The future of Europe: 3 scenarios

[Hexen]

(CNN) -- Fifty years ago, a Frenchman and a German -- seared by the devastation of World War II -- forged an enterprise with the less than exciting name of the European Coal and Steel Community.

West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and French Prime Minister Robert Schuman's modest beginning to European integration -- to tie together the coal and steel industries of France, West Germany and the Benelux countries -- would over the next half-century become a behemoth of 27 states, many of which didn't even exist in 1952.

That European Union vision is now at an historic crossroads and could over the next months begin to shred.


A dysfunctional legacy

The European club has both expanded in number and deepened in purpose. Beginning as a common market with expensive subsidies to farmers, it evolved into a community with coordinated foreign and trade policies, open borders among many members, a common social policy and a powerful European Court. Vast sums have been spent on infrastructure for poorer members.

Most notably, the Maastricht Treaty, named after the Dutch seaside town where it was signed in 1992, began the process of monetary union and -- supposedly -- economic convergence among member states. The first part happened; the second did not. A "stability and growth pact" was meant to harmonize interest rates, inflation and government deficits. But there were no enforcement mechanisms beyond sharp words and a slap on the wrist. France and Germany were among the first states to breach the commandment that deficits shalt not exceed 3% of GDP.

Some critics argue that Europe is like the python that swallowed a goat. In 1990, there were 12 members of the EU; now, the 27 members span an area from Lisbon to Talinn, from Cyprus to Stockholm.

How Europe grapples with the dysfunctional legacy of both an unbalanced deepening and headlong expansion will decide whether the eurozone recovers or withers.

The state of things now

The first hurdle to overcome is this weekend's Greek elections. Should a working majority emerge under the leadership of the New Democracy Party, Greece may follow through with the next tranche of public spending cuts demanded by its "troika" of creditors: the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank. The new Greek government will expect in return help from the troika rather than the same diet of austerity, arguing that the Greek people have to be offered some incentive to endure more sacrifice.

But if this weekend's election extends the political paralysis begun by May's vote, the uncertainty over whether Greece can remain in the eurozone will intensify. Should the left-wing Syriza party emerge as the largest, with its commitment to tear up the current bailout agreement, markets will begin to anticipate a "disorderly exit" from the eurozone.

Even if a weak pro-bailout government is formed, Greece is already behind on its obligations to privatize state industries and improve tax receipts. For Greeks, tax evasion is a national sport; the government is owed nearly 50 billion euros in back taxes. Greek media suggest depositors have withdrawn up to 5 billion euros from local banks in the past two weeks.

Uncertainty in Greece would in turn intensify the pressure on Spain and Italy, amid doubts about the whole eurozone enterprise. The combined economies of Ireland, Portugal and Greece -- the three countries that have been bailed out -- are smaller than that of Spain, which has quickly been dubbed "too big to bail, too big to fail." The European Union's willingness to help bail out Spain's massively indebted banking system to the tune of 100 billion euros ($125 billion) produced a "relief rally" on the bond and stock markets, but the relief scarcely lasted 24 hours.

By the end of the week, the yield on Spain's 10-year bond hovered around 7%, the financial equivalent of being admitted to intensive care with a raging fever. The new Spanish government has resisted a full bailout, arguing that it has undertaken drastic economic reform and that government finances (not too awful) should not be confused with the banks' (dreadful). But the influential ratings agencies do see a link; Moody's has cut Spanish sovereign debt to just a notch above junk status, on a par with Azerbaijan. Unemployment is at record highs, especially among the young; house prices are collapsing.

The Italians are also getting fed up with austerity, as Prime Minister Mario Monti acknowledged in a recent interview with CNN's Christiane Amanpour. He has joined the "growth club" with new French President Francois Hollande but has precious little room for maneuver, as the price on Italian debt has also risen. The IMF has praised Monti's efforts to sort out Italy's public finances but says deregulation and labor reform require further effort, just as the Italian economy is forecast to shrink 2% this year.

From outside the eurozone, its partners look on with horror. The governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, said last month, "Our biggest trading partner is tearing itself apart with no obvious solution."

What will be Europe's future?

Going forward (and, admittedly, simplifying the scenarios), Europe is looking at three paths, according to political and financial analysts.

The first and most traumatic is a disorderly collapse of the eurozone, starting in Greece but spreading to Spain and Italy. This scenario begins with anything less than a clear victory for the "bailout" parties in Greece on Sunday, followed by the virtual implosion of the Greek state, whose coffers are nearly empty. The current economy minister says Greece has enough money to survive until July 15.

In this scenario, Germany opts to puts fiscal rectitude ahead of its pan-European principles. Many Germans are already thinking this way. Deputy Finance Minister Steffen Kampeter told the BBC on Thursday that debt was a "national responsibility."

"I don't see any strategies where we socialize and redistribute the bad political decisions made by some who are over-indebted," he said.

Germany has ruled out the introduction of eurobonds, which would essentially dilute its credit rating to the advantage of the peripheral economies. And German Chancellor Angela Merkel has warned that Germany's role in saving the eurozone is "not unlimited."

"We must all resist the temptation to finance growth again through new debt," she said.

Taken to its logical conclusion, this first scenario could reduce the eurozone to a Franco-German core, with the smaller Benelux states attached. The consequences for the European economy would be calamitous, with governments defaulting on debt, capital controls imposed to prevent money from fleeing states on the verge of falling out of the eurozone and the likelihood of prolonged recession across Europe.

In addition, the very process of reverting to national currencies (for which there is no road map) would throw up a multitude of legal and contractual nightmares. And politically, the idea of European union would be set back decades.

The second course is that Europe muddles through while continuing to grope toward banking and fiscal integration.

A compromise between Greece and the troika (not so unlikely, given that 80% of Greeks want to stay in the eurozone) would bring the country back from the edge of the abyss, though any meaningful recovery would be years away.

The new European Stability Mechanism, due to come into effect next month as a permanent rescue fund, would recapitalize banks and help cool yields on vulnerable sovereign debt (Spain, Italy, Cyprus). Its war chest of 500 billion euros would be bolstered as required. (French officials are already suggesting that it be allowed to borrow from the European Central Bank.)

Merkel would make token concessions to the "growth agenda" at the European summit in Brussels at the end of this month.

Moves toward a banking union that would insure deposits, progress toward common tax policies, the decline of government debt and the emergence of the eurozone from recession would ease the pressure on governments struggling to find common ground. Merkel has acknowledged that this is a "Herculean task," but it is in Germany's interest. Very nearly 60% of German exports stay inside Europe, and are competitive because they are priced in euros rather than deutsche marks. A collapse of the eurozone would savage the German economy.

Merkel has signaled her support for tougher European supervision of the eurozone banking industry, in an implicit criticism of the way the authorities in Madrid underestimated the plight of Spanish banks. That seems an important precondition for further German support.

Next year, Merkel faces an electorate already impatient with German largesse for little return. Until then, the argument goes, she can't afford to be seen to be generous.

The third course would see a daring leap toward much closer integration: the "economic convergence" promised by Maastricht but never realized as governments allowed debt to rise and failed to liberalize their labor markets, supervise their banks or harmonize their tax systems. This is the mantra of Hollande, who wants measures to stimulate growth and "imagination and creativity" to deepen financial union, such as a joint fund to pay down debt.

There seems little prospect that such sudden and dramatic initiatives will gain the support of a European public no longer convinced of the benefits of deeper integration, nor of a German state unwilling to allow co-signers on its checking account.

