Fiscally "responsible" or "conservative" socialism of sorts?

[Die Neue Zeit]

Tax to nationalize? From a debt-averse and budgetary perspective, one could call this a fiscally “responsible” or “conservative” socialism of sorts, whereby a special tax would be levied on some combination of windfall profits, operating profits, and financial assets themselves, and then another combination of cash proceeds, non-retroactive tax credits, and retroactive tax credits (for discouraging tax avoidance) would be disbursed, in a compulsory purchase or eminent domain manner, to take the relevant ownership stakes into public ownership.

[Positivist]

This strikes me as a form of gradual, tax-style, expropriation ("tax-style" meaning non-compensatory confiscation.) I feel that these types of expropriative models are theoretically possible, yet would likely be deemed to be "unconstitutional" or in violation of some international trade agreement if attempted within the legal framework of capitalist States.

This being acknowledged, it is necessarily concluded that sufficient power to implement these taxes could only be accomplished through revolution. Though, at the point that a revolutionary power is installed within a society, one may wonder why the workers shouldn't just go for full-out immediate expropriation, given that there new power would make it possible. Unless of course this gradualist method is proposed in anticipation of economic hardships involved in a quick transition from capitalism to socialism, and is proposed as a means to avoid these problems. In that case it still stands as a viable suggestion, which would need to he worked out in detail post-revolution (or immediately pre-revolution) for a decisions to be made on it.

[Workers-Control-Over-Prod]

Revolutionary Expropriation sounds more fun. Besides that, i don't find the argument that the bourgeoisie would not fight or attack us so hard if we "gradually" liquidate them as a class, to hold much ground. If there were to be any bourgeois elements in the state left, or any reformist-potential class-traitors in the party, then such a move would be suicide.
There just isn't a nice way of annihilating the class enemy.

[officer nugz]

that sounds a whole lot like capitalism.

[Die Neue Zeit]

This strikes me as a form of gradual, tax-style, expropriation ("tax-style" meaning non-compensatory confiscation.) I feel that these types of expropriative models are theoretically possible, yet would likely be deemed to be "unconstitutional" or in violation of some international trade agreement if attempted within the legal framework of capitalist States.

Compulsory purchases / eminent domain are quite legal, though. "Local development" would be impossible without this. Only if capitalist states actually abided by the UN Declaration of Human Rights would such be quite illegal.


This being acknowledged, it is necessarily concluded that sufficient power to implement these taxes could only be accomplished through revolution.

Per the Revolutionary Marxists usergroup discussion "Reform or Revolution," I should note that it can be implemented by bourgeois states requiring re-nationalization of, for example, natural monopolies that were privatized.


Though, at the point that a revolutionary power is installed within a society, one may wonder why the workers shouldn't just go for full-out immediate expropriation, given that there new power would make it possible.

That is assuming that the workers want immediate expropriation from the get-go in the first place.


Unless of course this gradualist method is proposed in anticipation of economic hardships involved in a quick transition from capitalism to socialism, and is proposed as a means to avoid these problems.

Indeed.


Revolutionary Expropriation sounds more fun. Besides that, i don't find the argument that the bourgeoisie would not fight or attack us so hard if we "gradually" liquidate them as a class, to hold much ground. If there were to be any bourgeois elements in the state left, or any reformist-potential class-traitors in the party, then such a move would be suicide.
There just isn't a nice way of annihilating the class enemy.

You're forgetting, though, that capital controls and nastier measures against capital flight would be put in place to complement or anticipate this public policy.

[Vladimir Innit Lenin]

I don't find that this is an argument for Socialism.

It just sounds like a retrograde move towards a big-state, 'national' economy. Which is a political impossibility and somewhat reactionary, considering the economic history of much of developed Europe in the past 100 years or so.

[Die Neue Zeit]

Within the context of Europe, then, the term would be Tax-To-"Unionize." How's that "reactionary"? :confused:

[Vladimir Innit Lenin]

Why tax to unionise? What's the point. Unions are a dead end, tax is a dead end.

I don't see the point??

[Die Neue Zeit]

Why tax to unionise? What's the point. Unions are a dead end, tax is a dead end.

I don't see the point??

No, "Unionize" with a big-U with reference to comrade Cockshott's remarks on the European Union. So, a "fiscally conservative socialism" at the EU level would be a tax-to-Unionize model, with full powers of compulsory purchase / eminent domain.

