Top FARC leader killed

[Arm Cathartha na hÉireann]

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-15604456



Top Farc rebel leader Alfonso Cano killed in Colombia
The leader of Colombia's left wing Farc rebel group, Alfonso Cano, has been killed in a military raid, President Juan Manuel Santos has confirmed.

He called it the most devastating blow to the group in its decades-long insurgency and urged it to disband.

Defence Minister Juan Carlos Pinzon said Cano was killed in an operation in mountains in Colombia's south-west.

Security forces have killed a number of Farc commanders and arrested many others in recent years.

Giving details of the operation, Mr Pinzon said government forces first bombed a Farc jungle camp in Cauca state.

Troops were then lowered from helicopters to search the area and killed Cano and several other Farc (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) members in a gun battle.

'Prison or a tomb' Pictures of the dead leader, with his trademark bushy beard shaved off, were broadcast on Colombian television.

"It is the most devastating blow that this group has suffered in its history," President Santos said in a televised address.

"I want to send a message to each and every member of that organization: demobilise... or otherwise you will end up in a prison or in a tomb. We will achieve peace."

Cano, 63, was reportedly tracked down to the jungle camp with the aid of telephone intercepts.

Colombia had offered a reward of nearly $4m (£2.5m) for information leading to his capture.

Analysts say Cano's death deals a further blow to the rebel group's ability to co-ordinate attacks on security forces and other targets.

The Marxist-inspired Farc has already been weakened by a military offensive which began 10 years ago.

Mr Cano, a former academic from Bogota, became the Farc's leader in 2008 after his predecessor, Manuel Marulanda died of a heart attack.

His real name was Guillermo Leon Saenz.
In July, he narrowly escaped a raid on his camp, Colombian officials said.

(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-15604456#story_continues_2)In September 2010, Mono Jojoy, another top Farc commander, was killed in a bombing raid.

The Colombian army also said earlier this year that it had killed Mr Cano's head of security, Alirio Rojas Bocanegra.

The military has been able to expand its operations against the rebels with the help of the US, which has provided billions of dollars in funding, training and intelligence-sharing.

However, the Farc - the oldest and largest among Colombia's left-wing rebel groups - retains the ability to mount hit-and-run attacks, partly owing to cash raised through its involvement in the illegal drugs trade and partly thanks to the country's thick jungles.

The Farc is on US and European lists of terrorist organisations.
Colombia's civil conflict has lasted more than four decades, drawing in left-wing rebels and right-wing paramilitaries.
Dont know much about this conflict really, seems the organisation has taken a lot of big hits last few years. How much popular support do they have in Colombia?

[thälmann]

i dont know exactly numbers..but they have a lot of support and influence

[Seth]

Among urban workers and students, very little, but in the countryside they have a lot of influence with the rural poor.

[Black_Rose]

I just learned about tragic death of Alfonso Cano.

I was literally lachrymose when such a venerable leader and virtuous man was slain.

[Gorra Negra]

just saw this.

FARC has very small support in the urban centers -considering colombia is mostly urban- and some, even though still small, support in the south west and other pockets.

[Homo Songun]

FARC has very small support in the urban centers -considering colombia is mostly urban- and some, even though still small, support in the south west and other pockets.

Among urban workers and students, very little, but in the countryside they have a lot of influence with the rural poor
What makes you say this? It strikes me as counter-intuitive to the general laws of warfare that this could be true for a highly developed guerrilla conflict like in Colombia. All insurgencies depend on networks of urban sympathizers so far as they are successful.

James J. Brittain goes so far as to claim that by 2004, FARC had a presence in essentially every single municipality of the country:

http://monthlyreview.org/wp-content/uploads/old/2005/0905table1.jpg

Even if we take the Colombian military's claim of 18,000 combatants in 2010 at face value, down from Brittain's estimated peak of 46,000 in 2005, that would still mean a proportionally widespread presence throughout Colombia.

[Renegade Saint]

What makes you say this? It strikes me as counter-intuitive to the general laws of warfare that this could be true for a highly developed guerrilla conflict like in Colombia. All insurgencies depend on networks of urban sympathizers so far as they are successful.

James J. Brittain goes so far as to claim that by 2004, FARC had a presence in essentially every single municipality of the country:

http://monthlyreview.org/wp-content/uploads/old/2005/0905table1.jpg

Even if we take the Colombian military's claim of 18,000 combatants in 2010 at face value, down from Brittain's estimated peak of 46,000 in 2005, that would still mean a proportionally widespread presence throughout Colombia.
Many drug cartels do.

