Utilitarianism?

[nihilust]

"Utilitarianism is a theory in normative ethics holding that the proper course of action is the one that maximizes overall "happiness"."

using this definition, how do you think it applies, if at all, to a communist society? just looking for some differing input

[Ilyich]

"Utilitarianism is a theory in normative ethics holding that the proper course of action is the one that maximizes overall "happiness"."

using this definition, how do you think it applies, if at all, to a communist society? just looking for some differing input

My main problem with utilitarianism is that it hold that there exists universal morality. I doesn't take into account that different classes have different morals derived from their interests in gaining and maintaining power and that morality that appears to cross class boundaries is really just the ideas of the ruling class being spread throughout other sections of society.

[The Jay]

I do not whole heartedly support Utilitarianism. It works in some cases but not in others. The philosophy could be used to justify totalitarianism. Think of Hobbes's Leviathan, it could be viewed that an absolute ruler could be viewed as the best way to make people content as long as there were a sufficient propaganda machine to accompany it, ie. Orwell's 1984. These theoretical examples are not great theoretical or philosophical counters to the ideology as they are merely pointing out specific manifestations.

A better critique could be that the ideology merely focuses on a betterment of the human condition through an abstract and vague axiom of happiness. The fact is that the philosophy is so vague that it lends itself to either infinite criticism or infinite agreement.

[The Jay]

My main problem with utilitarianism is that it hold that there exists universal morality. I doesn't take into account that different classes have different morals derived from their interests in gaining and maintaining power and that morality that appears to cross class boundaries is really just the ideas of the ruling class being spread throughout other sections of society.

No it doesn't. Could you explain why you think what you do?

[Ilyich]

No it doesn't. Could you explain why you think what you do?

Okay, you know what? I just spent about forty-five minutes trying to come up with a response. I have come to the conclusion that I either said the wrong thing or I can't articulate why I think what I do. When I think about utilitarianism, for some reason, I associate it with moral universalism. I'm under the impression that it holds that every individual(from every class currently and throughout history) has the same code for morality.

[The Jay]

Okay, you know what? I just spent about forty-five minutes trying to come up with a response. I have come to the conclusion that I either said the wrong thing or I can't articulate why I think what I do. When I think about utilitarianism, for some reason, I associate it with moral universalism. I'm under the impression that it holds that every individual(from every class currently and throughout history) has the same code for morality.


It's good of you to admit that. Kudos!

I think that you were under that very impression. Utilitarianism holds that the best way to act is to hold the principle of maximizing happiness as the main way to determine the correct action. Note that this happiness is closer to the Platonic or Aristotelian version than the modern use of the word happiness, which is now a synonym of joy.

[Камо́ Зэд]

[Utilitarianism] doesn't take into account that different classes have different morals derived from their interests in gaining and maintaining power ...

I'd like to expand on this, actually. I don't know much about utilitarianism, to be perfectly fair, but from what I've read of it, it doesn't seem to acknowledge the revolutionary dialectical progression of history. Perhaps Marxism may be considered utilitarian in that the ultimate aim of Marxist political action is the elimination of classes and exploitation, and that the interests of the proletariat are the interests of the world majority. But Marxism isn't so much a philosophy geared toward the relief of suffering, like Buddhism, than it is a theoretical framework from which to analyze social relations and history. I suppose it's possible to reconcile Marxism and utilitarianism or otherwise to say that Marxism contains utilitarian elements.

[The Jay]

I'd like to expand on this, actually. I don't know much about utilitarianism, to be perfectly fair, but from what I've read of it, it doesn't seem to acknowledge the revolutionary dialectical progression of history. Perhaps Marxism may be considered utilitarian in that the ultimate aim of Marxist political action is the elimination of classes and exploitation, and that the interests of the proletariat are the interests of the world majority. But Marxism isn't so much a philosophy geared toward the relief of suffering, like Buddhism, than it is a theoretical framework from which to analyze social relations and history. I suppose it's possible to reconcile Marxism and utilitarianism or otherwise to say that Marxism contains utilitarian elements.


