Analytic or continental

[MarxSchmarx]

Come on, which of these two branches of modern philosophy do you think is basically "correct"?

[black magick hustla]

dumb question, both are apt for different things.

[MarxSchmarx]

dumb question, both are apt for different things.

The history of philosophy for the last 70 years largely is about trying to evade this question and fads come and go but I think the project of juggling the two has largely failed. It can't be had both ways - when the chips fall people choose sides.

[smk]

continental is obfuscatory bullshit.

it's a shame I only realized that after spending months trying to get through the works of Sartre, Nietzche, Heidegger, and the like.

I dont think that they are apt for different things, they are different styles. One of them promotes understanding, the other is silly.

Or maybe I'm just not smart enough for fancy continental writing.

[black magick hustla]

The history of philosophy for the last 70 years largely is about trying to evade this question and fads come and go but I think the project of juggling the two has largely failed. It can't be had both ways - when the chips fall people choose sides.

not really. a lot of analytics don't even touch with a 100 ft yard pole what continentals write about - humanity, culture, civilization, etcetera. a lot of analytic philosophy is about very specific technicalities concerning epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science, etc.

[Hit The North]

"I think the philosophers from X are right."

Right about what?

[Ose]

It's far too sweeping a generalisation to counterpose the two in such a way. To make a similarly sweeping generalisation, analytic philosophy consists largely of mere mental exercises, whereas the continental tradition is more about applying philosophy to the world and our experience of it. A certain well-known quote from Marx springs to mind.

It would be silly to look down on certain philosophers or their works based purely on their characterisation as either 'analytic' or 'continental'. Philosophy, like most subjects, is vulnerable to the development of certain fashions and trends; the dominance of analytic philosophy in Anglophone academia over the last 50 years is nothing to go by.

[black magick hustla]

if i had to choose, i would say analytic in terms of style, and continental in terms of subject matter. i honestly think a lot (not all) of continental philosophy is willfull obscurantism and/or is based on truths that aren't that spectacular or insightful but the presentation of them makes them seem deeper. but continental philosophers seem to care a bit more about thinking about society, civilization, etc which i admitedly think is more interesting than BEING AN ANTIREALIST AND REALIST ABOUT COUNTERFACTUALS.

i do think however analytical philosophers are very clear writers and they do prove that you can deal with complicated subject matters without writing a prose poem. i can't take seriously shit like deleuze, guittari, badiou, and a lot of the radical gibberish being gobbled up by hipster leftists right now. i think leftists should read more betran russel and learn to write from someone like him. i also think continental philosophy teaches people bad habits. i honestly think that every shitty leftist that uses "empiricist" as a slur has no idea what the term means.

[Mr. Natural]

The poll needs a third choice: Marxism. I'll take Marx, Engels, and Marxism, thank you. I cannot choose between wishy-washy left-liberal claptrap and brutal reductionist exercises.

Continental and analytic philosophers retreat into academic niches from which they half-heartedly observe, ruminate, and dissect life. They are representative of Engels' bitter reflection toward the end of his life that he and Marx had "sowed dragons but reaped fleas."

I especially hate linguistic analysts. "The philosophers have only interpreted the word, in various ways..."

[black magick hustla]

"brutal reductionist exercises."
i dont get what is the point of criticizing analytical philosophy's pedantry and technicalities. analyticals don't claim to be doing society any good, a lot of the times its just excentrics and weirdos tackling very academic questions they find exciting. i don't think kripke or david lewis saw themselves as intellectuals of any movement, they were just excentric old men doing what they love. i think this is one of the fundamental reasons why i can sometimes tolerate analytics more than continentals, continentals feel a responsability to engage society, but that is just them trying to give a particular importance to their world that doesnt exist.

[Mr. Natural]

BMH, We seem to agree on the nature of both the reductionist (analytic) and the idealist (continental) philosophers. Both deny the materialist dialectic (the continentals restrict it to human relations) and both separate humanity from nature.

My point about the poll is that it excluded Marxism and left me (and most Revlefters?) without a choice. A further point is that is the choice offered is the "choice" global capitalism offers: a retreat into idealism (humanity divorced from natural, material relations) or into an alienated "life" of separate things.

A final point is that many leftists claim Marxism is not a philosophy or a worldview. I cannot understand why or how avowed Marxists can take such a position.

[∞]

wow. Dead tie. Wasn't expecting that at all.

[ed miliband]

because of the course i do i only really come into contact with continental philosophy (with the exception of habermas, who straddles the border). i quite like wittgenstein tho.

[∞]

I would say although I've only really read analytic stuff. That continental has the capability to understand man's subjectivity and is able to work with morals and all that. And in very rare occasions, continental philosophy is able to challenge the logical implications of analytic philosophy.

For the most part however, they talk about different things, as far as I am concerned.

[MarxSchmarx]

The history of philosophy for the last 70 years largely is about trying to evade this question and fads come and go but I think the project of juggling the two has largely failed. It can't be had both ways - when the chips fall people choose sides. not really. a lot of analytics don't even touch with a 100 ft yard pole what continentals write about - humanity, culture, civilization, etcetera. a lot of analytic philosophy is about very specific technicalities concerning epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science, etc.

That's why it's spawned a whole cottage industry since it's founding of people who have trained in the analytic tradition who insisted something like "wait there's something worth considering in this continental stuff" (and, at least from my experience, the same is true in the "continental tradition") and have managed to weasle their way into prominent academic positions on that line.

But let's take your point at face value. I'd wager that "epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science" go to the heart of the "big questions" of philosophy.