[Vladimir Innit Lenin]

You cannot just bring in some obscure idea from a fairly obscure source, not reference it at all, and expect someone to understand it.

You need to either provide a reference, or summarise the idea yourself, please. Until you do so it's really impossible to comment.

[Positivist]

@The Boss, as DNZ has already stated, this is not a program on how to establish socialism, it is a method of bringing property into state power so such a program could actually be implemented.

[Vladimir Innit Lenin]

I was referring to his 'tax-to-Unionise' phrase, which i've never heard of and isn't common parlance, as far as i'm aware.

[Workers-Control-Over-Prod]

Within the context of Europe, then, the term would be Tax-To-"Unionize." How's that "reactionary"? :confused:

The real question here, if we are talking about "taxation", is with what kind of state are we going "Tax-To-Unionize"?

[Die Neue Zeit]

@The Boss, as DNZ has already stated, this is not a program on how to establish socialism, it is a method of bringing property into state power so such a program could actually be implemented.


The real question here, if we are talking about "taxation", is with what kind of state are we going "Tax-To-Unionize"?

As I stated before, one of the legitimate possibilities is this: Permanent capitalist nationalizations: no negatives (Marx, Engels, and the EU) (http://www.revleft.com/vb/permanent-capitalist-nationalizations-t161200/index.html).

Those talking the talk about "whatever has been privatized, let it be re-nationalized," acceptance or rejection of this pretty much defines the sincerity or lack thereof of what they're saying.

[Positivist]

The real question here, if we are talking about "taxation", is with what kind of state are we going "Tax-To-Unionize"?

This is an important question as implementing these tax-style nationalizations within a capitalist state either a.) Will be shot down or b.) Will be undone if a bourgiose party is restored to power. Furthermore dissension amongst law enforcement can be expected.
My problem though is in what exactly is a workers state and how does it consolidate workers power?

[Die Neue Zeit]

This is an important question as implementing these tax-style nationalizations within a capitalist state either a.) Will be shot down or b.) Will be undone if a bourgiose party is restored to power.

Should read "if another bourgeois party," because the incumbent bourgeois party (perhaps inspired by the politics of certain bourgeois politicians in Latin America) would have been the one implementing this. Contrast this, indeed, with something like a "public option."


Furthermore dissension amongst law enforcement can be expected.

How so? The cops proper typically aren't involved in tax cases, and the taxman is always out to grab tax money at any opportunity.

[Positivist]

Should read "if another bourgeois party," because the incumbent bourgeois party (perhaps inspired by the politics of certain bourgeois politicians in Latin America) would have been the one implementing this. Contrast this, indeed, with something like a "public option."

Its supposed to be implemented by a bourgiose party? I don't really understand how this is supposed to work. As for the cops thing I direct you to the numerous "patriot" groups which have formed since the mere election of obama, many of which inculde police officers, and obama's pretty far to the right.

[Die Neue Zeit]

Its supposed to be implemented by a bourgiose party?

Not them exclusively, but they are a possibility ("reform").

A number of things have been privatized, and there may be a consensus to take them back into public hands. However, the only other bourgeois alternative is debt financing, and we all know what has happened time and again with debt financing agreements for nationalizations (interest payments better used for nationalized operations, social expenditures, etc.).


I don't really understand how this is supposed to work. As for the cops thing I direct you to the numerous "patriot" groups which have formed since the mere election of obama, many of which inculde police officers, and obama's pretty far to the right.

I know, but again I'm posing the question of relevance. The taxman doesn't wear a blue uniform, and other state authority alternatives exist; if not uniformed in blue, then perhaps in dark green or badge.

[Positivist]

Not them exclusively, but they are a possibility ("reform").

A number of things have been privatized, and there may be a consensus to take them back into public hands. However, the only other bourgeois alternative is debt financing, and we all know what has happened time and again with debt financing agreements for nationalizations (interest payments better used for nationalized operations, social expenditures, etc.).

I know, but again I'm posing the question of relevance. The taxman doesn't wear a blue uniform, and other state authority alternatives exist; if not uniformed in blue, then perhaps in dark green or badge.

I'm still skeptical of social progress in a bourgiose state, especially sustainable social progress. And I don't think consensus is really possible where nationalization is involved unless the current owners are compensated, which is anti-thetical to the "tax-to-nationalize" approach, so this still would be difficult.

As for dissension amongst police, it may not be relevant to the specific act of tax collection but it is to general law enforcement, which is still important.

