TheGodlessUtopian
19th January 2013, 21:24
The following is a study guide to comrade Mao Tse-tung’s Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_12.htm). Written in 1936 during the war against Nationalist government, this text is one of several vital pieces in understanding Mao’s conception of warfare.For clarity all of the questions and answers I have provided myself. This guide may be freely redistributed.
~ ~ ~
Chapter One: How to Study War
Q1: Define the three laws of war.
A1: The first is simply the law of war which dictates that anyone directing a war must study, the second is the law of revolutionary law, while the third is the law of China’s revolutionary war. To comrade Mao each possessed a specific study demand which revealed details of how to successfully conduct armed conflict.
Q2: What does Mao describe war as?
A2: Mao describes war as the “…highest form of struggle for resolving contradictions.” Between nations, classes, states or political groups, this type of conflict has existed since the dawn of private property and has exacerbated with capitalism’s development.
Q3: Why did Mao reject the belief that it was possible to study the laws of war in general?
A3: Mao rejected this first incorrect belief because during the time of China’s second revolutionary war “the laws of war” meant information published by the reactionary nationalist government, materials which were imported from western nations with environmental conditions very different from China. Attempting to apply such foreign conditions to use within an army which operated under such foreign manners would have resulted in defeat.
Q4: Why did Mao reject the view that it was enough to study the revolutionary war in Russia?
A4: Like studying war in general, restraining one’s analysis to merely Russia, simply because the Russian revolutionaries were communists, amounts to, once again, applying foreign conditions to an unsuitable setting (or as Mao described it “cutting the feet to fit the shoe”). While closer in form to China’s conditions, Russia still lacked the exact formation which China saw at the time of Mao’s writing.
Q5: Why did Mao reject imitating the experience of the Northern Expedition?
A5: Primarily because that while the Northern Expedition gave some invaluable knowledge on warfare the conditions which were prevalent than, in city taking, were no longer relevant during 1936. This meant that the circumstances of war are different and experiences should not be copied wholesale and applied mechanically.
Q6: In terms of proficient commanders what did Mao value and say was needed?
A6: Mao spoke of the need to have commanders who were proficient in many styles of command as well as proficient in several localities. He spoke of needing commanders who, “directors of war”, who could operate in more than one field while playing a significant role in the revolution. Those commanders who weren’t able to develop into more than a single command style and post could still be helpful yet ultimately could only play a minor role within the revolution.
Q7: Mao paradoxically states that the aim of war is to eliminate war, explain.
A7: Mao speaks here in a very stagist sense where the path to communist society, to no war, is through the erection of just wars (socialist wars) to counter-act the unjust wars (reactionary wars). He says, “…to oppose counter-revolutionary war with revolutionary war, to oppose national counter-revolutionary war with national revolutionary war, and to oppose counter-revolutionary class war with revolutionary class war. History knows only two kinds of war, just and unjust. We support just wars and oppose unjust wars. All counter-revolutionary wars are unjust, all revolutionary wars are just.” Here he stresses that communist study of war is to prevent war and that in the end, when communism has been achieved, there will be no more wars of any kind.
Q8: What is a war situation?
A8: A war situation is an area of combat. This locale may cover the whole world or simply a single zone within a country. Any such situation demands serious study of all the problems which present themselves.
Q9: What is the “task of the science of strategy”?
A9: To study those laws which direct a war situation as a whole.
Q10: What is the task of the “science of campaigns” and the “science of tactics”?
A10: To study the laws which govern the war situation in a partial location (connected to the wider war situation).
Q11: Why does a commander need to understand a campaign’s tactical and strategy laws?
A11: This is “Because an understanding of the whole facilitates the handling of the part, and because the part is subordinate to the whole.” In other words one cannot understand how to proceed on the over-all stage without understanding how the individual units would move. “The view that strategic victory is determined by tactical successes alone is wrong because it overlooks the fact that victory or defeat in a war is first and foremost a question of whether the situation as a whole and its various stages are properly taken into account. If there are serious defects or mistakes in taking the situation as a whole and its various stages into account, the war is sure to be lost.” Strategically speaking, one bad move can cause disaster for the war situation as a whole.
Q12: Why cannot a situation be detached from its parts and become independent of them?
A12: This is because each war situation is made up from the sum of all its parts. “Sometimes certain parts may suffer destruction or defeat without seriously affecting the situation as a whole, because they are not decisive for it. Some defeats or failures in tactical operations or campaigns do not lead to deterioration in the war situation as a whole, because they are not of decisive significance. But the loss of most of the campaigns making up the war situation as a whole, or of one or two decisive campaigns, immediately changes the whole situation. Here, ‘most of the campaigns’ or ‘one or two campaigns’ are decisive. In the history of war, there are instances where defeat in a single battle nullified all the advantages of a series of victories, and there are also instances where victory in a single battle after many defeats opened up a new situation. In those instances the ‘series of victories’ and the ‘many defeats’ were partial in nature and not decisive for the situation as a whole, while ‘defeat in a single battle’ or ‘victory in a single battle’ played the decisive role. All this explains the importance of taking into account the situation as a whole.” What is most important for the person in command is attending to the situation as a whole; of how to group his forces, the relations between campaigns and stages, that if he ignores these points than set-backs will become epidemic.
Q13: What is the relationship between “the whole and the part”?
A13: Plainly put it is the relationship between strategy and campaign and campaign and tactics. That the importance of decisive action is not governed by abstract notions but by concrete circumstances (point of assault, terrain, enemy forces, supplies, etc).
Q14: What are the problems of strategy?
A14: Mao says that giving proper consideration to the relationship of “the enemy and ourselves, between various campaigns and various operations stages, those parts which have a bearing on (are decisive for) the situation as a whole, special features contained within the general situation, [and] the relation between the front and the rear.” None of these questions can be determined without hard thinking and certainly are not limited to the mentioned (as other questions include problems of command, manner of war, and action).
Q15: Why does Mao stress the importance of learning for commanders?
A15: War is a difficult art to learn and even harder to apply, hence it is important to have commanders who are dedicated and willing to infuse their previous combat knowledge with the constantly updating mental track of information.
