What are your counterarguments: Rawlsian perspective against guaranteed health care

[Fulanito de Tal]

As described below, the Rawlsian perspective states that it is not society's job to guarantee health care. What would be your arguments against this?


Wakefield (1988) claims that the difference principle does not apply to physical and mental health for practical and ethical reasons. The vast quantity of disorders that exist will be too much of a task for society to promise to address and resolve. As Wakefield (1988) judges, it seems absurd for society as a whole to dedicate resources to an unlimited amount of issues. Because the amount of disorders is so large, society would lose liberty beyond acceptable levels. Thus, in the name of liberty, the physical and mental health of the disadvantaged should not be guaranteed. Furthermore, it is not an ethical obligation to help those in need, but as a charity. Wakefield (1988) gives the example that the needless suffering of animals is avoided through intuition, which has nothing to do with a social contract (a main concept of the Rawlsian perspective). We do not avoid animal suffering due to a social contract, but because individuals feed a personal need to do so. It does not become a society's goal to provide for the material needs of the disadvantaged, as long as a social liberties have been maximized.

[Apoi_Viitor]

As described below, the Rawlsian perspective states that it is not society's job to guarantee health care. What would be your arguments against this?

That argument did not seem Rawlsian at all...

[Fulanito de Tal]

That argument did not seem Rawlsian at all...

Wakefield and the Social Service Review think it does sounds Rawlsian.

[Hoi Polloi]

No unified philosophy is ever unified; it's not some unique defect of Leftist politic that leads to there being a million types of Marixst. The same applies to other philosophies, including liberalism.

Applying the Theory of Justice alone, one could say that inequality in health care based on the accumulation of wealth in turn based on the random distribution of natural capital is not a difference achieved through meritocratic selection or competition and is not open to all members of society. People born into poverty can empirically be said to often inherit it through no fault of their own, same with wealth. Therefore the condition of Rawlsian justice that inequality must be A. earned and equally open to all members of society is not being met.

But that's only if you apply a certain view of wealth to that proviso about meritocracy and equal opportunity. To those of right wing economic mindsets, even the ones who have been one over by certain progressive agendas or goals (Third Way philosophy of the 90's has created a lot of these, self-styled progressives who believe in using markets to make life better for people), they might approve of some mandatory public funded social services but still believe that wealthy capitalists have gone through meritocratic selection and that the poor had an equal opportunity to that position.

So their different interpretation of Rawls from mine is not based on the minutia of the texts most likely, but on different perceived notions/original truths.

Similarly with the second requirement of the Theory of Justice, that any economic inequality not only be meritocratic and an equal opportunity position but also that even then it is only just if that inequality helps those more economically disadvantaged than them having economic equality with the advantaged would. That having some rich people must make the poor less poor than if their economic statuses were equalized, otherwise the rich have no right to be rich.

Now in some ways that is a very bold mandate, but it still allows for people who believe in laissez faire economics to just go in automatically assuming that letting suppliers accumulate the wealth of others somehow allows for the hand of the market more than letting the wealth generators keep their own surplus (in my mind, even when I was a capitalist, I still took it as a granted that upper management were a form of planned economics and that in a real free market the workers would be buying and selling either individually or in voluntary joint investments themselves).

The fact is you can be a socialist, a reformist capitalist, or an unrepentant serve-the-interests-of-the-capitalist-class capitalist and still be a Rawlsian - because everyone brings their own original truths, their own X and Y values, to the formula presented by Rawls.

That's my opinion anyway - I'm sure others know better than me.

[Fulanito de Tal]

^ First, thanks for the entire post. This helped me grasp the concepts better.

Second, concerning this quote:



The fact is you can be a socialist, a reformist capitalist, or an unrepentant serve-the-interests-of-the-capitalist-class capitalist and still be a Rawlsian - because everyone brings their own original truths, their own X and Y values, to the formula presented by Rawls.

