Calling all Hoxhaists(other "anti-revisionists" are also welcome)

[Lei Feng]

I have been curious about this for quite some time. Being a Maoist, I believe that Mao Zedong led China in the right path during his leadership(until the government was overtaken by Revisionists). His policies led to China becoming an egalitarian, revolutionary, and above all, socialist society.

However, after studying another Marxist tendency of the anti-revisionist variety(Hoxhaism), I have become a bit confused. I tend to agree with the majority of what they say, nearly everything. The only thing I have a problem with is them viewing Mao as a revisionist. I can understand Tito and Khruschev(obviously) being revisionists, but how is Mao one of them? He took a hardline stance against the revisionist camp along with Hoxha. Of course there was criticism from both sides, but the two countries/leaders were on generallly good terms until around 1977.

Basically what I know in terms of differences is that Mao expanded upon Marxism-Leninism while Hoxha just tried to emulate Stalin as well as he could.(Being a Maoist, I am in favour of Stalin as well, but it seems some Hoxhaists have a dogmatic view of his rule and don't see room for change that could be beneficial, as Mao had seen)

The point is, I would like you guys to provide me with some information regarding the differences between these two (in my eyes)truly Revolutionary ideologies.

All Hoxhaists/Marxist-Leninists are welcome!(Also any fellow Maoists are encouraged to answer, as well, so that I can get both views on the topic).

[Ismail]

Although in public Mao and the PRC attacked revisionism alongside Enver Hoxha and Albania, the Chinese conducted their activities from nationalist positions and also promoted right-wing economic policies at an angle different from that of the Soviet revisionists but which were nevertheless clearly not in the service of socialist construction. See: http://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/archive/chinecon.htm

In 1956 Mao supported Khrushchev against the "Anti-Party Group."

"I endorsed the CPSU Central Committee’s solution on the Molotov question. That was a struggle of opposites. The facts prove that unity could not be achieved and that the two sides were mutually exclusive. The Molotov clique took the opportunity to attack at a time when Comrade Khrushchev was abroad and unprepared. However, even though they waged a surprise attack, our Comrade Khrushchev is no fool. He is a smart person who immediately mobilized his troops and waged a victorious counterattack. That struggle was one between two lines: one erroneous and one relatively correct. In the four or five years since Stalin’s death the situation has improved considerably in the Soviet Union in the sphere of both domestic policy and foreign policy. This indicates that the line represented by Comrade Khrushchev is correct and that opposition to his line is incorrect.'"
(Mao Zedong, quoted in Zhihua Shen & Yafeng Xia. "Hidden Currents during the Honeymoon: Mao, Khrushchev, and the 1957 Moscow Conference," in Journal of Cold War Studies, Volume 11, Number 4, Fall 2009, pp. 108-109.)

Differences between the PRC and the USSR were waged primarily over geo-political issues, with issues of a consistent revolutionary character being secondary in the view of the Chinese leadership. Enver Hoxha in his diaries noted the various right-wing policies of the Chinese leadership in this regard, from focusing on territorial claims against the USSR to Mao proclaiming the "Three Worlds Theory" and calling on the world proletariat to unite with US imperialism against Soviet social-imperialism.

Publicly espousing anti-revisionism in ideology does not mean much when it isn't converted into practice. Khrushchev, after all, was one of the foremost figures praising Stalin throughout the 30's and 40's.

Although Albania and the PRC were publicly on "generally good terms" until 1977, by 1972 relations were quite remote outside of economic ties and the occasional symbolic visits of personnel. Hoxha on his diaries again notes that Chinese officials were keeping various things secret from their Albanian counterparts, and the visit of Nixon to Beijing heralded a steady decline in relations until 1977.

Extracts from Hoxha's diaries dealing with China are known as Reflections on China, in two volumes, which can be downloaded in English here:
* http://www.enverhoxha.ru/Archive_of_books/English/enver_hoxha_reflections_on_china_volume_I_eng.pdf
* http://www.enverhoxha.ru/Archive_of_books/English/enver_hoxha_reflections_on_china_volume_II_eng.pdf

Enver Hoxha's work Imperialism and the Revolution can also be downloaded here:
* http://enver-hoxha.net/content/content_english/books/books-imperialism_and_revolution.htm

Mao's "expansion" of Marxism-Leninism was a negation of much of it. There is no need to "expand" upon Marxism-Leninism in such a way as Mao did. Marxism-Leninism, as a scientific body of work, naturally moves forward in accordance with the development of the objective material conditions.

