Die Neue Zeit
7th July 2012, 17:10
Historically, Old Bolshevism called for a "Provisional Revolutionary Government" to replace the czar:
http://www.revleft.com/vb/revolutionary-provisional-government-t163083/index.html
http://www.revleft.com/vb/ironic-triumph-old-t145495/index.html
Vlast means the claiming of legitimate authority in semi-state sense, and the right to use force. The vlast is thus more fundamental than a government. It is the energising centre of a state, if not a full state itself. So the ‘old Bolsheviks’ said the workers and peasants must take power in order to carry the democratic revolution through to the end. In 1905 and after, the soviets were seen as a form of this class power, though not a necessary one. The Bolsheviks were not then thinking in terms of what Lenin said later on in his State and revolution: namely, that it was a permanent state form which would be more democratic than any we have seen.
Rather the soviets were seen as a form of state power or vlast which would carry out the tasks of the worker-peasant alliance. So they were not thinking of them in the way we do, since we have read State and revolution, which was published in 1918 and had almost nothing to do with the Russian Revolution. What they meant was the form of class power, and they were mostly concerned that it was our class doing things and not your class. This was true back in 1905-06. This class power would take the national form of a revolutionary provisional government (in Russian, ‘temporary’ and ‘provisional’ are the same word). Their concept of a revolutionary provisional government was not that of the actual Provisional government which arose in 1917, and the Bolsheviks knew this straightaway. Stalin says that explicitly in March: “the Provisional government is certainly not the revolutionary provisional government”. However, that phrase does change in meaning. But it was accepted that it would be temporary - lasting years maybe.
"All Power" to such a Revolutionary Provisional Government (RPG) would have overcome much of the institutional confusion taking place at the time. It would have put the Left SRs in their place on the question of the Decree on Peace (before the unnecessary Brest-Litovsk), yet raised their profile further with the Decree on Land. It would have passed the Workers Decrees with greater authority:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Decree#List_of_Soviet_Decrees
The structure of such an RPG, however, reminds one of the extra-constitutional rule of the Council of Ministers of Cuba, rei gerendae causa, that existed from its Revolution until 1976, even if the ministries were topped by collegiums or boards.
What about Mao's Central People's Government from 1949 to 1954, consisting of:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_People's_Government_of_the_People's_Republ ic_of_China
The People's Revolutionary Military Committee
The Government Administration Council
Flanked by two or more lesser bodies? That was short, but definitely multi-year, had (quoting Jose here) a "material relationship to the real world," and was hardly "moonbatty."
Also check out the role of the Political Consultative Conference from 1949 to 1954 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_People%27s_Political_Consultative_Conferen ce#History). Formally speaking, the Central People's Government and its "dictatorial decrees" were not subordinate to this legislative organ (except maybe in a somewhat supervisory manner, a la kontrol).
On one side could be a mass, participatory body for broader deliberation - or parallel bodies with their unique spheres (state affairs, social affairs, industrial affairs, etc.):
http://equalitybylot.wordpress.com/2011/12/20/strategies-to-implement-sortition/#comment-2474
There should be a much, much larger, but unicameral, [body]:
http://www.thirty-thousand.org/#Q10 (Thirty-Thousand.org)
Such a large [body], spread out over multiple cities, should make China’s National People’s Congress look so miniscule.
The definitive immediate or intermediate step towards having full sortition are random balloting and mixed-member, “party”-based proportional representation (MMP), like what the German Bundestag has currently. After all, Probability-Proportional-To-Size Sampling fits both PR and statistical sampling as the basis of random sortition. Anyway:
1) With the “party” basis, there is potential for mandatory random selection or at least (somewhat) random balloting of officeholders by electoral “parties” and political parties themselves. Full effectiveness here means a PR system that is “party-recallable” and closed-list; outside-[body] “party bureaucracies” should have the power to yank and parachute [body participants] at will.
2) Deductions are made from “party” totals so as to maintain overall proportionality. This is a crucial feature of MMP.
3) Thresholds for “party” entry should be reasonable. 5% is too high, and 1% is too low.
4) One or more chunks of this large [body] could be (s)elected on the basis of single-winner districts / geographic constituencies. As much as possible, the Condorcet methods (like the Schulze method) are to be applied. Random balloting, which would in fact be conducive towards Condorcet methods, is most relevant to this chunk or these chunks. I don’t know whether plurality/first-past-the-post or instant runoff should be kept, because they tend not to produce Condorcet winners.
5) One or more chunks of this large [body] could be (s)elected on the basis of one or more forms of single transferrable vote (STV), with the basic being Droop Quota and more complex being Schulze STV and CPO-STV.
6) One chunk of this large [body] could be demarchic regardless of whether “parties” employ random selection of their candidates.
7) One or more chunks of this large [body] could be (s)elected on the basis of various forms of open-list PR (D’Hondt, Sainte-Lague, etc.). The “party-recallable” feature should, as much as possible, apply here.