One could argue that it is "humanity, culture, civilization" that are in essence issues of social sciences like anthropology or sociology, no more deserving of a philosopher's scrutiny than questions about the embryological development of a fruitfly's thorax.

Moreover, to their credit, many "continental philosophers" do indeed concern themselves with substantive questions of "epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science".

So I think even if your dichotomy about the subject matters, as opposed to methods, of analytic/continental schools were valid (a point I find unlikely), there is a real question about whether the subject matter of what you see the "continental philosophers" as tackling is as meritorious for philosophers and their methods as the subject matter of what you see as the questions analytic philosophers tackle.

[Decolonize The Left]

Continental I guess, although I'd rather just vote for Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. They put to rest metaphysics/epistemology/philosophical mumbo-jumbo.

- August

[Ninja]

The poll needs a third choice: Marxism. I'll take Marx, Engels, and Marxism, thank you. I cannot choose between wishy-washy left-liberal claptrap and brutal reductionist exercises.
I don't think this is particularly true. Continental philosophy has created a very good space for Marxist philosophers. Many of the philosophers in continental philosophy have also advanced and allowed Marxism to evolve. Deleuze, Derrida, Lacan, and Queer Theorists. They have all created theories in regards to Marxism and identified problems with it, which in turn, allows Historical Materialists fix and advance the view.


Continental and analytic philosophers retreat into academic niches from which they half-heartedly observe, ruminate, and dissect life. They are representative of Engels' bitter reflection toward the end of his life that he and Marx had "sowed dragons but reaped fleas."
I also don't think this is particularly true. Critical theory plays a critical role in the struggle. Your approach seems to be more of a historical materialists, so we will have some disagreements, but you cannot deny the fact that the academy is a key site for education in regards to classist oppression and how to combat it.


I especially hate linguistic analysts. "The philosophers have only interpreted the word, in various ways..."
I feel as if learning how language operates in a world that we rely on language for the basis of all human interaction is a good thing. Learning how language does (or does not) effect us and how interactions is very important.

[Mr. Natural]

Ninja, I'm pleased to be the recipient of one of your too-few posts. Are you aware of Red Noob? He's also from Oklahoma.

My beef with both continental and analytic philosophers (I prefer continental, if forced to choose) is that they are terminally one-sided. I don't even consider analytics to be Marxist: Marxism and the materialist dialectic celebrate and investigate life and communism as systemic process, as internally related wholes.

Postmodernists such as Deleuze, Derrida, Lacan, etc., often provide interesting insights into our present condition, but they accept it. They are postMarxist, too. Continentals also restrict the materialist dialectic to human society and concerns, or they dismiss it altogether.

Analytics, on the other hand, have nothing to offer that I have found valuable. They are closet logicians who chop life's dynamic interrelatedness into dead objects for study. They have utterly abandoned Marxism, although some would object to this characterization.

I'm not expert on continentals and analytics, though, for I spend my time investigating more promising revolutionary theorists. If you have waded through Deleuze, etc., Ninja, you might have some corrections to my characterizations.

As for the academy, I hold with Helen Keller: "College is not the place to go for ideas." My college and university experiences tell me the academy is an integral capitalist institution that serves capital in numerous ways and provides The System with much of its propaganda.

The problem with linguistic analysis is that its practitioners abandon the world (and socialism and revolution) to minutely examine the ways in which we speak about such things. They are so terminally abstracted from life and so immersed in individual and species solipsism!

On a personal note, I was radicalized long ago when I audited classes of Marxist professor Richard Lichtman at UC-Berkeley. The philosophy department, though, was a den of linguistic analysts who denied Lichtman tenure. "Marxism is not a philosophy," they chorused.

You apparently are willing to dive into deep intellectual waters, Ninja. Allow me to recommend two books that are clearly written and have had a major effect on my Marxism. They would be Marxism and the Philosophy of Science (1985) by Helena Sheehan, and Bertell Ollman's Dance of the Dialectic (2003). Both works investigate materialist dialectic, and Ollman breaks critical new ground.

Finally, I identify myself as a red-green revolutionary. The "red" is Marxism, of course, and the "green" refers to the new sciences of organizational relations that scientifically affirm the basic laws and movement of the materialist dialectic and confirm communism as representing natural human relations and societies.

My red-green best to you in Oral Roberts land.

[Luís Henrique]

Come on, which of these two branches of modern philosophy do you think is basically "correct"?

"Analytic philosophy" is a more or less coherent school of thought; "continental philosophy" is not - more like a disparate collection of very different, and often mutually exclusive, sundry philosophies. The label itself reeks of Anglo-Saxon nationalism and bigotry, btw.

You could as well if we prefer card games or Sundays - it is a meaningless question.

As for me, I am a Marxist.

Luís Henrique

[black magick hustla]

"Analytic philosophy" is a more or less coherent school of thought;

Luís Henrique

not true. "analytic" is almost as vague as "continental". there are "analytic" thomists and "analytic" physicalists. of course both terms have some merit, and there are some stylistic and historic aspects that make continentals continentals, and analytics, analytic. have nothing to do with "anglo saxon" bigotry either.

[Luís Henrique]

continental is obfuscatory bullshit.

This is easy to say. And quite hard to demonstrate.


One of them promotes understanding, the other is silly."Analytic philosophy" doesn't promote understanding, it promotes conformity with bourgeois rule.


Or maybe I'm just not smart enough for fancy continental writing.When one doesn't understand something, there are always two possibilities: that the subject at hand is too difficult for the witts of the person, or that the subject doesn't make sence at all.

When the latter is the case, it is usually possible (though often difficult) to show where and why it doesn't make sence. When one dismisses some subject as "obfuscatory" without being able to explain how it is that, others will be tempted to assume the former.

