Glorious anti-imperialist Zhou Enlai celebrating with fellow leader of Third World

[caramelpence]

http://assets.nybooks.com/media/photo/2011/05/19/spence_2-060911_jpg_630x363_crop_q85.jpg

On a serious note, Kissinger has recently published a book on Chinese foreign policy and China-US detente in the 70s. I haven't bought or read it yet, but here's part of a review by Jonathan D. Spence:


With the fourth of the variations, “The Road to Reconciliation,” On China makes a major shift in mood and content, becoming in part a first-person narrative, as Kissinger himself enters the story as President Nixon’s national security adviser during the bold and ultimately successful quest to arrange a meeting between Mao and Nixon in Beijing, with an accompanying account of diplomatic exploration of the science of the possible. Readers seeking to find chapters on the Vietnam War as detailed as those on the Korean War will be disappointed—Kissinger remains muted on many aspects of the Vietnam war as it was viewed in the United States, and links the war to his earlier patterns of historical thinking, claiming:

"When the US buildup in Vietnam began, Beijing interpreted it in wei qi terms: as another example of American bases surrounding China from Korea, to the Taiwan Strait and now to Indochina…. Hanoi’s leaders were familiar with Sun Tzu’s Art of War and employed its principles to significant effect against both France and the United States. Even before the end of the long Vietnam wars, first with the French seeking to reclaim their colony after World War II, and then with the United States from 1963 to 1975, both Beijing and Hanoi began to realize that the next contest would be between themselves for dominance in Indochina and Southeast Asia."

Although much of the Nixon visit to China has been covered by the principals themselves in their published memoirs, the bibliography and notes to On China give helpful leads to many other sources. They enable Kissinger to recall the work of his advance team—and then the President’s February 1972 visit to Mao—in a sustained narrative that neatly blends the personal with the national sides of the story. Kissinger obviously derived immense pleasure from negotiating this China trip and from all his other visits at the highest levels—fifty or more, according to his own calculation—that came afterward.

Even if Mao was a somewhat tarnished colossus by this time, there is also Zhou Enlai to continue the tale, and then later Jiang Zemin, Deng Xiaoping, and other ministerial-level Chinese officials. Cumulatively these transcribed minutes help us to see the gradual changes in policy when both sides were willing to risk rebuff. Reprising his first variation, Kissinger reflects on how, from 1972 onward, “what we encountered was a diplomatic style closer to traditional Chinese diplomacy than to the pedantic formulations to which we had become accustomed during our negotiations with other Communist states.” Here, to his obvious delight, “was a diplomacy well suited to China’s traditional security challenge,” preserving a “civilization surrounded by peoples who, if they combined, wielded potentially superior military capacity.” China, Kissinger observes, prevailed by “fostering a calibrated combination of rewards and punishments and majestic cultural performance. In this context, hospitality becomes an aspect of strategy.”

As an added plus, there was the chance to get to know Zhou Enlai, a consummate courtier, politician, and diplomat, who “dominated by exceptional intelligence and capacity to intuit the intangibles of the psychology of his opposite number.” In a nicely constructed summary of the two main Chinese leaders, Kissinger writes of their special attributes:

"Mao dominated any gathering; Zhou suffused it. Mao’s passion strove to overwhelm opposition; Zhou’s intellect would seek to persuade or outmaneuver it. Mao was sardonic; Zhou penetrating. Mao thought of himself as a philosopher; Zhou saw his role as an administrator or a negotiator. Mao was eager to accelerate history; Zhou was content to exploit its currents."

The subsequent leader-to-leader meetings in Beijing went well and it may very well be true, as Kissinger writes, that the Nixon trip was “one of the few occasions where a state visit brought about a seminal change in international affairs.”

How swiftly, nevertheless, things could change: the Watergate crisis and the resignation of President Nixon on August 8, 1974, led, in Kissinger’s words, “to a collapse of congressional support for an activist foreign policy in the subsequent congressional elections in November 1974.” This was accompanied by an “enfeebling [of] the American capacity to manage the geopolitical challenge,” which in this situation meant above all a policy by which the US would weaken the Soviet build-up on China’s borders.

Kissinger tells us that “the destruction of the President who had conceived the opening to China was incomprehensible in Beijing,” though one might question whether Mao and Zhou were genuinely so astonished. Watergate was surely no more harmful and unanticipated than the sudden destruction of Mao’s selected successor, the minister of defense and army marshal Lin Biao. Lin was accused of trying to kill Mao in a 1971 coup, and subsequently was himself killed when the plane in which he was trying to escape to the Soviet Union, along with several of his family members, crashed in Mongolia. Even after this long passage of time, Kissinger carefully refers to the drama as being “reportedly an abortive coup.”

Mao himself jocularly noted in an aside to Nixon that

"in our country also there is a reactionary group which is opposed to our contact with you. The result was that they got on an airplane and fled abroad…. As for the Soviet Union, they finally went to dig out the corpses, but they didn’t say anything about it."