[Positivist]

On a different note, I believe that this approach needs some expansion. For one thing, the taxes collected in this manner should be concentrated into a central ownership fund where there redistribution to Geographically Organized Workers funds could be organized. These GeoFunds, or whatever the hell they end up being abbreviated to, would be composed of all of the workers in a particular Geographic region, and how the distributed assets are used should be determined according to vote. The use of funds and assets should have certain pre-set restrictions and should be coordinated between all separate GeoFunds when necessary.

Also, I think an overall platform or program should include more rapid nationalizations of the "commanding heights" and major monopolies.

[Die Neue Zeit]

Comrade, you just introduced the Meidner Plan (which I think you've already read about) into this discussion. It is somewhat different from this. Surprisingly, the Meidner Plan is in my policy demands blog and not this one! :lol:

The two key differences between the Meidner Plan and this policy are:

1) The Meidner Plan involves a more immediate redistribution, not taxation;
2) Geographically organized worker funds are different from nationalization and nationalization funds.

As I wrote in my work, there are available means for more rapid nationalizations of what you just mentioned. If a "too big to fail" business goes bankrupt, an interventionist government should by all means exercise compulsory purchase / eminent domain in a heartbeat. Guess what the market value of said business's ownership stakes is at that point? ;)

Anyway, the Swedish bourgeoisie were scared shit-still of the Meidner Plan and organized the defeat of the soc-dems, and none in the mainstream have raised this ever since.

[Positivist]

Could you explain the difference between a nationalization fund and geographically organized workers funds, and why the management of taxed assets and funds should not be performed by similar organizations (given of course a planning bueurecracy capable of working out the "how"?)

[Die Neue Zeit]

A nationalization fund is one operated by the nation-state directly, much like the sovereign wealth funds (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_wealth_fund) of a number of booming Third World economies.

The short-term issues with geographically organized workers funds, I think, are these:

1) A few tweaks here and there would make them little different from so-called "Pension Fund Socialism" (with fund non-accessibility for non-retired workers).
2) A few tweaks here and there would make them parallel provincial funds or federated "state" funds (which would open the bourgeois canard of "states' rights").

[Positivist]

Couldn't the two problems associated with geographically organized workers funds easily be avoided by restricting any tweaks which would relegate assets exclusively to retired workers, and by designing the network of GeoFunds to be absolutely federal?

[Die Neue Zeit]

Couldn't the two problems associated with geographically organized workers funds easily be avoided by restricting any tweaks which would relegate assets exclusively to retired workers, and by designing the network of GeoFunds to be absolutely federal?

The former is indeed easier, but already there would have to be mechanisms that would place these funds somewhere in between a retirement savings plan (planned withdrawals further out) and a rainy-day savings account (unplanned withdrawals).

The latter, however, is more difficult. In the case of Japan, for example, the funds could span two or more prefectures except for Hokkaido and the urban centers of Osaka, Kyoto, and of course Tokyo. In the case of Canada, it's hard to see how the provinces of Ontario, Quebec, and BC would not have their own funds. In the case of the US, the federated states of California, Texas, Florida, and New York are to be considered.

The devils are always in the details. ;)

[Positivist]

So, your position is that too few or too many GeoFunds would result in dissent amongst individual GeoFunds? Couldn't a strong central authority, or method of centralized governance over all of the GeoFunds neutralize this problem? Furthermore, how are variations in social demand registered across different regions without the input provided by the geographically organized funds?

Perhaps outlining my general position here would be helpful.
1.) Assets confiscated through taxation, compulsory purchase, or rapid non-compensatory nationalization are distributed amongst Geographically Organized Workers funds (quantity of assets allocated to each fund is determined by population of represented region.)
2.) These workers funds democratically determine how to use the assets. Decisions which require inter-regional cooperation would be processed through some sort of International/National assembly and Planning agency (planning bodies should also exist for intra-regional projects which are connected to the central planning agency.)

Where is the problem here? That intra-regional projects of different regions conflict? Well this could simply be mediated through the federal assembly and planning agency.

[Die Neue Zeit]

So, your position is that too few or too many GeoFunds would result in dissent amongst individual GeoFunds? Couldn't a strong central authority, or method of centralized governance over all of the GeoFunds neutralize this problem? Furthermore, how are variations in social demand registered across different regions without the input provided by the geographically organized funds?

That would basically mean just going along with the permanent nationalization funds model. I would think that variations in regional demand are already taken into account by the various enterprise ownership stakes taken into permanent public ownership. A large but regional company on the west coast and a large but regional company on the east coast, for example, could provide information on the demand for their respective goods and/or services.