In July 1978 Hoxha wrote to Hysni Kapo on the struggle the Party of Labour was waging against Chinese revisionism. Hoxha wrote:

"For our Party these are historical moments of international importance, though a historic burden has fallen on it to lead this difficult, yet glorious struggle, and to protect Socialist Albania and the purity of Marxism-Leninism against distortions, deviations and sophistry, to empower the world proletarian revolution and the national liberation struggle of the peoples against U.S. imperialism, Soviet social-imperialism and Maoist China.

Maoism as an anti-Marxist 'theory' is in agony. It will face the same fate as other theories which have been devised by global capitalism and imperialism in decay."
(Enver Hoxha. Letra të zgjedhura Vol. 1. Tiranë: 8 Nëntori. 1985. p. 401.)

[Zulu]

In 1956 Mao supported Khrushchev against the "Anti-Party Group."

"I endorsed the CPSU Central Committee’s solution on the Molotov question. That was a struggle of opposites. The facts prove that unity could not be achieved and that the two sides were mutually exclusive. The Molotov clique took the opportunity to attack at a time when Comrade Khrushchev was abroad and unprepared. However, even though they waged a surprise attack, our Comrade Khrushchev is no fool. He is a smart person who immediately mobilized his troops and waged a victorious counterattack. That struggle was one between two lines: one erroneous and one relatively correct. In the four or five years since Stalin’s death the situation has improved considerably in the Soviet Union in the sphere of both domestic policy and foreign policy. This indicates that the line represented by Comrade Khrushchev is correct and that opposition to his line is incorrect.'"
(Mao Zedong, quoted in Zhihua Shen & Yafeng Xia. "Hidden Currents during the Honeymoon: Mao, Khrushchev, and the 1957 Moscow Conference," in Journal of Cold War Studies, Volume 11, Number 4, Fall 2009, pp. 108-109.)

Little correction: the "Anti-Party Group" affair was in 1957.

And I think Mao's siding with Khrushchev was a bit of realpolitik. Seeing how he had won, and Molotov and the rest had been already purged, Mao sought to maintain relations with Khrushchev. It was not until the Sino-Indian war of 1962, when Khrushchev openly sided with India that all bridges were burned.

As for Mao's nationalist tendencies, they seem to have been pretty moderate. Suffice it to say, Stalin himself had some nationalist tendencies. But they both saw international socialism as the ultimate solution to their nations' problems, as well as those of all other nations, on one hand, and on the other, it can hardly be debated that the Soviet and Chinese people had more potential of solidifying the world communist movement around them and becoming its power bases in the struggle against imperialism, than smaller nations, simply because of numbers. This is a very thin ice, of course, and it gave rise to chauvinism in both USSR and PRC, but it's doubtful there was a better way around it.

[Ismail]

1956 was a typo, and there's a big difference between, say, generic "we are always loyal to the USSR"-type speeches and communiqués and implicitly praising Khrushchev's "destalinization" campaign.

Stalin had no "nationalist tendencies." The Chinese, as Hoxha noted in his diary, focused on territorial claims and within the span of 10 years began an alliance with US imperialism.

Compare what Mao said in 1957 to what Hoxha said in that same year:

"We are not in agreement with all those who attempt to discount the entire positive revolutionary side of Stalin, as experience, and who see only the black side of it... As is known, J. V. Stalin was a great Marxist. After Lenin it was he who protected Marxism-Leninism on all sides from revisionism and contributed greatly to the further development of science. Great merits are due to him in the preparation and development of the October Revolution, in the building of the first socialist state, in the historic victory over the invading fascists, in the development of the international communist and workers' movement. For all these deeds Stalin enjoyed great authority, not only in the Soviet Union but throughout the world... Stalin was never mistaken in such questions as the protection of the interests of the working class and of Marxist-Leninist theory, the fight against imperialism and against the other enemies of socialism. He was and remains an exemplary figure.'"
(Enver Hoxha, quoted in Stephen D. Kertesz (ed). East Central Europe and the World: Developments in the Post-Stalin Era. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. 1962. p. 204.)

