Questions about Albania

[Tommy4ever]

I've been looking at Hoxhaist Albania recently and have some questions:

1) Does anyone have some economic and development statistics for Albania during the Cold War era? Preferably with comparisons with Eastern Bloc states anc capitalist nations that were at a similar stage of development.

2) Inspite of its isolation from the Eastern Bloc, why did the Albanian regime collapse around the same time?

3) Were the economic and political problems suffered by Albania at the end of the regime the same as in the Eastern Bloc?

4) Why was Albania's ruling party unable to establish mechanisms to prevent 'capitalist roaders' taking over its leadership? What mechanisms could possibly successfully counter this problem?

5) If the Albanian regime was so popular, why is there now substantial leftist movement calling for a restoration of the pre-1991 form of government?

I know that the former ruling party morphed into a social democratic party which has dominated Albanian politics since, might this be a major reason?

[Ismail]

A post I made in another thread will answer questions #1 and 2.


The main introductory book is A Coming of Age: Albania Under Enver Hoxha, which was written in 1999. Here's a place you can download it: http://espressostalinist.files.wordpress.com/2010/12/a-coming-of-age.pdf

A year back a user wrote a good post on Albanian economic progress:

To Jolly Red Giant:

Historical context is important for dialectical materialism.

The sacrifices of our people were very great. Out of a population of one million, 28,000 were killed, 12,600 wounded, 10,000 were made political prisoners in Italy and Germany, and 35,000 made to do forced labour, of ground; all the communications, all the ports, mines and electric power installations were destroyed, our agriculture and livestock were plundered, and our entire national economy was wrecked.
Enver Hoxha, Selected Works, 1941–1948, vol. I (Tirana: 8 Nëntori Publishing House, 1974, 599-600.

Look up the bourgeois figures and they are almost exactly the same.
From Communism, Health, and Lifestyle: The Paradox of Mortality Transition in Albania, 1950-1990.

p. 9 – “Figures for 1927…show that 92.4% of the population was illiterate. Among the literate population only 446 had a university degree, and 1,773 had secondary schooling.”

“a figure on life expectancy at birth [was] given for 1938 as 38 years” Although this number is heavily disputed due to lack of tracking deaths, the fact remains that life expectancy was very low. The author also admits that the “majority of villagers died without any medical intervention.”

p. 9-10 – “Until 1922, when the first public health service was established, there was no health institution in the country.”

p. 15-16 - “in 1949 there were 238,266 malaria cases reported, which means that 20.1% of the population was infected.”
“”tuberculosis was widespread and in 1950 accounted for more than 15% of all deaths.”

From a bourgeois book: A Coming of Age: Albania under Enver Hoxha by O’Donnell

p. 186. "Enver Hoxha's plan to mobilize all of Albania's resources under the regimentation of a central plan was effective and quite successful […] Albania was a tribal society, not necessarily primitive but certainly less developed than most. It had no industrial or working class tradition and no experience using modern production techniques. Thus, the results achieved, especially during the phases of initial planning and construction of the economic base were both impressive and positive."

From Communism, Health, and Lifestyle: The Paradox of Mortality Transition in Albania, 1950-1990.

p. 20 – The growth of the net material product from one five-year-plan to the next was, on average, nearly 44%, with industry recording the fastest growth rates during this period [the Marxist period of 1945-1975].”

“The average growth of industry from 1951 to 1975 was 82.5%”

“The country’s highway system was greatly expanded and by 1985 consisted of 6,900 kilometres”

“Because of the large number of rivers and their mountainous nature, Albania developed its hydroelectric potential (HEP), estimated at 2,500 MW, second to Norway within Europe.”

From Stalinist Economic Strategy in Practice: The Case of Albania – Adi Schnytzer

Growth indices for the Albanian economy (1938=1)

Gross domestic material product
1950 – 1.7
1960 – 4.0
1970 – 8.3
1973 – 10.7

Global agricultural production
1950 – 1.2
1960 – 1.7
1970 – 3.1
1973 – 3.5

Global industrial production
1950 – 4
1960 – 25
1970 – 64
1973 – 86

Retail trade turnover
1950 – 1.4
1960 – 6
1970 – 10
1973 – 13

Population (millions)
1950 – 1.20
1960 – 1.60
1970 – 2.14
1973 – 2.30

“From the table [presented above] it is clear that the Albanian economy has sustained rapid economic growth since 1950.” The author adds it is surprising that the successes of the Albanian economy have not been more thoroughly catalogued by Western scholars.

In 1945 alone, one year after the socialist revolution, half of the arable land in Albania was already redistributed.

US government sources speak of it right here:
http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-165.html

From Communism, Health, and Lifestyle: The Paradox of Mortality Transition in Albania, 1950-1990 one more time:

p. 17 – “the Agrarian Land Reform, which was sanctioned by law in August 1945, based on the principle that ‘the land belong to the tiller.’ So, based on this law, the Albanian government confiscated the large landed estates without making any compensation to the owners. The land was then redistributed to the peasants, with the condition that it could not be sold, bought or rented.”

Official -statistics (the objectivity of which has been attested to by eminent British economists) show that between 1951 and 1985

Agricultural production increased by 4.5 times;
Retail sales per head of population: 5.5 times;
Industrial production increased by 16.2 times;
Chrome production increased by 30.9 times;
Electric power prduction increased by 217.1 times;
Chemical production increased by 585.8 times;
('Statistical Yearbook of the PSR of Albania1988'; Tirana; 1988; p.: 81, 87, 122).And a post I once made on the 1991-1992 events and such:

From Pickaxe and Rifle: The Story of the Albanian People (1974), p. 159: "During the two year plan [1949-1950] large projects were begun... Of the total investment in this period 47% was devoted to the development of industry with 20% going to the improvement and expansion of mining Albania's rich sub-soil resources. By 1950 general industrial output had been raised to over four times the output in 1958.

With the first five year plan (1952-1955) the development of industry gathered such momentum that by the end of the period Albania had been transformed from a backward agricultural into an agrarian industrial country."

p. 160: "In the third five year plan (1961-1965)... In spite of the fact that it was during this period that Khrushchev not only broke off unilaterally all economic agreements... industrial production rose to 35 times that of 1938 with 11 days sufficing to turn out the goods which had then required a whole year to produce. Industry represented 57% of total output as opposed to 8% in 1938. National income as a whole was 536% as compared with 1938 and per capital income 300%."

From A Coming of Age: Albania under Enver Hoxha, p. 186: "The prioritization of heavy industry [emphasis added] which enabled Albania to take advantage of the large number of natural resources it possessed was extremely logical."

... By the 1980's the economy had stagnated due to a lack of foreign trade, and in Hoxha's works there's plenty of anticipation for an expected economic collapse of capitalism (and revisionism) in the 1980's which never came. At this same time, despite efforts by Hoxha (which mirrored Stalin in the early 1950's) to have young cadre enter the party, bureaucracy remained. By 1989 the post-Hoxha leadership had begun to move away from socialism, and adopted Khrushchev-esque reforms in 1990 which caused the economy to sag. Then a student movement started based upon an idealization of capitalism. Meanwhile, Ramiz Alia began praising East Germany as a "socialist" state and began opening up to the US and UK. He began "destalinization" measures (removing Stalin monuments, stressing "peace" over "dogmatic" class war, etc.), began purging "hardliners" from the party and Central Committee, and agreed to market capitalist reforms in 1991 and 1992 which caused the economy to tank.

At this same time the newly-formed Democratic Party under Sali Berisha was very anti-communist and began forming pro-capitalist trade unions. In the 1991 election the Party of Labour still won quite a significant victory, and remained quite popular in the countryside. However, "This was followed immediately by two months of widespread unrest, including street demonstrations and a general strike lasting three weeks, which finally led to the collapse of the new regime by June. The National Endowment for Democracy had been there also, providing $80,000 to the labor movement and $23,000 'to support training and civic education programs'." (Killing Hope, p. 320. The NED being often described as a CIA front)

The Democrats had demanded that the government resign simply because it was "Communist." "In December [1991], DPA Party Chairman Sali Berisha charged the SPA [Socialist Party of Albania – social-democratic name change of the PLA] with deliberately obstructing the reform process in the countryside... He called for DPA members to resign from the coalition government... This occurred whilst Gramoz Pashko [Democrat, economics minister] was having talks in London with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)... Pashko criticized Berisha for breaking up the government, saying that the move would lead the country into even further anarchy and chaos. The same week saw the arrest of 71-year-old Nexhmije Hoxha, who had been expelled from the party in June... And so began the series of witch-hunts, mixing corruption with politics, that would so preoccupy the country's leaders over the next few years... Albania's immediate future could not have appeared bleaker." (The Albanians: A Modern History, p. 230.)

After disrupting the economy due to the trade union strikes (which were similar to those of the CIA-backed anti-Allende strikes in Chile in the early 1970's), the DPA won the 1992 elections. On April 4, 1992, Alia resigned as President. "The rapid dismantling of the one-party state had brought about the almost total breakdown of state authority, resulting not only in the collapse of the economy, but also in an escalation of serious crime....

By the Democrats' own admission, the rebuilding of the country's devastated economy would be a long, slow process....

Gloom and despair now typified Albanian rural life, as most peasants had a little milk or cheese to sell but were otherwise jobless and without income. The young wanted to get out at any cost... At the beginning of July... around 6,000 Albanians tried to commander ships in Durres... The attempted exodus was triggered by the discontinuation of unemployment benefits for state workers, thus effectively cutting off the income of around 20 per cent of Albania's workforce. A general air of unrest soon prevailed throughout the country... Although Operation Pelican, the Italian-organized food aid programme, had successfully prevented mass starvation, it could hardly be seen as a permanent solution to the country's food shortages." (pp. 232-234.)

"On 12 September, former president Ramiz Alia was put under house arrest... The cause of his sudden arrest could be traced to his outspoken articles in the socialist newspaper, 24 Hours, in which he criticized the government for having lowered the standard of living... five former Communist Party and police officials were jailed up to 20 years... By then virtually the entire former Politburo was under arrest.. many saw the purges of former leaders as directing attention away from real and acute problems facing the country." (pp. 235-236.)

