Chechnya as follows: “In innumerable areas in Chechnya, no man has set foot for several years now. It is dangerous to walk in woods, which have been mined by both our forces and the rebels. Since no minefields have been mapped, not even sappers take the risk. Civilians are blown up and farm animals killed by mines controlled by tripwires. The lofts and cellars of Grozny ruins are no less of a danger.”[40]
Russian engineering troops conduct mine detection and mine clearance operations on a daily basis, to support safe movement along the roads and railroads, and the safe operation of field water supply points. According to Russian sources, on average, the OGV combat engineers remove up to 20 mines or IEDs daily. From 1 October 1999 through 2 September 2000, they defused 1,747 mines and IEDs. The technical outfitting of the engineering subunits reportedly is lacking, and a large number of engineers have been killed or injured in clearance operations.[41]
Mine Awareness
The ICRC has launched a mine awareness program in Ingushetia. Its aim is to inform Internally Displace Persons (IDPs) of the dangers these weapons represent and to teach them some basic rules of behaviour in order to limit the risk of accidents when they return home. In March 2001 the ICRC mine awareness team, using locally produced teaching materials (posters and leaflets), gave 62 presentations to over 1,600 children in IDP camps.[42]
The ICRC mine awareness team provided mine awareness education to the Chechen children who came to stay in sanatoria in several republics and regions of the North Caucasus as a break from the dire living conditions in Chechnya. In Kabardino-Balkaria 46 presentations were given to 800 children. Ten performances of the puppet show "The danger of landmines - the new adventures of Cheerdig" were made to almost 3,000 children in sanatoria in Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, North Ossetia and Stavropol krai. The ICRC also provided over 2,600 of these children with school kits.
Since June 2000, in close cooperation with UNICEF, UNHCR’s mine awareness project has reached 15,000 youth and children in Ingushetia and Chechnya.[43] The UNICEF/UNHCR campaign of sensitization initially developed 15,000 mine awareness posters and 20,000 leaflets that have been distributed in all IDP camps in Ingushetia and in certain key locations in Grozny City. In 2001, a further 20,000 posters and leaflets will be distributed in Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan. The program includes training of local people in mine awareness education. In September 2000 a mine awareness training course was conducted in Ingushetia for UN, NGO and government partners which included teachers, psychologists and Ingush Ministry of Education counterparts. Later in November 2000, an intensive training workshop for 30 teachers, psychologists and youth leaders from the Grozny and Kurchaloi area was held. Approximately 400 Chechen teachers will be trained in 2001.[44]
Landmine Casualties
Landmine Monitor Report 2000 noted that by the outbreak of war in September 1999, there were approximately 3,500 people registered by the Ministry of Public Health in the Chechen Republic as needing artificial limbs. Of those, Chechen Health Ministry officials estimated up to 20 percent were mine victims.[45]
In May 2001, the Chechen Minister of Public Health reported to the Landmine Monitor researcher that the greatest number of mine incidents were noted “in the summer-autumn period of 2000. In only one Nojay-Yurt district in 2000 more than 160 cases of mine/explosive traumas of the civilian inhabitants were reported. The same picture can be seen in all others areas of Chechnya.”[46]
The Public Health Minister said that in August of 2000, he and a group of doctors began an attempt to calculate the number of people killed and wounded in the war, using information from all parts of Chechnya. The Minister said that the group believes that “today more than 8,000 people need artificial limbs. But taking into account that over the last months the mine-explosive traumas prevail, it is possible to predict that people needing artificial limbs will range from 14,000 to 16,000.”[47]
There is no complete official data on the number of landmine casualties in Chechnya. However, in April 2001 the ICRC stated that the “constant increase in the number of landmine and unexploded ordnance victims among the civilian population in Chechnya is of particular concern.”[48] On an almost daily basis information is received on mine and IED incidents, particularly among the Russian and Chechen armed forces. Many incidents involving civilians do not get reported in the media.
Based on an examination of numerous Russian media reports, in the year 2000, at least 66 people were killed and more than 162 injured in incidents involving landmines and IEDs. Civilians accounted for about half of those killed and injured.[49]
From May 2000 to March 2001, the Human Rights Investigation Bureau of Chechnya conducted field research in the southeastern region of Chechnya, and in Ingushetia. The surveys provided information, additional to that reported in the Russian media, on thirty-six people killed and twenty-one injured in landmine blasts in 2000. Further information was given on at least forty people killed and fourteen injured before 2000. Casualties included twenty-three children.[50] Data was also collected from hospitals and medical points on 279 mine casualties recorded during 1999 and 2000.[51]
Landmine casualties Male % Female % Total Percentage
Adult 210 75.3% 27 9.7% 85%
Child 38 13.6% 4 1.4% 15%
Activity at the Time of Accident Number of casualties Percentage
Collecting wood/food/water/metal 47 16.85%
Walking 38 13.6%
Farming 30 10.75%
Walking near explosion area 29 10.4%
Military 25 9.0%
Tending Livestock 21 7.5%
Playing/Recreation 21 7.5%
Travelling By Vehicle 17 6.1%
Clearing yard/house 14 5.0%
Demining 1 0.4%
Unknown 36 12.9%
Type of Device Number of Accidents Percentage
Antipersonnel Mine 80 28.7%
Booby Trap 57 20.4%
Antitank mine 20 7.2%
Other UXO 15 5.4%
Fuse 7 2.5%
Cluster munitions 5 1.8%
Unknown 95 34.0%
The Human Rights Investigation Bureau also distributed surveys on landmine issues to 260 refugees in Ingushetia and 160 in the Chechen Republic during the field research period.[52] More questionnaires were available for distribution, however, threats to researchers and the confiscation of an additional 120 surveys made continuing the research difficult.
In other field research, in May 2000, the Chechen NGO “Refugees Against Landmines,” began interviewing Chechen refugees in the Pankisi Gorge of Akhmeta district in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Ingushetia, and in Chechnya, about their knowledge of the landmine problem and mine victims in Chechnya. In the first round of interviews, 87% percent of those interviewed knew of people killed or injured by mines in Chechnya; 51% had relatives who had been injured. Over the course of the research information was obtained on another twenty-seven civilians killed or injured by mines in 2000.[53]
During the period 16 March to 30 April 2000, MSF Holland undertook an assessment of 56 health facilities in 11 districts of Chechnya. It was reported by 66% of the facilities that gunshot wounds and mine injuries were among the three main causes of mortality in adults. In another assessment undertaken in August 2000, 23 facilities in the city of Grozny and adjacent district, city of Argun, Shali and Shatoy, it was reported that 67% of all casualties related to hostilities were due to mine and UXO injuries. Women and children were reported as suffering 41% of all injuries relating to hostilities and 34% of all landmine and UXO injuries. In August alone 170 casualties related to the hostilities were identified.[54]
UNICEF is currently developing a Mine Victim Database using the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). With the assistance of the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action a six-day Data Gathering and Data Entry Workshop was conducted. Data gathering on mine victims in Chechnya has begun and the information will be used to direct victims to available services.[55] Local NGO, Voice of the Mountains (VoM), is the focal point for collecting mine incident data from a number of sources, including WHO, ICRC, MSF and VESTA monitors in the IDP camps.[56]
Since October 2000, 648 mine/UXO victims have been identified inside Chechnya and entered into the VoM database. In a recently commenced assessment in Ingushetia, 11 victims have so far been identified in what is an on-going process. In a survey by VESTA monitors in May 2001, 35 people with mine/UXO injuries were identified.[57]
Survivor Assistance
Chechnya has historically been one of the poorest of the Soviet republics. The health care system was inadequate before the 1994-96 war and even then ill equipped to handle war victims. Two-thirds of hospitals and clinics were destroyed in that war and those that remained at the outbreak of renewed fighting were running at around 30% of their original capacity.