[Zulu]

Stalin had no "nationalist tendencies."

Let's say they were occasional and very far in between. But still, Lenin did mention them in his notes "On the Question of Nationalities and the Autonomization". Stalin did "rehabilitate" some historical Russian figures, who in reality had had little revolutionary (or pro-people) merits. He critisized Engels for over-vilification of the Russian Tsarism, saying it had been no worse than any other empire of the 19th century. He did toast the Russians specifically for their input into the victory over the Nazis. All that earned him enormous popularity among the Russian nationalists and distortion in understanding of his achievements, which only fuels the anti-Soviet propaganda by both the Western bourgeoisie, Eastern European nationalists, and our Trotskyist "comrades". I think if Stalin had known of this turn of events in advance, he would have refrained from those things, even though they might have been regarded by him as done for the mere sake of historical accuracy at the time.





Compare what Mao said in 1957 to what Hoxha said in that same year:

I didn't take that Mao's quote as an attempt to detract from Stalin, but rather as pointing out that the Soviet Union continued its development, and praising Khrushchev for that. Mao never said anything good about Khrushchev's secret speech and dismantling of Stalin's cult of personality though.

The rapprochement with the US took place only when it was already clear that the Soviets were unavailable for partnership on the basis of communist internationalism, that the Cultural Revolution was not working too good, and that the stagists and revisionists prevailed in the CPC. And in any case Mao didn't want China to go down the Juche path.

[Ismail]

"[Chuev:] Stalin proposed that all republics become part of the RSFSR on the basis of autonomy, which Lenin opposed. But then Stalin admitted his mistake and agreed to Lenin's proposal to form the USSR with all Soviet republics having equality.

[Molotov:] The point is that Stalin in this instance continued Lenin's line. But Lenin had moved beyond the solution he had advocated earlier and which Stalin knew well. Lenin then moved the question to a higher plane.

Lenin had opposed the federal principle, federalism, because he favored centralism. All the reins, everything must be held in the hands of the working class so as to strengthen the state. Just read his articles on the national question. Autonomy within a unitary state, yes.

But Lenin suddenly dropped this unitary principle for a federal solution: 'Let us create the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics!'

But Stalin did not know this at the outset."
(Albert Resis (ed). Molotov Remembers. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, Inc. 1991. pp. 195-196.)

In any case I specifically mentioned national chauvinism in great-state relations. I shall give an example from Hoxha's diaries:

"This is neither the time nor the occasion to raise such problems which provide Khrushchev with a weapon to accuse us of being chauvinists. The ideological and political struggle against Khrushchev must not be diverted into delicate questions of territorial claims....

Even more important is the fact that Chou En-lai did not raise the question of territorial claims simply as a tactic, but as an issue of principle. The claims of the Chinese have been built on a dangerous platform and from a nationalist position, to the point that they themselves have pretensions to Outer Mongolia. This platform has nothing in common with the struggle against Khrushchevism and Khrushchev...

The territorial integrity of the Soviet Union must not be touched at this time, notwithstanding that history may have left problems to be tidied up. Today the whole struggle must be directed against the Khrushchevite renegades, but not with such arguments and methods as the Chinese are using...

Comrade Stalin was very correct, prudent, and principled in these delicate and complicated problems... in a talk which I had with Stalin he said to me. among other things, that from the formal aspect the Yugoslav Federation, as a union of different republics, was progressive. Seen from this viewpoint, there was no reason for it to be broken up, but Titoism and the Titoites must be fought ideologically and politically as betrayers of Marxism-Leninism. The struggle against them must not be waged from the chauvinist positions of territorial claims or against the peoples of Yugoslavia...

This was the principled stand of Stalin, and we were and are completely in agreement with this stand. The questions of territorial claims for all those countries which the Chinese comrades mention can be raised only when revisionism has been routed and Marxist-Leninist bolshevik parties have come to the head of those countries. Then the problems of disputed borders can be raised and discussed, as amongst Marxist-Leninists, in the spirit of proletarian internationalism, and just solutions found in favour not only of simple national interests, but also of international communism.

