Parvati
13th November 2011, 23:13
A post in the Learning section made me wonder if the Revolutionary Military Politics theory of T.Derbent was able in English, and I didn't find it. So I've translated a summerize of it. For those who are curious, T.Derbent is the pseudonym of Bertrand Sassoye, one founding member of the Communist Combatant Cells, in Belgium.
Categories of Revolutionary Military Politics
The very simplified list below is not a « catalog » in which it is necessary to choose a ready-made formula. Each situation requires a particular response. Each case contains elements of these different strategies, either by inertia (survival of old methods) or on the contrary because the struggle brings out the methods to be theorized ans systematized later. This list can at best serve as a guide.
The Blanquist insurrectionalist strategy
The most complete form of this strategy is the blanquist one, theorized in Instructions for an Uprising. A small group of armed conspirators (between 500 and 800 in the case of the uprising of May 12, 1839) attacks when they believe that the people is subjectively ready for insurgency and acts in place of the unorganized proletariat : they seized the armories and distribute weapons, they hit the head of political power and repressive forces (attack on the police headquarters), produce a systematic plan of barricades and organize the masses that are rallied to the insurgency. At the tactical level, Blanqui was a great defender of the tactics of barricades, that was criticized precisely by Engels. The tactic of passives barricades, followed by the revolutionnary proletariat until 1848 had only one chance to win : a mass refusal from the soldiers to obey the bourgeois army, maybe even that they had to pass in the camp of the insurgency.
The Insurrectionary general strike strategy
Inheritance (claimed or not) of Bakunin theses aimed at causing the abolition of the state by a single collective action, preferably a general strike, the insurgency sees its release depends on the spontaneity of the masses. Under this strategy, the insurrectionary general strike will arrive when the masses are subjectively ready, and that these subjective dispositions will easily solve objective questions (military, organizational) using the revolutionary creativity of the masses. This strategy also relies on a broad collapse of bourgeois power, again caused by the subjective dispositions of the masses (mass desertion in the army, etc.) This strategy was reproposed in the period between WWI and WWII by the current revolutionary syndicalist, and was able to find resurgence in the « Spontex Maoists » and in the ultra-left inspired by Bordiga.
Illustrative-terrorist strategy
Performed by a current of the anarchist movement an the Russian populists. It is base either on individual practice, or on that of secret organization – and in any case it is cut of a direct relationship to the masses. Their only connection to the masses is the example of their actions or attitude of their activists when they face repression, and possibly a few proclamations. The terrorist strategy has been able to hit the reaction on its peak, causing terror among the enemy and admiration among the masses, but it has never been able to convert these factors into forces that could overthrow a regime. This strategy has known only defeats in history : you can not « wake up » the revolutionary masses without organize them.
The Insurrectionalist Leninist-Komintern strategy
It was performed first in October 1917 and then thoroughly theorized (in particular throught the collective work signed Neuberg, Armed Insurrection) and planned by the Communist parties in the 20's and 30's. It integrates and systematizes the analysis of Marx and Engels (and the lessons of experiences like those of 1905) giving a central role to the vanguard Party working to put together elements necessary for a successful revolution (rise the revolutionary consciousness of the masses, political and military organization of the masses including the creation of a Red Guard, training of shock groups and use of them as a substitute for the tactics of barricades, creating a insurrectional headquarters, plans of battle, timing of onset, etc.) This strategy has suffered serious setbacks in Germany (1923), China (1927), Asturias (1934), Brazil (1935) and elsewhere.
Protracted People's war strategy
It has three phases : a phase of guerrilla warfare, strategic defensive (but tactically very active, take initiatives constantly), a phase of strategic balance, a strategic offensive phase where the revolutionary forces are able to conduct warfare and (incidentally) the war of position. Specific principles of protracted people's war have been determined by Mao Zedong :
First attack the scattered and isolated enemy forces, then major forces.
First established liberated zones in the countryside, encircling the cities from the countryside, first take small towns, then bigger ones.
Ensuring a strong numerical superiority in the battle (the strategy is to fight one against ten, tactics is to fight ten against one)
Secure the support of the people, ensuring full respect of its interests.