Each side could (and did) exaggerate the subtlety of the other. Mao felt no hindrance to “defying laws both human and divine” or—as Kissinger glosses Mao’s use of the familiar Chinese idiom—”trampling law underfoot without batting an eyelid.”

Equally hard to predict were the astonishing changes brought to China after Mao’s death in 1976, and the return to power of the thrice-purged Party veteran Deng Xiaoping, which provides the setting for the fifth variation. In his 1979 visit to the United States, which Kissinger labels “a kind of shadow play,” Deng made a dramatically favorable impression. Like the earlier Chinese strategists admired by Kissinger, Deng could pursue contrasting policies at once: thus in early 1979, for instance, while he was charming his hosts in the United States, he not only also ordered Chinese troops into Vietnam, to counter Soviet influence there, but also arrested and ordered harsh prison sentences for many of the Chinese artists and writers who had been participating in the short-lived flourishing of demands for more freedom of expression known as “Democracy Wall.”

It now seems inevitable—though it was not—that Deng’s ten years of close to absolute power after 1979 must have led inexorably to the immense demonstrations and subsequent massacres of 1989 in Tiananmen Square. We can note the caution of Kissinger’s language, as he writes that the events of spring 1989 were not due to a single cause, but that “it was the unprecedented confluence of disparate resentments that escalated into upheaval.” More simply put, “events escalated in a manner neither observers nor participants thought conceivable at the beginning of the month.”

Recent events in North Africa and the Middle East may help to underline Kissinger’s sardonic reflection that “the occupation of the main square of a country’s capital, even when completely peaceful, is also a tactic to demonstrate the impotence of the government, to weaken it, and to tempt it into rash acts, putting it at a disadvantage.” As to the “harsh suppression of the protest,” writes Kissinger, that was “all seen on television.” In fact, I believe it is still accepted by most analysts in the West that the television lights were turned out on the square, and much of the killing took place in darkness—hence the great disparity in reports of what happened where, and when, and of how many fatalities there really were. Such figures are needed if one is to separate random from deliberate use of lethal power.

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/jun/09/kissinger-and-china/?page=1

The dominant thrust of the book from what I can glean from the review is Kissinger explaining Chinese foreign-policy in terms of a historical and cultural emphasis on long-term strategy and incremental tactical decision-making rather than the head-on clashes of forces that Kissinger associates with foreign policy and international relations in Western Europe, due to a smaller territorial space being dominated by multiple political actors. Whether that line of argument is what it sounds like - an orientalist neo-traditionalist account - will only become apparent when I read the book, I guess.

[Ismail]

Enver Hoxha, July 26, 1971 (from Reflections on China Vol. I, p. 564):

To talk to an envoy of American imperialism, who poses as a friend of China, to be certain that what you tell him he will rush off to carry "fresh" to the heads of imperialism — and the talks were held precisely for this; and on the other hand, to fail to inform your own friend and ally, Albania, first of all, and then the whole of world opinion, this is perfidy, this is glaring revisionism, this is not "people's diplomacy", as the Chinese claim, but is secret diplomacy with the heads of American imperialism.

Khrushchev did many base things, openly and under cover, but he publicized his meetings. The meeting of Chou En-lai with Kissinger had to take the course it did, because this is how it began, in great secrecy, but when it ended "with success" and the world was given the "glad tidings", the Chinese had no way to hide it from us.

Irrespective of the great shame, which they never felt, because secret negotiations have been going on for a long time, irrespective that only when it became a fait accompli they told us of it, the information of Chou En-lai which was given to us shows their revisionist opportunist line, shows their lack of logic and argument, shows their desire for rapprochement with the Americans, and their lame attempts to conceal this desire. This information brings up weak arguments in order to forestall correct principled criticisms which will be made and, finally, all their arguments are based on an incorrect, very weak political analysis, supported with false reasoning to justify this shitty thing they did.(Bold in the original)

[Marxach-Léinínach]

Zhou Enlai never should've had as much power in the PRC as he did.

[pranabjyoti]

Zhou is actually the mentor of scoundrels like Deng and the degradation of CPC after Mao's death was actually for his actions. He is actually the representative of petty-bourgeoisie elements inside CPC. He openly spoke against the freedom struggle of Bangladesh and he actually stood for the reactionary pro-bourgeoisie elements inside party during the Cultural Revolution.

[caramelpence]

Zhou Enlai never should've had as much power in the PRC as he did.

Uh, what makes you think that US-China rapprochement was due to Zhou's intervention alone? Mao exercised key influence over Chinese foreign policy throughout the Maoist period which was why he was able to call back all of China's overseas diplomats during the Cultural Revolution so that they would be able to participate, and on the issue of US-China rapprochement in particular it was his personal intervention that led the People's Daily to publish Nixon's inauguration speech in its entirety in 1969. Rapprochement was very much a collective project and to tie it solely to Zhou shows a lack of intellectual honesty.