There is no other road. Any other road is wrong, and I think that the Chinese comrades have fallen up to their ears into this grave error."
(Enver Hoxha. Reflections on China Vol. I. Tirana: 8 Nëntori Publishing House. 1979. pp. 74-77.)

Mao said that "the situation has improved considerably in the Soviet Union in the sphere of both domestic policy and foreign policy" since Stalin's death.

The rapprochement with US imperialism was and is unforgivable and completely anti-Marxist. A foreign policy based on proletarian internationalism does not seek out imperialist "partners."

In addition to this the "Three Worlds Theory" called for and implemented an alliance of China with Pinochet's Chile, Mobutu's Zaire, etc.

"... it is evident that to the Marxist-Leninists it is altogether alien and extremely harmful to call for an alliance that denies the proletariat its hegemonic role in the revolution, that is not centered on the proletariat as the main social motive force of the epoch, that does not establish a definite criterion of the division between the proletariat and the reactionary bourgeoisie, between the peoples fighting for freedom and independence and the fascist regimes, the clergy, the dregs of the society (the lumpen elements), etc., but lumps them all together."
(Nexhmije Hoxha. Some Fundamental Questions of the Revolutionary Policy of the Party of Labour of Albania About the Development of the Class Struggle. Tirana: 8 Nëntori Publishing House. 1977. p. 55.)

In Imperialism and the Revolution Hoxha devotes a whole chapter on the anti-Marxist basis of the "Three Worlds Theory" and the anti-Marxist basis of even trying to justify it. The "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" "was not working too good" because it was in itself carried out in a way contrary to Marxism-Leninism. Hoxha voiced early criticism of the "GPCR" in a 1966 speech, which can be viewed in Volume IV of his Selected Works, pages 94-113 here: http://www.enverhoxha.ru/Archive_of_books/English/enver_hoxha_selected_works_volume_IV_eng.pdf

Of course in Imperialism and the Revolution he develops a more concrete view of the basis of the "GPCR" and its anti-Marxist course.

[Zulu]

But the PRC had no territorial claims against the USSR per se. Mao just wanted Khrushchev to admit the unequal character of the 19th century treaties between the Russian Empire and the Qing dynasty, which no true Marxist-Leninist should have refused. And later, the border conflicts arose from the systematic obstruction to fishing, shipping and other normal economic activity on the rivers by the Soviet border guards.

And after those conflicts the PRC found itself pretty much in the "socialism in one country" situation, when it had to basically grab any contacts it could get, especially if they were purely economic, and didn't entail any long lasting political commitments. It didn't sell out neither North Korea, nor Albania to the Yankees, while the USSR proved to be unreasonably hostile, when it let the Vietnamese roll over the PRC-aligned Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia.

[GoddessCleoLover]

Stalin may have formally assented to Lenin's position on the nationalities question, but his actual policies on that question led to resentments among the nationalities that was the prime cause of the dissolution of the Union. Economic problems were only a secondary reason for the Union's dissolution.

[Grenzer]

Particularly problematic is the Maoist doctrine of "New Democracy" which is counter-revolutionary by just about anyone's standards, which calls for a "bloc of the four classes" that includes the bourgeoisie.

[GoddessCleoLover]

As i recall the "New Democracy" concept was limited to China in its undeveloped and semi-feudal state and was intended to represent a short-term phase in the transition process.

[Grenzer]

As i recall the "New Democracy" concept was limited to China in its undeveloped and semi-feudal state and was intended to represent a short-term phase in the transition process.

The bourgeoisie shouldn't have a role in governing in a socialist state, period. If you believe otherwise, then I'd have to question your motives. "New Democracy" along with several other things is symptomatic of the bourgeois nature of Mao's thought, in my opinion. This criticism is shared by those of the Hoxhaist school of thought, as far as I'm aware.

Maoists uphold Stalin don't they? The Soviet Union didn't have a transitional stage in which the bourgeoisie played a governing role(at least according to the Marxist-Leninist/Hoxhaist/Maoist ideologies)) and it was a largely rural and under industrialized country. There were similar conditions in China, so why, according to the Maoists, should the bourgeoisie play a governing role?