Make the transition of enemy prisoners to the revolutionary camp.
Use the time between fights to train and learn.
Victorious in Yugoslavia, Albania, China and Indochina, also experienced significant failures notably in Greece (1945-1949) and Malaysia (1948-1960).
The strategy of the coup
It is based on a balance of power extremely favorable to the revolutionary party. In the example of Prague in 1948, it included the presence of the Soviet Army, power and prestige of the Communist Party, the existence of popular militias (15000 to 18000 armed workers), the almost complete infiltration of the National Security, and several army units, etc. This strategy has the advantage of being much more efficient than those involving armed confrontation. It can even keep the appearance of legality, which can neutralize certain social political intermediaries. The coup is more often the result of an opportunity provided by extraordinary historical circumstances than a theorized revolutionary strategy and presented as a model. Nevertheless, it could have a consistent application among the young progressive officers in the third world, which in the '60's and '70's were linked in one way or another to the Soviet Union.
The electoral/military strategy
It is based on the thesis that a partial taking of power is possible by legal means (as long as a large mass struggle guarantees the democratic rights) and that this power will take part in the revolutionary movement means, adding to the proper means of the revolutionary forces, and that this will be sufficient to ensure the deepening of the revolutionary process and counter-offensive against the reactionary (military coup or foreign intervention). Organizations adopting this strategy equip themselves with a military capability to ensure a takeover basically accomplished by legal means. General Pinochet has done much to invalidate the strategic hypothesis, which had already been a bloody failure with crushing of Schutzbund, Austria in 1934.
The foquist strategy
It emerged from a theory by the systematic features of the guerillas active in the late '50's and the early '60's in Latin America (including Cuba). It makes the creation and development of a mobile rural guerrilla the centerpiece of the revolutionary process. The foquism did not have a universal application and was largely based on the theory of dualism of Latin American society (the capitalist city and the feudal countryside), the impossibility of establishing liberated zones in the way Chinese and Indochinese did, etc. The mobile guerillas are required to grow into a people's army, to encircle the cities until the final attack of the plan, an insurrectional general strike in urban areas. The rôle of the proletariat is limited to support for rural guerilla warfare to blow.
The neo-insurgency strategy
It was forged in the wake of the victory of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua. Following the victory, several revolutionary forces abandoned completely or partially protracted people's war that they led sometimes for decades, to try to force a decision causing urban uprisings. This was the case of the New People's Army, led by the Communist Party of the Philippines until the rectification campaign of 1992 brought a return to the theses of protracted people's war.
The PASS (political-military fighting strategy)_ and the Revolutionary War combined
It has been defind and practiced by Mahir Çayan and the founders of the Popular Front for the Liberation Party in Turkey and assumed in the 70's and 80's by several organizations (Dev Yol, Dev Sol, MLSPB, THKP-revolutionary vanguard of the People, etc.) Under this strategy, the guerilla is the main apparel until the stage of the conventional war and other struggling methods (political, economic, democratic and ideological) subordinate to it. The strategy is divided into three stages :
The formation of urban guerilla warfare (it is easier to build a fighting force in a city, armed actions have more echoes, the field is socially more willing to accept and understand actions of an higher level)
The spread of the guerrillas in the country, and the formation of a rural guerilla next to the urban guerilla (more important because a unit may withdraw from the campaign and develop gradually and continuously integrating farmers, while that the urban guerilla warfare, forced to scatter in clandestine bases after each action, can not hope to establish an ongoing relationship with the masses and develop into a people's army.)
The transformation of the guerrilla forces in the regular armed forces.
Protracted Revolutionary War Strategy
It has been defind and practiced by European combattive communist organizations. It is based on the principles of maoist protracted people's war but differs profoundly by th abandonment of all forms of rural guerrillas warfare (and any idea of encircling the cities from the countryside), by substituting the liberated areas of underground networks in the mass organizations (trade unions, etc.) by the greater importance given to the actions of armed propaganda and the adoption of new organizational forms between party membership and military participation (in some cases, it refuses the traditional separation Communist Party/Red Army in formulating the theory of the Combattive Party, legitimized by the new political quality resulted from armed struggle)etc.