Zhou is actually the mentor of scoundrels like Deng and the degradation of CPC after Mao's death was actually for his actions.

What actions and what degradation?

[pranabjyoti]

What actions and what degradation?
If you have any idea about present China, then I am wondering why are asking me about "degradation"? I think I have to teach you the definition of degradation.
Zhou was the behind the re-introduction of Deng and its allies into the party, Deng was expelled from party in the time of Cultural Revolution. Deng at that time was marked as "capitalist roader", anybody now can realize how right that marking and decision was. But, later, especially on Zhou's initiative, Deng and others were re-introduced into the party. He want to make an allay with Pakistan and just for that reason, he undermined the brutal repression and torture of Pakistani army in present Bangladesh and opposed the freedom struggle. THOSE ARE THE ACTIONS.
There are other points too. Though he remained in the party and had been respected, but very often he stand beside capitalist roaders in the name of realpolitik and sabotaged Mao's and CPC decisions from inside.

[Ismail]

Zhou sabotaged things from the inside? Really?

It reminds me of Lin Biao. As Hoxha noted in Reflections on China Vol. II, p. 30:

A long time ago the Chinese comrades began to slow down the delivery of materials, machinery, and blue-prints, etc., to us. They 'justify' this failure on their part to fulfil contracts with all sorts of excuses such as: "Lin Piao sabotaged everything, therefore we are making repairs, and many things which we were to send you will be re-made" ...Do you have any evidence that Zhou did "initiatives" against Mao's wishes?

[HEAD ICE]

yup "degredation" of china came about because of the bad ideas of a state's man. kind of like how the USSR changed its class nature and became state-capitalist after they refused to give china nuclear weapon technology. this is the marxist method.

[pranabjyoti]

Zhou sabotaged things from the inside? Really?

I have seen it on books. So, at present I can not give you any net link. Those were memoirs of naxal leaders, who went to China. They described the hostile attitude of Zhou towards them. Actually, Zhou was more concerned about his new "friendship" with Nehru-Indira regime on the basis of the famous five points and fearing that by supporting Naxal movements, probably China will make the rulers of India angry.
What is your opinion about opposing the freedom struggle of Bangladesh and re-introduction of Deng in the party? There is no doubt that those were Zhou's initiative.

[pranabjyoti]

yup "degredation" of china came about because of the bad ideas of a state's man. kind of like how the USSR changed its class nature and became state-capitalist after they refused to give china nuclear weapon technology. this is the marxist method.
How many times do you to teach you (and others like you) that historical figures are not just "individuals" but representative of class rather. It couldn't be possible for Zhou if "capitalist roaders" were already existing and thriving inside the party. Zhou silently take the leadership and work for restoration of capitalism in China.

[Kiev Communard]

How many times do you to teach you (and others like you) that historical figures are not just "individuals" but representative of class rather. It couldn't be possible for Zhou if "capitalist roaders" were already existing and thriving inside the party. Zhou silently take the leadership and work for restoration of capitalism in China.

Yes,you are right. Your position would be more coherent, though, if you looked on the position of your favorites Stalin and Mao through the same lens, rather than pretending that they were "glorious socialists".

[pranabjyoti]

Yes,you are right. Your position would be more coherent, though, if you looked on the position of your favorites Stalin and Mao through the same lens, rather than pretending that they were "glorious socialists".
To me, they were representative of proletariat and that's enough.

[RedSunRising]

To me, they were representative of proletariat and that's enough.

Some of the trolls on this forum have admitted that they have been careful with their education in order to land a good job, but socialist powers playing politics to preserve the gains of their revolution is supposedly EVIL .

LOL!

[caramelpence]

Zhou was the behind the re-introduction of Deng and its allies into the part

This assertion neglects that it was actually Mao who was instrumental behind the return of Deng. A large part of the rationale behind Mao's decision-making was that Zhou himself was increasingly ill and incapacitated by the middle of 1974, as a result of cancer, to the extent that in June of that year he actually moved from his office in the leadership compound to a hospital that was to serve as his base of operations until the end of his life, only leaving the hospital in order to make a small number of political interventions. In addition, Zhou's political position had been weakened somewhat as a result of the "Criticize Lin Biao, Criticize Confucius" campaign because of how many of the slogans and criticisms alluded to Zhou by means of historical figures, most importantly the Duke of Zhou. The key decision as far as Deng's first rehabilitation is concerned was the proposal in October 1974 that Deng should take over Zhou's place in charge of the government with the title of first vice-premier, and that proposal was made by Mao, and was accepted by the rest of the Central Committee. It was also Mao who personally called for the reshuffling of the Military Affairs Commission (MAC) so that major generals would no longer be in charge of the same military regions as previously and it was Mao who, as part of this change, proposed that Deng should enter the MAC and take on the role of chief of staff - keeping in mind that the MAC is the key military command body in the Chinese political system, and is a party rather than state institution. What is significant about Mao's active role in restoring Deng is not only that it shows that you're wrong about it being Zhou's project but also that Mao had hitherto been trying to develop an alternative successor (to both Deng and Lin Biao) in the form of Wang Hongwen, and so the fact that Mao nonetheless went ahead with the rehabilitation of Deng suggests that he was not sufficiently confident in Wang's abilities or his independence from Jiang Qing and other radicals.

