Admiral Swagmeister G-Funk
4th August 2012, 13:07
My problem with - not understanding but rather, judging the legitimacy of - dialectical analysis comes down to how we first attain what is an objective fact. This is, how can the dialectical method be seen to understand truths? How are these truths even defined scientifically?
If we say quantity becomes quality in a dialectical relationship, how do we first define what is in the quantity and then what its quality is thus?
I don't disagree with the basic formula and I suppose that my problem is a problem of both methodology and linguistics when assuming objective data which can be used in a dialectical study.
I do also understand that, if reality is in constant motion and flux, then the data available to us changes and must be viewed in its particular context (historical-social-economic), but how to we create the parameters in which a context is considered to be understood objectively?
To me, and I'd imagine to most others, dialectical materialism is another provisional method which is provided in relation to the parameters of linguistic-capacity of epistemology. The problem is, as with the ideas of the ruling class themselves, how can we present our arguments as true scientific alternatives? How can the dialectical relationship between, say, class-conflict and the resultant, qualitative outcome that is class-consciousness, provide a just alternative to a capitalist 'realist' notion about people being inherently selfish or whatever?
It seems that both instances can be 'objectively' recognized as truths if we consider an empirical method of presenting data (perhaps, hypothetically we could use trends in union membership/activity in relation to economic crises to illustrate class-consciousness, if someone were to undertake such a brave study - this is hypothetical and for the sake of argument). Obviously dialectical materialism itself is hypothesis pretty much, but my questions are in relation to how we currently understand data and the like, which raises questions about the theory and how it is applied in as concretely scientific a way as possible, rather than a mere set of 'laws' which imply some kind of meta-narrative arbitrarily, because I'm uncertain as to what extent this application of knowledge is scientific at all.
I'm a student of sociology as a science but also a student of continental ideas which raise questions about how we understand what science is and how it works, so I think that dialectical materialism here comes under big jeapordy. I'd like to hear some basic indications about the relationship between marxism and analytical philosophy too, as both are concerned with science and, as such, bear the burden of attaining some kind of scientific legitimacy.
It seems that there is a contradiction in dialectical materialism itself, but not necessarily a dialectcal one. This is that, if the objective world is in constant flux and change, then we cannot rely on any grand understanding of any concept concretely. This means that a dialectical study of yesterday is not an adequate study of today. Therefore, the analysis needs to be constant, as no truth is a constant as so many that claim to uphold dialectical materialism would believe, perhaps not even consciously. The 'laws' of dialectical materialism be kept up with by any given analysis, such an analysis becomes a historical relic at the moment in which a dialectical contradiction takes place.
If we say quantity becomes quality in a dialectical relationship, how do we first define what is in the quantity and then what its quality is thus?
I don't disagree with the basic formula and I suppose that my problem is a problem of both methodology and linguistics when assuming objective data which can be used in a dialectical study.
I do also understand that, if reality is in constant motion and flux, then the data available to us changes and must be viewed in its particular context (historical-social-economic), but how to we create the parameters in which a context is considered to be understood objectively?
To me, and I'd imagine to most others, dialectical materialism is another provisional method which is provided in relation to the parameters of linguistic-capacity of epistemology. The problem is, as with the ideas of the ruling class themselves, how can we present our arguments as true scientific alternatives? How can the dialectical relationship between, say, class-conflict and the resultant, qualitative outcome that is class-consciousness, provide a just alternative to a capitalist 'realist' notion about people being inherently selfish or whatever?
It seems that both instances can be 'objectively' recognized as truths if we consider an empirical method of presenting data (perhaps, hypothetically we could use trends in union membership/activity in relation to economic crises to illustrate class-consciousness, if someone were to undertake such a brave study - this is hypothetical and for the sake of argument). Obviously dialectical materialism itself is hypothesis pretty much, but my questions are in relation to how we currently understand data and the like, which raises questions about the theory and how it is applied in as concretely scientific a way as possible, rather than a mere set of 'laws' which imply some kind of meta-narrative arbitrarily, because I'm uncertain as to what extent this application of knowledge is scientific at all.
I'm a student of sociology as a science but also a student of continental ideas which raise questions about how we understand what science is and how it works, so I think that dialectical materialism here comes under big jeapordy. I'd like to hear some basic indications about the relationship between marxism and analytical philosophy too, as both are concerned with science and, as such, bear the burden of attaining some kind of scientific legitimacy.
It seems that there is a contradiction in dialectical materialism itself, but not necessarily a dialectcal one. This is that, if the objective world is in constant flux and change, then we cannot rely on any grand understanding of any concept concretely. This means that a dialectical study of yesterday is not an adequate study of today. Therefore, the analysis needs to be constant, as no truth is a constant as so many that claim to uphold dialectical materialism would believe, perhaps not even consciously. The 'laws' of dialectical materialism be kept up with by any given analysis, such an analysis becomes a historical relic at the moment in which a dialectical contradiction takes place.