Why are some regimes 'um-democratic'?

[Blanquist]

Why is it harder for some regimes to give the illusion of democracy then other regimes?

Is less appearance of a democracy, like in Russia, a sign of the instability of the regime?

In Germany is appears to be quite easy to start a party and get on the ballot, but almost impossible in Russia, for example a party must have 50,000+ members, and collect signatures, be represented in all the regions, it must then win at least 7% to be in parliament etc.

Is the Russian regime just less stable then Germany, France, etc, to afford itself the luxury?

Does that mean that regimes like North Korea, Saudi Arabia, etc are the least stable?

[Jimmie Higgins]

Yes I think it can be a sign of instability in a regime. Sometimes it's less apparent, but I think if you look at Greece, for example, the EU pretty obviously needs the undemocratic troika to get around normal bourgeois democracy because they ruling classes need to accomplish something they know is opposed.

What it is in the sterotypes about strong-men that they always promise: "a return to order". Liberals tend to argue they appeal to a sort of existential fear of disorder in the population - that we "crave order" in uncertain times, but this is total hogwash. Pinochet or Franco does not bring "order" in terms of any anxieties in the general population - in fact their "order" requires a great deal of disruption and chaos in the lives of regular people. So the order they are really promising is ruling class order, a forced end to class struggles so that business can return to it's "order".

[Blanquist]

Yes I think it can be a sign of instability in a regime. Sometimes it's less apparent, but I think if you look at Greece, for example, the EU pretty obviously needs the undemocratic troika to get around normal bourgeois democracy because they ruling classes need to accomplish something they know is opposed.

What it is in the sterotypes about strong-men that they always promise: "a return to order". Liberals tend to argue they appeal to a sort of existential fear of disorder in the population - that we "crave order" in uncertain times, but this is total hogwash. Pinochet or Franco does not bring "order" in terms of any anxieties in the general population - in fact their "order" requires a great deal of disruption and chaos in the lives of regular people. So the order they are really promising is ruling class order, a forced end to class struggles so that business can return to it's "order".

So the ideal form of rule, for the bourgeoisie, would be a bourgeois democracy like in Germany, but in times of crisis it can't afford this luxury.

Correct?

[Jimmie Higgins]

As I see it yes. They'd rather have a passive class-peace than an enforced one because direct-repression can potentially backfire whereas just keeping people demoralized and passive is cost-effective and is harder to break out of.

The white-terror of the KKK worked after reconstruction, but white-terror backfired in the 1950/60s by mobilizing and enraging an opposition. The white terror in the 1950s and refusal of the movement to stop ended up disrupting things (States just closed public schools to white and black kids rather than intergerate) to the point that the US ruling-class's claim of "guardians of democracy" was glaringly hypocritical and so industrial capital decided to abandon the rural southern segregationist elites and go for social-peace through granting the reforms. But when the struggle turned against northern capital itself (urban riots, Malcolm X, BPP), the ruling class had a combined strategy of co-option and repression of the black power movement and this was much more successful because rather than rallying opposition, it divided and confused people.