In January 2001, the Minister of Public Health Services of the Russian Administration of Chechnya, Uvays Magomadov, announced on Russian television that 360 million roubles ($12.84 million) would be provided to fifty hospitals, and 700 million roubles ($25 million) for thirty polyclinics, in Chechnya.[58]
There is no precise information on assistance available to civilian mine victims in Chechnya. It is believed that many civilian mine victims do not survive the initial explosion because of the lack of accessible medical facilities, or the fear of being mistaken as fighters if they seek assistance. Some mine victims receive assistance in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey from international organizations including the ICRC, MSF, and Islamic Relief. The situation is better for Russian military, as mine victims receive medical care in military hospitals and subsequent rehabilitation.
The Russian Center of Disaster Medicine (RCDM) “Zaschita” operated health services for civilians in the northern Caucasus in 1999 and 2000. According to data extracted from RCDM records activities included assistance for mine victims. The records did not differentiate between the victims of mines/UXO and other firearm casualties. Between October 1999 and September 2000 in various centers medical assistance was provided to 964 landmine/UXO and firearm casualties.[59]
UNICEF and UNHCR work in close cooperation with WHO and ICRC to provide a comprehensive approach to survivor assistance by facilitating services for the physical and psychosocial rehabilitation of victims.[60]
UNHCR, with the assistance of a doctor in a counseling center in Nazran, run by local NGO VESTA, has facilitated emergency assistance to 35 victims of war, many of them children with serious eye injuries and other severe trauma because of the hostilities. Through its implementing partner Handicap International, UNHCR is providing wheelchairs and crutches to vulnerable victims of war in Ingushetia and Chechnya.[61]
Handicap International has distributed 1,000 walking sticks, 1,000 pairs of crutches and 250 wheelchairs in Chechnya, where they work with local NGOs. HI has also been involved in training local technicians, and providing equipment and material in relation to the proposed re-opening of an orthopedic workshop in Grozny.[62]
According to the World Health Organization, “As a result of two armed conflicts in the Republic of Chechnya during the last decade, approximately 7,000 citizens of the republic have lost or damaged a limb and are currently in need of prosthetic and/or orthopedic care. In addition, approximately 400 amputees are among the internally displaced population (IDP) in Ingushetia.”[63]
The exact number of amputations as a result of mine injuries is not known as identifying mine victims is difficult because of their fear of being accused of involvement in military operations.[64] In April 2000, WHO commenced a new emergency program on prosthetic assistance by supporting a prosthetic workshop in Vladikavkaz.[65] The Vladikavkaz Center for the Rehabilitation of Disabled Persons currently treats about 35 patients each week.[66] Between May and December 2000, staff provided 121 new prostheses and repaired 36 old prostheses.[67] In the period from May 2000 to June 2001, about 250 amputees received prostheses, more than 1,500 disabled persons received orthopedic devices and 16 amputees were re-operated on to correct defective stumps and make them fit for a prosthesis.[68] Following a special agreement with the administration of the Vedeno region in Chechnya, since the summer of 2000 Chechen amputees are allowed to travel to Vladikavkaz in a special mini-bus for treatment.[69] UNICEF supports the workshop both logistically and by providing prostheses, orthoses, wheelchairs and walking sticks for injuries related to the hostilities.[70]
UNICEF provides psychosocial counseling at the Vladikavkaz Center.[71] UNICEF is also assisting in the reintegration of war victims through vocational training, at the Sleptsovskaya Technical College in Nazran. Currently 60 people are receiving training.[72]
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[1] Interview with Ilias Akhmadov, Chechen Minister of Foreign Affairs, 21 December 1998.
[2] Letter to Jody Williams, Mary Wareham and Zarema Mazaeva, from Lyoma Usmanov, The Representative of the Chechen Government to the United States, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, 19 June 2001.
[3] Interview with I.T. Tauzov, assistant commander of the Southwestern Front of the Chechen forces, 20 February 2001.
[4] Interviews with groups of Chechen rebels, Grozny, 24 September 2000.
[5] Interview with worker at Anisimov plant, in Baku, 7 January 2001; 1999 interviews with former chief technologist of Electropribor plant, Mr. A.Z. Satuev; laboratory assistant at Anisimov plant, Mr. T. Larsaev; and former engineer at Krasny Molot plant, Mr. T. Akhmetkhanov.
[6] Letter to Jody Williams, Mary Wareham and Zarema Mazaeva, from Lyoma Usmanov, The Representative of the Chechen Government to the United States, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, 19 June 2001.
[7] The monitoring includes materials from more than 50 web sites; Chechen, Georgian and Russian newspapers; and TV programs. It includes informational agencies, newspapers, television and radio daily news; ORT, RTR, NTV Russian national television; Russian Television Channel TV 6; Kavkaz-Tsentr News Agency, www.kavkaz.org; www.kvestnik.org; www.marsho.org; www.nohchy.org.ge; www.chechnyaonline.com; www.amina.com; www.utro.ru; www.nns.ru; www.smi.ru; www.polit.ru; www.lenta.krasnet.ru; www.ykt.ru; www.strana.ru; www.svobodnaya-gruziya.com; www.nvo.ng.ru; www.allnews.ru; www.gazeta.ru; www.redstar.ru; www.inguk.ru; www.presscenter.ru; www.strana.ru; www.rbc.ru; www.txt.ntv.ru; www.vremya.ru; ÈÒÀÐ-ÒÀÑÑ www.itar-tass.lv; www.deadline.ru; www.interfax.ru; www.militarynews.ru; AVN (Russian Military News Agency); www.polk.ru; www.echo.ru; www.hro.org//memo.ru.
[8] Oleg Petrovskiy, “Where do the rebels get their explosives?,” Utro (electronic daily newspaper, www.utro.ru), 7 July 2000.
[9] Black Sea Press, News Agency of the Countries of the Black Sea Region, Tbilisi, Georgia, Edition 1, 18 December 2000.
[10] Evgeniy Mikhaylov, “Movement of Russian Troops and Police in Grozny is complicated by the Presence of Minefields and the Various Tricks of Fighters in Defensive Positions,” ITAR-TASS, 26 December 2000. (Through site of “News Server of the Yakut City Information Entertainment Server”: http://www.ykt.ru/news/122799/tass.htm).
[11] Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 865.
[12] Interview with I.T. Tauzov, assistant commander of the Southwestern Front of the Chechen forces, 20 February 2001; interview with a group of Chechen fighters, 15 January 2001.
[13] “Segodnya” (news program), NTV Russian national television, 11pm, 6 March 2000.
[14] “The rebels are ready to unleash mine war,” SMI.RU, 2 July 2000. (http://www.smi.ru/2000/02/07/949929682).
[15] 1999 interview with Mr. M. Arsaliev, chief deminer of the Chechen Republic.
[16] Letter to Jody Williams, Mary Wareham and Zarema Mazaeva, from Lyoma Usmanov, The Representative of the Chechen Government to the United States, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, 19 June 2001.
[17] Available through the Landmine Monitor researcher for Russia is “The Chronicle of Mine War in Chechnya: Year 2000,” which gives a month-by-month snapshot of mine-related operations/incidents in the war, gleaned from a survey of the media throughout the year.
[18] For a more detailed description of Russian use of mines in Chechnya, see the Russia country report in this book.
[19] “Chechens Say Russians Laid 300,000 Mines,” Kavkaz-Tsentr News Agency (Internet), 5 June 2000.
[20] “Russia Admits: Land Mines all over Chechnya,” Agency Caucusus, 10 January 2001. This was re-stated in the letter of Lyoma Usamov of 19 June 2001, which stated, “The Russian command, several months after the beginning of war, ‘boasted' about its 'achievements,' declaring that they planted half a million mines against 'the Chechen terrorists.’ (http: // www.chechenpress.com/news/ru/06_2001/12 _19_06.shtml).”
[21] Interview with I.T. Tauzov, assistant commander of Southwest Front of the Chechen forces, 20 February 2001. This number was also stated in the letter of 19 June 2001 of Chechen Representative Lyoma Usmanov.
[22] Interview with Lieutenant-General Nikolai Serdtsev, December 1999; “Night Patrol of ‘Fittermice,’” Rossiyskaya Gazeta (official daily newspaper of Russian government), 21 January 2000.