Luís Henrique

[black magick hustla]

One could argue that it is "humanity, culture, civilization" that are in essence issues of social sciences like anthropology or sociology, no more deserving of a philosopher's scrutiny than questions about the embryological development of a fruitfly's thorax.


i never said continentals dont think about metaphysics, epistemology, etc (although the way they tackle this questions is a bit different than analytics)/ continental philosophy is in many ways married to a lot of aspects of sociology, especially in Europe. anyway, of course there is more to "humanity, culture, and civilization" than science can say about. they are fundamental questions related to our identity, ethics, and existence. people will communicate about this things in many ways regardless of what "science" says.

[black magick hustla]

"Analytic philosophy" doesn't promote understanding, it promotes conformity with bourgeois rule.


of course, this is total ignorance and "bigotry" from your part. a lot of analytics are merely concerned with very technical questions, does not make them more "bourgeois" than "mathematicians" or "physicists". call me when you can find "defensing bourgeois rule" in kripkes boring ramblings about name and reference, and lewis' counterfactual realism.

[black magick hustla]

This is easy to say. And quite hard to demostrate

Of course not. there are many essays and arguments written about how a lot of "continental" style of philosophizing is ornate wordings. rosa isn't of course the only one, and she is just particularly zealous about it. There is no cottage industry of "science interpreters" trying to figure out what einstein said, in the same sense that there is a cottage industry of academics making a living on figuring out heidegger and having all sorts of interpretations about him, across the spectrum.

[Luís Henrique]

I feel as if learning how language operates in a world that we rely on language for the basis of all human interaction is a good thing. Learning how language does (or does not) effect us and how interactions is very important.

Indeed. But that is what the scientific discipline of Linguistic does. Not "analytical philosophy".

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

of course, this is total ignorance and "bigotry" from your part. a lot of analytics are merely concerned with very technical questions, does not make them more "bourgeois" than "mathematicians" or "physicists". call me when you can find "defensing bourgeois rule" in kripkes boring ramblings about name and reference, and lewis' counterfactual realism.

In short, all of it falls under Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach.

It is not as if academic ivorytowerness isn't bourgeois to the core, is it?

Luís Henrique

[black magick hustla]

It is not as if academic ivorytowerness isn't bourgeois to the core, is it?


:rolleyes: Of course the university is a product of division of labor and class society, doesn't make "analytic" philosophy more ivory tower or bourgeois than "continental" philosophy, or linguistics, or mathematics for that matter. Radical, social philosophy simply caters to a different market of academe. In fact, I would argue "analytic philosophy" is a bit less ivory towerish for the simple fact that a huge swathe of it can be understood with having a very rudimentary, or non at all, background on philosophy.

But thanks for the patronizing talk.

[Luís Henrique]

Of course not. there are many essays and arguments written about how a lot of "continental" style of philosophizing is ornate wordings.

Indeed, and some might even have some value. But one cannot excuse ignorance by merely saying somebody else has critiqued this or that. Either one has read Heidegger and Sartre (or Quine and Wittgenstein, for what is whort) and is able to criticise them, showing where they err, or their opinion has not much value, has it?


rosa isn't of course the only one, and she is just particularly zealous about it.

And particularly lousy in her "reasoning", particularly stupid in her misinterpretations of Wittgenstein, and particularly insulting to anyone who disagrees, or questions, or even merely asks for clarification about her collected sophisms. But that is a different, lesser and dirtier, issue.


There is no cottage industry of "science interpreters" trying to figure out what einstein said, in the same sense that there is a cottage industry of academics making a living on figuring out heidegger and having all sorts of interpretations about him, across the spectrum.

Speaking of that, Wittgenstein has as many and as much disparate interpreters and interpretations, across an equally wide spectrum, as Heidegger...

Indeed, he even boasted once that Russell and Moore would never be able to understand him.

Luís Henrique

[black magick hustla]

Speaking of that, Wittgenstein has as many and as much disparate interpreters and interpretations, across an equally wide spectrum, as Heidegger...

Indeed, he even boasted once that Russell and Moore would never be able to understand him.

Luís Henrique

Good for him. I am not a "wittgensteinian" and I think he suffered of obscurantism too.

[Luís Henrique]

:rolleyes: Of course the university is a product of division of labor and class society, doesn't make "analytic" philosophy more ivory tower or bourgeois than "continental" philosophy, or linguistics, or mathematics for that matter. Radical, social philosophy simply caters to a different market of academe.

No, indeed "continental" philosophy isn't less academic, less obfuscating, or less elitist than "analytical philosophy" - as anyone who has read Deleuze or Guattari can easily remind. Both are different brands of comformism, that would be the point.

Linguistics or mathematics are science, and have practical applications; the eleventh thesis doesn't apply to them.


But thanks for the patronizing talk.Patronising, is it? How exactly?

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

Good for him. I am not a "wittgensteinian" and I think he suffered of obscurantism too.

The guy was a mystic, period. No less than any "continental" philosopher you can think of, and a lot more than many of them.

Luís Henrique

[black magick hustla]

The guy was a mystic, period. No less than any continental philosopher you can think of, and a lot more than many of them.

Luís Henrique

I don't get your one man battle against wittgenstein. He had very interesting insights about mathematics and the nature of language, and all you can come up is that he was a "mystic". Of course, a lot of the things he said could have been stated clearer, and probably some of his most bizarre statements are mystical and obscurantist of nature. But he certainly was not just a "mystic". And certainly most "analytic" philosophy is not as hard/obscurantist as his. As I said, most of it can be understood by anyone reasonably educated. I find it quite hard to back up that Russel was an obscurantist.