You should read or watch lectures on Utilitarianism as well. Of course it doesn't refer to Historical Materialism. It's an attempt to derive the best algorithm for moral action.

[Камо́ Зэд]

You should read or watch lectures on Utilitarianism as well. Of course it doesn't refer to Historical Materialism. It's an attempt to derive the best algorithm for moral action.

Point taken, and I'll certainly take your advice about the lectures, comrade. My general impression of this algorithmic attempt, though, is that it seems to presuppose happiness as the highest moral good, albeit in a Platonic or Aristotelian sense. This isn't to say I'd necessarily disagree with this judgment, but I can't help but wonder what epochs await humanity beyond the development of communist civilization, what else there will be to struggle for. I bring this up because, perhaps, at some point in the continuum of human civilization, happiness will become vestigial in some way. Then again, I suppose this just redefines happiness in ways we can't yet predict, which I'm sure has happened at least once in human history so far.

[cantwealljustgetalong]

OK: it's rant time.

regardless if we agree that there is a universal morality or not, I think most (if not all) of us are socialists for moral reasons. we can talk about moral relativity to situation, or moral relativity to class, and have perfectly true discussions, but we neglect to mention what morality really is and why we're even talking about it.
morality, at its core, is an evolutionarily beneficial trait: it makes sense for a species to look out for itself if it wants to persist. it has manifested itself in different ways throughout history and has been translated into different codified moral systems over the millennia.

mind you, this does not mean that morality materially exists, although it exists almost universally in some way or another inside the human experience. cognitively speaking, the capacity for morality is certainly a universal trait in the same way that normative brain function is; there are people born without this capacity, but that doesn't stop it from being basically universal for human purposes.
environment plays a huge part in undermining evolutionary morality. for instance, infants generally demonstrate discomfort when they see a human life ended before them, but this instinct can easily be unlearned if they see it happen enough. children distressed by poverty will one day become the teenagers who strut past the homeless without a second glance. the nihilistic system of preventable death that capitalism engenders is just such a world, as were the class societies that preceded it.

evolutionary morality is necessarily consequentialist; it cares more about outcomes than about process, i.e., the survival of the species by any means necessary. that's about as far as I can read into what evolution has to say about morality. I take the socialist step towards seeking to forge a real humanistic morality on an amoral Earth, and I accept the consequentialist view that revolution in pursuit of this world would be a just act.

personally, I see a specific strand of Utilitarianism as the hidden moral system of socialism, Marxism, and communism in general. socialists that try to distance themselves from morality would never own up to it; morality is an idealist bourgeois construct and all of that. and certainly the liberal Kantian deontological morality is: thou shalt, thou shalt not, no matter the consequences. that's the liberal institutional logic: as long as everyone follows the rules, then it's just.
however, a consequentialist morality that favors the greatest good for the greatest number is obviously the moral code of socialism, and is not entirely divorced from what we can scientifically derive from morality. sure, we have to own the jump from 'what is' to 'what ought to be,' and taking this jump can't be claimed to be universal as the old philosophers thought it to be. however, what certainly is universal is the need to eat, and the other essentials I won't recount here; securing these essentials for as many members of our species as possible is a perfectly rational moral conclusion when presented with how morality developed evolutionarily.

most leftists I speak to harp on moral relativism and actively deny that they have moral inclinations, but I feel the need to call bullshit. why end poverty? why liberate the working class? why even build socialism? because it's the inevitable outcome of history? I doubt most leftists really believe that.
leftists should use the moral high-ground they have to attack liberal nihilism and conservative-liberal Kantianism. we should be able to make the case that Lenin (or whoever your favorite revolutionary is) in fact was acting morally in his attempts to build socialism and stress the immorality of the present order and why it must be overcome. while that is not an attractive argument to Marxists, it has immense emotional resonance and a haunting staying power with individuals who empathize with the ignored oppressed masses.

note: Utilitarianism is certainly part of the moral universalist liberal tradition, to the point where neo/classical economists attempted to formulate their theories in units of utility ('utils'. seriously). it is nonetheless the moral tradition many of us fall into, albiet in a materialist and relativist sense.