[23] Deputy Chief of the Military Engineering University, Major General A. Nizhalovskii's report during a virtual roundtable discussion of engineer equipment of military operations in Chechnya, Armeyskiy sbornik (Army collection), No. 6, June 2000, pp. 35-40. (Armeyskiy sbornik is a specialized monthly analytical periodical covering a wide range of military-related issues and problems. It contains a “roundtable section” which is a “virtual roundtable” in which various military authors may publish articles on a given subject.
[24] United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/24, “Situation in the Republic of Chechnya of the Russian Federation,” E/CN.4/RES/2001/24, 20 April 2001.
[25] N.I. Serdtsev, commander of the Engineer troops of the Defense Ministry of Russia, “Anti-terrorist operation in Caucasia: main lessons and conclusions,” roundtable report for Voyennaya mysl (Military Thought), No. 4, 2000, pp. 20-24.
[26] Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov, interview to Radio Svoboda, March 2000.
[27] Order of the Supreme commander-in-chief, Chechen Forces, General of Army Khalid Maskhadov, “About prime tasks of the commanders of mobile battle groups,” ¹ 502, 19 November 2000.
[28] TV news by ORT, NTV, RTR among others; interviews with federal soldiers and officers participating in combat actions in Chechnya.
[29] “Railway Connection with Chechnya Will Soon Resume,” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye (weekly) 26 November – 3 December 1999; “The Federal Center is Fully Determined,” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, 10-16 December 1999; “What is Grozny like after the Thunder?” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 11 February 2000.
[30] N.I. Serdtsev, commander of the Engineer troops of the Defense Ministry of Russia, “Anti-terrorist operation in Caucasia: main lessons and conclusions,” roundtable report for Voyennaya mysl, No. 4, 2000, pp. 20-24.
[31] For details of the mine problem resulting from the 1994-96 fighting, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 844. See also Landmine Monitor Report 2000, pp. 870-871, for a description of the problem by the end of that monitoring period.
[33] Interview with I.T. Tauzov, assistant commander of the Southwestern Front of the Chechen forces, 20 February 2001.
[34] See HALO Trust website: www.halotrust.org, visited 20 June 2001.
[35] ITAR-TASS, 10 August 2000,
(http://www.itar-tass.lv/ru/showit.sql?LANG=ru&IO=0&IB=0&ID=16147)
[36] ÍÒÂ, http://www.vremya.ru/2000/100/events/53.html.
[37] Alexander Sobolev, “FSB [Federal Security Services] Accuses the international organization ‘HALO-TRUST’ of rendering assistance to rebels,” (Interview with the director of HALO Trust Gay Willobe), Vremia novostey, Number 100, 10 August 2000. (http://www.vremya.ru/2000/100/events/53.html).
[38] “Plowland Cleared of Mines, Rebels Detained in Chechnya,” AVN (Russian Military News Agency), 3 April 2000.
[39] Olga Allenova, “’Mine Warfare’ Seen Continuing in Grozny,” Moscow Kommersant (daily newspaper), 25 April 2000, p.1.
[40] “Mine Clearance Experts Tell of Dangers in Chechnya,” Vesti (newscast), RTR Moscow Russian TV, 5 July 2000.
[41] “Russian Combat Engineers Fight ‘Mine War’ in Chechnya,” Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye (Russian weekly independent military newspaper), 13-19 October 2000.
[42] ICRC, “Emergency action of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement for the North Caucasus and the South of Russia (March 2001),” 21 May 2001.
[43] Email from Vera Soboleva, PI Officer, UNHCR Moscow, 28 June 2001.
[44] Tehnaz Dastoor, “UNICEF’s Mine Action Activities Overview”, Health in Action – in the North Caucasus, Newsletter on Emergency Preparedness and Response, WHO – Europe, May 2001, pp. 8-9.
[45] For further details see Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 873.
[46] Email to Zarema Mazaeva from Oumar Khanbiev, Minister of Public Health of the Chechen Republic-Ichkeria, 1 May 2001.
[47] Ibid.
[48] ICRC Update, “Emergency action of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement for the North Caucasus and the South of Russia (February 2001),” 9 April 2001.
[49] Landmine Monitor collated information on landmine incidents and casualties in Chechnya from 116 Russian newspaper articles.
[50] Complete information from interviewees is available from Landmine Monitor.
[51] The information was collated from 279 accident report forms obtained by the researchers from hospitals and medical points.
[52] Complete information from interviewees is available from Landmine Monitor.
[53] Interviewing began on 1 May 2000 and continued until mid-June, by which time approximately 100 refugees had been interviewed. Interviewing again took place between November 2000 and March 2001. In the second period, some 325 refugees responded to written questionnaires and another 137 were interviewed. Complete information from interviewees is available upon request.
[54] See UNICEF proposal, “Landmine and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) awareness education in the North Caucasus (Russian Federation),” UNMAS Mine Action Portfolio, p. 192.
[55] Email from Tehnaz Dastoor, UNICEF Mine Action Coordinator, Northern Caucasus, 22 June 2001.
[56] UNICEF Humanitarian Action: Northern Caucasus Donor Update, 27 April 2001.
[57] Email from Vera Soboleva, PI Officer, UNHCR Moscow, 4 July 2001.
[58] NTV Russian TV kanal news program, 23 January 2001.
[59] Information provided in the draft report on Russia for Landmine Monitor.
[60] UNICEF Humanitarian Action: Northern Caucasus Donor Update, 27 April 2001, http://www.reliefweb.int.
[61] Email from Vera Soboleva, PI Officer, UNHCR Moscow, 28 June 2001.
[62] Email from Leo MacGillivray, Program Officer, Handicap International, 28 June 2001.
[63] “Providing Prosthetic Assistance in the North Caucasus,” World Health Organization Emergency Assistance Programme for the North Caucasus, Russian Federation, Technical Field Report Series, March 2001, p. 2.
[64] Email from Irina Tarakanova, AA/WHO Moscow, 5 July 2001.
[65] WHO has been supporting the center in Vladikavkaz since 1997. “Providing Prosthetic Assistance in the North Caucasus”, World Health Organization Emergency Assistance Programme for the North Caucasus, Russian Federation, Technical Field Report Series, March 2001, p. 3.
[66] UNICEF Humanitarian Action: Northern Caucasus Donor Update, 27 April 2001. http://www.reliefweb.int.
[67] “Providing Prosthetic Assistance in the North Caucasus”, World Health Organization Emergency Assistance Programme for the North Caucasus, Russian Federation, Technical Field Report Series, March 2001, pp. 3-4.
[68] Email from Irina Tarakanova, AA/WHO Moscow, 5 July 2001.
[69] “Providing Prosthetic Assistance in the North Caucasus”, World Health Organization Emergency Assistance Programme for the North Caucasus, Russian Federation, Technical Field Report Series, March 2001, pp. 3-4.
[70] Email from Tehnaz Dastoor, UNICEF Mine Action Coordinator, Northern Caucasus, 22 June 2001.
[71] “Providing Prosthetic Assistance in the North Caucasus”, World Health Organization Emergency Assistance Programme for the North Caucasus, Russian Federation, Technical Field Report Series, March 2001, p. 5.
[72] Tehnaz Dastoor, “UNICEF’s Mine Action Activities Overview”, Health in Action – in the North Caucasus, Newsletter on Emergency Preparedness and Response, WHO – Europe, May 2001, p. 9.
Key developments since May 2000: Use of antipersonnel mines by Russian and Chechen forces has continued. Hundreds of new mine victims have been identified. Since June 2000, in close cooperation with UNICEF, UNHCR’s mine awareness project has reached 15,000 youth and children in Ingushetia and Chechnya. The Chechen Minister of Public Health has said that some 8,000 people are in need of artificial limbs.
Background
In September 1991, Chechnya declared independence from Russia, and adopted the name Chechen Republic “Ichkeria.” On 11 December 1994, the Russian Federation sent troops into Chechnya where mines were used extensively in the fighting by both sides. Although peace agreements were signed in August 1996, relations remained tense and deteriorated to the point of Russia sending troops back into Chechnya in September 1999. Chechen forces evacuated Grozny in February 2000 and the conflict entered a guerrilla war phase. Fighting, replete with massive violations of human rights and laws of war, including widespread use of mines by both sides, continues.