Anyway, its laughable that you think science is all about "applicability". As a scientist, I can tell you a lot of science has no practical application. Now, if I could just find a way of explaining the origin of Gamma ray bursts...

[Luís Henrique]

I don't get your one man battle against wittgenstein. He had very interesting insights about mathematics and the nature of language, and all you can come up is that he was a "mystic". Of course, a lot of the things he said could have been stated clearer, and probably some of his most bizarre statements are mystical and obscurantist of nature. But he certainly was not just a "mystic". And certainly most "analytic" philosophy is not as hard/obscurantist as his. As I said, most of it can be understood by anyone reasonably educated. I find it quite hard to back up that Russel was an obscurantist.

No, Russell wasn't an obscurantist. Wittgenstein was. But you are right, he wasn't worse than most other philosophers at that.


Anyway, its laughable that you think science is all about "applicability".

I don't think science is all about applicability. It isn't empty speculation, though - even if some scientists do eventually indulge in speculation. Method is the issue here.

Luís Henrique

[∞]

No, Russell wasn't an obscurantist. Wittgenstein was. But you are right, he wasn't worse than most other philosophers at that.

By no means was he an obscuranist. And what we have to understand was he did his best to avoid so, and going by what he tried to do and seeing how using short and simple statements to understand reality would prove him to be correct. If his uses of words confuse you in any way.

Having read his main work, I found it pretty digestible compared to Shakespearean phrases. Russell avoided being so because he spoke informally in everyday language, Wittgenstein takes some time to understand because he used brief statements in order to be precise with the depth he was dealing with. Wittgenstein went as far as he could without delving into the realm of mathematics.


I don't think science is all about applicability. It isn't empty speculation, though - even if some scientists do eventually indulge in speculation. Method is the issue here.

Luís Henrique

The method of their speculation in purely analytical. Do you think Einstein could have theorized or even philosophized the TOR with subjective pretenses that the Continental School offers? Like others on here mentioned before, these pretenses are fine so as long as you are observing things that have a subjective (basis, beauty, culture, etc, etc.) But cannot be used for things that are cold in austere in comparison.

[Minima]

man is black magick hustla laying it down. I was going to offer some stupid platitudes about transcending pointless academic turf wars but he said it all.

There is a great essay by Paul Graham similar to bmh's perspective written in a really straightforward and entertaining way.
The essay is called "how to do philosophy"
http://www.paulgraham.com/philosophy.html

[Luís Henrique]

By no means was he an obscuranist.

He was. A man against strikes, against modern music, and who believed mystical things were more important than not.


And what we have to understand was he did his best to avoid so, and going by what he tried to do and seeing how using short and simple statements to understand reality would prove him to be correct.

"Short and simple" statements aren't simple at all; they presupose a complex understanding of reality. But where did Wittgenstein ever said that short and simple statements are in any way better than long and complex ones? This seems to be another idea superimposed into him by other people, not something he ever believed.


If his uses of words confuse you in any way.

His use of words is confused, which is a very different thing.


Having read his main work, I found it pretty digestible compared to Shakespearean phrases.

Which main work, the Tractatus or Philosophical Investigations? Both are full of confuse and misleading sentences.


Russell avoided being so because he spoke informally in everyday language,

I don't think Principia Mathematica is written in everyday language.


Wittgenstein takes some time to understand because he used brief statements in order to be precise with the depth he was dealing with.

So using short and simple statements makes one more difficult to understand? How that, and what does that say about short and simple statements?


The method of their speculation in purely analytical.

Nope. Scientific method is not speculative method.


Do you think Einstein could have theorized or even philosophized the TOR with subjective pretenses that the Continental School offers?

Nor he did it with any help of analytical philosophy.

And there is no such thing as "Continental School".


Like others on here mentioned before, these pretenses are fine so as long as you are observing things that have a subjective (basis, beauty, culture, etc, etc.)

Again we go back to this confuse disjunction between "objective" and "subjective". "Culture", for instance, is nothing like "subjective"; it is a very material force in the real world, and it binds people to it, regardless if they subjectively like it or not.


But cannot be used for things that are cold in austere in comparison.

Talking about "Shakesperian phrases"...

Luís Henrique

[∞]

He was. A man against strikes, against modern music, and who believed mystical things were more important than not.

His taste in music is his solely. Mystical things are not something he worked with. In fact anything beyond what is explainable by any means is not relevant. That is what almost anyone would consider "mystical".


"Short and simple" statements aren't simple at all; they presupose a complex understanding of reality.

The subject matter is that of complex nature. However it was the usage of multiple simple yet true statements to gain understanding of the complex subject matter. Each statement by itslef is not very complex, but the entirety of the book (Tractus Logico Philsophus) was.




But where did Wittgenstein ever said that short and simple statements are in any way better than long and complex ones?

He never said that, he just used that.
:
1 complex sentence=multiple simple ones.

Sometimes things need to be broken down in order to be understood.
As long as the wording is precise it really doesn't matter. I find that simple sentences do this more efficiently. However, I am not a linguist so don't ask me about the details of why I find it harder to make a long complex sentence.


His use of words is confused, which is a very different thing.

Explain.



Which main work, the Tractatus or Philosophical Investigations? Both are full of confuse and misleading sentences.

Tractatus.




I don't think Principia Mathematica is written in everyday language.

I wasn't referring to that. Since IIRC is mainly math. I was speaking chiefly about what he wrote when describing matters like god, reason, and all that.


So using short and simple statements makes one more difficult to understand?

No. I didn't say that. I said it may be the case for you since you accused him of obscurnism.



