Buses bearing Stalin's portrait begin to appear in Russia

[Chicxulub]

Stalin bus begins driving through St Petersburg

http://i.telegraph.co.uk/multimedia/archive/01630/stalin_bus_1630382c.jpg

The commuter bus, a private initiative spearheaded by a pro-Stalin blogger, is to run through Saint Petersburg's historic centre as Russia prepares to commemorate the 65th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany on May 9.
Lined with palaces and cathedrals, Nevsky Prospect is a major thoroughfare of Saint Petersburg, Russia's former imperial capital.
However, later in the day the bus was attacked by unidentified individuals who completely painted over the portrait, the Interfax news agency reported.
"Vandals and so-called freedom fighters spoiled the bus, painting it over," Viktor Loginov, who initiated the portrait's placement on the bus, complained.
"The bus will be washed and tomorrow it will hit the road with the same picture," he vowed.

Mr Loginov, a young Russian blogger, raised money from various donors to pay for the bus to cruise the streets with a picture of the former Soviet dictator for two weeks.
"We are not trying to whitewash Stalin or to clear his name of the crimes attributed to him, imaginary or real; we are just trying to underscore his critical role in our shared Victory," he wrote in his blog.
Critics have condemned the bus project for glorifying a dictator who was responsible for the deaths of millions of people in the notorious Gulag prison camps and in the forced collectivisation of agriculture.
"This is an insult to those people whose loved ones died in Stalinist repressions," Maxim Reznik, head of the Saint Petersburg branch of the liberal Yabloko party, told AFP.
In April the Memorial human rights group sent a letter to Saint Petersburg governor Valentina Matviyenko asking her to stop the bus project, calling Stalin "one of the most terrible criminals of the 20th century."
Despite the brutality of Stalin's rule, many Russians admire him for his role in the victory over Nazi Germany in 1945. Stalin ruled the Soviet Union for nearly three decades until his death in 1953.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/7683577/Stalin-bus-begins-driving-through-St-Petersburg.html

[Chicxulub]

It's about time the Russian Federation stops waffling around the issue of Stalin's contributions to the USSR and Russia. These bus portraits are a great way of honoring him. Plus, the positive usage of Communist symbolism on the buses is a good thing as well.

Much to western chauvinist bourgeois leftist chagrin, Stalin is still beloved by many people throughout Eurasia. A poll not too long ago had Stalin voted 3rd in a greatest Russian ever poll--despite him being a Georgian.

This will do much in the effort to further prevent the liberal interpretation of the former USSR's history.

[unpopularfreedomfront]

Stalin was a murdering c*nt. Stalin is loved by many throughout Eurasia? I think you're referring to something called Stockholm Syndrome.

[Delenda Carthago]

The thing is, what do they see in Stalin. They see a person who helped the construction of socialism or they see someone who was another Char that "made Russia Great"?

[GallowsBird]

Much to western chauvinist bourgeois leftist chagrin, Stalin is still beloved by many people throughout Eurasia. A poll not too long ago had Stalin voted 3rd in a greatest Russian ever poll--despite him being a Georgian..

Was that the same poll with Lenin and Alexander Nevsky as the two above Stalin?

Stalin is more fondly remembered in Russia and Central Eurasia than the West. I have noticed he has a slight folk-hero status in some Central Eurasian countries. I have always found it weird how while the West demonises him and he is seen as a despot this is not the same for the countries that he is connected to. It is also strange that the opinions of the majority in those countries are treated as if their views don't matter regarding Stalin. That isn't to say people have to respect him, but they should take into account the worldwide perspective and not merely a Westerncentric viewpoint.

As for the buses, I think this is good news being that I am a Marxist-Leninist however I can't see many Totskyists, Left Communists and Anarchists being too enamoured with this news; whether we see his image as one of the symbols of Communism or not. Incidentally I'd prefer them to implement Marxist policies over these buses though! :cool:

[GallowsBird]

Stalin was a murdering c*nt. Stalin is loved by many throughout Eurasia? I think you're referring to something called Stockholm Syndrome.

No he is referring to many viewing him as a man who helped implement Marxist derived socioeconomic policies that helped the people by making the USSR into an economic and cultural power and organising the effort to defeat Nazism that was plaguing the world at the time. :rolleyes:

[Optiow]

Can't say I am happy to see Uncle Joe's poster there, as I think it spreads the idea that all communists are Stalinists, and that Stalin was the ideal communist.

But that notwithstanding, I support the other communist symbolism on the buses, and I think they look quite nice.

[unpopularfreedomfront]

The thing is, what do they see in Stalin. They see a person who helped the construction of socialism or they see someone who was another Char that "made Russia Great"?

I think some of them see a stongman, a strong leader. Something in the Russian psyche believes in having a father figure leader I think. Putin is also very popular, I certainly don't like him. My better half is Russian and her grandfather thinks Stalin was great. Her other grandfather was sent to a gulag during Stalins time, building some canal near Finland I think, he survived but years later died of some illness he had caught in the gulag - to the best of my knowledge.

[unpopularfreedomfront]

No he is referring to many viewing him as a man who helped implement Marxist derived socioeconomic policies that helped the people by making the USSR into an economic and cultural power and organising the effort to defeat Nazism that was plaguing the world at the time. :rolleyes:

Yeah, nevermind that he was a murderous c*nt. Organising the effort to defeat Nazism? Stalin was quite happy to carve up part of Europe between himself and Hitler.

[ʇsıɥɔɹɐuɐ ıɯɐbıɹo]

Well when that bus breaks down it really will be Stalin!:cool:

[Omsk]

Yeah, nevermind that he was a murderous c*nt. Organising the effort to defeat Nazism? Stalin was quite happy to carve up part of Europe between himself and Hitler.

I couldn't make that up if I tried!

[El Chuncho]

Yeah, nevermind that he was a murderous c*nt. Organising the effort to defeat Nazism? Stalin was quite happy to carve up part of Europe between himself and Hitler.

Can you stop calling him a ''murderous c*nt'' please, it is both dully repetitive and a little demeaning to female sexual organs...and Marxist-Leninists of course.

You do not like the bus or Stalin, good for you, but that doesn't give you the right to be a little sexist and immature.

Anyway, I think these buses are a great idea. A nice commemoration of the victory against Nazism.

[unpopularfreedomfront]

I couldn't make that up if I tried!

Never heard of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact then, eh?

[unpopularfreedomfront]

Can you stop calling him a ''murderous c*nt'' please, it is both dully repetitive and a little demeaning to female sexual organs...and Marxist-Leninists of course.

You do not like the bus or Stalin, good for you, but that doesn't give you the right to be a little sexist and immature.

Anyway, I think these buses are a great idea. A nice commemoration of the victory against Nazism.

I'll call him what he was. You say you are Marxist-Lenninist? Not even Lenin trusted Stalin.

[Volcanicity]

Kind of ironic that the OP's just been purged.

[GallowsBird]

Never heard of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact then, eh?

Have you ever heard of building up your resources rather than going to war with a fully mobilised enemy that at the present time would probably conquer your country and put a large part of your population in camps or just shoot them outright.

If you read some interviews with Stalin then you would see that he knew the war with Germany was going to come and plans for it had been made long before the outbreak of hostilities.

Also the "carving up of Europe" was in many cases retaking Soviet land that was taken by Germany in World War One and Poland in the Polish-Soviet War. Some places admittedly were invaded (if that is the right word) by the USSR with the goal of establishing Socialism in those countries (a goal I see as admirable).

[Omsk]

Never heard of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact then, eh?
This thread will probably be closed,but i will reply to you just for the sake of you learning something:

1.British capitalists aided Hitler.


SU WANTS TO SIGN PEACE PACTS

The Soviets were the first to sign the Kellogg Pact, proposed by United States; they were the first to sign any international peace pact or proposal, sometimes before they were invited.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 146

In an August 22, 1939, letter to Sumner Wells, Acting American Secretary of State, Ambassador Davies said in reference to the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact, "During the Litvinov tenure in the Foreign Office, there was to be sure a very strong moral impulse of hostility toward Germany and the aggressor powers beginning with the accession of Hitler to power. During that period the Soviet regime, in my opinion, diligently and vigorously tried to maintain a vigorous common front against the aggressors and were sincere advocates of the "indivisibility of peace."
Litvinov's able battle for peace and democratic ideas at the League of Nations and the vigorous attitude of the Soviet government in being prepared to fight for Czechoslovakia were indications of real sincerity of purpose and a marked degree of high-mindedness.
Beginning with Munich, and even before, however, there has been an accumulation of events which gradually broke down this attitude on the part of the Soviet government.
During my tenure in Moscow I was much impressed with the fact that the Russians were undoubtedly severely irked by what appeared to be a policy of "pinpricking" and an attitude of superiority and "talking down" which diplomatic missions of the Western powers assumed toward the Soviet government. The Soviets are proud and resented this deeply.
Davies, Joseph E. Mission to Moscow. New York, N. Y.: Simon and Schuster, c1941, p. 454

In his conduct of foreign policy, Stalin showed great caution, restraint, and realism. He needed time to build up Russia's industries and military strength. He was constantly provoked in the east and west, and in ways that must have infuriated him, but he never lost sight of the overriding need to delay the outbreak of war as long as possible. It was for this reason that he placed the greatest emphasis on peace and disarmament in world affairs.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 296

Each of the future allies sold space for time and let down allies and friends, until no space was left to be sold and no time to be bought.
In the course of 1934 Stalin set out on his search for protective alliances. Gradually, but not imperceptibly, he switched over from opposition to the system of Versailles to its defense. In September Russia joined the League of Nations. Hitherto the Kremlin and the League had boycotted each other. To Lenin the League had been the 'robbers' den', the organization designed to enforce the peace of Versailles, to perpetuate colonial domination and to suppress movements of emancipation all over the world.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 417

Yet, in spite of all this, one feels justified in asserting that in those years, 1935-37 and even later, Stalin was genuinely striving for an anti-Hitler coalition. This course of action was dictated to him by circumstances.... At the Nuremberg rally of September 1936 Hitler spoke about the Ukraine and Siberia as belonging to the German Lebensraum in terms so emphatic and fiery that they seemed to exclude even a transient understanding between himself and Stalin. Later in the year the leaders of the Axis came together to announce the conclusion of the anti-Comintern pact. Throughout all that period clashes, some of them serious, were occurring between Russian and Japanese frontier troops. The storm seemed to be gathering over Russia in Asia and Russia in Europe. If not anti-fascist virtue, then the demands of self-preservation drove Stalin to seek security in a solid system of alliances.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 420

(Sinclair’s comments only)
Again and again Russia came into the conferences of Europe and proposed complete disarmament. Our reactionary newspaper columnists are quite sure that this was a bluff; but what a simple matter it is to call a bluff if you have the cards! Why didn't the warlords of the militarist nations accept Litvinov's propositions? Why didn't they pretend to accept them?
The answer is because every one of them understood clearly that a collectivist economy can get along without colonies and foreign trade, whereas a profit economy must have these things and must increase them, and therefore is driven continually to fresh aggressions under penalty of revolution at home.
It is my belief that the disarmament proposals repeatedly made by the Soviet Union enable that country to stand before the world with clean hands, and place the blame for the wars which are coming upon the nations which refused the proposals and have gone on ever since to prepare for worse aggressions against the Soviet Union.
Sinclair and Lyons. Terror in Russia?: Two Views. New York: Rand School Press, 1938, p. 23

SU AND MEXICO ONLY ONES TO AID SPAIN

The Soviet Union shared with Mexico the honor of being the only governments that aided the Democratic government of Spain.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 147

As week succeeded week, it became obvious that the governments of Britain and France were prepared to give nothing to the Spanish people except advice. Once Stalin was convinced of this, he declared the intention of the Soviet state to give all the help it could to the Spanish loyalists.
Cole, David M. Josef Stalin; Man of Steel. London, New York: Rich & Cowan, 1942, p. 96

Three countries participated directly in the Spanish Civil War: Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union.
Krivitsky, Walter. I was Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 88

It was late in August 1936 and the Franco forces were firmly organized and marching successfully on Madrid, when three high officials of the Spanish Republic were finally received in Russia. They came to buy war supplies, and they offered in exchange huge sums of Spanish gold. Even now, however, they were not conveyed to Moscow but kept incognito in a hotel in Odessa. And to conceal the operation, Stalin issued, on Friday, Aug. 28, 1936, through the Commissar of Foreign Trade, a decree forbidding "the export, re-export, or transit to Spain of all kinds of arms, munitions, war materials, airplanes, and warships. The decree was published and broadcast to the world on the following Monday. The fellow travelers of the Comintern, and the public, roused by them, already privately dismayed at Stalin's failure to rush to the support of the Spanish Republic, now thought that he was joining Leon Blum's policy of non-intervention. Stalin was in reality sneaking to the support of the Spanish Republic. While its high officials waited in Odessa, Stalin called an extraordinary session of the Politburo, and presented his plan for cautious intervention in the Spanish Civil War - all this under cover of his proclamation of neutrality.
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 91

Two days later a special courier, who came by plane to Holland, brought me instructions from Moscow: Extend your operations immediately to cover Spanish Civil War. Mobilize all available agents and facilities for prompt creation of a system to purchase and transport arms to Spain. A special agent is being dispatched to Paris to aid you in this work. He will report to you there and work under your supervision.
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 93

In plain terms, it was Captain Oulansky's job to organize and operate a ring of arms smugglers, and to do this so cleverly that no trace could be discovered by the spies of foreign governments.
"If you succeed," Yagoda told him, "come back with a hole in your lapel for the Order of the Red Banner."
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 96

We all met in Paris in perfect secrecy on September 21. Zimin brought explicit and emphatic instructions that we must not permit the slightest possibility of the Soviet government's becoming in any way associated with our traffic in arms. All cargos were to be handled "privately" through business firms created for the purpose.
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 97


We made large purchases from the Skoda works in Czechoslovakia, from several firms in France, from others in Poland and Holland. Such is the nature of the munitions trade that we even bought arms in Nazi Germany.
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 98


By the middle of October, shiploads of arms began to reach republican Spain. The Soviet aid came in two streams. My organization used foreign vessels. Captain Oulansky's "private syndicate" in Odessa began by using Spanish boats but found their number limited. Moscow, held by Stalin's insistence on absolute secrecy lest he become involved in a war, would not permit the use of ships sailing under Soviet papers.
With these false papers, Soviet boats loaded with munitions would sail from Odessa under new names, flying foreign colors, and they would clear the Bosphorus, where German and Italian counter-espionage agents were keeping a sharp look-out. When they had entered loyalist ports and delivered their cargo, their names would be changed back to Russian ones and they would return to Odessa under their own colors.
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 99


My agent had bought the 50 government planes for 4,000 pounds each, subject to inspection. When the question of the consignee came up, he offered a choice of a Latin-American country or China. The dealer preferred China.
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 102


I was ordered to send the planes to Alicante. But that port was blockaded by Franco's vessels. The master of the ship made for Alicante, but had to turn back to save the ship and cargo. He attempted to head for Barcelona, but was prevented by my agent on board. My shipload of aircraft plied back and forth in the Mediterranean. Franco kept it from Alicante. Stalin kept it from Barcelona.
...The Norwegian ship finally slipped through Franco's blockade and discharged its planes at Alicante. At the same time, other war supplies, including tanks and artillery, arrived from the Soviet Union. All loyalist Spain saw that tangible aid was actually coming from Russia. The Republicans, Socialists, anarchists, [and Trotskyists], and syndicalists had only theories and ideals to offer. The Communists were producing guns and planes to use against Franco. Soviet prestige soared.
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 103


While this International Brigade - the army of the Comintern - was taking shape in the foreground, purely Russian units of the Red Army were quietly arriving and taking up their posts behind the Spanish front. This Soviet military personnel in Spain never reached more than 2,000 men, and only pilots and tank officers saw active duty. Most of the Russians were technicians--general staff men, military instructors, engineers, specialists in setting up war industries, experts in chemical warfare, aviation mechanics, radio operators, and gunnery experts. These Red Army men were segregated from the Spanish civilians as much as possible, housed apart, and never permitted to associate in any way with Spanish political groups or figures. They were ceaselessly watched by the 0GPU, both to keep their presence in Spain a secret and to prevent any political heresy from corrupting the Red Army.
This special expeditionary force was under the direct control of General Berzin, one of the two leading Soviet figures assigned by Stalin to captain his intervention in Spain. The other was Arthur Stashevsky, officially the Soviet trade envoy stationed in Barcelona.
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 107


Berzin was selected by Stalin to organize and direct the Loyalist Army.
Stalin's chief political commissar in Spain was Arthur Stashevsky.
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 108


Dr. Negrin, of course, saw the only salvation of his country in close co-operation with the Soviet Union. It had become obvious that active support could come only from that source.
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 112


The splendid feats of the International Brigade, and the material help received from the Soviet Union, so prompted the growth of the Communist Party of Spain that by January 1937 its membership was more than 200,000. The saving of Madrid enormously enhanced Soviet prestige.
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 114


The successful defense of Madrid with Soviet arms gave the 0GPU new opportunities to extend its powers.
Krivitsky, Walter G. I was Stalin's Agent, London: H. Hamilton, 1939, p. 115

By February 15th, however, they [the Fascists] were forced to retreat by the newly-reorganized republican army... and the support of 40 Soviet warplanes--moscas and chatos--that had just arrived in Spain: not as many in number as the German warplanes, but technically superior.
Brar, Harpal. Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 327

Airplanes provided by the Soviet government, 500 pieces of artillery, and 10,000 machine guns were held up in France.
Brar, Harpal. Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 336

The people of Spain had a loyal friend in the Soviet Union, which could be relied upon to do everything in its power to promote their cause and to frustrate the designs of every imperialist power.
Brar, Harpal. Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 338


And henceforth the Soviet government did all it could to supply the Republicans with everything they needed, from men (through the international brigades who sent some 35,000 men to Spain), to military advisers from its own army, to armaments and food.
Brar, Harpal. Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 440

It is common knowledge that soon after the fascist rebellion and the beginning of the civil war in Spain the Soviet Union began to aid and support the Spanish Republic....
By the end of 1936 the Soviet Union had supplied Spain with 106 tanks, 60 armored cars, 136 airplanes, more than 60,000 rifles, 174 field guns, 3,727 machine guns, and an unspecified amount of ammunition.
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 724

VYSHINSKY: In his message to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Spain addressed to Comrade Jose Diaz, Comrade Stalin said: "The toilers of the Soviet Union are merely fulfilling their duty in giving all the assistance they can to the revolutionary masses of Spain. They fully realize that the liberation of Spain from the yoke of the fascist reactionaries is not the private affair of the Spaniards, but the common cause of the whole of advanced and progressive humanity."
Report of Court Proceedings: The case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre--1937, Moscow: Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R, p. 506

The experience of the Civil War in Spain--where no country except the Soviet Union provided assistance to the legal government of the Republic,...
Berezhkov, Valentin. At Stalin's Side. Secaucus, New Jersey: Carol Pub. Group, c1994, p. 10