The situation degenerated from there. The country began one of the most corrupt in the world, Berisha attempted to centralize power in his own hands throughout the 1993-1996 period as political opponents were harassed, arrested, or assassinated, etc. Corruption and capitalism went together to cause the economy to spiral into a crisis, and the year 1997 saw a civil war erupt. "Berisha now became subject to serious public and international criticism of his actions, with western governments condemning violent attacks on the press... The Berisha government... attempted to regain control of the south by bombing the rebel-held Greek minority village of Delvina. This was a feeble and ineffective attempt to terrorise the local population, which led directly to the rebel takeover of the nearby town of Saranda. There followed the wholesale looting of army and navy depots by protestors... the important town of Gjirokaster [Hoxha's birthplace] fell to the rebels....

Berisha, arguing that he was facing a communist insurgency, had made a formal appeal for military assistance... the restoration of order was a priority for the West. Thus, in a damage limitation exercise, a multinational task force was duly assembled and landed at Durres on 15 April... Berisha's administration was forced to face political reality and cave in to opposition and international demands for an all-party government and new parliamentary elections." (pp. 246-247.)

With NATO assistance the revolt was quelled and Berisha was kicked out in elections that year, only to return some years later. Albania remains corrupt and Berisha remains a reactionary.

A short 2007 Christian Science Monitor article contrasting the Albania of Hoxha's time to modern-day Albania: http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0710/p10s01-woeu.html?page=1
3) Were the economic and political problems suffered by Albania at the end of the regime the same as in the Eastern Bloc?They weren't different, although the shortage of consumer goods and economic materials was much worse.


4) Why was Albania's ruling party unable to establish mechanisms to prevent 'capitalist roaders' taking over its leadership? What mechanisms could possibly successfully counter this problem?This is a question that is more based on threads about vanguard parties or (if one is a Trotskyist) "Stalinism" rather than Albania itself.


5) If the Albanian regime was so popular, why is there now substantial leftist movement calling for a restoration of the pre-1991 form of government?Evidently you meant "no" rather than "now." In the first place most Albanians are very young and the post-1992 government is very anti-communist. In the second place socialism is identified with stagnation. Most Albanians do admit that there was considerable economic and social progress in the 1944-1978 period, but then say that the 1978-1991 period was anything but. The security service in Albania (the Sigurimi) was also much more "firm" than, say, the Stasi or other Eastern Bloc security services. It had much more in common with the NKVD. The Sigurimi would do things like arrest entire families for the crime of one family member, children would be denounced in front of others at school because of anti-communist family members or friends, citizens often had to report about their "commitments" to socialism on a weekly or monthly basis, etc.

Still, there are communists in Albania. Here's an article written by one last year: http://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/rdv16n2/enver.htm


I know that the former ruling party morphed into a social democratic party which has dominated Albanian politics since, might this be a major reason?No, the Democratic Party of Albania dominates most Albanian politics and is very anti-communist. The Socialist Party of Albania is the successor to the PLA, and it's a right-wing social-democratic party that denounces communism.

It's worth noting that most Albanians are politically apathetic. The only thing that really gets them excited is issues of Albanian nationalism, such as Kosovo. They view the US as a wonderful country because it supports Kosovo's independence and has given economic aid to Albania. Also in Albanian textbooks one "learns" of how Woodrow Wilson was single-handedly responsible for Albania not being divided up between the Great Powers at the conclusion of World War I.

[Tommy4ever]

So is there some sort of Hoxhaist, or atleast leftist movment in Albania at all? Perhaps mostly based amongst the older generation?

[Ismail]

So is there some sort of Hoxhaist, or atleast leftist movment in Albania at all? Perhaps mostly based amongst the older generation?Most Albanian Communists are old people, yes. That's generally the case in Eastern Europe and the former USSR as well.

The Communist Party of Albania is the only organized communist force in the country from what I've seen. Hysni Milloshi, their leader, unsuccessfully ran for Mayor of Tirana most recently. Here's a (rather badly translated) interview: http://espressostalinist.wordpress.com/2011/08/03/interview-with-hysni-milloshi-in-the-telegraph/

In 1997 Milloshi noted (http://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/rdv3n2/albania.htm) that, "[The tearing down of the statue of Enver Hoxha in the capital in 1991] was organised by the Democratic Party, which was then in the opposition. But Ramiz Alia knew of it and encouraged them. The night before, this sturdy statue had already been dismantled by Alia's men, so that it would come down easily. When the people saw what had happened to the statue, many peasants came marching to Tirana from all parts of the country. For seven days and nights they beleaguered the Communist Party headquarters. They demanded that Berisha's party be banned and that the terrorists who demolished cultural monuments be arrested. But Ramiz Alia refused to cooperate with them. l never foresaw that I would play an important role. I see myself simply as a small intellectual. But when I observed Ramiz Alia not taking up his responsibility, I wrote a long letter in defence of Comrade Enver Hoxha. Excerpts were published in the press. Immediately committees emerged in defence of Enver Hoxha. 750,000 people affiliated with them! (Note Albania has 3 million inhabitants.)"

[Red_Struggle]

\The Communist Party of Albania is the only organized communist force in the country from what I've seen.

Actually, there is the PPSHr (Party of Labor of Albania reorganized).

[A Marxist Historian]

A post I made in another thread will answer questions #1 and 2.

They weren't different, although the shortage of consumer goods and economic materials was much worse.

This is a question that is more based on threads about vanguard parties or (if one is a Trotskyist) "Stalinism" rather than Albania itself.

Evidently you meant "no" rather than "now." In the first place most Albanians are very young and the post-1992 government is very anti-communist. In the second place socialism is identified with stagnation. Most Albanians do admit that there was considerable economic and social progress in the 1944-1978 period, but then say that the 1978-1991 period was anything but. The security service in Albania (the Sigurimi) was also much more "firm" than, say, the Stasi or other Eastern Bloc security services. It had much more in common with the NKVD. The Sigurimi would do things like arrest entire families for the crime of one family member, children would be denounced in front of others at school because of anti-communist family members or friends, citizens often had to report about their "commitments" to socialism on a weekly or monthly basis, etc.

Still, there are communists in Albania. Here's an article written by one last year: http://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/rdv16n2/enver.htm

No, the Democratic Party of Albania dominates most Albanian politics and is very anti-communist. The Socialist Party of Albania is the successor to the PLA, and it's a right-wing social-democratic party that denounces communism.

It's worth noting that most Albanians are politically apathetic. The only thing that really gets them excited is issues of Albanian nationalism, such as Kosovo. They view the US as a wonderful country because it supports Kosovo's independence and has given economic aid to Albania. Also in Albanian textbooks one "learns" of how Woodrow Wilson was single-handedly responsible for Albania not being divided up between the Great Powers at the conclusion of World War I.

So then the reason there are few communists in Albania is that ... the government is anti-communist.

This is a common problem is my impression. If the way to get communism is to persuade the government to be pro-communist, I think we will have a long wait.

And the other problem is the Albanians themselves, who just aren't a very good people. I suppose that indeed was Hoxha's opinion.

This reminds me of the famous Bertold Brecht poem "The Solution," writen after the 1953 rebellion in East Germany.

"After the uprising of the 17th of June
The Secretary of the Writers Union
Had leaflets distributed in the Stalinallee
Stating that the people
Had forfeited the confidence of the government
And could win it back only
By redoubled efforts. Would it not be easier
In that case for the government
To dissolve the people
And elect another?"

-M.H.-

[Ismail]

If the way to get communism is to persuade the government to be pro-communist, I think we will have a long wait.Except that's a strawman. Communism in Albania is unpopular because the government is anti-communist, because the economy in the 1980's stagnated owing to a lack of outside trade, because the government completely prohibited religious practices from 1967-1990, and because of the Sigurimi.

[Anarchrusty]

Albania declared itself independant a few months/years ago I remember. They are a muslem state and to me, they have every right to find their own way, especially after what the Serves did to them in the Yugoslavian wars. The Dutch arrested a general of them some time ago who had ordered their genocide some time ago.
If anything, we on the left should support their struggle, like we support the Palestinians or the Sudanesians.

[Luc]

Albania declared itself independant a few months/years ago I remember. They are a muslem state and to me, they have every right to find their own way, especially after what the Serves did to them in the Yugoslavian wars. The Dutch arrested a general of them some time ago who had ordered their genocide some time ago.
If anything, we on the left should support their struggle, like we support the Palestinians or the Sudanesians.

Albania was in the Yugoslavian wars?:confused:

[Anarchrusty]

Albania was in the Yugoslavian wars?:confused:


Yeah it was a mass. Many people stood up to eachother after nazi propaganda by the Serves, who were the petit bergouis classes of the country and were aplicitated by their higher elitist orders to uphold the caste system of unaffiliated demographic alien parasitics (their words, not mine) takeover in unsubstantiated regional localities of disgruntled working class uprisings due to religious and national diversities.
In short, fascism.

[Ismail]

Albania declared itself independant a few months/years ago I remember. They are a muslem state and to me, they have every right to find their own way, especially after what the Serves did to them in the Yugoslavian wars. The Dutch arrested a general of them some time ago who had ordered their genocide some time ago.
If anything, we on the left should support their struggle, like we support the Palestinians or the Sudanesians.You're thinking of Kosovo, which is also inhabited by Albanians but whose history has been quite different from the rest of Albania.

[Tommy4ever]

Yeah it was a mass. Many people stood up to eachother after nazi propaganda by the Serves, who were the petit bergouis classes of the country and were aplicitated by their higher elitist orders to uphold the caste system of unaffiliated demographic alien parasitics (their words, not mine) takeover in unsubstantiated regional localities of disgruntled working class uprisings due to religious and national diversities.
In short, fascism.

As Ismail said, you are thinking of Kosovo rather than Albania. Albania has been independent since 1912 (although it faced occupation in WWI and WWII).

Kosovo is largely inhabited by Albanians (although there are Serb communities there), I know Kosovo has its own flag, but they seem to use Albania's in most circumstances as well.

I'd imagine that one day Kosovo might try to unify with Albania.

[Ismail]

The problem is that Kosovars see themselves as fairly distinct from Albanians (their dialects are quite different) and have developed their own "nationalism." Most also seem to believe that unity with Albania will only harm Kosovo's economy. Throughout the 1910s-1980s most nationalist Kosovars sought unity with Albania, which was why when the Italians in 1939 did invade they made sure that Kosovo became a part of a "Greater Albania." The National Liberation Front under Hoxha condemned this move as an obvious ploy to promote greater popularity for the fascist occupiers. At the same time, though, Hoxha did try to get Kosovo reunited with Albania (legitimately, as part of a postwar agreement between an independent Yugoslavia and Albania), but Tito was not interested.