Mao said:
“A commander's correct dispositions stem from his correct decisions, his correct decisions stem from his correct judgements, and his correct judgements stem from a thorough and necessary reconnaissance and from pondering on and piecing together the data of various kinds gathered through reconnaissance. He applies all possible and necessary methods of reconnaissance, and ponders on the information gathered about the enemy's situation, discarding the dross and selecting the essential, eliminating the false and retaining the true, proceeding from the one to the other and from the outside to the inside; then, he takes the conditions on his own side into account, and makes a study of both sides and their interrelations, thereby forming his judgements, making up his mind and working out his plans. Such is the complete process of knowing a situation which a military man goes through before he formulates a strategic plan, a campaign plan or a battle plan. But instead of doing this, a careless military man bases his military plans on his own wishful thinking, and hence his plans are fanciful and do not correspond with reality. A rash military man relying solely upon enthusiasm is bound to be tricked by the enemy, or lured on by some superficial or partial aspect of the enemy's situation, or swayed by irresponsible suggestions from subordinates that are not based on real knowledge or deep insight, and so he runs his head against a brick wall, because he does not know or does not want to know that every military plan must be based on the necessary reconnaissance and on careful consideration of the enemy's situation, his own situation, and their interrelations.”
If the information newly gleamed does not correspond to the situation at hand than it is up to the commander to develop new strategies which do fit the situation at hand, of creating a strategy which corresponds to reality; this can only be done if they are willing to learn. Learning, overcoming contradictions, and applying the new insights (especially when it applies to the political atmosphere and nature of enemy troops) to overcome the enemy are all necessities to emerging victorious from the war situation.
Chapter 2: The Chinese Communist Party and China’s Revolutionary War
Q16: What were three stages of China’s revolutionary war?
A16: The first stage was from 1924-1927, its beginning, while the second stage began in 1927-1936. It is during this third time period where the national revolutionary war began.
Q17: What were the main enemies in China’s revolutionary war?
A17: The main enemies of China during this moment in time were Imperialism and feudal forces.
Q18: Which body led the Chinese revolutionary war?
A18: The Chinese Communist Party. This is because the other forces, all strata of the bourgeoisie and peasantry were limited in outlook and could not muster resistance or lead China in the direction where freedom and prosperity would be plentiful.
Chapter Three: Characteristics of China’s Revolutionary War
Q19: What are the four characteristics of China’s Revolutionary War?
A19: To quote comrade Mao:
“Thus the four principal characteristics of China's revolutionary war are: a vast semi-colonial country which is unevenly developed politically and economically and which has gone through a great revolution; a big and powerful enemy; a small and weak Red Army; and the agrarian revolution. These characteristics determine the line for guiding China's revolutionary war as well as many of its strategic and tactical principles. It follows from the first and fourth characteristics that it is possible for the Chinese Red Army to grow and defeat its enemy. It follows from the second and third characteristics that it is impossible for the Chinese Red Army to grow very rapidly or defeat its enemy quickly; in other words, the war will be protracted and may even be lost if it is mishandled.”
It is from these specific characteristics which grew the specific strategy in which the Red Army was led to victory.
Q20: List some of the “matters of principal” or the military line of the Party.
A20: Since there are many I will keep the list to the most relevant. Namely:
1. Opposing adventurism when on the offensive, opposing conservatism when on the defensive while opposing fightism when shifting from one place to another.
2. Opposing guerrilla-ism in the Red Army while recognizing its guerrilla character.
3. Opposing protracted campaigns and a strategy of quick decision, and uphold the strategy of protracted war and campaigns of quick decision.
4. Opposing fixed battle lines and positional warfare, and favour fluid battle lines and mobile warfare.
5. Opposing fighting merely to rout the enemy, and uphold fighting to annihilate the enemy.
6. Opposing the principle of maintaining one large rear area, and uphold the principle of small rear areas.
7. Opposing an absolutely centralized command, and favour a relatively centralized command.
8. Opposing an incorrect, sectarian policy on cadres, and uphold the correct policy on cadres.
Those were but a few. It is important to remember that opposing bandit and warlord ways, rejecting isolationism, and upholding proper discipline while understanding that the Red Army was the propaganda vehicle of the revolution were also vital points.
Chapter Four: “Encirclement and Suppression” and Counter-Campaigns Against It—The Main Patterns of China’s Civil War.
Q21: What form did the Red Army’s operations manifest as?
A21: The Red Army’s military operations took the form of counter-campaigns to the enemy’s encirclement and suppression campaigns. This meant countering the enemy by blunting their offensive and turning the strategic defensive into a strategic offensive.
Q22: What were the special characteristics of the Red Army’s operations?
A22: As in any war where the pattern is of “attack” and “defend” the Red Army abided by these rules only with a focus on “repeated alteration”. This meant “In each ‘encirclement and suppression’ campaign, the enemy employs the offensive against the Red Army's defensive, and the Red Army employs the defensive against his offensive; this is the first stage of a counter-campaign against ‘encirclement and suppression’. Then the enemy employs the defensive against the Red Army's offensive, and the Red Army employs the offensive against his defensive; this is the second stage of the counter-campaign. Every ‘encirclement and suppression’ campaign has these two stages, and they alternate over a long period.” Properly defending against the enemy then meeting his offensive with a counter-offensive, whereupon the enemy turns defensive, the Red Army then moves to assault the enemy’s defense. This is the basic out-line of the special characteristics; that this process is repeated over a long time.
Q23: How is this process different during each encounter?
A23: The process of repeated alteration is unique in each outcome in the sense that when the Red Army suffers partial defeats the scope of the counter-campaign against encirclement and suppression becomes smaller, while when the Red Army wins atrial victories the scope becomes more complicated and large. This was exemplified during the Kuomintang’s Fifth Encirclement and Suppression campaign where the Red Army’s strategic defensive was broken by the enemy resulting in great loses in both men and bases. This meant that the scope of the counter-campaigns in the future would necessarily be of a smaller scale. In this manner when the Red Army is successful, and soldiers and Party members flock to their banner, the counter-campaigns become more impressive and convoluted as more manpower is involved.
Q24: What constitutes a partial defeat for the enemy?
A24: As Mao explained: “It is a strategic defeat for the enemy when his ‘encirclement and suppression’ campaign is broken and our defensive becomes an offensive, when the enemy turns to the defensive and has to reorganize before launching another ‘encirclement and suppression’ campaign.” Following this logic is also necessitates that once such conditions have been achieved the Red Army would have won a partial victory.
Q25: During this time period what constituted “Left-Opportunism”?
A25: In essence Left-Opportunism took the form of rejecting the line of repeated alteration, of the protracted nature of the civil war, and embracing instead of a conventional warfare which advocated assaulting the cities while calling for an armed uprising; the belief to this being that the war could be won in quick order, that the Red Army should never adopt defensive measures and should always implement offensive ones. Such, of course, is simply not possible. Implementation of this line leads to disaster.