In the summer [of 1936] the Spanish Civil War started. Stalin became involved to the extent of sending supplies including 648 aircraft and 407 tanks. Three thousand Soviet military 'volunteers' served in Spain, and the Comintern organized the 42,000 volunteers of the International Brigade commanded by the supposed Canadian 'Kleber ', in fact Red Army Corps Commander, Shtern.
Conquest, Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations. New York, New York: Viking, 1991, p. 219

...Stalin, while professing Soviet adherence to non-intervention [in the Spanish Civil War], secretly approved the immediate dispatch of trained Soviet pilots to fly fighter aircraft supplied by the French.
Costello, John and Oleg Tsarev. Deadly illusions. New York: Crown, c1993, p. 254

Sixteen Soviet freighters put to see from the Black Sea port of Odessa, heading for the Mediterranean. By early November they had safely reached the Republican-held port of Cartagena, where they unloaded more than 800 tanks and aircraft along with thousands of gallons of badly needed fuel. Although military aid on a far more massive scale was needed to defeat Franco, Stalin's first grudging commitment of Soviet support proved an important morale booster for the Spanish Republicans. Soviet supplies meant that the Loyalists were no longer battling alone against a Nationalist army being supplied with an increasing flood of arms from Germany and Italy.
" Madrid will not now fall," declared Prime Minister Caballero, "now the war will begin, because we now have the necessary materials." His defiant words were reinforced later that month with the arrival of hundreds of Soviet military personnel and more arms. Orlov and his comrades in the Red Air Force and Army units in Spain resented Stalin's order that military personnel were to "keep out of range of artillery fire". Their T-10 tanks and Mosca and Chato fighter aircraft proved more than a match for the German and Italian opposition. Even in the hands of hastily trained Republican pilots and crews the firepower and maneuverability of the Soviet weapons proved superior to Nationalist tanks and aircraft during the December battles for Madrid.
Costello, John and Oleg Tsarev. Deadly illusions. New York: Crown, c1993, p. 256

Stalin was as good as his word. Twenty years later, when Orlov testified in 1957 before the Senate Internal Security Sub-Committee and recounted how he had organized the looting of the Spanish treasury, Radio Moscow announced that the $420 million worth of Spanish gold smuggled to Russia in 1937 had been sent legitimately to "finance the Republican cause". Franco's government was pressing the Soviets to send back the bullion after Negrin's heirs had returned to Madrid the official receipt for "510 million grams of gold" which the bank of Moscow had given to the cashiers of the Bank of Spain in 1938.
Khrushchev, the Soviet president in 1957 certainly was not going to return a single peseta of Republican money to the Fascist regime of Franco. This was made clear in a broadcast by Radio Moscow in which the USSR reminded the world that the value of Soviet aid delivered to the Spanish Government during the Civil War amounted to much more than the value of 510 metric tons of gold. According to the statement the Spanish account with the USSR was still overdrawn because of the Republicans' failure to repay $50 million of an additional $85 million in supplies which they had allegedly been loaned officially.
Costello, John and Oleg Tsarev. Deadly illusions. New York: Crown, c1993, p. 263

After all, we had to intervene in Spain because of the fear of agitation on the part of Trotskyites. The Instantsia [Politburo] fears accusations of liquidation--accusations that we have let down the Spanish Left. This is absurd; questions of policy must be decided according to the demands of the State, and not from the point of view of [dissidents, critics, and traitors]....
Litvinov, Maksim Maksimovich. Notes for a Journal. New York: Morrow, 1955, p. 268

Stalin's role in the Spanish Civil War likewise comes under fire from the "left." Again taking their cue from Trotsky and such professional anti-Communist ideologues as George Orwell, many "Socialists" claim that Stalin sold out the Loyalists. A similar criticism is made about Stalin's policies in relation to the Greek partisans in the late 1940s, which we will discuss later. According to these "left" criticisms, Stalin didn't "care" about either of the struggles, because of his preoccupation with internal development and "Great Russian power." The simple fact of the matter is that in both cases Stalin was the only national leader any place in the world to support the popular forces, and he did this in the face of stubborn opposition within his own camp and the dangers of military attack from the leading aggressive powers in the world (Germany and Italy in the late 1930s, the U.S. 10 years later).
Because the USSR, following Stalin's policies, had become a modern industrial nation by the mid 1930s, it was able to ship to the Spanish Loyalists Soviet tanks and planes that were every bit as advanced as the Nazi models. Because the USSR was the leader of the world revolutionary forces, Communists from many nations were able to organize the International Brigades, which went to resist Mussolini's fascist divisions and the crack Nazi forces, such as the Condor Legion, that were invading the Spanish Republic. The capitalist powers, alarmed by this international support for the Loyalists, planned joint action to stop it. In March 1937, warships of Germany, Italy, France, and Great Britain began jointly policing the Spanish coast. Acting on a British initiative, these same countries formed a bloc in late 1937 to isolate the Soviet Union by implementing a policy they called "non-intervention," which Lloyd George, as leader of the British Opposition, labeled a clear policy of support for the fascists. Mussolini supported the British plan and called for a campaign "to drive Bolshevism from Europe." Stalin's own foreign ministry, which was still dominated by aristocrats masquerading as proletarian revolutionaries, sided with the capitalist powers. The New York Times of October 29, 1937, describes how the "unyielding" Stalin, representing "Russians stubbornness," refused to go along: "A struggle has been going on all this week between Josef Stalin and Foreign Commissar Litvinov," who wished to accept the British plan. Stalin stuck to his guns, in the Soviet Union refused to grant Franco international status as a combatant, insisting that it had every right in the world to continue aiding the duly elected government of Spain, which it did until the bitter end.
Franklin, Bruce, Ed. The Essential Stalin; Major Theoretical Writings. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1972, p. 22

(Sinclair’s comments)
Whenever you may think about them you can hardly dispute the fact that Russia is for all practical purposes at war today. Russian technicians are helping the democratic people of Spain to defend their existence. Russian technicians are helping the people China to the same end. Russia is fighting not merely Franco, but Hitler and Mussolini in Spain.
Sinclair and Lyons. Terror in Russia?: Two Views. New York: Rand School Press, 1938, p. 22

Those of us who are over 50 today remember well that the Soviet Union, fulfilling its internationalist duty, helped the legitimate Government and the people of Spain with everything it could--arms, provisions, and medicines. Imbued with revolutionary enthusiasm and the spirit of romanticism Soviet tankmen, pilots, artillerymen, rank-and-file soldiers and prominent military leaders volunteered to fight in Spain.
Zhukov, Georgi. Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov. London: Cape, 1971, p. 141

In the winter of 1936-37 most Russian planes in Spain were flown by Russian pilots, and the attack to drive the Nationalists back from Madrid was opened on Oct. 29 by Russian tanks, driven by Russians, led by the tank specialist General Pavlov and supported by Russian planes.
...Nonetheless, Soviet support was decisive in the autumn of 1936, preventing the Nationalists from winning the war in a few months. Russian advisers and the International Brigades brought order and discipline into the Republican army,...
Bullock, Alan. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. New York: Knopf, 1992, p. 540

[In December 1936] Stalin had sent a letter to the Spanish Prime Minister, Caballero, signed by Molotov & Voroshilov as well as himself, in which he urged the Republican government to avoid social radicalism, enlist the support of the middle class, and broaden the basis of his government "in order to prevent the enemies of Spain from presenting it as a communist republic."
The fact that the Soviet Union through the Comintern was the only reliable source of arms and supplies gave Stalin the power to intervene in Spanish politics as well as in the war.
Bullock, Alan. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. New York: Knopf, 1992, p. 541


"... the Soviet Union sent to the Spanish Government 806 military aircraft, mainly fighters, 362 tanks, 120 armored cars, 1,555 artillery pieces, about 500,000 rifles, 340 grenade launchers, 15,113 machine-guns, more than 110,000 aerial bombs, about 3.4 million rounds of ammunition, 500,000 grenades, 862 million cartridges, 1,500 tons of gunpowder, torpedo boats, air defense searchlight installations, motor vehicles, radio stations, torpedoes and fuel".
('International Solidarity'; op. cit; p.329-30).

and under the new Soviet policy,
"... a little more than 2,000 Soviet volunteers fought and worked in Spain on the side of the Republic throughout the whole war, including 772 airmen, 351 tank men, 222 army advisers and instructors, 77 naval specialists, 100 artillery specialists, 52 other specialists, 130 aircraft factory workers and engineers, 156 radio operators and other signals men, and 204 interpreters".
('International Solidarity': op. cit. p.328).

In Berlin on 30 may 1937 Hitler stated: After Red airplanes bombed British, German, and Italian ships lying in the harbor of Majorca a few days ago and killed six officers on an Italian ship, German ships were forbidden to remain in the harbor any longer. On Saturday, May 29, 1937, the pocket battleship Deutschland was lying in the roadstead of Ibiza. The ship belongs to the forces assigned to the international sea patrol. In spite of this, the pocket battleship was suddenly bombed between 6 and 7 p.m. by two planes of the Red Valencia Government in a gliding attack.... The result of this criminal attack is that 20 were killed and 73 wounded.
Domarus, Max , Ed. Hitler’s Speeches and Proclamations, 1932-1945. Vol. 2. Wauconda, Illinois: Bolchazy-Carducci, c1990, p. 899

As it became clear that Italy, Germany, and Portugal would not abide by the nonintervention formula and that the insurgent forces were winning, Stalin decided to intervene.
Tucker, Robert. Stalin in Power: 1929-1941. New York: Norton, 1990, p. 351

[In a letter to Kaganovich and Chubar on 18 August 1936 Stalin stated] I consider it necessary to sell oil to the Spaniards immediately on the most favorable terms for them, at a discounted price, if need be. If the Spaniards need grain and foodstuffs in general, we should sell all that to them on favorable terms. Let me know how much oil we have already delivered to the Spaniards. Make it incumbent on the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade to act quickly and decisively.
Shabad, Steven, trans. The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 1931-1936. New Haven: Yale University Press, c2003, p. 327

[in a letter to Stalin on 18 August 1936 Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze, and Chubar stated] We heard Comrade Sudin's progress report on the sale of oil to the Spaniards. It was determined that 6000 tons of fuel oil have been sold as of 18 August, and another tanker has been ordered to fill up with oil.
In accordance with your [Stalin] telegram, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade has been instructed to sell oil to the Spaniards immediately at a reduced price in the necessary amount on the most favorable terms.
Shabad, Steven, trans. The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 1931-1936. New Haven: Yale University Press, c2003, p. 327

[In a letter to Kaganovich on 6 September 1936 Stalin stated] It would be good to sell Mexico 50 high-speed bombers, so that Mexico can immediately resell them to Spain. We could also pick about 20 of our good pilots to perform combat functions in Spain and at the same time give flight training on the high-speed bombers to Spanish pilots. Think this matter over as quickly as possible. It would be good to sell by the same means 20,000 rifles, 1000 machine guns, and about 20 million rounds of ammunition. We just need to know the calibers.
Shabad, Steven, trans. The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 1931-1936. New Haven: Yale University Press, c2003, p. 351

[Footnote to a letter by Kaganovich on 11 October 1936 to Stalin]. On 29 September the Politburo had decided to begin arms deliveries. By 22 October 5 ships had been dispatched to Spain containing 50 tanks, plus fuel and ammunition, 30 hi-speed bombers, and artillery. Further Soviet arms shipments to Spain were made in larger quantities.
Shabad, Steven, trans. The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 1931-1936. New Haven: Yale University Press, c2003, p. 368

In the cruel Spanish Civil War which followed, anti-fascists all over the world helped the Republican army. Stalin's reaction was instantaneous and, once again, enlightened: Soviet advisers, tanks, and planes were rushed to the aid of democracy in Spain--together with a large number of NKVD agents.
Radzinsky, Edvard. Stalin. New York: Doubleday, c1996, p. 337

... Stalin's Russia was the only country to provide real help to Republican Spain.
Ulam, Adam. Stalin; The Man and his Era. New York: Viking Press, 1973, p. 426

The fact remained that Russia was doing something to try to stop the march of fascism, that communism appeared to extend a helping hand to an embattled democracy, while the French and British statesmen prattled on about nonintervention in Spain, where German planes and pilots and fascism legions were openly assisting Franco.
Ulam, Adam. Stalin; The Man and his Era. New York: Viking Press, 1973, p. 427

While Russian military, air, and naval personnel helped the Republican side and the USSR furnished it with supplies, Soviet participation in the Spanish Civil War was veiled in much more mystification than that of the fascist powers.
Ulam, Adam. Stalin; The Man and his Era. New York: Viking Press, 1973, p. 468

My father also wondered why the British had not supported the Spanish Republicans, since they had every interest in preventing the expansion of Italy and Germany into Spain. Germany and Italy had sent many troops. France and Britain acted as though neutral and blocked the approaches, and the Soviet Union alone sent arms via the Black Sea. I know this from Admiral Kuznetsov, whom my father met at this time. He commanded a cruiser which escorted the convoys.
Beria, Sergo. Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin. London: Duckworth, 2001, p. 31

On 15 Oct 1936 Soviet tanks, planes and "advisors" started arriving in Spain to support the Republican government against General Francisco Franco, backed by Hitler and Mussolini.
Montefiore, Sebag. Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar. New York: Knopf, 2004, p. 200

...more than 2000 Soviet volunteers fought and worked in Spain on the side of the Republic throughout the whole war, including 772 airmen, 351 tank men, 222 army advisors and instructors, 77 naval specialists, 100 artillery specialists, 52 other specialists, 130 aircraft factory workers and engineers, 156 radio operators and other signals men, and 204 interpreters....
The total extent of Soviet military supplies may be seen from the following figures: the Soviet Union sent to the Spanish Government 806 military aircraft, mainly fighters, 363 tanks, 120 armored cars, 1,555 artillery pieces, about 500,000 rifles, 340 grenade launchers, 15,113 machine guns, more than 110,000 aerial bombs, about 3.4 million rounds of ammunition, 500,000 grenades, 862 million cartridges, 1500 tons of gunpowder, torpedo boats, air defense searchlight installations, motor vehicles, radio stations, torpedoes and fuel".
International Solidarity With the Spanish Republic, 1936-39. Moscow: Progress Publishers, c1974, p. 328-330

Among the more salient denunciations [of the Soviet Union's assistance to Spain during the Spanish Civil War] are the following: That military aid to Spain came too late and too little; that a large part of the arms were obsolete; that they were given only to communist-led units; that the arms were fed, piece-meal, as it were, to the Governments of Caballero and Negrin in direct proportion to reciprocal controls and influence purportedly granted the Soviets; that the Soviets limited their aid to appease Britain and France; that Russian officers controlled and directed the Madrid armies; that as early as autumn, 1937, the Soviet Union "gave up" on the Spanish revolution and ceased all arms shipments....
And so on, and so on.
The tragedy of the above is that a great part of this quite malicious and self-serving, right-wing propaganda was put forth by both capitulationists and ultras alike.... The word "malicious" is apropos in this case, since each and every point can be easily proven a skillfully perpetrated lie.
Landis, Arthur H. Spain, The Unfinished Revolution, Baldwin Park, California: Camelot Pub. Co. [1972], p. 231

To all those who fault the USSR for not having sent sufficient arms to the Republic the following data should be interesting. The Franco Admiral, Bastarreche, at a conference in Zaragoza in 1960 stated that, "The Nationalist Navy sunk during the period of our war 53 merchant ships with a total of 129,000 tons; captured on the high seas were another 324 ships of some 484,000 tons. Twenty-four foreign ships were also seized, and as many as 1000 detained on the high seas for examination and later released....
Interesting, isn't it? Among the known Russian ships sunk were the Komsomol, Timiriazev and the Blagoev, all in the Autumn of 1936. A number of others were torpedoed in 1937, as were many Spanish ships of the Republican fleet.
...The evidence then is more than sufficient to conclude that despite the tremendous losses of men, ships, and material along the thousand-mile, submarine-infested run from the Black Sea to Spain, the Soviets had never faltered in their aid to Spain....
Indeed, with 53 merchant ships loaded with Russian arms for Spain torpedoed and sent to the bottom of the Mediterranean, the Soviets have a right to suggest to their unconscionable attackers of the ultra-left, and others, that they not be so hasty with their quite self-serving accusations.
Landis, Arthur H. Spain, The Unfinished Revolution, Baldwin Park, California: Camelot Pub. Co. [1972] page 242-244

The Spanish government rallied all the forces it could on the political left. Spain’s communists in particular stood by it.
The revolutionary tradition impelled Stalin to look favorably on the request from Madrid for help. So too did the awareness that if no resistance to German assertiveness were shown, Europe as a whole would be exposed to the expansionist aims of the Third Reich. Failure to act would be taken as a sign that the policy of the popular front had no substance. Finance and munitions were dispatched by boat to Spain from Leningrad. Simultaneously the Communist International sent the Italian Communist Party leader Togliatti under the alias Ercoli to direct the activities of the Spanish communists.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 387

But he [Stalin] and the Comintern at least did something, and it is hardly likely that the Republicans would have held out so long if he had not sanctioned the Spanish Communist Party’s participation. His Trotskyist critics accused him of excessive pragmatism in his management of the Soviet foreign policy. They ignored the limited resources available to the USSR. Economically, militarily, and ‘above all’ geographically there was no serious chance for him to do more than he achieved at the time.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 389

CHURCHILL SUPPORTS SU MOVING INTO POLAND

Americans still talk as if Stalin and Hitler jointly and cynically divided the unfortunate Poles. But Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, said in a broadcast on October 1, 1939: "The Soviets have stopped the Nazis in eastern Poland; I only regret that they are not doing it as our allies." A few weeks later, on October 26, Prime Minister Chamberlain himself rather sourly admitted in the House of Commons that "It had been necessary for the Red Army to occupy part of Poland as protection against Germany."
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 164

There can be little doubt but that Moscow would've fallen had the blitz been launched from the old Polish-Soviet and Baltic-Soviet frontiers, rather than from the line which Berlin had been obliged to accept in 1939.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 429

In December 1944 Churchill said, “I cannot feel that Russian demands for reassurance about her western frontiers go beyond limits of what is reasonable or just.”
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 509

SU DESERVED PART OF POLAND AND TAKING IT WAS JUSTIFIED

The chaos that reigned throughout Poland was rapidly becoming civil war in the eastern part of the country. This territory, which Molotov called "Western Ukraine and Byelo-- Russia" was inhabited by Ukrainian and Byelo--Russian peasants under Polish landlords. It was not given to Poland by the Versailles Treaty; both Woodrow Wilson and the British Lord Curzon left it outside their "ethnic Poland." The Polish landlords thrust the new Polish State into a war of aggression in 1920 and took the lands. Through the Warsaw government, which they dominated, the landlords treated their peasants more brutally than had the Russian tsar.... In an effort to Polonize the territory by force they settled demobilized Polish soldiers along the frontier, often by dispossessing whole villages of natives. For 20 years the League of Nations reports indicated that Eastern Poland had one of the most brutally handled minority problems anywhere in Europe.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 165