Many fighters against Serbian chauvinism in 1910's-20's Kosovo were bourgeois-democratic figures. Some, like Bajram Curri, looked up to Lenin's calls for the unity and self-determination of all oppressed nations. King Zog, who in the 1920's was backed by Yugoslavia, had them assassinated along with other, Albanian bourgeois-democratic figures like Avni Rustemi (whose organization, Bashkimi, forced the Albanian parliament to stand in silence when Lenin died.) Rustemi said, "You know quite well, gentlemen, how Lenin defended the high principles of humanism; he was the first one to denounce the secret treaty of 1915 which had set forth the dismemberment of Albania." (Mediterranean Quarterly #7, 1996, p. 49.)

[Luc]

Ah, thanks all! I knew that didn't make sense.:lol:

[Comrade Trotsky]

I actually came here to start an Albania thread, so I guess I'll ask my questions here.

Why are so many leftists so anti-hoxha? I'v seen quite a bit of opposition to his rule over the years, yet looking back, It appears that unemployment rates were lower than any other eastern bloc country, there was absolutely no foregin debt, it was the first country in history to have complete electricity to the entire country, and it was also the most progressive country in the EB in terms of womens rights, as well. So why do some dislike Hoxha, then? Those seem like pretty positive things. I understand that Albania had the lowest standard of living in europe for most of hoxahs regime, but I don't think thats a fair reason to hold him in a low regard..

[A Marxist Historian]

I actually came here to start an Albania thread, so I guess I'll ask my questions here.

Why are so many leftists so anti-hoxha? I'v seen quite a bit of opposition to his rule over the years, yet looking back, It appears that unemployment rates were lower than any other eastern bloc country, there was absolutely no foregin debt, it was the first country in history to have complete electricity to the entire country, and it was also the most progressive country in the EB in terms of womens rights, as well. So why do some dislike Hoxha, then? Those seem like pretty positive things. I understand that Albania had the lowest standard of living in europe for most of hoxahs regime, but I don't think thats a fair reason to hold him in a low regard..

Well, according to Ismail, who should know, Albanians didn't like Hoxha and his regime. Now in his opinion, that is largely their own fault it seems, as apparently Hoxha deserved to have a better country to be the leader of. Nonetheless, that seems to me to be a perfectly good reason for leftists to dislike Hoxha.

-M.H.-

[Ismail]

In PMs you suggested that Albania should have joined Yugoslavia in 1948, so evidently the struggle against revisionism and the economic hardships that brought doesn't exactly appeal to you.

[Bandito]

http://www.partijarada.org/images/boro_i_ramiz.jpg


World War II heroes, a Serb Boro Vukmirović and Albanian Ramiz Sadiku were killed by Italian fascists in Kosovo. When the fascists wanted to shoot them separately, they demanded being shot together. They were shot hugged with their arms around each other.

[A Marxist Historian]

In PMs you suggested that Albania should have joined Yugoslavia in 1948, so evidently the struggle against revisionism and the economic hardships that brought doesn't exactly appeal to you.

Correct more or less. Titoite and Hoxhaite revisionism both caused hardship for the workers. If Tito's idea of a "small" Balkan Socialist Federation, including Bulgaria and Albania, had come into existence, and Greece as well if the guerillas had won, that would have been a good thing for the Balkan working classes. Unfortunately Stalin vetoed it, though Dimitrov in Bulgaria was in favor.

Albania is just too small and backward a country economically for any sort of an independent socialist regime to be viable there, even to the degree that the Soviet Union and China were. As Albania's history under Hoxha demonstrates, even by your account. Hoxha's opposition to Albania participating in the Yugoslav federation was petty-bourgeois nationalism.

As Tito, whatever his faults, was at least not a Serbian or Croatian nationalist, Albanians would not necessarily have been an oppressed nationality in such a pan-Balkan federation, as they were to some degree in Tito's Yugoslavia, where Albanian irredentism was inevitably seen as pro-Hoxha and therefore pro-Stalin.

It was Stalin's anti-Tito policy that pushed him into the arms of imperialism. Originally it was quite unjustifiable, as Tito was on the left wing of Stalinism not the right wing when Stalin called for war against Titoism and purges of Titoites all over Eastern Europe.

-M.H.-

[Ismail]

If Tito's idea of a "small" Balkan Socialist Federation, including Bulgaria and Albania, had come into existence, and Greece as well if the guerillas had won, that would have been a good thing for the Balkan working classes. Unfortunately Stalin vetoed it, though Dimitrov in Bulgaria was in favor.Tito's idea was to strengthen the hand of Yugoslavia. As for Dimitrov, according to Yugoslav accounts he shared many sympathies with Titoists and spoke to Dedijer (IIRC) of supposedly building a more "democratic socialism." Stalin did suggest federations between East European states to gradually come into existence, just not the kind advocated by Tito.


Albania is just too small and backward a country economically for any sort of an independent socialist regime to be viable there, even to the degree that the Soviet Union and China were. As Albania's history under Hoxha demonstrates, even by your account.Albania made great economic strides and placed its hopes on world revolution in the 1980's. When that did not come about Albania obviously suffered, but from this you draw a ridiculous conclusion:

Hoxha's opposition to Albania participating in the Yugoslav federation was petty-bourgeois nationalism.Actually Tito didn't want Hoxha to participate. He'd rather Hoxha be dead. From the start the Yugoslavs backed Koçi Xoxe and engaged in exploitative trade practices. Albania under Yugoslavia would have simply followed the Yugoslav course of "market socialism" and would have suffered through the Yugoslav Wars as well.


As Tito, whatever his faults, was at least not a Serbian or Croatian nationalist,Tito backed Ranković and his Serbian chauvinism up until it became unpopular to do so.


Albanians would not necessarily have been an oppressed nationality in such a pan-Balkan federation, as they were to some degree in Tito's Yugoslavia, where Albanian irredentism was inevitably seen as pro-Hoxha and therefore pro-Stalin.Albanian "irredentism" was seen as "pro-Hoxha" because Kosovars were naturally enough seen as Albanians artificially separated by imperialism as far back as 1913. Don't forget that in the early 80's the Yugoslav government suppressed student and worker strikes in Kosovo using the same argument you're using. So either Stalin was secretly still alive, Hoxha was so evil that Kosovo could never be allowed to fathom union with Albania, or the Yugoslavs were adopting Serbian chauvinism against Yugoslavia's poorest "autonomous province."


It was Stalin's anti-Tito policy that pushed him into the arms of imperialism. Originally it was quite unjustifiable, as Tito was on the left wing of Stalinism not the right wing when Stalin called for war against Titoism and purges of Titoites all over Eastern Europe.So Stalin's "anti-Tito policy" forced Tito to contemplate joining NATO and the Marshall Plan? Did Stalin force Tito to renounce revolution and embrace reformism? Bukharin also started out on the "left-wing" of the Bolsheviks, it doesn't mean anything.

[Tiger Tamer]

Albania was a totalitarian hole on the map where the police could arrest you, strip you nakde, and torture you with cigarettes and dogs for no reason other than you said something bad about "brother enver" or looked at them in a bad way. And at the end fo the day you probably die without teh family ever knowing what happened to you. Also if the boss at the workplace wanted sex with a girl she had to give it oor lose her life to sigarimi. My grandpa's sister died that way, we think because she embarressed a flirting manager.

Only fool would like albania but I'm sure stalinist-enveriste cretin like ismail would have you think it was a paradise on earth.

[Ismail]

Many Albanians who lived in the 1940's-80's have noted that the country made great strides in all fields. I don't see how excesses by the Sigurimi or the occasional corruption (which James S. O'Donnell among others has noted) takes away from that.

It also isn't nice to refer to a country as a "hole on the map." Émigrés tend to not be very good at providing objective analyses of countries, and using words like "totalitarian" is not a mature way to analyze or describe countries (or, for that matter, ideologies.)

[A Marxist Historian]

Tito's idea was to strengthen the hand of Yugoslavia. As for Dimitrov, according to Yugoslav accounts he shared many sympathies with Titoists and spoke to Dedijer (IIRC) of supposedly building a more "democratic socialism." Stalin did suggest federations between East European states to gradually come into existence, just not the kind advocated by Tito.

A point in Dimitrov's favor IMHO.

It is quite true that Tito's idea was to strengthen the hand of Yugoslavia. Stalin's theoretical conception of "socialism in one country" can, in theory at least, be applied just as well to a Balkan revolutionary federation as to the Soviet Union.

In practice, due to the much smaller size and power of Yugoslavia, to survive it had to ally with the "other superpower," given Stalin's extreme hostility to Tito and Titoism, and the fact that Tito after all was not truly a revolutionary any more than Stalin was. Which it did.

Stalin, Khruschev, Mao, Deng, Tito and Hoxha are all Stalinists in my book, as the fundamental strategic conception of all of them was socialism in one country, namely their own, and spread of world revolution as at best a nice dream that should not interfere with policymaking on a day to day basis.

Within that context, a large as possible Balkan Socialist Federation was a good and natural idea, first propounded in fact by Bulgarian/Rumanian revolutionary Rakovsky, Trotsky's closest political ally, and accepted as official doctrine by the Comintern in its healthy days, something which Dimitrov, the head of the Comintern under Stalin, still remembered.


Albania made great economic strides and placed its hopes on world revolution in the 1980's. When that did not come about Albania obviously suffered, but from this you draw a ridiculous conclusion:
Actually Tito didn't want Hoxha to participate. He'd rather Hoxha be dead. From the start the Yugoslavs backed Koçi Xoxe and engaged in exploitative trade practices. Albania under Yugoslavia would have simply followed the Yugoslav course of "market socialism" and would have suffered through the Yugoslav Wars as well.

What were Xoxe's actual policies? How were they different or worse than Hoxha's? If not, then as a true internationalist concerned with the best for his country as well as others Hoxha should have been willing to yield his position as top leader if necessary.

As for Albania placing its hopes on world revolution in the '80s, that strikes me as more rhetorical desperation than anything else. In the '80s Albania neither had any particular outside support nor any particular outside enemies, so Hoxha could say whatever he pleased without any fear that anything he might say might affect the fate of his country either positively or negatively. Quite simply, nobody except the Kosovars was even paying much attention to Albania at that point.