8) The rest of this large [body] should be (s)elected solely on the basis of party-recallable, closed-list PR. If ordinary voters wish to have influence on who gets (s)elected here, then they should apply for organizational membership.
I've substituted "body" for "legislature" above because of the political science distinction between deliberation and decision-making. To be a working and not parliamentary body, it would have to participate in some degree of executive-administration action (and deliberate on such), as well.
However, with this could come a Revolutionary Provisional Government along Old Bolshevik lines, and whose size would be statistically representative. It could also divide itself into unique spheres (again, state affairs, social affairs, industrial affairs, etc.), but each component as a whole would combine legislative and executive-administrative authority such as these and more:
http://equalitybylot.wordpress.com/2012/02/07/role-for-sortition-in-selecting-the-executive/#comment-2784
1) Assuming weak or semi-strong veto power, and not strong veto power, from Peru’s model, an exclusively executive ability to deal with legislature-defeated bills and vetoed bills, like those dealing with questions on war and peace, by holding referenda
2) From the models of Brazil and Chile, an exclusive legislative initiative (reserved for the executive) in policy areas beyond just budget law and international trade affairs
3) From Ecuador’s model, the ability to force legislatures to explicitly vote down, within a certain number of days (30 in Ecuador), bills submitted by the executive that have also been declared “urgent” (otherwise that bill automatically becomes law)
[This point, perhaps as well as others here, actually boosts the case for more legislative "free votes," as the backbenchers, perhaps looking for pork barrelling opportunities, always complain about caucus whips. I think this more or less removes caucus whips.]
4) From Venezuela’s model, the ability to legislate by decree after a legislative supermajority passes an enabling law
5) For the purposes of direct monetary and fiscal intervention, including the specific case of avoiding a US-style budget crisis initiated by a relatively stubborn legislature (a la Gingrich), from Colombia’s model, the ability to declare “economic emergency”
6) From the FDR era, but more extensive, the enforcement of political accountability in those courts dealing specifically with constitutional affairs (as opposed to typical criminal and civil cases) by means of of arbitrary “judiciary reorganization” and “court packing”
Perhaps also:
7) From Russia’s model, the power to arbitrarily dismiss and [appoint RPGs] of municipalities, provinces, prefectures, and federated states
[Although those executive abilities come from discussions on Third World Caesarean Socialism, First World situations posing an RPG would apply these to the RPG as a whole and not to a single chief executive.]
In essence, the Revolutionary Provisional Government scenario would address the need to have a functioning government while there's a lot of "Conventional" deliberation (however effective or ineffective) and mass participation going on about the framework for moving forward.
Prospects?
http://www.revleft.com/vb/revolutionary-provisional-government-t163083/index.html
http://www.revleft.com/vb/ironic-triumph-old-t145495/index.html
Vlast means the claiming of legitimate authority in semi-state sense, and the right to use force. The vlast is thus more fundamental than a government. It is the energising centre of a state, if not a full state itself. So the ‘old Bolsheviks’ said the workers and peasants must take power in order to carry the democratic revolution through to the end. In 1905 and after, the soviets were seen as a form of this class power, though not a necessary one. The Bolsheviks were not then thinking in terms of what Lenin said later on in his State and revolution: namely, that it was a permanent state form which would be more democratic than any we have seen.
Rather the soviets were seen as a form of state power or vlast which would carry out the tasks of the worker-peasant alliance. So they were not thinking of them in the way we do, since we have read State and revolution, which was published in 1918 and had almost nothing to do with the Russian Revolution. What they meant was the form of class power, and they were mostly concerned that it was our class doing things and not your class. This was true back in 1905-06. This class power would take the national form of a revolutionary provisional government (in Russian, ‘temporary’ and ‘provisional’ are the same word). Their concept of a revolutionary provisional government was not that of the actual Provisional government which arose in 1917, and the Bolsheviks knew this straightaway. Stalin says that explicitly in March: “the Provisional government is certainly not the revolutionary provisional government”. However, that phrase does change in meaning. But it was accepted that it would be temporary - lasting years maybe.
"All Power" to such a Revolutionary Provisional Government (RPG) would have overcome much of the institutional confusion taking place at the time. It would have put the Left SRs in their place on the question of the Decree on Peace (before the unnecessary Brest-Litovsk), yet raised their profile further with the Decree on Land. It would have passed the Workers Decrees with greater authority:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Decree#List_of_Soviet_Decrees
The structure of such an RPG, however, reminds one of the extra-constitutional rule of the Council of Ministers of Cuba, rei gerendae causa, that existed from its Revolution until 1976, even if the ministries were topped by collegiums or boards.
What about Mao's Central People's Government from 1949 to 1954, consisting of:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_People's_Government_of_the_People's_Republ ic_of_China
The People's Revolutionary Military Committee
The Government Administration Council
Flanked by two or more lesser bodies? That was short, but definitely multi-year, had (quoting Jose here) a "material relationship to the real world," and was hardly "moonbatty."