Nope. Scientific method is not speculative method.

There is some aspect of speculation in the form of hypothesis, science demands you test it.


Nor he did it with any help of analytical philosophy.

That he didn't. But what he did use analytic skills. Which to some degree are similar to that of analytic philosophy.


And there is no such thing as "Continental School".

Sorry my mistake, I didn't mean to write that. Nor was I implying there being an actual "school".



Again we go back to this confuse disjunction between "objective" and "subjective". "Culture", for instance, is nothing like "subjective"; it is a very material force in the real world, and it binds people to it, regardless if they subjectively like it or not.

Culture has remnants of emotion and attachment due to similarity. The only non-continental person to examine it would be a sociologist or some kind of scientist in that regards. The point is analytic philosophy never really dealt with this kind of stuff.



Talking about "Shakesperian phrases"...

Luís Henrique

It wasn't. The metaphor was direct and it wasn't being ontological in any way so it was pretty much okay for me to use it.

[Luís Henrique]

His taste in music is his solely. Mystical things are not something he worked with.

And his opposition to working class organisation?


In fact anything beyond what is explainable by any means is not relevant.This is untrue. He thought the "unspeakable", ie, the mystic, cannot be meaningfully talked about; but he never said or implied that because it cannot be talked about it is any less important. Indeed there is reason to think that he thought that it was more important than what can be talked about.


The subject matter is that of complex nature. However it was the usage of multiple simple yet true statements to gain understanding of the complex subject matter. Each statement by itslef is not very complex, but the entirety of the book (Tractus Logico Philsophus) was.No statement is actually simple, because its relations to reality are extremely complex.


He never said that, he just used that.
:
1 complex sentence=multiple simple ones.

Sometimes things need to be broken down in order to be understood.
As long as the wording is precise it really doesn't matter. I find that simple sentences do this more efficiently. However, I am not a linguist so don't ask me about the details of why I find it harder to make a long complex sentence.This could be easily paraphrased as:



Sometimes things need to be broken down in order to be understood, but as long as the wording is precise it really doesn't matter; it is just that I find that simple sentences do this more efficiently, however, I am not a linguist so don't ask me about the details of why I find it harder to make a long complex sentence.

I don't think anything is gained or lost in such way.


Explain. Such as the absurd sentence on ethics and aesthetics being one and the same, when he clearly meant something very different. Such kind of misuse of words is very common in his work.


Tractatus.Which he spent most of his life trying to debunk.


No. I didn't say that. I said it may be the case for you since you accused him of obscurnism.I wouldn't accuse someone of obscurantism because they express themselves poorly. It is the substance of Wittgenstein's positions that I find reactionary.


There is some aspect of speculation in the form of hypothesis, science demands you test it.Yes, but science actually doesn't have a method for formulating hypotheses. Scientific method resides elsewhere, in the systematic testing of hypoteses, controlled variables and repeatability.


That he didn't. But what he did use analytic skills. Which to some degree are similar to that of analytic philosophy.They are logic, which is much more ancient than analytic philosophy, and also widely used by non-analytic philosophers.


Sorry my mistake, I didn't mean to write that. Nor was I implying there being an actual "school".OK.


Culture has remnants of emotion and attachment due to similarity.I am sorry, I can't understand what you mean by that. I don't think culture has remnants of emotion, nor I think emotion can have remnants, and I don't understand your use of the word 'similarity' here; to me similarity is always a relation between at least two different things, and you seem to use it here as some kind of absolute. Unless you are saying that culture has remnants of emotion because culture and emotion are similar, in which case I think it is simply false; culture is not similar to emotion, and it doesn't make sence to say that A has remnants of B because A and B are similar.


The only non-continental person to examine it would be a sociologist or some kind of scientist in that regards.I can't fathom the idea of a non-continental person...

Sociologists, anthropologists, historians, fictional writers, journalists, actors, librarians, psychologists, ethnologists, political scientists, politicians, businessmen, working class activists... and of course the learned and interested layman.


The point is analytic philosophy never really dealt with this kind of stuff.Which in essence means it is apolitical, and, as such, comformist.


It wasn't. The metaphor was direct and it wasn't being ontological in any way so it was pretty much okay for me to use it."Cold" and "austere" carry a lot of ideological weight, and are directly related, in this context, to the objective/subjective misleading disjunction. So yes, there is a lot of metaphysics in that phrase.

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

Voted "continental", but just because I wanted to see the results and there is no "neither" option. So when tallying, please subtract one from "continental".

Luís Henrique

[Homo Songun]

I'm not opposed to the idea of needing to yoke oneself to a professional guide for the exploration of a particular area of knowledge in principle. For example, electronics or mountaineering. That it is supposedly needed for "continental philosophy" I used to find laughable though, because it is not needed for any other branch. Nowadays, I just don't give a shit. There is just too much other good stuff to read that doesn't require plowing through an ocean of secondary literature. I did take the time to study Hegel though, for obvious reasons.

[black magick hustla]

I'm not opposed to the idea of needing to yoke oneself to a professional guide for the exploration of a particular area of knowledge in principle. For example, electronics or mountaineering. That it is supposedly needed for "continental philosophy" I used to find laughable though, because it is not needed for any other branch. Nowadays, I just don't give a shit. There is just too much other good stuff to read that doesn't require plowing through an ocean of secondary literature. I did take the time to study Hegel though, for obvious reasons.

Really well said.