Mine Ban Policy
Chechnya is not an internationally recognized state, and therefore could not sign the Mine Ban Treaty, even if so inclined. While at one point officials had said that the Chechen Republic would be ready to sign the Mine Ban Treaty immediately,[1] with the resumption of the war in 1999, that position has reversed.
In response to queries by Landmine Monitor about current landmine policy, the Chechen representative in the US wrote in June 2001, “The position of the Chechen government has already been voiced by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1998, an announcement was made expressing support for the Ottawa process and the readiness of the Chechen Republic to sign the Ottawa Convention of 1997.... But, very regretfully, as a result of the aggression of the Russian Federation and the renewal of military actions on the territory of the Chechen Republic, now the active, wide-scale use of antipersonnel mines of various types and other explosive devices by the Russian army is again taking place.”[2]
A Chechen commander noted that the Chechen military recognizes the “necessity of prohibition of use of mines,” but that it is “compelled” to use “self-made fougasses” (improvised explosive devices) in its “struggle against the armed aggressor.”[3] Other Chechen fighters echoed this view.[4]
Production
It is unclear if, or how much, landmine production capability was located in Chechnya before the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It is believed that there had been no domestic production of mines in Chechnya although some plants have produced military materiel.[5]
In the current war Chechen forces are not believed to have mass-produced conventional antipersonnel mines, but are skilled at manufacturing homemade mines or improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The Chechen representative in the US, while acknowledging use of IEDs, said, “The Chechen Republic has no factories for making mines and consequently it is impossible to call the manufacturing of radio-controlled self-made explosive devices a real industry.”[6]
Regular monitoring of public sources by the Chechen NGO “Refugees Against Landmines” for this report indicates extensive use of radio controlled explosive devices by the rebel forces; one site details safety precautions during the manufacture of an explosive and details the characteristics of various types of mines and other kinds of weapons.[7]
According to the commander of a Russian engineers brigade who participated in mine clearance in Grozny and numerous other areas in Chechnya, sites for fabricating IEDs and other weapons were operating in Argun Gorge and Grozny until the moments of occupation.[8]
Transfer
Chechnya is not known to have exported mines. The landmines in Chechnya were brought in during Soviet times. During the first war, it appears that Chechens obtained antipersonnel mines from Russian soldiers and officers, and mines are also believed to have come from the Trans-Caucasus, delivered by groups on horseback across the mountains. Russian media regularly contends that weapons pass through Georgia to the rebels. On 18 December 2000, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze categorically denied these allegations.[9] Russian sources contend that with Argun Gorge blocked by Russian forces, the only way for rebels to obtain weapons is by pack animals.[10]
Landmine Monitor Report 2000 reported that rebels received mines through contacts in the Russian military.[11] A Chechen commander and various rebels told Landmine Monitor for this report that such supply of mines continue.[12]
One Russian report stated that among other things Chechens used “serial landmines of Western manufacturing.”[13] AVN, the military news agency, reported that Russian troops encounter mines of NATO origin, as well as World War II-vintage German antitank and antipersonnel mines. The Russian forces assume the modern mines came from Turkey.[14] There has been no independent confirmation of these allegations.
Stockpiling
It is not possible to get accurate information on the quantity or types of mines in Chechen stockpiles today. According to Mr. M. Arsaliev, the chief deminer of the Chechen Republic, the pre-war arsenal stored in the Chechen Republic consisted mainly of PMN, OZM-72, MON-50, MON-90, and MON-100 antipersonnel mines, and TM-62 antitank mines.[15]
Rebel forces appear to rely increasingly on IEDs, which would seem to indicate depleted stocks from the Soviet period. The Chechen representative in the US claimed, “The Chechen Army does not have and has never had antipersonnel mines in its arsenal, although army diversionary groups and guerrilla groups carrying out the struggle against the occupying regime rather frequently use, predominantly against armour, various kinds of self-made explosive devices.”[16]
Use
Although the conflict transitioned into a guerrilla-style war following the evacuation of Grozny in February 2000, both Russian and Chechen forces have continued to use antipersonnel landmines extensively. Fighting and mine use continues as this report goes to print. (For details on past use in the 1994-1996 conflict and the fighting post-September 1999, see relevant reports in Landmine Monitor Report 1999 and 2000.[17])
Use of Mines by Russian Forces[18]
Landmine Monitor Report 2000 noted that Chechens had made unverifiable claims that Russia has used between 200,000 and 300,000 mines since the fighting broke out in September 1999.[19] Subsequently, a Russian military official reportedly said at a press conference that Russian forces had sown more than 500,000 landmines in Chechnya.[20] More recently a Chechen commander and the Chechen representative in the US have contended that Russian troops have used 1.8 million mines in Chechnya. Accurate assessments are impossible while fighting continues.[21]
Russian officials, including at the highest military levels in the operation in Chechnya, admit the large-scale use of mines throughout the operations, but reject allegations of the indiscriminate use of landmines by the Russian forces in Chechnya. They contend that only “controllable minefields” and landmines equipped with self-deactivation and self-destruction mechanisms are being used in the area of conflict. They have also said that minefields have been mapped and in some cases marked and that mines used in temporary positions are removed when units change position.[22]
The Defense Ministry says that Russian engineers “carefully follow international landmine use requirements including those added during the International Convention in Geneva (1980). Federal units generally use transportable set of landmines TSL-1 and TSL-2 [VKPM-1 and VKPM-2 transportable sets of antipersonnel mines] to protect their positions. Moreover, dirigible [command-detonated] minefields DM-3 [UMP-3], signal mines and non-explosive obstacles were used.”[23] (For an analysis by the Russian military of mine warfare in operations in Chechnya, see the Use section of the country report on Russia).
Serious questions can be raised as to whether the methods of mine warfare and types of antipersonnel mines used by Russian forces have been consistent with Protocol II and Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons. Russia is a state party to the former and says it now bases its mine use on the latter.
Use of Mines by Chechen Rebels
On 20 April 2001, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution that “strongly condemns all...breaches of international humanitarian law perpetrated by Chechen fighters such as hostage-taking, torture and the indiscriminate use of landmines, booby-traps and other explosive devices aimed at causing widespread civilian casualties.”[24]
In comparing Chechen mine use in 1994-1996 to that since 1999, Russian Colonel-General N. I. Serdtsev acknowledged that the engineer units of the Chechen army have become highly proficient.[25] He said the rebel base stations are highly fortified, and while there was no real system of obstacles, booby-traps and IEDs were used more than ever. The increase in efficiency of the mine war is demonstrated by the increase of casualties among personnel and the destruction of machinery.
In a radio interview in March 2000, Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov stated that the decision to use mines is taken by junior commanders, in both Chechen and Russian forces, and that the use of antipersonnel mines and antitank mines would only increase with the beginning of the partisan war.[26]
In November 2000, the supreme commander of Chechen forces, General of Army Khalid Maskhadov, in an order “About prime tasks of the commanders of mobile battle groups” said: “To All commanders, having conducted the careful analysis of actions of the opponent to reveal the most probable locations of divisions of the Russian armies participating in this mayhem, mine these places around villages, observing safety measures. Mine roads leading to a village, already in the feature directly contiguous to occupied item, widely using radio-controlled mines.”[27]
Chechen rebels using guerrilla tactics rely heavily on mines and IEDs. The Chechens reportedly have used PMN, PMN-2, OZM-72, MON-100, and MON-200 mines, improvised cluster devices, grenades with tripwires and booby-traps.[28] Chechen fighters have used mines to retard the advance of Russian troops, as well as to complicate rebuilding of communication infrastructure, and along railroads, electrical supply lines and other such sites. Rebels are reported to regularly target railroads and trains accompanied by Russian forces. [29]
According to the commander the Russian Engineer troops, rebels mine highways with controllable and uncontrollable landmines of different types, antitank mines, and antipersonnel mines. He stated that they generally use ammunition they have found on the battlefields, and that mining usually takes place at night, but if the road is not well traveled, then also during the day. He noted that high authorities in Russia believe that the level of preparation, ammunition accumulation, deployment of workshops, laboratories producing self-made explosive devices and radio-activated fuzes, and elaboration of mine-explosive obstacles demonstrate the high level of organization of Chechen separatists.[30]
Landmine Problem
With the renewed fighting, it is impossible to get accurate information about mined areas, but given that very limited mine clearance took place after the 1994-96 war, the current situation can only be worse.[31]
For this report, the organization “Refugees Against Landmines” began interviewing Chechen refugees in the Pankisi Gorge of Akhmeta district in Georgia, in Azerbaijan, in Turkey and a small number of refugees in Ingushetia and Chechnya. Interviewing was carried out between November 2000 and March 2001. It is planned to continue such monitoring in the future.