So no, it wasn't Zhou's decision, it was Mao's, and if you want to make conspiratorial arguments about Mao being surrounded by lurking revisionists you need to provide evidence rather than simple assertions. You see that paragraph above, in this post? That's called evidence from someone who knows what they're talking about.

[Tim Finnegan]

To me, they were representative of proletariat and that's enough.
But is that a product of thorough analysis, or an article of faith? That, I believe, was the substance of Kiev Communard's comment.

[pranabjyoti]

This assertion neglects that it was actually Mao who was instrumental behind the return of Deng. A large part of the rationale behind Mao's decision-making was that Zhou himself was increasingly ill and incapacitated by the middle of 1974, as a result of cancer, to the extent that in June of that year he actually moved from his office in the leadership compound to a hospital that was to serve as his base of operations until the end of his life, only leaving the hospital in order to make a small number of political interventions. In addition, Zhou's political position had been weakened somewhat as a result of the "Criticize Lin Biao, Criticize Confucius" campaign because of how many of the slogans and criticisms alluded to Zhou by means of historical figures, most importantly the Duke of Zhou. The key decision as far as Deng's first rehabilitation is concerned was the proposal in October 1974 that Deng should take over Zhou's place in charge of the government with the title of first vice-premier, and that proposal was made by Mao, and was accepted by the rest of the Central Committee. It was also Mao who personally called for the reshuffling of the Military Affairs Commission (MAC) so that major generals would no longer be in charge of the same military regions as previously and it was Mao who, as part of this change, proposed that Deng should enter the MAC and take on the role of chief of staff - keeping in mind that the MAC is the key military command body in the Chinese political system, and is a party rather than state institution. What is significant about Mao's active role in restoring Deng is not only that it shows that you're wrong about it being Zhou's project but also that Mao had hitherto been trying to develop an alternative successor (to both Deng and Lin Biao) in the form of Wang Hongwen, and so the fact that Mao nonetheless went ahead with the rehabilitation of Deng suggests that he was not sufficiently confident in Wang's abilities or his independence from Jiang Qing and other radicals.

So no, it wasn't Zhou's decision, it was Mao's, and if you want to make conspiratorial arguments about Mao being surrounded by lurking revisionists you need to provide evidence rather than simple assertions. You see that paragraph above, in this post? That's called evidence from someone who knows what they're talking about.
Any source?

[black magick hustla]

Some of the trolls on this forum have admitted that they have been careful with their education in order to land a good job, but socialist powers playing politics to preserve the gains of their revolution is supposedly EVIL .

LOL!

you are the worst at at analogies señorita p. genesis

[bailey_187]

Any source?

lol but u dont accept any sources that contradict your views. talking about sources when you dig out the most obscure books from the 1930s and pretend they present the "truth".

[pranabjyoti]

lol but u dont accept any sources that contradict your views. talking about sources when you dig out the most obscure books from the 1930s and pretend they present the "truth".
Better say that you can not provide any proper source at present.

[bailey_187]

Better say that you can not provide any proper source at present.

I dont have any sources because i dont know anything about this. I just find it funny how u of all people can be requesting sources.

Tell me this, what is a "proper source" to you? Regarding Soviet history its obscure fellow-traveler accounts from the 1930s. So im guessing similar things regarding China would be a "proper sources"? lol

[pranabjyoti]

I dont have any sources because i dont know anything about this. I just find it funny how u of all people can be requesting sources.

Tell me this, what is a "proper source" to you? Regarding Soviet history its obscure fellow-traveler accounts from the 1930s. So im guessing similar things regarding China would be a "proper sources"? lol
Any source from a proper reliable person like William Hinton (for example) regarding that matter. So far, I have heard it first time that Mao helped Deng to return to party.
Just mere phrases aren't enough. At least it's fact that Zhou opposed the freedom struggle of Bangladesh and made friendship with Nehru (Prime Minister of India) on five points. While Mao directly supported the Naxalbari uprising by calling it "spring thunder over India" but at least I don't know about any action from Zhou to support India's first peoples democratic revolution.

[caramelpence]

Any source?

