Conghaileach
7th November 2003, 14:00
The Popular Palestinian Intifada … Where is it heading?
(Translated from Arabic)
By Ahmad Saadat, General Secretary of Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP)
September 28, 2003 marked the 3rd anniversary of the Intifada (Uprising).
What distinguishes this last year from the previous two is the rapid
political developments, which pose important questions as to the fate of
the Intifada and how to reap the greatest benefits of three years of
Palestinian sacrifices. In the first half of this year, the Palestinian
Authority (PA) fulfilled the obligations required for the completion of
phase one of the Road Map, by hiring a Prime Minister with maximum
authority. The second half of the year saw US imperialism and its British
ally invade Iraq, occupying its lands, despite near unanimous international
and UN opposition. It also marked the US declaration of the Road Map,
formation of a new Palestinian government, and the start of security
negotiations with the Zionist government, followed by the so called Truce,
which meant the halt of resistance and military operations from the
Palestinians side only!
However, the most visible characteristic of this period is the deepening
crisis of the Palestinian Authority, with three governments formed in this
year alone. The illusions of the Palestinian Authority were offset by the
reality contained in the Road Map. The PA thought, or perhaps wished, that
the Road Map would provide the pathway and mechanisms towards an
independent state on the Palestinian lands occupied in 1967, based on the
address by George Bush in which he called for the formation of a
Palestinian leadership that would seriously fight terrorism (in other
words, fight the Palestinian Resistance).
It was clear that the primary aim of this new/old security project was to
contain the Palestinian issue, to provide security for the Zionist occupier
and its settlers, and to transfer the entire crisis onto Palestinian
society. On the ground, the Sharon government let its racism
loose-escalating its campaign of assassinations against our people and our
leadership; assassinating Hamas leaders and cadres; taking outrageous
decisions, such as the deportation of Arafat; directly and blatantly
targeting Palestinian civilians, particularly the families of resistance
fighters; and, of course, expanding the settlements and building the
separation wall to force new realities on our people.
All of these facts suggest important questions: has the Palestinian
Uprising exhausted its strength and thus its reasons to continue? What are
the achievements of the last three years? Did the Road Map provide a
political and national alternative to the uprising and to the resistance?
Did the Road Map reflect a political achievement that reaped the benefits
of the uprising? What are the requirements and challenges facing our people
and its political leadership?
The uprising is a popular initiative. It is a state of rebellion that is a
response to the failure of the political negotiations that reached a dead
end at Camp David 2000, and a rejection of the attempts by Barak's Zionist
government to impose its conditions on our people and marginalize the
Palestinian national rights. In other words, the uprising was a natural
response to the Zionist political escalation against our people. And the
methods and weapons used by the resistance were also a natural response to
the Zionist military escalation against our people. The weaknesses that
accompanied the uprising stemmed from the absence of a unified political
decision-making body (and the absence of a unified leadership), as well as
from the state of political division that our people have lived through
since the birth of the Madrid-Oslo path. In addition, the lack of harmony
and balance between the dual components of armed struggle and popular mass
initiatives also weakened the uprising.
There are attempts to hold the uprising responsible for the pain and the
suffering of our people, rather than holding the occupier responsible. This
is an unjust argument that holds no objective understanding. It is only
natural that the losses of the occupied are larger than those of the
occupier, especially when the occupying power possesses a superior military
machine. So the central question that we now need to answer is: are the
achievements of the Intifada equivalent to the sacrifices of our masses?
The Palestinian uprising, in its first two years, forced the UN Security
Council to approve resolution 1397. This resolution called for the
establishment of an independent Palestinian State, as a non-negotiable
right, regardless of any future negotiations. The Intifada also managed to
deepen the internal crisis within the Zionist society to a level never
before witnessed by the "Israeli state," a total crisis that manifested
itself politically, economically and militarily. On the political front,
Sharon, who is considered to be a doomed, corrupted failure, became the top
political leader in "Israel." The Intifada also unmasked the deceitful
politics of the Zionist left and their tokenism of co-existence, as well as
the marketing of their illusions to the Palestinian people through regional
and international conferences and workshops in attempts to normalize
relations with the Zionist enemy. Both the Zionist right and the Zionist
left are unified against the Right of Return of Palestinian refugees, and
against the recognition of Jerusalem as an Arab city. Both agree that
"Israel" should determine the Palestinian future and fate.
Statistics show that the Zionist settler project entered a serious crisis
in terms of the slow population growth, particularly in settlements. And
economically, the Israeli losses in the tourism industry exceeded billions
of dollars, with decreasing economic growth in various industries, which
reflected itself on prioritization of spending.