Without a proper Level One Impact Survey, it is not possible to give an accurate assessment of the landmine problem. Estimates of the size of the problem varied widely, but in interviews carried out for Landmine Monitor, Chechen military and civilians claim that 80% of the territory is either mine-contaminated or can be presumed to have such a threat. Inhabitants of fifteen areas consider the problem to be urgent and a threat to themselves. These areas include: Groznenskii, Urus-Martanovskii, Shatoiskii, Itum-Kalinskii (former Sovetskii), Sharoiskii (former Sovetskii), Vedenskii, Galanchezhskii (former Vedenskii), Cheberloevskii (part of Vedenskii), Shalinskii (now separated from Kurchaloevskii and Argun), Kurchaloevskii, Achkhoi-Martanovskii, Nozhai-Yurtovskii, Gudermesskii, Novogroznenskii, and Staroyurtovskii
One Chechen commander said he estimates that some 9,000 square kilometers of foothills and mountainous regions have been mined. He said vacant houses and office buildings are mined, urban areas, villages, roads, fields and woods are mined, even on small mountainous paths, “so-called goat tracks.” He said that “huge” areas of agricultural land cannot be used.[33]
Overall, 92% of those interviewed for this report were aware of agricultural and forested areas that are mined. Some 56% knew of various buildings (i.e., apartment buildings, schools, hospitals) that are mined. Thirty-eight percent were aware of mined roads, bridges, and railroads. When asked if mined areas were marked, 80% answered that they were not marked. When asked if they knew of mine-free areas, 70% answered “no.” Some 34% said mines were cleared by Chechen forces, 14% by international organizations, 9% by Russian forces, 3% said by civilians and 15% had no answer.
Responses about specific mined areas included the following. Landmine Monitor was not in a position to verify any of these reports.
Male from Stariye Atagi village on 23 February: in January 2000 the forest near the village of Chiri-Yurt was mined; in January 2000 the area of dachas at the Shatoyskaya motorway was mined by Russian troops; in January 2000 Soip-Molla bridge was mined; in September 2000, the road between Argun and Gudermes was mined by Russian troops; in October 2000 a hospital in the Stariye-Atagi village was mined by Russian troops; in January 2001, school number 41 in Grozniy was mined. None of the mined areas was marked.
Ruslan from Avturi village, Shalinskiy region on 3 march 2001: On 13 April 2000, 3 square kilometers of pasture land at the northern outskirts of Avturi village was mined by Russian troops; on 3 of October 2000, 10 square kilometers of woodlands between Avturi and Serjen-Yurt villages was mined by Russian troops; on 17 November 2000 cottage camp was mined by Russian troops; on 15 November 1999, the house at 24 Ioseliani Str. in Grozniy was mined by Russian troops; on 27 November 1999 school number 8 in Grozniy was mined by Russian troops; on 20 December 1999 the surgery ward of the hospital number 9 in Grozniy was mined by Russian troops; on 1 January 2000 the road to the Serjen-Yurt was mined by Russian troops; on 12 January 2000 the railway station in Grozniy and on 11 January 2000 bridge in Germenchuk village was mined by Russian troops. None of the mined areas was marked.
Malika from Gudermes city on 26 February 2001: In July 2000 on the north of Gedermes city, 20 square kilometers of sovkhoz field was mined; in April 2000 pasture on the western outskirts of the Gedermes (1.5 square kilometers) was mined by Russian troops. In May 2000 the school and in March 2000 the regional hospital in Gudermes city were mined. In June 2000 the road between Rostov-Baku on the section near Jalka was mined by Russian troops. In September 2000 ailwal on exit from Gudermes city and a bridge over the Gums River were mined by Russian troops. None of the mined areas was marked.
Luiza from Vedeno village on February 2001: In 2000, 10 square kilometers of agricultural lands Sovkhoz “Rodina” were mined; on 15 May 2000 4 square kilometers of pasture was mined by Russian troops. The forest near the Serjen-Yurt village was mined by Russian troops. In September 1999 the dacha in Khankala was mined by Russian troops. In October 2000 “Stigl” airport in Grozniy was mined; in November 2000 the railway stations in Grozniy and Gudermes, and the bridge over the Bas River in Germenchuk village were mined by Russian troops. In November 2000 hospitals number 9 and 7 in Grozniy and in December 2000 the house for the blind at 8 March Str (9 floor) and schools 9, 18, 41 were mined by Russian troops. None of the mined areas was marked.
Rustam from Grozniy on 24 February 2001: On 20 August 2000, the vegetable garden near the house at 120 Avtorkhanov Ave. in Grozniy was mined by Russian troops. On 15 June 2000, at a cottage along Sovetskaya route 400 square meters was mined by Russian troops. On 9 May 2000, the house at 36 Gudermesskaya Str. in Grozniy was mined by Russian troops. On 6 May 2000, School number 30 (40 square meters) in Oktiabrskiy district in Grozniy was mined by Russian troops. In September 2000, the bridge over the Sunja River in Grozniy was mined by Russian troops. None of the mined areas was marked.
Albert from Grozniy on 25 February 2001: In April 2000, 800 square meters in District 96 in Grozniy was mined. In March 2000 the house at 4 Garajnaya Str. in Grozniy was mined by Russian troops. In July 2000 Town Hospital number 9 was mined by Russian troops. In March 2000 Staropromislovskaya motorway was mined by Russian troops. None of the mined areas was marked.
Akhmed from Vedeno village on 1 March 2001: In the Vedeno village: On 16 May 2000 a large agricultural plot in the Vedenskiy region near Eshelkhatoy and Neftianka villages was mined by Russian troops. On 20 June 2000, the regional rest park and areas bordering it were mined by Russian troops. In May 2000 Russian troops mined forests in the Vedenskiy region especially near Neftianka village. At the end of the May 2000 “Sovkhoz” fruit nursery and former building of the district committee of the Communist Party were mined by Russian troops. In May 2000, the Culture House of the Vedenskiy region and former boarding school building were mined by Russian troops. All schools in Vedeno village were destroyed. In May 2000 the regional hospital was mined by Russian troops. In June 2000, the bridge and road to Tsa-Vedeno village was mined by Russian troops. None of the mined areas was marked.
Eskerkhan from Duba-Yurt village, on 22 February 2001: In January 2001 Khankala cottage camp was mined by Russian troops; houses at 21, 19, 29, 30 Gudermesskaya Str. and 17, 19, 20 Avtorkhanov Ave. in Grozniy were mined by Russian troops. The bridge over the Sunja River in Grozniy was mined by Russian troops. None of the mined areas was marked.
Mine Clearance
HALO Trust conducted a mine assessment mission in January 1997 and proposed a demining project in cooperation with the Chechen army. For most of 1998 and 1999, it carried out programs in Chechnya and by the time of the 1999 Russian military offensive, HALO had trained both manual and mechanical clearance teams and had some 150 personnel working.[34] Operations were based in southwestern Chechnya. HALO was preparing to hand over management to Chechen personnel when the fighting began again. Operations were suspended in December 1999.
