Famines of the Soviet Union

[Scrounger]

What was it that caused them? Right-wingers usually bring it up in order to support their claim that planned economy and collectivisation of industries doesn't work. I've read the wiki page related to it but it's rather limited and I'd like to hear a response from someone who has deeper knowledge about it.

Thanks in advance

[EvilRedGuy]

Inappropriate Weather?


:laugh:

[#FF0000]

Can we stop posting one line and unhelpful responses in Learning threads?

[deadsmooth]

The Great War started in August of 1914 C.E., or just about harvest time, which was above average. The harvests were delivered to various railsidings, river docks, etc. pretty much as usual, it being too soon for labor shortages to appear.

However, the Empire of Russia diverted all available transportation to mobilizing for the War, and most of this harvest rotted on the ground at the pick-up points, as all available storage space was filled up and never emptied.

This is why the first food riots broke out in the Empire in the spring of 1915, long before the Revolution.

The Empire of Germany did considerable damage to Russia's infrastructure 1914-1917, and the Empire of Russia did more by deferring maintenance in order to divert those resources to the War. Also, considerable damage was done to the Russian labor pool and social cohesion (sorry to sound so clinical).

The Farms of Russia were paid C.O.D. not F.O.B. As there were no deliveries made in 1914, so to the Farms were not paid, regardless of productivity or expenses. This made planting in the spring of 1915 difficult to impossible, and so the cycle continued.

Contrary to the expectations of foreign Capitalists/imperialists, it proved impossible for the Communists to reverse this cycle overnight. Remember to, that the counter-Revolution and its destructiveness continued until circa 1922-23, which caused delays in recovery.

And after the foreign sponsored counter-Revolution failed foreign political, economic, military, and propaganda attacks continued, which could not have helped any.

Also consider the billions invested by the Empire of Russia in other countries stolen by foreign governments in the 1920-30's.

[ComradeOm]

Well no, collectivisation, within the Stalinist model, doesn't work. At least so long as your definition of 'working' includes ' not killing millions'. Davies' and Wheatcroft's definitive and detailed account of the 1932-33 famine, Years of Hunger, identifies four key factors. Of which I can only remember three off hand. Annoying. These are:

1) The weather. This was not the sole cause of the famine, as Stalinist so often insist. Droughts were common before and after the 1930s without causing the deaths of millions. This did however complicate the sowing process

2) Collapse of proper agricultural practices. Collectivisation was bad enough but it was the relentless drive from the centre for more and more grain that led to a disastrous fall in yields. Fantastical production targets wrecked havoc in industry but were lethal in agriculture. For example, until 1932 (IIRC) the annual national economic plans had consistently called for ever greater expansion of the sown areas; without, of course, allocating resources to exploiting virgin lands. The result was the effective abandonment of crop rotation on collective farms, weed-choked fields and a collapse in yields

3) Lack of horsepower. Literally in the case of livestock, whose numbers plummeted during the early 1930s. This was a direct result of seed seizures by the state and collectivisation. Tractors never materialised in anywhere near the numbers required to cover the deficit and as a result there simply wasn't enough horsepower to effectively sow and harvest the crop

As I said, I can't quite recall factor 4. May have been the lack of available fertiliser after the state had cut back on imports

I wrote a few posts on the earlier 1921 famine here (http://www.revleft.com/vb/pbs-documentary-russian-t160934/index.html). Do either suggest some inherent deficiency in planned economies? I don't believe so. The famines of 1918 and 1921 were essentially part of the long economic collapse of the Tsardom. We can argue over whether the Bolsheviks were entirely correct in their policies but it must be acknowledged that they had little room for manoeuvre. In contrast the famine of 1932-33*, and arguably that 1946-47, was the direct result of state incompetence. It was not coincidence that mass starvation went hand in hand with mass collectivisation. This was not a failure of planning per se but a failure of an elite that believed that it was above planning or listening to the advice of agronomists, economists or its own officials on the ground

Edit: So in short: the deaths of millions were caused not by planning but by the incompetence of the Stalinist state

*A simplification. Famine like conditions had first appeared a year or two earlier in some areas and would persist until 1935 or so

[piet11111]

Those famines happened in the tsarist regime as well only now they had a civil war a lot of bad weather and crop diseases (result of the bad weather allowing fungal growths to form more)
In europe and asia there was also large amounts of crop failure in those years due to the same factors (minus the civil war) only not on the same disastrous level because of more advanced farming techniques.

Also the first world war and the civil war demanded a lot of farm horses to be used by the army depleting their numbers by quite a large portion.
Then you also had sabotage by the kulaks though probably not on the level the soviet union claimed.

[Nox]

The Kulaks were the sole reason for the failure of Stalin's collectivisation, they revolted and destroyed farm equipment, burned crops etc. Around 6 million died as a result of this.

Collectivisation was a very good thing because it doubled the wheat yield in just a few years, using roughly the same area of land for agriculture.

[ComradeOm]

The Kulaks were the sole reason for the failure of Stalin's collectivisation, they revolted and destroyed farm equipment, burned crops etc. Around 6 million died as a result of thisWhat can anyone say to this? It's just so obviously stupid as to defy contradiction

Leaving aside the issues with the very definition of 'kulaks' (http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1761699&postcount=18), we are expected to believe that over a few years these 'kulaks' slaughtered over 50% of the horses in the USSR? That they destroyed tens of millions of tonnes of grain? That they infiltrated and sabotaged the tractor factories and rail networks? That they did all this even after millions of them had been deported to 'special settlements'?

