Kodzoquo
30th November 2001, 20:28
III. The Social and Economic Context of Caucasian Development
In recent years a there has developed in Russia an undisguised racist contempt and suspicion toward ethnic minorities, especially Caucasians. When moving to other parts of the Russian Federation, people from the Caucasus face discrimination in the workplace and harassment from police. The roots of this new xenophobia are beyond the scope of this paper, but it has contributed to certain trends among non-Russian minorities: to remain as much as possible within their own ethnic territory; to try to increase ethnic power and autonomy within those territories; to consolidate their economic and social position at the expense of the neighboring Russian population; and to resuscitate their traditional culture, native language and, in this case, the Islamic faith. All of this has contributed to dramatic social and economic changes in the northern Caucasus.
With the exception of the oil-based industrial infrastructure of Chechnya, much of which was damaged in the war, the economic base of the Caucasus is agricultural, particularly specialty products (tobacco, coriander, grapes for wine production, etc.). There is some small-scale industry, and tourism - which was heavily subsidized by the state - played a significant part during the Soviet era. All of these industries were manned mainly by Russian rather than native workers. Besides agriculture, all other industries are now in crisis. The general cash income of the region has markedly decreased, and stands at only around 50-60% of the Moscow average. The buying capacity of Russians has been particularly damaged, especially since, as urban dwellers primarily, their standard of living is not compensated by the home production of various foodstuffs.
The pace of social and economic change has varied from place to place and across ethnic groups. In Karachai-Cherkessia, Russians and Cherkessians tend to live in cities and in the lowlands, terrain of which is perfect for the development of orchards. Yet this requires extensive capital investment, which is lacking. As a result, the pace of privatization has been slow, Soviet-era modes of organization persist, and the revitalization of traditional cultures has not gained momentum. In contrast, Karachais reside in the highlands, terrain suitable for root vegetables and herding. Karachais have undertaken "wild privatization", staking out claims by fencing in particular parcels of land, without any firm legal basis. Since these lands often were ancestral plots swallowed by collectivization, it has provoked minimal conflict. It has also led to the revitalization of traditional social life built around clan gatherings and Islam. There has also been the development of some small-scale industry, notably beer brewing and trout farming, but this has been hindered by bureaucratic red tape, corruption and criminal syndicates. Success thus depends on formations of "protection rackets," both through criminal and (corrupt) official sources. This may lead to inter-ethnic or inter-strata enmity when the owners and racketeers (or bureaucrats) belong to different ethnic groups or different estates.
IV. Lessons for Avoiding Inter-Ethnic Conflict
From the above review of developments in the northern Caucasus, it is clear that very often the conflicts we see are not ethnic conflicts proper, but most often are ethnically disguised economic conflicts, triggered by the ongoing social and economic uncertainty, redistribution of property, struggle for key positions, etc. On the other hand, it is clear that in a region rife with ethnic friction, only two conflicts have led to bloodshed: the eviction of the Ingushes from North Ossetia and the Chechen War. It is obvious, then, that there are some mechanisms at work that either prevent or stifle ethnic strife.
The first, paradoxically, is that the continuity of power in the hands of former Communist Party functionaries helps to maintain social order. President Jarimov in Agydea, for example, was elected not as an Adygean leader, but as a former top personality of the local party leadership with sufficient experience, connections and conservative attitudes. Conflicts arise where former leaders are too weak to maintain power. Secondly, voluntary organizations may play an important role. Despite the disorder in Chechnya, there was a Council for Inter-Ethnic Reconciliation which managed to minimize the number of local conflicts. Islamic Sufi orders have also played a very positive role in Chechnya and Dagestan. Beyond this, the reconciling role of traditional village elders is also quite important. These mechanisms helped to prevent intensification of the Balkar-Kabardin conflict and hindered the mass participation of Ingushes on the Chechen side in the Chechnya War. Similarly, elderly Azeri women, acting in a traditional role, halted a crowd of Azeri youngsters when they tried to storm Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, after the February 1988 declaration of secession. Unfortunately, their efforts were annulled by the inflammatory rhetoric of the Azairbaidjan media. On the other hand, the existence of a large percentage of ethnically mixed marriages does not seem to help in conflict prevention. The percentage of such marriages was very high in Abkhazia and especially in Ossetia, but members of these families were regarded with mistrust by both sides.