In August 2000, it was reported that Russia had accused HALO Trust of espionage and arrested several employees of the organization. The organization was charged with gathering military intelligence and providing it to Chechen rebels and field commanders.[35] Accusations also included illicit transit of engineering, communication, and military materiel for the rebels.[36] HALO flatly and vehemently denied the charges.[37]
Russian military have made contradictory statements about areas of Chechen territory they have cleared. For example, on 3 April 2000, the Russian Military News Agency reported that “160 hectares of land has been cleared of mines and prepared for plowing in the Pravoberezhny district. Engineers have surveyed 653 hectares of land in the Urus-Martan district.”[38] And on 24 April 2000, Russia – not long after declaring it had gained control over Grozny – declared the city “completely cleared of mines,” stating that “[o]ver 177,000 explosive devices and rounds of ammunition were rendered harmless.”[39]
Yet in July 2000, a Russian engineer being interviewed on Russian television described Chechnya as follows: “In innumerable areas in Chechnya, no man has set foot for several years now. It is dangerous to walk in woods, which have been mined by both our forces and the rebels. Since no minefields have been mapped, not even sappers take the risk. Civilians are blown up and farm animals killed by mines controlled by tripwires. The lofts and cellars of Grozny ruins are no less of a danger.”[40]
Russian engineering troops conduct mine detection and mine clearance operations on a daily basis, to support safe movement along the roads and railroads, and the safe operation of field water supply points. According to Russian sources, on average, the OGV combat engineers remove up to 20 mines or IEDs daily. From 1 October 1999 through 2 September 2000, they defused 1,747 mines and IEDs. The technical outfitting of the engineering subunits reportedly is lacking, and a large number of engineers have been killed or injured in clearance operations.[41]
Mine Awareness
The ICRC has launched a mine awareness program in Ingushetia. Its aim is to inform Internally Displace Persons (IDPs) of the dangers these weapons represent and to teach them some basic rules of behaviour in order to limit the risk of accidents when they return home. In March 2001 the ICRC mine awareness team, using locally produced teaching materials (posters and leaflets), gave 62 presentations to over 1,600 children in IDP camps.[42]
The ICRC mine awareness team provided mine awareness education to the Chechen children who came to stay in sanatoria in several republics and regions of the North Caucasus as a break from the dire living conditions in Chechnya. In Kabardino-Balkaria 46 presentations were given to 800 children. Ten performances of the puppet show "The danger of landmines - the new adventures of Cheerdig" were made to almost 3,000 children in sanatoria in Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, North Ossetia and Stavropol krai. The ICRC also provided over 2,600 of these children with school kits.
Since June 2000, in close cooperation with UNICEF, UNHCR’s mine awareness project has reached 15,000 youth and children in Ingushetia and Chechnya.[43] The UNICEF/UNHCR campaign of sensitization initially developed 15,000 mine awareness posters and 20,000 leaflets that have been distributed in all IDP camps in Ingushetia and in certain key locations in Grozny City. In 2001, a further 20,000 posters and leaflets will be distributed in Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan. The program includes training of local people in mine awareness education. In September 2000 a mine awareness training course was conducted in Ingushetia for UN, NGO and government partners which included teachers, psychologists and Ingush Ministry of Education counterparts. Later in November 2000, an intensive training workshop for 30 teachers, psychologists and youth leaders from the Grozny and Kurchaloi area was held. Approximately 400 Chechen teachers will be trained in 2001.[44]
Landmine Casualties
Landmine Monitor Report 2000 noted that by the outbreak of war in September 1999, there were approximately 3,500 people registered by the Ministry of Public Health in the Chechen Republic as needing artificial limbs. Of those, Chechen Health Ministry officials estimated up to 20 percent were mine victims.[45]
In May 2001, the Chechen Minister of Public Health reported to the Landmine Monitor researcher that the greatest number of mine incidents were noted “in the summer-autumn period of 2000. In only one Nojay-Yurt district in 2000 more than 160 cases of mine/explosive traumas of the civilian inhabitants were reported. The same picture can be seen in all others areas of Chechnya.”[46]
The Public Health Minister said that in August of 2000, he and a group of doctors began an attempt to calculate the number of people killed and wounded in the war, using information from all parts of Chechnya. The Minister said that the group believes that “today more than 8,000 people need artificial limbs. But taking into account that over the last months the mine-explosive traumas prevail, it is possible to predict that people needing artificial limbs will range from 14,000 to 16,000.”[47]
There is no complete official data on the number of landmine casualties in Chechnya. However, in April 2001 the ICRC stated that the “constant increase in the number of landmine and unexploded ordnance victims among the civilian population in Chechnya is of particular concern.”[48] On an almost daily basis information is received on mine and IED incidents, particularly among the Russian and Chechen armed forces. Many incidents involving civilians do not get reported in the media.
Based on an examination of numerous Russian media reports, in the year 2000, at least 66 people were killed and more than 162 injured in incidents involving landmines and IEDs. Civilians accounted for about half of those killed and injured.[49]
From May 2000 to March 2001, the Human Rights Investigation Bureau of Chechnya conducted field research in the southeastern region of Chechnya, and in Ingushetia. The surveys provided information, additional to that reported in the Russian media, on thirty-six people killed and twenty-one injured in landmine blasts in 2000. Further information was given on at least forty people killed and fourteen injured before 2000. Casualties included twenty-three children.[50] Data was also collected from hospitals and medical points on 279 mine casualties recorded during 1999 and 2000.[51]
Landmine casualties Male % Female % Total Percentage
Adult 210 75.3% 27 9.7% 85%
Child 38 13.6% 4 1.4% 15%
Activity at the Time of Accident Number of casualties Percentage
Collecting wood/food/water/metal 47 16.85%
Walking 38 13.6%
Farming 30 10.75%
Walking near explosion area 29 10.4%
Military 25 9.0%
Tending Livestock 21 7.5%
Playing/Recreation 21 7.5%
Travelling By Vehicle 17 6.1%
Clearing yard/house 14 5.0%
Demining 1 0.4%
Unknown 36 12.9%
Type of Device Number of Accidents Percentage
Antipersonnel Mine 80 28.7%
Booby Trap 57 20.4%
Antitank mine 20 7.2%
Other UXO 15 5.4%
Fuse 7 2.5%
Cluster munitions 5 1.8%
Unknown 95 34.0%
The Human Rights Investigation Bureau also distributed surveys on landmine issues to 260 refugees in Ingushetia and 160 in the Chechen Republic during the field research period.[52] More questionnaires were available for distribution, however, threats to researchers and the confiscation of an additional 120 surveys made continuing the research difficult.
In other field research, in May 2000, the Chechen NGO “Refugees Against Landmines,” began interviewing Chechen refugees in the Pankisi Gorge of Akhmeta district in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Ingushetia, and in Chechnya, about their knowledge of the landmine problem and mine victims in Chechnya. In the first round of interviews, 87% percent of those interviewed knew of people killed or injured by mines in Chechnya; 51% had relatives who had been injured. Over the course of the research information was obtained on another twenty-seven civilians killed or injured by mines in 2000.[53]
During the period 16 March to 30 April 2000, MSF Holland undertook an assessment of 56 health facilities in 11 districts of Chechnya. It was reported by 66% of the facilities that gunshot wounds and mine injuries were among the three main causes of mortality in adults. In another assessment undertaken in August 2000, 23 facilities in the city of Grozny and adjacent district, city of Argun, Shali and Shatoy, it was reported that 67% of all casualties related to hostilities were due to mine and UXO injuries. Women and children were reported as suffering 41% of all injuries relating to hostilities and 34% of all landmine and UXO injuries. In August alone 170 casualties related to the hostilities were identified.[54]
UNICEF is currently developing a Mine Victim Database using the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). With the assistance of the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action a six-day Data Gathering and Data Entry Workshop was conducted. Data gathering on mine victims in Chechnya has begun and the information will be used to direct victims to available services.[55] Local NGO, Voice of the Mountains (VoM), is the focal point for collecting mine incident data from a number of sources, including WHO, ICRC, MSF and VESTA monitors in the IDP camps.[56]
Since October 2000, 648 mine/UXO victims have been identified inside Chechnya and entered into the VoM database. In a recently commenced assessment in Ingushetia, 11 victims have so far been identified in what is an on-going process. In a survey by VESTA monitors in May 2001, 35 people with mine/UXO injuries were identified.[57]
Survivor Assistance
Chechnya has historically been one of the poorest of the Soviet republics. The health care system was inadequate before the 1994-96 war and even then ill equipped to handle war victims. Two-thirds of hospitals and clinics were destroyed in that war and those that remained at the outbreak of renewed fighting were running at around 30% of their original capacity.