Seriously, what sort of mind believes all this? Yeah, let's ignore all those more mundane factors (government intervention, actual economic reasons) and focus on semi-fictional bands of anti-Soviet agitators roaming the country with the aid of German and Polish agents :rolleyes:


Collectivisation was a very good thing because it doubled the wheat yield in just a few years, using roughly the same area of land for agriculture.Really? I ask because even official Soviet estimates from the 1930s don't make that claim. Try again

As it happens, Davies and co (Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union) give a much more modest increase of 15% between 1928 and 1938; a difference perfectly within the range of natural variation. The 1938 figure is, for example, actually less than that of 1913

[Scrounger]

Thanks for all the replies so far.

[Nox]

we are expected to believe that over a few years these 'kulaks' slaughtered over 50% of the horses in the USSR? That they destroyed tens of millions of tonnes of grain? That they infiltrated and sabotaged the tractor factories and rail networks?

I don't know about the tractor factories/rail networks, but I know that they sabotaged the harvest significantly in order to cause around 6 million deaths as a result.

You must understand that the 'Kulaks' weren't an organised group, they were just greedy peasants who went on a rampage in opposition to collectivisation, the rebellion spread rapidly and many were involved, the scale of it was massive.


Seriously, what sort of mind believes all this? Yeah, let's ignore all those more mundane factors (government intervention, actual economic reasons) and focus on semi-fictional bands of anti-Soviet agitators roaming the country with the aid of German and Polish agents :rolleyes:

Although I agree there was an element of propaganda in Stalin's portrayal of the Kulaks, they were still the main reason why those 6 million died in the famine, because they are the ones who caused the famine. Yes, I do acknowledge that Stalin could have handled the situation better, but ultimately he didn't cause the famine in the first place.


Really? I ask because even official Soviet estimates from the 1930s don't make that claim. Try again

I've seen numerous sources that show an increase of 75-100% in the wheat yield. I will try and find one for you.

To be honest, it doesn't surprise me that the numbers of livestock decreased, as areas previously used for livestock would have been used for wheat production instead, or labourers from livestock areas would have been moved to Kolkhozy. Stalin focused on wheat/grain production seeing as this was the most efficient way to feed the population and fund industrialisation.

[ComradeOm]

You must understand that the 'Kulaks' weren't an organised group, they were just greedy peasants who went on a rampage in opposition to collectivisation, the rebellion spread rapidly and many were involved, the scale of it was massiveOne might almost be convinced that the Stalinist state was waging a war against a broad spectrum of the peasantry and not just some alienated exploitive caste, no? The term 'kulak' denotes nothing more than 'peasant who resisted collectivisation' - a perfectly rational response given that the entire collectivisation programme was intended to 'squeeze' the peasantry for more grain. Because this was not in the interests of the broader peasantry, and there were no incentives to the contrary, the most damaging form of resistance was passive - slaughtering animals or lower worker productivity

That and the fact that grain is a finite resource. You can't keep taking it without regard for consequences. Many of the livestock slaughtered in these years simply could not be maintained on the available supplies of fodder. Better to slaughter them and sell/eat the meat


I've seen numerous sources that show an increase of 75-100% in the wheat yield. I will try and find one for you.I probably know the figures that you'll present - the unadjusted propaganda headlines of the 1930s. Figures that incidentally state that average grain production during the famine years was greater than the decade prior to 1913 and just slightly less than 1928. If you believe these figures then there was no famine in 1932-33. Which would be consistent with the Stalinist line at the time


To be honest, it doesn't surprise me that the numbers of livestock decreased, as areas previously used for livestock would have been used for wheat production instead, or labourers from livestock areas would have been moved to Kolkhozy. Stalin focused on wheat/grain production seeing as this was the most efficient way to feed the population and fund industrialisation.So you are blaming Stalin for the collapse in livestock figures (greater percentage-wise than either world war) that severely hindered efforts to sow/harvest the grain harvest?

There comes a point where it is necessary to treat the management of a national economy as something more nuanced than a crude political equation

[Le Socialiste]

Planned economies can't (and don't) work. However, you are asking about famines within the Soviet Union. Can you be more specific? Are you referring to Stalin's collectivization efforts or asking about famines inside the Soviet Union in general? During its early, formative years the Soviets introduced various measures that they deemed necessary to the furtherance of the "revolution". One of the results of these measures was war communism, wherein the forcible requisitioning of resources from the peasantry and countryside for the maintenance of the Red Army and the cities resulted in widespread hunger and dissatisfaction as requisition squads would sometimes/often take more than they were supposed to. The creation and instillation of state oversight and control over agricultural production throughout the countryside in the form of seed banks and state farms only compounded these issues. The devestatingly destructive nature of years of war, civil war, and social upheaval had crippled the economy, including lines of transportation and communication, leaving the nation's industrial economy in ruins.

Production was all but nonexistent as workers in the cities began fleeing en masse into the country. Lack of adequate transportational facilities meant a lack of food in the city, forcing many to abandon their workplaces and go underground, using the black market as a means of staying afloat. According to some sources, by 1920 "illicit trade had grown to such proportions that it largely supplanted the official channels of distribution." Elements of city life continued to deteriorate as lack of fuel, warm clothing, and food proved deadly in the winters. Taken together, there were millions forced to go without the basic necessities needed to sustain themselves and their families. The eventual shift from war communism to a planned economy, coupled with the reintroduction of single-man/woman management over industries and workplaces, left many people in want.