Pretty much any in-depth book on the elite politics of modern China? I don't know of any historian who has even provided a revisionist account in this area because it doesn't strike me as something that could ever be a matter of real dispute. If we were talking about a disagreement over how to go about interpreting a given set of historical facts or how to handle conflicting forms of evidence then maybe it would make sense or be valuable to challenge sources or look at the different positions in the historiographical debates (for example, if we were discussing the death toll from the Great Leap Forward or who was central for the first united front) but in this case there is no real debate to speak of because we have overwhelming evidence that it was Mao who made the major decisions behind Deng's first rehabilitation. Nonetheless, let me direct you towards two texts: MacFarquhar, Roderick, 'The succession to Mao and the end of Maoism 1969-82' in MacFarquhar, Roderick, (ed.), The Politics of China 1949-1989 (Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 286-92, and Teiwes, Frederick C., and Sun, Warren, The End of the Maoist Era: Chinese Politics During the Twilight of the Cultural Revolution, 1972-76 (M.E. Sharpe, 2007), pp. 66-75, 178-205.

These books should be very easy to find, as the MacFarquhar volume is a standard reference work and is made up of articles from the Cambridge History of China and the Teiwes and Sun volume is by far the most detailed account of elite-level politics during the last stage of the Cultural Revolution, as the title indicates. I should make absolutely clear that I am not interested in responding to any absurd allegations that you have about these authors being imperialist agents or about there being a massive conspiracy to fabricate the evidence and make it seem as if Mao was vigorously supportive of Deng's return to power (which he was) when actually he was a principled supporter of mass mobilization who was surrounded by hidden revisionists. I have presented evidence that shows that Mao was behind Deng's return to power (he also personally supported Deng leading the Chinese delegation to the UN in early 1974, which I didn't mention in my last post) and if you have evidence that it was actually Zhou making these decisions or that Zhou was otherwise a central player in personnel-related decisions during this period despite his ailing health then you should present your evidence (you won't, because there is none) rather than resorting to absurd attacks on leading scholars in the field or relying on obscure comments from Naxalites about Zhou's personal flaws and characteristics.

Now, watch a Maoist reveal just how disrespectful Stalinists are towards historical evidence.


Any source from a proper reliable person like William Hinton (for example)

Actually, if you were familiar with Hinton's work on the Cultural Revolution and his changing perspectives, you would know that, in Shenfan, after Turning Point and before The Great Reveral, Hinton actually took a very critical attitude towards left (or "ultra-left") forces and supported the stabilizing policies that were put in place under Deng's oversight in the 1970s. Hinton's changing views are an interesting historical story in themselves (in the sense that they can be treated as primary sources by historians who are interested in how Western intellectuals and activists responded to the development of the Cultural Revolution, rather than as the best secondary accounts available) but at the end of the day he was not a historian of Chinese elite politics, not least because he did not have access to the resources that people like Sun do, so it isn't that surprising that he didn't write too much about the relationship between Mao and Deng at the elite level and that he was more concerned with the impact of policy at the level of individual communities.

Also, Hinton rightfully condemned the Tiananmen crackdown, which you celebrate. I guess you see him as reliable where you agree but an imperialist agent where you disagree.


So far, I have heard it first time that Mao helped Deng to return to party

That says more about your knowledge of modern China than anything else.

[caramelpence]

Just mere phrases aren't enough. At least it's fact that Zhou opposed the freedom struggle of Bangladesh and made friendship with Nehru (Prime Minister of India) on five points. While Mao directly supported the Naxalbari uprising by calling it "spring thunder over India" but at least I don't know about any action from Zhou to support India's first peoples democratic revolution.

You're right in saying that "mere phrases" are not enough when it comes to any political position but then you go on to say that Mao supported the Naxalites by announcing that the uprising signified "spring thunder over India" - but this is itself simply a phrase, so if you think that Mao did support the uprising in any genuine sense, you'll need to point to particular political decisions that were undertaken by Mao and/or the Chinese government with the aim of giving meaningful assistance to the Naxalites. In any case, your attempt to show that Zhou was a "capitalist roader" through his alleged support for the repression of the national liberation struggle in Bangladesh assumes that Zhou had effective autonomy in the sphere of foreign policy, whereas it was ultimately Mao who was the key decision-maker in this area. Mao was the only individual to receive Foreign Ministry options papers from Zhou and it was on the basis of Mao's response to these papers that the most important decisions in foreign policy were made, and as I've already pointed out in this thread it was Mao's personal initiative that led to the publication of Nixon's inauguration speech in order to signal China's willingness to pursue detente with the US, and it was also Mao who selected the Chinese delegation to the UN in 1974. It was also Mao who made the decision to withdraw all of China's diplomats during the Cultural Revolution, which had important implications for China's position in the world during that period. The Chinese state's refusal to support national liberation was hardly limited to Bangladesh either, it also manifested itself in the CPC's longstanding policy of not supporting the return of Hong Kong until it could be carried out on the party's terms, which during the Cultural Revolution meant not support the radical riots that broke out in Hong Kong in May 1967.

[pranabjyoti]

Also, Hinton rightfully condemned the Tiananmen crackdown, which you celebrate. I guess you see him as reliable where you agree but an imperialist agent where you disagree.
WHERE HAVE I SUPPORTED THE TIENANMEN CRACKDOWN? AT LEAST I AM SURE THAT YOU CAN NOT SHOW ANY POST.