[Ismail]

But the PRC had no territorial claims against the USSR per se. Mao just wanted Khrushchev to admit the unequal character of the 19th century treaties between the Russian Empire and the Qing dynasty, which no true Marxist-Leninist should have refused. And later, the border conflicts arose from the systematic obstruction to fishing, shipping and other normal economic activity on the rivers by the Soviet border guards.The Chinese leadership was focusing on relatively minor border disputes and easily allowing themselves to be attacked by the Soviet revisionists. The "true Marxist-Leninist" you speak up would adopt Hoxha's view which was, again, "The questions of territorial claims for all those countries which the Chinese comrades mention can be raised only when revisionism has been routed and Marxist-Leninist bolshevik parties have come to the head of those countries. Then the problems of disputed borders can be raised and discussed, as amongst Marxist-Leninists, in the spirit of proletarian internationalism, and just solutions found in favour not only of simple national interests, but also of international communism."


And after those conflicts the PRC found itself pretty much in the "socialism in one country" situation, when it had to basically grab any contacts it could get, especially if they were purely economic, and didn't entail any long lasting political commitments. It didn't sell out neither North Korea, nor Albania to the Yankees, while the USSR proved to be unreasonably hostile, when it let the Vietnamese roll over the PRC-aligned Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia.The DPRK was and is a revisionist, state-capitalist regime which the Chinese sought to "win over" for geopolitical reasons. Zhou Enlai criticized Hoxha for wanting to build up a formidable defense against outside invasion, and instead called on Albania to enter into an alliance with Yugoslavia and Romania, both states which the Chinese were clearly trying to court. Hoxha refused.

China did, in fact, sell out to US imperialism. It established contacts with the Pinochet regime in Chile, it established friendly ties with Zaire (whose rebels were previously Chinese-backed), it called on the world proletariat to unite with the "second world" (France, Italy, Britain, Australia, etc.) because apparently Soviet social-imperialism was "more dangerous" than US imperialism. In the end it was argued that NATO was a "defensive" alliance against the Soviets.

As for Kampuchea, the Khmer Rouge carried out border provocations and had clearly adopted an aggressive posture towards Vietnam. The Chinese invasion of Vietnam was strongly condemned by Hoxha, who called for a Vietnam free from "guardians" and also free from the Khmer Rouge.

[Zulu]

Stalin may have formally assented to Lenin's position on the nationalities question, but his actual policies on that question led to resentments among the nationalities that was the prime cause of the dissolution of the Union. Economic problems were only a secondary reason for the Union's dissolution.
"Resentments among the nationalities" were nourished by the nationalists, the former and the wannabe bourgeoisie of said nationalities. The question of nationalities is always a class question in nature, and as such it stems from the economic problems. The USSR was no exception. If it wasn't for Khrushchev's revisionism, which created premises for the restoration of capitalism, the nationalities question would have not arisen ever again, after Lenin's instructions had been carried out for the most part during Stalin's time.

[Ismail]

Stalin may have formally assented to Lenin's position on the nationalities question, but his actual policies on that question led to resentments among the nationalities that was the prime cause of the dissolution of the Union. Economic problems were only a secondary reason for the Union's dissolution.Actually no, the main reason the Union disbanded was because of the treacherous policies of the Soviet revisionist leadership and the subsequent agreements between the Russian and likewise "national" bourgeois forces in the other European republics. Most people in Central Asia and the Caucasus backed continued Soviet rule via referendum. Naturally enough, however, the local leaderships were glad to profit off of the dissolution of the Union. I don't see what the Stalin period in particular had to do with anything outside of reactionary nationalism concerning events during his leadership, said nationalism being allowed to flourish due to Glasnost.