Overall, one may assume that these mechanisms will be most effective in more traditionally oriented societies and economies. Unfortunately, in many societies in the northern Caucasus today, a large number of young men are growing up without exposure to or respect for traditional values. As such, there is a danger that new conflict is growing in the region. If there is to be any chance of avoiding this, it must be through economic development. The economic future of these areas lies not in industry or agriculture, but in reviving the tourist trade. The Caucasus region has a pleasant climate rich in natural beauty, plenty of historical relics, exotic customs, ancient architecture, etc - everything needed for a successful tourist industry. What it lacks is social stability. Tourism requires security, suppression of crime and terrorism, a decent and effective police force, and so on. Many Caucasians equate service jobs with servility, and are unwilling to work in the tourist trade. Equally, many ethnic Russians are reluctant to work for non-Russian bosses. Tourism is likely to be the future for the region, but for this industry to flourish, there must be significant changes in both social interaction and national mentalities.
Notes and References
Arutiunov, S.A., Narody I kul’tury: razvitie I vzaimodeistvie, Moscow, Nauka, 1989.
Arutiunov, S.A., Kavkazskaya likhoradka: diagnoz i lechenic," Itogi, No. 34, 1999.
Arutiunov, S.A., Zakony gor vne zakonov ravnin," Itogi, No. 3, 1999.
Gasanov, N.N., Zachevov, K. Ya., and Kazimov, A.K., "Mezhnatsional’noe soglasie v Dagestane: problemy i perspectivy," Polis, No. 2, 1993.
Kaltakhchian, A.C., "Reabilitatsiia repressirovannykh narodov: pervye shagi," Etnopolis, No. 2, 1992.
Mikhailov, V.A., "Printsip voronki ili mekhanizm razvertyvaniia mezhetnicheskogo konflikta," Sotsis, No. 5, 1993.
Skakunov, E.M., "Etnonatsional’nye konflikty I politicheskaia stabil’nost’ Rossii," Etnopolis, No. 2, 1992.
Zolian, S.T., "Opisanie regional’nogo konflikta kak methodologicheskaia problema," Polis, No. 2, 1994.
by S.A. Arutiunov
Head, Caucasian Studies Department
Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology
Russian Academy of Sciences
In recent years a there has developed in Russia an undisguised racist contempt and suspicion toward ethnic minorities, especially Caucasians. When moving to other parts of the Russian Federation, people from the Caucasus face discrimination in the workplace and harassment from police. The roots of this new xenophobia are beyond the scope of this paper, but it has contributed to certain trends among non-Russian minorities: to remain as much as possible within their own ethnic territory; to try to increase ethnic power and autonomy within those territories; to consolidate their economic and social position at the expense of the neighboring Russian population; and to resuscitate their traditional culture, native language and, in this case, the Islamic faith. All of this has contributed to dramatic social and economic changes in the northern Caucasus.
With the exception of the oil-based industrial infrastructure of Chechnya, much of which was damaged in the war, the economic base of the Caucasus is agricultural, particularly specialty products (tobacco, coriander, grapes for wine production, etc.). There is some small-scale industry, and tourism - which was heavily subsidized by the state - played a significant part during the Soviet era. All of these industries were manned mainly by Russian rather than native workers. Besides agriculture, all other industries are now in crisis. The general cash income of the region has markedly decreased, and stands at only around 50-60% of the Moscow average. The buying capacity of Russians has been particularly damaged, especially since, as urban dwellers primarily, their standard of living is not compensated by the home production of various foodstuffs.
The pace of social and economic change has varied from place to place and across ethnic groups. In Karachai-Cherkessia, Russians and Cherkessians tend to live in cities and in the lowlands, terrain of which is perfect for the development of orchards. Yet this requires extensive capital investment, which is lacking. As a result, the pace of privatization has been slow, Soviet-era modes of organization persist, and the revitalization of traditional cultures has not gained momentum. In contrast, Karachais reside in the highlands, terrain suitable for root vegetables and herding. Karachais have undertaken "wild privatization", staking out claims by fencing in particular parcels of land, without any firm legal basis. Since these lands often were ancestral plots swallowed by collectivization, it has provoked minimal conflict. It has also led to the revitalization of traditional social life built around clan gatherings and Islam. There has also been the development of some small-scale industry, notably beer brewing and trout farming, but this has been hindered by bureaucratic red tape, corruption and criminal syndicates. Success thus depends on formations of "protection rackets," both through criminal and (corrupt) official sources. This may lead to inter-ethnic or inter-strata enmity when the owners and racketeers (or bureaucrats) belong to different ethnic groups or different estates.