That says more about your knowledge of modern China than anything else.
In your post, you just mentioned some books by formal historians. At least can you say something about MAO DIRECTLY SUPPORTED DENG'S RETURN TO CAPITALISM POLICY.
I hope in those books, it was written that Deng had re-entered party after self-criticism and what I guess that he is just "acting" throughout the period to go to the top. Just like Bernstein, who openly admitted after Engels's death that "when Engels was alive, he actually had to write against his will". In short, he is just cheating to get the confidence of Engels to go to reputation. Men like Deng can not be honest and can certainly adopt the same policy.
In your post, you have said Mao's initiatives to send Deng to UN. But, what you re-introduction of Deng into party and who took the initiative? Was it Mao? I have doubt.

[caramelpence]

WHERE HAVE I SUPPORTED THE TIENANMEN CRACKDOWN? AT LEAST I AM SURE THAT YOU CAN NOT SHOW ANY POST.

Turn your caps lock off, it only makes you look even more absurd. In post 15 of the recent thread in the history forum on Tiananmen, you say that "anyone supporting them can not call him/herself even "leftist", being "communist" are a far cry" and the rest of your posts in that thread are also based around accusations of being "pro-West" and the like, which is what so-called leftists say when they want to justify the crackdown. All without a shred of evidence, in the same way as this thread.


In your post, you just mentioned some books by formal historians. At least can you say something about MAO DIRECTLY SUPPORTED DENG'S RETURN TO CAPITALISM POLICY.
I hope in those books, it was written that Deng had re-entered party after self-criticism and what I guess that he is just "acting" throughout the period to go to the top.

I cited those books because they provide scholarly backing to the evidence I presented in my earlier post, concerning Deng's appointment to first vice premier and other important decisions that were undertaken by Mao - those decisions constitute the evidence that Mao had an important role in Deng's first rehabilitation, and as I'm not a Maoist I obviously don't accept that Deng restored capitalism because I don't think that China was anything other than capitalist during the Maoist period. You still haven't provided any evidence to show that Zhou was the major player behind the rehabilitation of Deng. As for Deng's return to the party, again, it's comments like this that make you clear you don't know what you're talking about. Deng was never expelled from the party, he retained his party membership throughout the Cultural Revolution, despite being identified as the number-two capitalist roader. The forum where there were attempts to have Deng expelled from the party was the 12th Plenum of the Central Committee, held in October of 1968, where Liu Shaoqi was deprived of all his party and state posts, and whilst the radicals, as represented by the Cultural Revolution Group, attempted to have Deng removed from the CC and the party, it was actually Mao's personal intervention that prevented this from taking place. So not only are you wrong about Deng being expelled from the party and then returning, his eventual rehabilitation through Mao's initiative was made possible by Mao's decision not to expel him back in 1968. As for whether you think he was "acting" or whatever, I'll leave the childish speculations to you, as I find it pretty implausible, even by Maoist standards, to say that Deng was secretly a supporter of authoritarian capitalism throughout his entire political career and that he only moved into the CPC leadership in order to eventually be able to destroy the revolution, with all the other Chinese leaders being unaware of his real intentions and cunning the entire time. The fact is that Mao supported his rehabilitation.

[pranabjyoti]

Turn your caps lock off, it only makes you look even more absurd. In post 15 of the recent thread in the history forum on Tiananmen, you say that "anyone supporting them can not call him/herself even "leftist", being "communist" are a far cry" and the rest of your posts in that thread are also based around accusations of being "pro-West" and the like, which is what so-called leftists say when they want to justify the crackdown. All without a shred of evidence, in the same way as this thread.
Well, being critical of "protesters" of Tienanmen doesn't mean that someone is supporting the Chinese state. It's now openly declared war of armed organizations trying to do revolution in their own countries. They killed to members of UCPN(M) when they entered Tibet from Nepal and they are now close allies with reactionary Governments like Rajapakshe of SriLanka and Singh of India.
Problem with people like you that you want to view everything with your own black and white glass and never try to understand others viewpoints in depth. To me, I must make it clear, both the Chinese state and Tienanmen protesters are bad, state is worse and the protesters (as portrayed by media) worst.