Here's a 1987 Albanian article on Soviet national oppression: http://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/archive/sovnatq.htm

[Zulu]

The Chinese leadership was focusing on relatively minor border disputes and easily allowing themselves to be attacked by the Soviet revisionists. The "true Marxist-Leninist" you speak up would adopt Hoxha's view which was, again, "The questions of territorial claims for all those countries which the Chinese comrades mention can be raised only when revisionism has been routed and Marxist-Leninist bolshevik parties have come to the head of those countries. Then the problems of disputed borders can be raised and discussed, as amongst Marxist-Leninists, in the spirit of proletarian internationalism, and just solutions found in favour not only of simple national interests, but also of international communism."


AFAIK, the border demarcation question did not seriously arise until 1964, and prior to that, for the entire year of 1963 there was a extensive polemic between the CPSU and the CPC, carried out mainly via editorials and "open letters" in the respective parties' newspapers, dealing with the whole range of questions, from Leninism, to the assessment of Stalin, to the future of the International Communist movement. During which the CPSU made it clear they had no intention of routing their revisionism. So the Chinese proposed to civilly work out a "divorce" and remain friends, if not comrades. The Soviets refused, accusing the Chinese instead of all the vices, and things began escalating till the shots were fired.

I don't say the Chinese (and Mao in particular) were not falling into revisionism themselves. I just say that they tried to hold out pretty long, but were eventually pushed to it. So, overall, their culpability is little compared to that of the Soviet revisionists (who also have to carry additional blame because they were supposed to be more wise and patient as the "older" communists).

[Homo Songun]

As i recall the "New Democracy" concept was limited to China in its undeveloped and semi-feudal state and was intended to represent a short-term phase in the transition process.
The bourgeoisie shouldn't have a role in governing in a socialist state, period. If you believe otherwise, then I'd have to question your motives. "New Democracy" along with several other things is symptomatic of the bourgeois nature of Mao's thought, in my opinion. This criticism is shared by those of the Hoxhaist school of thought, as far as I'm aware.

Mao never called for a governing role for the bourgeoisie. He divided the revolution into two tasks, one expelling the Japanese imperialists and two, socialist construction. In the era of imperialism, the bourgeoisie is no longer capable of leading national liberation. In a colonial country, the non-comprador bourgeoisie is flabby and vacillates between collaboration and resistance to foreign exploitation. Insofar as the national bourgeoisie is capable of resisting, they have a role to play in the united front against imperialism. That's not a conciliatory attitude on Mao's part, but simply acknowledging the social reality of the struggle for liberation from foreign (capitalist) domination. In his words, "Possible participation in the revolution on the one hand and proneness to conciliation with the enemies of the revolution on the other-- such is the dual character of the Chinese bourgeoisie." He explicitly calls for a dictatorship of the proletariat in his essay on New Democracy. He also takes pain to point out that China's way is not necessarily any other country's way, BTW.


Maoists uphold Stalin don't they? The Soviet Union didn't have a transitional stage in which the bourgeoisie played a governing role(at least according to the Marxist-Leninist/Hoxhaist/Maoist ideologies)) and it was a largely rural and under industrialized country. There were similar conditions in China, so why, according to the Maoists, should the bourgeoisie play a governing role?

The two countries were not similar at all at the time of their respective revolutions. Russia was an imperialist power (Stalin: "Lenin was right in saying that tsarism was 'military-feudal imperialism.' Tsarism was the concentration of the worst features of imperialism, raised to a high pitch.") On the other hand, China was a semi-colonial basket-case, divided between various European powers and Japan. Also, in 1917, the world capitalist system was not quite as decadent as it was in 1949.

[Sir Comradical]

I can understand Tito and Khruschev(obviously) being revisionists, but how is Mao one of them? He took a hardline stance against the revisionist camp along with Hoxha.

http://johnfenzel.typepad.com/john_fenzels_blog/images/nixon_mao_1.jpg

[Krano]

http://johnfenzel.typepad.com/john_fenzels_blog/images/nixon_mao_1.jpg
And what is bad with opening relations with other countries? could you give some great examples of countries which didn't have any ties to any other countries and succeeded? North Korea?

[Sir Comradical]

And what is bad with opening relations with other countries? could you give some great examples of countries which didn't have any ties to any other countries and succeeded? North Korea?