Also, the GeoFunds model might not be appropriate for something like nationalizing the casual/temp labour industry. Uniform labour standards are better met by uniform organization.


Perhaps outlining my general position here would be helpful.
1.) Assets confiscated through taxation, compulsory purchase, or rapid non-compensatory nationalization are distributed amongst Geographically Organized Workers funds (quantity of assets allocated to each fund is determined by population of represented region.)
2.) These workers funds democratically determine how to use the assets. Decisions which require inter-regional cooperation would be processed through some sort of International/National assembly and Planning agency (planning bodies should also exist for intra-regional projects which are connected to the central planning agency.)

Where is the problem here? That intra-regional projects of different regions conflict? Well this could simply be mediated through the federal assembly and planning agency.

Good point. You know, if you were into researching stuff, I would highly recommend surfing for more literature on Rudolf Meidner and the Meidner Plan.

[Die Neue Zeit]

Back to the pension problem, an Occupy supporter raised the Meidner Plan within the context of pension plans: What Future for Pensions? (http://bostonoccupier.com/2012/04/23/what-future-for-pensions/)



PAN ANGELOPOULOS

Compared to its Northern European counterparts, the US welfare state has always been considered inadequate. After decades of ‘reforms’ pushed through aggressively by the Reagan, Clinton, and Bush administrations, it now rests on a fragile base, offering a paltry social wage. What remains is the legacy of a New Deal that did not go far enough.

This is not solely an American phenomenon; on both sides of the Atlantic, welfare retrenchment gains pace as neoliberalism advances. As the provision of social services and a safety net by the state recedes, workers’ livelihoods become increasingly subject to the vicissitudes of the market. Whereas the social democratic (or Keynesian) state was based on citizens’ rights, universal benefits and a rising standard of financial and material provision, the neoliberal state is discretionary, means-tested, and minimalist. House owning, pension owning, share owning, and private medical insurance are regarded as substitutes for public housing, state pensions, income support, and free health service. ‘Popular capitalism’ replaces the welfare state, and what has taken decades of struggle to achieve is clawed back.

Today, in the midst of the Great Recession, the logic of re-commodification is reaching new extremes, while capital seeks to force working people to pay for its crisis through substantial cutbacks to social welfare. Against all odds, the backbone of the US welfare state has survived though. The widespread support enjoyed by Social Security (its entitlement, averaging $1,100 per month, saves nearly half the US senior population from destitution) means that it has not yet suffered the austerity or privatization that would paralyze it. As alarmism over the deficit and debt grows though, Social Security will be targeted for deep cuts that will undermine both its legitimacy and what should be the right to a decent, comfortable retirement. Old-age poverty rates, already remarkably high (especially among women), are sure to go through the roof.

Deficit hawks, using projections that combine distant horizons with arbitrary assumptions, assert that Social Security is a drain on public finances, and that privatizing it and raising the retirement age will reduce costs and improve pensions (this is often accompanied by a rhetoric that sets young against old). As former New Left Review editor Robin Blackburn shows in Age Shock though, these arguments just don’t hold water. The record of private pension provision, which has grown tremendously since the early 1980s with the proliferation of Individual Retirement Accounts and 401(k)s to supplement the subsistence stipend that Social Security offers, is dismal.

Private provision comes in two forms: defined benefit (DB), which guarantees a specific pension entitlement calculated in terms of salary and years of contribution (this is also the way many once-generous public schemes in Europe work), and defined contribution (DC), which offers only whatever pension can be purchased in the money markets for the sum in the pension pot at retirement. Up until the 1980s, most corporate and public plans were DB; these employed risk and asset-pooling and offered guaranteed pensions and health care benefits. Since then there has been a shift to DC plans, together with growing pension wealth inequality and income erosion in retirement. These plans no longer guarantee pensions, while the market risk is entirely borne by the contributor-worker. In the case of a stock market collapse, the results can be catastrophic: in the three years following March 2000, after the dot-com crash, US pension and mutual fund values dropped by nearly a half; in 2008 global retirement funds dropped by 20 per cent in one week. Moreover, with DC plans employers’ contributions plummet (about half of what they contribute to DB schemes), while costs for workers are higher because of hidden fees and heavy administrative, marketing, and customization charges. Meanwhile, the private sector DB schemes that survive are threatened by ‘vulture capitalism’ – corporate bankruptcies carried through with the aim of dumping pension liabilities. This has occurred repeatedly in the steel, airline, and auto industries, with often-catastrophic results for the workers affected.