In January 2001, the Minister of Public Health Services of the Russian Administration of Chechnya, Uvays Magomadov, announced on Russian television that 360 million roubles ($12.84 million) would be provided to fifty hospitals, and 700 million roubles ($25 million) for thirty polyclinics, in Chechnya.[58]
There is no precise information on assistance available to civilian mine victims in Chechnya. It is believed that many civilian mine victims do not survive the initial explosion because of the lack of accessible medical facilities, or the fear of being mistaken as fighters if they seek assistance. Some mine victims receive assistance in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey from international organizations including the ICRC, MSF, and Islamic Relief. The situation is better for Russian military, as mine victims receive medical care in military hospitals and subsequent rehabilitation.
The Russian Center of Disaster Medicine (RCDM) “Zaschita” operated health services for civilians in the northern Caucasus in 1999 and 2000. According to data extracted from RCDM records activities included assistance for mine victims. The records did not differentiate between the victims of mines/UXO and other firearm casualties. Between October 1999 and September 2000 in various centers medical assistance was provided to 964 landmine/UXO and firearm casualties.[59]
UNICEF and UNHCR work in close cooperation with WHO and ICRC to provide a comprehensive approach to survivor assistance by facilitating services for the physical and psychosocial rehabilitation of victims.[60]
UNHCR, with the assistance of a doctor in a counseling center in Nazran, run by local NGO VESTA, has facilitated emergency assistance to 35 victims of war, many of them children with serious eye injuries and other severe trauma because of the hostilities. Through its implementing partner Handicap International, UNHCR is providing wheelchairs and crutches to vulnerable victims of war in Ingushetia and Chechnya.[61]
Handicap International has distributed 1,000 walking sticks, 1,000 pairs of crutches and 250 wheelchairs in Chechnya, where they work with local NGOs. HI has also been involved in training local technicians, and providing equipment and material in relation to the proposed re-opening of an orthopedic workshop in Grozny.[62]
According to the World Health Organization, “As a result of two armed conflicts in the Republic of Chechnya during the last decade, approximately 7,000 citizens of the republic have lost or damaged a limb and are currently in need of prosthetic and/or orthopedic care. In addition, approximately 400 amputees are among the internally displaced population (IDP) in Ingushetia.”[63]
The exact number of amputations as a result of mine injuries is not known as identifying mine victims is difficult because of their fear of being accused of involvement in military operations.[64] In April 2000, WHO commenced a new emergency program on prosthetic assistance by supporting a prosthetic workshop in Vladikavkaz.[65] The Vladikavkaz Center for the Rehabilitation of Disabled Persons currently treats about 35 patients each week.[66] Between May and December 2000, staff provided 121 new prostheses and repaired 36 old prostheses.[67] In the period from May 2000 to June 2001, about 250 amputees received prostheses, more than 1,500 disabled persons received orthopedic devices and 16 amputees were re-operated on to correct defective stumps and make them fit for a prosthesis.[68] Following a special agreement with the administration of the Vedeno region in Chechnya, since the summer of 2000 Chechen amputees are allowed to travel to Vladikavkaz in a special mini-bus for treatment.[69] UNICEF supports the workshop both logistically and by providing prostheses, orthoses, wheelchairs and walking sticks for injuries related to the hostilities.[70]
UNICEF provides psychosocial counseling at the Vladikavkaz Center.[71] UNICEF is also assisting in the reintegration of war victims through vocational training, at the Sleptsovskaya Technical College in Nazran. Currently 60 people are receiving training.[72]
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[1] Interview with Ilias Akhmadov, Chechen Minister of Foreign Affairs, 21 December 1998.
[2] Letter to Jody Williams, Mary Wareham and Zarema Mazaeva, from Lyoma Usmanov, The Representative of the Chechen Government to the United States, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, 19 June 2001.
[3] Interview with I.T. Tauzov, assistant commander of the Southwestern Front of the Chechen forces, 20 February 2001.
[4] Interviews with groups of Chechen rebels, Grozny, 24 September 2000.
[5] Interview with worker at Anisimov plant, in Baku, 7 January 2001; 1999 interviews with former chief technologist of Electropribor plant, Mr. A.Z. Satuev; laboratory assistant at Anisimov plant, Mr. T. Larsaev; and former engineer at Krasny Molot plant, Mr. T. Akhmetkhanov.
[6] Letter to Jody Williams, Mary Wareham and Zarema Mazaeva, from Lyoma Usmanov, The Representative of the Chechen Government to the United States, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, 19 June 2001.
[7] The monitoring includes materials from more than 50 web sites; Chechen, Georgian and Russian newspapers; and TV programs. It includes informational agencies, newspapers, television and radio daily news; ORT, RTR, NTV Russian national television; Russian Television Channel TV 6; Kavkaz-Tsentr News Agency, www.kavkaz.org; www.kvestnik.org; www.marsho.org; www.nohchy.org.ge; www.chechnyaonline.com; www.amina.com; www.utro.ru; www.nns.ru; www.smi.ru; www.polit.ru; www.lenta.krasnet.ru; www.ykt.ru; www.strana.ru; www.svobodnaya-gruziya.com; www.nvo.ng.ru; www.allnews.ru; www.gazeta.ru; www.redstar.ru; www.inguk.ru; www.presscenter.ru; www.strana.ru; www.rbc.ru; www.txt.ntv.ru; www.vremya.ru; ÈÒÀÐ-ÒÀÑÑ www.itar-tass.lv; www.deadline.ru; www.interfax.ru; www.militarynews.ru; AVN (Russian Military News Agency); www.polk.ru; www.echo.ru; www.hro.org//memo.ru.
[8] Oleg Petrovskiy, “Where do the rebels get their explosives?,” Utro (electronic daily newspaper, www.utro.ru), 7 July 2000.
[9] Black Sea Press, News Agency of the Countries of the Black Sea Region, Tbilisi, Georgia, Edition 1, 18 December 2000.
[10] Evgeniy Mikhaylov, “Movement of Russian Troops and Police in Grozny is complicated by the Presence of Minefields and the Various Tricks of Fighters in Defensive Positions,” ITAR-TASS, 26 December 2000. (Through site of “News Server of the Yakut City Information Entertainment Server”: http://www.ykt.ru/news/122799/tass.htm).
[11] Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 865.
[12] Interview with I.T. Tauzov, assistant commander of the Southwestern Front of the Chechen forces, 20 February 2001; interview with a group of Chechen fighters, 15 January 2001.
[13] “Segodnya” (news program), NTV Russian national television, 11pm, 6 March 2000.
[14] “The rebels are ready to unleash mine war,” SMI.RU, 2 July 2000. (http://www.smi.ru/2000/02/07/949929682).
[15] 1999 interview with Mr. M. Arsaliev, chief deminer of the Chechen Republic.
[16] Letter to Jody Williams, Mary Wareham and Zarema Mazaeva, from Lyoma Usmanov, The Representative of the Chechen Government to the United States, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, 19 June 2001.
[17] Available through the Landmine Monitor researcher for Russia is “The Chronicle of Mine War in Chechnya: Year 2000,” which gives a month-by-month snapshot of mine-related operations/incidents in the war, gleaned from a survey of the media throughout the year.
[18] For a more detailed description of Russian use of mines in Chechnya, see the Russia country report in this book.
[19] “Chechens Say Russians Laid 300,000 Mines,” Kavkaz-Tsentr News Agency (Internet), 5 June 2000.