Supporting UNITA during the Angolan Civil war? Strategic alliances with the US against the Soviet Union? That from a guy who whined about Soviet revisionism or some other such nonsense. Don't get me wrong, China's social-system during the Mao era had positive effects on millions of people, but to go from sending half a million volunteers to defend the DPRK is a far cry from the direction China took after the Sino-Soviet split.

[Ismail]

Enver Hoxha's letter to the CC of the CCP shortly before Nixon's visit (which the Albanians were notified of) has some words on that subject:

"In the history of the communist movement there are many examples of talks at various levels between opponents. Historical parallels cannot be made, because they took place in different conditions and times and on different problems. However, our great teachers have shown that talks should be held when they are truly indispensable when they serve the cause of the revolution and socialism, that the aggressive aims of the opponent must be kept clearly in mind, and that the situation and the opponent must be assessed correctly.

The talks which you are going to hold with Nixon would have been acceptable to progressive world opinion in certain given conditions, if they were sure to bring benefit to the anti-imperialist struggle, to the revolution in general, and to China in particular....

In these conditions steps could be undertaken for talks, with no need, in our opinion, to jump immediately from a very low-level to a top-level meeting of personalities of the two states, China and the United States of America, simply because Nixon has apparently frequently expressed his desire for such a meeting... In our opinion, this meeting in these conditions is wrong both in principle and as a tactic.

It seems to us that it cannot be claimed that the talks with Nixon, whether they succeed or fail, will be equally in favour of China and will not cause any harm. On the contrary, regardless of the results of the talks, the very fact that Nixon, who is known as a rabid anti-communist, as an aggressor and murderer of peoples, as the representative of the blackest of American reaction, is to be received in China has many minuses and will bring many negative consequences to the revolutionary movement and our cause.

There is no way in which Nixon's visit to China and the talks with him can fail to create harmful illusions about American imperialism and its strategy and policy among the ordinary people, among the nations, among the revolutionaries. It will exert a negative influence on the resistance and struggle of the American people themselves against the policy and aggressive activity of the government of Nixon, who will seize the opportunity to run for president again. Nixon's visit to China will weaken the upsurge of revolt against American imperialism everywhere in the world. Thus, we think American imperialism will be given the possibility to ensure a period of relative calm which it will try to exploit to consolidate its positions, to gather strength and prepare for new military adventures.

It is not hard to guess what the Italian workers who clashed with the police and demonstrated their repugnance to Nixon's recent visit to Italy, the Japanese workers who did not allow Eisenhower even to set foot on their territory, and the peoples of Latin America who protested and rose against the Rockefellers and all the other envoys of the Washington government, will think. Only the Yugoslav Titoites and the Rumanian revisionists welcomed President Nixon to their capitals with flowers.

The talks with Nixon place a weapon in the hands of the revisionists to devalue all the struggle and the great polemic in which the Communist Party of China has engaged for exposure of the Soviet renegades as allies and collaborators of American imperialism, enabling them to put the stand of China towards American imperialism on a par with the line of betrayal and collaboration which the Soviet revisionists follow towards it. This gives the Khrushchevite revisionists the opportunity to wave their banner of false anti-imperialism more vigorously and to intensify their demagogy and lies in order to draw the anti-imperialist forces behind them. Already the Soviet revisionists have begun to exploit Nixon's visit to China to fan up nationalist and chauvinist sentiments under the pretext that a Sino-American alliance aimed against the Soviet Union is under way."
(Enver Hoxha. Selected Works Vol. IV. Tirana: 8 Nëntori Publishing House. 1982. pp. 669-672.)

And so on. Of course in his diaries in that same period Hoxha is much more blunt and calls the PRC's policy anti-Marxist.

Mao's meeting with Nixon was not a case of "opening relations with other countries." Albania did that too, with states like the DPRK, North Vietnam and Tanzania on one hand and countries like Italy and France on the other. There's a big difference between those (done mainly for trade on an equal basis) and opening relations with a global superpower as the USA was and is, and especially of collaborating actively with said superpower against the interest of revolution, which is what the Chinese also did by proclaiming that Zaire, Chile, etc. were countries of the "third world" who must unite regardless of their leaderships against Soviet social-imperialism, which was termed a bigger danger than American imperialism as opposed to the principled stand of opposition to both imperialist states.