This week, Adenauer's grandson, Stephan Werhahn, said that his grandfather and Schuman "wanted to build a strong and independent Europe, but now with the bailout funds and billions in rescues, we are demolishing it." And he announced that he was leaving the party his grandfather had founded.
The counter-argument of history is that the European banking crisis of 1931 "contributed directly to the breakdown of democracy" in Germany and across the continent, according to economists Niall Ferguson and Nouriel Roubini.

Writing in the Financial Times recently, they concluded, "The EU was created to avoid repeating the disasters of the 1930s. It is time Europe's leaders -- and especially Germany's -- understood how perilously close they are to doing just that."

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Source: [URL="http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/15/world/europe/europe-future/index.html?hpt=wo_t5"]http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/15/world/...html?hpt=wo_t5 (http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/15/world/europe/europe-future/index.html?hpt=wo_t5)

Well what is the more likely scenario here?

[Metacomet]

B

[wsg1991]

D

[wsg1991]

actually A is more likely

[Thirsty Crow]

Well what is the more likely scenario here?
Scenario A underestimates the favours Syriza could perform for European capital. It doesn't take a clear victory of a clearly pro-austerity political force to prevent this outcome - in my opinion, markets can expect a "disorderly exit" if Syriza forms a formally "anti-austerity coalition", but there is no guarantee that this will occur as Syriza functionaries have on occasion demonstrated their flexibility with regard to the anti-austerity platform. In other words, I think we can expect Syriza to function as a different kind of a party of austerity, something which will not go unnoticed and that this scenario is actually wrong on this account.

[Paul Cockshott]

Unless the center, the Comission and the Parliament gain powers to levy income and or property taxes and in the process take over responsibility for big ticket items of public expenditure like pensions, the tensions between trade surplus and trade deficit states will break the monetary union.

[Thirsty Crow]

Unless the center, the Comission and the Parliament gain powers to levy income and or property taxes and in the process take over responsibility for big ticket items of public expenditure like pensions, the tensions between trade surplus and trade deficit states will break the monetary union.
Can you elaborate a bit on the dynamic between these countries and the causes and reasons for this difference, or maybe suggest some reading material?

[Q]

Most notably, the Maastricht Treaty, named after the Dutch seaside town

Just noting that Maastricht is at least 185 km from any coast...

http://oi49.tinypic.com/mr7q06.jpg

[Q]

On a more ontopic note: The disintegration of the EU, as depicted in scenario 1, would surely be disastrous not only for capital, but for the working class as well. It would put back the necessity of a unified European working class for decades and, as such, make successful workers revolutions a pipedream. But, as Menocchio noted, this is not a given if Syriza were to win tomorrow.

So, what is clearly missing is a pan-European working class movement that poses an alternative on our terms. Our class can be formed on this continental scale and fight for its political interests.

[Hit The North]

^^^ Given that closer ties between the European nations has not produced a corresponding political unification of the European working class, I don't follow your logic. Surely it is when European capital is in systemic crisis that international working class action becomes more likely?

[Q]

^^^ Given that closer ties between the European nations has not produced a corresponding political unification of the European working class, I don't follow your logic. Surely it is when European capital is in systemic crisis that international working class action becomes more likely?

Your "spontaneous-ism" is showing again. Working class political unity is not something that "just" happens given the right conditions. The conditions just open the possibility. Working class collectivity is something that is build and this is exactly the tasks of communists: To merge the political agenda of socialist change with the mass movement and, in the process, transforming the working class from a mere slave-class to a class for its own.

As to your question: Most certainly not! Such crisis, without a working class-collective already in place, will just mean an endless series of miseries for working people. This is what we see in Greece, where society is in a process of disintegration, back to non-capitalist relations and subsistence-level survival.

The development of the working class, as long as it has not formed itself as a class-collective fighting for political power, is intertwined with that of capitalism.

[Thirsty Crow]

The development of the working class, as long as it has not formed itself as a class-collective fighting for political power, is intertwined with that of capitalism.It's hard to see how such a develpment - of a class-collective in your words - was facilitated ("open possibilities") by the monetary trade union in place. This is highly contentious since no clear difference in this possibility is traced back to the previous situation in Europe, prior to Maastricht. Though, to be clear, I'm not saying you're definitely wrong, but simply that I have my doubts on such a characterization of European integration - the thesis is, it seems to me, unsubstantiated.

[Paul Cockshott]

will try and write a short article over the weekend.

[Lynx]

The economically weaker countries will dump the Euro and float their own currencies. They are not going to endure a decade of austerity to satisfy Germany's obsession with debt. German exports within the EU will consequently take a plunge.

[Q]

The economically weaker countries will dump the Euro and float their own currencies. They are not going to endure a decade of austerity to satisfy Germany's obsession with debt. German exports within the EU will consequently take a plunge.

The problem is not Germany. Germany is just a pawn carrying out the interests of financial capital in a way that it conceives as the best possible course for German interests, which is in the lasting existence of the EU project.

If Greece were to leave the EU, the financial markets would most likely dump it like a brick and they would face hyperinflation on the scale of 1920's Germany or, more recently, Zimbabwe. Hardly something to look forward to.

[Lynx]

The problem is not Germany. Germany is just a pawn carrying out the interests of financial capital in a way that it conceives as the best possible course for German interests, which is in the lasting existence of the EU project.

If Greece were to leave the EU, the financial markets would most likely dump it like a brick and they would face hyperinflation on the scale of 1920's Germany or, more recently, Zimbabwe. Hardly something to look forward to.
The onus is on the country with the strongest economy to help the other members of the union. This is how most 'currency unions' remain together. If a US state or Canadian province were to behave as Germany has, we would witness a similar breakup here.
What is good for Germany is not sustainable for Greece. They have already defaulted, if not officially. Austerity is damaging their economy, making it more difficult for them to meet future obligations. The Euro prevents them from devaluing and gaining a more favourable balance of trade. In the face of German intransigence, what is the alternative?
While there would be inflation following an exit, it would be short lived as long as the drachma is allowed to fall. Greece could follow the route taken by Argentina.

Unless the EU intends to impose austerity with the barrel of a gun, Greece and other countries will leave. It is in their own best interest. This is what happens when ideology, particularly within the confines of Germany, is allowed to trump common sense.

[Die Neue Zeit]

Unless the center, the Comission and the Parliament gain powers to levy income and or property taxes and in the process take over responsibility for big ticket items of public expenditure like pensions, the tensions between trade surplus and trade deficit states will break the monetary union.

But, comrade, surely that would fly in the face of left-nationalists here by any other name who are dismissive of the notion of a more democratic and more "social" EU as a step forward for workers across Europe. ;)

I would also add that there needs to be a uniform labour policy and sets of laws that would put in place an EU-wide and upward equal standard of living for equal or equivalent work realized on the basis of real purchasing power parity. These would allow real freedom of movement past current norms, precluding the extreme exploitation of intra-EU immigrants.


So, what is clearly missing is a pan-European working class movement that poses an alternative on our terms. Our class can be formed on this continental scale and fight for its political interests.

Indeed, comrade, certainly starting with what I said above.