[Gorra Negra]

What makes you say this? It strikes me as counter-intuitive to the general laws of warfare that this could be true for a highly developed guerrilla conflict like in Colombia. All insurgencies depend on networks of urban sympathizers so far as they are successful.

James J. Brittain goes so far as to claim that by 2004, FARC had a presence in essentially every single municipality of the country:

http://monthlyreview.org/wp-content/uploads/old/2005/0905table1.jpg

Even if we take the Colombian military's claim of 18,000 combatants in 2010 at face value, down from Brittain's estimated peak of 46,000 in 2005, that would still mean a proportionally widespread presence throughout Colombia.

I don't know what you're trying to say. I never claim other wise.

[El Chuncho]

(Heard about this earlier but..) R.I.P to Alfonso Cano. Your memory will live on, comrade!

http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/multimedia/dynamic/00634/World_News_6-1_jpg_634803t.jpg

[Homo Songun]

I don't know what you're trying to say. I never claim other wise.

If you don't think there is a contradiction between what we are saying then I
don't think you have thought the implications of what you are saying all the
way through. Lets set aside our personal political judgements of the actors in
the conflict and examine the sheer logistics of warfare. I admit I am far from
being a milgeek, but it is apparent to me that even in regular armies, for
every soldier whose job it is to be firing at the enemy there must be a dozen
more whose job is in the supply chain, repairs, transport, medical, and so on.

Now think about the nature of an asymmetrical guerrilla force. There is no
corresponding capability for that kind of a set up on their part. They have no
choice but to rely on the people they find themselves amongst for supplies,
intelligence gathering, and so on. As Mao said, the guerrilla have no rear
area. Again, setting aside political judgements, he was objectively the most
successful guerrilla strategist of the 20th century, if not history, so I think
we can pay attention what he has to say on the subject. He explained this
principle via analogy: "The guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish
swims in the sea."

Acording to Mao, the guerrilla "swim" by waging war politically as much as they
do militarily:


What is the relationship of guerrilla warfare to the people? Without a
political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must, if its political
objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their
sympathy, co-operation, and assistance cannot be gained. ... Because guerrilla
warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can
neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and
co-operation. ... The moment that this war of resistance dissociates itself
from the masses of the people is the precise moment that it dissociates itself
from hope of ultimate victory over the Japanese.

Not for nothing does counter-insurgency doctrine study Mao on this. That it is
taken as established principle is illustrated by the Vietnam war, where the US
evacuated the Vietnamese campesinos from the countryside in order to place them
inside heavily guarded "strategic hamlets", emptying the sea so to speak. Today
the Indian state today is using a similar method in their battle with the
Naxalbari.

So it must follow from the fact that FARC can sustain 18,000+ combat troops for
the long haul that there must be significant amount of passive support if not
active collaboration on the part of Colombian society for political goals they
are espousing. As you point out, Colombia has a more or less urbanized
population, so they must have a corresponding degree of urban supporters, in light
of the fact they were present in every municipality by 2004.

All that said, I still want to know on what basis you are claiming the
contrary. I don't think it is possible to be simply a case of being flush with
cash from narcotrafficking. After all narcos don't want to hold territory,
they just want to pass through it unnoticed. Escobar was the one narcotrafficker
who tried a frontal assault on the State and he was obliterated very quickly.
So there has to be some other factor.

[Os Cangaceiros]

Escobar was the one narcotrafficker
who tried a frontal assault on the State and he was obliterated very quickly.

When did this happen?

[Homo Songun]

Reading his biography online should give a flavor of his trajectory I suppose. While there are lots of violent/rich mafiosi that break the law, I don't think there are too many that actually manage to transcend the law. Law in the Austinian sense at any rate.

[CommieTroll]

When did this happen?

Pablo Escobar died in a gun battle with Colombian police who were aided by the USA in December 1993. Officially he died at the hands of Colombian police but an unexplained bullet wound to his head leads people to believe he committed suicide

[Os Cangaceiros]

Reading his biography online should give a flavor of his trajectory I suppose. While there are lots of violent/rich mafiosi that break the law, I don't think there are too many that actually manage to transcend the law. Law in the Austinian sense at any rate.

Yes, you might have taken it a bit too far there. ;)

I don't see why putting up a military front to the state would be in any organized crime group's best interest. In fact the goal of such groups should be to successfully blur organized crime and the legitimate affairs of government/business so the two are almost the same...that's what's been done very successfully in places like Russia, Italy and Japan, for example.

As far as criminal organizations forming a "state within a state", I think that one could make a convincing argument that it has happened in Mexico, with the criminal organizations there ordering curfews in Mexican cities that are obeyed, stealing billions of dollars worth of Mexico's oil, establishing their own communication towers and wireless mesh networks, etc. (as well as infiltrating some of the highest echelons of Mexico's government, of course). They've fought some skirmishes with Mexico's military and police forces, but even for a sophisticated criminal network, the goal is never to overthrow the government.


