Max Stirner [Archive]

Dave B

12th August 2011, 19:19

Stirner’s Ego and His Own was a response or counter argument to Fuerbachian communism which so happened to be the position that Karl and Fred took in 1844.

Fuerbachian communism was that human beings had a natural social instinct (the human essence) to be co-operative and thus communistic.

And that in communism, as a gift economy, you found fulfilment in doing stuff for others etc, and that was a natural state of human existence.

And that human society and humans had been driven away from that natural state, of primitive communism if you like, by the evolution of the economic necessities of private property and capitalism etc etc.

And that communism and desire for it would be a return to that natural state, with the post factum benefits of technological developments of society as a consequence of capitalism etc.

Thus;

Private Property and Communism

(3) Communism as the positive transcendence of private property as human self-estrangement, and therefore as the real appropriation of the human essence by and for man; communism therefore as the complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e., human) being – a return accomplished consciously and embracing the entire wealth of previous development. This communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man – the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species. Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it knows itself to be this solution

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/comm.htm

Stirner viewed this as yet another manifestation, justification and invention of and for a tyrannical cultural moral ideology over the individual.

Thus; just as if you don’t respect private property or the monarch or whatever you are a social pariah and a git.

Now according to Stirner, Fuerbach was saying that if you didn’t believe and follow the tenets of the ‘social instinct’ and natural altruism you were not even a human being and some kind of defective deviant from humanity itself.

An idea, in labelling egotists as sub-human, that was even more offensive, tyrannical and oppressive than the current ones.

And Stirner also made the argument that egotistical self interest and materialism were philosophically synonymous.

Karl and Fred accepted the argument and responded with the idea that it was selfish (or egotistical) to be a communist, which requires rational unselfishness.

Thus;

Letters of Marx and Engels 1844 Letter from Engels to Marx in Paris

This egoism is taken to such a pitch, it is so absurd and at the same time so self-aware, that it cannot maintain itself even for an instant in its one-sidedness, but must immediately change into communism. In the first place it's a simple matter to prove to Stirner that his egoistic man is bound to become communist out of sheer egoism. That's the way to answer the fellow. In the second place he must be told that in its egoism the human heart is of itself, from the very outset, unselfish and self-sacrificing, so that he finally ends up with what he is combating.

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/letters/44_11_19.htm

And they also responded later to Stirner with their ‘German Ideology’.

A lot of the of the debate revolved around esoteric Hegelian terminology I think, which was above my head, hence the ‘Mongol’ stuff.

Another criticism of human essence theory was that it had no basis in materialist scientific fact, something that had to wait until Darwins 2nd book.

This great question has been discussed by many writers4 of consummate ability; and my sole excuse for touching on it is the impossibility of here passing it over, and because, as far as I know, no one has approached it exclusively from the side of natural history. The investigation possesses, also, some independent interest, as an attempt to see how far the study of the lower animals can throw light on one of the highest psychical faculties of man.
The following proposition seems to me in a high degree probable—namely, that any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts,5 would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as
3 'Metaphysics of Ethics,' translated by J. W. Semple, Edinburgh, 1836, p. 136.
4 Mr. Bain gives a list ('Mental and Moral Science,' 1868, p. 543-725) of twenty-six British authors who have written on this subject, and whose names are familiar to every reader; to these, Mr. Bain's own name, and those of Mr. Lecky, Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, and Sir J. Lubbock, as well as of others, may be added.

5 Sir B. Brodie, after observing that man is a social animal ('Psychological Enquiries,' 1854, p. 192), asks the pregnant question, "ought not this to settle the disputed question as to the existence of a moral sense?" Similar ideas have probably occurred to many persons, as they did long ago to Marcus Aurelius. Mr. J. S. Mill speaks, in his celebrated work, 'Utilitarianism,' (1864, p. 46), of the social feelings as a "powerful natural sentiment," and as "the natural basis of sentiment for utilitarian morality;" but on the previous page he says, "if, as is my own belief, the moral feelings are not innate, but acquired, they are not for that reason less natural." It is with hesitation that I venture to differ from so profound a thinker, but it can hardly be disputed that the social feelings are instinctive or innate in the lower animals; and why should they not be so in man? Mr. Bain (see, for instance, 'The Emotions and the Will,' 1865, p. 481) and others believe that the moral sense is acquired by each individual during his lifetime. On the general theory of evolution this is at least extremely improbable.

[page] 72
its intellectual powers had become as well developed, or nearly as well developed, as in man. For, firstly, the social instincts lead an animal to take pleasure in the society of its fellows, to feel a certain amount of sympathy with them, and to perform various services for them. The services may be of a definite and evidently instinctive nature; or there may be only a wish and readiness, as with most of the higher social animals, to aid their fellows in certain general ways. But these feelings and services are by no means extended to all the individuals of the same species, only to those of the same association. Secondly, as soon as the mental faculties had become highly developed, images of all past actions and motives would be incessantly passing through the brain of each individual; and that feeling of dissatisfaction which invariably results, as we shall hereafter see, from any unsatisfied instinct, would arise, as often as it was perceived that the enduring and always present social instinct had yielded to some other instinct, at the time stronger, but neither enduring in its nature, nor leaving behind it a very vivid impression. It is clear that many instinctive desires, such as that of hunger, are in their nature of short duration; and after being satisfied are not readily or vividly recalled. Thirdly, after the power of language had been acquired and the wishes of the members of the same community could be distinctly expressed, the common opinion how each member ought to act for the public good, would naturally become to a large extent the guide to action. But the social instincts would still give the impulse to act for the good of the community, this impulse being strengthened, directed, and sometimes even deflected by public opinion, the power of which rests, as we shall presently see, on instinctive sympathy. Lastly, habit in the individual would ultimately play a very…………

http://darwin-online.org.uk/converted/published/1871_Descent_F937/1871_Descent_F937.1.html

It is a great read (Stirner) even if I think he was a bastard.