[Paul Cockshott]

But, comrade, surely that would fly in the face of left-nationalists here by any other name who are dismissive of the notion of a more democratic and more "social" EU as a step forward for workers across Europe. ;)

I would also add that there needs to be a uniform labour policy and sets of laws that would put in place an EU-wide and upward equal standard of living for equal or equivalent work realized on the basis of real purchasing power parity. These would allow real freedom of movement past current norms, precluding the extreme exploitation of intra-EU immigrants.

Well establishing equal pension rights with work in any country contributing to pension rights would be a step towards that. The key issue is democratic rights for the EU center versus the states. That requires the Parliament to have rights to levy taxes and set laws on labour conditions etc accross the union. But in order to get support for the the parliament having these powers and to allow the center to be seen as democratic it would require a much more democratic center : with for example some of the parliament chosen by lot rather than being professional politicians and the right of initiative and popular legislation over income and property taxes and expenditure.

[Die Neue Zeit]

^^^ I wasn't referring to pensions much. I was referring to the general levying of non-sales taxes and other greater powers at the political union level.

[JamesH]

Unless the center, the Comission and the Parliament gain powers to levy income and or property taxes and in the process take over responsibility for big ticket items of public expenditure like pensions, the tensions between trade surplus and trade deficit states will break the monetary union.


I'm not sure I understand this; the EU central bank is the sovereign issuer of the Euro. Why does it need to undertake union-wide taxation? It doesn't have to raise the money it spends.

[Paul Cockshott]

I'm not sure I understand this; the EU central bank is the sovereign issuer of the Euro. Why does it need to undertake union-wide taxation? It doesn't have to raise the money it spends.

No the central bank does not undertake taxation in any country. The role of most central bank is to issue the state with credits in the form of drawing rights and banknotes which the state then uses to pay public employees. The state then collects taxes for which it will only accept in payment notes or credits denominate in the currency issued by its central bank. These taxes are then used by the state to pay off its liabilities to the central bank.

In most countries with their own currencies, the state has almost unlimited drawing rights on the central bank, but it is very unwise for it to use these rights rashly since the over issue of notes which are not clawed back via taxation leads to inflation.

The situation in the Euro Zone is quite different. There are now 3 bodies to consider

The ECB
The Commission
The nation states: Germany, Spain, Holland etc

The ECB is independent and neither the Commission nor the nation states have the kind of unlimited drawing rights on it that the UK government has on the Bank of England.

The nation states are obliged to levy taxes and pay wages in Euros, but the only way they can make up a temporary shortfall in revenue over expenditure is by recourse to the private bond market. They can not just instruct the ECB to issue them with credits.

Now the ability of different states to raise money on the bond markets depends on the estimates by the private banks of the future ability of the states to pay these bonds back in Euros. For countries running a trade surplus like Germany this is not much of a problem since there are more euros flowing into the country than flowing out. A country like Spain or Greece who is running a trade deficit, can only sustain the deficit if the private bond market is willing to extend credit to the Spanish state and the Spanish banks.

Why does Germany run a trade surplus : two basic reasons
It has a more rapid rate of development of the productivity of labour
The share of real wages in national income has been held down by austerity programmes

The first means, due to the law of value, that the prices of German industrial products fall relative to those made for example in Spain. The second means that the rising industrial production of Germany can not be sold on the home market to German workers.
This leads to chronic trade deficits in some countries and surpluses in others.

Such deficits and surpluses can be accomodated within a monetary union if there is a strong central government that redistributes income between areas via taxation.

The UK has a monetary union. The Scottish and Northern Irish pounds are tied to the English pound at a one to one rate, and the Scottish Government, is unable to get the Bank of Scotland to simply advance it credits in Scottish Pounds the way the Westminster Government can with the Bank of England.
Wales and Northern Ireland for example run a deficits with the rest of the UK ( for Scotland it is harder to say as it depends on how you count oil revenues ).
But the Welsh government does not have to impose the sort of austerity that Greece has to impose because it has a subsidy from London of some £20 billion a year, and moreover pensions are met by the central government.

In the Eurozone the Commission had negligible revenue - 3% VAT if I remember correctly, and it can not just raise income tax to get more revenue. So there is no possibility of the Commission paying large subsidies to deficit regions. Instead the deficit countries have to go begging cap in hand to the Council of Ministers or the Troika, asking for loans from other national governments. This is not a sustainable situation.

There are only two real courses out of this: Either the Euro breaks down and countries revert to national currencies which float freely relative to one another, or the process of redistribution of revenue is taken out of the control of the bond markets and done via tax revenues raised by the center.

The workers movement accross Europe should be demanding that the Union Parliament be given the right to tax income and property accross the Union with a uniform code of taxation to prevent the rich shipping the money from one country to another to avoid paying tax, and to provide it with the income necessary to redistribute income accross the Union.
They should also be demanding a reduction in exploitation in the most productive countries like Germany, so that the products of German industry can be sold on the home market.

In the EU programme that I and Heinz Dieterich put forward we advocate these measures along with more radical steps - elimination of exploitation, cancellation of debts and direct popular legislation at the union level.

[Q]

<snap awesome post>

This kind of message can easily be transmitted using modern media. For example, a youtube video of maybe 5 minutes, with eye catching animations, helps to bring this message to the minds of millions.

As a result, it might help break the nationalism among the left.

[Paul Cockshott]

This kind of message can easily be transmitted using modern media. For example, a youtube video of maybe 5 minutes, with eye catching animations, helps to bring this message to the minds of millions.

As a result, it might help break the nationalism among the left.

Do you want to try doing that?

[Q]

Do you want to try doing that?

I have zero required skills. But I have iMovie at work, so I might play around with that. But if someone who knows their stuff wants to give it a shot, please yell :p

[JamesH]

No the central bank does not undertake taxation in any country. The role of most central bank is to issue the state with credits in the form of drawing rights and banknotes which the state then uses to pay public employees. The state then collects taxes for which it will only accept in payment notes or credits denominate in the currency issued by its central bank. These taxes are then used by the state to pay off its liabilities to the central bank.

In most countries with their own currencies, the state has almost unlimited drawing rights on the central bank, but it is very unwise for it to use these rights rashly since the over issue of notes which are not clawed back via taxation leads to inflation.

The situation in the Euro Zone is quite different. There are now 3 bodies to consider

The ECB
The Commission
The nation states: Germany, Spain, Holland etc

The ECB is independent and neither the Commission nor the nation states have the kind of unlimited drawing rights on it that the UK government has on the Bank of England.

The nation states are obliged to levy taxes and pay wages in Euros, but the only way they can make up a temporary shortfall in revenue over expenditure is by recourse to the private bond market. They can not just instruct the ECB to issue them with credits.

Now the ability of different states to raise money on the bond markets depends on the estimates by the private banks of the future ability of the states to pay these bonds back in Euros. For countries running a trade surplus like Germany this is not much of a problem since there are more euros flowing into the country than flowing out. A country like Spain or Greece who is running a trade deficit, can only sustain the deficit if the private bond market is willing to extend credit to the Spanish state and the Spanish banks.

Why does Germany run a trade surplus : two basic reasons

It has a more rapid rate of development of the productivity of labour
The share of real wages in national income has been held down by austerity programmes

The first means, due to the law of value, that the prices of German industrial products fall relative to those made for example in Spain. The second means that the rising industrial production of Germany can not be sold on the home market to German workers.
This leads to chronic trade deficits in some countries and surpluses in others.

Such deficits and surpluses can be accomodated within a monetary union if there is a strong central government that redistributes income between areas via taxation.