Note that these strategies fall into two broad categories : those who seek a decision in one battle (insurrectionalist strategies) and those seeking a decision by a succession of battles and campains (guerillas strategies).
Categories of Revolutionary Military Politics
The very simplified list below is not a « catalog » in which it is necessary to choose a ready-made formula. Each situation requires a particular response. Each case contains elements of these different strategies, either by inertia (survival of old methods) or on the contrary because the struggle brings out the methods to be theorized ans systematized later. This list can at best serve as a guide.
The Blanquist insurrectionalist strategy
The most complete form of this strategy is the blanquist one, theorized in Instructions for an Uprising. A small group of armed conspirators (between 500 and 800 in the case of the uprising of May 12, 1839) attacks when they believe that the people is subjectively ready for insurgency and acts in place of the unorganized proletariat : they seized the armories and distribute weapons, they hit the head of political power and repressive forces (attack on the police headquarters), produce a systematic plan of barricades and organize the masses that are rallied to the insurgency. At the tactical level, Blanqui was a great defender of the tactics of barricades, that was criticized precisely by Engels. The tactic of passives barricades, followed by the revolutionnary proletariat until 1848 had only one chance to win : a mass refusal from the soldiers to obey the bourgeois army, maybe even that they had to pass in the camp of the insurgency.
The Insurrectionary general strike strategy
Inheritance (claimed or not) of Bakunin theses aimed at causing the abolition of the state by a single collective action, preferably a general strike, the insurgency sees its release depends on the spontaneity of the masses. Under this strategy, the insurrectionary general strike will arrive when the masses are subjectively ready, and that these subjective dispositions will easily solve objective questions (military, organizational) using the revolutionary creativity of the masses. This strategy also relies on a broad collapse of bourgeois power, again caused by the subjective dispositions of the masses (mass desertion in the army, etc.) This strategy was reproposed in the period between WWI and WWII by the current revolutionary syndicalist, and was able to find resurgence in the « Spontex Maoists » and in the ultra-left inspired by Bordiga.
Illustrative-terrorist strategy
Performed by a current of the anarchist movement an the Russian populists. It is base either on individual practice, or on that of secret organization – and in any case it is cut of a direct relationship to the masses. Their only connection to the masses is the example of their actions or attitude of their activists when they face repression, and possibly a few proclamations. The terrorist strategy has been able to hit the reaction on its peak, causing terror among the enemy and admiration among the masses, but it has never been able to convert these factors into forces that could overthrow a regime. This strategy has known only defeats in history : you can not « wake up » the revolutionary masses without organize them.
The Insurrectionalist Leninist-Komintern strategy
It was performed first in October 1917 and then thoroughly theorized (in particular throught the collective work signed Neuberg, Armed Insurrection) and planned by the Communist parties in the 20's and 30's. It integrates and systematizes the analysis of Marx and Engels (and the lessons of experiences like those of 1905) giving a central role to the vanguard Party working to put together elements necessary for a successful revolution (rise the revolutionary consciousness of the masses, political and military organization of the masses including the creation of a Red Guard, training of shock groups and use of them as a substitute for the tactics of barricades, creating a insurrectional headquarters, plans of battle, timing of onset, etc.) This strategy has suffered serious setbacks in Germany (1923), China (1927), Asturias (1934), Brazil (1935) and elsewhere.
Protracted People's war strategy
It has three phases : a phase of guerrilla warfare, strategic defensive (but tactically very active, take initiatives constantly), a phase of strategic balance, a strategic offensive phase where the revolutionary forces are able to conduct warfare and (incidentally) the war of position. Specific principles of protracted people's war have been determined by Mao Zedong :
First attack the scattered and isolated enemy forces, then major forces.
First established liberated zones in the countryside, encircling the cities from the countryside, first take small towns, then bigger ones.
Ensuring a strong numerical superiority in the battle (the strategy is to fight one against ten, tactics is to fight ten against one)
Secure the support of the people, ensuring full respect of its interests.
Make the transition of enemy prisoners to the revolutionary camp.
Use the time between fights to train and learn.
Victorious in Yugoslavia, Albania, China and Indochina, also experienced significant failures notably in Greece (1945-1949) and Malaysia (1948-1960).