Special attention must be paid to the secret protocols signed at the same time as the nonaggression pact. They provided for the division of Poland into German and Soviet spheres of influence "in the event of territorial and political changes on the territory belonging to the Polish state." Some historians regard these agreements as totally wrong and speak of the "fourth partition of Poland." In their view the Soviet Union could simply have liberated the Polish-occupied parts of Byelorussia and the Ukraine without any preliminary agreement with Germany. England and France had already declared war on Germany, they argue, and Germany would have had to resign itself to the actions of the Red Army. The fact is, however, that at the end of August 1939 no one could have said for certain how England and France would act after Germany's invasion of Poland. They might still have refrained from declaring war. Both the prospect of German troops emerging on the Soviet border after occupying all of Poland and that of Soviet troops entering Polish territory without prior agreement with Germany entailed great dangers. I must agree that the secret protocols attached to the nonaggression pact were a natural extension of that pact. The Soviet Union was unable to prevent Germany's invasion of Poland, but it could see to the strengthening of its own defensive positions in case of possible complications --especially since the territory involved was not strictly Polish but where the local Byelorussians and Ukrainian populations had long been struggling for national liberation.
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 729

The outbreak of the Polish-Russian war is commonly blamed on the Poles and it is indisputable that their troops started it by invading, at the end of April 1920, the Soviet Ukraine.
Pipes, Richard. Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1993, p. 178

Both [Germany and Russia] were agreed that the new Poland had no right to exist - but the Poles made quite sure of the Russians continuing hatred by invading the Ukraine on April.5, 1920, capturing Kiev, the capital, on May 6. They were only driven out a month later and forced to retreat to Warsaw by a Red Army brilliantly commanded by Tukhachevsky, the man Stalin was to execute in 1937.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher. The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 14

Polish leaders eager to take advantage of what they perceived to be the exhaustion of the Red Army invaded the Ukraine and occupied Kiev that May [1920].... A treaty signed at Riga in March 1921 gave Poland a slice of the western Ukraine and pushed the Soviet frontier 100 miles further to the east.
Overy, R. J. Russia's War: Blood Upon the Snow. New York: TV Books, c1997, p. 23

The Katyn story must begin with the character of the Polish elitist officer corp. Poland was created as an independent country from the ruins of the Germanic, Austrian and Russian empires. The new Polish ruling elite was arrogant and opportunistic. As part of the all out imperialist assault against Soviet Russia, the newly created Polish state launched an unprovoked invasion into its neighboring countries in 1920. The new Soviet Russia was powerless against the Polish invaders, operating in conjunction with a dozen more imperialist countries. Poland annexed a large part of Ukraine, Byelorussia and Lithuania, even taking away its present capital, Vilnius. Some 20 million non-Poles were placed under the rule of the Polish landlords and gentry. Assured the support of England and France, Poland become the gangster of Eastern Europe. It took a fiercely anti-Soviet attitude, becoming an active base for all sorts of anti-Soviet political and terrorist groups that conducted raids and inserted agents into the USSR.
Mukhin, Y.I., Katyn Detective,1995

The Soviet Union had genuine territorial claims on Poland since the period of the Civil War when Poland took advantage of the weakness of the Russian Federation and in 1920 attacked the newly formed Ukrainian and Byelorussian republics as well as Lithuania. As a result of the defeat of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR.) in this war, Poland annexed the western regions of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Lithuania, including the cities of Lvov, Brest, Grodno, and Vilnius.
Medvedev, Roy & Zhores. The Unknown Stalin. NY, NY: Overlook Press, 2004, p. 235

POLAND TREATS JEWS BADLY

The frictions were complicated by the fact that the cities and trading towns of the region are largely Jewish.... Not even Hitler treated the Jews more brutally than did the " Poland of the Pans" as the minor nationalities called it, using the Polish term for "Lord." "A Jew-child is a future Jew; twist its neck when it is born," read one of the Anti---Semitic posters the Red Army found when it marched into Poland. Frictions between all the minor nationalities had been kept at boiling heat by pogroms.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 165

EASTERN SUPPORT FOR SU MARCHING INTO POLAND

The Red Army's march was seen in Eastern Europe as a check to this plan of the Nazis, preventing the organization of the East Poland chaos into a Nazi Ukraine.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 165


The arrival of the Red Army was not only unopposed by the population; there are evidences that it was hailed with passionate joy. "Russian troops went into Poland without firing a shot and were seen marching side-by-side with the retiring Polish troops," said the first Associated Press dispatch.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 165


Ukrainian girls hung flowers on the tanks of the arriving Red Army.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 168


Few people who know the racial composition of Eastern Poland doubted that the population had resented the rule of Warsaw and felt "liberated" when the Red Army came.... Even the Polish Government--in--Exile did not venture to declare the Red Army's march an act of war.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 169


Deputies from Grodno told how the Jewish and Byelo-Russian workers of the city had organized their own militia before the Red Army came and had rushed out and helped build a bridge for it into the city under the fire of Polish officers.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 169


Poles in fairly large numbers were deported to various places in the Soviet Union. Letters received by their relatives in Europe and America showed that they were scattered all over the USSR; the sending of the letters also indicated that they were not under surveillance but merely deported away from the border district. The Soviet authorities claimed that former Polish officers and military colonists had done considerable sabotage and kept the people disturbed by rumors of imminent invasions by Romanian and British troops.... Most of them then stated that they fully understood the necessity of the Red Army's march into Poland.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 170

There is no question that the peasants preferred Russians to Germans along their border.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 175

The way was prepared by the Soviet refusal of the boundary line which Hitler first offered in Poland, and which would have given to the Soviets territory in "ethnic Poland" as far as Warsaw. This refusal not only preserved Soviet neutrality in the eyes of Britain but helped convince East European powers that the Soviets were not only strong but just.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 176

Next the Soviets presented Lithuania with her ancient capital Vilno, seized 20 years earlier by the Poles. It was an important gift, being twice the size of the present capital Kaunas; its 550,000 population increased Lithuania's total population by 20 percent. Molotov later stated that it was not given because Vilno had a Lithuanian population; after 20 years of Polish domination, most of Vilno's inhabitants were Poles and Jews. "The Soviet government took into consideration...the historic past and...the national aspirations of the Lithuanian people." In other words that gift was made, not for the sake of Vilno, which didn't particularly want to be transferred, but for the psychological effect on the Lithuanians.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 176

They added that the Soviets could have demanded anything up to annexation and complete Sovietization of their countries and neither Germany nor the Allies could have stopped it.” Their internal organization was no more affected by the new alliance than the governments in South America are affected by the acquisition of naval bases by the United States. The countries were not even required to join in the defense of the USSR unless the attack upon it came directly across their territory. Baltic diplomats and press therefore commented on the shrewdness and reasonableness of Moscow and on the expected trade advantages; they much resented the term "vassal" applied to them by the Anglo-American press.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 177-178

They [the Baltic Germans--ed.] formed the upper class in the Baltic states. For centuries they had been the outpost of German imperialism eastward; they owned the big estates and dominated the industries. At the time of the Russian revelation, much of the native population sided with the Bolsheviks; it was the Baltic Germans who overthrew the local Red governments, calling the troops of the Kaiser to their aid. The removal of these Baltic Germans by Soviet pressure on Hitler scattered what was, for the USSR the most dangerous Nazi fifth column anywhere in Europe. Baltic newspapers expressed regret mingled with pleasure at their going, and remarked that it gave the natives a chance at the better -- paid jobs.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 178

In a sense, the expulsion of the Baltic Germans and the Soviet penetration into the Baltic countries seem to have been direct retribution for the German assault on Poland. A careful reading of the declarations of both Hitler and von Ribbentrop makes this evident.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 225

Americans still speak of Stalin as "Hitler's accomplice" in cynically dividing Poland. But Winston Churchill said in a radio broadcast October 1st: "The Soviets have stopped the Nazis in Eastern Poland; I only wish they were doing it as our allies." Bernard Shaw, in the London Times, gave "three cheers for Stalin," who had given Hitler "his first set-back." Even Prime Minister Chamberlain sourly told the House of Commons, October 26: "It has been necessary for the Red Army to occupy part of Poland as protection against Germany." The Polish government-in-exile, which was in flight through Romania at the time but reached London some weeks later, never ventured to declare that Soviet march an act of war.
The population of the area did not oppose the Russian troops but welcomed them with joy. Most were not Poles but Ukrainians and Byelorussians. U.S. Ambassador Biddle reported that the people accepted the Russians "as doing a policing job." Dispatches told of Russian troops marching side-by-side with retiring Polish troops, of Ukrainian girls hanging garlands on Russian tanks. The Polish commander of the Lvov garrison, who for several days had been fighting against German attacks on three sides, quickly surrendered to the Red Army when it appeared on the fourth side, saying: "There is no Polish government left to give me orders and I have no orders to fight the Bolsheviks."
Strong, Anna Louise. The Stalin Era. New York: Mainstream, 1956, p. 80

The American view that Stalin and Hitler had petitioned Poland in advance is not borne out by the way the partitioning occurred. The boundary between Germans and Russians changed three times before it was fixed at a conference, September 28. It is unlikely that German troops drove all the way to Lvov and attacked it for several days in order to give the city to the USSR. Nor is it likely that the Russians would have incurred casualties by rushing to Vilna, if the city had been allocated to them in advance.
"Respect for Russia has greatly increased; the peasants unquestionably prefer Russians to Germans along the border," read an AP cable from past Europe, September 27th.
The march into eastern Poland, thus, seems not a connivance with Hitler but the first great check the Soviets gave to Hitler under the Non-Aggression Pact.
Strong, Anna Louise. The Stalin Era. New York: Mainstream, 1956, p. 81

When it became absolutely clear that the Polish state had collapsed, then the Soviet forces entered Poland (on September 17) in order to safeguard her defenses and the people of territories invaded by Soviet forces alike. The truth is that the Soviet army was greeted by the local population as liberators and heroes.
Brar, Harpal. Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 572

And indeed, the invading Red Army units were welcomed by many Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Jewish inhabitants of this territory where the dominant Poles were an ethnic minority living mainly in the towns and the non-Polish population suffered discrimination.
Tucker, Robert. Stalin in Power: 1929-1941. New York: Norton, 1990, p. 601

PRIESTS WELCOME BOLSHEVIKS

Dovzhenko laughed when I asked him about the attitude of the Ukrainian priests. "It is probably the first place where priests welcomed the Bolsheviks," he said.... Under the Poles they were constantly being arrested for such crimes as "false registry of names," which meant that they registered children in the Ukrainian language instead of in Polish.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 173

PEOPLE EXPERIENCE FREEDOM WITH FURY

There is no fury greater than that of people who, after centuries of oppression, have glimpsed freedom for a little while.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 174

FINNISH INDEPENDENCE CAME FROM BOLSHEVIKS

Finnish independence was a gift from the Bolshevik revolution. Any schoolteacher in present-day Finland would lose her job if she mentioned this incontrovertible historic fact. When Kerensky came to power, Finland applied for independence. The Kerensky government refused. Neither Britain, France, America, nor any foreign power approved of Finland's independence in those days. Only the Bolsheviks approved.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 180

FINLAND SERVED THE NAZIS

This early democratically elected Finland was quickly suppressed. Baron Mannerheim, a tsarist general, called in German troops to overthrow the government.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 180


Finland was therefore known to the Soviet leaders as the most hostile of all the Baltic states.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 182

With the aid of German officers and engineers, Finland had been converted into a powerful fortress to serve as a base for the invasion of the Soviet Union. Twenty-three military airports had been constructed on Finnish soil, capable of accommodating 10 times as many planes as there were in the Finnish Air Force.
Sayers and Kahn. The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 332

As for the Finns, they carried out unrestrained propaganda against the Soviet Union. There can be no doubt that Finland was eager to join in a campaign against the Soviet Union.
Schecter, Jerrold. Trans & Ed. Khrushchev Remembers: the Glasnost Tapes. Boston: Little, Brown, c1990, p. 51

BOLSHEVIKS GAVE FINNS GOOD TERMS

Moscow first proposed an alliance such a she had with her other Baltic states, but almost at once dropped the proposal in view of Finland's clear unwillingness.... The Soviets wanted the frontier moved back far enough to take Leningrad out of gunshot from Finland; they did not ask, as some have thought, for the Mannerheim Line. They also wanted some small islands that covered Leningrad's sea approach. They offered in return twice as much equally good but less strategic land; later they raised the offer. They also asked a 30 year lease of Hangoe, or some other point at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, as a naval base.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 183


In the peace terms the Soviet Union exacted from Finland considerably more territory adjacent to Leningrad than had originally been asked....The naval base at Hangoe was secured. But the Soviets returned Petsamo and the nickel mines near it, which they had captured. They asked no indemnities but agreed on a treaty whereby they supplied Finland with food. As terms go these were not excessive.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 191


Sir Stafford Cripps, British ambassador to Moscow, thinks that the terms might have been stiffer. He told me that all the Soviet annexations from Finland to Bessarabia had been necessary strategic moves against the coming attack by Hitler. He added: "the Soviets may be sorry someday that they didn't take more of Finland when they could."
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 191


Sir Stafford was wrong. Stalin's sense of timing is better than Sir Stafford's.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 191

EASTERN EUROPE SUPPORT FOR RED ARMY MARCHING IN

The most applauded folk in all Lithuania during my visit were the Red Army Boys. At concerts, dances, trade union meetings, I heard them mentioned scores of times and never without cheers.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 200


Old-time Lithuanians said: "we have seen in our lives three armies -- the old tsarist Army, the German Army of occupation during the first World War, and now these Soviet troops. This is by far the most cultured Army we have ever known." As boosters for the Soviet Union's reputation, the Red Army did an excellent job.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 202


At the American Legation they explained that [Lithuanian] people were afraid not to come to the elections. But Smetona [right-wing Lithuanian president] had openly used police terror to make the peasants come to previous elections, yet they had not come. It was not terror that brought them to the places I visited; it was new hope.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 208

On July 21, 1940, Lithuania became a Soviet Socialist Republic by unanimous vote of the People's Sejm.... A few hours later, on the same day, Latvia and Estonia followed.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 212


What is the use of all these little nations? They only put on heavy taxes for big armies and then their armies are no good anyway. We see what is happening in Europe to all the little countries.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 214


They secured a wide buffer belt from the coast of Finland to the Black Sea.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 220

Summing up, it seemed that life was no worse in Rumania for those who had stayed behind to greet the Russians, and that there were definite improvements for most people. The conservative peasant still had his land and kept more of the product of his labor. There were still plenty of cattle about. The worker had freedom and a sense of new power. The Jew was out of the concentration camps. He had equal rights and a chance to live. All had religious freedom; churches and their institutions were not being molested.
Snow, Edgar. The Pattern of Soviet Power, New York: Random House, 1945, p. 38

In his speech to the supreme Soviet on October 31, 1939, Molotov said:
"When the Red Army marched into these regions it was greeted with general sympathy by the Ukrainian and Byelorussian population who welcomed our troops as liberators from the yoke of the gentry, from the yoke of the Polish landlords and capitalists."
Brar, Harpal. Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 572

Some writers have condemned the "division of Poland" between Hitler and Stalin, the "occupation" of the Baltic states, and the "immoral collusion" of the two dictators. But the situation was more complicated. As a witness to the events that unfolded in the fall of 1939, I cannot forget the atmosphere in western Byelorussia and western Ukraine in those days. The people there met us with flowers, they held bread-breaking ceremonies to welcome us, gave us fruits and milk. Owners of small cafes offered free meals to Soviet officers. Those were genuine feelings. The people believed that the Red Army would protect them from Hitler's terror. Similar things were happening in the Baltic countries. As the Wehrmacht units marched nearer, many people fled to the east, looking for safety in the territory controlled by the Red Army.
Berezhkov, Valentin. At Stalin's Side. Secaucus, New Jersey: Carol Pub. Group, c1994, p. 278

Units of the Byelorussians and Kiev special military districts met no resistance in crossing the Polish frontier. Stalin read dispatches from Timoshenko, Vatutin, Purkaev, Gordov, Khrushchev and others. One from Mekhlis drew his special attention:
"The Ukrainian population is meeting our army like true liberators.... The population is greeting our troops and officers; they bring out apples, pies, drinking water and try to thrust them into our soldiers’ hands. As a rule, even advance units are being met by entire populations coming out on to the streets. Many weep with joy.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 359

The troops were allowed to use their weapons only if attacked. Only isolated armed clashes took place. There was in fact no resistance. The ethnic majority, being Ukrainians and Byelorussians, sincerely welcomed the arrival of the Soviet forces.
...In June 1940 the Soviet government succeeded in recovering Bessarabia and the northern Bukovina by peaceful means, and by agreement with the Rumanian government the frontier was re-established along the rivers Prut and Danube. The Moldavian Soviet Republic had been formed.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 361


The decision to take over Western Ukraine and Byelorussia, in the face of advancing German Armies, was in my view justified, and it was broadly in accord with the desire of the local working-class population.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 386

I phoned the General Headquarters at once. Stalin told me:
"Don't disarm the Bulgarian troops. Let them be while they are waiting for orders from their government."
By this simple act the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command expressed its full confidence in the Bulgarian people and army who gave a fraternal welcome to the Red Army as their liberator from Nazi occupation and from the Tsarist pro-Fascist regime.
Zhukov, Georgi. Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov. London: Cape, 1971, p. 548

RUSSIAN-GERMAN NON-AGGRESSION PACT WAS NEEDED

The non-aggression pact was not an alliance.... Without violating the pact, the Soviet Union was free to oppose, even by armed force, a German attack on Turkey or Yugoslavia. She agreed not to take part in aggression against Germany, but had promised nothing about resisting an aggression that the Nazis might start.... The pact did more; the Soviet Union, acting as a neutral, blocked Nazi expansion on several important occasions more effectively than could have been done by engaging in war.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 220


The pact was accompanied by a trade agreement in which the USSR agreed to supply Germany with certain raw materials in exchange for German machines. No estimates ever made of this trade place it as high as that carried on in 1931 between the USSR and German Republic -- in other words, normal commercial trade. The USSR never became the "arsenal" for Germany in anything like the sense in which America, while still technically neutral, became the arsenal for Great Britain. America has even been the arsenal for Japan in her war against China to a far greater extent then be USSR ever was for Germany. The only commodity sent by the Soviets to Germany that could be classed as a war commodity was oil; the highest foreign guesses assume that the Soviets may possibly have sent as much as a million tons. America's supply of oil to Japan even under the government licensing system was more than three times as much. In the second year of the pact, the Soviets signed a trade treaty with Romania up by which they got Romanian oil that Hitler presumably wanted.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 220


There is no proof of the often--made assertion that the non-aggression pact provoked Hitler's march into Poland.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 220


The boundary between Germany and the USSR in Poland was changed three times. This suggests a rapid improvising by two powers that do not wish to fight each other, rather than a pre-determination of boundaries.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 222


The Soviet Union, in the 22 months of the pact's duration, had checked Nazi expansion more than it was checked by all of Europe's Armed Forces -- Polish, Norwegian, Dutch, Belgian, French, Greek, Yugoslav, and British -- combined.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 234

