Comparative presidential systems

[Die Neue Zeit]

Political Science 101 (I hope): What are the pros and cons of comparative (primarily Latin American) presidential systems, as per the examples below?

1) Assuming weak or semi-strong veto power, and not strong veto power, from Peru’s model, an exclusively executive ability to deal with legislature-defeated bills and vetoed bills, like those dealing with questions on war and peace, by holding referenda

2) From the models of Brazil and Chile, an exclusive legislative initiative (reserved for the executive) in policy areas beyond just budget law and international trade affairs

3) From Ecuador’s model, the ability to force legislatures to explicitly vote down, within a certain number of days (30 in Ecuador), bills submitted by the executive that have also been declared “urgent” (otherwise that bill automatically becomes law)

4) From Venezuela’s model, the ability to legislate by decree

5) For the purposes of direct monetary and fiscal intervention, including the specific case of avoiding a US-style budget crisis initiated by a relatively stubborn legislature (a la Gingrich), from Colombia’s model, the ability to declare “economic emergency”

6) From the FDR era, but more extensive, the enforcement of political accountability in those courts dealing specifically with constitutional affairs (as opposed to typical criminal and civil cases) by means of of arbitrary "judiciary reorganization" and "court packing"

7) From Russia's model, the power to arbitrarily dismiss and support chief executives of municipalities, provinces, prefectures, and federated states

[Demogorgon]

Such reforms do strike me as attempting to rearrange a bad political system to make it better, rather than simply admitting it doesn't work very well. The trouble with having separated legislatures and executives is that it promotes deadlock and is as such inherently conservative.

As for the political examples, I can go through each in turn if you want, but I will just speak generally just now, apart from to say the Russian example is not at all desirable, both in terms of principle and in how it actually works in Russia.

In general though, means to break deadlock in Presidential systems are better than nothing and most of these proposals go some way towards that. But it is better to have a system where the executive rests upon a legislative majority if you want a system where rapid progress can be made. Which isn't to say that you can't incorporate some of these examples into that too if you feel it necessary, particularly to offset some of the fragmentation that proportionality (a vital aspect of a progressive system) can bring.

If a Presidential system is insisted upon though, some of Roberto Unger's (a self described "revolutionary reformist") suggestions in that regard are interesting. He proposes that legislation for the purposes of changing society should be separated from the ordinary legislation that is the business of government and be prioritised with various deadlock breaking mechanisms such as referendums to make decisions if legislature and executive cannot agree and the ability of both branches to call fresh elections to break deadlock.

[Die Neue Zeit]

Such reforms do strike me as attempting to rearrange a bad political system to make it better, rather than simply admitting it doesn't work very well. The trouble with having separated legislatures and executives is that it promotes deadlock and is as such inherently conservative.

My post didn't imply that the legislature and the executive are necessarily separated at all. :confused:


As for the political examples, I can go through each in turn if you want, but I will just speak generally just now, apart from to say the Russian example is not at all desirable, both in terms of principle and in how it actually works in Russia.

By all means, please go through each. :)


In general though, means to break deadlock in Presidential systems are better than nothing and most of these proposals go some way towards that. But it is better to have a system where the executive rests upon a legislative majority if you want a system where rapid progress can be made.

Of course, but given the context of my past discussions all this is merely a means of getting around populist and legislator resentment of whip-based votes.


Which isn't to say that you can't incorporate some of these examples into that too if you feel it necessary, particularly to offset some of the fragmentation that proportionality (a vital aspect of a progressive system) can bring.

Good point.


If a Presidential system is insisted upon though, some of Roberto Unger's (a self described "revolutionary reformist") suggestions in that regard are interesting. He proposes that legislation for the purposes of changing society should be separated from the ordinary legislation that is the business of government and be prioritised with various deadlock breaking mechanisms such as referendums to make decisions if legislature and executive cannot agree and the ability of both branches to call fresh elections to break deadlock.

How does that relate in similarities and differences to the Peru, Ecuador, and Venezuela models?

[And again, my post didn't imply legislative-executive separation.]