Pablo Escobar died in a gun battle with Colombian police who were aided by the USA in December 1993. Officially he died at the hands of Colombian police but an unexplained bullet wound to his head leads people to believe he committed suicide

I know how he died, I was asking when was it that he did a FARC-style military offensive against the government of Colombia.

[Ravachol]

They've fought some skirmishes with Mexico's military and police forces, but even for a sophisticated criminal network, the goal is never to overthrow the government.

Not as a goal-in-itself, obviously. But organised crime has shown to influence political events (including aiding coups) in order to further their own interests. They are capitalist organisations which seek to turn a profit, only they operate in the illegalized market sectors. They behave essentially no different (though more ruthless, violent and erratic due to the nature of the markets they operate in, the sections of the proletariat they recruit their labour force from,etc.) than any other corporation, and influencing (or overthrowing) governements isn't out of the question for them per se. It's just not an objective but a means.

[Os Cangaceiros]

Not as a goal-in-itself, obviously. But organised crime has shown to influence political events (including aiding coups) in order to further their own interests.

That reminds me of that movie, "Once Upon A Time In Mexico", in which a drug lord (based on this guy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amado_Carrillo_Fuentes)) finances a military coup to overthrow the Mexican state. At the time I thought the plot was really far-fetched, but it seems a little bit more plausible in recent years.

[black magick hustla]

I was literally lachrymose when such a venerable leader and virtuous man was slain.

goddamn, do you talk to human beings like that

[Gorra Negra]

If you don't think there is a contradiction between what we are saying then I
don't think you have thought the implications of what you are saying all the
way through. Lets set aside our personal political judgements of the actors in
the conflict and examine the sheer logistics of warfare. I admit I am far from
being a milgeek, but it is apparent to me that even in regular armies, for
every soldier whose job it is to be firing at the enemy there must be a dozen
more whose job is in the supply chain, repairs, transport, medical, and so on.

Now think about the nature of an asymmetrical guerrilla force. There is no
corresponding capability for that kind of a set up on their part. They have no
choice but to rely on the people they find themselves amongst for supplies,
intelligence gathering, and so on. As Mao said, the guerrilla have no rear
area. Again, setting aside political judgements, he was objectively the most
successful guerrilla strategist of the 20th century, if not history, so I think
we can pay attention what he has to say on the subject. He explained this
principle via analogy: "The guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish
swims in the sea."

Acording to Mao, the guerrilla "swim" by waging war politically as much as they
do militarily:



Not for nothing does counter-insurgency doctrine study Mao on this. That it is
taken as established principle is illustrated by the Vietnam war, where the US
evacuated the Vietnamese campesinos from the countryside in order to place them
inside heavily guarded "strategic hamlets", emptying the sea so to speak. Today
the Indian state today is using a similar method in their battle with the
Naxalbari.

So it must follow from the fact that FARC can sustain 18,000+ combat troops for
the long haul that there must be significant amount of passive support if not
active collaboration on the part of Colombian society for political goals they
are espousing. As you point out, Colombia has a more or less urbanized
population, so they must have a corresponding degree of urban supporters, in light
of the fact they were present in every municipality by 2004.

All that said, I still want to know on what basis you are claiming the
contrary. I don't think it is possible to be simply a case of being flush with
cash from narcotrafficking. After all narcos don't want to hold territory,
they just want to pass through it unnoticed. Escobar was the one narcotrafficker
who tried a frontal assault on the State and he was obliterated very quickly.
So there has to be some other factor.

You lack a bit of history on the Colombian armed/social conflict.

I never claimed the contrary on FARC support. I am aware of the existence of urban networks and support in rural regions. In many rural areas, the population have lived along side armed groups for more than half a century plus the lack of a state presence made the population sympathetic and supportive of different guerrilla movements.

About three decades ago a Counter-insurgency offensive by the State literally wiped out the Colombian left.
One of the main targets of the State were these areas were the population was sympathetic to FARC.

The State wanted to uproot FARC's popular base and they did. Magdalena Medio, where the countries major labor battles were fought about a century ago, was a stronghold for different guerrilla groups. So was Antioquia, another historically labor-active region. Now days and after the State unleashed terror on the population these areas are major military/paramilitary strongholds.

There are still departments where the FARC were never really uprooted but like I said these areas are very small and non-influential. Their ability to wage any type of assault is limited and usually relegates to sporadic attacks.
In urban centers, FARC has little to no influence in social movements. Armed groups have cells in Universities and maybe in some neighborhoods keeping in mind the strong presence of the paramilitary in cities like Medellin. Colombia's second city.