On the security level, the settlers inside and outside the "Green Line" are
living in a continuous state of panic and fear, especially with the rate of
human loss at almost 1 to 3 (Israeli to Palestinian). This has resulted in
a state of hysteria, collapse of morale, deterioration of confidence, and
feelings of insecurity.
The greatest achievement of the Intifada has been the regaining of
Palestinian unity on national goals and objectives, in Palestine and in the
Diaspora (Shatat). The totality of the Palestinian people contributed to
the Intifada in one way or another, according to their capabilities and
conditions. For example, the rise of participation from our people in
occupied, 1948 Palestine and in the Shatat; and the rise of the popular
forces and masses in the Arab world and worldwide, who took the streets on
many occasions to express their support for the Intifada-despite the
silence and collapse of the Arab regimes.
But to say that the Intifada has achieved its objectives and that it is
time to reap the benefits of its achievements and turn them into political
gains (as declared by Abu Mazen in a speech to the Palestinian Legislative
Council [PLC] on the eve of forming his government) is an assumption that
can be confirmed or denied only on the basis of the political settlement
presented by the Zionist enemy in diplomatic negotiations.
In this case, the proposed settlement is the Road Map, which was altered
from its original version, and was subjected to "Israeli" conditions. Too
much has been said and written about the Road Map already. It is a
political initiative that is based on the criminalization of the
Palestinian people and condemnation of the Palestinian resistance as
"terrorism." It is also blatant intervention into Palestinian internal
affairs. The Road Map can only serve as an American political umbrella to
manage and contain the crisis in Palestine, providing more space for
"Israel" to impose its logic on both our people and on the Palestinian
Authority.
We are asked to exchange the Intifada for the Road Map. Such an exchange
will not be beneficial to our people and will only re-create the wheels of
Oslo, but in a more dangerous way. It might have benefits, but only for
specific layers in the ruling class within the Palestinian Authority, which
took advantage of Oslo and that political negotiation to build its own
private projects and establish business partnerships with Zionist investors.
Let's assume for the sake of argument that the Palestinian ruling class is
basing its call to end the Intifada on good intentions. The reality says
that what determines the transition from the battlefield to the negotiating
table is the ability of the resistance to make a radical change in the
balance of powers between our people and the occupation. In other words, to
force "Israel" to end its occupation, and recognize the Right of Return for
Palestinian refugees and the establishment of an independent Palestinian
state with Jerusalem as its capital. Have we reached that stage yet?
In reality, the answer is no. The conditions to transform achievements of
the Intifada into real political gains are not yet there. The only choice
in front of us as we enter the forth year of this Intifada is to support
its continuation, escalation and development, and to enhance its political
vision which would encourage expansion of the Intifada to include all the
sectors of our society. What we need to do immediately can be summarized as
follows:
Firstly: To free the masses and their leadership from the illusions of any
possible US support or an unbiased stand. Instead, we should work on
creating the right international conditions to help achieve a political
settlement and protect our national rights. We should also unify our
political vision and political decisions on the basis of national
dialogues, in order to build a unified leadership consisting of all
Palestinian political parties, as well as influential and respected
individuals.
Secondly: To provide a political alternative to the Road Map made of a
realistic political vision that would integrate the tools of the Uprising.
Call for the international community to take responsibility and pressure
"Israel" to stop its aggression against the Palestinian people. Secure
temporary international protection for Palestinian people while
transitioning and building the institutions of a democratic, independent
Palestinian state. And pressure "Israel" to stop its aggression and
implement UN resolutions that can lead to an International Conference under
the auspices of the United Nations. Such a conference would create
mechanisms for "Israel" to implement UN resolutions related to Palestine,
and provide a framework to stop violence and security deterioration in the
region.
Thirdly: To reclaim and re-affirm the Arab national dimension of the
Palestinian question, especially since the occupation of Iraq represents a
step toward the building of a "new Middle East" in the context of imposing
total imperialist hegemony on the Arab homeland. It is only through the
Arab national framework that we are capable of achieving the national goals
of the Arab masses, and empowering its resistance to the imperialist
American domination. We need to take the initiative to participate in
building an Arab mass movement confronting the American-Zionist aggression
against our Arab homeland. We also need to present a progressive
Palestinian discourse based on local, national, and international popular
resistance, and not a discourse that would provide the Arab regimes with
justifications for their defeat or collaboration with the US.