[The Jay]

Could you then explain to me the reasoning you have for subscribing to an evolution-based origin of morality?

[cantwealljustgetalong]

sure!

any amoeba has the self-preservation instinct. as Kropotkin observes in Mutual Aid, the tendency toward mutual support in nature is magnified by the level of complexity of the organism. mutual support allows species to defend themselves against need and predators more effectively, and was hence rewarded in the natural selection process. humans are social animals and, due to cooperation, became the dominant species on Earth.

it can be observed that every human society on Earth has some permutation of a moral code, much like they have mythos. the evolutionary tendency towards mutual support seems to be the obvious motivation for moral attitudes towards others, just as theory of mind is the motivation for worship of inanimate objects. much like theory of mind finds cultural expression through religion, the mutual instinct finds cultural expression through morality. evolution can convincingly be said to be the source of morality.

[The Jay]

That sounds like a whole bunch of un-scientific speculation to me.

[Philo]

It doesn't, except in the sense that "developing our well-being" is an admirable and desirable guideline. But that is hardly the moral theory that is utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is basically just capitalism transposed into moral terms, with "utility" taking a supposedly moral rather than economic import. Insofar as I think there is any room for what we call "moral" (I prefer ethical) thought without being repressive ideology, I tend to favor a more Kantian approach - one of intersubjectivity. "Ethics" are ways we negotiate our various concrete interests so we can live together in a way conducive to mutual flourishing. It is not a transcendent normativity but a social relation, though moral behavior obviously has to have a biological substrate. However, the fact that an intersubjective, communicative ethics operates through such a substrate at some level (obviously, being animals, there needs to be at one level a "biological" aspect to all our behavior, such as evolved reciprocal altruism) but this does not provide an "absolute" ground for a normative fact, at least if by "fact" we mean anything like a descriptive fact.

Just to make this point clear, suppose I think is is wrong to cause pain. Someone hits me with a bottle, and I yell ouch, obviously. Your typical naturalist absolute moralist will point to the fact that I am objectively in pain (it isn't just my arbitrary act of imagination) as a ground for morality. But this fails, for it is really saying:

1. It is wrong to cause pain.
2. I have caused a person to be objectively in pain.
3. Therefore what I did was wrong.

This in no way provides any kind of "ground" for ethics. Whatever we call "ethics" is just the highes level of generalization in our efforts to get along and live, nothing more, but also crucially nothing less.

[nihilust]

Thanks for all the replies guys/girls! Definitely cleared it up but dont you think communism would entail Util? I do agree that the definition i used almost seems to presuppose "this and that" but if we live in any distinct type of society that obeys a moral conciousness, are we not already doing that? Is it not justifiable then to act in such a way that obeys societies moral code, especially if we live in a communist society and the decision is made for the progress of the people and sciences? i think it is. i do think the ends justify the means

[nihilust]

"Kantian ethics are deontological, revolving entirely around duty rather than emotions or end goals. All actions are performed in accordance with some underlying maxim or principle, which are deeply different from each other; it is according to this that the moral worth of any action is judged. Kant's ethics are founded on his view of rationality as the ultimate good and his belief that all people are fundamentally rational beings."
This is the first time ive ever read on Kantianism, but i do like that definition very much so! Can someone explain to me how Kant. and Util. differ in practice? The definitions ive provided for both honestly seem fairly interchangeable to me, especially where they both say, util- the proper course of action is the one that maximizes overall "happiness" AND Kant- "revolving entirely around duty rather than emotions or end goals. All actions are performed in accordance with some underlying maxim or principle".
Mainly due to the proper action and duty instead of emotion seems to come together easily.

[The Jay]

It doesn't, except in the sense that "developing our well-being" is an admirable and desirable guideline. But that is hardly the moral theory that is utilitarianism.

agreed



Utilitarianism is basically just capitalism transposed into moral terms, with "utility" taking a supposedly moral rather than economic import.