I would hardly be surprised if Tito treated an independent Albania unfairly. Had it joined the Yugoslav Federation, there would have been no reason for him to do so, and Albania would have benefitted economically enormously. And Albanian revolutionaries could have resisted Tito's Bukharinism vastly more effectively within Yugoslavia than in an isolated Albanian enclave.


Tito backed Ranković and his Serbian chauvinism up until it became unpopular to do so.

That was only because he saw Croatian nationalism, with its Ustasha overtones, as a bigger danger, and Tito always balanced between the different nationalities. Tito had mixed parentage, and was no Serbian nationalist. Had Albania joined the federation, Albanians would be another nationality for Tito to lean on sometimes vs. the more dangerous nationalists.

The Serbian nationalists hated him, and hate him to this day.


Albanian "irredentism" was seen as "pro-Hoxha" because Kosovars were naturally enough seen as Albanians artificially separated by imperialism as far back as 1913. Don't forget that in the early 80's the Yugoslav government suppressed student and worker strikes in Kosovo using the same argument you're using. So either Stalin was secretly still alive, Hoxha was so evil that Kosovo could never be allowed to fathom union with Albania, or the Yugoslavs were adopting Serbian chauvinism against Yugoslavia's poorest "autonomous province."

I do not forget that at all. I see Kosovar protests vs. the mounting Serbian nationalist oppression in Kosovo, especially after Tito died, as highly supportable. Such were the workings of Stalinist-Titoist degeneration into bourgeois nationalism. Something you see at its very worst in the former USSR, where most Stalinists have turned into anti-Semitic bourgeois nationalists of the worst type who make Milosevic look good.

Much of this might well have been avoided in Kosovo at any rate if Albania had joined the Yugoslav Federation instead of staying out and acting as a catspaw for Stalin's maneuvers vs. Tito.


So Stalin's "anti-Tito policy" forced Tito to contemplate joining NATO and the Marshall Plan? Did Stalin force Tito to renounce revolution and embrace reformism? Bukharin also started out on the "left-wing" of the Bolsheviks, it doesn't mean anything.

I am tempted simply to answer yes to your questions. It is not that simple of course.

It was Stalin who pushed Tito into breaking with the Soviet Union. If Stalin had been willing to allow Tito to deviate a bit on minor questions, as he was later to allow Mao to do, in all probability Yugoslavia would never have left the Soviet bloc in the first place, and Tito would have not engaged in alliances with America or experiments with "market socialism."

Or, unfortunately, with the larger dose of internal democracy that Yugoslavia adopted under Tito.

-M.H.-

[Ismail]

In practice, due to the much smaller size and power of Yugoslavia, to survive it had to ally with the "other superpower," given Stalin's extreme hostility to Tito and Titoism, and the fact that Tito after all was not truly a revolutionary any more than Stalin was. Which it did.You're free to believe that Yugoslavia was "forced" to ally with the US and NATO, I don't think it will convince many others.


What were Xoxe's actual policies? How were they different or worse than Hoxha's? If not, then as a true internationalist concerned with the best for his country as well as others Hoxha should have been willing to yield his position as top leader if necessary.Xoxe's policies were a carbon-copy of the Yugoslav ones. Amongst them were calls for the Democratic Front to continue being the main force of affairs rather than the semi-illegal Communist Party of Albania, which was not fully legalized until after the Yugoslav revisionists were exposed. As for leadership, Xoxe wanted Hoxha dead, as did the Yugoslavs. Xoxe abused his position as Interior Minister to try to get this to come about. As early as 1944 the Yugoslavs were denouncing Hoxha, e.g. November 23 of that year:

"The second Plenum of the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party was held in Berat and was marked by Yugoslav interference in Albanian internal affairs. The newly appointed Yugoslav representative, Colonel Velimir Stojnic, supported by his assistant, Nijaz Dizdarevic, was critical of Enver Hoxha's policies, particularly concerning the future of Kosovë and Dibër and his firm stand on the question of complete Albanian nationalist independence, free from Yugoslav control."
(Owen Pearson. Albania in Occupation and War: From Fascism to Communism, 1940-1945. New York: St Martins Press. 2005. p. 411.)

Stojnic used the same argument you did as well, that Albania simply could not survive alone, ergo it had to join Yugoslavia.


As for Albania placing its hopes on world revolution in the '80s, that strikes me as more rhetorical desperation than anything else. In the '80s Albania neither had any particular outside support nor any particular outside enemies, so Hoxha could say whatever he pleased without any fear that anything he might say might affect the fate of his country either positively or negatively. Quite simply, nobody except the Kosovars was even paying much attention to Albania at that point.Except Hoxha wrote these things in his diary, it wasn't simply public pronouncements. it's also incorrect to say that Albania had no outside enemies. There were fears that Albania and Yugoslavia would go to war in the 1981-1982 period over the issue of Kosovar students struggling against Serbian chauvinism, which brought upon said students the force of the Yugoslav state, which blamed student strikes on Hoxha, etc.


I would hardly be surprised if Tito treated an independent Albania unfairly. Had it joined the Yugoslav Federation, there would have been no reason for him to do so, and Albania would have benefitted economically enormously. And Albanian revolutionaries could have resisted Tito's Bukharinism vastly more effectively within Yugoslavia than in an isolated Albanian enclave.The CPA and the Communist Party of Kosovo were both tiny. In 1944 the former had 2,800 members, and only 29,137 in 1948. This being in a population of about 1.5 million or so. Party membership didn't grow much in the ensuing decades. Every book I've read about Albania makes it clear that Hoxha would have been dead if the Yugoslavs had their way.


It was Stalin who pushed Tito into breaking with the Soviet Union. If Stalin had been willing to allow Tito to deviate a bit on minor questions, as he was later to allow Mao to do, in all probability Yugoslavia would never have left the Soviet bloc in the first place, and Tito would have not engaged in alliances with America or experiments with "market socialism."Yugoslavia's issues were not "minor." It isn't permissible for Mao to align with the US against the Soviets, it shouldn't be permissible for Tito to do the same either, and of course after Stalin died the USSR and Yugoslavia denounced "Stalinism" together and restored their relations for the most part, sans a few differences in foreign policy (e.g. Yugoslavia backing Pol Pot while the USSR supported Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea.)

[A Marxist Historian]

You're free to believe that Yugoslavia was "forced" to ally with the US and NATO, I don't think it will convince many others.

When I say "forced" I mean "forced." Without US and NATO backing, sooner or later Stalin would have sent the Soviet Army in to overthrow Tito. So from his point of view he had no choice.

If Tito were truly a revolutionary, he would have seen this as a wonderful opportunity to mobilize the masses of Soviet and East European workers against Stalin rather than a threat to Yugoslav national sovereignty, and the last thing he would have wanted to do would have been to make any deals with the US vs. the Soviet Union, as that would have discredited him with the Soviet working class, larger and more important than the Yugoslav. Just as if Hoxha were truly a revolutionary...

Tito also of course sought to mobilize the Yugoslav workers behind him, that is what all his "democratism" was about, and even the feelers sent out to the Trotskyists as his only possible international allies other than the imperialists.

Gomulka in Poland by the way did successfully deter Kruschev's threat to overthrow him by military force by mobilizing the workers behind in in '56. But Krushchev was not Stalin, and Gomulka was neither Tito nor the workers councils being formed in Hungary, a deadly threat to the Soviet bureaucracy, but rather a relatively harmless Polish nationalist Stalinist.


Xoxe's policies were a carbon-copy of the Yugoslav ones. Amongst them were calls for the Democratic Front to continue being the main force of affairs rather than the semi-illegal Communist Party of Albania, which was not fully legalized until after the Yugoslav revisionists were exposed. As for leadership, Xoxe wanted Hoxha dead, as did the Yugoslavs. Xoxe abused his position as Interior Minister to try to get this to come about. As early as 1944 the Yugoslavs were denouncing Hoxha, e.g. November 23 of that year:

"The second Plenum of the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party was held in Berat and was marked by Yugoslav interference in Albanian internal affairs. The newly appointed Yugoslav representative, Colonel Velimir Stojnic, supported by his assistant, Nijaz Dizdarevic, was critical of Enver Hoxha's policies, particularly concerning the future of Kosovë and Dibër and his firm stand on the question of complete Albanian nationalist independence, free from Yugoslav control."
(Owen Pearson. Albania in Occupation and War: From Fascism to Communism, 1940-1945. New York: St Martins Press. 2005. p. 411.)

Stojnic used the same argument you did as well, that Albania simply could not survive alone, ergo it had to join Yugoslavia.

I think history demonstrated that Stojnic was basically right, and that complete Albanian national independence was just a petty bourgeois nationalist dream. As for the fairly minor point of rule by party vs. rule by National Front, perhaps Hoxha was to the left of Tito on this, but Tito in turn was to the left of *all* the other Stalinist leaders in Eastern Europe, and was most certainly to the left of Stalin. The "popular front" was dissolved in Yugoslavia at least a good year before it was dissolved in *any* of the other East European "popular democracies," with perhaps the solitary exception of Albania.

As to Xoxe wanting Hoxha dead, well, not only did Hoxha want Xoxe dead, but he in fact killed him. So on this plane at minimum one must say that Hoxha did not have a superior position.



Except Hoxha wrote these things in his diary, it wasn't simply public pronouncements. it's also incorrect to say that Albania had no outside enemies. There were fears that Albania and Yugoslavia would go to war in the 1981-1982 period over the issue of Kosovar students struggling against Serbian chauvinism, which brought upon said students the force of the Yugoslav state, which blamed student strikes on Hoxha, etc.

The CPA and the Communist Party of Kosovo were both tiny. In 1944 the former had 2,800 members, and only 29,137 in 1948. This being in a population of about 1.5 million or so. Party membership didn't grow much in the ensuing decades. Every book I've read about Albania makes it clear that Hoxha would have been dead if the Yugoslavs had their way.

Yugoslavia's issues were not "minor." It isn't permissible for Mao to align with the US against the Soviets, it shouldn't be permissible for Tito to do the same either, and of course after Stalin died the USSR and Yugoslavia denounced "Stalinism" together and restored their relations for the most part, sans a few differences in foreign policy (e.g. Yugoslavia backing Pol Pot while the USSR supported Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea.)