[Demogorgon]

My post didn't imply that the legislature and the executive are necessarily separated at all. :confused:

I think there may be a misunderstanding here. When discussing different systems in comparative terms "Presidential" is used to describe any system based on a separately chosen Executive and legislature. So for instance Israel was "presidential" when the Prime Minister was directly elected and South Africa is "parliamentary", even though the head of government is the president.

Obviously you were using the terms differently, and also all the examples you gave were Presidential. I see meant relations between executive and legislature in any system now, so confusion cleared up I hoe.


By all means, please go through each. :)
Okay, but I need to put a huge caveat on my analysis here and say that what works in one context may not work in another and there is no best system, so take myassessment of your examples with a pinch of salt.

1) Assuming weak or semi-strong veto power, and not strong veto power, from Peru’s model, an exclusively executive ability to deal with legislature-defeated bills and vetoed bills, like those dealing with questions on war and peace, by holding referenda

The ability to put a bill to the people if the legislature won't comply (or indeed if the Government simply wants a direct mandate) is fairly common, also being found in places like France and so forth and are not necessarily a bad idea. However the the trouble with them is the trouble with referenda in general and those initiated in a non deliberative manner in particular is that they only present a straight yes and no with no prospect of amending the legislation. In such a system there should be some manner of making sure that the legislation to be put to the people is scrutinised to make it as good as possible.

2) From the models of Brazil and Chile, an exclusive legislative initiative (reserved for the executive) in policy areas beyond just budget law and international trade affairs

I'm not particularly familiar with this example, though I can see what it aims to achieve. I suppose it has its uses in a Presidential system, but in a system where the Executive rests upon support of the legislature nothing is going to pass anyway unless it has the tacit support of the Executive, so isn't particularly necessary.

3) From Ecuador’s model, the ability to force legislatures to explicitly vote down, within a certain number of days (30 in Ecuador), bills submitted by the executive that have also been declared “urgent” (otherwise that bill automatically becomes law)

Maybe, but you have to be careful in case it becomes Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution. Such a system should be limited to economic policy (and possibly measures for disaster relief, though that should fall under other powers anyway) so that it can't be used to curtail civil liberties. Generally I would say in fact that progressives should support measures that allow for rapid change in economic policy while keeping safeguards strong otherwise. Also of course the problem that there isn't scope for amendment also applies here.


4) From Venezuela’s model, the ability to legislate by decree

This isn't a general power in Venezuela, but rather a power that can be granted temporarily by a legislative super majority. You have to be really careful with powers like that to say the least. Again it is possible that there may be justification for limited use in economic policy (again with the ability for the legislation to be scrutinised and amended some way) but in general I disapprove.

5) For the purposes of direct monetary and fiscal intervention, including the specific case of avoiding a US-style budget crisis initiated by a relatively stubborn legislature (a la Gingrich), from Colombia’s model, the ability to declare “economic emergency”

This is a common one. We have a variation in Scotland whereby if Parliament won't pass the budget, the previous one simply continues in force until it does. No Gingrich shut downs thank you. The Colombian model allows a but more scope I think, but perhaps the Scottish model might work better.

6) From the FDR era, but more extensive, the enforcement of political accountability in those courts dealing specifically with constitutional affairs (as opposed to typical criminal and civil cases) by means of of arbitrary "judiciary reorganization" and "court packing"

Probably not. A constitutional provision preventing the Courts from ruling on economic and labour policy (while being very careful-as with the other examples-not to allow that to hand gifts to the right) or perhaps a Canadian style notwithstanding clause would be better. Or indeed keep judicial review of legislation fairly weak and mostly to maintain human rights, civil liberties and so forth.

7) From Russia's model, the power to arbitrarily dismiss and support chief executives of municipalities, provinces, prefectures, and federated states

As I say this power is outrageous and should not be considered elsewhere.

There is another power worth bringing up as you haven't mentioned it and that is the French Prime Minister's infamous Article 49 power to declare a bill a matter of confidence and hence it automatically passes the National Assembly unless an absolute majority votes to dismiss the Government, which would presumably mean new elections. This power is open to abuse and can be curtailed recently and the way it works in France tends to undermine accountability but a version whereby the Government can only use it if it has already tried to pass the legislation by normal ways and where defeat means an automatic election (with perhaps a reelected Government being able to declare the bill automatically passed) may work.