The privatization of what is left of public pensions is thus an ill-suited option; the result would only be to reduce retirement incomes and to increase inequality and insecurity. In an ageing society though, ensuring a future for decent pensions at around 70-75 per cent of average income (allowing for the dignity of financial independence that would permit the pursuit of creative, socially worthwhile activities) poses a real challenge. By 2035 retirement incomes will need 15 per cent of GDP, but there will be a shortfall of around 4 per cent, with the revenue deficiencies of private schemes accounting for two-thirds of this. As Blackburn argues, the phenomenon of an ageing society is better seen as common shock, not an individually (and privately) insurable risk. Addressing it requires more than protecting Social Security; there will need to be more collective insurance, additional sources of revenue, and a new development of welfare principles. Public systems must be at the centre of the effort to remake pension provision. They are efficient and cost effective (the Social Security Administration caters to over 150 million employees and 50 million beneficiaries with a staff of 68,000 – about the size of a single large insurance company), and simply need good benefit formulae and adequate revenue sources to deliver good results.

The innovatory solution to pension woes, to prevent the return of pauperized old age, requires a basic state pension (Social Security), financed largely by ‘pay-as-you-go’ and providing a guaranteed basic income, supplemented by a universal, pre-funded secondary pension financed by a tax on capital. Credits for care work, child-rearing, and educational or cultural contribution would help remedy the problem of lower pensions for women in the current system. The basic state pension and the secondary pension would supply around 45-50 per cent and 30 per cent of median income respectively. How would the revenue be raised? Social Security will not experience any significant revenue shortfall in the future (of the 4 per cent of GDP shortfall in 2035, it would account for less than 1.5 per cent). Raising the contribution rate though, which is currently 12.4 per cent, by 1 percentage point and increasing the annual income threshold above which no further Social Security contributions are payable (it is currently just under $90,000) would generate substantially more revenue.

The novel aspect of this plan is the universal secondary pension. The idea comes from the visionary economist Rudolf Meidner, who helped design Sweden’s social democratic economy (‘Rehn-Meidner model’). In the 1970s Meidner, anticipating the new social expenditures that would be entailed by an ageing and learning society, proposed the creation of strategic social funds – ‘wage-earner funds’ – to be financed by a levy on shares. The policy had the strong support of the left wing of the Social Democratic Party and the trade unions, but was bitterly opposed by the Conservatives and the powerful Swedish Employers Association. The Social Democratic government diluted the proposal so that the social funds were financed by a modest tax on profits, and in 1992 it was dismantled altogether, although the plan had been successful in several respects (increased collective savings; higher economic growth, capital formation, and pensions; lower unemployment and inflation).

Today the plan would be similar: all listed corporations employing more than twenty people or with a turnover of over $10 million would be required to issue new shares equivalent to 10-20 per cent of its profits to a network of social funds. This would both raise employers’ contributions and make tax avoidance more difficult, while the levy would be an asset tax not an income-related tax, hence it would not subtract from corporate cash-flow, nor threaten investment and employment. It would be a sort of capital gains tax on any profits-related growth in company value, falling entirely on the corporation’s owners – thus the rich, who own most shares (the wealthiest 1 per cent of US households owns two-thirds of all assets and receives one half of all share dividends and capital gains). As conventional tax sources would not be drawn upon, there would be more funding for education, health care, and social infrastructure.

The public social fund network would hold the shares it received for the long term, and use the dividend income they generate to pay pensions. The funds would produce wealth as well as redistribute it, promoting investments in productive capacity, environmental protection, and public infrastructure. Organized on non-commercial lines, the funds would not only de-commodify pension provision, bringing it back into the public sphere, but also lead to a degree of real popular control over the economic process, as companies would gradually become worker-owned in a collective sense. Essentially, the network of social funds would gradually accumulate claims to the future social surplus at the expense of capitalists and rentiers. Altogether, the Meidner plan would entail a radical reconceptualization of terms like ‘nationalization’ and ‘worker control.’