The strategy of the coup
It is based on a balance of power extremely favorable to the revolutionary party. In the example of Prague in 1948, it included the presence of the Soviet Army, power and prestige of the Communist Party, the existence of popular militias (15000 to 18000 armed workers), the almost complete infiltration of the National Security, and several army units, etc. This strategy has the advantage of being much more efficient than those involving armed confrontation. It can even keep the appearance of legality, which can neutralize certain social political intermediaries. The coup is more often the result of an opportunity provided by extraordinary historical circumstances than a theorized revolutionary strategy and presented as a model. Nevertheless, it could have a consistent application among the young progressive officers in the third world, which in the '60's and '70's were linked in one way or another to the Soviet Union.
The electoral/military strategy
It is based on the thesis that a partial taking of power is possible by legal means (as long as a large mass struggle guarantees the democratic rights) and that this power will take part in the revolutionary movement means, adding to the proper means of the revolutionary forces, and that this will be sufficient to ensure the deepening of the revolutionary process and counter-offensive against the reactionary (military coup or foreign intervention). Organizations adopting this strategy equip themselves with a military capability to ensure a takeover basically accomplished by legal means. General Pinochet has done much to invalidate the strategic hypothesis, which had already been a bloody failure with crushing of Schutzbund, Austria in 1934.
The foquist strategy
It emerged from a theory by the systematic features of the guerillas active in the late '50's and the early '60's in Latin America (including Cuba). It makes the creation and development of a mobile rural guerrilla the centerpiece of the revolutionary process. The foquism did not have a universal application and was largely based on the theory of dualism of Latin American society (the capitalist city and the feudal countryside), the impossibility of establishing liberated zones in the way Chinese and Indochinese did, etc. The mobile guerillas are required to grow into a people's army, to encircle the cities until the final attack of the plan, an insurrectional general strike in urban areas. The rôle of the proletariat is limited to support for rural guerilla warfare to blow.
The neo-insurgency strategy
It was forged in the wake of the victory of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua. Following the victory, several revolutionary forces abandoned completely or partially protracted people's war that they led sometimes for decades, to try to force a decision causing urban uprisings. This was the case of the New People's Army, led by the Communist Party of the Philippines until the rectification campaign of 1992 brought a return to the theses of protracted people's war.
The PASS (political-military fighting strategy)_ and the Revolutionary War combined
It has been defind and practiced by Mahir Çayan and the founders of the Popular Front for the Liberation Party in Turkey and assumed in the 70's and 80's by several organizations (Dev Yol, Dev Sol, MLSPB, THKP-revolutionary vanguard of the People, etc.) Under this strategy, the guerilla is the main apparel until the stage of the conventional war and other struggling methods (political, economic, democratic and ideological) subordinate to it. The strategy is divided into three stages :
The formation of urban guerilla warfare (it is easier to build a fighting force in a city, armed actions have more echoes, the field is socially more willing to accept and understand actions of an higher level)
The spread of the guerrillas in the country, and the formation of a rural guerilla next to the urban guerilla (more important because a unit may withdraw from the campaign and develop gradually and continuously integrating farmers, while that the urban guerilla warfare, forced to scatter in clandestine bases after each action, can not hope to establish an ongoing relationship with the masses and develop into a people's army.)
The transformation of the guerrilla forces in the regular armed forces.
Protracted Revolutionary War Strategy
It has been defind and practiced by European combattive communist organizations. It is based on the principles of maoist protracted people's war but differs profoundly by th abandonment of all forms of rural guerrillas warfare (and any idea of encircling the cities from the countryside), by substituting the liberated areas of underground networks in the mass organizations (trade unions, etc.) by the greater importance given to the actions of armed propaganda and the adoption of new organizational forms between party membership and military participation (in some cases, it refuses the traditional separation Communist Party/Red Army in formulating the theory of the Combattive Party, legitimized by the new political quality resulted from armed struggle)etc.
Note that these strategies fall into two broad categories : those who seek a decision in one battle (insurrectionalist strategies) and those seeking a decision by a succession of battles and campains (guerillas strategies).