IV. Lessons for Avoiding Inter-Ethnic Conflict
From the above review of developments in the northern Caucasus, it is clear that very often the conflicts we see are not ethnic conflicts proper, but most often are ethnically disguised economic conflicts, triggered by the ongoing social and economic uncertainty, redistribution of property, struggle for key positions, etc. On the other hand, it is clear that in a region rife with ethnic friction, only two conflicts have led to bloodshed: the eviction of the Ingushes from North Ossetia and the Chechen War. It is obvious, then, that there are some mechanisms at work that either prevent or stifle ethnic strife.
The first, paradoxically, is that the continuity of power in the hands of former Communist Party functionaries helps to maintain social order. President Jarimov in Agydea, for example, was elected not as an Adygean leader, but as a former top personality of the local party leadership with sufficient experience, connections and conservative attitudes. Conflicts arise where former leaders are too weak to maintain power. Secondly, voluntary organizations may play an important role. Despite the disorder in Chechnya, there was a Council for Inter-Ethnic Reconciliation which managed to minimize the number of local conflicts. Islamic Sufi orders have also played a very positive role in Chechnya and Dagestan. Beyond this, the reconciling role of traditional village elders is also quite important. These mechanisms helped to prevent intensification of the Balkar-Kabardin conflict and hindered the mass participation of Ingushes on the Chechen side in the Chechnya War. Similarly, elderly Azeri women, acting in a traditional role, halted a crowd of Azeri youngsters when they tried to storm Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, after the February 1988 declaration of secession. Unfortunately, their efforts were annulled by the inflammatory rhetoric of the Azairbaidjan media. On the other hand, the existence of a large percentage of ethnically mixed marriages does not seem to help in conflict prevention. The percentage of such marriages was very high in Abkhazia and especially in Ossetia, but members of these families were regarded with mistrust by both sides.
Overall, one may assume that these mechanisms will be most effective in more traditionally oriented societies and economies. Unfortunately, in many societies in the northern Caucasus today, a large number of young men are growing up without exposure to or respect for traditional values. As such, there is a danger that new conflict is growing in the region. If there is to be any chance of avoiding this, it must be through economic development. The economic future of these areas lies not in industry or agriculture, but in reviving the tourist trade. The Caucasus region has a pleasant climate rich in natural beauty, plenty of historical relics, exotic customs, ancient architecture, etc - everything needed for a successful tourist industry. What it lacks is social stability. Tourism requires security, suppression of crime and terrorism, a decent and effective police force, and so on. Many Caucasians equate service jobs with servility, and are unwilling to work in the tourist trade. Equally, many ethnic Russians are reluctant to work for non-Russian bosses. Tourism is likely to be the future for the region, but for this industry to flourish, there must be significant changes in both social interaction and national mentalities.
Notes and References
Arutiunov, S.A., Narody I kul’tury: razvitie I vzaimodeistvie, Moscow, Nauka, 1989.
Arutiunov, S.A., Kavkazskaya likhoradka: diagnoz i lechenic," Itogi, No. 34, 1999.
Arutiunov, S.A., Zakony gor vne zakonov ravnin," Itogi, No. 3, 1999.
Gasanov, N.N., Zachevov, K. Ya., and Kazimov, A.K., "Mezhnatsional’noe soglasie v Dagestane: problemy i perspectivy," Polis, No. 2, 1993.
Kaltakhchian, A.C., "Reabilitatsiia repressirovannykh narodov: pervye shagi," Etnopolis, No. 2, 1992.
Mikhailov, V.A., "Printsip voronki ili mekhanizm razvertyvaniia mezhetnicheskogo konflikta," Sotsis, No. 5, 1993.
Skakunov, E.M., "Etnonatsional’nye konflikty I politicheskaia stabil’nost’ Rossii," Etnopolis, No. 2, 1992.
Zolian, S.T., "Opisanie regional’nogo konflikta kak methodologicheskaia problema," Polis, No. 2, 1994.
by S.A. Arutiunov
Head, Caucasian Studies Department
Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology
Russian Academy of Sciences