With all of this we have to be careful however. When looking for systems that allow for dynamic change, we do not want to end up looking like Gaullists. Gaullism is not our friend.


Of course, but given the context of my past discussions all this is merely a means of getting around populist and legislator resentment of whip-based votes.

Maybe, but a system based on multiple parties and lists would naturally have members of the same party more inclined to vote the same way anyway. These proposals are perhaps better to get around the gridlock that can be caused by many parties existing.

In general though, socialists should not be looking at legislators and executives in the way they are looked at now-which frankly smacks of fantasy at times. The notion of the legislature being there to make laws and the Executive to govern is silly. The most important job of the legislature is to scrutinise the Executive and it should be given as much power to do that as possible (as should a Citizen's Assembly to bring in demarchy). Indeed I'd give Executive Power directly to the legislature in some cases. Bringing more of the economy under public control means the public authorities have to take part in the running of them. I would have legislative committees take part in that directly.


How does that relate in similarities and differences to the Peru, Ecuador, and Venezuela models?

Elements of it are in many of them, also given you are asking the merits of these systems, it is useful to discuss similar proposals.

[Die Neue Zeit]

I think there may be a misunderstanding here. When discussing different systems in comparative terms "Presidential" is used to describe any system based on a separately chosen Executive and legislature. So for instance Israel was "presidential" when the Prime Minister was directly elected and South Africa is "parliamentary", even though the head of government is the president.

Obviously you were using the terms differently, and also all the examples you gave were Presidential. I see [you] meant relations between executive and legislature in any system now, so confusion cleared up I hope.

Damn, I forgot the South African model! That's the missing element! So it's basically a South African-style presidency with regards to legislative confidence. OTOH, the chief-executive-vs-legislative system could still be formally separate yet substantively united. This implies some "Party Executive Committee" formally outside the governing structure but calling all the shots vs. all the legislators and even El Presidente and some National/Pan-National Leader not occupying La Presidencia.


Okay, but I need to put a huge caveat on my analysis here and say that what works in one context may not work in another and there is no best system, so take myassessment of your examples with a pinch of salt.

Will do.


1) Assuming weak or semi-strong veto power, and not strong veto power, from Peru’s model, an exclusively executive ability to deal with legislature-defeated bills and vetoed bills, like those dealing with questions on war and peace, by holding referenda

The ability to put a bill to the people if the legislature won't comply (or indeed if the Government simply wants a direct mandate) is fairly common, also being found in places like France and so forth and are not necessarily a bad idea. However the the trouble with them is the trouble with referenda in general and those initiated in a non deliberative manner in particular is that they only present a straight yes and no with no prospect of amending the legislation. In such a system there should be some manner of making sure that the legislation to be put to the people is scrutinised to make it as good as possible.

I would think that there could be measures for such scrutiny within the executive. I'm thinking of the US Council of Economic Advisers and similar "Aló, Señor Presidente" bodies but with a more public role, which would then in fact be similar to Russia's Public Chamber (presidential parallelism vs. the Duma).


2) From the models of Brazil and Chile, an exclusive legislative initiative (reserved for the executive) in policy areas beyond just budget law and international trade affairs

I'm not particularly familiar with this example, though I can see what it aims to achieve. I suppose it has its uses in a Presidential system, but in a system where the Executive rests upon support of the legislature nothing is going to pass anyway unless it has the tacit support of the Executive, so isn't particularly necessary.

Well, this aims to curtail "private bills" from going into inappropriate areas. Usually "private bills" are up for "free votes" not subject to the whims of the whip.


3) From Ecuador’s model, the ability to force legislatures to explicitly vote down, within a certain number of days (30 in Ecuador), bills submitted by the executive that have also been declared “urgent” (otherwise that bill automatically becomes law)

Maybe, but you have to be careful in case it becomes Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution. Such a system should be limited to economic policy (and possibly measures for disaster relief, though that should fall under other powers anyway) so that it can't be used to curtail civil liberties. Generally I would say in fact that progressives should support measures that allow for rapid change in economic policy while keeping safeguards strong otherwise. Also of course the problem that there isn't scope for amendment also applies here.