Also check out the role of the Political Consultative Conference from 1949 to 1954 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_People%27s_Political_Consultative_Conferen ce#History). Formally speaking, the Central People's Government and its "dictatorial decrees" were not subordinate to this legislative organ (except maybe in a somewhat supervisory manner, a la kontrol).
On one side could be a mass, participatory body for broader deliberation - or parallel bodies with their unique spheres (state affairs, social affairs, industrial affairs, etc.):
http://equalitybylot.wordpress.com/2011/12/20/strategies-to-implement-sortition/#comment-2474
There should be a much, much larger, but unicameral, [body]:
http://www.thirty-thousand.org/#Q10 (Thirty-Thousand.org)
Such a large [body], spread out over multiple cities, should make China’s National People’s Congress look so miniscule.
The definitive immediate or intermediate step towards having full sortition are random balloting and mixed-member, “party”-based proportional representation (MMP), like what the German Bundestag has currently. After all, Probability-Proportional-To-Size Sampling fits both PR and statistical sampling as the basis of random sortition. Anyway:
1) With the “party” basis, there is potential for mandatory random selection or at least (somewhat) random balloting of officeholders by electoral “parties” and political parties themselves. Full effectiveness here means a PR system that is “party-recallable” and closed-list; outside-[body] “party bureaucracies” should have the power to yank and parachute [body participants] at will.
2) Deductions are made from “party” totals so as to maintain overall proportionality. This is a crucial feature of MMP.
3) Thresholds for “party” entry should be reasonable. 5% is too high, and 1% is too low.
4) One or more chunks of this large [body] could be (s)elected on the basis of single-winner districts / geographic constituencies. As much as possible, the Condorcet methods (like the Schulze method) are to be applied. Random balloting, which would in fact be conducive towards Condorcet methods, is most relevant to this chunk or these chunks. I don’t know whether plurality/first-past-the-post or instant runoff should be kept, because they tend not to produce Condorcet winners.
5) One or more chunks of this large [body] could be (s)elected on the basis of one or more forms of single transferrable vote (STV), with the basic being Droop Quota and more complex being Schulze STV and CPO-STV.
6) One chunk of this large [body] could be demarchic regardless of whether “parties” employ random selection of their candidates.
7) One or more chunks of this large [body] could be (s)elected on the basis of various forms of open-list PR (D’Hondt, Sainte-Lague, etc.). The “party-recallable” feature should, as much as possible, apply here.
8) The rest of this large [body] should be (s)elected solely on the basis of party-recallable, closed-list PR. If ordinary voters wish to have influence on who gets (s)elected here, then they should apply for organizational membership.
I've substituted "body" for "legislature" above because of the political science distinction between deliberation and decision-making. To be a working and not parliamentary body, it would have to participate in some degree of executive-administration action (and deliberate on such), as well.
However, with this could come a Revolutionary Provisional Government along Old Bolshevik lines, and whose size would be statistically representative. It could also divide itself into unique spheres (again, state affairs, social affairs, industrial affairs, etc.), but each component as a whole would combine legislative and executive-administrative authority such as these and more:
http://equalitybylot.wordpress.com/2012/02/07/role-for-sortition-in-selecting-the-executive/#comment-2784
1) Assuming weak or semi-strong veto power, and not strong veto power, from Peru’s model, an exclusively executive ability to deal with legislature-defeated bills and vetoed bills, like those dealing with questions on war and peace, by holding referenda
2) From the models of Brazil and Chile, an exclusive legislative initiative (reserved for the executive) in policy areas beyond just budget law and international trade affairs
3) From Ecuador’s model, the ability to force legislatures to explicitly vote down, within a certain number of days (30 in Ecuador), bills submitted by the executive that have also been declared “urgent” (otherwise that bill automatically becomes law)
[This point, perhaps as well as others here, actually boosts the case for more legislative "free votes," as the backbenchers, perhaps looking for pork barrelling opportunities, always complain about caucus whips. I think this more or less removes caucus whips.]
4) From Venezuela’s model, the ability to legislate by decree after a legislative supermajority passes an enabling law
5) For the purposes of direct monetary and fiscal intervention, including the specific case of avoiding a US-style budget crisis initiated by a relatively stubborn legislature (a la Gingrich), from Colombia’s model, the ability to declare “economic emergency”
6) From the FDR era, but more extensive, the enforcement of political accountability in those courts dealing specifically with constitutional affairs (as opposed to typical criminal and civil cases) by means of of arbitrary “judiciary reorganization” and “court packing”
Perhaps also:
7) From Russia’s model, the power to arbitrarily dismiss and [appoint RPGs] of municipalities, provinces, prefectures, and federated states
[Although those executive abilities come from discussions on Third World Caesarean Socialism, First World situations posing an RPG would apply these to the RPG as a whole and not to a single chief executive.]
In essence, the Revolutionary Provisional Government scenario would address the need to have a functioning government while there's a lot of "Conventional" deliberation (however effective or ineffective) and mass participation going on about the framework for moving forward.
Prospects?