Q26: When does this pattern of repeated encirclement and suppression campaigns come to an end?
A26: Mao theorized that such a pattern would only come to an end when the fundamental balance of forces dynamically shifted; when either the Red Army or the Nationalist Army gained a profound advantage in both the military and political field. This means that once the Red Army gained the upper hand and was able to employ their own encirclement and suppression campaigns, with the realization that the Nationalists would not be able to muster the same kind of resistance in which the Red Army showed due to political and military conditions, this repeated, protracted, pattern would end.
Chapter Five: The Strategic Defensive
Q27: Define the differences between Active Defense and Passive Defense.
A27: Explained simply active defense is when one defends with the intention of launching a counter-attack while passive defense is simply defending for the sake of defending. As Mao said: “Active defence is also known as offensive defence, or defence through decisive engagements. Passive defence is also known as purely defensive defence or pure defence. Passive defence is actually a spurious kind of defence, and the only real defence is active defence, defence for the purpose of counter-attacking and taking the offensive.” The difference lies in reaction.
Q28: What were the two deviations which arose in regards to the enemy?
A28: Mao explained that the two deviations were tendencies which either belittled the enemy, or thus caused unnecessary fighting which annihilated Red Army units, or the tendency to overestimate the enemy which caused Red Army commanders to embark on a series of retreats without any active defense.
Q29: When an armed uprising is launched why mustn’t the revolutionary forces cease in their attack for even a moment?
A29: This is because during such an event, where the reactionary ruling strata are taken off-guard, the pressure must always remain on them so as the ruling class may not recover their political power, and so that the revolutionary forces do not become content with their victories and slacken the offensive and underestimate the enemy’s remaining strength.
Q30: Was it better to plan early for the breaking of the enemy’s Encirclement and Suppression Campaign or better to plan late?
A30: Breaking the enemy’s Encirclement and Suppression campaigns were the primary goal during the Peoples War in china, yet since the enemy launched so many such offensives the planning in how to counter-act the next encirclement and suppression campaign must be planned sometime in relation to both when they will launch the next offensive and when the Red Army should launch the immediate counter-assault to the previous Encirclement campaign. Taking these factors into consideration one must rely on planning as early as possible on counterstrategies.
To elaborate Mao says: “When should we conclude our offensive and switch to the phase of preparing our counter-campaign against 'encirclement and suppression'? When we are victoriously on the offensive and the enemy is on the defensive, his preparations for the next 'encirclement and suppression' campaign are conducted in secret, and therefore it is difficult for us to know when his offensive will begin. If our work of preparing the counter-campaign begins too early, it is bound to reduce the gains from our offensive and will sometimes even have certain harmful effects on the Red Army and the people. For the chief measures in the preparatory phase are the military preparations for withdrawal and the political mobilization for them. Sometimes, if we start preparing too early, this will turn into waiting for the enemy; after waiting a long time without the enemy's appearing, we will have to renew our offensive. And sometimes, the enemy will start his offensive just as our new offensive is beginning, thus putting us in a difficult position. Hence the choice of the right moment to begin our preparations is an important problem. The right moment should be determined with due regard both to the enemy's situation and our own and to the relation between the two. In order to know the enemy's situation, we should collect information on his political, military and financial position and the state of public opinion in his territory. In analyzing such information we must take the total strength of the enemy into full account and must not exaggerate the extent of his past defeats, but on the other hand we must not fail to take into account his internal contradictions, his financial difficulties, the effect of his past defeats, etc. As for our side, we must not exaggerate the extent of our past victories, but neither should we fail to take full account of their effect.”
He goes on to say that in general it is better to prepare early rather than late.
Q31: What were the chief problems the Red Army faced during the preparatory phase?
A31: Political mobilization, recruitment, handling of politically alien elements, as well as arrangements for finance and provisions. In terms of the Red Army’s movements care in selecting the cattle area was of great importance.
Q32: How was political mobilization a factor in overcoming the Encirclement and Suppression campaigns?
A32: To quote Mao: “…we should tell the Red Army and the people in the base area clearly, resolutely and fully that the enemy's offensive is inevitable and imminent and will do serious harm to the people, but at the same time, we should tell them about his weaknesses, the factors favourable to the Red Army, our indomitable will to victory and our general plan of work. We should call upon the Red Army and the entire population to fight against the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" campaign and defend the base area. Except where military secrets are concerned, political mobilization must be carried out openly, and, what is more, every effort should be made to extend it to all who might possibly support the revolutionary cause. The key link here is to convince the cadres.” Directness and honesty, in other words, are the essential tools to maintaining the popular support needed to break the enemy offensive.
Q33: How was Red Army recruitment handled?
A33: Firstly it was handled on what the Red Army required, as in what state it was in (how many active units, casualties from the previous campaign, etc) and secondly it was determined by the political consciousness of the people as well as the size of the population as a whole (recruitment would have been dangerous in areas where every villager is essential.
Q34: What is a strategic retreat?
A34: As Mao explains: “A strategic retreat is a planned strategic step taken by an inferior force for the purpose of conserving its strength and biding its time to defeat the enemy, when it finds itself confronted with a superior force whose offensive it is unable to smash quickly.” This strategy involves withdrawing from large amounts of territory in order to draw the enemy into areas in which they are at a disadvantage. When they are weak and low in morale the Red Army should strike as part of the strategic counter-offensive.
Q35: What is the objective of strategic retreat?
A35: To conserve military strength for the counter-offensive. The strategic retreat is merely the first stage within the strategic defense.
Q36: What favorable conditions can be created before launching of a counter-offensive?
A36: In order to launch a counter-offensive the Red Army must be actively supported by the local population (meaning possession of a base area), operate in terrain which is favorable to guerilla actions, have all the assault troops concentrated, identify the weak spots of the enemy, and have the enemy reduced to a tired, demoralized state where they are prone to make mistakes. It is important to note that not all of these conditions are required before the launching of a counter-offensive; while a weaker force must have at least a few of these pre-requirements it is not necessary, and indeed most likely impossible, to induce each one.
Q37: What are the principal, or terminal, points for retreat within a base area?
A37: As discussed by comrade Mao the terminal points for a strategic retreat can be divided into three categories: “…those in the frontal, middle, and rear section of the base area.” This does not mean that the Red Army altogether refuses to fight within the enemy controlled, or White, areas; but rather only when the enemy launches a major campaign does the focus shift entirely too strategic retreat within a base area.