I do not think that Tito allying with the US was "permissible," not at all.

And I do think you may well be right that Tito would have killed Hoxha. There were Trotskyists in Yugoslavia, and, until he broke with Stalin, he killed them with extreme thoroughness, so there is no particular reason to think he would have treated Hoxha any better if he saw Hoxha as a political enemy.

But that is besides the point. The question is what is the correct political line, not what Enver Hoxha should do to ensure his political safety. If worst came to worse, he could have taken refuge in the Soviet Union I suppose.

-M.H.-

[Ismail]

If Tito were truly a revolutionary, he would have seen this as a wonderful opportunity to mobilize the masses of Soviet and East European workers against Stalin rather than a threat to Yugoslav national sovereignty,Well let's see, Tito flirted with the Marshall Plan and NATO whereas Hoxha called on the workers of the Eastern Bloc and USSR to overthrow their governments. Hoxha banned foreign investment in Albania, Tito made Yugoslavia's debt situation so bad vis-à-vis the IMF that it was a major factor in Yugoslavia's dissolution and resulted in austerity programs throughout the 80's. Khrushchev seriously considered invading Albania, so did Greece (actually the period of 1944-1950 or so was more or less a state of war between the two countries, since Greece claimed Northern Epirus.) According to Hoxha there were also Chinese-backed attempts within the military to overthrow the Party.


Gomulka in Poland by the way did successfully deter Kruschev's threat to overthrow him by military force by mobilizing the workers behind in in '56. But Krushchev was not Stalin, and Gomulka was neither Tito nor the workers councils being formed in Hungary, a deadly threat to the Soviet bureaucracy, but rather a relatively harmless Polish nationalist Stalinist.Yeah, it's a shame Khrushchev wasn't Stalin, since Gomulka was not in good standing and the Khrushchevites rehabilitated him. Just like, as Hoxha noted, the Soviets promoted Imre Nagy and other rightist forces after Stalin died. Tito in turn also promoted these figures, which led to a brief period of distrust between Tito and the post-Stalin leadership when Nagy was overthrown.


I think history demonstrated that Stojnic was basically right, and that complete Albanian national independence was just a petty bourgeois nationalist dream.I guess the next 45 years were just an optical illusion.


As to Xoxe wanting Hoxha dead, well, not only did Hoxha want Xoxe dead, but he in fact killed him. So on this plane at minimum one must say that Hoxha did not have a superior position.Bukharin wanted Stalin dead, it doesn't mean that Stalin being dead would have been the equivalent to Bukharin being dead.

[A Marxist Historian]

Well let's see, Tito flirted with the Marshall Plan and NATO whereas Hoxha called on the workers of the Eastern Bloc and USSR to overthrow their governments. Hoxha banned foreign investment in Albania, Tito made Yugoslavia's debt situation so bad vis-à-vis the IMF that it was a major factor in Yugoslavia's dissolution and resulted in austerity programs throughout the 80's. Khrushchev seriously considered invading Albania, so did Greece (actually the period of 1944-1950 or so was more or less a state of war between the two countries, since Greece claimed Northern Epirus.) According to Hoxha there were also Chinese-backed attempts within the military to overthrow the Party.

You are confusing your time periods. In the late '40s, Tito was to the left of Stalin on every question without exception. in 1950 or 1951 Tito, after Stalin declared war on him, considering him an ultraleft semi-Trotskyite, allied with the imperialists, firstly over Korea, and went to the right.

This was extremely opportunist on his part, but within the framework of a basic strategy of "socialism in one country," the USSR first for Stalin, Yugoslavia first for Tito, Albania first for Hoxha, made total sense.

Hoxha's leftism was an accident of geography. It was essentially anti-Titoism, the consistent thread in all his policies. During much of the existence of his state, he had sponsorship first from Stalin and then from Mao, so his anti-Titoism was useful for propping up an independent Albania.

And in his last years, when China had lost interest in Albania, Yugoslavia was the American favorite, and Brezhnev's too more or less, so Hoxha really had little alternative except to pose as a revolutionary, and hope that thr big powers would have more important things to worry about than Albania.


Yeah, it's a shame Khrushchev wasn't Stalin, since Gomulka was not in good standing and the Khrushchevites rehabilitated him. Just like, as Hoxha noted, the Soviets promoted Imre Nagy and other rightist forces after Stalin died. Tito in turn also promoted these figures, which led to a brief period of distrust between Tito and the post-Stalin leadership when Nagy was overthrown.

Very brief, as Stalin and Mao and Tito and Hoxha were all united vs. the Hungarian workers when they formed workers and soldiers councils and talked about going back to Lenin. The Hungarian revolutionaries had some illusions in Nagy, who simply wanted to reform Stalinism a bit, but he was not in charge, it was the workers in charge, until the revolution was crushed by Soviet tanks, with disastrous results for the consciousness of the Hungarian workers.


I guess the next 45 years were just an optical illusion.

Yes. As events demonstrated in 1991. The system established by Hoxha never took root in the hearts of the Albanian working class, as you yourself have admitted.


Bukharin wanted Stalin dead, it doesn't mean that Stalin being dead would have been the equivalent to Bukharin being dead.

This is a separate discussion for different threads. Bukharin and Stalin were at one point pretty close personal friends, and it was Stalin who killed Bukharin, not the other way around. This notion that Bukharin wanted Stalin dead is absurd and flies against the whole history of their mutual relations. I assume it is based on something Bukharin said in the heat of the moment during Bukharin's quite brief conflict with Stalin in 1928.

-M.H.-

[Ismail]

Hoxha's leftism was an accident of geography. It was essentially anti-Titoism, the consistent thread in all his policies. During much of the existence of his state, he had sponsorship first from Stalin and then from Mao, so his anti-Titoism was useful for propping up an independent Albania.Actually Albania built up relations with Yugoslavia in the 70's up until 1981 when the Kosovo protests were suppressed, so that argument doesn't work. I also fail to see how his positions were solely based on the existence of Yugoslavia.


Very brief, as Stalin and Mao and Tito and Hoxha were all united vs. the Hungarian workers when they formed workers and soldiers councils and talked about going back to Lenin. The Hungarian revolutionaries had some illusions in Nagy, who simply wanted to reform Stalinism a bit, but he was not in charge, it was the workers in charge, until the revolution was crushed by Soviet tanks, with disastrous results for the consciousness of the Hungarian workers.The formation of a few councils does not change the fact that the rest of the rebels were anti-communists and anti-semites. It's not much different from Edén Pastora's Contra group in the 80's, which claimed to be the "real" Sandinistas. It was swamped by the other, viciously anti-communist Contra groups and lacked the vanguard necessary to do anything. Don't forget there were actual "Stalinists" (anti-revisionists) involved in the Hungarian events as well.

The consciousness of the Hungarian workers was shattered by the Khrushchevites who took the opportunity to liquidate the Party in Hungary and to allow Hungary to proceed under "Goulash communism." For this reason Hungary was the Eastern Bloc state that led the way in calling for economic and political "reforms" in the late 80's.


This is a separate discussion for different threads. Bukharin and Stalin were at one point pretty close personal friends, and it was Stalin who killed Bukharin, not the other way around.What matters isn't friendship. It's been established that Hoxha and Shehu were very close friends for about 35 years, but it does not change the fact that Shehu denounced Hoxha to the Yugoslavs in the 40's and in the early 80's took a rightist line in economics.


This notion that Bukharin wanted Stalin dead is absurd and flies against the whole history of their mutual relations. I assume it is based on something Bukharin said in the heat of the moment during Bukharin's quite brief conflict with Stalin in 1928.There is the Humbert-Droz bit (http://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/rdv8n1/bukharin.htm) which I've shown you in other threads, and Bukharin himself admitted that his own followers talked of assassinating Stalin.

"One more document from his case requires discussion: a letter he wrote to Stalin while in prison, dated December 10, 1937. In it he begged the Gensec to allow him either to work at some cultural task in Siberia or to emigrate to America, where he would be a faithful Soviet citizen and would 'beat Trotsky and company in the snout.' ...

More important for understanding his fate and the course of the Terror was his admissions that some sort of 'conference' of his young followers had occurred in 1932. Apparently one of them had said in Bukharin's presence that he wished to kill Stalin. Bukharin now acknowledged that he had been 'two-faced' about his followers and had not informed the authorities of their discussions. He had believed at this time, he claimed, that he could lead them back to the party. As for the accusations that he was linked to foreign espionage services and had fostered terrorism, all that was false. But by this time Bukharin had lied repeatedly to Stalin and the whole Central Committee. Even though his behavior did not warrant the death penalty, Stalin had serious reason to distrust him."
(Robert W. Thurston. Life and Terror in Stalin's Russia. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1996. p. 42.)

[A Marxist Historian]

Actually Albania built up relations with Yugoslavia in the 70's up until 1981 when the Kosovo protests were suppressed, so that argument doesn't work. I also fail to see how his positions were solely based on the existence of Yugoslavia..

An independent Albania was never a terribly viable proposition, and certainly isn't now, as even a casual look at contemporary Albania illustrates. Hoxhaism was essentially the futile attempt to maintain an independent Stalinist Albania. The revolutionary rhetoric came out when Hoxha lost all foreign patrons, but at the same time, had no real enemies.

So it at least put Albania on the world scene a bit free of real danger, publicity for Hoxha if nothing else.

It is natural that Albania tried to be friendly with Tito in the '70s, as China then was pro-Tito. It was only after Deng essentially dumped Albania that Hoxha returned to his preferred attitudes.


The formation of a few councils does not change the fact that the rest of the rebels were anti-communists and anti-semites. It's not much different from Edén Pastora's Contra group in the 80's, which claimed to be the "real" Sandinistas. It was swamped by the other, viciously anti-communist Contra groups and lacked the vanguard necessary to do anything. Don't forget there were actual "Stalinists" (anti-revisionists) involved in the Hungarian events as well.

The consciousness of the Hungarian workers was shattered by the Khrushchevites who took the opportunity to liquidate the Party in Hungary and to allow Hungary to proceed under "Goulash communism." For this reason Hungary was the Eastern Bloc state that led the way in calling for economic and political "reforms" in the late 80's.