The UK has a monetary union. The Scottish and Northern Irish pounds are tied to the English pound at a one to one rate, and the Scottish Government, is unable to get the Bank of Scotland to simply advance it credits in Scottish Pounds the way the Westminster Government can with the Bank of England.
Wales and Northern Ireland for example run a deficits with the rest of the UK ( for Scotland it is harder to say as it depends on how you count oil revenues ).
But the Welsh government does not have to impose the sort of austerity that Greece has to impose because it has a subsidy from London of some £20 billion a year, and moreover pensions are met by the central government.

In the Eurozone the Commission had negligible revenue - 3% VAT if I remember correctly, and it can not just raise income tax to get more revenue. So there is no possibility of the Commission paying large subsidies to deficit regions. Instead the deficit countries have to go begging cap in hand to the Council of Ministers or the Troika, asking for loans from other national governments. This is not a sustainable situation.

There are only two real courses out of this: Either the Euro breaks down and countries revert to national currencies which float freely relative to one another, or the process of redistribution of revenue is taken out of the control of the bond markets and done via tax revenues raised by the center.

The workers movement accross Europe should be demanding that the Union Parliament be given the right to tax income and property accross the Union with a uniform code of taxation to prevent the rich shipping the money from one country to another to avoid paying tax, and to provide it with the income necessary to redistribute income accross the Union.
They should also be demanding a reduction in exploitation in the most productive countries like Germany, so that the products of German industry can be sold on the home market.

In the EU programme that I and Heinz Dieterich put forward we advocate these measures along with more radical steps - elimination of exploitation, cancellation of debts and direct popular legislation at the union level.

Is there not also a third option? That is, the creation of an EU fiscal authority that can fund social security, defense, pension, etc. obligations; an authority whose relation to the ECB is similar to the US government's relation to the Fed.

In that way, union-wide taxation would simply be about regulating aggregate demand and redistributing wealth, rather than a means of raising revenue.

[TheRedAnarchist23]

"starting in Greece but spreading to Spain and Italy."

They allways forgget Portugal:(

[ckaihatsu]

Germany will say "fuck this" and join the Atlanticist bloc (U.S., UK, Canada), leaving the tatters of the non-aligned Eurozone to join the Eastern bloc (China, Russia, Iran, Syria).

Hostilities commence as curtain opens, paving the way for *yet another* era of horrific racist world warfare in order to destroy capital and provide new opportunities for rebuilding and real economic "growth".

(Gasps, giving way to laughter, then applause.)

(Not an actual prognostication. Check local listings for a schedule near you.)

[ckaihatsu]

Is there not also a third option? That is, the creation of an EU fiscal authority that can fund social security, defense, pension, etc. obligations; an authority whose relation to the ECB is similar to the US government's relation to the Fed.

In that way, union-wide taxation would simply be about regulating aggregate demand and redistributing wealth, rather than a means of raising revenue.


Um, please wake me up if I just dozed off here, but I thought we were *revolutionaries* and not reformists.... (Hence the name of this discussion board.)

These proposals are like saying "The bosses aren't doing shit for us, *and* can't seem to get their *own* shit together, so the answer is for them to get their shit together and do shit for us."

Big -whatever- on all of that...(!)

[Paul Cockshott]

Is there not also a third option? That is, the creation of an EU fiscal authority that can fund social security, defense, pension, etc. obligations; an authority whose relation to the ECB is similar to the US government's relation to the Fed.

In that way, union-wide taxation would simply be about regulating aggregate demand and redistributing wealth, rather than a means of raising revenue.
Such a EU fiscal authority would be part of the commission, the point that is crucial is whether it is subject to parliament or the council of ministers. If the later it is completely outside the possibility of class politics

[Lynx]

Um, please wake me up if I just dozed off here, but I thought we were *revolutionaries* and not reformists.... (Hence the name of this discussion board.)

These proposals are like saying "The bosses aren't doing shit for us, *and* can't seem to get their *own* shit together, so the answer is for them to get their shit together and do shit for us."

Big -whatever- on all of that...(!)
Reforms are worthwhile if they alleviate misery. With all due respect, this thread will likely end up as an epitaph.

[Paul Cockshott]

Any left party contesting for power today as the Gree left are, needs to have a policy on these issues.

[Lynx]

Is there a left party advancing heterodox economics? Even Keynesianism would be an improvement to the spectacle we are witnessing.

[ckaihatsu]

Reforms are worthwhile if they alleviate misery.


The aim of the class struggle isn't to 'alleviate misery' -- it's to defeat the bourgeois foe. If reforms are conceded in the process then so be it, but this isn't about collecting chocolate gold coins or something....





With all due respect, this thread will likely end up as an epitaph.


Would you mind elaborating? Your meaning isn't that clear.





Any left party contesting for power today as the Gree left are, needs to have a policy on these issues.


I'll side with Menocchio in post #5 on this one -- because of Syriza's objectively soft-left, candidate-of-change positioning, the temptation for opportunism is just too great to view their stated platform as being on solid ground.





Is there a left party advancing heterodox economics? Even Keynesianism would be an improvement to the spectacle we are witnessing.


Ehhhhhh, but why *prolong* this train-wreck -- ? -- ! It's really not any of our concern anyway.

[Lynx]

The aim of the class struggle isn't to 'alleviate misery' -- it's to defeat the bourgeois foe. If reforms are conceded in the process then so be it, but this isn't about collecting chocolate gold coins or something....
So far the struggle is against austerity.

Would you mind elaborating? Your meaning isn't that clear.
The end of the EU will render this discussion moot.

Ehhhhhh, but why *prolong* this train-wreck -- ? -- ! It's really not any of our concern anyway.
It isn't our concern, yet a replacement for austerity will inevitably be demanded.

[Workers-Control-Over-Prod]

Can you elaborate a bit on the dynamic between these countries and the causes and reasons for this difference, or maybe suggest some reading material?

The Eurozone is a currency union but has individual national fiscal and wage/inflationary policies. The Euro was initiated by France to compete with Germany, Germany then encouraged Italy to enter the Currency union as Italy's car industry had been giving German car industry some harsh competition.

Basically the German Bourgeoisie have been able to suppress workers real wages since the 90's and even lower them in the last four years while Greek workers and southern European workers have been very militant and fought for higher wages; This caused Germany to have a lower inflation, lowering prices and out competing Greek and southern European economies.

Only two ways to go for Europe: Centralise crucial economic policies immediately or watch as the Euro crumbles and Europe fall back into nationalism and that always means war...

[Die Neue Zeit]

Is there a left party advancing heterodox economics? Even Keynesianism would be an improvement to the spectacle we are witnessing.

Sorry, comrade, but Keynesianism has proven time and again to be a bad start. Post-Keynesianism, on the other hand...

[Hit The North]

Your "spontaneous-ism" is showing again.

Whatever I'm showing it certainly contrasts with your "organisational gradualism".


Working class political unity is not something that "just" happens given the right conditions.Who said that it just happens? But the question is what the right conditions are. You appear to be suggesting that the best conditions for organising the European working class is the overcoming of the capitalist crisis on the terms of the European capital, otherwise why would you argue that the disintegration of its project, that is, the collapse of the EU, would be a disaster for the working class? Actually, it would be an opportunity.