That's ridiculous. Capitalism is not "about" utility. It is about the accumulation of wealth within the framework of private property. You are proposing that Capitalism is some method derived in order to efficiently run society when that is not the case.


Insofar as I think there is any room for what we call "moral" (I prefer ethical) thought without being repressive ideology,

We have to be repressive to some degree. I feel no guilt in repressing fascist ideology and will feel no guilt in repressing supporters of Capitalism after a revolution.



I tend to favor a more Kantian approach - one of intersubjectivity. "Ethics" are ways we negotiate our various concrete interests so we can live together in a way conducive to mutual flourishing. It is not a transcendent normativity but a social relation,

Kant was nowhere near a believer in an intersubjective framework. He viewed his morality as deriving an absolute morality, which is conceptually opposed to the acceptance of an intersubjective moral framework as being just that, subjective.



though moral behavior obviously has to have a biological substrate. However, the fact that an intersubjective, communicative ethics operates through such a substrate at some level (obviously, being animals, there needs to be at one level a "biological" aspect to all our behavior, such as evolved reciprocal altruism) but this does not provide an "absolute" ground for a normative fact, at least if by "fact" we mean anything like a descriptive fact.


There needs to be some serious concrete proof added here for me to find this an acceptable argument. Not only do you have to prove that there is some natural inclination towards certain tendencies at birth, but you must prove that these are similar to all and that these tendencies are maintained through even a small amount of social conditioning.

Also, your describing the type of fact was superfluous.



Just to make this point clear, suppose I think is is wrong to cause pain. Someone hits me with a bottle, and I yell ouch, obviously. Your typical naturalist absolute moralist will point to the fact that I am objectively in pain (it isn't just my arbitrary act of imagination) as a ground for morality. But this fails, for it is really saying:

1. It is wrong to cause pain.
2. I have caused a person to be objectively in pain.
3. Therefore what I did was wrong.

This in no way provides any kind of "ground" for ethics. Whatever we call "ethics" is just the highes level of generalization in our efforts to get along and live, nothing more, but also crucially nothing less.


You do not need to be a moral absolutist to hold that type of belief. Whenever you posit the basis for any type of moral system there are certain axioms that one must hold as true by default for it to function. This is true of any logical system, so your criticism is functionally meaningless.

[The Jay]

"Kantian ethics are deontological, revolving entirely around duty rather than emotions or end goals. All actions are performed in accordance with some underlying maxim or principle, which are deeply different from each other; it is according to this that the moral worth of any action is judged. Kant's ethics are founded on his view of rationality as the ultimate good and his belief that all people are fundamentally rational beings."
This is the first time ive ever read on Kantianism, but i do like that definition very much so! Can someone explain to me how Kant. and Util. differ in practice? The definitions ive provided for both honestly seem fairly interchangeable to me, especially where they both say, util- the proper course of action is the one that maximizes overall "happiness" AND Kant- "revolving entirely around duty rather than emotions or end goals. All actions are performed in accordance with some underlying maxim or principle".
Mainly due to the proper action and duty instead of emotion seems to come together easily.



They are completely different, actually. Kant viewed Ethics as being something that relies on Categorical Imperatives which are silly, whereas Utilitarianism is just a framework that makes much more sense. An example that is often used to describe Kant's Ethics in classes is this: lying is wrong; therefore, it is wrong in each and every case and should never be done. This means, literally I am not being facetious, that if you were home and someone came to your house and said, "we are looking for your daughter to kidnap her so tell us where she is," you would have to either tell them or keep your mouth shut. You could not lie to them and say that she isn't here. Utilitarianism makes no such demands.

[Philo]

That's ridiculous. Capitalism is not "about" utility. It is about the accumulation of wealth within the framework of private property. You are proposing that Capitalism is some method derived in order to efficiently run society when that is not the case.

Sure, but I was alluding to the parallels between "rational utility maximizers" in economic theory and utilitarianism.