It is absolutely true that the crushing of the Hungarian Revolution by Khrushchev pushed the Hungarian workers to the right. Reinforcing the right wing tide in Hungary due to the disastrous mistakes made in 1919 by Bela Kun and other leaders of the original Hungarian Revolution. But that could and should be a separate discussion for another thread.

Your take on what happened in Hungary is very wrong. The best account of the Hungarian Revolution is Peter Fryer's book, which I hope you are familiar with. Fryer was the reporter on the scene for the British Communist Party. His experiences made him a Trotskyist. He describes how the Hungarian workers councils crushed the Hungarian fascists when they tried to raise their heads. The leader of the councils, Pal Maleter, was definitely a revolutionary not a counterrevolutionary, who wanted to return to Lenin, not heed the siren calls of the West in Poland Solidarity fashion.

It is posted on the web in full at

http://www.marxists.org/archive/fryer/1956/dec/




What matters isn't friendship. It's been established that Hoxha and Shehu were very close friends for about 35 years, but it does not change the fact that Shehu denounced Hoxha to the Yugoslavs in the 40's and in the early 80's took a rightist line in economics.

There is the Humbert-Droz bit (http://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/rdv8n1/bukharin.htm) which I've shown you in other threads, and Bukharin himself admitted that his own followers talked of assassinating Stalin.

"One more document from his case requires discussion: a letter he wrote to Stalin while in prison, dated December 10, 1937. In it he begged the Gensec to allow him either to work at some cultural task in Siberia or to emigrate to America, where he would be a faithful Soviet citizen and would 'beat Trotsky and company in the snout.' ...

More important for understanding his fate and the course of the Terror was his admissions that some sort of 'conference' of his young followers had occurred in 1932. Apparently one of them had said in Bukharin's presence that he wished to kill Stalin. Bukharin now acknowledged that he had been 'two-faced' about his followers and had not informed the authorities of their discussions. He had believed at this time, he claimed, that he could lead them back to the party. As for the accusations that he was linked to foreign espionage services and had fostered terrorism, all that was false. But by this time Bukharin had lied repeatedly to Stalin and the whole Central Committee. Even though his behavior did not warrant the death penalty, Stalin had serious reason to distrust him."
(Robert W. Thurston. Life and Terror in Stalin's Russia. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1996. p. 42.)

Bukharin, who was obviously about to be shot, was desperately trying to come up with what he hoped Stalin wanted to hear from him. What is in those letters is revealing for his state of mind, but hardly evidence of an assassination plot.

He had to find a way to say that the accusations against him were true without utterly contradicting everything he had said previously, which put him through all sorts of strange contortions. Because if he called his investigators liars, which of course they were, then he wouldn't be following the party line, now would he?

There were indeed meetings of Bukharinists in 1932, that is what the Riutin circle was all about. Riutin had been a major pillar of the Stalin-'Bukharin faction vs. Trotsky, he was the guy who actually organized gangs of hecklers to shout down the Left Opposition in Moscow party meetings in 1927.

Bukharin opposed what Riutin was up to, but certainly kept himself informed to keep his options open. Riutin, unlike Bukharin and for that matter unlike Trotsky did raise the slogan "overthrow Stalin" in 1932. But he never at any point in the Riutin platform, now available in its interminable 300 page length, called for a putsch or assassinations, or even strike action. It was simply a call for the *Communist Party* to remove him as a leader, perhaps expel him.

As for Humbert-Droz, I addressed this elsewhere. This weird story tells you more about Humbert-Droz than about Bukharin.

-M.H.-

[Ismail]

The revolutionary rhetoric came out when Hoxha lost all foreign patrons, but at the same time, had no real enemies.I'm pretty sure the Cultural and Ideological Revolution launched in 1966 wasn't done when Hoxha had no allies.


It is natural that Albania tried to be friendly with Tito in the '70s, as China then was pro-Tito. It was only after Deng essentially dumped Albania that Hoxha returned to his preferred attitudes.Er, no. It was when China left Albania that Hoxha significantly improved his relations with Yugoslavia. Yet at the same time in his diary Hoxha notes that the Chinese wanted Albania to ally with Yugoslavia and Romania, which Hoxha regarded as treacherous. The opening up of relations between Albania and Yugoslavia actually began after 1968 (when the USSR invaded Czechoslovakia), but again, the Chinese wanted Albania to ally with Yugoslavia, which Hoxha completely condemned.


Your take on what happened in Hungary is very wrong. The best account of the Hungarian Revolution is Peter Fryer's book, which I hope you are familiar with. Fryer was the reporter on the scene for the British Communist Party. His experiences made him a Trotskyist. He describes how the Hungarian workers councils crushed the Hungarian fascists when they tried to raise their heads. The leader of the councils, Pal Maleter, was definitely a revolutionary not a counterrevolutionary, who wanted to return to Lenin, not heed the siren calls of the West in Poland Solidarity fashion.There is, of course, also the book The Truth About Hungary by Herbert Aptheker.

[A Marxist Historian]

I'm pretty sure the Cultural and Ideological Revolution launched in 1966 wasn't done when Hoxha had no allies.

So when China had a Cultural Revolution, Albania had one too, the same year? Seems like you are proving my point.


Er, no. It was when China left Albania that Hoxha significantly improved his relations with Yugoslavia. Yet at the same time in his diary Hoxha notes that the Chinese wanted Albania to ally with Yugoslavia and Romania, which Hoxha regarded as treacherous. The opening up of relations between Albania and Yugoslavia actually began after 1968 (when the USSR invaded Czechoslovakia), but again, the Chinese wanted Albania to ally with Yugoslavia, which Hoxha completely condemned.

So then Hoxha followed Deng's (or was it Maos's?) advice over Tito, even to some degree after the Chinese dumped him, but gagged at Ceaucescu? Interesting, but not of great importance.

By your account, it sounds as if Mao tried to drag Hoxha into an alliance with Tito, and Hoxha resisted kicking and screaming, but went along partially. So you are again confirming my point basically, while adding some interesting details.


There is, of course, also the book The Truth About Hungary by Herbert Aptheker.

There is indeed, the difference being that Fryer's account, unlike Aptheker's, is truthful.

As for the Aptheker book, there were some interesting comments about it on the "Historians of American Communism" H-Net academic discussion network.

http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=H-HOAC&month=0610&week=b&msg=E4TJGYK8aN1NzQbRV6//eg&user=&pw=

I have seen the critique of the book by Shane Mage referred to. It isn't posted to the Net as far as I know unfortunately.

Mage was one of the original founders of the Spartacist League. The issue of the Hungarian Revolution played a major role in the creation of the Spartacist League, or rather its pre-history. Here is the Spartacist account.

http://www.icl-fi.org/english/wv/883/hungary1956.html

From it I have excerpted the core of what Mage had to say about Hungary:

“The first and decisive thing about the Hungarian revolution is that it was a workers revolution, and the leading role of the workers was institutionally formulated by the establishment of workers councils. Except for the Russian army, there was in Hungary not the shadow of a social force capable of preventing the assumption of state power by the workers councils. Thus the objective conditions for the formation of a soviet republic, in the event of revolutionary victory of course, were entirely favorable.

The actual level of consciousness of the Hungarian workers, however, was not at the level indicated by the objective possibilities of the revolution. In this the Hungarian workers were like the Russian proletariat after the February revolution. The general demand was not for all power to the workers councils, but for ‘free elections’ to a sovereign parliament.

It would, however, be a disastrous mistake to take the level of consciousness corresponding to the struggle against the Stalinist bureaucracy as the permanent and ultimate political program of the Hungarian proletariat. The Hungarian workers wanted ‘free elections,’ but they also wanted to preserve their own councils and extend their powers. They wanted to move forward to socialism, not backward to capitalism.”

—'The YSL Right Wing and the ‘Crisis of World Stalinism', The Hungarian Revolution; excerpted as “‘Pure Democracy’ or Political Revolution in East Europe” in the Spartacist pamphlet, Solidarność: Polish Company Union for CIA and Bankers (1981)"

-M.H.-

[Ismail]

So when China had a Cultural Revolution, Albania had one too, the same year? Seems like you are proving my point.The Cultural and Ideological Revolution obviously had inspirations from China, but in his diaries and even in closed Central Committee speeches Hoxha criticized various aspects of China's GPCR. He openly attacked it in his book Imperialism and the Revolution.


So then Hoxha followed Deng's (or was it Maos's?) advice over Tito, even to some degree after the Chinese dumped him, but gagged at Ceaucescu? Interesting, but not of great importance.Again, the Albanians didn't improve their relations with Yugoslavia because of China, and Albania's denunciation of Yugoslavia did not cease during the period. Hoxha feared either a NATO invasion via Greece and/or Italy, a Yugoslav invasion, or, most probable in his view at the time, a Soviet invasion with Yugoslav acceptance.

And in any case it wasn't like trade between Albania and Yugoslavia burst through the roof. The point is that you're presenting an image of Hoxha as some sort of rabid Yugoslavia-hater whose every single policy move had to do with what Tito was doing next door. Elez Biberaj in Albania: A Socialist Maverick notes (pp. 27-28) that, "Following Nixon's visit to Beijing, Albania and China could no longer agree upon common goals, strategies, and tactics or coordinate activities towards those ends. But while defying China on several major issues, Hoxha was careful not to provoke a break with Beijing....

At the Seventh APL Congress in November 1976, Hoxha, in a clear affront to the Chinese, failed to endorse the post-Mao leadership headed by Hua Guofeng and vehemently criticized Beijing's pragmatic policy towards the United States and Western Europe. In June 1977 it was reported that the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping, who had been dismissed in April 1976 and was publicly denounced by the Albanians, including Hoxha at the Seventh Congress, was imminent. In addition Beijing announced that Tito had been invited to visit China... In July 1978 China terminated all economic and military assistance to Albania, recalled its specialists, and suspended trade ties, stopping short of breaking diplomatic relations with Tiranë."

So Tito visiting China was basically a signal that the Chinese really didn't care about fighting revisionism anymore, just as the 1955 visit by Khrushchev to Belgrade was. Just as China wanted Albania to copy its domestic ("socialism with Chinese characteristics") and foreign ("Three Worlds Theory") views, Khrushchev wanted Albania to adopt the "international socialist division of labor" and to rehabilitate Koçi Xoxe.

As for Fryer, he's praised by the current Hungarian government for reporting on the "freedom fighters." That isn't good.