Working class collectivity is something that is build and this is exactly the tasks of communists: To merge the political agenda of socialist change with the mass movement and, in the process, transforming the working class from a mere slave-class to a class for its own.
I quite agree. And this revolutionary strategy is not the same as the social democrat model you and DNZ and Cockshott espouse. From the tone of your post you are suggesting that "the political agenda of socialist change" should take second place to the maintenance of the EU as its disintegration would "be disastrous not only for capital, but for the working class as well." And of course the essential social democratic ingredient to all this is that you tie the good of the working class to the good of the bourgeoisie. So, to whit, you write:


The development of the working class, as long as it has not formed itself as a class-collective fighting for political power, is intertwined with that of capitalism. But, on the contrary, the European working class can only develop its organisation through struggle against European capital. As revolutionaries we should be pushing for any action that hits the interests of capital as hard as possible not formulating policies that help to stabilize the institutions of the EU. In short we build organisation by prosecuting the class struggle.

So let us be clear that "the political agenda of socialist change" is about contesting capitalist rule politically, socially and, most significantly, at the point of production; not concocting this or that fiscal policy.


As to your question: Most certainly not! Such crisis, without a working class-collective already in place, will just mean an endless series of miseries for working people. This is what we see in Greece, where society is in a process of disintegration, back to non-capitalist relations and subsistence-level survival.
Actually, what we are seeing in Greece is the collapse of capitalism, opening up the possibility where society can reassert itself against the rule of capital and markets. The election results show a situation of entrenched polarisation. So even without the existence of your ideal organisation, the class struggle is taking place anyway.

Notwithstanding your dismal analysis that the Greek workers are not capable of acting as a class or that they are not organised, where does your strategy lead us? We should cooperate with austerity? We should allow capitalism to overcome its crisis before we move?

The revolutionary position should be to call for Greek workers to lead a march out of the EU and to engage in the occupation of all those areas where international capital withdraws.

[Thirsty Crow]

So far the struggle is against austerity.

While it is an altogether different problem of how to facilitate the outgrowth of this struggle into open class struggle - meaning, struggle for political power, continent wide, and world wide.

[Lynx]

The election results will not save the EU. The German obsession with austerity will see to that. The election in France may signal a shift in policy in some sense, but there is little time to change course.
Can we expect Europeans to question capitalism when they are faced with the results of bad economic policy? Criticism of austerity from abroad is enough to indicate that policy is the problem, rather than the system. Criticism of the poorly designed monetary union indicates that the structure itself is unsound.

[ckaihatsu]

The election results will not save the EU. The German obsession with austerity will see to that. The election in France may signal a shift in policy in some sense, but there is little time to change course.
Can we expect Europeans to question capitalism when they are faced with the results of bad economic policy? Criticism of austerity from abroad is enough to indicate that policy is the problem, rather than the system. Criticism of the poorly designed monetary union indicates that the structure itself is unsound.


I was able to let your previous response pass, but this is too much -- you're sounding like the perfect liberal apologist hack who'd rather let a few heads roll than call the whole thing in.

Like some "bad apples in the bunch", you're chalking this up to "bad economic policy", and explicitly *not* the system itself. Even going so far as to indict the "poorly designed monetary union" because "the structure itself is unsound" does *not* do justice to our better knowledge of what's actually going on.

This is a crisis of *capitalism*, no less, and we've seen the same thing before in history -- the *system* is inherently unable to sustain growth over several decades, and no growth means stagnation or shrinkage while the world's growing population requires an *expanding* economy.

If anything we should be seeing some guilt-ridden latecomers to the revolutionary cause just about now -- instead of what you're doing which is comforting the king on the way to the gallows.

[Paul Cockshott]

Prole art threat says that what I am advocating is social democracy. There is a limited truth in that. Two of the programmatic objectives in the 'Transition to Socialism in the EU' document were present in partial form in classical social democracy during its most radical phase

the demand for direct popular legislation was in the Erfurt programme
the demand for the cancellation of debts was in the original programme of the Social Democratic Federation - the first Marxist party in Britain

However the other key demand - the right of workers to the full value created by their labour ( before tax of course ) is taken from Marx's Critique of the German Social Democratic programme, which was never accepted by the social democratic movement.

These objectives amount to a programme for abolishing capitalism.

They can not come about except via a European democratic revolution against the existing state structures.

[Lynx]

I was able to let your previous response pass, but this is too much -- you're sounding like the perfect liberal apologist hack who'd rather let a few heads roll than call the whole thing in.
How the crisis is being portrayed and how it is being perceived by almost everyone outside of Germany is what I'm sounding like.


Like some "bad apples in the bunch", you're chalking this up to "bad economic policy", and explicitly *not* the system itself. Even going so far as to indict the "poorly designed monetary union" because "the structure itself is unsound" does *not* do justice to our better knowledge of what's actually going on.
As usual, the crisis is being chalked up to many factors. Some are legitimate, others are rhetorical. Pursuing austerity policies during a downturn does not make economic sense, as some economists will argue. It is pro-cyclical. The design of the EU is problematic, as has been pointed out.
Behind all the usual excuses (eg. greedy bankers, lazy Greeks, big government, entitlements, living beyond our means) there is the crisis of capitalism.


This is a crisis of *capitalism*, no less, and we've seen the same thing before in history -- the *system* is inherently unable to sustain growth over several decades, and no growth means stagnation or shrinkage while the world's growing populatotion requires an *expanding* economy.
Yes, and history has shown that there are "solutions" to the crisis:
1. A dose of Keynesianism (most any flavor) to allow another bubble to be blown.
2. A Roosevelt/Robin Hood style "New Deal" (ie. taxing the wealthy to re-establish the safety net)
3. A financial collapse, or as some prefer to describe it, "creative destruction".

Austerity is the slow torture version of option 3.


If anything we should be seeing some guilt-ridden latecomers to the revolutionary cause just about now -- instead of what you're doing which is comforting the king on the way to the gallows.
Without a labour movement, it is we who are headed for the gallows.

If you want me to preach to the choir, just ask.

[Pretty Flaco]

none of the scenarios can be right if they dont end in a zombie apocalypse!

[Lynx]

You might have to be satisfied with rats fleeing a sinking ship.

[Die Neue Zeit]

Whatever I'm showing it certainly contrasts with your "organisational gradualism".

[...]

I quite agree. And this revolutionary strategy is not the same as the social democrat model you and DNZ and Cockshott espouse.

[...]

So let us be clear that "the political agenda of socialist change" is about contesting capitalist rule politically, socially and, most significantly, at the point of production; not concocting this or that fiscal policy.

That's economistic thinking, though. Workers do not think politically in "point of production" disputes, as opposed to critiquing public policy paradigms and formulating alternative ones to wage real political struggle around.

[Hit The North]

That's economistic thinking, though. Workers do not think politically in "point of production" disputes,

Politicised workers do.

[Workers-Control-Over-Prod]

Who said that it just happens? But the question is what the right conditions are. You appear to be suggesting that the best conditions for organising the European working class is the overcoming of the capitalist crisis on the terms of the European capital, otherwise why would you argue that the disintegration of its project, that is, the collapse of the EU, would be a disaster for the working class? Actually, it would be an opportunity.

But, on the contrary, the European working class can only develop its organisation through struggle against European capital. As revolutionaries we should be pushing for any action that hits the interests of capital as hard as possible not formulating policies that help to stabilize the institutions of the EU. In short we build organisation by prosecuting the class struggle.


Notwithstanding your dismal analysis that the Greek workers are not capable of acting as a class or that they are not organised, where does your strategy lead us? We should cooperate with austerity? We should allow capitalism to overcome its crisis before we move?