We have to be repressive to some degree. I feel no guilt in repressing fascist ideology and will feel no guilt in repressing supporters of Capitalism after a revolution.

You're equivocating. There's a difference between:

1. Repressing an ideology
2. An ideology that serves to maintain and reinforce authoritarian social arrangements

I am using the second sense.


Kant was nowhere near a believer in an intersubjective framework. He viewed his morality as deriving an absolute morality, which is conceptually opposed to the acceptance of an intersubjective moral framework as being just that, subjective.

There is not necessarily a conflict between an intersubjective metaethics and some kind of moral absolutism. I could easily say that the ground of morality consists in my obligations as a rational being in a community of other such beings, rather than some natural fact (as utilitarianism usually posits) while at the same time drawing absolutist normative implications from this, which I don't disagree Kant did.

In other words, when Kant says "act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law" this is an absolutely binding prescript, but the second-order metaethical ground of what is going on when we consider this "right" is our fulfillment of the requirements of practical reason as rational beings living in a community of rational beings. You're equivocating between the first-order question of absolutist vs. flexible prescriptions, and the second-order question of what "grounds" morality. Look at Gauthier's Morals By Agreement, for example. Though this is more social-contractualist than I am comfortable with, it describes the relationship between intersubjective metaethics and a "realist" approach to normative ethics quite nicely, and he is a Kantian.



There needs to be some serious concrete proof added here for me to find this an acceptable argument. Not only do you have to prove that there is some natural inclination towards certain tendencies at birth, but you must prove that these are similar to all and that these tendencies are maintained through even a small amount of social conditioning.

I did not maintain or deny that there are such tendencies. My only point was that even if there was, say, some evolved tendency for altruism, it would not rescue strong metaethical realism.


You do not need to be a moral absolutist to hold that type of belief. Whenever you posit the basis for any type of moral system there are certain axioms that one must hold as true by default for it to function. This is true of any logical system, so your criticism is functionally meaningless.

It's not functionally meaningless at all, this analogy between moral and formal systems actually conveys my point quite nicely. In formal systems, we choose certain axioms. Choose. Similarly, we "choose" our ethical axioms and revise them in the process of trying to get along as social beings.

[The Jay]

Fair enough.

As for your last point, I don't see how that makes a difference even though it is correct. I think that we agree on a lot, but you seem to be applying analysis as criticism. It's either that or I'm just being a contrarian asshole.

[cantwealljustgetalong]

it is indeed unscientific. a moral code cannot be based on purely positive, scientific statements; ethics is only of use relative to an agent. my point is that it has objective origins and those need to be taken into account when forming a moral system without moral universalism. I'd be curious to hear what your morality is based on, especially given its similarity to mine.

[nihilust]

I feel complete in regards to this thread and appreciate everyone posting and helping me organize my thoughts further!

[Tanner]

Utilitarianism has an unfortunate tendency to support a status quo. This proclivity is more noticeable with rule utilitarianism than with Mill’s act utilitarianism but can be seen to exist in both. We need to look no further than Mill’s own contradictions between his ethics and political philosophy to see this. In On Liberty, Mill wrote:

“No person is an entirely isolated being; it is impossible for a person to do anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himself, without mischief reaching at least to his near connections, and often far beyond them. If he injures his property, he does harm to those who directly or indirectly derived support from it, and usually diminishes, by a greater or less amount, the general resources of the community.”
The problem here is that he clearly recognizes property as a societal, communal interest and still writes in support of its private ownership. Another example of his inability to radically change status quo even when such changes would favor utility comes from Mill’s Principles of Political Economy (book 2, chapters 11 through 13). Here Mill acknowledged that the working class under capitalism existed as a commodity whose value was decided primarily on principles of supply and demand and that they existed as a majority of the population. Under “pure” act utilitarianism, it would serve the most good to move away from the system which they were being exploited in. Instead, Mill (in agreement with Bentham) actually advocates that the working class reproduce less and raise their wages by lowering their supply of labor. It seems Mill was able to advocate utility only within his own liberal framework and almost unable to think outside of it. Marx realized this weakness of utilitarianism, in Das Kapital he wrote:

“To know what is useful for a dog, one must study dog-nature. This nature itself is not to be deduced from the principle of utility. Applying this to man, he who would criticise all human acts, movements, relations, etc., by the principle of utility, must first deal with human nature in general, and then with human nature as modified in each historical epoch.”
Here he meant that utilitarianism doesn’t make enough inquiry into what’s actually good for people and instead only sees human nature as it is alienated under capitalism.