The PLP had a thing (now gone along with countless other interesting articles that didn't make the transition to their flashier website) on the Hungarian revolt. It is as follows:

October 23 marks the 50th anniversary of the beginning of the "Hungarian Revolution," an event that is heavily falsified, smothered in capitalist, nationalist, and anticommunist lies.

We can’t attempt a full discussion of the events and lessons of the Hungarian Revolt in this short article. Instead we’ll summarize the main points of Charles Gati’s new book Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt (Stanford University Press, 2006).

A Hungarian refugee and fanatic anticommunist, Gati has studied all the primary documents from the former revisionist Hungarian regime and from the Soviet leadership. This evidence forces him to come to very different conclusions from earlier Cold-War anticommunist, as well as Trotskyist, studies.

At the end we’ll point out a few lies from a prominent Western source, the BBC, and briefly draw some lessons.

We need to be clear about one thing up front. By 1956 the Soviet Union was no longer the dictatorship of the proletariat. It had abandoned the goal of communism, and was a state capitalist system. As Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese CP were soon to realize, the USSR was beyond "reform." The same is true for the Hungarian CP.

Gati’s conclusions
1. "Relatively few Hungarians actually fought against Soviet rule." (3)

No more than 15,000 including all political shades from reform socialist (the majority) to fascists, out of a total population of almost ten million.

2. The revolt was not "against communism."

"Their ultimate goal was to reform the system, not to abolish it." (3) "Products of a system that professed to build a new socialist economic, social, and political order, the insurgents initially rebelled against the failure of that ideal, not the ideal itself… It was telling that their key original demand focused on the return to power of Imre Nagy, a man they learned to respect in 1953-55 as a Communist reformer… It probably never even occurred to them to raise such issues as the reprivatization of large industry and banks or the return of huge holdings to large landowners; the country’s so-called socialist achievements – at least in the economic realm – were beyond challenge." (159-60)

3. "The revolution lacked effective leadership." (4)

Imre Nagy could not stop the revolt from sliding more and more into the hands of right and fascist forces who were lynching communists, including "reform" communists, attacking Jews, and trying to provoke as much violence as possible.

4. "The Soviet leadership in Moscow was not trigger-happy." (4)

The key Soviet leadership documents, now published, show that Khrushchev & Co. would have settled for a multi-party system and a neutral Hungary. But they would not permit a right-wing regime such as had invaded the USSR in 1941 to return to power allied with NATO.

5. US propaganda was "very provocative" (5). "More than anything else, hypocrisy characterized the U.S. approach to Hungary." (218)

Rather than "liberating" Hungarians from socialism, the Republicans under Eisenhower and Nixon were "interested in liberating Congress from the Democrats." (218) They were actually "relieved when the Russians came back and squelched the Hungarian Rising." (181)

The last thing the US wanted was a belt of neutral countries in Eastern Europe, though both the Eastern Europeans themselves and the Soviet leadership did want it. Radio Free Europe was "sympathetic to the pre-1945 Horthy regime" – the fascists who had invaded the USSR.

[....]

The Lessons of the Hungarian Revolt
The revolt began as a protest from the Left against a revisionist (= phony communist) Party and leadership. But, heavily influenced by nationalism from the beginning, the rebels’ politics rapidly moved to the Right.

No leadership ever developed that opposed any of the following:

Nagy’s rapid move to the right, towards accommodation with capitalist parties and NATO imperialists;
the lynchings of communists;
anti-semitic attacks against Jews.
In addition,

There were no appeals to proletarian internationalism – nationalism, not internationalism, was the ideology that united all the rebels.
There were no attacks on the inequalities of revisionist Hungarian – and Soviet – socialism...

Building a base for communist politics in Hungary would have been a hard job -- as it always is, anywhere! Right-wing capitalists, aristocrats, and Fascists had ruled Hungary for decades. These forces still had a following. But they were heavily discredited by losing the war, and causing the deaths of so many Hungarian soldiers and civilians. And as Gati is forced to recognize, the youthful worker and student rebels of 1956 wanted, not capitalism, but a better form of socialism.

So the chance was there. But The Hungarian Workers Party (real name of the Communist Party) blew it. It had never made a revolution. It was put into power by the Soviet Union. It modeled itself on, and was a right-wing caricature of, the Soviet Communist Party. It "built a base" by offering privileges, and repressing those who disagreed with it.

[A Marxist Historian]

The Cultural and Ideological Revolution obviously had inspirations from China, but in his diaries and even in closed Central Committee speeches Hoxha criticized various aspects of China's GPCR. He openly attacked it in his book Imperialism and the Revolution.

Again, the Albanians didn't improve their relations with Yugoslavia because of China, and Albania's denunciation of Yugoslavia did not cease during the period. Hoxha feared either a NATO invasion via Greece and/or Italy, a Yugoslav invasion, or, most probable in his view at the time, a Soviet invasion with Yugoslav acceptance.

And in any case it wasn't like trade between Albania and Yugoslavia burst through the roof. The point is that you're presenting an image of Hoxha as some sort of rabid Yugoslavia-hater whose every single policy move had to do with what Tito was doing next door. Elez Biberaj in Albania: A Socialist Maverick notes (pp. 27-28) that, "Following Nixon's visit to Beijing, Albania and China could no longer agree upon common goals, strategies, and tactics or coordinate activities towards those ends. But while defying China on several major issues, Hoxha was careful not to provoke a break with Beijing....

At the Seventh APL Congress in November 1976, Hoxha, in a clear affront to the Chinese, failed to endorse the post-Mao leadership headed by Hua Guofeng and vehemently criticized Beijing's pragmatic policy towards the United States and Western Europe. In June 1977 it was reported that the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping, who had been dismissed in April 1976 and was publicly denounced by the Albanians, including Hoxha at the Seventh Congress, was imminent. In addition Beijing announced that Tito had been invited to visit China... In July 1978 China terminated all economic and military assistance to Albania, recalled its specialists, and suspended trade ties, stopping short of breaking diplomatic relations with Tiranë."

So Tito visiting China was basically a signal that the Chinese really didn't care about fighting revisionism anymore, just as the 1955 visit by Khrushchev to Belgrade was. Just as China wanted Albania to copy its domestic ("socialism with Chinese characteristics") and foreign ("Three Worlds Theory") views, Khrushchev wanted Albania to adopt the "international socialist division of labor" and to rehabilitate Koçi Xoxe.

Perhaps I overstated a bit polemically. Hoxha always prided himself on being an independent and nobody's lackey, and his hatred of Tito and Titoism perhaps didn't have quite the monomaniacal character of say George Bush Jr. vs. Saddam Hussein, a bit more like Obama's more reasoned approach.

But it really amounts to the same thing in the end, just as there is no difference between Bush and Obama in the end.


As for Fryer, he's praised by the current Hungarian government for reporting on the "freedom fighters." That isn't good.

That is not surprising. The current Hungarian government tries to present itself as what the Hungarian workers wanted in 1956. As even PLP basically recognizes, that is simply a lie.

This is very much like Putin praising Stalin, as Putin wants to present himself as not being just another Yeltsin, and bask even if at a great remove in some fashion from Soviet workers' continuing enthusiasm for the Bolshevik Revolution.

As you will realize if you read Fryer's book, which I have given you the URL for, Fryer turns over in his grave whenever a Hungarian reactionary praises his book.


The PLP had a thing (now gone along with countless other interesting articles that didn't make the transition to their flashier website) on the Hungarian revolt. It is as follows:

Inteesting, and there is truth in *some* of what the review says, though PL accepts Aptheker's misrepresentations about reactionaries running rampant. As revolution leader Pal Maleter told Fryer, wherever the monarchists raised their heads the workers crushed them and drove them back in their holes.

The book by Gati they are reviewing makes some interesting points, most of which do not contradict Fryer. Gati's main effort in the book was to show just how reactionary the US policy toward Hungary was, which should surprise no revolutionary.

Gati was certainly right that there was no effective leadership. In Hungary as everywhere else, what was needed was a revolutionary party, a Hungarian section of the Trotskyist Fourth International, to take the leadership of the movement and play the role the Bolsheviks played in 1917.

Instead you had an amorphous workers council leadership, which did listen to Nagy too much.

But if there had been no Soviet invasion, there would have been time to form one, as the workers dominated the political scene and the right wing was only trying to raise its head. The crimes of the Horthy regime in alliance with Nazi Germany were still fresh in the minds of every Hungarian, so it would not have been so easy for them to take over.

And, more to the point, whatever speculations one might have as to what would have happened with no Soviet invasion, the fact is that at the point of the invasion, workers councils were in control of the country, not Imre Nagy and his cabinet.

Lastly, as to the Soviet Union in 1956 having suddenly already become state capitalist, only three years after Stalin's death with absolutely *no* even faintly pro-capitalist measures having been taken, that is simply Mao-style anti-Marxist petty-bourgeois idealism. A subject for another thread.

During the '50s, what distinguished Krushchev economically from Stalin was his greater attention to the standard of living of the working class, wage increases, the building of public housing like the famous "Khrushchovki" in which most Russians live to this day. And to the peasants, whose lives improved remarkably.

He was a Stalinist but a reformer, not qualitatively different from Stalin but better as far as the working people were concerned, at least the Russian working people as opposed to the Hungarian.

For that matter, Khrushchev's policies towards Eastern Europe were better too. Instead of using Eastern European economic resources to build the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union was aiding Eastern European countries economically under Khrushchev.

So in fact in some ways he was more of an "internationalist" than Stalin.

-M.H.-

[Ismail]

Lastly, as to the Soviet Union in 1956 having suddenly already become state capitalist, only three years after Stalin's death with absolutely *no* even faintly pro-capitalist measures having been taken, that is simply Mao-style anti-Marxist petty-bourgeois idealism. A subject for another thread.The condemnation of the "cult of personality" and the fact that Stalin's work Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. was denounced as "left-deviationist" after his death indicated that revisionism was triumphant within the CPSU. What followed was the practical end of the machine tractor stations (something explicitly warned against by Stalin) and various measures designed to undercut central planning in the 1960's and 70's.