Fourthly: To identify the weaknesses that have led to the imbalance between
the various forms of popular resistance, and provide the conditions for
reviving the popular dimension of the Intifada. These include: building the
organizational infrastructure and leadership body for the Intifada, which
would extend to cities, villages and neighborhoods; re-activating popular
organizations and trade unions; and electing a capable leadership in order
to revive such organizations, and to become a mobilizing force for
organizing the wide popular resistance. The imbalance between the armed
resistance and the popular resistance is not attributed only to the intense
use of the Zionist military machine, forcing what some called the
"militarization" of the Intifada, but also to the absence of a program and
plans that would motivate all sectors of society, and provide the
democratic popular dimension of the Intifada.
Finally, and in response to the whispers of those who call for the end of
the Intifada under the claim of protecting the national interest of our
people, I would like to state clearly that the continuation of the Intifada
might harm the interest of the Palestinian Authority. That is logical and
possible. However, the existence of the Authority, any authority, is not a
goal in itself, except for those who see it as a means to self-interested
gain. The Palestinian Authority in our situation was supposed to be,
according to the defenders of Oslo, a mechanism for transition from the
occupation to a real Palestinian sovereignty capable of ending the
occupation. Such a view could be understood. However, if the PA is no
longer capable of such a task, and responds to international pressure as it
has (arresting resistance leaders and "criminalizing" the resistance), then
it becomes a tool of oppression against the Palestinian people, the
Intifada, and the resistance. Therefore, in this case, what would justify
the PA's existence, and would it represent the highest national interest of
the Palestinian people?
The Authority was not the project of the Palestinian majority; however, all
Palestinian political forces respected its existence and dealt with it in
different ways. This does not mean that we should make the PA our fate,
especially if it becomes a burden on our people's national struggle.
This conclusion is not a call to dismantle the Palestinian Authority, but
rather a call to be ready at all times to protect the political entity of
our people in the face of complex equations, especially should the
existence of the PA become conditioned upon surrender to the demands of the
enemy in the future.
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) represented the strategic tool
for our people's struggle and secured our unity worldwide. The PLO also
represented the common goals of the struggle of our people. That is why the
central mission now must be re-affirming the need for the PLO, and
presenting practical democratic mechanisms to re-build its institutions and
expanding it to include all political and social forces. The PLO must be
the instrument of resistance at this current political stage in the history
of our people's struggle against the Zionist enemy.
(Translated from Arabic)
By Ahmad Saadat, General Secretary of Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP)
September 28, 2003 marked the 3rd anniversary of the Intifada (Uprising).
What distinguishes this last year from the previous two is the rapid
political developments, which pose important questions as to the fate of
the Intifada and how to reap the greatest benefits of three years of
Palestinian sacrifices. In the first half of this year, the Palestinian
Authority (PA) fulfilled the obligations required for the completion of
phase one of the Road Map, by hiring a Prime Minister with maximum
authority. The second half of the year saw US imperialism and its British
ally invade Iraq, occupying its lands, despite near unanimous international
and UN opposition. It also marked the US declaration of the Road Map,
formation of a new Palestinian government, and the start of security
negotiations with the Zionist government, followed by the so called Truce,
which meant the halt of resistance and military operations from the
Palestinians side only!
However, the most visible characteristic of this period is the deepening
crisis of the Palestinian Authority, with three governments formed in this
year alone. The illusions of the Palestinian Authority were offset by the
reality contained in the Road Map. The PA thought, or perhaps wished, that
the Road Map would provide the pathway and mechanisms towards an
independent state on the Palestinian lands occupied in 1967, based on the
address by George Bush in which he called for the formation of a
Palestinian leadership that would seriously fight terrorism (in other
words, fight the Palestinian Resistance).
It was clear that the primary aim of this new/old security project was to
contain the Palestinian issue, to provide security for the Zionist occupier
and its settlers, and to transfer the entire crisis onto Palestinian
society. On the ground, the Sharon government let its racism
loose-escalating its campaign of assassinations against our people and our
leadership; assassinating Hamas leaders and cadres; taking outrageous
decisions, such as the deportation of Arafat; directly and blatantly
targeting Palestinian civilians, particularly the families of resistance
fighters; and, of course, expanding the settlements and building the
separation wall to force new realities on our people.
All of these facts suggest important questions: has the Palestinian
Uprising exhausted its strength and thus its reasons to continue? What are
the achievements of the last three years? Did the Road Map provide a
political and national alternative to the uprising and to the resistance?
Did the Road Map reflect a political achievement that reaped the benefits
of the uprising? What are the requirements and challenges facing our people
and its political leadership?