Habermas critiqued Rawls on this. He said that while the original position and veil of ignorance exercise was good, the actual thepry that Rawls created was not done from an original position and veil of ignorance. He did it as a person that brings inherited baggage. Therefore, Habermas said that justice should come from a collaborative approach of individuals that have reach a certain level of self-awareness. The collaborative part attempts to include all people in a pluralistic society. The self-awareness part attempts to ensure that you are aware of the baggage that you are brining into the discussion.

[Rafiq]

Who cares, it's been working pretty well in Europe or Cuba

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

It sounds to me like "You can't solve all matters of public health, so therefore don't bother", which is ludicrous on the face of it. There are also other things that can be done to reduce the load on public healthcare, such as sanitation, education, and wealth redistribution, which have primary benefits of their own worth pursuing.

Am I wrong in my summary of Wakefield's argument?

[AnonymousOne]

Very confused as to how this argument would work given the Veil of Ignorance, where a society is created by rational people without knowing their own role or status. Applying that, wouldn't Rawls obviously be pro-universal health care?

[Apoi_Viitor]

Very confused as to how this argument would work given the Veil of Ignorance, where a society is created by rational people without knowing their own role or status. Applying that, wouldn't Rawls obviously be pro-universal health care?

I thought so too at first, but Hoi Polloi's post does a very good job at explaining why Rawls' method ends up simply reproducing the biases of each individual.

However, after rereading the OP, I don't understand how Wakefield's second argument falls into a Rawlsian framework. *I'm referring to this part below*


Furthermore, it is not an ethical obligation to help those in need, but as a charity. Wakefield (1988) gives the example that the needless suffering of animals is avoided through intuition, which has nothing to do with a social contract (a main concept of the Rawlsian perspective). We do not avoid animal suffering due to a social contract, but because individuals feed a personal need to do so. It does not become a society's goal to provide for the material needs of the disadvantaged, as long as a social liberties have been maximized.

[AnonymousOne]

However, after rereading the OP, I don't understand how Wakefield's second argument falls into a Rawlsian framework. *I'm referring to this part below*

I believe it's just a generic social contract framework, and the author is saying that helping and providing mutual aid isn't something that's a part of the social contract (or the rules that we create that govern society) but rather an intuition or feeling. Since Rawls uses a social contract, the creation of society under the veil of ignorance, and charity is an intuition which isn't a part of the rules created.

It's weird, and odd but it's fairly coherent given a warped view of Rawls.

[syndicat]

Rawls' first principle of justice is maximum liberty consistent with a like level of liberty for everyone else.

Sustaining a person's capacities is part of positive liberty, because people will be able to do less, will be less in control of their lives, if their health is damaged or not sustained or if they are severely disabled or die due to failure to provide resources to sustain health.

[Fulanito de Tal]

I thought so too at first, but Hoi Polloi's post does a very good job at explaining why Rawls' method ends up simply reproducing the biases of each individual.

However, after rereading the OP, I don't understand how Wakefield's second argument falls into a Rawlsian framework. *I'm referring to this part below*

Because Rawls focuses on social goods and not natural goods. Social goods include liberty, access to political offices, etc. Natural goods involve health care, food, etc.

What I see is that Wakefield is only applying Theory of Justice in a manner that negatively affects the least disadvantaged and makes no contributions that negatively affect the wealthy. So, he's selectively applying the theory in a systematically biased fashion. If Wakefield wants to apply Theory of Justice to show that no one should be guaranteed welfare, then he should also apply it to show that no one should have access to inherited benefits.

I argue that assisting people with health issues is a matter of justice. How can someone say that because they were lucky enough to not have the genes that predispose someone to schizophrenia say that it's not their problem that someone else is? Furthermore, EVERYONE will eventually need health care. It's a needed commodity, not like cars or a/c. Restricting someone's access to it is not maximizing liberty for all, but only for those with enough accumulated wealth. So, to have access to health care, you have to limit your actions to those that allow you to accumulate that wealth. That is not maximum liberty.