As a note, Hoxha on Hungary in 1968 (http://www.marx2mao.com/Other/WCRC68.html):

Let us start with Hungary. In the euphoria of the advent to power of Khrushchevite revisionism, but at a moment when it had not yet consolidated its positions, world capitalism, its Titoite agency and the internal Magyar reactionary bourgeoisie launched the armed counter-revolution against the dictatorship of the proletariat and the Workers' Party of Hungary, thinking it was the weakest link of the chain of the socialist countries. And so it was indeed. Rakosi's party melted away like snow in rain. But world capitalism and Titoism had not chosen the correct moment: they were convinced of Khrushchev's treacherous line, but they did not take account of the fact that his positions were not yet stabilized and, although he hesitated to resort to tanks, he was finally obliged to do so. Otherwise his road of treason could have been compromised. But in connection with the Hungarian counter-revolution the following facts must be pointed out:

1. The Hungarian counter-revolution was initiated by some intellectuals and students. These wavering strata, deprived of the influence of a genuine Marxist-Leninist party, became reserves and squads of the counter-revolutionary attack under the direction of the bourgeoisie. The Hungarian writers were in the van of this counter-revolution.
2. The Hungarian working class in general and that of Budapest in particular, despite the revolutionary traditions inherited from the 1919 proletarian revolution, was unable to defend its power and gains. On the contrary, a considerable part of the working class, especially in Budapest, was activated in favour of the counter-revolutionaries. It became therefore a reserve of reaction. This means, in other words, that the work of Rakosi's party was not well grounded, it was superficial. The working class did not fully recognize it as their leader. This was the greatest and most dangerous evil.
3. The counter-revolution entirely liquidated Rakosi's party within a few days, while counterrevolutionary Janos Kadar promulgated the decree for its official dissolution.
4. During the few days of counter-revolution in Hungary many bourgeois, capitalist and fascist parties immediately sprang up like mushrooms after rain. Thus, the Hungarian counter-revolution was suppressed by means of Soviet tanks, a thing which can no longer be repeated. The same traitor who liquidated the party, under the dictate of the Khrushchevite revisionists, promulgated the other decree for the re-founding of the new allegedly "Marxist-Leninist" party, the Hungarian revisionist party, a still worse one than that of Rakosi.

The Hungarian counter-revolution was suppressed by counter-revolutionaries. Thus, both wings of the putsch were bound to come together, as they did. They would build up their own "Hungary", as they did build it. They would restore capitalism, as they are restoring it. Drawing lessons from the bloodshed and, after having paid a bloody ransom for its hasty actions, Hungarian reaction is now carrying out at leisure its reforms of radical capitalist transformation independently, and without any trouble from the Soviet forces and tanks which remain on Hungarian territory. The Hungarian bourgeoisie is, so to speak, going about its business, this time under the protection of the Khrushchev tanks. The Hungarian capitalist bourgeoisie, hostile to the working class, disguised under the "banner of the party", is lulling the working class to sleep while forging new chains for it. The capitalist bourgeoisie has as its vanguard the old and new revisionist intelligentsia in complete identity of views and unity of action.Hoxha in his book The Khrushchevites details more about Hungary and other Eastern Bloc states at that time: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hoxha/works/1976/khruschevites/10.htm


During the '50s, what distinguished Krushchev economically from Stalin was his greater attention to the standard of living of the working class, wage increases, the building of public housing like the famous "Khrushchovki" in which most Russians live to this day. And to the peasants, whose lives improved remarkably.Of course, revisionists and social-democrats always focus on "living better," from Bukharin to Khrushchev to Gorbachev. The Soviets after Stalin sharply denounced the Chinese and Albanians for daring to insist that the construction of socialism requires sacrifices.


For that matter, Khrushchev's policies towards Eastern Europe were better too. Instead of using Eastern European economic resources to build the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union was aiding Eastern European countries economically under Khrushchev.Is this why Khrushchev proposed the "international socialist division of labor" which just about every East European state disliked but which only Albania had the intention of completely refusing? Khrushchev wanted Albania to become the "orchard garden of the socialist bloc," subordinating the construction of industry to agricultural exports.

Grover Furr also noted actions done not long after Stalin died:

As Stalin lay dying his old comrades in the Politburo assembled at his bedside and unilaterally -- without any vote by the Central Committee - DID AWAY with the resolutions of the 19th Party Congress. Specifically, they did away with the expanded Presidium, the clear purpose of which was to bring new blood into Party leadership.

Then they set about abandoning the resolutions of the 19th Party Congress of just a few month's before (October 1952).

The new Party rules were never put into effect. Stalin's final work, _Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR_, which had been the main topic of discussion at the 19th Party Congress, was quickly dropped -- forgotten about, never referred to again.

The Korean War was soon settled and the South Korean fascists given 1/2 the country they had lost.

The Vietnam War was settled in 1954 when the USSR forced the North Vietnamese to retreat to the North for the promise of free elections in 1956 -- which the USA never permitted. A reign of fascist terror soon swept the South of Vietnam.

[A Marxist Historian]

The condemnation of the "cult of personality" and the fact that Stalin's work Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. was denounced as "left-deviationist" after his death indicated that revisionism was triumphant within the CPSU. What followed was the practical end of the machine tractor stations (something explicitly warned against by Stalin) and various measures designed to undercut central planning in the 1960's and 70's.

As a note, Hoxha on Hungary in 1968 (http://www.marx2mao.com/Other/WCRC68.html):
Hoxha in his book The Khrushchevites details more about Hungary and other Eastern Bloc states at that time: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hoxha/works/1976/khruschevites/10.htm
As to Hoxha on Hungary, well, I think it is enough to say that I prefer Fryer's truthful account of what was actually happening.

The machine tractor stations were a vehicle for creating a privileged Stakhanovite elite to lord it over the other peasants, a little Soviet style labor aristocracy to provide a social support for Stalinism just as the labor bureaucracy in imperialist countries provide social support for labor bureaucrats and Social Democrats. Good riddance. As long of course as the tractors themselves were not gotten rid of, which they certainly were not.


Of course, revisionists and social-democrats always focus on "living better," from Bukharin to Khrushchev to Gorbachev. The Soviets after Stalin sharply denounced the Chinese and Albanians for daring to insist that the construction of socialism requires sacrifices.

Is this why Khrushchev proposed the "international socialist division of labor" which just about every East European state disliked but which only Albania had the intention of completely refusing? Khrushchev wanted Albania to become the "orchard garden of the socialist bloc," subordinating the construction of industry to agricultural exports.

Grover Furr also noted actions done not long after Stalin died:

No doubt Krushchev applied the idea in a Russian chauvinist fashion, but essentially the idea of an international socialist division of labor was excellent. The insistence of each Eastern European country on total economic independence from all the others is not the least reason why after initial great progress in the Fifties, Eastern Europe started falling behind Western Europe.

Under the Common Market and then the EU, Western Europe was more united economically than was Comecon! The ultimate demonstration of the idiocy even in purely economic terms of "socialism in one country."

As for economic sacrifice, that needs to be openly argued for before the workers and democratically accepted as necessary. That was the method of Trotsky in arguing even for militarization of the trade unions in 1921 -- an error, but the error of a revolutionary.

The Stalin-Hoxha method of shoving it down the throats of the workers whether they like it or not leads to -- well, to Stalinism and Hoxhaism.

Which the workers will never see as their future. Stalinism destroyed the Soviet Union, and Hoxha destroyed his own mistaken project of an independent socialist Albania by repeating Stalin's path.

The idea that masses of workers will drag Stalin and Stalinism out of the dustbin of history that they have been tossed into is a dream on your party that will never be realized. Only the revolutionary path of Trotsky has a future.

-M.H.-

[tir1944]

The machine tractor stations were a vehicle for creating a privileged Stakhanovite elite to lord it over the other peasants, a little Soviet style labor aristocracy to provide a social support for Stalinism just as the labor bureaucracy in imperialist countries provide social support for labor bureaucrats and Social Democrats.The Stakhanovites can be considered the "elite" only in the sense of being the most productive and diligent of workers.Anyone could become a Stakhanovite as long as he/she made an effort,worked "over the norm".



No doubt Krushchev applied the idea in a Russian chauvinist fashion, but essentially the idea of an international socialist division of labor was excellent.Excellent indeed!
Let some countries grow lemons and peaches (Khrushchev's "advice" to Hoxha) with all serious industry being concentrated withing a few "leading nations"!
Way to progress...
:rolleyes:

[Ismail]

The machine tractor stations were a vehicle for creating a privileged Stakhanovite elite to lord it over the other peasants, a little Soviet style labor aristocracy to provide a social support for Stalinism just as the labor bureaucracy in imperialist countries provide social support for labor bureaucrats and Social Democrats. Good riddance. As long of course as the tractors themselves were not gotten rid of, which they certainly were not.Making collectives buy and sell tractors restored a huge amount of commodity relations in the countryside. Instead of, as Stalin said, replacing commodity circulation with products-exchange, the revisionists went in the opposite direction.


Under the Common Market and then the EU, Western Europe was more united economically than was Comecon! The ultimate demonstration of the idiocy even in purely economic terms of "socialism in one country."Either that or an example of capitalist monopolies and internal weaknesses forcing such "unity."

[A Marxist Historian]

The Stakhanovites can be considered the "elite" only in the sense of being the most productive and diligent of workers.Anyone could become a Stakhanovite as long as he/she made an effort,worked "over the norm".

Excellent indeed!
Let some countries grow lemons and peaches (Khrushchev's "advice" to Hoxha) with all serious industry being concentrated withing a few "leading nations"!
Way to progress...
:rolleyes:

Stakhanovites were paid some three-four times as much as other workers. And the way they carried out their famous labor feats is that the foremen organize production around them, making sure they were instantly supplied with the best materials and tools, compelling all the other workers on the shift to turn the Stakhanovite into a hero, and the foreman as his sponsor into a hero too.

Not just elitist but inefficient and wasteful, often disrupting the production process and leading to machine breakage through overuse etc.

-M.H.-

[tir1944]

The "Motto" of Socialism is "To each according to his deed".



Not just elitist but inefficient and wasteful, often disrupting the production process and leading to machine breakage through overuse etc.
Source?

[A Marxist Historian]

The "Motto" of Socialism is "To each according to his deed".


Source?

As to Stakhanovism disrupting the production process and leading to waste, breakages etc., and social privilege for the Stakhanovites, many many. Any decent labor history of the USSR in the 1930s, of which plenty have been written. Trotsky of course too.

The standard classic work recognized as solid by historians from all political camps was by Robert Davies, forgetting the title right now. If you're really interested, I'll dig it up.

-M.h.-