Chamberlain spoke of the pact as a "bomb shell" and "a very unpleasant surprise." But this was pretense. He was not surprised save at the sudden realization that he had been outplayed in the game of "lets you and him fight."
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 373

In the last analysis neither the USSR nor the western democracies won the diplomatic game of 1939. Both lost. Only Hitler won. The fact remains that Anglo-French policy gave Stalin and Molotov no viable alternative to the course they finally adopted.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 379

If Stalin himself did not want to go under, he must fight for the existence of British-American 'capitalism.’ To such a paradoxical result had the law of historical development led. Stalin had meant to be the leader of a world revolution. The destiny of his success forced him to become simply a Russian statesman. As such he had procured for the Soviet Union a respite of nearly 18 months. His policy did not lead to the onset of the world revolution, but it did bring Russia into the Second World War under the most favorable conditions that could be secured. The feared war on two fronts, which would probably had been the end of Russia, had been avoided. The danger had existed all the time that Russia might be faced alone with an enemy of superior strength, or even a number of enemies. Now the Soviet Union entered the war at the side of the most powerful states in the world. As head of the Russian state, Stalin had made good.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 358

From that time on, Russia used the breathing-space granted by the Pact, not only to prepare for defense but to block Hitler's penetration of East Europe through measures short of war. Hitler revealed this later in his declaration of war against the USSR and bitterly listed the Russian acts that blocked him.
Moscow's first move was to build a wide buffer belt along her western border by alliances.... Moscow invited Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to send foreign ministers to Moscow to discuss an alliance. One by one, they went and signed.... The Baltic states, themselves, resented the term "vassal" applied to them by the Anglo-American press. They thought themselves not badly off. Their internal organization was not at the time affected; they merely gave bases to the USSR in return for help in their defense.
The dramatic expulsion of half a million Germans from the Baltic States followed. How bitterly Hitler resented this was shown in his declaration of war when he told how "far more than 500,000 men and women...were forced to leave their homeland.... To all this I remained silent, because I had to." These are not words of a complacent victor. The Baltic Germans were the upper class in the Baltic States; some had been there as landed barons for centuries. It was they who, at the time of the Russian Revolution, brought in the German troops to overthrow local red governments. Their expulsion scattered what was for the USSR the most dangerous fifth-column in Europe.
Strong, Anna Louise. The Stalin Era. New York: Mainstream, 1956, p. 82

Many say that the treaty with Hitlerite Germany allowed us to do what we wanted with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, and Romania. Naturally, we understood that there were concessions to us in the Treaty and that they were to our advantage. I want to say this straightforwardly. The access we gained to the Baltic Sea significantly improved our strategic situation. By reaching the shores of the Baltic, we deprived the Western powers of a foothold that they might use against us--and that they actually had used during the civil war--for establishing a front against the USSR.
Schecter, Jerrold. Trans & Ed. Khrushchev Remembers: the Glasnost Tapes. Boston: Little, Brown, c1990, p. 51

At half-past-six on the afternoon of July 3, 1941, the day after his return to Moscow, Stalin spoke to his people:
"One must ask how could it have happened that the Soviet Government consented to conclude the Pact of Non-Aggression with such felons and monsters as Hitler and Ribbentrop. Had not the Soviet government thereby made a mistake? Of course not. A Pact of Non-Aggression is a pact of peace between two countries. It was just such a Pact that Germany offered us in 1939. Could the Soviet Government reject such an offer? I think no peace-loving country should reject an agreement with a neighboring State, even if at the head of that state stand such monsters and cannibals as Hitler and Ribbentrop. This, naturally, depends on the indispensable conditions that the peace agreement does not infringe either directly or indirectly the territorial integrity, independence, and honor of the peace-loving country."
Fishman and Hutton. The Private Life of Josif Stalin. London: W. H. Allen, 1962, p. 141

SELFLESS AID TO OTHER COUNTRIES

Second Meeting of Hoxha with Stalin
March-April 1949

I mention this, Stalin continued, to show how important it is to bear in mind the concrete conditions of each country, because the conditions of one country are not always identical with those of other countries. That is why no one should copy our experience or that of others, but should only study it and profit from it by applying it according to the concrete conditions of his own country.
“The chief of your General Staff,” Comrade Stalin told me, “has sent us some requests for your army. We ordered that all of them should be met. Have you received what you wanted?”
“We have not yet received any information about this,” I said.

At this moment Stalin called in a general and charged him with gathering precise information about this question. After a few minutes the telephone rang. Stalin took up the receiver and, after listening to what was said, informed me that the materiel was en route.

“Did you get the rails?” he asked. “Is the railway completed?”
“We got them,” I told him, “and we have inaugurated the railway, and continued to outline the main tasks of the plan for the economic and cultural development of the country and the strengthening of its defenses.”
On this occasion I also presented our requests for aid from the Soviet Union.
Just as previously, Comrade Stalin received our requests sympathetically and said to us quite openly:
“Comrades, we are a big country, but you know that we have not yet eliminated all the grave consequences of the war. However, we shall help you today and in the future, perhaps not all that much, but with those possibilities we have. We understand that you have to set up and develop the sector of socialist industry, and in this direction we agree to fulfill all the requests you have presented to us, as well as those for agriculture.”
Then, smiling, he added:
“But will the Albanians themselves work?”
I understood why he asked me this question. It was the result of the evil-intended information of the Armenian huckster, Mikoyan, who, at a meeting I had with him, not only spoke to me in a language quite unlike that of Stalin, but also used harsh terms in his criticisms about the realization of plans in our country, alleging that our people did not work, etc. His intention was to reduce the rate and amount of aid. This was always Mikoyan's stand. But Stalin accorded us everything we sought.
“We shall also send you the cadres you asked for,” he said, “and they will spare no effort to help you but, of course, they will not stay in Albania forever. Therefore, comrades, you must train your own cadres, your own specialists, to replace ours. This is an important matter. However many foreign cadres come to your country, you will still need your own cadres. Therefore, comrades,” he advised us, “you must open your university, which will be a great centre for training your future cadres.”
“We have opened the first institutes,” I told Comrade Stalin, “and work is going ahead in them, but we are still only at the beginning. Apart from experience and textbooks, we also lack the cadres necessary for opening the university.”
“The important thing is to get started,” he said. “Then step by step, everything will be achieved. For our part, we shall assist you both with literature and with specialists, in order to help increase the number of higher institutes which are the basis for the creation of the university in the future.”
“The Soviet specialists,” Comrade Stalin went on, “will be paid by the Albanian government the same salaries as the Albanian specialists. Don't grant them any favor more than your specialists enjoy.”
“The Soviet specialists come from far away,” I replied, “and we cannot treat them the same as ours.” Comrade Stalin objected at once:
“No, no, whether they, come from Azerbaijan or any other part of the Soviet Union, we have our rules for the treatment of the specialists we send to the assistance of the fraternal peoples. It is their duty to work with all their strength as internationalist revolutionaries, to work for the good of Albania just as for the good of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government undertakes to make up the necessary difference in their salaries.”
Hoxha, Enver. With Stalin: Memoirs. Tirana: 8 N‘ntori Pub. House, 1979.

We assisted Spanish democracy, which had not yet become Socialist. We assisted China in her struggle against Japanese imperialism, although China is not yet a Socialist country.
Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p


The pact was singed beacuse the slow and idiotic British capitalist leaders were too scared to actually support Stalin,they were late,they neglected the peace talks and they basically rejected Stalins proposials.



SUMMARY OF BRITAIN AND FRANCE DRAGGING THEIR FEET IN SUMMER OF 1939

Voices in Britain and France demanded an alliance with the USSR to stop Hitler.... The USSR made several proposals for a triple alliance to guarantee both East and West Europe against the Nazis. Every suggestion was put on ice by the Chamberlain government and after delay, turned down. Chamberlain sought agreement rather with Hitler; on May 3, 1939, he startled the House of Commons by saying he was ready for a non-aggression pact with Germany. Two days later, he refused the proposal of the USSR for a military alliance.
Even Conservatives began to protest Chamberlain's actions. Winston Churchill, on May 7th, in the House of Commons, demanded an alliance with the USSR. Under such pressure, the British and French ambassadors in Moscow were finally instructed, May 25th, to "discuss" an alliance. Ten vital weeks had been lost since the rape of Czechoslovakia. Three more weeks were wasted in waiting for a certain Mr. Strang to get to Moscow. This representative, sent by the British foreign office to "handle discussions," proved, on arrival, to have no authority to sign anything.... The Soviets were clearly in haste; the British as clearly delayed. Suddenly, Moscow learned that the British Parliamentary Secretary of Overseas Trade had been discussing with a German official a loan of half a billion or a billion pounds.
To the Moscow leaders, it was clear that Britain either trifled or was trying to push war East....
Twice, Moscow signaled the British people that the discussions were getting nowhere. The first signal was the resignation on May 3rd, of Maxim Litvinov, Soviet Foreign Minister. For a decade he had symbolized to the world a program for peace through collective agreements against aggression. This program had failed, said Moscow through Litvinov's resignation. It failed in Manchuria, in Abyssinia, in Spain, in China, in Austria, in Albania, in Czechoslovakia, in Memel--eight years of failure, because the government chiefs of the Western democracies appeased or encouraged the aggressors....
After six weeks, Moscow gave another signal. On July 29, Zhdanov, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Supreme Soviet, declared in an article in Pravda that the talks with Britain and France were getting nowhere and that he did not think either Britain or France wanted an alliance or intended to check Hitler, but might be negotiating just to keep the Russians quiet while Hitler prepared to attack them.
At the end of July, when all Europe's foreign offices knew that Hitler intended to seize the Polish corridor within a month, the Soviets made a last attempt. They suggested that Britain and France send military missions to Moscow to plan the mutual defense of East Europe on the spot. The missions waited ten days, then traveled by the slowest route; when they reached Moscow it was found they had no authority to agree to anything....
Strong, Anna Louise. The Stalin Era. New York: Mainstream, 1956, p. 76

[bailey_187]

Kind of ironic that the OP's just been purged.

all for a greater cause, he layed down his e-life with bravery

[Ocean Seal]

I'll call him what he was. You say you are Marxist-Lenninist? Not even Lenin trusted Stalin.


A Marxist-Leninist is one who upholds the theories of Marx, Engels and Lenin alongside various other Revolutionaries. As a result they show direct opposition to the path of Trotskyist, Ultra-Leftist and Revisionist trends of Socialism.

Most Marxist-Leninists claim that the Soviet Union under Stalin's leadership represented a correct and successful practical implementation of the ideas of the scientific socialist ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). That does not mean; however, that Marxist-Leninists are completely uncritical of Stalin.
From the group



Never heard of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact then, eh?

Yes, that's what they teach in social studies classes. Most teachers like mine forgot to mention that Stalin wanted to mobilize for war against Germany but that the Western powers were too busy appeasing the man, and when Stalin asked for a joint West-Soviet defense of Czechoslovakia they continued to allow Hitler to expand. With allies like those who wants to go to war?

[Sir Comradical]

The thing is, what do they see in Stalin. They see a person who helped the construction of socialism or they see someone who was another Char that "made Russia Great"?

Definately for nationalist reasons.

[Rooster]

I don't understand why saying that because he's popular with people has anything to do with anything. Churchill, Genghis Khan, Vlad the Impaler and even Mussolini are still popular in their respective countries.

[unpopularfreedomfront]

This thread will probably be closed,but i will reply to you just for the sake of you learning something:

The pact was singed beacuse the slow and idiotic British capitalist leaders were too scared to actually support Stalin,they were late,they neglected the peace talks and they basically rejected Stalins proposials.

That still does not explain why the USSR invaded lands which weren't theirs.

[Omsk]

Vlad the Impaler
Maybe in fairy tales where he is a vampire.


That still does not explain why the USSR invaded lands which weren't theirs.

Yes it does,read the entire thing.

[Volcanicity]

Having a portrait of Stalin,Trotsky,Mao or any figure associated with Communism on the side of a bus does'nt help the left in 2011 at all.

It really is time people got over this whole worshipping leaders as if they're some kind of deity.

[unpopularfreedomfront]

Yes, that's what they teach in social studies classes. Most teachers like mine forgot to mention that Stalin wanted to mobilize for war against Germany but that the Western powers were too busy appeasing the man, and when Stalin asked for a joint West-Soviet defense of Czechoslovakia they continued to allow Hitler to expand. With allies like those who wants to go to war?

From the Marxist-Lenninist group: "Most Marxist-Leninists claim that the Soviet Union under Stalin's leadership represented a correct and successful practical implementation of the ideas of the scientific socialist ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)." Well, holy sh!t :lol:

Anyway, while a non-aggression pact could be understandable, that in turn didn't mean Stalin had to invade the Baltics, Poland, Finland and other areas. That went beyond non-agression, that was aggression.

[Volcanicity]

From the Marxist-Lenninist group: "Most Marxist-Leninists claim that the Soviet Union under Stalin's leadership represented a correct and successful practical implementation of the ideas of the scientific socialist ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)." Well, holy sh!t :lol:

Except you missed out the most important part of the quote"That does not mean however that Marxist-Leninists are completly uncritical of Stalin".

[Public Domain]

Sweet! I'm not a Marxist-Leninist, but I'd much rather see this than another McDonalds ad!

[unpopularfreedomfront]

Except you missed out the most important part of the quote"That does not mean however that Marxist-Leninists are completly uncritical of Stalin".

Don't worry, I got the jist of it. I wonder just what part would they be critical of, the part where he had millions of Soviet citizens murdered?

[GallowsBird]

Don't worry, I got the jist of it. I wonder just what part would they be critical of, the part where he had millions of Soviet citizens murdered?

:rolleyes: I see you get the prize for using that line first. You should read many other threads about Stalin... that line is tired and has been refuted many times by many Marxist-Leninist "Stalinskies".

[Volcanicity]

Don't worry, I got the jist of it. I wonder just what part would they be critical of, the part where he had millions of Soviet citizens murdered?
No we're just critical that Stalin purged them all with two hands instead of one like Mao did. :rolleyes:

Good luck with the ban.

[unpopularfreedomfront]

:rolleyes: I see you get the prize for using that line first. You should read many other threads about Stalin... that line is tired and has been refuted many times by many Marxist-Leninist "Stalinskies".

Yeah, some revisonist historians also refute that 6 million Jews were killed in the death camps. Because you say it aint so, doesn't mean it aint so.....

[unpopularfreedomfront]

No we're just critical that Stalin purged them all with two hands instead of one like Mao did. :rolleyes:

Good luck with the ban.

A ban? Lol, for what, the truth. A ban would be worth it. Truth hurts, eh? When I figure out exactly what kinda Socialist it is that I am why do I think I won't be rushing into the arms of Marxism-Lenninism :rolleyes: No wonder most leftist groups and parties in Ireland are Trotskyite. Having said that I don't think I'm a Trotskyist either.

[GallowsBird]

Yeah, some revisonist historians also refute that 6 million Jews were killed in the death camps. Because you say it aint so, doesn't mean it aint so.....


And the first to bring the Nazis into things...

Yes, but because someone, especially a capitalist, says something doesn't make it true either. And the deaths of various groups in Nazi occupied countries can be verified whereas for the most part this is not the case in the USSR in which simple arithmatic can disprove spurious theories of 50 Million people being killed by (the evidently ominpresent :rolleyes:) Stalin.
Although many did die in the famine I'll add that no one blames leaders for deaths caused by famines and depressions unless they are Communists which is quite telling.

[Volcanicity]

A ban? Lol, for what, the truth. A ban would be worth it. Truth hurts, eh? When I figure out exactly what kinda Socialist it is that I am why do I think I won't be rushing into the arms of Marxism-Lenninism :rolleyes:
Well if you would've turned up here asking civilised questions rather than throwing slurs and accusations and cursing all over the place then you maybe would've got your answers to your questions to what kinda Socialist you are a bit quicker.

[El Chuncho]

A ban? Lol, for what, the truth. A ban would be worth it.

If you get banned it would most likely just be for your troll-attitude and sexist use of ''****'', however, your truth is highly questionable anyway. But that is neither here nor there, as they say.

[Obs]

Maybe it's about time Marxists-Leninists stop caring so much about Stalin. Yeah, his contributions were great and he was a great leading figure in the history of the USSR, and I bet we can use some of the experience from back then when it comes around to building socialism.

But maybe our most pressing matter right now is actually getting to a point where it's even possible to start doing that. Putting pictures of Stalin on Russian buses does not do that.

[unpopularfreedomfront]

Well if you would've turned up here asking civilised questions rather than throwing slurs and accusations and cursing all over the place then you maybe would've got your answers to your questions to what kinda Socialist you are a bit quicker.

I am referring to a different post in a different section. Anyway, by all means admire Stalin as much or as little as you want to, I don't. Try to revise history as much as you want to, I won't.

[Volcanicity]

Anyway, by all means admire Stalin as much or as little as you want to, I don't. Try to revise history as much as you want to, I won't.
Thanks I will.

Bye.

[lines]

Stalin saved Russia, he was not a murderer.... such notions are reactionary propaganda.

[unpopularfreedomfront]

If you get banned it would most likely just be for your troll-attitude and sexist use of ''****'', however, your truth is highly questionable anyway. But that is neither here nor there, as they say.

Sexist use of a swear word, lol, aren't we all very pc now :lol: And I believe you'll find what I wrote was "c*nt"........That is like saying use of the word "bastard" is offensive to those born outside of wedlock when not used to describe those born out of wedlock :laugh: .......as they say. Eurovision on Sat, who d'ya think will win?

[unpopularfreedomfront]

Stalin saved Russia, he was not a murderer.... such notions are reactionary propaganda.

:laugh: This is like the twilight zone..........

[Omsk]

Maybe you could try and answer or counter my posts? Or you finally got the truth?:)

[unpopularfreedomfront]

Maybe you could try and answer or counter my posts? Or you finally got the truth?:)

I did. While a non-aggression pact may have been understandable what is not understandable is why Stalin then invaded the Baltic countries, Finland, Poland and other. A pact with Nazi Germany not to invade each other is one thing, then going onto invade sovereign countries is another matter. Wonder if you supported the later invasions of Czechoslovakia too? And Hungary? Why do I think you probably did.

[Volcanicity]

:laugh: This is like the twilight zone..........
Which is no doubt where your ass will be disappearing into soon.

[Omsk]

Wonder if you supported the later invasions of Czechoslovakia too? And Hungary? Why do I think you probably did.

Actually no,the invasions were carried out by revisionist and were too brutal.(for the period)


Here is on the account of Finland.



