andyx1205
2nd March 2012, 09:54
Those who say the uprising in Syria was created by the West should be picked up and dropped in Homs. The uprising started off as a genuinely legitimate and peaceful means of opposition with escalation towards armed resistance and it is only until recently that external players are being involved to control the direction of the revolution for their own means (Saudis,Qatar,etc).
The more interesting question is what is better for the Syrian people out of the two following choices:
1) Arm the opposition with the goal of stronger military resistance: it can either convince more Syrians to side with the opposition if it has a chance of winning, or it can open up the possibility of greater escalation and civil war.
2) The fate of Syria should be left to Syrians: instead of greater military resistance, put hopes in greater percentage of Syrians supporting the opposition; can lead to greater army defections but can also mean freedom of the regime to massacre a weak resistance.
The best solution is whatever can result in greater percentage of Syrians supporting the opposition (what this is...is debatable). Amongst the three groups (supporters of the regime, supporters of the opposition, those neutral who are most likely sympathetic but hesitant to join the opposition), the last one is the largest group.
My question: what is the preferred main strategy for the Syrian opposition to defeat the Assad regime?
Though I am currently undecided, I lean towards option 2. External involvement can result in nationalist top army officials siding with the regime as opposed to possibly siding with the opposition. It is possible however that only arming/funding the opposition as opposed to direct intervention (like Libya) will not have this effect on nationalist Syrian army officials, yet, it is clear that arming/funding the opposition means influencing the direction of the revolution since those giving the funding/arms would decide which parts of the opposition (based on the self-interests of the external players) get the funding/arms.
It certainly is possible that funding/arming the opposition can increase the chances of defeating the regime, though as mentioned, it can also result in escalation into civil war. It is also clear that when it comes to the interests of Syrians on the whole, this is counter-productive for the Syrians since those sectors of the opposition receiving the funding/arms would serve the interests of those giving the funding/arms.
*please do not post in this thread if you support Assad and think the uprising was started by a conspiracy by the West, I do not want this thread to be derailed into such a discussion
I asked my political science professor on the question of intervention to which he responded with the following:
the uprising is certainly popular. then again, the regime has some real support. My guess would be 40% are pro-opposition, 30% are pro-regime, and 30% are fence-sitting (most of them sympathetic to the opposition but fearing the chaos of a successful revolution).
I don't think that external military intervention is likely, certainly not for a long time--it would be far more difficult than Libya, far more expensive than Libya, and would require Turkish support (and its not something they want to do, at least not at the moment). Any intervention would essentially going to war with Syria--there's not really any sort of limited intervention that makes practical sense. Even a NFZ means bombing Syria's very extensive air defence system--its a major bombing campaign, and given that air power has played no role in the regime's repression, it would have little effect. Yes, it might tip fence-sitters towards the opposition. however, it might also tip nationalist army officers closer to the regime, which would be counter-productive.
One is thus left with sanctions, isolations, funding and/or arming the opposition, and accepting it may well be be a long, drawn-out bloody battle.
The reason I am leaning towards opposition to external involvement is because I strongly fear another case of "revolution betrayed," that is, the post-revolutionary regime will betray the Syrian people, similar to how the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has betrayed the revolution. In most cases throughout history, the masses, the youth, the revolutionaries give their blood for the revolution, only for the revolution to be hijacked and power to be consolidated by anti-revolutionaries. The perfect example of the revolution in that area being betrayed is Iran (the more I read about the Iranian Revolution, where the brutal Shah was overthrown, the more my blood boils).
The more interesting question is what is better for the Syrian people out of the two following choices:
1) Arm the opposition with the goal of stronger military resistance: it can either convince more Syrians to side with the opposition if it has a chance of winning, or it can open up the possibility of greater escalation and civil war.
2) The fate of Syria should be left to Syrians: instead of greater military resistance, put hopes in greater percentage of Syrians supporting the opposition; can lead to greater army defections but can also mean freedom of the regime to massacre a weak resistance.
The best solution is whatever can result in greater percentage of Syrians supporting the opposition (what this is...is debatable). Amongst the three groups (supporters of the regime, supporters of the opposition, those neutral who are most likely sympathetic but hesitant to join the opposition), the last one is the largest group.
My question: what is the preferred main strategy for the Syrian opposition to defeat the Assad regime?
Though I am currently undecided, I lean towards option 2. External involvement can result in nationalist top army officials siding with the regime as opposed to possibly siding with the opposition. It is possible however that only arming/funding the opposition as opposed to direct intervention (like Libya) will not have this effect on nationalist Syrian army officials, yet, it is clear that arming/funding the opposition means influencing the direction of the revolution since those giving the funding/arms would decide which parts of the opposition (based on the self-interests of the external players) get the funding/arms.
It certainly is possible that funding/arming the opposition can increase the chances of defeating the regime, though as mentioned, it can also result in escalation into civil war. It is also clear that when it comes to the interests of Syrians on the whole, this is counter-productive for the Syrians since those sectors of the opposition receiving the funding/arms would serve the interests of those giving the funding/arms.
*please do not post in this thread if you support Assad and think the uprising was started by a conspiracy by the West, I do not want this thread to be derailed into such a discussion
I asked my political science professor on the question of intervention to which he responded with the following:
the uprising is certainly popular. then again, the regime has some real support. My guess would be 40% are pro-opposition, 30% are pro-regime, and 30% are fence-sitting (most of them sympathetic to the opposition but fearing the chaos of a successful revolution).
I don't think that external military intervention is likely, certainly not for a long time--it would be far more difficult than Libya, far more expensive than Libya, and would require Turkish support (and its not something they want to do, at least not at the moment). Any intervention would essentially going to war with Syria--there's not really any sort of limited intervention that makes practical sense. Even a NFZ means bombing Syria's very extensive air defence system--its a major bombing campaign, and given that air power has played no role in the regime's repression, it would have little effect. Yes, it might tip fence-sitters towards the opposition. however, it might also tip nationalist army officers closer to the regime, which would be counter-productive.
One is thus left with sanctions, isolations, funding and/or arming the opposition, and accepting it may well be be a long, drawn-out bloody battle.
The reason I am leaning towards opposition to external involvement is because I strongly fear another case of "revolution betrayed," that is, the post-revolutionary regime will betray the Syrian people, similar to how the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has betrayed the revolution. In most cases throughout history, the masses, the youth, the revolutionaries give their blood for the revolution, only for the revolution to be hijacked and power to be consolidated by anti-revolutionaries. The perfect example of the revolution in that area being betrayed is Iran (the more I read about the Iranian Revolution, where the brutal Shah was overthrown, the more my blood boils).