I don't really take seriously the claim of a lot of people up in "continental" philosophy depts. that there specialized wordsmithery is akin to technical jargon in other fields, like mathematics. It is really hard to prove something is entirely meaningless though. The logical positivists tried, but obviously they failed and made up some weird statements themselves too. As the above essay mentioned, I do think that a lot of the "smart" people that suspect that a lot of it is nonsense simply just study something else. I wanted to do philosophy at first but then I had the epiphany that a lot of it is stupid, so I became a physicist instead.


I don't think "all continental" philosophy is nonsense. I do think that even a lot of the "nonsense obscurantists" like Derrida have, under all the fluff, interesting insights. I do think however, that if you remove the fluff, is not as insightful as people think it is, and or, the valuable ideas could be expressed in better ways without losing any content. I admire wittgenstein not because of his own obscurantist tendencies and shitty, reactionary opinions on things, but because he had the gonads to say most philosophy is entirely nonsense, and then just turn to mathematics or something. That is why he is important. he isn''t perfect - Oppenheimer was a fucking snitch, coward and a rat, doesn't mean he wasn't a good physicist.

I do think a lot of analytic philosophy is nonsense too, but not entirely in the same way than continental philosophy. I took a class on metaphysics from an analytical point of view, and most of it was not that hard to understand if read carefully, but could be done without reading too much secondary literature. However, in my opinion a lot of it reduced to matters of semantics (i.e. what is change?), and was entirely useless.

At the end though, I do think "philosophy" in some ways does have a place in our society. I think a lot of people are unable to think in a "meta" level, which is important, especially when thinking about civilization and society, and philosophy can help. I do think that the "level of specialization" at the PhD level promoted by universities is pretty much smoke and mirrors though. But I am biased because my favorite theorists are obscure ultraleft marxists that probably had at most, if any upper level education, a bachelor, and a lot of them were probably not trained in philosophy/sociology.

[zoot_allures]

I voted analytic, but I don't really agree that analytic philosophers are more right than the continental ones. The conclusions I draw don't much resemble the received views in analytic philosophy. Rather, I like the style of analytic philosophy, the particular way analytic philosophers tend to approach problems. My way of thinking has always resonated much more with the analytic tradition.

Continental philosophy I often struggle to read - it frequently just seems like nonsense to me. Clearly it works for many people, and that's cool; if you find it engaging, you should definitely pursue it. It's not for me though.

[zoot_allures]

I do think a lot of analytic philosophy is nonsense too, but not entirely in the same way than continental philosophy. I took a class on metaphysics from an analytical point of view, and most of it was not that hard to understand if read carefully, but could be done without reading too much secondary literature. However, in my opinion a lot of it reduced to matters of semantics (i.e. what is change?), and was entirely useless.

At the end though, I do think "philosophy" in some ways does have a place in our society. I think a lot of people are unable to think in a "meta" level, which is important, especially when thinking about civilization and society, and philosophy can help. I do think that the "level of specialization" at the PhD level promoted by universities is pretty much smoke and mirrors though. But I am biased because my favorite theorists are obscure ultraleft marxists that probably had at most, if any upper level education, a bachelor, and a lot of them were probably not trained in philosophy/sociology.

You might be interested in the book "Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized" by James Ladyman & Don Ross. Although there are tons of things in the book I strongly disagree with, I think a lot of analytic metaphysics is deeply misguided (well, I think a lot of analytic philosophy in general is deeply misguided, and has been pretty much since its birth), and they diagnose some of the more serious problems and suggest a radically different approach. Ladyman is primarily a philosopher of physics, so given your background, it might be especially appealing.

I won't bother going into any detail on it; you can find reviews, summaries, etc, online. A warning, though: I'm not sure how extensive your knowledge of philosophy is, but the philosophy in it - in particular the philosophy of science - does get pretty technical. As long as you have a good grasp of that and some interest in metaphysics, science, and the general role of philosophy, it's definitely worth a read.

[∞]

Really well said.

I don't really take seriously the claim of a lot of people up in "continental" philosophy depts. that there specialized wordsmithery is akin to technical jargon in other fields, like mathematics. It is really hard to prove something is entirely meaningless though. The logical positivists tried, but obviously they failed and made up some weird statements themselves too. As the above essay mentioned, I do think that a lot of the "smart" people that suspect that a lot of it is nonsense simply just study something else. I wanted to do philosophy at first but then I had the epiphany that a lot of it is stupid, so I became a physicist instead.


I don't think "all continental" philosophy is nonsense. I do think that even a lot of the "nonsense obscurantists" like Derrida have, under all the fluff, interesting insights. I do think however, that if you remove the fluff, is not as insightful as people think it is, and or, the valuable ideas could be expressed in better ways without losing any content. I admire wittgenstein not because of his own obscurantist tendencies and shitty, reactionary opinions on things, but because he had the gonads to say most philosophy is entirely nonsense, and then just turn to mathematics or something. That is why he is important. he isn''t perfect - Oppenheimer was a fucking snitch, coward and a rat, doesn't mean he wasn't a good physicist.



Didn't he say this,

I am a Communist at heart,

I don't much else beside he went to the USSR. I don't know what you mean by reactionary but he wasn't a total boug.
I heard arguments that he was a "perfectionist liberal". Citing his opposition to "mindless preservation of tradition".

[ChrisK]

And his opposition to working class organisation?

The man tried to immigrate to the Soviet Union. And you really think he was anti-worker?


This is untrue. He thought the "unspeakable", ie, the mystic, cannot be meaningfully talked about; but he never said or implied that because it cannot be talked about it is any less important. Indeed there is reason to think that he thought that it was more important than what can be talked about.

Those mystical attitudes were added late in his work in the Tractatus, after his horrific experiences in WWI. Anyway, later in his life he clearly rejected this.

Also, those mystical attitudes can be excised without any change in the meanings of the text.