FINNISH INDEPENDENCE CAME FROM BOLSHEVIKS

Finnish independence was a gift from the Bolshevik revolution. Any schoolteacher in present-day Finland would lose her job if she mentioned this incontrovertible historic fact. When Kerensky came to power, Finland applied for independence. The Kerensky government refused. Neither Britain, France, America, nor any foreign power approved of Finland's independence in those days. Only the Bolsheviks approved.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 180

FINLAND SERVED THE NAZIS

This early democratically elected Finland was quickly suppressed. Baron Mannerheim, a tsarist general, called in German troops to overthrow the government.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 180


Finland was therefore known to the Soviet leaders as the most hostile of all the Baltic states.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 182

With the aid of German officers and engineers, Finland had been converted into a powerful fortress to serve as a base for the invasion of the Soviet Union. Twenty-three military airports had been constructed on Finnish soil, capable of accommodating 10 times as many planes as there were in the Finnish Air Force.
Sayers and Kahn. The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 332

As for the Finns, they carried out unrestrained propaganda against the Soviet Union. There can be no doubt that Finland was eager to join in a campaign against the Soviet Union.
Schecter, Jerrold. Trans & Ed. Khrushchev Remembers: the Glasnost Tapes. Boston: Little, Brown, c1990, p. 51

BOLSHEVIKS GAVE FINNS GOOD TERMS

Moscow first proposed an alliance such a she had with her other Baltic states, but almost at once dropped the proposal in view of Finland's clear unwillingness.... The Soviets wanted the frontier moved back far enough to take Leningrad out of gunshot from Finland; they did not ask, as some have thought, for the Mannerheim Line. They also wanted some small islands that covered Leningrad's sea approach. They offered in return twice as much equally good but less strategic land; later they raised the offer. They also asked a 30 year lease of Hangoe, or some other point at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, as a naval base.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 183


In the peace terms the Soviet Union exacted from Finland considerably more territory adjacent to Leningrad than had originally been asked....The naval base at Hangoe was secured. But the Soviets returned Petsamo and the nickel mines near it, which they had captured. They asked no indemnities but agreed on a treaty whereby they supplied Finland with food. As terms go these were not excessive.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 191


Sir Stafford Cripps, British ambassador to Moscow, thinks that the terms might have been stiffer. He told me that all the Soviet annexations from Finland to Bessarabia had been necessary strategic moves against the coming attack by Hitler. He added: "the Soviets may be sorry someday that they didn't take more of Finland when they could."
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 191


Sir Stafford was wrong. Stalin's sense of timing is better than Sir Stafford's.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 191


On the question of the pact:



The non-aggression pact was not an alliance.... Without violating the pact, the Soviet Union was free to oppose, even by armed force, a German attack on Turkey or Yugoslavia. She agreed not to take part in aggression against Germany, but had promised nothing about resisting an aggression that the Nazis might start.... The pact did more; the Soviet Union, acting as a neutral, blocked Nazi expansion on several important occasions more effectively than could have been done by engaging in war.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 220


The pact was accompanied by a trade agreement in which the USSR agreed to supply Germany with certain raw materials in exchange for German machines. No estimates ever made of this trade place it as high as that carried on in 1931 between the USSR and German Republic -- in other words, normal commercial trade. The USSR never became the "arsenal" for Germany in anything like the sense in which America, while still technically neutral, became the arsenal for Great Britain. America has even been the arsenal for Japan in her war against China to a far greater extent then be USSR ever was for Germany. The only commodity sent by the Soviets to Germany that could be classed as a war commodity was oil; the highest foreign guesses assume that the Soviets may possibly have sent as much as a million tons. America's supply of oil to Japan even under the government licensing system was more than three times as much. In the second year of the pact, the Soviets signed a trade treaty with Romania up by which they got Romanian oil that Hitler presumably wanted.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 220


There is no proof of the often--made assertion that the non-aggression pact provoked Hitler's march into Poland.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 220


The boundary between Germany and the USSR in Poland was changed three times. This suggests a rapid improvising by two powers that do not wish to fight each other, rather than a pre-determination of boundaries.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 222


The Soviet Union, in the 22 months of the pact's duration, had checked Nazi expansion more than it was checked by all of Europe's Armed Forces -- Polish, Norwegian, Dutch, Belgian, French, Greek, Yugoslav, and British -- combined.
Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 234

Chamberlain spoke of the pact as a "bomb shell" and "a very unpleasant surprise." But this was pretense. He was not surprised save at the sudden realization that he had been outplayed in the game of "lets you and him fight."
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 373

In the last analysis neither the USSR nor the western democracies won the diplomatic game of 1939. Both lost. Only Hitler won. The fact remains that Anglo-French policy gave Stalin and Molotov no viable alternative to the course they finally adopted.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 379

If Stalin himself did not want to go under, he must fight for the existence of British-American 'capitalism.’ To such a paradoxical result had the law of historical development led. Stalin had meant to be the leader of a world revolution. The destiny of his success forced him to become simply a Russian statesman. As such he had procured for the Soviet Union a respite of nearly 18 months. His policy did not lead to the onset of the world revolution, but it did bring Russia into the Second World War under the most favorable conditions that could be secured. The feared war on two fronts, which would probably had been the end of Russia, had been avoided. The danger had existed all the time that Russia might be faced alone with an enemy of superior strength, or even a number of enemies. Now the Soviet Union entered the war at the side of the most powerful states in the world. As head of the Russian state, Stalin had made good.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 358

From that time on, Russia used the breathing-space granted by the Pact, not only to prepare for defense but to block Hitler's penetration of East Europe through measures short of war. Hitler revealed this later in his declaration of war against the USSR and bitterly listed the Russian acts that blocked him.
Moscow's first move was to build a wide buffer belt along her western border by alliances.... Moscow invited Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to send foreign ministers to Moscow to discuss an alliance. One by one, they went and signed.... The Baltic states, themselves, resented the term "vassal" applied to them by the Anglo-American press. They thought themselves not badly off. Their internal organization was not at the time affected; they merely gave bases to the USSR in return for help in their defense.
The dramatic expulsion of half a million Germans from the Baltic States followed. How bitterly Hitler resented this was shown in his declaration of war when he told how "far more than 500,000 men and women...were forced to leave their homeland.... To all this I remained silent, because I had to." These are not words of a complacent victor. The Baltic Germans were the upper class in the Baltic States; some had been there as landed barons for centuries. It was they who, at the time of the Russian Revolution, brought in the German troops to overthrow local red governments. Their expulsion scattered what was for the USSR the most dangerous fifth-column in Europe.
Strong, Anna Louise. The Stalin Era. New York: Mainstream, 1956, p. 82

Many say that the treaty with Hitlerite Germany allowed us to do what we wanted with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, and Romania. Naturally, we understood that there were concessions to us in the Treaty and that they were to our advantage. I want to say this straightforwardly. The access we gained to the Baltic Sea significantly improved our strategic situation. By reaching the shores of the Baltic, we deprived the Western powers of a foothold that they might use against us--and that they actually had used during the civil war--for establishing a front against the USSR.
Schecter, Jerrold. Trans & Ed. Khrushchev Remembers: the Glasnost Tapes. Boston: Little, Brown, c1990, p. 51

At half-past-six on the afternoon of July 3, 1941, the day after his return to Moscow, Stalin spoke to his people:
"One must ask how could it have happened that the Soviet Government consented to conclude the Pact of Non-Aggression with such felons and monsters as Hitler and Ribbentrop. Had not the Soviet government thereby made a mistake? Of course not. A Pact of Non-Aggression is a pact of peace between two countries. It was just such a Pact that Germany offered us in 1939. Could the Soviet Government reject such an offer? I think no peace-loving country should reject an agreement with a neighboring State, even if at the head of that state stand such monsters and cannibals as Hitler and Ribbentrop. This, naturally, depends on the indispensable conditions that the peace agreement does not infringe either directly or indirectly the territorial integrity, independence, and honor of the peace-loving country."
Fishman and Hutton. The Private Life of Josif Stalin. London: W. H. Allen, 1962, p. 141


More on Finland:



STALIN OFFERED FINLAND VERY GOOD TERMS

During the first week of October, 1939, while still negotiating its new treaties with the Baltic states, the Soviet Government proposed a mutual assistance pact with Finland. Moscow offered to cede several thousand square miles of Soviet territory on central Karelia in exchange for some strategic Finnish islands near Leningrad, a portion of the Karelian Isthmus, and a 30 year lease on the port of Hango for the construction of a Soviet naval base. The Soviet leaders regarded these latter territories as essential to the defense of the Red naval base at Kronstadt and the city of Leningrad.
...But the pro-Nazi clique dominating the Finnish government refused to make any concessions and broke off all the negotiations.
Sayers and Kahn. The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 333

Then Finland sued for peace, and, surprisingly, the Kremlin asked little more than its terms before the war began--a frontier somewhat more distant, the Mannerheim Line disrmed, and the occupation by Soviet units of strategic points like the island of Hango.
Duranty, Walter. The Kremlin and the People. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1941, p. 179

Having secured the southern Baltic against surprise attack, Moscow approached Finland, which holds the gateway of the north. Though Finland's independence was a free gift from the Russian Revolution, Finland was known as the most hostile of the Baltic States. That early democratic Finland had been bloodily overthrown by Baron Mannerheim, an ex-Czarist general, with the aid of the kaiser's troops. Finland had become a base for international actions against the USSR.... Finland's air fields were built by the Nazis. Made to accommodate 2,000 planes, when Finland had 150, they were clearly designed for use by a major power....
The Finnish delegation came to Moscow October 11th. The Soviets proposed an alliance, but dropped it since the Finns were unwilling. Then they proposed an exchange of territory to protect Leningrad. They asked that the border be moved back enough to take Leningrad out of gunshot and that some small islands, guarding the sea approach, be given to the USSR. They offered in return twice as much territory, equally good but less strategic. They also asked a 30 year lease of Hangoe or some other point at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland--that long thin waterway that leads to Leningrad--as a naval base. President Cajander, of Finland, broadcast a statement that the terms did not affect Finland's integrity.
A month of bargaining went on in which Moscow raised her offers. Finland stood to get nearly 3 to 1 in the territorial trade; and Hangoe base would be held, not 30 years, but only during the Anglo-German war and would then come to Finland fully equipped. Many Finns were boasting of the "smart bargain" their diplomats were getting. Then, suddenly, the Finnish negotiators broke off discussions with the cryptic remark that circumstances would decide when and by whom they would be renewed....
So when Finnish artillery shot over the border in late November and killed Red Army men, Moscow sharply protested, and, when Finland disregarded the protest, Soviet troops marched into Finland on November 30, 1939. Finland declared war and appealed for foreign aid.
Strong, Anna Louise. The Stalin Era. New York: Mainstream, 1956, p. 83

Compared with our own vast territorial and natural resources, Finland had little to offer us in the way of land and forests. Our sole consideration was security-- Leningrad was in danger.
Talbott, Strobe, Trans. and Ed. Khrushchev Remembers. Boston: Little Brown, c1970, p. 152

On April 8, 1938, the NKVD resident in Finland, Rybkin, was summoned to the Kremlin,... Rybkin was ordered to offer the Finnish government a secret deal, sharing interests in Scandinavia and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, on the conditions of their signing a pact of mutual economic and military assistance in case of aggression by third parties. The pact was to guarantee Finland eternal safety from attack by European powers and mutual economic privileges for the two countries on a permanent basis. Included in the proposals was a division of spheres of military and economic influence over the Baltic areas that lay between Finland and the Soviet Union.
Sudoplatov, Pavel. Special Tasks. Boston: Little, Brown, c1993, p. 94

On Oct. 14, 1939, a Soviet note made firm proposals for an exchange of territory, together with a 30 year lease of the Hango peninsula and frontier adjustments in the Petsamo area and on the Karelian Isthmus. The Finns refused to yield at any point. Attempts to negotiate continued, but made no progress. On Nov. 13, 1939, Stalin broke them off. His patience was exhausted. He decided to use force.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 312

Encouraged by the success of his [Stalin] measures on the western borders, he now turned his attention to the northwest. He was worried by the proximity of the Finnish border to Leningrad and Finland's obvious inclination towards Germany. Talks were conducted with the aim of compelling the Finns to move their border further from Leningrad for appropriate territorial compensation, but the Finnish foreign minister, Tanner, was under instruction from the country's head of state, Field Marshal Mannerheim, a former general in the tsarist army, not to yield to the Russians.... At the end of November mutual recriminations started up over unprovoked exchanges of fire, notably in the vicinity of the Soviet village of Mainilo. Molotov handed the Finnish envoy, Irne-Koskinen, a note which contained a demand, amounting to an ultimatum, 'for the immediate withdrawal of your forces 20 to 25 kilometers away from the frontier on the Karelian peninsula.' Two days later the envoy replied that his government was 'ready to enter talks on the mutual withdrawal of forces to a certain distance from the frontier'. Finland had taken up the challenge and, being equally unyielding, announced mobilization. On Nov. 28, 1939 the USSR renounced the 1932 Soviet-Finnish treaty of non-aggression. Neither Moscow nor Helsinki had exhausted all means to avoid war, to put it mildly.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 363

In 1938, the Soviet fear was that in the event of war between Germany and the Soviet Union, the islands [Aalands] could be used as a base for the protection of ships carrying vital German supplies of iron ore from Sweden. For Finland, the Aalands were important for the protection of her western shore. Now, Stalin was prepared to allow Finland to fortify the islands, on two conditions. One was that the Soviets should participate in the building and send observers to supervise the work. The other was that the Finns should allow them to build a fortified air and naval base on Suursaari, one of the Finnish islands which commanded the approach to Leningrad and the Soviet Baltic Fleet's base at Kronstadt. The protection of both had become a matter of urgency for Stalin, and he was now, for the first time, prepared to do deals in order to acquire strategic bases for this purpose.
Once again, however, mutual distrust caused the talks to end in deadlock. Yartsev suggested that they should be continued under cover of the official trade negotiations which were then taking place in Moscow. The Finns refused. But Stalin did not give up. In March 1939 he sent a new emissary to Helsinki: Boris Stein, then Soviet ambassador in Rome. Stein had served for some years in Helsinki and was known personally to many members of the Finnish government. No doubt Stalin hoped someone more senior than Yartsev might carry greater weight.
Stein brought fresh proposals. The Soviet Union agreed that a fortified base on Suursaari might compromise the neutrality which the Finns had gone to such great links to establish. Therefore, the Soviets had another, less contentious offer: would Finland agree to lease to the USSR the string of islands including Suursaari? Or, if this proved unacceptable, would Finland be prepared to exchange the islands for an area of Soviet territory on the mainland? The islands measured 183 square kilometers. Stalin was willing to give a larger area in exchange, and to undertake not to fortify the islands.
In spite of advice from Marshal Mannerheim that they should negotiate seriously with the Soviets, and that it would be a mistake to send them away empty handed yet again, the Finnish government said no.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher. The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 379

The preliminary skirmishing of was now over. Molotov stepped back and Stalin took charge, running the conference himself from then on. He was consistently brief and to the point. Sometimes, when some particularly knotty problem came up, he would, as was his habit, rise from his seat and pace up and down, puffing on his pipe and listening carefully to all the arguments before making up his mind.
He made it clear that with the advent of the European war, the protection of Leningrad had become the immediate Soviet concern. Leningrad must be protected at all costs from any potential attack by land or sea. He therefore proposed moving the present Soviet-Finnish border northwards, up the Karelian Isthmus into Finland, a matter of some 25 miles, to take it well out of artillery range of Leningrad. In addition, in order to protect the city from attack by sea, he proposed that the USSR should take over all the islands in the Gulf of Finland, and lease the port of Hanko on the Finnish mainland for use as a Soviet naval base. He offered a payment of 8 million Finnish marks for a 30 year lease.
In the far north, he pointed out that the approaches to Murmansk, the Soviet Union's only ice-free ocean port in the western part of the huge country, were also vulnerable. Here, he demanded that Finland should cede to him the Rybachi Peninsula, which commanded the approaches to Murmansk.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher. The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 388


In return for the territory to be ceded to the Soviet Union in both the north and south, Stalin offered the Finns over twice as much territory alongside the center of Finland. This would have the beneficial effect to Finland of thickening her dangerously narrow 'waist ', the nightmare of Finnish military strategists since it meant an invader can swiftly divide the country in two.
The meeting ended on that note, and Paasikivi [the Finnish representative] and his team returned to the legation to wire the Soviet demands to their government in Helsinki. The government's reply was uncompromising: they were not disposed to concede much, if anything at all.
Stalin was not a soldier - he was a bureaucrat. His days of military glory, such as they were, were long past. Yet throughout the conference he was evidently haunted by the ghosts of the Russian Civil War of 20 years before, when British warships had lurked in the Gulf of Finland and the White General Yudenich had tried to take Petrograd, the home of the Revolution. Then Stalin, having already claimed the glory for saving Tsaritsyn, the city which was later to be renamed Stalingrad, took control of the Red forces, as the special representative of the party's Central Committee, and saved Petrograd, the city which was to become Leningrad.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher. The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 389


In June 1919, against the advice of his military experts, he [Stalin] had flung units of the Baltic Fleet, a few aircraft, and 800 troops from Petrograd into an assault on the two forts, Krasnaya Gorka and Seroya Loshad, which guarded the approaches to the city. "The swift capture of Gorka," he had written in a report at the time which did nothing to play down his part in the proceedings, "came as a result of the rudest intervention by me and other civilians in operational matters, even to the point of countermanding orders on land and sea and imposing our own." He had added ominously, "I consider it my duty to announce that I shall continue to act in this way in the future." In 1939, his vision of himself as "Stalin, the Savior of Petrograd" kept intruding into the problems of the present.
"It is not the fault of either of us," he told the Finns, "that geographical circumstances are as they are. We must be able to bar entrance to the Gulf of Finland. If the channel to Leningrad did not run along your coast, we would not have the slightest occasion to bring the matter up. Your memorandum is one-sided and over-optimistic.... It is a law of naval strategy that passage into the Gulf of Finland can be blocked by the cross-fire of batteries on both shores as far out as the mouth of the Gulf. Your memorandum supposes that an enemy cannot penetrate into the Gulf. But once a hostile fleet is in the Gulf, the Gulf can no longer be defended.
"You ask why we want Koivisto? [A Finnish island off the east coast of the Karelian Isthmus.].... Regarding Koivisto, you must bear in mind that if 16-inch guns were placed there they could entirely prevent movements of our fleet in the inmost extremity of the Gulf [i.e.: round the port of Kronstadt]. We asked for 2700 square kilometers and offer more than 5500 in exchange. Does any other great power do that? No. We are the only ones who are that simple."
Read, Anthony and David Fisher. The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 390


At the end of this second day of the conference, Paasikivi informed Stalin that their discussions had now reached the point where he must return to Helsinki in order to obtain fresh instructions from his government. Stalin agreed, but reminded him of the urgency of the matter: the Finnish army was already mobilizing, while the Soviets were reinforcing their own border troops. The situation was therefore explosive.
"This cannot go on for long without the danger of accidents," he said. Later that evening, the Soviets handed over a written memorandum containing their proposals. Stalin made no threats, delivered no ultimatum. He did not think it necessary to do so. He believed he made the Finns a fair offer, one they could not afford to refuse. But Paasikivi sounded a note of warning.
Paasikivi was not so optimistic. "The Hanko Neck concession and the cession of the area on the Isthmus are exceptionally difficult matters," he said.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher. The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 391