Within the context of what I wrote (not in the OP, but in other recent discussions with you), I already implied, and I quote, "extensive restrictions on 'states of emergency'" - both by themselves and in relation to my reference to the Colombian model re. mere "economic emergency."


4) From Venezuela’s model, the ability to legislate by decree

This isn't a general power in Venezuela, but rather a power that can be granted temporarily by a legislative super majority. You have to be really careful with powers like that to say the least. Again it is possible that there may be justification for limited use in economic policy (again with the ability for the legislation to be scrutinised and amended some way) but in general I disapprove.

The book I cited didn't mention the "organic law" requirements for decree-making in Venezuela. I'll have to edit again, I think. :(


5) For the purposes of direct monetary and fiscal intervention, including the specific case of avoiding a US-style budget crisis initiated by a relatively stubborn legislature (a la Gingrich), from Colombia’s model, the ability to declare “economic emergency”

This is a common one. We have a variation in Scotland whereby if Parliament won't pass the budget, the previous one simply continues in force until it does. No Gingrich shut downs thank you. The Colombian model allows a but more scope I think, but perhaps the Scottish model might work better.

My only minor "gripe" with the Scottish model, which I wasn't aware of ( :( ), is that there's not enough of a spotlight on El Presidente or on some National/Pan-National Leader not occupying La Presidencia.


6) From the FDR era, but more extensive, the enforcement of political accountability in those courts dealing specifically with constitutional affairs (as opposed to typical criminal and civil cases) by means of of arbitrary "judiciary reorganization" and "court packing"

Probably not. A constitutional provision preventing the Courts from ruling on economic and labour policy (while being very careful-as with the other examples-not to allow that to hand gifts to the right) or perhaps a Canadian style notwithstanding clause would be better. Or indeed keep judicial review of legislation fairly weak and mostly to maintain human rights, civil liberties and so forth.

Well, today we had just had this Supreme Court of Canada BS rejecting Flaherty's national securities regulator plan (http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/story/2011/12/21/scoc-national-securities-regulator.html) (and for today's purposes I'll ignore the Finance Minister's Tory background)!

So much for that notwithstanding clause. Bourgeois federalism strikes again! :cursing:


7) From Russia's model, the power to arbitrarily dismiss and support chief executives of municipalities, provinces, prefectures, and federated states

As I say this power is outrageous and should not be considered elsewhere.

Now I know I really went too far. I need to put more conditions on this.


There is another power worth bringing up as you haven't mentioned it and that is the French Prime Minister's infamous Article 49 power to declare a bill a matter of confidence and hence it automatically passes the National Assembly unless an absolute majority votes to dismiss the Government, which would presumably mean new elections. This power is open to abuse and can be curtailed recently and the way it works in France tends to undermine accountability but a version whereby the Government can only use it if it has already tried to pass the legislation by normal ways and where defeat means an automatic election (with perhaps a reelected Government being able to declare the bill automatically passed) may work.

Would that not be more powerful than Ecuador's model re. the 30-day lawmaking window? Also, would that not be unnecessary if Peru's model is factored in?


With all of this we have to be careful however. When looking for systems that allow for dynamic change, we do not want to end up looking like Gaullists. Gaullism is not our friend.

De Gaulle didn't lead a Third World country or oversee a proletarian demographic minority. ;)


In general though, socialists should not be looking at legislators and executives in the way they are looked at now-which frankly smacks of fantasy at times. The notion of the legislature being there to make laws and the Executive to govern is silly. The most important job of the legislature is to scrutinise the Executive and it should be given as much power to do that as possible (as should a Citizen's Assembly to bring in demarchy). Indeed I'd give Executive Power directly to the legislature in some cases. Bringing more of the economy under public control means the public authorities have to take part in the running of them. I would have legislative committees take part in that directly.