The revolutionary position should be to call for Greek workers to lead a march out of the EU and to engage in the occupation of all those areas where international capital withdraws.

I agree, the crisis of the Currency Union definitely has given the Left something to present as consistent with our theories. But thinking that because workers are fired and their wages cut, makes them class conscious, is pulling only on one end of the string and forgetting to grab the other end to join them together.

The fall in social position, living and working conditions for the worker is enough objective potential revolutionary discourse to organise them around. But you of course need an organisation that has revolutionary goals in mind, not unionist reformism etc. because the first place workers go to are their reformist unions, and you need existing organisations rooted in the working class to hand the working class the right theoretical and organisational tools to practically free themselves from the chains of the bourgeoisie and the reformists.

Both the objective reality discourse and revolutionary organisation is needed to successfully have a workers revolution.

We have more than enough dissatisfaction in the western society with Capitalist inequality and injustice, and the vanguard of this objective reality discourse of course being Greece. But thinking that workers will all of a sudden educate and revolutionarily organise themselves themselves out of thin air, is ridiculous; there needs to be a strong organisation of the conscious working class to exploit the opportunity of the revolutionary objective reality and lead the rest of its class to power, the communist party, proletarian vanguard of the working people.

[Die Neue Zeit]

Politicised workers do.

Again, politicization rarely if every occurs in "point of production" disputes, other mere labour disputes, other economic struggles, etc.

I'm all for "politico-political" struggles spilling over into economic struggles, but that's a different beast than the illusion of growing politics out of economic struggles.

[Hit The North]

Again, politicization rarely if every occurs in "point of production" disputes, other mere labour disputes, other economic struggles, etc.



You must think that workers live in their workplaces and do not participate in other areas of society. You must think that workers are not also family members, members of communities, social clubs and parties, or that they are not citizens and consumers. Or you must believe that they leave these things at the door when they walk into their factory, warehouse, bus depot or office block. You must think that significant industrial struggles and political upheavals do not happen at the same time, that the strike is merely economic and is unconnected to the political, the communal or the ideological. Otherwise, why do you demand such a schematic ordering of events and insist on the low horizon of point of production struggles? Perhaps you believe that capitalism is not an economic system but primarily a political system! Of course, capitalism is both, as it is a totalising social system, but as long as the solution to capitalist crisis is sought only in political programs, and not in the overturning of the relations of production, then capitalism will stagger on. This, of course, has been the historical function of social democracy.


I'm all for "politico-political" struggles spilling over into economic struggles, but that's a different beast than the illusion of growing politics out of economic struggles.

Yes, you are all for the struggle being led by party bureaucrats bearing programs, rather than the active self-organization of the masses. It will be interesting to see how this plays out in the Greek crisis.

[Workers-Control-Over-Prod]

Also, Engels makes clear that class consciousness is gained by the actual class struggle of working people fighting for higher wages etc. against the capitalists and their state. So of course there need to be strong existent organisations of the most conscious part of the working class.
We need both: the material conditions for revolution (such as the current low rate of profit which forces capitalists to "lower costs" i.e. wages, benefits etc. making workers fight back) as well as revolutionary workers' organisations that can provide the correct theoretical and organisational instruments for successful workers revolution; what happens without these we see in Egypt and countless other awry revolts of the working people against injustice and inequality.

[Hit The North]

We have more than enough dissatisfaction in the western society with Capitalist inequality and injustice, and the vanguard of this objective reality discourse of course being Greece. But thinking that workers will all of a sudden educate and revolutionarily organise themselves themselves out of thin air, is ridiculous;

I agree with much of your post. But you shouldn't underestimate the ability and necessity of the workers to educate and organize themselves, neither should you overestimate the motive power of "educated" revolutionaries within the class struggle. It was Russian workers that invented soviet power, not Russian Marxists, for example. Actual class struggle is the best form of education for the working class.


there needs to be a strong organisation of the conscious working class to exploit the opportunity of the revolutionary objective reality and lead the rest of its class to power, the communist party, proletarian vanguard of the working people.

Well, then the Greek people have a problem as the official communist party is not revolutionary and is unable to lead the Greek workers to power, so they must struggle to build a new vanguard.

[JPSartre12]

the second. I dont see the corporate powers that be willing to let the EU super-state just break up and dissolve ... I'm sure they'd like to keep (if not expand) the EU as rather than let it all go kaput

[Die Neue Zeit]

You must think that workers live in their workplaces and do not participate in other areas of society. You must think that workers are not also family members, members of communities, social clubs and parties, or that they are not citizens and consumers. Or you must believe that they leave these things at the door when they walk into their factory, warehouse, bus depot or office block.

We live outside the workplace, but we pretty much leave politics "at the door" when entering the workplace.


You must think that significant industrial struggles and political upheavals do not happen at the same time, that the strike is merely economic and is unconnected to the political, the communal or the ideological.

In most instances that's simply a fact, though. Political strikes arising from protest movements and other "non-economic" political activity are more politically viable than "political" strikes arising from mass/general strike action.


Otherwise, why do you demand such a schematic ordering of events and insist on the low horizon of point of production struggles? Perhaps you believe that capitalism is not an economic system but primarily a political system! Of course, capitalism is both, as it is a totalising social system, but as long as the solution to capitalist crisis is sought only in political programs, and not in the overturning of the relations of production, then capitalism will stagger on. This, of course, has been the historical function of social democracy.

Historical developments have vindicated the likes of Lassalle over the Bakunin syndicalists, the Proudhon cooperativists, the Labour tred-iunionisty (monopolizing "working-class politics" as merely the political arm of the trade union "movement"), and even the "Early Marx" line which led to Luxemburg's grow-political-struggles-out-of-economic-ones crap.

Political support for the political program is an integral part of the solution. The "overturning" of which you speak should be part of said program. That has been the point of what Lenin called "revolutionary social democracy."


Yes, you are all for the struggle being led by party bureaucrats bearing programs, rather than the active self-organization of the masses. It will be interesting to see how this plays out in the Greek crisis.

SYRIZA's growth was the result of its education, agitation, and organization in that order (or perhaps organization, education, and agitation, but regardless, the education preceded the agitation).

Moreover, the agitation wasn't typical left sloganeering, but incorporated communication savviness, leadership "charisma," anti-Merkel conspiracy theories (http://www.revleft.com/vb/religion-evil-article-t159465/index.html), and other substantively populist "demagoguery" (http://www.revleft.com/vb/one-born-every-t144497/index.html) as perceived by political opponents.

[Hit The North]

We live outside the workplace, but we pretty much leave politics "at the door" when entering the workplace.


Do "we"? If by "we" you mean yourself, then this is evidence of your ineffectiveness as an agitator for socialism.


In most instances that's simply a fact, though. Political strikes arising from protest movements and other "non-economic" political activity are more politically viable than "political" strikes arising from mass/general strike action.

You formulate this in a highly schematic way. Whether strikes can be brought into existence on the basis of political agitation presupposes a high level of politicization already within the class. It is not the case that protest movements can produce strikes more often than strikes can build political protest - it depends on the particular circumstances of the class struggle. Besides which your formulation is tautological and, therefore, empty. Of course a politically motivated strike is more "politically viable" than one rooted in strictly sectional, economic demands. But this isn't really the point, as we have yet to understand the concrete political demands and its economic effects or the economic demands and their political effect in any particular case. So for instance, the 1968 London Dockers strike against immigration (a politically motivated strike) was politically reactionary and politically divisive, whilst the 1984 Miner's Strike (derived from a sectional economic motive to defend against mine closures and redundancies) was politically progressive and united tens of thousands of workers and socialists in a militant movement.