What keeps this conflict fueling are the people affected. Peasants who see no justice or a way of decent existence join armed groups-both guerrillas/army/paramilitary. Maybe as a way of protecting their family or to seek a better way of living etc.

I would never say that Narcos don't want to hold territories or that Escobar went against the State. Narco trafficking has completely penetrated the colombian state. During this Counter-insurgency offensive that I referred to earlier MILLIONS of people were kicked out their land by the paramilitary/army and a good part of this land ended up in the hands of the Colombian bourgeois. A class that has strong ties to Narco traffickers or are narcos themselves. They are not separated from each other.

Same goes for Escobar. Escobar never went against the state and lost bc. of it. Escobar had been doing his business since the lat 70's and was open and defiant about it. He had a good bit of politicians/police in his pocket. Escobar lost bc. he went against other cartel's. Other cartel's with a lot of influence, even more than him. Plus the yanks wanted to make a point.

[Shotgun Opera]

I know how he died, I was asking when was it that he did a FARC-style military offensive against the government of Colombia.
Prior to his death, Escobar was pretty ruthless when it came to dealing with anyone he disliked. Anyone in the government or civilian population could expect to be shot or blown up if they did anything to interfere with Escobar and that led to a lot of violence and a lot of deaths. I think that's what was being referrerd to.

[Homo Songun]

You lack a bit of history on the Colombian armed/social conflict.

If so, then you should easily be able to set me straight with some facts and figures to back up your opinions. I usually find the former more persuasive than the latter anyhow, but then again I can be obstinate that way. ;)


I never claimed the contrary on FARC support.If you still think this, then I have failed to explain my point adequately to you. To reiterate my earlier statement: we have completely incompatible positions. You are asserting that the FARC has little support, whereas I am saying that your assertion is false. Only one can be true. Is that clear enough?


About three decades ago a Counter-insurgency offensive by the State literally wiped out the Colombian left.
One of the main targets of the State were these areas were the population was sympathetic to FARC. I presume that you mean the Unión Patriótica (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriotic_Union_%28Colombia%29) era in the 1980's. I think it is deeply problematic to equate the guerrilla insurgency with the UP, but fine.


The State wanted to uproot FARC's popular base and they did. Magdalena Medio, where the countries major labor battles were fought about a century ago, was a stronghold for different guerrilla groups. So was Antioquia, another historically labor-active region. Now days and after the State unleashed terror on the population these areas are major military/paramilitary strongholds.I won't contest the back and forth of what territory exchanged hands and when. But there is a major problem with your argument that FARC was uprooted as a whole after this time and it is this:

http://monthlyreview.org/wp-content/uploads/old/2005/0905table2.jpg

In other words, by slaughtering the legal left, the venal and short-sighted Colombian ruling class allowed the FARC to expand by an order of magnitude in 16 years.


There are still departments where the FARC were never really uprooted but like I said these areas are very small and non-influential.No, not really. For example, FARC was strong enough to force President Pastrana to grant them the whole of San Vicente del Caguán during the negotiations of 1998-2002, an area larger than Switzerland:

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/2d/MunsCaqueta_San_Vicente_del_Caguan.png/250px-MunsCaqueta_San_Vicente_del_Caguan.png

By the way, 740,000 people migrated into the FARC-held territory over the same 4-year period.



In urban centers, FARC has little to no influence in social movements. Armed groups have cells in Universities and maybe in some neighborhoods keeping in mind the strong presence of the paramilitary in cities like Medellin. Colombia's second city. I have no doubt that in 2012 they are on the back foot relatively speaking, but mostly as part of the standard ebb and flow of asymmetrical warfare, for reasons explained in my earlier posts.


I would never say that Narcos don't want to hold territories or that Escobar went against the State. Narco trafficking has completely penetrated the colombian state. During this Counter-insurgency offensive that I referred to earlier MILLIONS of people were kicked out their land by the paramilitary/army and a good part of this land ended up in the hands of the Colombian bourgeois. A class that has strong ties to Narco traffickers or are narcos themselves. They are not separated from each other.

Same goes for Escobar. Escobar never went against the state and lost bc. of it. Escobar had been doing his business since the lat 70's and was open and defiant about it. He had a good bit of politicians/police in his pocket. Escobar lost bc. he went against other cartel's. Other cartel's with a lot of influence, even more than him. Plus the yanks wanted to make a point.I am not terribly interested in pursuing this strand of the conversation, but I will say that the fact that narco-traffickers participate in government in Colombia (not least of which, the Uribe family) in no way weakens my case. It actually strengthens it. Not for nothing was the Cali cartel called "gentlemen" and Escobar considered a pseudo Robin Hood, am I right?