I cited those books because they provide scholarly backing to the evidence I presented in my earlier post, concerning Deng's appointment to first vice premier and other important decisions that were undertaken by Mao - those decisions constitute the evidence that Mao had an important role in Deng's first rehabilitation, and as I'm not a Maoist I obviously don't accept that Deng restored capitalism because I don't think that China was anything other than capitalist during the Maoist period. You still haven't provided any evidence to show that Zhou was the major player behind the rehabilitation of Deng. As for Deng's return to the party, again, it's comments like this that make you clear you don't know what you're talking about. Deng was never expelled from the party, he retained his party membership throughout the Cultural Revolution, despite being identified as the number-two capitalist roader. The forum where there were attempts to have Deng expelled from the party was the 12th Plenum of the Central Committee, held in October of 1968, where Liu Shaoqi was deprived of all his party and state posts, and whilst the radicals, as represented by the Cultural Revolution Group, attempted to have Deng removed from the CC and the party, it was actually Mao's personal intervention that prevented this from taking place. So not only are you wrong about Deng being expelled from the party and then returning, his eventual rehabilitation through Mao's initiative was made possible by Mao's decision not to expel him back in 1968. As for whether you think he was "acting" or whatever, I'll leave the childish speculations to you, as I find it pretty implausible, even by Maoist standards, to say that Deng was secretly a supporter of authoritarian capitalism throughout his entire political career and that he only moved into the CPC leadership in order to eventually be able to destroy the revolution, with all the other Chinese leaders being unaware of his real intentions and cunning the entire time. The fact is that Mao supported his rehabilitation.
Just tell me that in the above books, is there any evidence that Mao had supported Deng's policy and Deng at that time, openly forwarding his famous "no matter black or white cat" type openly pro-capitalist policies. If you want to say yes, then show sources for sure.
There are examples of Lenin supporting and praising Kautsky in many of his writings, but does that mean he had supported the Kautsky we know?

[Ismail]

Hoxha on Deng's rehabilitation:

Reflections on China Vol. II, pp. 34-38.

April 15, 1973

Teng Hsiao-ping has emerged on the scene again with the title of the Vice-Premier of the State Council.

The "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" conceived and led by the "Great Chairman Mao Tsetung" not only came to an end with "success", but now all those cadres who were denounced by it as "enemies and agents number 2, number 3", and so on in turn, "counter-revolutionaries, members of the Kuomintang", etc., have begun to be rehabilitated one by one. Of course, the Cultural Revolution, which began against Liu Shao-chi, Peng Chen, Teng Hsiao-ping and others, ended with the disclosure of the "plot hatched up by Lin Piao" and his death... "The little bit of gold", as Mao called him before the revolution, "the number 2 enemy of the Communist Party of China", as he was called during the Cultural Revolution, now, after the revolution, "has corrected himself" and "recognized his mistakes".

The official version, which was communicated to the ambassadors of the socialist countries, including our ambassador, is that "at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, Teng made grave mistakes and, together with Liu Shao-chi, implemented the reactionary bourgeois line". Mao himself has judged him in this way, but allegedly said, "We should differentiate between his mistakes and those of Liu Shao-chi". And thus, on the 14th of August 1972 (following Kissinger's visit) "friend" Teng, who is clever and senses which way the wind is blowing, "writes a letter to the Chairman, admits his mistakes, makes a self-criticism and promises to work well." ...

The person who communicated these things to us, Chih Peng-fei, the Foreign Minister of China, concluded with the official version that "this is the great and brilliant cadres policy of Chairman Mao. The rehabilitation of Teng Hsiao-ping is a great lesson for the Communist Party of China, which will learn from Marxism-Leninism and the wise teachings of the Chairman". He personally removed and restored him, no more no less...

The Chinese ambassadors in different countries are singing another refrain: "It is not Teng Hsiao-ping who has made mistakes, but mistakes were made against him. Teng Hsiao-ping is a good and loyal comrade of Chairman Mao" ...

At present, a course pro the United States of America is being followed, and Chou En-lai is guiding it....

Then China will come to the standard of its "brilliant policy" of peaceful coexistence, of the third force, which was boosted by Chou En-lai in an interview or a banquet, I don't remember which. That means to follow the example of the "communists" Tito and Ceausescu. "Good relations with the two superpowers, both the United States of America and the Soviet Union", give and take in the two directions, intrigue here intrigue there, allegedly because the contradictions are being exploited, and all this covered with the idea that "I am a great power and nothing can be done in the world without me". "We must continue this way until we become three superpowers with all their features", indeed without any disguise at all, because such work leads to tearing the disguises one after another, as they were torn from the Soviet Union.

[Ismail]

Caramelpence, out of curiosity, what do you make of Hoxha's analyses of Chinese politics and the GPCR?

[caramelpence]

Well, being critical of "protesters" of Tienanmen doesn't mean that someone is supporting the Chinese state...