Paasikivi did not care for the implication of this last remark. His country was neutral and wished to remain so. "We want to continue in peace," he said, "and remain apart from all incidents."
Stalin's reply was blunt. "That is impossible," he said brusquely.
Paasikivi refused to be put down, however. "How do these proposals of yours fit in with your famous slogan, "We do not want a crumb of foreign territory, but neither do we want to cede an inch of our own territory to anyone"? he asked.
"In Poland, we took no foreign territory," came the reply, meaning that the Red Army had simply re-occupied land that once belonged to the tsars. "And this is a case of exchange."
Read, Anthony and David Fisher. The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 392


Paasikivi started by saying Finland was now prepared to make some concessions. These included ceding various islands in the Gulf of Finland and moving the Karelian frontier back up the Isthmus some 13 kilometers, eight miles, though not the 25 miles demanded by Stalin. However, he made it clear that on Hanko the Finns had not changed their position.
Stalin was not impressed, and insisted the new concessions were not enough. The original demands, he said, had been the bare minimum required for Soviet security, and could not be bargained away. He thought the present European war could easily escalate into a world war which might last for many years. In that event, the USSR must be able to defend Leningrad from attack via the Gulf.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher. The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 393


Paasikivi's tough stand paid off. At about 9 p.m., barely an hour after the Finns had walked out, Molotov's secretary telephoned them to ask if they would come back to the Kremlin for further talks that night. The resumed meeting started at 11 p.m.
Again, Stalin and Molotov faced the Finns alone. Molotov had drafted a memorandum after the earlier session, in which the Soviets made certain modifications to their position. Instead of demanding the right to put a Soviet garrison of 5000 men into Hanko, they were prepared to reduce the number to 4000, and guarantee to remove them on "the termination of the British-French-German war". In addition they were prepared to compromise on the Karelian frontier issue.
Neither Paasikivi nor Tanner thought these concessions were in themselves enough to change the mind of the government, but they agreed to report them to Helsinki nevertheless.
Early next morning, Paasikivi went to Tanner's room in the legation, after a sleepless night spent trying to find a way through the impasse. He had come to the conclusion, he told Tanner that for the past 20 years the Finns had been living in a fool's paradise. They had chosen neutrality, but the truth was that neutrality was a luxury they could not afford with the Soviet Union as a next-door neighbor. Since they could not change the geography, they would have to change their policies.
If they refused the Soviet demands, he continued, this would lead to war - a war which Finland would inevitably lose. He proposed, therefore, to advise the Finnish government to accept Moscow's terms....
Paasikivi and Tanner arrived back in Helsinki on Oct. 26 to find the Council had still failed to grasp the realities of the situation. The ministers seemed to be living in an Alice in Wonderland world, making statements which were totally at variance with the coldly pessimistic assessments of their own military advisers. Marshal Mannerheim himself bluntly forecast national disaster in the event of war with the Soviet Union. But the politicians refused to heed such warnings. Defense Minister Nuikkanen pooh-poohed his own generals. "The military command is always too pessimistic," he told Paasikivi airily.
To compound their stupidity, the members of the Council of State also conspired to keep the Finnish people in ignorance of the true state of affairs. Erkko [Finnish Foreign Minister] even continued to preserve the fiction that in the last resort they could rely on Sweden to come to their aid. Bolstered by this false confidence, he drafted yet another set of proposals for Paasikivi to take back to Moscow. These offered a little more territory in Karelia - taking the border to 37 miles from Leningrad - and some in the far north, but not enough to come close to satisfying even the latest, scaled-down Soviet demands.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher. The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 394


On the Soviet side it is clear that Stalin, no doubt advised by Otto Kuusinen, his Finnish confidant, still believed the Finns would see sense in the end. Perhaps Kuusinen overestimated the political flexibility of his countrymen. In any event, the last thing Stalin wanted at this time was a war on his northern frontier. He and his advisers had analyzed the Finnish position with great care, concluding that it was hopeless. They presumed the Finns must have come to the same conclusion - what other conclusion was there to be reached? Surely, their argument went, no country would contemplate its own destruction when, by coming to an agreement, it would actually gain rather than lose territory? As always with Stalin, political logic dictated his own actions, and, as always, he presumed it dictated the actions of others.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher. The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 395


Molotov told Schulenburg in Moscow that he was extremely angry with the Finns, saying their stubbornness in refusing such modest Soviet demands could be explained as only "resistance bolstered by England." The Soviet Union, he said, had even offered to pay all the expenses involved in moving the Finnish population from areas ceded to her, including the cost of building new homes for them. It could not understand their refusal of such generosity.
The failure of the negotiations to achieve the peaceful transfer of territory which he desired had far-reaching effects, even on Stalin himself. He came under considerable pressure from a strong body of opinion within the Politburo, led by Zhdanov. Lined up with Zhdanov were Adm. Kuznetsov, General Meretskov, commander of the Leningrad Military District, and Adm. Tributz, the new commander of the Baltic Fleet. No doubt Molotov, whose earliest political positions of any note had been in the Petrograd (as it then was) party, and who had been chairman of the economic council for the northern region, which included Karelia, was among those who had become convinced Stalin was being too soft with the Finns. These hard-liners thought the time for polite negotiation was over - in their view, even Stalin's initial demands had been quite inadequate in military terms. They made no bones about the fact that they wanted a return to Peter the Great's frontier with Finland, which had included the whole of the Karelian Isthmus and the city of Vipuri.
In Zhdanov's eyes, the security of Leningrad was the single most important foreign policy issue facing the USSR. If Leningrad were not made secure from any external threat, the country could be sucked into the so-called "Second Imperialist War" because of the need to defend the city.
Stalin was a cautious man, but in the end he was won over by Zhdanov's argument - and possibly by the fear of the consequence of his not backing the judgment of his own military men.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher. The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 400


The Finnish government instigated the incident, and did not deny that seven shells had struck the village of Mainila.... With a certain bravura, the Finns suggested that in order to avoid any further incidents, both sides should withdraw their forces the same distance from the frontier.
The Soviets were not amused by the Finnish reply. Molotov delivered another blast on Tuesday, Nov. 28, 1939. The relative positions of the two forces, he argued, were not comparable. "The Soviet forces do not threaten any vital Finnish center, since they are hundreds of kilometers from any of these, whereas the Finnish forces, 32 kilometers away from the USSR's vital center, Leningrad, which has a population of 3,500,000 creates for the latter a direct menace. It is hardly necessary to state that there is actually no place for the Soviet troops to withdrawal to, since withdrawal to a distance of 25 kilometers would place them in the suburbs of Leningrad, which clearly would be absurd from the point of view of the security of Leningrad.
The Soviet Union regarded the concentration of troops near the frontier, and the incident of the seven artillery shots, as hostile acts. This was, Molotov declared, "incompatible" with the 1934 non-aggression pact between the two countries. "Consequently, the Soviet government considers itself obliged to declare that it considers itself as of today as being relieved of its obligations under the non-aggression pact...which is being systematically violated by the government of Finland."
Read, Anthony and David Fisher. The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 404


Only that afternoon [December 1st] a "People's government of Finland", under the presidency of Kuusinen, had been established in Terijoki, which the Red Army had managed to "liberate." The Soviet Union instantly recognized this government as representing the "Democratic Republic of Finland," and announced the formation of a "1st Finnish Corps" made up of volunteers, which would form the nucleus of the future people's army.
Next day, Molotov signed a pact of mutual assistance with Kuusinen. Stalin, Voroshilov, and Zhdanov, Moscow Radio announced, were all present at the "negotiations." It was no surprise to anyone that the new pact gave the Soviets everything they had demanded in the talks with Paasikivi, including the whole of the Karelian Isthmus, Hanko and the islands in the Gulf. What was surprising was that in return the Soviet Union gave the Finnish Democratic Republic no less than 70,000 square kilometers of central Karelia - over 20 times the amount of territory being ceded by the Finns - plus 120 million Finnish marks as compensation for the railways in the Isthmus and 3 million marks for the islands and the Rybachi peninsula in the far north.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher. The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 405

The proposal that Stalin put to the Finns on Oct. 12 was to move the existing Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian isthmus 25 miles farther away from Leningrad; and, for better protection of the city from attack by sea, for the Soviet Union to take over all the islands in the Gulf of Finland and lease the port of Hankow for use as a naval base. In the north, he asked for the cession of the Rybachi Peninsula, which commanded the approaches to Murmansk, the Soviet Union's only ice-free port on its western side. In return the Russians offered twice as much territory adjoining the center of Finland, where the narrow "waist" between the Russian frontier and the Gulf of Bothnia exposed the Finns to the danger of an invader cutting the country in two.
In the negotiations, which continued until November 8, Stalin showed himself willing to moderate his demands but not to withdraw them. Both Marshall Mannerheim, the hero of the earlier Finnish-Soviet war, and Paasikivi were in favor of coming to terms with the Russians, but the Finnish government, fully supported by public opinion, refused;...
Stalin was surprised at the Finnish intransigence; he appears to have hesitated before accepting the view of the hard-liners led by Zhdanov, the party boss of Leningrad, that they should not waste any more time but take what they needed by force. He finally agreed, subject to the proviso that only troops from the Leningrad Military District were to be involved.
Bullock, Alan. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. New York: Knopf, 1992, p. 660

It so happened that I was gone, during that week, on a visit to Finland. I found the Finns pleasant and friendly. I was received in audience by President Paasikivi, that great Finnish realist, who, though originally a highly conservative businessman, considered it in Finland's interests never to quarrel with the Russians. He said he had done his utmost, in November 1939, to meet the Russians at least half-way, since he regarded their demand for a frontier or rectification north-west of Leningrad "understandable and reasonable" in the tense atmosphere of the Second World War, which had already begun. He was prepared at the time to make concessions to the Russians, but he was overruled by the Finnish government.
... I met the future president of Finland, Mr. Kekkonen. Kekkonen's line was very similar to Paasikivi: Finland had to be realistic; the Finnish government of 1939 was wrong to have dug in its heels; but although the Russian armistice terms-- particularly the $300 million in reparations--were pretty tough, Finland was lucky not to be occupied by Russian troops and the most important thing for her was to maintain good-neighborly relations with Russia and to remain strictly neutral. The Finns, he said, were happy to have remained masters in their own house. Needless to say, a good deal was said about the Fulton speech; nobody present was happy about it. On the contrary, as Kekkonen said, it was going to poison the international atmosphere. This kind of thing, he remarked, would do nobody any good, and Finland was frankly worried about it, for it might provoke the Russians who until then had been "pretty reasonable" in their relations with the Finns.
Werth, Alexander. Russia; The Post-War Years. New York: Taplinger Pub. Co. 1971, p. 110-111

He [Stalin] expressed strong resentment over the Iron Curtain speech made at Fulton, Missouri, by former Prime Minister Winston Churchill. This speech, Stalin said, was an unfriendly act; it was an unwarranted attack upon the USSR. Such a speech, if directed against the United States, never would have been permitted in Russia.
Smith, Walter Bedell. My Three Years in Moscow. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1950, p. 52

Would the czarist government have dealt so reasonably with Finland, asked Stalin? 'There is no doubt on this', he replied. Would any other great power offer 5500 km2 in exchange for 2700 (for the Soviets were willing to compensate the Finns in the north for the territory that the Finns were asked to cede in the south)? 'No. We are the only one that is so stupid.'
McNeal, Robert, Stalin: Man and Ruler. New York: New York University Press, 1988, p. 223

Early in 1939 Stalin, with security in mind, asked the Finns to meet him for discussions about frontier adjustments, offering to exchange territory. In addition, he wanted the lease of a port on the Gulf of Finland, and asked the Finns to give up other strategic parcels of territory, totalling 1066 square miles in return for nearly twice as much--but less valuable--Russian territory in the far north. No agreement was reached. After the signing of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact and Hitler's invasion of Poland, Stalin again sought territorial adjustments with Finland....
Axell, Albert. Stalin's War: Through the Eyes of His Commanders. London, Arms and Armour Press. 1997, p. 56



Oh!
And regarding the Baltic states:



The question for Stalin in August 1939 was quite clear. He distrusted Hitler. The Baltic states neither would nor could resist a German lightning invasion. That would face him with an accomplished fact, but it would be difficult to declare war on that account against the Baltic States; and, of course, he had no desire to do so. If, however, he placed Russian garrisons in the Baltic States, it would be known in Berlin that any invasion would bring immediate fighting with Soviet troops. That would be a deterrent for Berlin.
Stalin went to work very cautiously. The Russian troops sent into the Baltic States were stationed in encampments of their own, far away from any settlement, and nowhere did they come into contact with the population. They were hardly seen. The Soviet State in no way interfered in the affairs of the three Baltic States; it did not even attempt to influence their armies. The regime remained as it was in all three states; and they retained their own diplomatic representation abroad. Even their communists, particularly in Latvia, still remained in prison.
Probably it will never be known how Stalin expected this to end. But he was overtaken by events. He seemed to have judged well; indeed, when war came the Western Powers seemed even weaker than he had assumed. France collapsed, and the British troops returned to their island. Hitler was virtually master of the whole of Europe outside Russia. Stalin had to safeguard his country. It proved that the garrisons in the Baltic states were insufficient. President Ullmanis, in Latvia, began to move. He was in intimate personal touch with Berlin. It seemed to him [Ullmanis] to be possible to bring about a German-Russian conflict. He no longer contented himself with dealing through the Latvian minister in Berlin, but sent men in his confidence as his personal representatives, to persuade the Germans to intervene. Naturally the Russians did not remain unaware of this. A pretext was given them by a small incident with a British warship in Estonian territorial waters. Moscow declared that the Baltic states were much too weak to be able to defend their neutrality. Such a breach of neutrality as had occurred might bring the Soviet Union into the war. On this ground, further Soviet troops marched into the Baltic States, and by a coup d' etat completed the sovietization of the three States and their incorporation into the Soviet Union.
From Stalin's point view, this policy was no abandonment of the old principles; indeed, it was the fulfillment of an injunction of Lenin's. Lenin had not had any hesitation about bringing particular peoples of the Russian Empire back into the Russian Federation by force. An example had been Stalin's own native country, Georgia.... Thus, in 1917 Georgia proclaimed its independence. It had a social democratic government, and soon established diplomatic relations with a number of European States. It even became a Member State of the League of Nations; but every effort to interest the great powers in its fate came to grief. When Azerbaijan and Armenia were sovietized, Georgia, too, was compelled to conclude peace with Soviet Russia. The peace treaty seemed entirely normal. In it Soviet Russia unreservedly recognized Georgian independence and bound itself not to interfere in internal Georgian affairs. But this treaty had a secret clause, which was published later. Under this clause the Georgian Government bound itself not only to amnesty all the imprisoned Georgian communists but to grant legal existence and freedom of propaganda to the Communists. Scarcely had this clause been given effect when the Communists provoked rioting in one of the public gardens of Tiflis. It was a trifling incident, but Lenin at once declared that the Georgian Government was unable to guarantee law and order in its own territory, thus endangering the neighboring states. Russian troops marched into Georgia, and the country was sovietized. Stalin had entirely concurred. In 1923 there was a new rising in Georgia, on an important scale; it was brutally crushed, with a great deal of bloodshed. Thus it cannot be said that Stalin's policy toward the Baltic states was an innovation; it was entirely in line with the Leninist policy.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 342

A new and important shift thus occurred in Stalin's foreign policy. His first move in the Baltic lands, the establishment of bases, had been dictated solely by strategic expediency. He had apparently had no intention of tampering with their social system. His sense of danger, heightened and intensified by the collapse of France, now impelled him to stage revolutions in the three small countries. For the first time he now departed, in a small way, from his own doctrine of socialism in one country, the doctrine that he had so relentlessly inculcated into a whole Russian generation.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 446

Of course, Hitler said, the Soviets were determined to exact a price for their cooperation with the Third Reich. But as far as Hitler could see, their principal aim was merely to extend Soviet access to the Baltic via Latvia and Estonia - a modest enough demand in all conscience.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher. The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 192

[unpopularfreedomfront]

Hahaha, you love your copy and paste don't you? Listen, i could go trawling and find opinions, reports, articles etc etc that directly contradict what you have posted - not that I'm going to bother my arse doing so. You are a revisionist, plain and simple. Stalin only occupied the Baltics to help them? Ha. I guess that was why when the Nazi's were defeated he left and let the citizens determine their own fate? :thumbdown:

[Nolan]

It's kind of bitter to see he's getting the whole MLK treatment.

[Comrade J]

Stalin was a murdering c*nt. Stalin is loved by many throughout Eurasia? I think you're referring to something called Stockholm Syndrome.

I am not in any way a Stalinist, but there is no denying his legacy remains strong in parts of the former Soviet Union, across Russia and especially around the Urals and into Georgia. It's not an example of Stockholm Syndrome at all, that doesn't even work in this case as there was no interpersonal relation between him and most citizens, it's simply that many people had a better quality of life under Stalin than they do now.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, capital became immensely concentrated in the hands of a few oligarchs who traded on the black market under Gorbachev and then bought (or were given) state assets during Yeltsin's privatisation period, who they then financed for re-election with the money he had helped them 'earn'. This is partly why Russia is so immensely poor now - the capital is so concentrated, and also many of the billionaires that fell out of favour with Putin fled to Europe.

[unpopularfreedomfront]

Which is no doubt where your ass will be disappearing into soon.

Didn't you say bye already? Yes, you did...see, scroll back a little. What do you want, a kiss? :D

[Omsk]

Well,than,since you cant and won't participate in this discussion any more,i guess you finally changed your mind.Thats ok too,glad we had this little chat,if you need any more information on the SU,ask away.:thumbup1:


You are a revisionist

Nope.Not even a historical revisionist.

[Volcanicity]

Didn't you say bye already? Yes, you did...see, scroll back a little. What do you want, a kiss? :D
No that was more of a adieu.
I was just waiting for your ass to be purged like the good "Stalinist" I am.

Now it's bye.

[unpopularfreedomfront]

Well,than,since you cant and won't participate in this discussion any more,i guess you finally changed your mind.Thats ok too,glad we had this little chat,if you need any more information on the SU,ask away.:thumbup1:


Nope.Not even a historical revisionist.

If that's your way of telling yourself "I've won, I've won!" then knock yourself out :) I am more than willing to engage in debate and discussion on the merits or otherwise of the murderer Stalin.

[unpopularfreedomfront]

No that was more of a adieu.
I was just waiting for your ass to be purged like the good "Stalinist" I am.

Now it's bye.

Ohhhh, adieu.....French....how nice. I'll say it in Irish to you, slan abhaile :D Maybe you should put "Stalinist" up there instead of Marxist-Lenninist.

[Omsk]

Why don't you people understand that we are not Stalinist's,that is a term used by Trots to describe Anti-reivionist ML's who are not entirely critical of Stalin.

[unpopularfreedomfront]

I am not in any way a Stalinist, but there is no denying his legacy remains strong in parts of the former Soviet Union, across Russia and especially around the Urals and into Georgia. It's not an example of Stockholm Syndrome at all, that doesn't even work in this case as there was no interpersonal relation between him and most citizens, it's simply that many people had a better quality of life under Stalin than they do now.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, capital became immensely concentrated in the hands of a few oligarchs who traded on the black market under Gorbachev and then bought (or were given) state assets during Yeltsin's privatisation period, who they then financed for re-election with the money he had helped them 'earn'. This is partly why Russia is so immensely poor now - the capital is so concentrated, and also many of the billionaires that fell out of favour with Putin fled to Europe.