Q38: When retreating within an enemy held, or White, area what are the terminal points?
A38: As elaborated by comrade Mao the following quote explains, in detail, all of the points:
“(1) those in front of our base area, (2) those on its flanks, and (3) those behind it. Here is an example of the first type.
During our first counter-campaign against ‘encirclement and suppression’ in Kiangsi, had it not been for the disunity inside the Red Army and the split in the local Party organization (the two difficult problems created by the Li Li-san line and the A-B Group), it is conceivable that we might have concentrated our forces within the triangle formed by Kian, Nanfeng and Changshu and launched a counter-offensive. For the enemy force advancing from the area between the Kan and Fu Rivers was not very greatly superior to the Red Army in strength (100,000 against 40,000). Though the popular support there was not as active as in the base area, the terrain was favourable; moreover, it would have been possible to smash, one by one, the enemy forces advancing along separate routes.
Now for an example of the second type.
During our third counter-campaign in Kiangsi, if the enemy's offensive had not been on so large a scale, if one of the enemy's columns had advanced from Chienning, Lichuan and Taining on the Fukien-Kiangsi border, and if that column had not been too strong for us to attack, it is likewise conceivable that the Red Army might have massed its forces in the White area in western Fukien and crushed that column first, without having to make a thousand-li detour through Juichin to Hsingkuo.
Finally, an example of the third type.
During that same third counter-campaign in Kiangsi, if the enemy's main force had headed south instead of west, we might have been compelled to withdraw to the Huichang-Hsunwu-Anyuan area (a White area), in order to induce the enemy to move further south; the Red Army could have then driven northward into the interior of the base area, by which time the enemy force in the north of the base area would not have been very large.
The above, however, are all hypothetical examples not based on actual experience; they should be regarded as exceptional and not treated as general principles. When the enemy launches a large-scale ‘encirclement and suppression’ campaign, our general principle is to lure him in deep, withdraw into the base area and fight him there, because this is our surest method of smashing his offensive.”
Naturally it follows that a policy of “give and take” must be established where in order to gain ground retreat must be made in a constructive manner with the intention of counter-acting the enemy advances. After all, attempts to confront a dramatically stronger enemy on their own terms will only lead to horrendous loses. Taking this concept further also applies to “damage done to the people” where while they may suffer under enemy occupation, ultimately, the end-goal is their complete liberation; not “allowing some of the pots and pans to be smashed will result in everyone’s pots and pans being smashed.” Some must be sacrificed for the greater good. A historical example of this can be found in the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 where Left Communist elements demanded that no Russian lands be given to the enemy; had this route been taken there is a good chance that the Soviet government would have been smashed early.
Q39: Why is “convincing the cadres” the most important aspect of conducting a strategic retreat?
A39: Because the cadres are among the people, and because both the cadres and the people have little, if any, experience of strategic retreat, and the cadres will be the ones who convince the people of the necessity of strategic retreat, it is of great importance to convince the cadres and inspire confidence in them; doing this will result in their motivation to combat the enemy on creative terms and push them to conduct agitation among the people in an energetic manner, enough to overcome the temporary loss of morale in seemingly abandoning territory. This makes the difference between gaining support and losing support among the population.
Q40: The strategic counter-offensive refers to active defense, during this moment what can transpire in relation to the strength of the conflicting armies?
A40: The strategic counter-offensive is the moment where the army at the disadvantage may extricate himself from their low-point, thus reducing the advantage the stronger army has, and it may also be the time where the stronger army can reduce its capacity to fight through loses in battle. It is the moment in the over-all conflict where a new situation might be created and new directions on who will emerge victorious could be formed.
Q41: When starting the counter-offensive what are the main concerns to take into consideration?
A41: In short all the stages of a campaign must be taken into consideration: the first battle must be won, such a battle must be won with a clear objective in mind, the next stages in the campaign must be figured out and the process of restarting this whole strategic understanding must be completed. A commander who lacks the foresight to draw up such battle plans will likely face defeat.
Q42: During the Fifth Encirclement and Suppression Campaign how did Military equalitarianism cause significant setback for the Red Army?
A42: The concept of military equalitarianism is a concept advocated by military adventurists which concentrates the combat forces in a mode that denies strategic planning. It is a mode of warfare which pushes for “attacking on all fronts” without taking into consideration the underlying planning needed for such attacks. In this way military equalitarianism infected the Red Army through the Left-Communist idea of attacking enemy blockhouses and concentrating on passive warfare (ceaseless attacking the enemy in their strongholds, etc).
Leaving behind the guerrilla concepts of the past, of concentrating all armed forces and picking off the foe’s weak spots, and embracing this other method, which wasn’t suited to the situation, the military adventurists within the Red Army’s ranks brought disaster towards communist spheres of control within China.
Q43: When the Red Army speaks of concentrating their forces what do they mean?
A43: When the Red Army spoke of concentrating their forces they mean that enough combat detachments should be concentrated so as to gain a relative superiority on the field. This does not mean grouping together “every single rifle” but simply means gathering enough forces to overcome the enemy for the strategic purpose of the campaign as a whole.
Q44: Concerning the question of positional warfare or mobile warfare, which does the Red Army prefer?
A44: In terms of lacking a large reserves of ammunition and general supplies, and so as long as there is only a single Red Army force to each base area, the answer is mobile warfare; this is the type exhibited by Red Army commanders.
Q45: Does endorsement of Mobile warfare mean a rejection of positional warfare?
A45: No, while the Red Army employed mobile warfare, what some might call guearilla-ism due to its lack of fixed battle lines, this does not mean that the Red Army forsakes positional warfare when it comes to destroying isolated enemy unites and attacking vital blockhouses and cities. Such simply means a more selective usage of positional warfare adopted as an exception to the rule and not the rule itself.
Q46: Speaking of campaigns and battles is the nature of these engagements protracted or of Quick Decision?
A46: While final victory cannot be attained until great masses of revolutionary forces have been assembled thus giving it a protracted nature the opposite is true of individual battles and campaigns; during these moments engaging in a War of Quick Decision, as comrade Mao describes it, is preferable. This is because the weaker Red Army forces must always be on the move. This necessitates a fluid engagement in battle where the resolution of the confrontation is speedy. Failing to achieve this condition will likely end in substantial Red Army loses.
Q47: What effect does a War of Annihilation cause on the enemy and the campaign as a whole?