[20] “Russia Admits: Land Mines all over Chechnya,” Agency Caucusus, 10 January 2001. This was re-stated in the letter of Lyoma Usamov of 19 June 2001, which stated, “The Russian command, several months after the beginning of war, ‘boasted' about its 'achievements,' declaring that they planted half a million mines against 'the Chechen terrorists.’ (http: // www.chechenpress.com/news/ru/06_2001/12 _19_06.shtml).”
[21] Interview with I.T. Tauzov, assistant commander of Southwest Front of the Chechen forces, 20 February 2001. This number was also stated in the letter of 19 June 2001 of Chechen Representative Lyoma Usmanov.
[22] Interview with Lieutenant-General Nikolai Serdtsev, December 1999; “Night Patrol of ‘Fittermice,’” Rossiyskaya Gazeta (official daily newspaper of Russian government), 21 January 2000.
[23] Deputy Chief of the Military Engineering University, Major General A. Nizhalovskii's report during a virtual roundtable discussion of engineer equipment of military operations in Chechnya, Armeyskiy sbornik (Army collection), No. 6, June 2000, pp. 35-40. (Armeyskiy sbornik is a specialized monthly analytical periodical covering a wide range of military-related issues and problems. It contains a “roundtable section” which is a “virtual roundtable” in which various military authors may publish articles on a given subject.
[24] United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/24, “Situation in the Republic of Chechnya of the Russian Federation,” E/CN.4/RES/2001/24, 20 April 2001.
[25] N.I. Serdtsev, commander of the Engineer troops of the Defense Ministry of Russia, “Anti-terrorist operation in Caucasia: main lessons and conclusions,” roundtable report for Voyennaya mysl (Military Thought), No. 4, 2000, pp. 20-24.
[26] Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov, interview to Radio Svoboda, March 2000.
[27] Order of the Supreme commander-in-chief, Chechen Forces, General of Army Khalid Maskhadov, “About prime tasks of the commanders of mobile battle groups,” ¹ 502, 19 November 2000.
[28] TV news by ORT, NTV, RTR among others; interviews with federal soldiers and officers participating in combat actions in Chechnya.
[29] “Railway Connection with Chechnya Will Soon Resume,” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye (weekly) 26 November – 3 December 1999; “The Federal Center is Fully Determined,” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, 10-16 December 1999; “What is Grozny like after the Thunder?” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 11 February 2000.
[30] N.I. Serdtsev, commander of the Engineer troops of the Defense Ministry of Russia, “Anti-terrorist operation in Caucasia: main lessons and conclusions,” roundtable report for Voyennaya mysl, No. 4, 2000, pp. 20-24.
[31] For details of the mine problem resulting from the 1994-96 fighting, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 844. See also Landmine Monitor Report 2000, pp. 870-871, for a description of the problem by the end of that monitoring period.
[33] Interview with I.T. Tauzov, assistant commander of the Southwestern Front of the Chechen forces, 20 February 2001.
[34] See HALO Trust website: www.halotrust.org, visited 20 June 2001.
[35] ITAR-TASS, 10 August 2000,
(http://www.itar-tass.lv/ru/showit.sql?LANG=ru&IO=0&IB=0&ID=16147)
[36] ÍÒÂ, http://www.vremya.ru/2000/100/events/53.html.
[37] Alexander Sobolev, “FSB [Federal Security Services] Accuses the international organization ‘HALO-TRUST’ of rendering assistance to rebels,” (Interview with the director of HALO Trust Gay Willobe), Vremia novostey, Number 100, 10 August 2000. (http://www.vremya.ru/2000/100/events/53.html).
[38] “Plowland Cleared of Mines, Rebels Detained in Chechnya,” AVN (Russian Military News Agency), 3 April 2000.
[39] Olga Allenova, “’Mine Warfare’ Seen Continuing in Grozny,” Moscow Kommersant (daily newspaper), 25 April 2000, p.1.
[40] “Mine Clearance Experts Tell of Dangers in Chechnya,” Vesti (newscast), RTR Moscow Russian TV, 5 July 2000.
[41] “Russian Combat Engineers Fight ‘Mine War’ in Chechnya,” Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye (Russian weekly independent military newspaper), 13-19 October 2000.
[42] ICRC, “Emergency action of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement for the North Caucasus and the South of Russia (March 2001),” 21 May 2001.
[43] Email from Vera Soboleva, PI Officer, UNHCR Moscow, 28 June 2001.
[44] Tehnaz Dastoor, “UNICEF’s Mine Action Activities Overview”, Health in Action – in the North Caucasus, Newsletter on Emergency Preparedness and Response, WHO – Europe, May 2001, pp. 8-9.
[45] For further details see Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 873.
[46] Email to Zarema Mazaeva from Oumar Khanbiev, Minister of Public Health of the Chechen Republic-Ichkeria, 1 May 2001.
[47] Ibid.
[48] ICRC Update, “Emergency action of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement for the North Caucasus and the South of Russia (February 2001),” 9 April 2001.
[49] Landmine Monitor collated information on landmine incidents and casualties in Chechnya from 116 Russian newspaper articles.
[50] Complete information from interviewees is available from Landmine Monitor.
[51] The information was collated from 279 accident report forms obtained by the researchers from hospitals and medical points.
[52] Complete information from interviewees is available from Landmine Monitor.
[53] Interviewing began on 1 May 2000 and continued until mid-June, by which time approximately 100 refugees had been interviewed. Interviewing again took place between November 2000 and March 2001. In the second period, some 325 refugees responded to written questionnaires and another 137 were interviewed. Complete information from interviewees is available upon request.
[54] See UNICEF proposal, “Landmine and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) awareness education in the North Caucasus (Russian Federation),” UNMAS Mine Action Portfolio, p. 192.
[55] Email from Tehnaz Dastoor, UNICEF Mine Action Coordinator, Northern Caucasus, 22 June 2001.
[56] UNICEF Humanitarian Action: Northern Caucasus Donor Update, 27 April 2001.
[57] Email from Vera Soboleva, PI Officer, UNHCR Moscow, 4 July 2001.
[58] NTV Russian TV kanal news program, 23 January 2001.
[59] Information provided in the draft report on Russia for Landmine Monitor.
[60] UNICEF Humanitarian Action: Northern Caucasus Donor Update, 27 April 2001, http://www.reliefweb.int.
[61] Email from Vera Soboleva, PI Officer, UNHCR Moscow, 28 June 2001.
[62] Email from Leo MacGillivray, Program Officer, Handicap International, 28 June 2001.
[63] “Providing Prosthetic Assistance in the North Caucasus,” World Health Organization Emergency Assistance Programme for the North Caucasus, Russian Federation, Technical Field Report Series, March 2001, p. 2.
[64] Email from Irina Tarakanova, AA/WHO Moscow, 5 July 2001.
[65] WHO has been supporting the center in Vladikavkaz since 1997. “Providing Prosthetic Assistance in the North Caucasus”, World Health Organization Emergency Assistance Programme for the North Caucasus, Russian Federation, Technical Field Report Series, March 2001, p. 3.
[66] UNICEF Humanitarian Action: Northern Caucasus Donor Update, 27 April 2001. http://www.reliefweb.int.
[67] “Providing Prosthetic Assistance in the North Caucasus”, World Health Organization Emergency Assistance Programme for the North Caucasus, Russian Federation, Technical Field Report Series, March 2001, pp. 3-4.
[68] Email from Irina Tarakanova, AA/WHO Moscow, 5 July 2001.
[69] “Providing Prosthetic Assistance in the North Caucasus”, World Health Organization Emergency Assistance Programme for the North Caucasus, Russian Federation, Technical Field Report Series, March 2001, pp. 3-4.
[70] Email from Tehnaz Dastoor, UNICEF Mine Action Coordinator, Northern Caucasus, 22 June 2001.
[71] “Providing Prosthetic Assistance in the North Caucasus”, World Health Organization Emergency Assistance Programme for the North Caucasus, Russian Federation, Technical Field Report Series, March 2001, p. 5.
[72] Tehnaz Dastoor, “UNICEF’s Mine Action Activities Overview”, Health in Action – in the North Caucasus, Newsletter on Emergency Preparedness and Response, WHO – Europe, May 2001, p. 9.