The uprising is a popular initiative. It is a state of rebellion that is a
response to the failure of the political negotiations that reached a dead
end at Camp David 2000, and a rejection of the attempts by Barak's Zionist
government to impose its conditions on our people and marginalize the
Palestinian national rights. In other words, the uprising was a natural
response to the Zionist political escalation against our people. And the
methods and weapons used by the resistance were also a natural response to
the Zionist military escalation against our people. The weaknesses that
accompanied the uprising stemmed from the absence of a unified political
decision-making body (and the absence of a unified leadership), as well as
from the state of political division that our people have lived through
since the birth of the Madrid-Oslo path. In addition, the lack of harmony
and balance between the dual components of armed struggle and popular mass
initiatives also weakened the uprising.
There are attempts to hold the uprising responsible for the pain and the
suffering of our people, rather than holding the occupier responsible. This
is an unjust argument that holds no objective understanding. It is only
natural that the losses of the occupied are larger than those of the
occupier, especially when the occupying power possesses a superior military
machine. So the central question that we now need to answer is: are the
achievements of the Intifada equivalent to the sacrifices of our masses?
The Palestinian uprising, in its first two years, forced the UN Security
Council to approve resolution 1397. This resolution called for the
establishment of an independent Palestinian State, as a non-negotiable
right, regardless of any future negotiations. The Intifada also managed to
deepen the internal crisis within the Zionist society to a level never
before witnessed by the "Israeli state," a total crisis that manifested
itself politically, economically and militarily. On the political front,
Sharon, who is considered to be a doomed, corrupted failure, became the top
political leader in "Israel." The Intifada also unmasked the deceitful
politics of the Zionist left and their tokenism of co-existence, as well as
the marketing of their illusions to the Palestinian people through regional
and international conferences and workshops in attempts to normalize
relations with the Zionist enemy. Both the Zionist right and the Zionist
left are unified against the Right of Return of Palestinian refugees, and
against the recognition of Jerusalem as an Arab city. Both agree that
"Israel" should determine the Palestinian future and fate.
Statistics show that the Zionist settler project entered a serious crisis
in terms of the slow population growth, particularly in settlements. And
economically, the Israeli losses in the tourism industry exceeded billions
of dollars, with decreasing economic growth in various industries, which
reflected itself on prioritization of spending.
On the security level, the settlers inside and outside the "Green Line" are
living in a continuous state of panic and fear, especially with the rate of
human loss at almost 1 to 3 (Israeli to Palestinian). This has resulted in
a state of hysteria, collapse of morale, deterioration of confidence, and
feelings of insecurity.
The greatest achievement of the Intifada has been the regaining of
Palestinian unity on national goals and objectives, in Palestine and in the
Diaspora (Shatat). The totality of the Palestinian people contributed to
the Intifada in one way or another, according to their capabilities and
conditions. For example, the rise of participation from our people in
occupied, 1948 Palestine and in the Shatat; and the rise of the popular
forces and masses in the Arab world and worldwide, who took the streets on
many occasions to express their support for the Intifada-despite the
silence and collapse of the Arab regimes.
But to say that the Intifada has achieved its objectives and that it is
time to reap the benefits of its achievements and turn them into political
gains (as declared by Abu Mazen in a speech to the Palestinian Legislative
Council [PLC] on the eve of forming his government) is an assumption that
can be confirmed or denied only on the basis of the political settlement
presented by the Zionist enemy in diplomatic negotiations.
In this case, the proposed settlement is the Road Map, which was altered
from its original version, and was subjected to "Israeli" conditions. Too
much has been said and written about the Road Map already. It is a
political initiative that is based on the criminalization of the
Palestinian people and condemnation of the Palestinian resistance as
"terrorism." It is also blatant intervention into Palestinian internal
affairs. The Road Map can only serve as an American political umbrella to
manage and contain the crisis in Palestine, providing more space for
"Israel" to impose its logic on both our people and on the Palestinian
Authority.
We are asked to exchange the Intifada for the Road Map. Such an exchange
will not be beneficial to our people and will only re-create the wheels of
Oslo, but in a more dangerous way. It might have benefits, but only for
specific layers in the ruling class within the Palestinian Authority, which
took advantage of Oslo and that political negotiation to build its own
private projects and establish business partnerships with Zionist investors.
Let's assume for the sake of argument that the Palestinian ruling class is
basing its call to end the Intifada on good intentions. The reality says
that what determines the transition from the battlefield to the negotiating
table is the ability of the resistance to make a radical change in the
balance of powers between our people and the occupation. In other words, to
force "Israel" to end its occupation, and recognize the Right of Return for
Palestinian refugees and the establishment of an independent Palestinian
state with Jerusalem as its capital. Have we reached that stage yet?