Historical developments have vindicated the likes of Lassalle over the Bakunin syndicalists, the Proudhon cooperativists, the Labour tred-iunionisty (monopolizing "working-class politics" as merely the political arm of the trade union "movement"), and even the "Early Marx" line which led to Luxemburg's grow-political-struggles-out-of-economic-ones crap.


More vapid abstraction. In what sense has Lassalle been proven correct against these other lines of action? Has Lassalle's ideas lead us one iota closer to socialism? Which historical developments are you referring to? Moreover, what does this have to do wiht the topic of this thread?


Political support for the political program is an integral part of the solution.

Who's support for who's political program?


SYRIZA's growth was the result of its education, agitation, and organization in that order (or perhaps organization, education, and agitation, but regardless, the education preceded the agitation).
What are you talking about? How did the education take place and among whom?

[Workers-Control-Over-Prod]

I agree with much of your post. But you shouldn't underestimate the ability and necessity of the workers to educate and organize themselves, neither should you overestimate the motive power of "educated" revolutionaries within the class struggle. It was Russian workers that invented soviet power, not Russian Marxists, for example. Actual class struggle is the best form of education for the working class.



Well, then the Greek people have a problem as the official communist party is not revolutionary and is unable to lead the Greek workers to power, so they must struggle to build a new vanguard.

Yes, the creation of worker councils, soviets, is a natural phenomenon of labor activity in capitalism. The creation of worker councils comes from strike councils, that, when capitalism is unable to employ people, turn into worker councils quite naturally. You can see strike councils everywhere, from Egypt to Europe to China to USA. And when workers wages are cut, the ones who are in a union, go on strike to fight for their rights, more than often form strike councils to discuss, and when there are constant strikes and the economic situation gets even worse with more cuts, these councils logically turn into permanent councils of workers; worker councils.

I don't know much about KKE, what do you mean by "not a revolutionary party", you mean not a militant party that could challenge the capitalist state and form its own?

[Die Neue Zeit]

Do "we"? If by "we" you mean yourself, then this is evidence of your ineffectiveness as an agitator for socialism.

I meant my class background. :confused:

[Die Neue Zeit]

You formulate this in a highly schematic way. Whether strikes can be brought into existence on the basis of political agitation presupposes a high level of politicization already within the class.

But where does that come from? Cookie-cutter political struggle of the basic sort can come in the form of protest action, grassroots lobbying (like for constitutional amendments and referenda initiatives), and of course action within the parliamentary arena.

It does not come from sectional strikes.


It is not the case that protest movements can produce strikes more often than strikes can build political protest

All the basic political struggle that I've mentioned is to the point. If strikes grow out of this, it's a bonus, but political aims are achieved. Strikes almost never build political action.

The most notable case I can think of are the various pre-WWI strikes for universal suffrage. Those were political from the get-go, and economic issues were secondary.


Besides which your formulation is tautological and, therefore, empty. Of course a politically motivated strike is more "politically viable" than one rooted in strictly sectional, economic demands. But this isn't really the point

But that is the point, precisely because your line seeks to grow political action from various point-of-production and other economic struggles.


So for instance, the 1968 London Dockers strike against immigration (a politically motivated strike) was politically reactionary and politically divisive, whilst the 1984 Miner's Strike (derived from a sectional economic motive to defend against mine closures and redundancies) was politically progressive and united tens of thousands of workers and socialists in a militant movement.

The Miners' Strike may have been progressive, but my question is: how political was it, really?


More vapid abstraction. In what sense has Lassalle been proven correct against these other lines of action? Has Lassalle's ideas lead us one iota closer to socialism? Which historical developments are you referring to? Moreover, what does this have to do wiht the topic of this thread?

Lassalle's main point was that pure political action is necessary, despite his anti-unionism, his Iron Law of Wages (both of which were feeble attempts to support his nonetheless spot-on political conclusion), etc. Those sideshows were simply because most unions were and are apolitical, the "historical developments" I'm referring to.

The topic of this thread is about democratizing the EU structure, as opposed to nationalist anti-EU sentiment of left or right variety. That won't come with trade union action here and there.


Who's support for who's political program?

Comrades here have pointed to the SPD model, in reference to worker-class political support for a revolutionary program. This support necessarily comes in the form of a party-movement.


What are you talking about? How did the education take place and among whom?

Why do you think SYRIZA has radical economists crunching some numbers for its political activists?

[Martin Blank]

Perhaps you believe that capitalism is not an economic system but primarily a political system! Of course, capitalism is both, as it is a totalising social system, but as long as the solution to capitalist crisis is sought only in political programs, and not in the overturning of the relations of production, then capitalism will stagger on. This, of course, has been the historical function of social democracy.

I wanted to pull out this section of PAT's commentary because I think this is a key error that is made on both sides of this argument -- and one that has replicated itself time and again over the last 130 years.

Yes, capitalism is an all-encompassing system -- a "totalising social system", as PAT puts it. We find the blood and bile of the capitalist mode of production in every workplace, public square and neighborhood of society. Whether we are looking at the world we live in politically, economically, culturally or socially, we find the face of capitalism staring back at us. This is why the revolutionary workers' movement has to be all-encompassing, with an organized, conscious and "total" presence capable of squaring off against the power of capital in all arenas and aspects of society.

However, Marx was clear when he called the class struggle a political struggle. What hasn't been so clear in the years since Marx's death is why he placed such unequivocal importance on this and, more importantly, what is meant by it.

For more than a century, the idea of "political action" has been inexorably entwined with that of electoral action. This entwining has led to over a century of working-class division and prostration, and arguably responsible for most of the greatest defeats of the proletariat in the 20th century. This was a direct product of the rise of Social Democracy and its domination over the workers' movement -- a domination that even extended over Frederick Engels, with outright revision of political documents he wrote so as to make it look like he was in step with social-democratic electoralism.

Even today, we see this crude equation drawn as a dividing line between reform and revolution. We've seen it in the argument over the recent Greek elections, in the debates over Nepal, in discussions on the #Occupy movement, and so on and so on. As PAT put it:


... as long as the solution to capitalist crisis is sought only in political programs, and not in the overturning of the relations of production, then capitalism will stagger on. This, of course, has been the historical function of social democracy.

This, however, begs the question of what Marx meant when he said the class struggle was a political struggle. Throughout his writings, beginning with the 1848 revolutions and culminating in the Paris Commune, we find the answer: for Marx, the political struggle was a struggle against capitalist rule and, more concretely, the capitalist state. In other words, political action is aimed at weakening and undermining capitalist rule and the capitalist state vis-à-vis the working class. Among the various tactics that could be used under specific material conditions to undermine capitalist rule is that of standing in elections, but electoral activity is not the alpha and omega of political action.

What made the liberal-populist #Occupy movement such a threat to the ruling classes? It wasn't its political message or slogans. It wasn't its sudden and explosive growth. It was its (arguably) semi-conscious undermining of capitalist rule through the occupation of land, both public and private. It was, to use Marx and Engels' words from the Communist Manifesto, a "despotic inroad" against private property -- "despotic" in the sense that occupiers did not simply subordinate themselves to the demands of the ruling classes or their state to vacate the land, and had to be physically removed.