Sorry but that's not quite correct. People today in Russia have a much higher standard of living than they did under Stalin, of course the same could be said for anywhere 60 years later. Ireland, the UK, USA, France etc etc. Russia today isn't as immensely poor as you think. Trust me, I have been there (and to Ukraine) a good few times. Even my in-laws who are normal working people have a relatively decent quality of life, could always be better but could always be worse. But yes a proper redistribution of wealth would be ideal. An end to the capitalist system would be ideal. But for us to think that the USSR was an ideal is simply wrong. It could have been, should have been but wasn't. It all went drastically wrong somewhere along the line. Pity. It did have it's good points but it had too many bad points. It tried but it failed.

[El Chuncho]

Sexist use of a swear word, lol, aren't we all very pc now :lol:

You know damn well what ''****'' means, and I don't care if you replace a letter with a * or not. I am not PC at all, and I have been quite critical of a lot of people saying this and that is sexist, however, the use of a female sexual organ as an expletive is sexist, sorry.

[unpopularfreedomfront]

Why don't you people understand that we are not Stalinist's,that is a term used by Trots to describe Anti-reivionist ML's who are not entirely critical of Stalin.

"You people"? Is it cause I's black you said that?

Nah, I'm only messing, I'm white :lol: Anyway, I was just replying to the little Stalinista who said he is a Stalinist, take it up with him. I guess at that age they're kinda confused :D If you and yours are the ML Lite Branch, who the fecks the ML Joe 4 President Branch?.....lol You say you are not revisionist yet from what I know it is widely accepted within the leftist movement as a whole that Stalin was not as white as white as you make him out to be and that Stalin is certainly not a role model. I again suggest that you are in fact the revisionist, you are trying to rehabilitate Stalin.

[unpopularfreedomfront]

You know damn well what ''****'' means, and I don't care if you replace a letter with a * or not. I am not PC at all, and I have been quite critical of a lot of people saying this and that is sexist, however, the use of a female sexual organ as an expletive is sexist, sorry.

Is the use of d!ck also sexist? :laugh:

[Omsk]

If you and yours are the ML Lite Branch
On the countrary,im hardline.


you are trying to rehabilitate Stalin.
Well,he was 'denounced' by a revisionist lackey. (ie Niki)

[unpopularfreedomfront]

On the countrary,im hardline.


Well,he was 'denounced' by a revisionist lackey. (ie Niki)

Nik Kershaw was a Communist?

[Omsk]

Nick Kershaw was a Communist?


Im talking about this mean revisionist machine.
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/68/Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-B0628-0015-035%2C_Nikita_S._Chruchstschow.jpg/225px-Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-B0628-0015-035%2C_Nikita_S._Chruchstschow.jpg

[red cat]

Stalin is more fondly remembered in Russia and Central Eurasia than the West. I have noticed he has a slight folk-hero status in some Central Eurasian countries.

Also to some extent in south Asia.

[unpopularfreedomfront]

Im talking about this mean revisionist machine.
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/68/Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-B0628-0015-035%2C_Nikita_S._Chruchstschow.jpg/225px-Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-B0628-0015-035%2C_Nikita_S._Chruchstschow.jpg


Yes, I did know that, lol. Ah, I think the word you're looking for is "progressive" not revisionist :)

[IndependentCitizen]

Having a portrait of Stalin,Trotsky,Mao or any figure associated with Communism on the side of a bus does'nt help the left in 2011 at all.

It really is time people got over this whole worshipping leaders as if they're some kind of deity.

Completely agree, also makes us out to be like some sort of cult...

BUT! This could ignite a new wave of class consciousness!

[rednordman]

Bloody heck, some people waste themselves on this forum.

I do understand the argument against Stalins Russia in WW2, thousands of communists have despised him for decades for this alone. But at the end of the day, where has it ultimately got us?..Now the fucking nazis are being made to look like the good guys ffs! There has also been a small resurgence of the far-right across europe. If modern consensus expects us to disappear after the fall of the Soviet Union, than why do they tolerate the fascists?

I'm not saying that it is ok to build him up like some sort of legend, but the more you highlight his crimes (some of which are indeed suspect to western propaganda - especially the said death tolls and such), the more you end up adding timber to the burning furnace of modern day fascists.

I suppose it was a bad idea to put his face on the side of a bus, simply because we are having this argument in the first place. I think that the left just needs to take the good and learn from the bad of our history. Otherwise we are always going get it rubbed in our by the likes of the BNP and such, and with the recent collapse of neo-liberalism, it shouldn't be this way.

Also if you think that slagging Stalin off to death is going to change peoples view of communism, you are sadly mistaken. The west did more to ruin communism as an ideal than any brutal tyrant ever could, and they did it without killing anyone. They just ruined the human races chance for the creation of a better world instead.

[Dire Helix]

For the record, the man behind this whole "Stalinobus" idea is a self-proclaimed fascist of "Spanish variety". Take it as you will.

I personally don`t see the appearance of these buses as something that should be welcomed by communists. It may come as a surprise to some, but most Stalin admirers in Russia don`t come from the left - they are firmly on the right. Many Russian people don`t see Stalin as a revolutionary, a devoted communist, a builder of socialism or anything of the sort - no, they see him as this fatherly "good leader" figure who protected normal people and punished the baddies. Needless to say, this is an extremely reactionary sentiment that should be opposed by all communists(regardless of what they think of Stalin), which is why we shouldn`t be encouraging public display of Stalin`s imagery, since it doesn`t really make it easier for us to spread our ideas.

Call me when there are buses with this:
http://www.abload.de/img/revosailor07gq.jpg
(revolutionary Russian sailors hold a banner which says "Death to the bourgeois!")

Now that would be something.

[Obs]

Yes, I did know that, lol. Ah, I think the word you're looking for is "progressive" not revisionist :)
You've gotta be out of your goddamn gourd if you think Khrushchev or his rule was progressive for the USSR.

[unpopularfreedomfront]

You've gotta be out of your goddamn gourd if you think Khrushchev or his rule was progressive for the USSR.

Compared to the nightmare that was Stalin Khrushchev was Santa, Captain Kirk and the tooth fairy all rolled into one :) Repression subsided (didn't end of course) Could never figure out why they removed Khrushchev - was he really going a bit loopy at the end?

[Obs]

Compared to the nightmare that was Stalin Khrushchev was Santa, Captain Kirk and the tooth fairy all rolled into one :)
Esepecially if you were a capitalist. For regular folks, not so much.

[Kamos]

Compared to the nightmare that was Stalin Khrushchev was Santa, Captain Kirk and the tooth fairy all rolled into one :) Repression subsided (didn't end of course) Could never figure out why they removed Khrushchev - was he really going a bit loopy at the end?

Oh, he was a very nice old guy. Totally harmless - in fact, he was often seen posing for photographs together with Santa Claus and he loved animals as well. What a pity he was a capitalist: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1965_Soviet_economic_reform

[pranabjyoti]

Also to some extent in south Asia.
Not only South Asia, probably among the most oppressed peoples around the world, especially in the third world (as we know it).

[unpopularfreedomfront]

Esepecially if you were a capitalist. For regular folks, not so much.

Oh yeah, capitalists were the ones he had killed....how silly of me to forget that :rolleyes: The average man and woman were perfectly safe in Stalins USSR.....as long as they didn't have a daughter Beria fancied of course. Stalin and Beria the perfect couple.

I have a friend whose almost entire ethnic group, Kalmyks, were shipped off to Siberia one night by Uncle Joe. Yes indeed, a great man. How many heroes of the Soviet Union did Stalin have executed I wonder? Hmmmmm......Wow, what a hero.

[Sinister Cultural Marxist]

Didn't Stalin reverse Lenin's decision to legalize homosexuality? Didn't Stalin have a horrid penchant for collectively punishing any ethnic group from which there was a group who opposed him? For instance, his deportation of Chechens to Siberia ... how did that help to build "workers democracy" for the Chechens, any more than the trail of tears helped to improve democracy for the Cherokee?

If Stalin pursued all the policies he did, but called himself a "Nationalist" instead of a "Communist", would many "Communists" support him? We can thank him for crushing the Nazis, but it seems that there were more than a few "revolutionary errors" made by the man.

EDIT-unpopular is right about that too, Stalin was very harsh on various minorities like the Buddhist mongol Kalmyks or the muslim crimean Tatars as well. He even had some plan concocted to send Jews to a remote corner of Siberia where he had set up a yiddish oblast, of course nowhere near where most actual Russian Jews lived ...

[pranabjyoti]

Didn't Stalin reverse Lenin's decision to legalize homosexuality? Didn't Stalin have a horrid penchant for collectively punishing any ethnic group from which there was a group who opposed him? For instance, his deportation of Chechens to Siberia ... how did that help to build "workers democracy" for the Chechens, any more than the trail of tears helped to improve democracy for the Cherokee?

If Stalin pursued all the policies he did, but called himself a "Nationalist" instead of a "Communist", would many "Communists" support him? We can thank him for crushing the Nazis, but it seems that there were more than a few "revolutionary errors" made by the man.

EDIT-unpopular is right about that too, Stalin was very harsh on various minorities like the Buddhist mongol Kalmyks or the muslim crimean Tatars as well. He even had some plan concocted to create an SSR for the Jews in a remote corner of Siberia ...
The ethnic cleansing BS again. You just forgot to mention that all these had happened after WWII and the people, who were punished were actually Nazi collaborators. IMO they deserve much more severe punishment.
Just read Solokov and you will understand the mentality of Don Cossacks, who continuously supported counter-revolution and at last ended up as Nazi collaborators.
MEN LIKE YOU JUST FORGOT THAT MOST ETHNIC MINORITIES GOT THEIR OWN LETTERS AND WRITTEN LANGUAGES DURING THE ERA OF UNCLE JOE.

[Marxach-Léinínach]

Didn't Stalin reverse Lenin's decision to legalize homosexuality? Didn't Stalin have a horrid penchant for collectively punishing any ethnic group from which there was a group who opposed him? For instance, his deportation of Chechens to Siberia ... how did that help to build "workers democracy" for the Chechens, any more than the trail of tears helped to improve democracy for the Cherokee?

If Stalin pursued all the policies he did, but called himself a "Nationalist" instead of a "Communist", would many "Communists" support him? We can thank him for crushing the Nazis, but it seems that there were more than a few "revolutionary errors" made by the man.

Did Stalin reverse those decisions all by himself? As for ethnic groups that opposed him, more like ones that were having massive pro-Nazi insurgencies in the middle of the war. Losing the Caucasian front because of the Chechen insurgency wouldn't have helped build workers' democracy for anybody in the USSR.

[Sinister Cultural Marxist]

Did Stalin reverse those decisions all by himself? As for ethnic groups that opposed him, more like ones that were having massive pro-Nazi insurgencies in the middle of the war. Losing the Caucasian front because of the Chechen insurgency wouldn't have helped build workers' democracy for anybody in the USSR.

No, but deporting civilian Chechens is err, not exactly justified from the fact that some Chechens fought for the Nazis. Some Armenians may have fought for the Russians, that certainly doesn't justify what the Turks did. Collective punishment is wrong, whether it's a so-called communist or otherwise who is enacting it.

Pranab-ummmm, as I said to Marxist-Leninach, collective punishment is wrong. So there were anti-commie guerrillas coming from those populations ... that doesn't justify collectively punishing anyone from that ethnic group. You said "those people were collaborators" ... so all Chechens were nazi collaborators? Does that position deserve restriction? It sounds like racism to me

[Omsk]

The cossacks were traitors to the SU and reactionaries,they always fought against fellow Russians,either on the side of the Tsar or the side of the Hitlerite swine vermin.Most of them should have faced severe punishment.(ie death)
XVth SS Cossack Cavalry Corps was famous for its habit of decapitating communist partisans,and putting their heads on flags.I spit on cossacks!
The ones who fought in the Red Army are no good too.
They called the Germans their "liberators" even while the Einsatzkommando cannibalized and slaughtered thousand of Russians!

[pranabjyoti]

No, but deporting civilian Chechens is err, not exactly justified from the fact that some Chechens fought for the Nazis. Some Armenians may have fought for the Russians, that certainly doesn't justify what the Turks did. Collective punishment is wrong, whether it's a so-called communist or otherwise who is enacting it.
Well, just tell me why the "civilian" Chechens haven't opposed the "criminal" Chechens, who had been collaborating with the worst enemy of mankind till that time. IMO, doing criminal acts and being silent while something very criminal offense is going on before your own eyes are almost same to some extent. Why there wasn't mass protest against Nazi collaboration arouse from Chechen community during WWII, while their whole country is suffering so badly from Nazi attack.

[Nolan]

Why do you idiots keep feeding the troll?

[Omsk]

And please,must i remind you comrades that direct support of Cossacks is reactionary and has nothing to do with leftist.They were our enemies from day one!
So please,no "poor cossacks!"

[Marxach-Léinínach]

Well, just tell me why the "civilian" Chechens haven't opposed the "criminal" Chechens, who had been collaborating with the worst enemy of mankind till that time. IMO, doing criminal acts and being silent while something very criminal offense is going on before your own eyes are almost same to some extent. Why there wasn't mass protest against Nazi collaboration arouse from Chechen community during WWII, while their whole country is suffering so badly from Nazi attack.

And as Grover Furr has pointed out, only going after the insurgents would have been equivalent to genocide ie. leaving basically an entire generation of Chechen, Crimean Tatar etc. women with no husbands. As it was, the nation was preserved, only somewhere else where they weren't so much of a security threat

[Sinister Cultural Marxist]

Erich-I'm confused, I thought the Chechens, Crimean Tatars, and Kalmyks were different from the Don Cossacks? In fact, I thought the whole point of the Cossacks to begin with was a Tsarist policy designed for the explicit purpose of controlling these kinds of ethnically distinct non-Russian minorities?

Pranab-that doesn't justify mass expulsion. We don't know why various people didn't fight the Nazis, they all probably had their own individual reasons. But many of these minorities DID join the red army too and yet the minorities were punished anyways. This is the fundamental flaw with collective punishment ... it by definition totally ignores the individual motives and actions when it is executed. IF Stalin had only deported individuals who actively helped partisans, or who were partisans, that would be a different matter. But deporting families of innocent people because people who spoke the same language in the next village fought Hitler is WRONG, under all circumstances.

[Omsk]

Erich-I'm confused, I thought the Chechens, Crimean Tatars, and Kalmyks were different from the Don Cossacks? In fact, I thought the whole point of the Cossacks to begin with was a Tsarist policy designed for the explicit purpose of controlling these kinds of ethnically distinct non-Russian minorities?
It was a reply in support of a user who posted something about the Don Cossacks.

[Proukunin]

I don't glorify Stalin, but I do think that he was an important figure that lead a country into a superpower and also lead the soviet union to defeat the Nazi's. He's more important than Vladimir Putin or Demetriv. He did force collectivization which is horrible and I don't apologize for him for that. But he was the leader during WW2 which was a horrible time alltogether for all countries.

[Omsk]

Demetriv.
??

[pranabjyoti]

Erich-I'm confused, I thought the Chechens, Crimean Tatars, and Kalmyks were different from the Don Cossacks? In fact, I thought the whole point of the Cossacks to begin with was a Tsarist policy designed for the explicit purpose of controlling these kinds of ethnically distinct non-Russian minorities?
Just one similarity! All were Nazi Collaborators.

Pranab-that doesn't justify mass expulsion. We don't know why various people didn't fight the Nazis, they all probably had their own individual reasons. But many of these minorities DID join the red army too and yet the minorities were punished anyways. This is the fundamental flaw with collective punishment ... it by definition totally ignores the individual motives and actions when it is executed. IF Stalin had only deported individuals who actively helped partisans, or who were partisans, that would be a different matter. But deporting families of innocent people because people who spoke the same language in the next village fought Hitler is WRONG, under all circumstances.
Well, there were Nazi collaborators from Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and also from other parts of USSR. But, they were small minorities and most have opposed them. But, I guess that wasn't the case of the those minorities that you have mentioned. There may be Red army soldiers from those communities, but most probably they were small in number and the mentality of majority of those communities were anti-USSR.

[El Chuncho]

Is the use of d!ck also sexist? :laugh:

I have made this point many times, using either term is wrong, because it means using a sexual organ (which is also the main defining feature of the sexes) as an expletive.

[unpopularfreedomfront]

I have made this point many times, using either term is wrong, because it means using a sexual organ (which is also the main defining feature of the sexes) as an expletive.

And that is wrong because......................?

[unpopularfreedomfront]

Just one similarity! All were Nazi Collaborators.

Well, there were Nazi collaborators from Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and also from other parts of USSR. But, they were small minorities and most have opposed them. But, I guess that wasn't the case of the those minorities that you have mentioned. There may be Red army soldiers from those communities, but most probably they were small in number and the mentality of majority of those communities were anti-USSR.

Any proof to back up your statements? Or is this just Stalinist ranting?

[RedSonRising]

I think all too much personal credit is given to Stalin for repelling the Nazis. What the hell was he going to do, pretend the genocidal violence in the countryside wasn't happening, or that it wasn't threatening to expand deeper into the country and engulf all of Russia?

Some people act like he stood at the edge of the Volga with a pair of howitzers and just mowed down all the Nazis in all of his proletarian glory.

[GallowsBird]

And please,must i remind you comrades that direct support of Cossacks is reactionary and has nothing to do with leftist.They were our enemies from day one!
So please,no "poor cossacks!"

Though some individual Cossacks did join the revolution obviously (though most were Whites). But people forget that the Cossacks aren't an ethnic group in any strict sense but a military "caste" (for lack of a better word) of Russians (and occasionally other East Slavic peoples).

[GallowsBird]

Some people act like he stood at the edge of the Volga with a pair of howitzers and just mowed down all the Nazis in all of his proletarian glory.

That's ridiculous.

He actually stood with one foot at the Volga and the other at the Don and fired at Berlin with a tank in each hand!:p

[Red Commissar]

How long would this stay though? I'm pretty sure if I read the article right this was a part of the "celebrations" of VE day in Europe which a blogger had managed to push through. It probably won't be there for too long.

However we should also take caution of the nationalist aspect. As another posted mentioned in another thread:



One of nationalist demonstrations in Leningrad during the past May Day:

http://www.abload.de/img/gedc2248zy1q.jpg

CPRF`s demonstration:
http://www.abload.de/img/gedc2245szvl.jpg

The writing on Stalin`s portrait says: "Our cause is a right one":laugh:

Both nationalists and Zyuganovite "communists" hold a soft spot for the "glorious generalissimus". On CPRF`s forums he is praised as the man who restored Russia to its former glory, revived Orthodox Christianity and rid the country of Jew-Bolsheviks.

[Rafiq]

Some internet troll decides to raise money for a bus with Stalin's face on it. So what?