In reality, the answer is no. The conditions to transform achievements of
the Intifada into real political gains are not yet there. The only choice
in front of us as we enter the forth year of this Intifada is to support
its continuation, escalation and development, and to enhance its political
vision which would encourage expansion of the Intifada to include all the
sectors of our society. What we need to do immediately can be summarized as
follows:
Firstly: To free the masses and their leadership from the illusions of any
possible US support or an unbiased stand. Instead, we should work on
creating the right international conditions to help achieve a political
settlement and protect our national rights. We should also unify our
political vision and political decisions on the basis of national
dialogues, in order to build a unified leadership consisting of all
Palestinian political parties, as well as influential and respected
individuals.
Secondly: To provide a political alternative to the Road Map made of a
realistic political vision that would integrate the tools of the Uprising.
Call for the international community to take responsibility and pressure
"Israel" to stop its aggression against the Palestinian people. Secure
temporary international protection for Palestinian people while
transitioning and building the institutions of a democratic, independent
Palestinian state. And pressure "Israel" to stop its aggression and
implement UN resolutions that can lead to an International Conference under
the auspices of the United Nations. Such a conference would create
mechanisms for "Israel" to implement UN resolutions related to Palestine,
and provide a framework to stop violence and security deterioration in the
region.
Thirdly: To reclaim and re-affirm the Arab national dimension of the
Palestinian question, especially since the occupation of Iraq represents a
step toward the building of a "new Middle East" in the context of imposing
total imperialist hegemony on the Arab homeland. It is only through the
Arab national framework that we are capable of achieving the national goals
of the Arab masses, and empowering its resistance to the imperialist
American domination. We need to take the initiative to participate in
building an Arab mass movement confronting the American-Zionist aggression
against our Arab homeland. We also need to present a progressive
Palestinian discourse based on local, national, and international popular
resistance, and not a discourse that would provide the Arab regimes with
justifications for their defeat or collaboration with the US.
Fourthly: To identify the weaknesses that have led to the imbalance between
the various forms of popular resistance, and provide the conditions for
reviving the popular dimension of the Intifada. These include: building the
organizational infrastructure and leadership body for the Intifada, which
would extend to cities, villages and neighborhoods; re-activating popular
organizations and trade unions; and electing a capable leadership in order
to revive such organizations, and to become a mobilizing force for
organizing the wide popular resistance. The imbalance between the armed
resistance and the popular resistance is not attributed only to the intense
use of the Zionist military machine, forcing what some called the
"militarization" of the Intifada, but also to the absence of a program and
plans that would motivate all sectors of society, and provide the
democratic popular dimension of the Intifada.
Finally, and in response to the whispers of those who call for the end of
the Intifada under the claim of protecting the national interest of our
people, I would like to state clearly that the continuation of the Intifada
might harm the interest of the Palestinian Authority. That is logical and
possible. However, the existence of the Authority, any authority, is not a
goal in itself, except for those who see it as a means to self-interested
gain. The Palestinian Authority in our situation was supposed to be,
according to the defenders of Oslo, a mechanism for transition from the
occupation to a real Palestinian sovereignty capable of ending the
occupation. Such a view could be understood. However, if the PA is no
longer capable of such a task, and responds to international pressure as it
has (arresting resistance leaders and "criminalizing" the resistance), then
it becomes a tool of oppression against the Palestinian people, the
Intifada, and the resistance. Therefore, in this case, what would justify
the PA's existence, and would it represent the highest national interest of
the Palestinian people?
The Authority was not the project of the Palestinian majority; however, all
Palestinian political forces respected its existence and dealt with it in
different ways. This does not mean that we should make the PA our fate,
especially if it becomes a burden on our people's national struggle.
This conclusion is not a call to dismantle the Palestinian Authority, but
rather a call to be ready at all times to protect the political entity of
our people in the face of complex equations, especially should the
existence of the PA become conditioned upon surrender to the demands of the
enemy in the future.
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) represented the strategic tool
for our people's struggle and secured our unity worldwide. The PLO also
represented the common goals of the struggle of our people. That is why the
central mission now must be re-affirming the need for the PLO, and
presenting practical democratic mechanisms to re-build its institutions and
expanding it to include all political and social forces. The PLO must be
the instrument of resistance at this current political stage in the history
of our people's struggle against the Zionist enemy.