[Rafiq]

"Utilitarianism is a theory in normative ethics holding that the proper course of action is the one that maximizes overall "happiness"."

using this definition, how do you think it applies, if at all, to a communist society? just looking for some differing input

It does not. Utilitarianism is not only idealist in nature, it is not only anti scientific and by default incapable of actually understanding the real nature of social change (which doesn't apply to people making decisions that effect society as a whole because they think it's "more moral" or even "for the better of all"), it is always, and absolutely in nature an obscene mutation of bourgeois-liberalism, perhaps it is even a dump of shit that was washed ashore academia or the intellectual sphere that was a result of the mass ideological regression experienced since the beginnings of neoliberalism (new age garbage, eastern spirituality etc. fall into this category as well). The goal of the communists is not to achieve happiness for all, but as an ideological manifestation of the interests of the proletariat, it is the active process in which the proletariat emancipates itself from itself, the process in which existing social relations are destroyed not by the hammer of good will or technocratic expertise, but by the hammer of emancipation, the product of an existing systemic (as in, inherent to the capitalist mode of production) contradiction of class interests. Happiness is a personal problem, something that ought to be solved privately. The problem of capitalism is not that it is incapable of making everybody happy, the problem of capitalism is it's inherent contradictions, both of class and of systemic (market, etc.) nature, making your good intentions and what not absolutely useless in the face of these real existing seeds of destruction.

[Rafiq]

I'd like to expand on this, actually. I don't know much about utilitarianism, to be perfectly fair, but from what I've read of it, it doesn't seem to acknowledge the revolutionary dialectical progression of history. Perhaps Marxism may be considered utilitarian in that the ultimate aim of Marxist political action is the elimination of classes and exploitation

Firstly, I'd like to address the fact that exploitation is not simply a moral category, it is what is described as the relationship between two existing classes, morals aside (Not in the sense that "morals aside" means exploitation as a concept is not moral in character, but that exploitation (he's taking advantage of me and using me for his ends) =/= exploitation (term to describe an actual class relationship that for fills the process of capital accumulation from Kapital).

Secondly, teleology is not necessarily inherent to Marxism, although it is present in Marx's writings, it is relatively contradictory to Marxism as a whole (historical materialism). The ultimate aim of the Communists is proletarian dictatorship, the emancipation of the proletariat and the destruction of the bourgeois class, not a society that we deem better than the one that exists today.

[TiberiusGracchus]

"Utilitarianism is a theory in normative ethics holding that the proper course of action is the one that maximizes overall "happiness"."

using this definition, how do you think it applies, if at all, to a communist society? just looking for some differing input

I think it's at best banal.

"We believe that it's good to do what is best for as many as possible". Well duh!


But what is the best for people? Some utilitarian say "as much pleasure and as little pain as possible" and I believe that to be totally moronic. Pleasure is not good in it self and pain is not bad in it self, they are rather signs that tell us if something is good/bad.

Also how do you achieve whatever is good? When utlitarians try to answer such questions it always becomes clear that this is a bourgeoisie way of thinking. It very much resemble bourgeosie economics with "list of preferences", a-historical individualism and rational choice-assumtions, instrumental rationality and reductionism (the multitude of qualitative human aspects and relations reduced to a principle of utility).

Marx said that this bourgeoisie way of thinking could not have originated in any different place than Britain.


Besides, you can pretty much legitimize anything with utilitarian arguments. Bureaucrats, politicians and other people with much power and no principles love utilitarianism.