Oh, did you know Newton was into mysticism too? Fuck that gravity shit.


No statement is actually simple, because its relations to reality are extremely complex.

Ummm I think you are confused. Here is a simple statement "Phil is tall" here is a complex statement "Phil is tall and fat". Get it? Symbolized the two statements are "Tp" and "Tp . Fp" It has nothing to do with the statements relation to reality.


Such as the absurd sentence on ethics and aesthetics being one and the same, when he clearly meant something very different. Such kind of misuse of words is very common in his work.

That is not a misuse of words. He is equating that which is good with that which is beautiful. Its a common enough view. I just so happen to disagree with him here.


Which he spent most of his life trying to debunk.

Elizabeth Anscombe, Peter Geach, James Conant, Stanley Cavell, Cora Diamond, Rupert Read, Max Black, Roger White and so on and so forth disagree with you. And I wouldn't mess with Anscombe his prized pupil.


I wouldn't accuse someone of obscurantism because they express themselves poorly. It is the substance of Wittgenstein's positions that I find reactionary.

Which part? That language is a social construction? That abstractions are idealist and incorrect? That at heart he was a communist?



Which in essence means it is apolitical, and, as such, comformist.

Is mathematics conformist? Its awfully apolitical.

[StalinFanboy]

I read Agamben, Foucault, Deleuze, Heidegger, Spinoza, and Tiqqun pretty often.

[L.A.P.]

I'm not that familiar with analytic philosophy as I am with continental philosophy. At least from what I've seen, analytic philosophers seem to be more concerned with trying to justify ruling class ideologies using outdated Lockean and pre-Kantian ideas of freedom and human nature than formulate problems of society and such. I mean, just look at John Rawls, Robert Nozick, and Peter Singer....even the analytic leftists like Chomsky and Cohen suck. I guess black magick hustla has a point too, I'm sure I would like analytic philosophy more if I read works regarding mathematics and science instead of social and existential shit. I also think a lot of continental philosophy like Derrida and Heidegger is a load of hogwash. Ever since that batshit purge occured on RevLeft, I got into reading a lot of continental shit like Nietszche, Kierkegaard, Sartre, Zappfe, Lacan, Zizek, Barthes, and Foucault.

[Raúl Duke]

I agree totally with black magick hustla.

My experience with philosophy has been for the most part continental, particularly of the "existentialist" tent (i.e. Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, etc). In most cases, reading their primary source is difficult to understand and some do engage in obscurantism or strange verbose language. This seems to be a trend in theory as well, for example: Guy Debord's "Society of the Spectacle" is written in a "dense" language that I feel could be simplified (and it has been, although in many interpretations; similar to texts in continental philosophy.)

I agree with him in that continental philosophy does focus seemingly more on "society, et.al" than analytical philosophy but the methodologies within analytical philosophy may be useful in looking into somethings (and not others) just as methodologies in continental philosophy may be useful for other things.

However, I don't know much about analytical philosophy.

[Luís Henrique]

The man tried to immigrate to the Soviet Union. And you really think he was anti-worker?

At the time he tried to immigrate, the Soviet Union was anti-worker itself.

It was also a State in which "diamat" was official philosophy. Was he anti-"diamat"?


Oh, did you know Newton was into mysticism too? Fuck that gravity shit.Oh yes, but nobody is claiming that mysticism is a bad thing because Newton said so.


Ummm I think you are confused. Here is a simple statement "Phil is tall" here is a complex statement "Phil is tall and fat". Get it? Symbolized the two statements are "Tp" and "Tp . Fp" It has nothing to do with the statements relation to reality.It is not simple, because "tallness" is a social construct, and so, when you say "Phil is tall" you are probably implicitly saying things like "Phil is tall, so he is handsome" or "Phil is tall, so he is stupid", depending on exactly how the subject is socially constructed. Also, obviously "tallness" is relative, so it depends on context to have any actual meaning (Phil is tall - for a boy age five; Phil is tall - for a midget; Phil is tall - for a Bushman). That's why any statement is complex; it implies other statements to make actual sence.


That is not a misuse of words. He is equating that which is good with that which is beautiful. Its a common enough view. I just so happen to disagree with him here.Of course it is a misuse of words; he meant that ethics and aesthetics are similar when regarded from a quite specific point of view. His phrasing however means something very different - that ethics an aesthetics are equal, not similar, from every point of view, not just from a specific one. Bad rhetorics.


Which part? That language is a social construction? That abstractions are idealist and incorrect? That at heart he was a communist?
That people shouldn't try and change the world; that music past Brahms is "machinery noise"; that workers who go on strike are bad parents because they teach their children to disobey.

I don't know if he ever said that language is a social construction; if so, he was technically wrong (language is a social activity, or a social phenomenon, but it is not a construction, so it cannot be a "social construction"), but probably just misspeaking, as so often. It would however be very far from original. If he said that abstractions are idealist and incorrect, he was just simply and plainly wrong. Indeed, since the word 'abstraction' is itself an abstraction, he would be comically wrong. And I don't think that anyone can be a "communist at heart"; a communist is someone who acts for communism.


Is mathematics conformist? Its awfully apolitical.It is about a different subject. When however you think in an apolitical way about how human society is organised, or when you imply that people should only think about non-political things, then you are being comformist.

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

That's why any statement is complex; it implies other statements to make actual sence.

Indeed, that is implied in Wittgenstein's concept of "language game". Think about it.