A47: A War of Annihilation is the process of completely destroying enemy units. While causing some units to flee or rendering minor damage to multiple units may be necessary during other combat goals, the surest manner in which to win a campaign is to totally destroy reactionary forces combat units; this has a profound psychological impact as well as greatly impacting enemy commanders ability to achieve their desired goal.
~ ~ ~
Chapter One: How to Study War
Q1: Define the three laws of war.
A1: The first is simply the law of war which dictates that anyone directing a war must study, the second is the law of revolutionary law, while the third is the law of China’s revolutionary war. To comrade Mao each possessed a specific study demand which revealed details of how to successfully conduct armed conflict.
Q2: What does Mao describe war as?
A2: Mao describes war as the “…highest form of struggle for resolving contradictions.” Between nations, classes, states or political groups, this type of conflict has existed since the dawn of private property and has exacerbated with capitalism’s development.
Q3: Why did Mao reject the belief that it was possible to study the laws of war in general?
A3: Mao rejected this first incorrect belief because during the time of China’s second revolutionary war “the laws of war” meant information published by the reactionary nationalist government, materials which were imported from western nations with environmental conditions very different from China. Attempting to apply such foreign conditions to use within an army which operated under such foreign manners would have resulted in defeat.
Q4: Why did Mao reject the view that it was enough to study the revolutionary war in Russia?
A4: Like studying war in general, restraining one’s analysis to merely Russia, simply because the Russian revolutionaries were communists, amounts to, once again, applying foreign conditions to an unsuitable setting (or as Mao described it “cutting the feet to fit the shoe”). While closer in form to China’s conditions, Russia still lacked the exact formation which China saw at the time of Mao’s writing.
Q5: Why did Mao reject imitating the experience of the Northern Expedition?
A5: Primarily because that while the Northern Expedition gave some invaluable knowledge on warfare the conditions which were prevalent than, in city taking, were no longer relevant during 1936. This meant that the circumstances of war are different and experiences should not be copied wholesale and applied mechanically.
Q6: In terms of proficient commanders what did Mao value and say was needed?
A6: Mao spoke of the need to have commanders who were proficient in many styles of command as well as proficient in several localities. He spoke of needing commanders who, “directors of war”, who could operate in more than one field while playing a significant role in the revolution. Those commanders who weren’t able to develop into more than a single command style and post could still be helpful yet ultimately could only play a minor role within the revolution.
Q7: Mao paradoxically states that the aim of war is to eliminate war, explain.
A7: Mao speaks here in a very stagist sense where the path to communist society, to no war, is through the erection of just wars (socialist wars) to counter-act the unjust wars (reactionary wars). He says, “…to oppose counter-revolutionary war with revolutionary war, to oppose national counter-revolutionary war with national revolutionary war, and to oppose counter-revolutionary class war with revolutionary class war. History knows only two kinds of war, just and unjust. We support just wars and oppose unjust wars. All counter-revolutionary wars are unjust, all revolutionary wars are just.” Here he stresses that communist study of war is to prevent war and that in the end, when communism has been achieved, there will be no more wars of any kind.
Q8: What is a war situation?
A8: A war situation is an area of combat. This locale may cover the whole world or simply a single zone within a country. Any such situation demands serious study of all the problems which present themselves.
Q9: What is the “task of the science of strategy”?
A9: To study those laws which direct a war situation as a whole.
Q10: What is the task of the “science of campaigns” and the “science of tactics”?
A10: To study the laws which govern the war situation in a partial location (connected to the wider war situation).
Q11: Why does a commander need to understand a campaign’s tactical and strategy laws?
A11: This is “Because an understanding of the whole facilitates the handling of the part, and because the part is subordinate to the whole.” In other words one cannot understand how to proceed on the over-all stage without understanding how the individual units would move. “The view that strategic victory is determined by tactical successes alone is wrong because it overlooks the fact that victory or defeat in a war is first and foremost a question of whether the situation as a whole and its various stages are properly taken into account. If there are serious defects or mistakes in taking the situation as a whole and its various stages into account, the war is sure to be lost.” Strategically speaking, one bad move can cause disaster for the war situation as a whole.
Q12: Why cannot a situation be detached from its parts and become independent of them?
A12: This is because each war situation is made up from the sum of all its parts. “Sometimes certain parts may suffer destruction or defeat without seriously affecting the situation as a whole, because they are not decisive for it. Some defeats or failures in tactical operations or campaigns do not lead to deterioration in the war situation as a whole, because they are not of decisive significance. But the loss of most of the campaigns making up the war situation as a whole, or of one or two decisive campaigns, immediately changes the whole situation. Here, ‘most of the campaigns’ or ‘one or two campaigns’ are decisive. In the history of war, there are instances where defeat in a single battle nullified all the advantages of a series of victories, and there are also instances where victory in a single battle after many defeats opened up a new situation. In those instances the ‘series of victories’ and the ‘many defeats’ were partial in nature and not decisive for the situation as a whole, while ‘defeat in a single battle’ or ‘victory in a single battle’ played the decisive role. All this explains the importance of taking into account the situation as a whole.” What is most important for the person in command is attending to the situation as a whole; of how to group his forces, the relations between campaigns and stages, that if he ignores these points than set-backs will become epidemic.
Q13: What is the relationship between “the whole and the part”?
A13: Plainly put it is the relationship between strategy and campaign and campaign and tactics. That the importance of decisive action is not governed by abstract notions but by concrete circumstances (point of assault, terrain, enemy forces, supplies, etc).
Q14: What are the problems of strategy?
A14: Mao says that giving proper consideration to the relationship of “the enemy and ourselves, between various campaigns and various operations stages, those parts which have a bearing on (are decisive for) the situation as a whole, special features contained within the general situation, [and] the relation between the front and the rear.” None of these questions can be determined without hard thinking and certainly are not limited to the mentioned (as other questions include problems of command, manner of war, and action).
Q15: Why does Mao stress the importance of learning for commanders?
A15: War is a difficult art to learn and even harder to apply, hence it is important to have commanders who are dedicated and willing to infuse their previous combat knowledge with the constantly updating mental track of information.