Escobar had his own army and killed hundreds of government officials. His "prison sentence" which can be read about on Wikipedia is an example of how he completely vitiated the the essence of the law, and by extension the reach of the traditional ruling class. It was for that he was smashed. At least, can we agree he set the gold standard for all that came after him?

[Gorra Negra]

If so, then you should easily be able to set me straight with some facts and figures to back up your opinions. I usually find the former more persuasive than the latter anyhow, but then again I can be obstinate that way. ;)

If you still think this, then I have failed to explain my point adequately to you. To reiterate my earlier statement: we have completely incompatible positions. You are asserting that the FARC has little support, whereas I am saying that your assertion is false. Only one can be true. Is that clear enough?

I presume that you mean the Unión Patriótica (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriotic_Union_%28Colombia%29) era in the 1980's. I think it is deeply problematic to equate the guerrilla insurgency with the UP, but fine.

I won't contest the back and forth of what territory exchanged hands and when. But there is a major problem with your argument that FARC was uprooted as a whole after this time and it is this:

http://monthlyreview.org/wp-content/uploads/old/2005/0905table2.jpg

In other words, by slaughtering the legal left, the venal and short-sighted Colombian ruling class allowed the FARC to expand by an order of magnitude in 16 years.

No, not really. For example, FARC was strong enough to force President Pastrana to grant them the whole of San Vicente del Caguán during the negotiations of 1998-2002, an area larger than Switzerland:

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/2d/MunsCaqueta_San_Vicente_del_Caguan.png/250px-MunsCaqueta_San_Vicente_del_Caguan.png

By the way, 740,000 people migrated into the FARC-held territory over the same 4-year period.

I have no doubt that in 2012 they are on the back foot relatively speaking, but mostly as part of the standard ebb and flow of asymmetrical warfare, for reasons explained in my earlier posts.

I am not terribly interested in pursuing this strand of the conversation, but I will say that the fact that narco-traffickers participate in government in Colombia (not least of which, the Uribe family) in no way weakens my case. It actually strengthens it. Not for nothing was the Cali cartel called "gentlemen" and Escobar considered a pseudo Robin Hood, am I right?

Escobar had his own army and killed hundreds of government officials. His "prison sentence" which can be read about on Wikipedia is an example of how he completely vitiated the the essence of the law, and by extension the reach of the traditional ruling class. It was for that he was smashed. At least, can we agree he set the gold standard for all that came after him?

I think my whole point on up-rooting FARC's base is rally important to be dismissed. I say this bc. Madgalena Medio and Antioquia are KEY regions for the Colombian economy.

What do I mean when I say base. I don't mean the UP, even though them and other leftists were targets. I am referring to whole towns that were seen as guerrilla safe heavens by the State.

Your earlier posts were very unclear bc. it seemed that I had claimed FARC had NO support. My claim is that FARC has little support, enough to still operate but not even remotely close to an actual military victory or any type of victory for that matter.

Now, I have the impression that you have some type of romantic idea of what the FARC are simply bc. they're a guerrilla group. Yet your evidence is very short and vague.

I can read the chart you've posted several times. I don't doubt the numbers the problem with it is almost a decade old. A lot has happened since 2004 not to mention the ultra-right wing Uribe regime. To me there's a big difference between 18000 and 50000 fighters. that tells me something has changed quite drastically to see your force drop by more than half.

Or the fact that the Pastrana administration decided to negotiate. I would never claim it was forced to bc. of FARC actions but more pressure from the yank gov't. The fact is that at their military height FARC's biggest military accomplishment was the take over of Mitu the capital of a Southern Department. Very underdeveloped and isolated, I really doubt that such action forced the State to negotiate. If you were to tell me that they took over Barrancabermeja-a port city sitting on oil. Then I would agree. So, most of your claims about how FARC are still a very strong group come from around this period of time -in other words NOT CURRENT.

[Homo Songun]

Actually the slums of Barrancabermeja, which is incidentally located in Magdalena Medio, were a hotbed of rebel activity, if not outright control, decades after you claim they should have been cleared from that region. A casual search of old news articles can verify this.

The problem with our conversation thus far is that you keep moving the goalposts. First, it was that the FARC has little influence. Then it was that FARC had little influence after the eighties. Now you are implying the FARC has had little influence since 2005. Of course, the material conditions that engendered FARC's influence in the first place have seen no substantive change since either of those dates, or since their inception for that matter. Serious people can draw their own conclusions from this.