The plan outlined above (Blackburn has shown with meticulous detail that it is financially viable in the US, Europe, and Japan) would, by providing strong public pensions, help solve pension woes and achieve solidarity between generations by keeping constant the ratio of average income to pensioner income. By taxing the wealthy it would reduce inequality and increase the living standards of the lower classes. The plan would also gradually socialize investment and parts of the economy in a novel way. Of course, this would only be one step in this direction, its success depending upon the broader balance of class forces and the outcome of fundamental political battles. To be sustainable, the system of social funds would have to be only one element of a broader public utility finance system, with publicly owned and accountable banks, a national investment bank, and a different kind of central bank its core. More broadly, there would have to be public provision and de-commodification of major areas of social welfare, to ensure free access to decent health care and education for working people and pensioners. These are lofty goals, but vital to achieve if we are to begin creating a new, different society.



(POSTER NOTE: The author above is suggesting something somewhat different from the Meidner Plan. The Meidner Plan called for the redistribution from 20% of business profits directly, while the author is suggesting merely mandatory voting share issuance regardless of the operating situation. However, if this plan doesn't affect corporate cash flow, as opposed to income taxes payable, then why is "the taxpayer" paying into the funds?)

[Positivist]

I would actually prefer this revised edition of the meidner plan, but am unsure if the author has neglected the dichotomy between common and preferred stocks. My understanding of stocks may be somewhat rudimentary, but doesn't preferred include a set rate of return, but no voting rights, while common stocks procure voting rights but do not necessarily entail any dividends at all? I suppose you could collect both, easily remedying this problem and perhaps at this point dividends on common stocks are near universal.

[Die Neue Zeit]

Preferred stocks or shares don't vote, regardless of the set rate of return. The latter (dividend payment) can be abrogated or deferred by the company (non-cumulative or cumulative, respectively), unlike interest on bonds, but the dividends tend to be higher than those on common stocks. Common stocks are more complicated, in that there can be different classes of them.


I would actually prefer this revised edition of the meidner plan [...] I suppose you could collect both, easily remedying this problem and perhaps at this point dividends on common stocks are near universal.

I worded my Meidner proposal very specifically ("superior voting shares") to take the above difference into account.

The author's revised take could be applicable for times of operating losses. The overall problem with this, however, is the very issuance of new shares. IIRC, the original Meidner Plan called for the redistributed profits to be used for purchasing existing shares (where the % ownership increases faster). My tax-to-nationalize discussion is also based mainly on grabbing existing shares.

[Positivist]

Oh, interesting. I'll expand more later, but I understand the incentive to redistribute the other way noe. Though if at some point the intention of these plans became clear to the capitalists, could they refuse the sale of stocks? Furthermore, the drawn out process of voting at GeoFunds could lead to the use of the money on different projects. I guess this last part gives credence to the type of sovereign wealth fund you were advocating, except for control of production is not reappropriated to the workers itself, but rather to the state. There is again the problem of a bourgiose state here.

Overall, very interesting. Good prospects.

[Die Neue Zeit]

Oh, interesting. I'll expand more later, but I understand the incentive to redistribute the other way now. Though if at some point the intention of these plans became clear to the capitalists, could they refuse the sale of stocks?

Well, there's no law forcing enterprises to issue stocks or shares in what is called the primary (capital) market, where initial public offerings occur. That's another issue of mine with the author's take. What Meidner called for was the transfer of ownership through what is called the secondary (capital) market, with all the glamour of stock exchanges.


Furthermore, the drawn out process of voting at GeoFunds could lead to the use of the money on different projects. I guess this last part gives credence to the type of sovereign wealth fund you were advocating, except for control of production is not reappropriated to the workers itself, but rather to the state. There is again the problem of a bourgiose state here.

I can definitely see the possibility of some public "fund of funds" (based on the aforementioned taxation scheme) comprised of the GeoFunds, of the nationalization fund, and of some "Cooperatives with State Aid" fund (eminent domain or compulsory but then the state turns the ownership over to workers forming coops and uses the coop funds for startup cost assistance).


Overall, very interesting. Good prospects.

Yes, prospects not seen through cheap sloganeering, for sure.

[Positivist]

So what we're discussing now is a sort of general civic ownership fund which is compiled through eminent domain purchases and taxation of assets/profits. This broad, more diverse approach I believe is effective in neutralizing some of the negative consequences we have discussed with several of the individual implements earlier. Also for clarification, I'm assuming cooperatives with state aid are employee owner corporation which reciege financial aid in exchange for conformity to rational state planning.

[Die Neue Zeit]

It's not that far. The startup aid should be unconditional, but should just be for the startup. There's an independence issue here re. the capitalist state, and we also want to avoid a "bailout" culture. Maybe further down the road, with a culture of "rational state planning," can there be some slack.