Now you're shifting towards proletarian demographic majority situations. There's discussion on this stuff in Equality By Lot:

http://equalitybylot.wordpress.com/2011/12/14/which-actors-for-each-activity/

http://equalitybylot.wordpress.com/2011/12/20/strategies-to-implement-sortition/

http://equalitybylot.wordpress.com/2011/12/09/sortition-in-popular-movements-modern-kleroterion/

[Demogorgon]

Damn, I forgot the South African model! That's the missing element! So it's basically a South African-style presidency with regards to legislative confidence. OTOH, the chief-executive-vs-legislative system could still be formally separate yet substantively united. This implies some "Party Executive Committee" formally outside the governing structure but calling all the shots vs. all the legislators and even El Presidente and some National/Pan-National Leader not occupying La Presidencia.

That implies the same party controlling both branches, which cannot be guaranteed if they are separately chosen. Let's leave that aside though, the discussion of the actual examples is the real meat here.


I would think that there could be measures for such scrutiny within the executive. I'm thinking of the US Council of Economic Advisers and similar "Aló, Señor Presidente" bodies but with a more public role, which would then in fact be similar to Russia's Public Chamber (presidential parallelism vs. the Duma).

Well having various ways of scrutinizing the drafting process obviously helps. Again I am not saying that this is a bad idea, just that it needs to be thought out. Who does the scrutiny is important as well. if they are just appointees then the people's role in making the legislation is diminished.


Well, this aims to curtail "private bills" from going into inappropriate areas. Usually "private bills" are up for "free votes" not subject to the whims of the whip.

Private bills are whipped here as well. if your only goal is to stop them from scuppering Executive Policy, there are easier ways than Constitutional provisions. I can see why you might need it in a purely Presidential model, but in any model I would regard as superior, there are simply simpler ways to achieve the same goal.


Within the context of what I wrote (not in the OP, but in other recent discussions with you), I already implied, and I quote, "extensive restrictions on 'states of emergency'" - both by themselves and in relation to my reference to the Colombian model re. mere "economic emergency."

Yeah, but I am just talking about the examples you give in of themselves. I can think of reasons why economic bills may need to be passed very quickly (to stop Capitalists indulging in scorched earth tactics) but I am not comfortable with that in other contexts. I think policy making with regards to the economy, standards of living, welfare, labour relations and so forth needs to be kept separate from that that can impact upon civil liberties.


My only minor "gripe" with the Scottish model, which I wasn't aware of ( :( ), is that there's not enough of a spotlight on El Presidente or on some National/Pan-National Leader not occupying La Presidencia.

Well I don't see that as a bad thing. That being said though if you followed Scottish politics, you'd see the spotlight for the past five years hasn't been on anyone besides "el presidente".:lol:


Well, today we had just had this Supreme Court of Canada BS rejecting Flaherty's national securities regulator plan (http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/story/2011/12/21/scoc-national-securities-regulator.html) (and for today's purposes I'll ignore the Finance Minister's Tory background)!

So much for that notwithstanding clause. Bourgeois federalism strikes again! :cursing:
True, but a notwithstanding clause can still limit the courts. Really though you may be approaching this the wrong way. The reason FDR tried to pack the court was that he was dealing with a court with excessive powers. The point should be not giving courts those powers in the first place.

A possible solution would be a clause in the constitution finding that legislation may not be found unconstitutional on substantive grounds to the extent that it brings the economy under public control, provides rights for workers and provides for social welfare.


Would that not be more powerful than Ecuador's model re. the 30-day lawmaking window? Also, would that not be unnecessary if Peru's model is factored in?

In practice it doesn't work quite so powerfully in France because the Government still has to go through the usual drafting process. Also my proposal further limits it by proposing that the Government has to try passing the legislation by normal means first.

As for it not being necessary if the Government can also refer bills to referendum (incidentally the French Government has that power too), it is for a different purpose. The idea isn't that the legislature is dissolved every five minutes but rather that the legislature cannot block a minority Government's programme too readily.

It is important to factor in for a socialist plurality in the legislature. It should be able to act in such a situation.


De Gaulle didn't lead a Third World country or oversee a proletarian demographic minority. ;)

He did lead a country undergoing major modernisation and industrial development though. I am just pointing out that we don't want to stray too close to his territory, for that is a place no progressive should go.