Luís Henrique

[Sans]

That is not a misuse of words. He is equating that which is good with that which is beautiful. Its a common enough view. I just so happen to disagree with him here.
I don't remember the exact context in which the likeness of ethics and aesthetics is brought up by Wittgenstein, but I would suppose it to have come about from an idea that they share a form in language. Neither are facts, propositions describing features of the world, but rather both ethical and aesthetical statements seem like rules.

Otherwise, it strikes me as an out of place idea. But, perhaps you have got a source which lead you to believe that he thought of ethics as an expression of aesthetics and vice versa?

[Valdyr]

Having studied both (though I admittedly have a stronger background in analytic thought), I'm hesitant to really embrace either, as I'm critical of both in roughly equal parts.

I definitely think that at its core, the main analytic criticism of continental philosophy -its obscurantism- is well-placed. A lot of continental philosophy is at best overwritten and achieves a lot less insight than it thinks, and in its worst anti-realist postmodern manifestations provides a space for reactionaries. A good example of this latter phenomenon is the so-called "Radical Orthodox" movement in theology, which uses postmodern theory to insulate itself from all secular science and secular criticism and proclaim theology the "queen of the sciences."

On the other hand, a lot of analytic philosophy, as others have pointed out, consists in self-serving (by virtue of their "apolitical" pretense) bourgeois theoretical exercises, and while the clarity of some analytic philosophy is appreciated compared to the worst strands of continental postmodernism, the absurd logic-slicing (which I view as simply getting lost in language/a perfect example of idealism in the Marxist sense) and attempt to look like a natural science reminds me of the way neoliberal economics sets itself up as the "scientific," apolitical, empirical, eternal truth. The worst manifestation of this is the tendency to try and rip words/concepts from their context, and provide their "pure" philosophical analysis.

Whether intentionally or unintentionally, analytic philosophy is often completely divorced from any material, historical, social, or cultural context in which it is being produced, and this is the way in which it is essentially not revolutionary (and often downright reactionary). It doesn't recognize the radical contingency of our current ideas and modes of social organization, and by extension our ability to change our situation through real-life action.

In short, continental philosophy is too often postmodern, pseudo-profound obscurantism, but is basically correct in its focus on social/cultural/other more concrete concerns, its recognition of the importance of context, and of the importance of history, and analytic philosophy has an important point concerning clarity and its opposition to the aforementioned continental excesses, but is essentially idealist and reactionary in the same way as neoliberal economics.

[Luís Henrique]

But, perhaps you have got a source which lead you to believe that he thought of ethics as an expression of aesthetics and vice versa?

For my part, I just think he miswrote.

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

It is not simple, because "tallness" is a social construct, and so, when you say "Phil is tall" you are probably implicitly saying things like "Phil is tall, so he is handsome" or "Phil is tall, so he is stupid", depending on exactly how the subject is socially constructed. Also, obviously "tallness" is relative, so it depends on context to have any actual meaning (Phil is tall - for a boy age five; Phil is tall - for a midget; Phil is tall - for a Bushman). That's why any statement is complex; it implies other statements to make actual sence.

To take Wittgenstein's insight of "language games" seriously, the problem with logic classes is that they completely remove "propositions" from any actual context.

I don't think "X is tall" where X is the name of a human being is a common kind of sentence in common discourse. It seems ackward in any living context that I can imagine. Of course, sentences such as, "Phil is the tallest of them", "Phil is taller than Mark", "The suspect is a tall man", "Phil is tall for his age", etc., are common sentences, and they may imply the idea that Phil is tall. But a sentence like "Phil is tall" seems to only belong in two not too "ordinary" "language games": the one that is played in English language classes for foreigners, and the one that is played in Logic classes.

Again, if we stick with Wittgenstein, there is a problem with the game that is played in Logic classes: it mistakenly assumes that removing sentences from their usual context, or "language games" is a neutral operation, that has no effect on their meaning.

If Wittgenstein is right, such assumption is not only false, but it accounts for many of the problems with philosophy. If he is right, Logic classes are like a kind of morgue for sentences, where they are subjected to procedures that are analogue to forensic anatomy procedures. But while coroners understand that they are analysing corpses, not living people, logicians fail to make the distinction.

Or you could think of Wittgenstein's insight as the linguistic equivalent to quantum physics: when you observe a sentence, just like when you observe a particle, observation itself affects the observed item (but this in turn requires a much more careful use of words than his "look how words are used").

Of course, restablishing the notion that sentences, far from being complete in and of themselves, are part of a greater system - that of language, or of human communication, etc. - in itself brings back what Mr. Natural, in the other thread (http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=2360204&postcount=18), has been calling "philosophy of internal relations", ie, dialectics. It also puts the lie to the notion that "Phil is tall" (or any other sentence, of course) is a "simple proposition": there are no simple propositions; each proposition implies the whole language. Wittgenstein as Jakob Boehme, or are we misunderstanding something here?

Luís Henrique

[Sans]

Again, if we stick with Wittgenstein, there is a problem with the game that is played in Logic classes: it mistakenly assumes that removing sentences from their usual context, or "language games" is a neutral operation, that has no effect on their meaning.

While context can be important in understanding what symbol is meant with a sign, more often than not the symbol can be understood through the sentence itself, meaning that the composition of the sentence establishes sufficient context for someone who knows the language. I also don't think it is a common goal in logic classes to attempt to gain a specific understanding of certain propositions, but rather to understand rules of inference that are used in language.

Besides that, I think you've got a point that separating language from the context in which it is used, verbal and, more importantly, material, generally can lead to issues. I like the idea of viewing language as something like a collection of tools, which is used for their own purposes, usually in relation to some situation or activity. Wittgenstein used the term "logic" in a deep fashion which included such 'uses for the specific tools (symbols)', so that superficially his use of the term would resemble "grammar".