Mao said:
“A commander's correct dispositions stem from his correct decisions, his correct decisions stem from his correct judgements, and his correct judgements stem from a thorough and necessary reconnaissance and from pondering on and piecing together the data of various kinds gathered through reconnaissance. He applies all possible and necessary methods of reconnaissance, and ponders on the information gathered about the enemy's situation, discarding the dross and selecting the essential, eliminating the false and retaining the true, proceeding from the one to the other and from the outside to the inside; then, he takes the conditions on his own side into account, and makes a study of both sides and their interrelations, thereby forming his judgements, making up his mind and working out his plans. Such is the complete process of knowing a situation which a military man goes through before he formulates a strategic plan, a campaign plan or a battle plan. But instead of doing this, a careless military man bases his military plans on his own wishful thinking, and hence his plans are fanciful and do not correspond with reality. A rash military man relying solely upon enthusiasm is bound to be tricked by the enemy, or lured on by some superficial or partial aspect of the enemy's situation, or swayed by irresponsible suggestions from subordinates that are not based on real knowledge or deep insight, and so he runs his head against a brick wall, because he does not know or does not want to know that every military plan must be based on the necessary reconnaissance and on careful consideration of the enemy's situation, his own situation, and their interrelations.”
If the information newly gleamed does not correspond to the situation at hand than it is up to the commander to develop new strategies which do fit the situation at hand, of creating a strategy which corresponds to reality; this can only be done if they are willing to learn. Learning, overcoming contradictions, and applying the new insights (especially when it applies to the political atmosphere and nature of enemy troops) to overcome the enemy are all necessities to emerging victorious from the war situation.
Chapter 2: The Chinese Communist Party and China’s Revolutionary War
Q16: What were three stages of China’s revolutionary war?
A16: The first stage was from 1924-1927, its beginning, while the second stage began in 1927-1936. It is during this third time period where the national revolutionary war began.
Q17: What were the main enemies in China’s revolutionary war?
A17: The main enemies of China during this moment in time were Imperialism and feudal forces.
Q18: Which body led the Chinese revolutionary war?
A18: The Chinese Communist Party. This is because the other forces, all strata of the bourgeoisie and peasantry were limited in outlook and could not muster resistance or lead China in the direction where freedom and prosperity would be plentiful.
Chapter Three: Characteristics of China’s Revolutionary War
Q19: What are the four characteristics of China’s Revolutionary War?
A19: To quote comrade Mao:
“Thus the four principal characteristics of China's revolutionary war are: a vast semi-colonial country which is unevenly developed politically and economically and which has gone through a great revolution; a big and powerful enemy; a small and weak Red Army; and the agrarian revolution. These characteristics determine the line for guiding China's revolutionary war as well as many of its strategic and tactical principles. It follows from the first and fourth characteristics that it is possible for the Chinese Red Army to grow and defeat its enemy. It follows from the second and third characteristics that it is impossible for the Chinese Red Army to grow very rapidly or defeat its enemy quickly; in other words, the war will be protracted and may even be lost if it is mishandled.”
It is from these specific characteristics which grew the specific strategy in which the Red Army was led to victory.
Q20: List some of the “matters of principal” or the military line of the Party.
A20: Since there are many I will keep the list to the most relevant. Namely:
1. Opposing adventurism when on the offensive, opposing conservatism when on the defensive while opposing fightism when shifting from one place to another.
2. Opposing guerrilla-ism in the Red Army while recognizing its guerrilla character.
3. Opposing protracted campaigns and a strategy of quick decision, and uphold the strategy of protracted war and campaigns of quick decision.
4. Opposing fixed battle lines and positional warfare, and favour fluid battle lines and mobile warfare.
5. Opposing fighting merely to rout the enemy, and uphold fighting to annihilate the enemy.
6. Opposing the principle of maintaining one large rear area, and uphold the principle of small rear areas.
7. Opposing an absolutely centralized command, and favour a relatively centralized command.
8. Opposing an incorrect, sectarian policy on cadres, and uphold the correct policy on cadres.
Those were but a few. It is important to remember that opposing bandit and warlord ways, rejecting isolationism, and upholding proper discipline while understanding that the Red Army was the propaganda vehicle of the revolution were also vital points.
Chapter Four: “Encirclement and Suppression” and Counter-Campaigns Against It—The Main Patterns of China’s Civil War.
Q21: What form did the Red Army’s operations manifest as?
A21: The Red Army’s military operations took the form of counter-campaigns to the enemy’s encirclement and suppression campaigns. This meant countering the enemy by blunting their offensive and turning the strategic defensive into a strategic offensive.
Q22: What were the special characteristics of the Red Army’s operations?
A22: As in any war where the pattern is of “attack” and “defend” the Red Army abided by these rules only with a focus on “repeated alteration”. This meant “In each ‘encirclement and suppression’ campaign, the enemy employs the offensive against the Red Army's defensive, and the Red Army employs the defensive against his offensive; this is the first stage of a counter-campaign against ‘encirclement and suppression’. Then the enemy employs the defensive against the Red Army's offensive, and the Red Army employs the offensive against his defensive; this is the second stage of the counter-campaign. Every ‘encirclement and suppression’ campaign has these two stages, and they alternate over a long period.” Properly defending against the enemy then meeting his offensive with a counter-offensive, whereupon the enemy turns defensive, the Red Army then moves to assault the enemy’s defense. This is the basic out-line of the special characteristics; that this process is repeated over a long time.
Q23: How is this process different during each encounter?
A23: The process of repeated alteration is unique in each outcome in the sense that when the Red Army suffers partial defeats the scope of the counter-campaign against encirclement and suppression becomes smaller, while when the Red Army wins atrial victories the scope becomes more complicated and large. This was exemplified during the Kuomintang’s Fifth Encirclement and Suppression campaign where the Red Army’s strategic defensive was broken by the enemy resulting in great loses in both men and bases. This meant that the scope of the counter-campaigns in the future would necessarily be of a smaller scale. In this manner when the Red Army is successful, and soldiers and Party members flock to their banner, the counter-campaigns become more impressive and convoluted as more manpower is involved.
Q24: What constitutes a partial defeat for the enemy?
A24: As Mao explained: “It is a strategic defeat for the enemy when his ‘encirclement and suppression’ campaign is broken and our defensive becomes an offensive, when the enemy turns to the defensive and has to reorganize before launching another ‘encirclement and suppression’ campaign.” Following this logic is also necessitates that once such conditions have been achieved the Red Army would have won a partial victory.
Q25: During this time period what constituted “Left-Opportunism”?
A25: In essence Left-Opportunism took the form of rejecting the line of repeated alteration, of the protracted nature of the civil war, and embracing instead of a conventional warfare which advocated assaulting the cities while calling for an armed uprising; the belief to this being that the war could be won in quick order, that the Red Army should never adopt defensive measures and should always implement offensive ones. Such, of course, is simply not possible. Implementation of this line leads to disaster.
Q26: When does this pattern of repeated encirclement and suppression campaigns come to an end?