Firstly, the Chinese government's support for other reactionary regimes in the Third World is not an innovation of the reform period. For example, the Maoist state was one of the only countries whose embassies in Chile did not admit political dissidents during the Pinochet coup in 1973 and China was also the only Communist bloc regime not to sever relations with Pinochet's government in the same year, also accepting Pinochet's replacement for the Chilean ambassador that had been put in place in China during the Allende government. As you yourself have alluded in this thread, the Chinese government also developed close relations with Pakistan during the Cold War in order to have a regional ally in South Asia in opposition to India, and it's also recognized that China supported a number of reactionary political agents within countries during this period, as when the Chinese government supported UNITA alongside Israel and the United States in Angola, or when the German conservative politician Franz Josef Strauss was invited to China in a personal capacity in order to have talks with the Chinese leaders, including Mao. The persistent foreign policy of the Chinese government under the CPC has been to support a whole range of political actors and states on tactical grounds, which during the Cold War meant gaining sufficient support to ensure that the PRC would be able to take up the Chinese seat in the United Nations, amongst other goals. In the second place, even your apparent clarification smacks of apologism for the crackdown. I don't want to turn this thread into a discussion about Tiananmen, but the key question is this - are you willing to unconditionally condemn the Chinese government for its crackdown?


Just tell me that in the above books, is there any evidence that Mao had supported Deng's policy and Deng at that time

Now you're trying to shift the issues at hand. You argued at the beginning of this discussion that Mao was not responsible for the rehabilitation of Deng and that it was Zhou instead. You may well believe that Mao might not have supported Deng's rehabilitation if he had a better understanding of what Deng's policies would be or if he had known Deng's intentions, but I've provided evidence that it was ultimately Mao's decisions that led to Deng's rehabilitation, whatever Mao should have done or might have done under a different set of circumstances, and so unless you have reason to critique the evidence I've provided (e.g. Mao's personal decision to appoint Deng to the first vice-premiership) or have positive evidence to show that Zhou was the key actor, you should accept that it was indeed Mao who made the key decisions as far as Deng's first return to power is concerned. You have, of course, already made several laughable factual blunders, such as saying that Deng was removed from the party and then allowed to regain his membership, and mischaracterizing the way foreign policy was developed and implemented during the Maoist period.

As for Deng's policies, you should be aware that at various points in this discussion I've been referring to Deng's first rehabilitation because Deng was in a position of authority for only a year before being deposed for a second time during the Cultural Revolution in late 1975, and it was Mao who took the lead in attacking Deng, this being also recognized by major scholars, such as the ones I cited above. This decision-making might be taken as evidence that Mao did in fact oppose the policies that had been implemented under Deng's leadership, which included attacks on factionalism in the PLA and using the PLA to control industrial disputes. However, there are at least three points worth noting. In the first place, Mao himself was in very poor health by this period, just like Zhou Enlai, to the extent that his nephew (Mao Yuanxin) had to be transferred in late 1975 before Deng's fall in order to be at Mao's side and communicate Mao's intentions to other political leaders and to foreign guests, with Mao Yuanxin using his position to encourage Mao's existing doubts about Deng's commitment to the Cultural Revolution. In this context, it's difficult to know how autonomous Mao was as a political actor.

In the second place, the alternative leader to Deng that Mao opted for was neither someone who had been a leadership figure before the Cultural Revolution (like Deng) or a member of the radical faction, but was Hua Guofeng, who had risen within the party-state system during the Cultural Revolution itself whilst also being a junior political leader (in Hunan) before the Cultural Revolution began. The decision to opt for Hua rather than Zhang Chunqiao or Wang Hongwen indicates that Mao was not willing to allow a radical to take control of the management of government, and it is also significant that in his attacks on Deng, Mao described Deng's errors as contradictions among the people, rather than as contradictions between the people and the class enemy, consistent with his previous opposition to Deng's removal from the party, long before Deng's first rehabilitation. In other words, even after Mao had witnessed Deng's policies after his first rehabilitation, the extent of his critique was still limited, and his decision-making certainly did not amount to an embrace of the Gang of Four.

In the third place, and following on from point two, regardless of Mao's attitude towards Deng and his policies during 1974/5, his decision to support Deng's initial rehabilitation and his support for Hua over someone like Zhang need to be put in the broader context of the latter phase of the Cultural Revolution. By this I mean that from at least July 1968 onwards (if not before) Mao had made clear that his basic goal was to restore political order, including the reconstruction of the party, and to avoid the mass mobilizations and forms of popular politics that had taken place during the initial activist phase of the Cultural Revolution. His positions from this point onwards took the avoidance of disorder as their premise, and this is important because it indicates that Mao and other leaders were ultimately unified by their common rejection of far-reaching political changes that might have actually allowed for socialist democracy in China and avoided the market reforms that did take place under Deng after Mao's death. In this, he and Deng had more commonalities than differences, regardless of the changes exhibited by elite politics during the period 1969-76 and any objections that Mao may have had to any specific policies that were undertaken by Deng.

[Ismail]

As a note, in the early 1970's there was a plot which Hoxha believes was organized by Zhou Enlai for the Albanian military (under Beqir Balluku) to overthrow the government. Balluku wanted Hoxha and the Party of Labour of Albania to discard their "dual adversary" view (that the USA and USSR must be equally combated and that China's foreign policy was right-wing), and Balluku also opposed Hoxha's efforts to downplay the role of the military. I rather doubt Mao would have been totally unaware of such a plan.