caramelpence
23rd May 2011, 10:25
In recent months we have noted a resurgence of China’s hardline Maoist left. It can be glimpsed symbolically in the red pageantry of Bo Xilai (薄熙來), the former commerce minister and now Chongqing head honcho who has suspended advertising at his official television network and filled the lineup with “red culture” programming — and who has his propaganda chiefs, like so many Pied Pipers, leading the local population in “red songs” to commemorate the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party.
It could be glimpsed earlier this year in the sudden prominence of Chen Kuiyuan (陈奎元), vice-chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and dean of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, an anti- “bourgeois liberalization” attack dog who sat with propaganda czar Li Changchun (李长春) when media control policy for 2011 was drummed home to national propaganda ministers. It could be read in and between the lines of the address to this year’s National People’s Congress by politburo standing committee member Wu Bangguo (吴邦国), in which he said China might “descend into an abyss of internal chaos” if it veered from the current political system.
The examples seem too numerous to admit doubt . . .
The silencing of Xin Ziling (辛子陵), a former official at the China National Defense University and a well-known “liberal,” who has called with great urgency for political reform. The high-profile and very personal slinging match between Wang Wen (王文), the head of the editorial desk at the Chinese-language Global Times, generally known for its nationalistic bent, and the liberal poet and essayist Ye Fu (野夫). The nasty (from the left) and very lopsided exchange between liberal scholar and CMP fellow Xiong Peiyun (熊培云) and a Party official at the University of International Business and Economics.
There is, of course, the detention and subsequent ritualistic attack on artist Ai Weiwei (艾未未), known as one of China’s most outspoken proponents of political reform. And the increased visibility of Li Shenming (李慎明), currently a vice-director at CASS and formerly secretary to Wang Zhen (王震), one of the so-called Eight Elders of the Chinese Communist Party, who has argued openly for the continued relevance of the “Stalinist model,” saying the critical reason for the collapse of both the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet Union was not the failure of Marxism or socialism, but the betrayal of these values and systems by Khrushchev and Gorbachev.
The “deep reds,” with their wistful talk of the glories of Mao Zedong, the “Four Basic Principles” and socialism with Chinese characteristics, seem to have been emboldened.
But how, and why?
While the hawks on the left seem to have greater visibility (and perhaps greater political pull) right now, they are only half the story. It takes two to tango, right?
We have seen interesting, even historic, shows of strength from the liberal right in recent weeks. The first of two recent examples, of course, was the essay from social critic Mao Yushi (茅于轼), which enumerated the various crimes of the CCP’s revolutionary leader, Mao Zedong, an act of criticism of historic proportions. The second was an editorial in the Party’s official People’s Daily that urged tolerance for “differing ideas” and seemed to be pointing at the grumbling powers on the left when it said the “hurling of epithets and the yanking of pigtails” is “fundamentally is a sign of weakness and narrow-mindedness.”
It must be noted that the People’s Daily editorial, which according to a well-placed source at People’s Daily Online was an independent effort by moderate journalists with senior-level blessing (not, as some have suggested, a cynical public relations ploy), has drawn fury from the left. During a recent speech on Marxist theory, Chen Kuiyuan, the very same man whose prominent place at the national meeting of propaganda ministers signaled tighter ideological controls on the media, said that “so-called ‘tolerance’ cannot become the ‘stealthy substitution of one thing for another’,” a clear reference to what he saw as the dangers of the kind of thinking expressed in the People’s Daily editorial. “If Marxism is stealthily substituted, and changed out slyly for ‘democratic socialism’, ‘neoliberalism’ or other such bourgeois thought systems,” said Chen, “the nature of our Party and our country will change.”
Last but not least, of course, we have Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝), who has stepped out on numerous occasions over the past year and harped on the need for political reform, most recently meeting with student leaders on the anniversary of the 1919 May Fourth Movement and on a diplomatic mission to Indonesia. And one of the most interesting (and perhaps revealing) rumors now going around in Party circles is that a deputy propaganda minister recently referred to Premier Wen as a “troublemaker.”
Therefore, as we watch China’s resurgent Maoist left, we have to recognize that the liberal right is acting with greater brazenness as well. This in fact is one important reason why we have seen so much of the left in recent months.
In the following piece, translated from the Chinese side of the China Elections and Governance website, the writer looks at the causes of these “fierce and furious responses” from China’s left. The piece provides excellent background on the current ideological rift playing out behind the scenes, where despite the outward grand narrative of a confident, exuberant and rising China, confidence is flagging.
This is make it or break it time. After three decades of reform, the big questions are now on the table.
As the intellectual Zhang Musheng (张木生) said recently on the launch of a new book that is making ripples inside the Party — more on that tomorrow — “The age of ‘avoiding debate” (不争论) has passed. We have drilled our way through ‘chaos’, and now a new age of ‘debate’ is upon us.”
http://cmp.hku.hk/2011/05/18/12410/
I should point out before resident Maoists get excited that terms like "left" and "Maoist" can be used in confusing ways in reporting on current Chinese political trends. In particular, they can be used to refer to politicians who supported continued political authoritarianism and restraint in the pursuit of economic reform, rather than the mass mobilization and egalitarianism we might associate with Maoism as a historical phenomenon. I think what this article does show, however, is that the grassroots social struggles that have arisen during the reform period are having implications for intra-party politics as well even if none of the forces mentioned in this article present themselves as genuine defenders of working-class democracy.