A26: Mao theorized that such a pattern would only come to an end when the fundamental balance of forces dynamically shifted; when either the Red Army or the Nationalist Army gained a profound advantage in both the military and political field. This means that once the Red Army gained the upper hand and was able to employ their own encirclement and suppression campaigns, with the realization that the Nationalists would not be able to muster the same kind of resistance in which the Red Army showed due to political and military conditions, this repeated, protracted, pattern would end.
Chapter Five: The Strategic Defensive
Q27: Define the differences between Active Defense and Passive Defense.
A27: Explained simply active defense is when one defends with the intention of launching a counter-attack while passive defense is simply defending for the sake of defending. As Mao said: “Active defence is also known as offensive defence, or defence through decisive engagements. Passive defence is also known as purely defensive defence or pure defence. Passive defence is actually a spurious kind of defence, and the only real defence is active defence, defence for the purpose of counter-attacking and taking the offensive.” The difference lies in reaction.
Q28: What were the two deviations which arose in regards to the enemy?
A28: Mao explained that the two deviations were tendencies which either belittled the enemy, or thus caused unnecessary fighting which annihilated Red Army units, or the tendency to overestimate the enemy which caused Red Army commanders to embark on a series of retreats without any active defense.
Q29: When an armed uprising is launched why mustn’t the revolutionary forces cease in their attack for even a moment?
A29: This is because during such an event, where the reactionary ruling strata are taken off-guard, the pressure must always remain on them so as the ruling class may not recover their political power, and so that the revolutionary forces do not become content with their victories and slacken the offensive and underestimate the enemy’s remaining strength.
Q30: Was it better to plan early for the breaking of the enemy’s Encirclement and Suppression Campaign or better to plan late?
A30: Breaking the enemy’s Encirclement and Suppression campaigns were the primary goal during the Peoples War in china, yet since the enemy launched so many such offensives the planning in how to counter-act the next encirclement and suppression campaign must be planned sometime in relation to both when they will launch the next offensive and when the Red Army should launch the immediate counter-assault to the previous Encirclement campaign. Taking these factors into consideration one must rely on planning as early as possible on counterstrategies.
To elaborate Mao says: “When should we conclude our offensive and switch to the phase of preparing our counter-campaign against 'encirclement and suppression'? When we are victoriously on the offensive and the enemy is on the defensive, his preparations for the next 'encirclement and suppression' campaign are conducted in secret, and therefore it is difficult for us to know when his offensive will begin. If our work of preparing the counter-campaign begins too early, it is bound to reduce the gains from our offensive and will sometimes even have certain harmful effects on the Red Army and the people. For the chief measures in the preparatory phase are the military preparations for withdrawal and the political mobilization for them. Sometimes, if we start preparing too early, this will turn into waiting for the enemy; after waiting a long time without the enemy's appearing, we will have to renew our offensive. And sometimes, the enemy will start his offensive just as our new offensive is beginning, thus putting us in a difficult position. Hence the choice of the right moment to begin our preparations is an important problem. The right moment should be determined with due regard both to the enemy's situation and our own and to the relation between the two. In order to know the enemy's situation, we should collect information on his political, military and financial position and the state of public opinion in his territory. In analyzing such information we must take the total strength of the enemy into full account and must not exaggerate the extent of his past defeats, but on the other hand we must not fail to take into account his internal contradictions, his financial difficulties, the effect of his past defeats, etc. As for our side, we must not exaggerate the extent of our past victories, but neither should we fail to take full account of their effect.”
He goes on to say that in general it is better to prepare early rather than late.
Q31: What were the chief problems the Red Army faced during the preparatory phase?
A31: Political mobilization, recruitment, handling of politically alien elements, as well as arrangements for finance and provisions. In terms of the Red Army’s movements care in selecting the cattle area was of great importance.
Q32: How was political mobilization a factor in overcoming the Encirclement and Suppression campaigns?
A32: To quote Mao: “…we should tell the Red Army and the people in the base area clearly, resolutely and fully that the enemy's offensive is inevitable and imminent and will do serious harm to the people, but at the same time, we should tell them about his weaknesses, the factors favourable to the Red Army, our indomitable will to victory and our general plan of work. We should call upon the Red Army and the entire population to fight against the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" campaign and defend the base area. Except where military secrets are concerned, political mobilization must be carried out openly, and, what is more, every effort should be made to extend it to all who might possibly support the revolutionary cause. The key link here is to convince the cadres.” Directness and honesty, in other words, are the essential tools to maintaining the popular support needed to break the enemy offensive.
Q33: How was Red Army recruitment handled?
A33: Firstly it was handled on what the Red Army required, as in what state it was in (how many active units, casualties from the previous campaign, etc) and secondly it was determined by the political consciousness of the people as well as the size of the population as a whole (recruitment would have been dangerous in areas where every villager is essential.
Q34: What is a strategic retreat?
A34: As Mao explains: “A strategic retreat is a planned strategic step taken by an inferior force for the purpose of conserving its strength and biding its time to defeat the enemy, when it finds itself confronted with a superior force whose offensive it is unable to smash quickly.” This strategy involves withdrawing from large amounts of territory in order to draw the enemy into areas in which they are at a disadvantage. When they are weak and low in morale the Red Army should strike as part of the strategic counter-offensive.
Q35: What is the objective of strategic retreat?
A35: To conserve military strength for the counter-offensive. The strategic retreat is merely the first stage within the strategic defense.
Q36: What favorable conditions can be created before launching of a counter-offensive?
A36: In order to launch a counter-offensive the Red Army must be actively supported by the local population (meaning possession of a base area), operate in terrain which is favorable to guerilla actions, have all the assault troops concentrated, identify the weak spots of the enemy, and have the enemy reduced to a tired, demoralized state where they are prone to make mistakes. It is important to note that not all of these conditions are required before the launching of a counter-offensive; while a weaker force must have at least a few of these pre-requirements it is not necessary, and indeed most likely impossible, to induce each one.
Q37: What are the principal, or terminal, points for retreat within a base area?
A37: As discussed by comrade Mao the terminal points for a strategic retreat can be divided into three categories: “…those in the frontal, middle, and rear section of the base area.” This does not mean that the Red Army altogether refuses to fight within the enemy controlled, or White, areas; but rather only when the enemy launches a major campaign does the focus shift entirely too strategic retreat within a base area.
Q38: When retreating within an enemy held, or White, area what are the terminal points?
A38: As elaborated by comrade Mao the following quote explains, in detail, all of the points:
“(1) those in front of our base area, (2) those on its flanks, and (3) those behind it. Here is an example of the first type.