Militant occupation of private property is political action -- more so than standing in an election -- because it directly challenges the rule and power of the exploiting and oppressing classes, even if it is only over a miniscule slice of the totality of private property. However, it becomes revolutionary political action when such occupations are consciously aimed at undermining, putting in check or otherwise weakening the power of the ruling classes and their state.

Undermining, weakening, eroding and ultimately defeating the ruling classes and their state is the key to overturning the existing series of social relationships that define the capitalist mode of production. This is because of the role that the state plays in enforcing the domination of the ruling classes in all areas of society. A militant strike? A challenge to basic cultural norms? People demanding a change in traditional social relations (e.g., civil rights)? Call the police! Send in the troops!

The state is the linchpin of class rule, and its defeat and destruction is the path to overturning all existing social relations. No strike -- not even a general strike -- can accomplish this task.

There are, of course, other tactics and activities that are part of the arsenal of revolutionary working-class political action. But all of them are based on the same general principle: contributing to the process of defeating and destroying the ruling classes and their state.

[Die Neue Zeit]

I wanted to pull out this section of PAT's commentary because I think this is a key error that is made on both sides of this argument -- and one that has replicated itself time and again over the last 130 years.

[...]

For more than a century, the idea of "political action" has been inexorably entwined with that of electoral action.

[...]

Among the various tactics that could be used under specific material conditions to undermine capitalist rule is that of standing in elections, but electoral activity is not the alpha and omega of political action.

Comrade, I didn't make that mistake at all. :confused:


Militant occupation of private property is political action

[...]

No strike -- not even a general strike -- can accomplish this task.

I know the distinction between long-term occupation and short-term occupation, but could you please explain the difference between the latter and a sit-down strike? :confused:

[Martin Blank]

First of all, I wish PAT had not deleted his reply to me. I thought it was a good basis for continuing discussion. Ah well.


I know the distinction between long-term occupation and short-term occupation, but could you please explain the difference between the latter and a sit-down strike? :confused:

A sit-down strike is an economic action designed to win certain demands in a situation where other forms of industrial action are inadequate. For example, the sit-downs and occupations at Republic Windows/Serious Energy were a correct tactic for dealing with the attempt to close the factory and move its work elsewhere. Similarly, the 1936-37 Flint Sit-Down Strike was the correct action due to the threats of lockout and replacement by scabs.

A sit-down, like most economic actions, is defensive in character. It is meant to defend a certain position from being lost -- whether that is a certain standard of living, the job itself, etc. Even in the case of Flint, Kelsey-Hayes and other sit-downs of the 1930s, the underlying character of the actions was defensive, since the demand for a contract was meant as a measure of job security and amnesty for strikers.

However, a takeover and occupation of an area of land, public or private, is an offensive action -- a conquest of territory. Even the most militant of sit-down strikes we've seen outside of revolutionary situations are not designed as a seizing of the factory from its owners and managers. But an occupation is meant to be a seizure of private property and its transformation into a "liberated zone" (for lack of a better term) -- an area returned to the commons by way of confiscation.

Can a sit-down strike be an offensive action? Certainly, but such an action can only be effective in the context of an all-encompassing movement that has occupations as a central political tactic. In other words, it can be, but really only in the context of a mass revolutionary working-class movement fighting to defeat and destroy the ruling classes and their state.

[Hit The North]

First of all, I wish PAT had not deleted his reply to me. I thought it was a good basis for continuing discussion. Ah well.


I deleted it because my new laptop posted it in error before it was finished. Since then I've been busy but I'll get on to it when I'm not. :)

[Martin Blank]

I deleted it because my new laptop posted it in error before it was finished. Since then I've been busy but I'll get on to it when I'm not. :)

Fair enough.

[Hit The North]

I have no problem with Miles formulation and would largely endorse it which is why in one earlier post I wrote:


So let us be clear that "the political agenda of socialist change" is about contesting capitalist rule politically, socially and, most significantly, at the point of production; not concocting this or that fiscal policy.Since then I have been bending the stick somewhat in favour of spontaneous working class self-activity in response to what I perceive to be DNZ's fetish for party organisation and programatic exactitude and a strategic formulation that gives motive priority to party leaderships.

But, of course, the unity of struggle that Miles refers to is crucial.

However, we must keep some things in mind. Firstly that capitalism is, above all else, a social relation of production. Secondly, that the proletariat is first and foremost an economic class and that its power - corresponding to its special place in the capitalist social order- is at the point of production. Thirdly that the entire edifice of capitalist society is produced and reproduced at the point of production. As we can see today, the inability of capitalism to maintain levels of profitability, to find avenues for the valorization of capital, poses dire consequences for the political states which ultimately rely upon an expanding economy. It is wrong, therefore, to downgrade the economic strike in the way that DNZ does in favour of political strikes organised from above. What DNZ fails to realise in his half-baked attacks on ‘economism’ is that the generalisation of economic strikes (and it is the generalisation that give economic strikes their political character) provides workers with the tools, the practice and the confidence to begin acting as a class. As Trotsky puts it:

Originally written by Leon Trotsky (http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1931/spain/spain08.htm):
By means of the strike, various strata and groups of the proletariat manifest themselves, signal to each other, verify their own strength and the strength of their foe. One layer infects and awakens the other. All this together makes the present strike wave absolutely inevitable. Least of all do the communists have to be afraid of it, for this is the very expression of the creative force of the revolution. Only through these strikes, with all their mistakes, with all their “excesses” and “exaggerations,” does the proletariat rise to its feet, assemble itself in one unit, begin to feel and to conceive itself as a class, as a living historical force. Never have revolutions developed under a conductor’s stick. Excesses, mistakes, sacrifices are the very nature of any revolution.
Really, what I want to argue for is a more dialectical view of what Marxists understand as 'politics' and 'economics' and a recognition that they are mutually inter-penetrated. I think this conception is implicit in Miles formulation but entirely missing in DNZ's schematicism.


Originally posted by Miles
The state is the linchpin of class rule, and its defeat and destruction is the path to overturning all existing social relations. No strike -- not even a general strike -- can accomplish this task. Not on its own perhaps, and certainly not spontaneously and without political planning, but a general strike would be a powerful weapon in defeating the state. Strikes can undermine the legitimacy of the state. If the state is exposed in its inability to impose order, to provide transportation, or keep the economy going, then it is already tottering. If it is forced to use the police for strike breaking or if the army is called in to maintain services that workers refuse to maintain and if this inevitably leads to confrontations between the repressive agents of the state and ordinary workers then there is a crisis of legitimacy that the state will find it difficult to overcome. Moreover, this will help intensify, like nothing else, the process of polarization that is necessary for opening up a revolutionary situation.

Occupying a public square or state building is one thing; occupying a workplace is quite another. The first contains political revolt and is, therefore, admirable; but the latter contains an overturning of the relations of production that are the basis for bourgeois power and, in terms of the proletariat seizing the instruments of production, distribution and administration, provides the basis for working class power. Further, it is the class acting as a class. In the public square we are ‘society’, in the workplace, we are the working class. The job of revolutionaries, of course, is to build bridges between the class acting as civil society and as the ruling economic force and to show the absolute unity of these movements. The only way we can do this is by acting in both arenas of struggle - not, as DNZ does, denouncing the ideological limitations of the industrial struggle.