It could be glimpsed earlier this year in the sudden prominence of Chen Kuiyuan (陈奎元), vice-chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and dean of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, an anti- “bourgeois liberalization” attack dog who sat with propaganda czar Li Changchun (李长春) when media control policy for 2011 was drummed home to national propaganda ministers. It could be read in and between the lines of the address to this year’s National People’s Congress by politburo standing committee member Wu Bangguo (吴邦国), in which he said China might “descend into an abyss of internal chaos” if it veered from the current political system.
The examples seem too numerous to admit doubt . . .
The silencing of Xin Ziling (辛子陵), a former official at the China National Defense University and a well-known “liberal,” who has called with great urgency for political reform. The high-profile and very personal slinging match between Wang Wen (王文), the head of the editorial desk at the Chinese-language Global Times, generally known for its nationalistic bent, and the liberal poet and essayist Ye Fu (野夫). The nasty (from the left) and very lopsided exchange between liberal scholar and CMP fellow Xiong Peiyun (熊培云) and a Party official at the University of International Business and Economics.
There is, of course, the detention and subsequent ritualistic attack on artist Ai Weiwei (艾未未), known as one of China’s most outspoken proponents of political reform. And the increased visibility of Li Shenming (李慎明), currently a vice-director at CASS and formerly secretary to Wang Zhen (王震), one of the so-called Eight Elders of the Chinese Communist Party, who has argued openly for the continued relevance of the “Stalinist model,” saying the critical reason for the collapse of both the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet Union was not the failure of Marxism or socialism, but the betrayal of these values and systems by Khrushchev and Gorbachev.
The “deep reds,” with their wistful talk of the glories of Mao Zedong, the “Four Basic Principles” and socialism with Chinese characteristics, seem to have been emboldened.
But how, and why?
While the hawks on the left seem to have greater visibility (and perhaps greater political pull) right now, they are only half the story. It takes two to tango, right?
We have seen interesting, even historic, shows of strength from the liberal right in recent weeks. The first of two recent examples, of course, was the essay from social critic Mao Yushi (茅于轼), which enumerated the various crimes of the CCP’s revolutionary leader, Mao Zedong, an act of criticism of historic proportions. The second was an editorial in the Party’s official People’s Daily that urged tolerance for “differing ideas” and seemed to be pointing at the grumbling powers on the left when it said the “hurling of epithets and the yanking of pigtails” is “fundamentally is a sign of weakness and narrow-mindedness.”
It must be noted that the People’s Daily editorial, which according to a well-placed source at People’s Daily Online was an independent effort by moderate journalists with senior-level blessing (not, as some have suggested, a cynical public relations ploy), has drawn fury from the left. During a recent speech on Marxist theory, Chen Kuiyuan, the very same man whose prominent place at the national meeting of propaganda ministers signaled tighter ideological controls on the media, said that “so-called ‘tolerance’ cannot become the ‘stealthy substitution of one thing for another’,” a clear reference to what he saw as the dangers of the kind of thinking expressed in the People’s Daily editorial. “If Marxism is stealthily substituted, and changed out slyly for ‘democratic socialism’, ‘neoliberalism’ or other such bourgeois thought systems,” said Chen, “the nature of our Party and our country will change.”
Last but not least, of course, we have Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝), who has stepped out on numerous occasions over the past year and harped on the need for political reform, most recently meeting with student leaders on the anniversary of the 1919 May Fourth Movement and on a diplomatic mission to Indonesia. And one of the most interesting (and perhaps revealing) rumors now going around in Party circles is that a deputy propaganda minister recently referred to Premier Wen as a “troublemaker.”
Therefore, as we watch China’s resurgent Maoist left, we have to recognize that the liberal right is acting with greater brazenness as well. This in fact is one important reason why we have seen so much of the left in recent months.
In the following piece, translated from the Chinese side of the China Elections and Governance website, the writer looks at the causes of these “fierce and furious responses” from China’s left. The piece provides excellent background on the current ideological rift playing out behind the scenes, where despite the outward grand narrative of a confident, exuberant and rising China, confidence is flagging.
This is make it or break it time. After three decades of reform, the big questions are now on the table.
As the intellectual Zhang Musheng (张木生) said recently on the launch of a new book that is making ripples inside the Party — more on that tomorrow — “The age of ‘avoiding debate” (不争论) has passed. We have drilled our way through ‘chaos’, and now a new age of ‘debate’ is upon us.”
http://cmp.hku.hk/2011/05/18/12410/
I should point out before resident Maoists get excited that terms like "left" and "Maoist" can be used in confusing ways in reporting on current Chinese political trends. In particular, they can be used to refer to politicians who supported continued political authoritarianism and restraint in the pursuit of economic reform, rather than the mass mobilization and egalitarianism we might associate with Maoism as a historical phenomenon. I think what this article does show, however, is that the grassroots social struggles that have arisen during the reform period are having implications for intra-party politics as well even if none of the forces mentioned in this article present themselves as genuine defenders of working-class democracy.