During our first counter-campaign against ‘encirclement and suppression’ in Kiangsi, had it not been for the disunity inside the Red Army and the split in the local Party organization (the two difficult problems created by the Li Li-san line and the A-B Group), it is conceivable that we might have concentrated our forces within the triangle formed by Kian, Nanfeng and Changshu and launched a counter-offensive. For the enemy force advancing from the area between the Kan and Fu Rivers was not very greatly superior to the Red Army in strength (100,000 against 40,000). Though the popular support there was not as active as in the base area, the terrain was favourable; moreover, it would have been possible to smash, one by one, the enemy forces advancing along separate routes.
Now for an example of the second type.
During our third counter-campaign in Kiangsi, if the enemy's offensive had not been on so large a scale, if one of the enemy's columns had advanced from Chienning, Lichuan and Taining on the Fukien-Kiangsi border, and if that column had not been too strong for us to attack, it is likewise conceivable that the Red Army might have massed its forces in the White area in western Fukien and crushed that column first, without having to make a thousand-li detour through Juichin to Hsingkuo.
Finally, an example of the third type.
During that same third counter-campaign in Kiangsi, if the enemy's main force had headed south instead of west, we might have been compelled to withdraw to the Huichang-Hsunwu-Anyuan area (a White area), in order to induce the enemy to move further south; the Red Army could have then driven northward into the interior of the base area, by which time the enemy force in the north of the base area would not have been very large.
The above, however, are all hypothetical examples not based on actual experience; they should be regarded as exceptional and not treated as general principles. When the enemy launches a large-scale ‘encirclement and suppression’ campaign, our general principle is to lure him in deep, withdraw into the base area and fight him there, because this is our surest method of smashing his offensive.”
Naturally it follows that a policy of “give and take” must be established where in order to gain ground retreat must be made in a constructive manner with the intention of counter-acting the enemy advances. After all, attempts to confront a dramatically stronger enemy on their own terms will only lead to horrendous loses. Taking this concept further also applies to “damage done to the people” where while they may suffer under enemy occupation, ultimately, the end-goal is their complete liberation; not “allowing some of the pots and pans to be smashed will result in everyone’s pots and pans being smashed.” Some must be sacrificed for the greater good. A historical example of this can be found in the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 where Left Communist elements demanded that no Russian lands be given to the enemy; had this route been taken there is a good chance that the Soviet government would have been smashed early.
Q39: Why is “convincing the cadres” the most important aspect of conducting a strategic retreat?
A39: Because the cadres are among the people, and because both the cadres and the people have little, if any, experience of strategic retreat, and the cadres will be the ones who convince the people of the necessity of strategic retreat, it is of great importance to convince the cadres and inspire confidence in them; doing this will result in their motivation to combat the enemy on creative terms and push them to conduct agitation among the people in an energetic manner, enough to overcome the temporary loss of morale in seemingly abandoning territory. This makes the difference between gaining support and losing support among the population.
Q40: The strategic counter-offensive refers to active defense, during this moment what can transpire in relation to the strength of the conflicting armies?
A40: The strategic counter-offensive is the moment where the army at the disadvantage may extricate himself from their low-point, thus reducing the advantage the stronger army has, and it may also be the time where the stronger army can reduce its capacity to fight through loses in battle. It is the moment in the over-all conflict where a new situation might be created and new directions on who will emerge victorious could be formed.
Q41: When starting the counter-offensive what are the main concerns to take into consideration?
A41: In short all the stages of a campaign must be taken into consideration: the first battle must be won, such a battle must be won with a clear objective in mind, the next stages in the campaign must be figured out and the process of restarting this whole strategic understanding must be completed. A commander who lacks the foresight to draw up such battle plans will likely face defeat.
Q42: During the Fifth Encirclement and Suppression Campaign how did Military equalitarianism cause significant setback for the Red Army?
A42: The concept of military equalitarianism is a concept advocated by military adventurists which concentrates the combat forces in a mode that denies strategic planning. It is a mode of warfare which pushes for “attacking on all fronts” without taking into consideration the underlying planning needed for such attacks. In this way military equalitarianism infected the Red Army through the Left-Communist idea of attacking enemy blockhouses and concentrating on passive warfare (ceaseless attacking the enemy in their strongholds, etc).
Leaving behind the guerrilla concepts of the past, of concentrating all armed forces and picking off the foe’s weak spots, and embracing this other method, which wasn’t suited to the situation, the military adventurists within the Red Army’s ranks brought disaster towards communist spheres of control within China.
Q43: When the Red Army speaks of concentrating their forces what do they mean?
A43: When the Red Army spoke of concentrating their forces they mean that enough combat detachments should be concentrated so as to gain a relative superiority on the field. This does not mean grouping together “every single rifle” but simply means gathering enough forces to overcome the enemy for the strategic purpose of the campaign as a whole.
Q44: Concerning the question of positional warfare or mobile warfare, which does the Red Army prefer?
A44: In terms of lacking a large reserves of ammunition and general supplies, and so as long as there is only a single Red Army force to each base area, the answer is mobile warfare; this is the type exhibited by Red Army commanders.
Q45: Does endorsement of Mobile warfare mean a rejection of positional warfare?
A45: No, while the Red Army employed mobile warfare, what some might call guearilla-ism due to its lack of fixed battle lines, this does not mean that the Red Army forsakes positional warfare when it comes to destroying isolated enemy unites and attacking vital blockhouses and cities. Such simply means a more selective usage of positional warfare adopted as an exception to the rule and not the rule itself.
Q46: Speaking of campaigns and battles is the nature of these engagements protracted or of Quick Decision?
A46: While final victory cannot be attained until great masses of revolutionary forces have been assembled thus giving it a protracted nature the opposite is true of individual battles and campaigns; during these moments engaging in a War of Quick Decision, as comrade Mao describes it, is preferable. This is because the weaker Red Army forces must always be on the move. This necessitates a fluid engagement in battle where the resolution of the confrontation is speedy. Failing to achieve this condition will likely end in substantial Red Army loses.
Q47: What effect does a War of Annihilation cause on the enemy and the campaign as a whole?
A47: A War of Annihilation is the process of completely destroying enemy units. While causing some units to flee or rendering minor damage to multiple units may be necessary during other combat goals, the surest manner in which to win a campaign is to totally destroy reactionary forces combat units; this has a profound psychological impact as well as greatly impacting enemy commanders ability to achieve their desired goal.