The title makes it seem like all these bus drivers are starting to reveal his face on the bus.

Next.

[Sword and Shield]

I think all too much personal credit is given to Stalin for repelling the Nazis. What the hell was he going to do, pretend the genocidal violence in the countryside wasn't happening, or that it wasn't threatening to expand deeper into the country and engulf all of Russia?

Some people act like he stood at the edge of the Volga with a pair of howitzers and just mowed down all the Nazis in all of his proletarian glory.

The point is that if all the liberals who complain about Stalin's forced industrialization had their way, the Soviet Union would not have survived World War II.

"We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or they will crush us." 10 years later the Nazis attacked the USSR.

[Sir Comradical]

I think all too much personal credit is given to Stalin for repelling the Nazis. What the hell was he going to do, pretend the genocidal violence in the countryside wasn't happening, or that it wasn't threatening to expand deeper into the country and engulf all of Russia?

Some people act like he stood at the edge of the Volga with a pair of howitzers and just mowed down all the Nazis in all of his proletarian glory.

"Many allied visitors who called at the Kremlin during the war were astonished to see on how many issues, great and small, military, political or diplomatic, Stalin personally took the final decision. He was in effect his own Commander-in-Chief, his own minister of defence, his own quartermaster, his own minister of supply, his own foreign minister, and even his own chef de protocol. The stavka, the Red Army’s GHQ, was in his offices in the Kremlin. From his office desk, in constant and direct touch with the commands of the various fronts, he watched and directed the campaigns in the field. From his office desk, too, he managed another stupendous operation, the evacuation of 1,360 plants and factories from western Russia and the Ukraine to the Volga, the Urals and Siberia, an evacuation that involved not only machines and installations but millions of workmen and their families.

There is no doubt that he [Stalin] was their real Commander-in- Chief. His leadership was by no means confined to the taking of abstract strategic decisions, at which civilian politicians may excel. The avid interest with which he studied the technical aspects of modern warfare, down to the minute detail, shows him to have been anything but a dilettante. He viewed the war primarily from the angle of logistics...To secure reserves of manpower and supplies of weapons, in the right quantities and proportions, to allocate them and transport them to the right points at the right time, to amass a decisive strategic reserve and to have it ready for intervention at decisive moments – these operations made up nine-tenths of his task..."

- (Isaac Deutscher, Stalin)

[Rafiq]

Ironically, if the British who attacked Russia during the civil war had it their way, wed be speaking German right now. Never the less, the allies were just as much Scum as the axis .

[Robocommie]

I think it's funny that Google Ads chose an ad for World of Tanks for this thread.

[Sir Comradical]

Any proof to back up your statements? Or is this just Stalinist ranting?

It's not a Stalinist rant. There actually were Nazi collaborators from Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. Many Cossacks, Chechens and Ingushetians also collaborated. I remember reading this in Deutscher's account of Stalin.

[Stand Your Ground]

In b4 the Nazbols attack the buses.

[gorillafuck]

Russians who admire stalin aren't the radical left a lot of the time. Stalin is also associated with far right nationalism.

Also just as an fyi people there, at least from what I could tell, think very differently of Lenin and Stalin. They like Lenin. They don't like Stalin.

[El Chuncho]

And that is wrong because......................?

Because it demeans the sexual organs of males or females. Keep up, please.

[B.K.]

There's nothing to be happy about. To put it in short: the persons who started this campaign are pure fascists (in the Mussolini's sense of this word) who admire Stalin because he cleaned Russia of revolutionaries of any sorts, and imposed a rule of iron hand. One of their leaders openly admits that his political views are close to Italian fascism and Spanish falangism, and the content of his blog confirms it. Don't let their use of communist symbols fool you.

[Ismail]

There's nothing to be happy about. To put it in short: the persons who started this campaign are pure fascists (in the Mussolini's sense of this word) who admire Stalin because he cleaned Russia of revolutionaries of any sorts, and imposed a rule of iron hand. One of their leaders openly admits that his political views are close to Italian fascism and Spanish falangism, and the content of his blog confirms it. Don't let their use of communist symbols fool you.The efforts of the right to co-opt Stalin has its origins in the "red-brown alliances" formed after the breakup of the USSR against neo-liberalism. Communist movements in the former USSR obviously weren't in very good shape, and the actual inhabitants of the former USSR knew very little about communism anyway. The "brown" part of said alliances quickly began to dominate.

I don't see how one could praise both Stalin and Spanish Falangism though. Historical ignorance can get one to praise both Stalin and Fascism at the same time, but Stalin sent arms and men to fight fascism in Spain and to defend the Republic, which was denounced by the Falangists as a creation of "Judeo-Masonic" and "Judeo-Bolshevik" forces.

As for Stalin in WWII, Ian Grey in his biography of Stalin entitled Stalin: Man of History and the book Stalin's Wars by Geoffrey Roberts are good reads. Stalin intervened a lot in military matters. One of the main reasons Stalin isn't seen as so much of a communist by Russians is partly due to the fact that after the 1960's Stalin was pretty much only praised in a military role. The Soviet line basically went "Stalin somehow got in the party and screwed up the brilliant Leninist norms established by the glorious Party and made a hundred thousand million aberrations everywhere. On the upside he did good in WWII."* Russians saw Stalin as the guy who defended Russia and who kept it independent, rather than defended the USSR from the scourge of Fascism, the enemy of Communism.

* This is to be contrasted with the line adopted under Khrushchev, which went along the lines of "Stalin was a despotic tyrant who crushed everyone and who, although a Communist, was also an idiot who literally planned military operations on a globe."

[Omsk]

The above point by Ismail is true,the party and the Russian people after 1960 viewed Stalin as a 'figure responsible for the defeat of Nazism and the victory in the war' which is basically right,and accusations against him that are regarding his role in ww2 should be double checked.
On a side note,most of the Russians fought for survival in ww2,not just for communism,or Stalin,because the fascist would have slaughtered them like cattle if they won.
But of course,communism,and Stalin also served as motivational images.

[Smyg]

The Soviet people defeated the nazis, not Stalin.

[pranabjyoti]

The Soviet people defeated the nazis, not Stalin.
They have also gave Stalin the power to take decisions on their behalf. WHAT AN IRONY!:crying::confused:

[Per Levy]

They have also gave Stalin the power to take decisions on their behalf. WHAT AN IRONY!:crying::confused:

um no, the cadres gave stalin the power, the people of the SU wernt allowed to vote pro or contra stalin. and could they even elect the cadres? i doubt that highly.

[Ismail]

What does "cadre" mean in this case?

In any case "the Soviet people defeated Nazism, not Stalin" was the Soviet line after 1956 and was only partially corrected in the 1970's. This line was meant to diminish the contribution Stalin played to the war effort. Obviously Stalin didn't single-handedly defeat Nazism with his bare fists and his reservoir of Lenin quotes, but it's rather obvious that if, say, Stalin died halfway through the war, the Soviet people would have been significantly demoralized.

As Trotsky once said of Lenin, "Had I not been present in 1917 in St. Petersburg, the October Revolution would still have taken place—on the condition that Lenin was present and in command. If neither Lenin nor I had been present in Petersburg, there would have been no October Revolution: the leadership of the Bolshevik Party would have prevented it from occurring—of this I have not the slightest doubt." (Trotsky's Diary in Exile, 1935, p. 46.)

As Stalin once said (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1931/dec/13.htm):

Ludwig: Marxism denies that the individual plays an outstanding role in history. Do you not see a contradiction between the materialist conception of history and the fact that, after all, you admit the outstanding role played by historical personages?

Stalin: No, there is no contradiction here. Marxism does not at all deny the role played by outstanding individuals or that history is made by people. In Marx's The Poverty of Philosophy and in other works of his you will find it stated that it is people who make history. But, of course, people do not make history according to the promptings of their imagination or as some fancy strikes them. Every new generation encounters definite conditions already existing, ready-made when that generation was born. And great people are worth anything at all only to the extent that they are able correctly to understand these conditions, to understand how to change them. If they fail to understand these conditions and want to alter them according to the promptings of their imagination, they will land themselves in the situation of Don Quixote. Thus it is precisely Marx's view that people must not be counterposed to conditions. It is people who make history, but they do so only to the extent that they correctly understand the conditions that they have found ready-made, and only to the extent that they understand how to change those conditions. That, at least, is how we Russian Bolsheviks understand Marx. And we have been studying Marx for a good many years.

Ludwig: Some thirty years ago, when I was at the university, many German professors who considered themselves adherents of the materialist conception of history taught us that Marxism denies the role of heroes, the role of heroic personalities in history.

Stalin: They were vulgarizers of Marxism. Marxism has never denied the role of heroes. On the contrary, it admits that they play a considerable role, but with the reservations I have just made.

[pranabjyoti]

Comrade Ismail, IMO, arguing with anti-Stalin arrogants, who even put Stalin against the general people of USSR. Once I have asked them if they were really "oppressed" by the Stalin regime, then why they fought so viciously against Nazi Germany? To them, by common sense, it's the matter of choosing an a**hole and a MF.
In comparison, would the general people of the colonies of the part of the allies like UK would fought against Nazi Germany with such ferocity as the people of USSR? CERTAINLY NOT. I know that during the WWII, the news of bombing of London by Luftwaffe brought enormous joy to the many Indians. Some even began to see Germany and Japan as saviors of the colonies.
BUT I AM SURE THAT I AM BEATING DRUMS TO DEAF EARS.

[Omsk]

I will not go into discussion over this again,it has been proven that Stalin was a capable commander both in the Civil War (although the western propaganda and good old Trotsky say otherwise) and in WW2. (although in the later case,he did make a number of mistakes,which were however,overweighted by his acomplishments)

Read this:


STALIN WAS A VERY GOOD MILITARY LEADER

Not a little of Stalin’s strategic strength on the southern front lay in the fact that, consciously or unconsciously, he concentrated the troops he had and sent them in this or the other direction. What he did was essentially to restrict the bluffing character of the operations in the south and to lead the attack in an entirely realistic fashion. This was bound to give him superiority over the enemy’s thinned-out front.
History shows over and over again how on the battlefield a clear-sighted amateur who possessed, as did Stalin, strategic ability and a certain courage facing the facts, was able to beat the professional strategists, who were handicapped by their traditional training.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 81

His success justified his ambition. Tsaritsyn was a success, the Urals were another, and Petrograd and the southern front were yet greater successes.
In Petrograd he had made his first attempt to be his own general as well.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 86

Taking advantage of the preoccupation of the main Red Army with the pursuit and annihilation of Admiral Kolchak, his ally in the South, Gen. Denikin had commenced a rapid advance in the direction of Moscow. The Soviet armies on this front were under the sole direction of Stalin and his immediate subordinates, Voroshilov and Minin. The campaign against Denikin therefore, serves as a practical illustration of Stalin's capacities in the military as well as the purely political sphere. We have already seen indications of his inspiring leadership in the heroic defense of Tsaritsyn in face of overwhelming odds; now he was to deal with a problem involving the fate, not only of one city, but of the whole of Soviet Russia.
Reinforced by sections of the victorious Siberian armies, Stalin and Voroshilov brought the advance of the Whites to a sudden halt and, as new divisions continued to arrive, the invader was slowly pushed back towards his base lines around Kiev.
As if to deny Stalin the victory he had so carefully planned, a new enemy appeared in the north. Having recruited a powerful army of White Russians, French, and Poles, Gen. Yudenich crossed the Estonian border into Russia and finding no serious opposition, commenced an advance on Petrograd.
This presented Stalin with a cruel choice at which a lesser man would certainly have balked; should he weaken his own forces by sending them against Yudenich or should he maintain his successful drive against Denikin? Lenin, tremendously impressed by his lieutenant's military successes, seriously advised the abandonment of Petrograd until such time as Stalin had liquidated Denikin, proposing to eject Yudenich at a later date.
This provoked the one recorded instance were Stalin opposed a decision of Lenin; he demanded that Petrograd be defended to the last as Tsaritsyn had been defended a few months before. To assist in the defense of the city he undertook to detach half the effective strength of his own forces, leaving the remainder to resist Denikin's counter-offensive as best they might. He found an unexpected ally in this debate in Trotsky who, for once, made no secret of his admiration for what he termed "Stalin's Revolutionary zeal."
In face of this unusual combination, and impressed by Stalin's disinterested loyalty in placing the saving of Petrograd before his own military requirements, Lenin yielded, even going so far as to defend Stalin's views at the meeting of the Soviet Commissar's which discussed the problem.
Cole, David M. Josef Stalin; Man of Steel. London, New York: Rich & Cowan, 1942, p. 47

Eleven days later Stalin entered Baku as a deliverer, while Denikin was hurriedly evacuating his broken armies at the Black Sea port of Novorosisk. Having seen his grandiose schemes smashed by the genius of a man who had never received a single day's orthodox military training, Gen. Denikin gave up his command and fled to Constantinople, leaving his troops to try and reach the White army of Gen. Wrangel in the Crimea as best they could.
On this note of personal triumph for Stalin, the liquidation of the Czarist forces from Russia was completed. The Bolshevik Central Committee was loud in its praise of Stalin's remarkable achievement, he was twice decorated with the coveted Order of the Red Flag and was unanimously elected to the Supreme Revolutionary War Council. Among the many tributes paid him was one from his old opponent, Karl Radek, who admitted in an article in Pravda of February 23, 1935: "Stalin was the leader of the proletarian army and the military genius of the civil war."
...it is certainly possible that the abilities of Wrangel might have brought success to Czarism even at this 11th hour, had he not been opposed by a man of the caliber of Stalin.
...with Stalin's entry into Sebastopol on November 15, 1920, the last vestige of Czarism disappeared forever.
Cole, David M. Josef Stalin; Man of Steel. London, New York: Rich & Cowan, 1942, p. 50

It seems that Stalin also contributed to the decisions on the third and fourth fronts in 1919. On the northern front he, in command of the army, hindered the union of Kolchak's troops with the Czechs. When General Yudenich, with Finnish and British troops and ships, went against St. Petersburg, Stalin forced him to retreat.
But during those days of the Civil War, Stalin never had the power which the Central Committee entrusted to Trotsky. Lenin's confidence in a dozen instances gave Trotsky carte blanche by a general approval of all orders issued by Trotsky for a given date. Stalin, on the other hand, was always restricted to specific tasks.
Ludwig, Emil, Stalin. New York, New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1942, p. 66

Voroshilov states, "As he became closer and closer in touch with the military apparatus, Comrade Stalin became convinced of its absolute helplessness, and in certain sections of its direct unwillingness to organize resistance to the ever more insolent counter-revolution.
Life of Stalin, A Symposium. New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1930, p. 52

Voroshilov states, "These were days of great trial. You should have seen Comrade Stalin at that time. Calm as usual, deep in thought, he literally had no sleep for days on end, distributing his intensive work between the fighting positions and the Army Headquarters.
Life of Stalin, A Symposium. New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1930, p. 59

Voroshilov states, "And one more characteristic was shown absolutely clearly on the Southern front--Stalin's way of working with 'shock troops,' his way of choosing the main direction for the army to take, concentrating the best sections of the army, and crushing the enemy. In this respect, and also in the selection of the direction for the army to take, Stalin achieved great skill.
Life of Stalin, A Symposium. New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1930, p. 76

Voroshilov states, "What is most apparent is Comrade Stalin's capacity of quickly to grasping the concrete circumstances and acting in accordance with them. The most relentless enemy of mental slovenliness, indiscipline, and individualism in warfare, Comrade Stalin, where the interests of the revolution so demanded, never hesitated to take upon himself the responsibility for exceptional measures, for radical changes; where the revolutionary situation so demanded, Comrade Stalin was ready to go against any regulations, any principal of subordination.
Comrade Stalin was always an advocate of the most strict military discipline and centralization in conditions,...
Life of Stalin, A Symposium. New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1930, p. 79

Voroshilov states, "Comrade Stalin always insisted on personal responsibility for work undertaken, and was physically incapable of tolerating 'departmental red tape.'
Comrade Stalin paid great attention to the organization of supplies to the troops. He knew and understood the meaning of good food and warm clothes for the soldiers. At Tsaritsyn and Perm, and on the Southern front, he left no stone unturned to guarantee supplies to the troops and thus make them stronger and steadier.
Life of Stalin, A Symposium. New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1930, p. 80

He knew the ways of winning men. He has always been a good mixer, with personal qualities that make very few enemies and many loyal friends. During the civil war, on the front near Petrograd, Stalin noticed that one of the soldiers did not cheer him as a commander, which is Red Army custom. He halted and asked why. The soldier said nothing but pointed to his feet. It was December and he was wearing straw sandals. Stalin took off his boots and gave them to the soldier, putting the sandals on his own feet. He wore them for many days.
Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 49

Stalin was not a military man. Nevertheless he coped ably with the leadership of the armed forces. Ably. There was no people's commissar heading the air force but Stalin. The Navy, led by Stalin, and the artillery, led by Stalin.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 202

CHUEV: Golovanov, in his memoirs, writes that Stalin, and not the marshal of artillery Voronov, determined the main thrust of artillery at Stalingrad.
MOLOTOV: That's right.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 202

He (Stalin) made numerous visits to all the fronts at the request of the Central Committee, and his reports back to them and to Lenin and others show that the same organizational talents demonstrated in the pre-revolutionary period and in the revolution were applied to the war situation. Everywhere he showed his characteristic common-sense realism, unerringly pointing to key weaknesses and proposing practical solutions. He shuttled between the eastern front, against Kolchak, the southern front, against Denikin, and the Petrograd front, against Yudenich. Nor was his role confined to that of organizational specialist. It was his plan for the attack on Denikin--approved by the Central Committee--that resulted in the final defeat of his armies in the freeing of Kiev and Kharkov.
Cameron, Kenneth Neill. Stalin, Man of Contradiction. Toronto: NC Press, c1987, p. 35

Is it true that Stalin really was an outstanding military thinker, a major contributor to the development of the Armed Forces and an expert in tactical and strategic principles?
From the military standpoint I have studied Stalin most thoroughly, for I entered the war together with him and together with him I ended it.
Stalin mastered the technique of the organization of front operations and operations by groups of fronts and guided them with skill, thoroughly understanding complicated strategic questions. He displayed his ability as Commander-in-Chief beginning with Stalingrad.
In guiding the armed struggle as a whole, Stalin was assisted by his natural intelligence and profound intuition. He had a knack of grasping the main link in the strategic situation so as to organize opposition to the enemy and conduct a major offensive operation. He was certainly a worthy Supreme Commander.
Here Stalin's merit lies in the fact that he correctly appraised the advice offered by the military experts and then in summarized form--in instructions, directives, and regulations--immediately circulated them among the troops for practical guidance.
As regards the material and technical organization of operations, the buildup of strategic reserves, of the organization of production of materiel. and troop supplies, Stalin did prove himself to be an outstanding organizer. And it would be unfair if we, the Soviet people, failed to pay tribute to him for it.
Cameron, Kenneth Neill. Stalin, Man of Contradiction. Toronto: NC Press, c1987, APPENDIX 1
Portrait of Stalin by Zhukov, p. 143

"There were times, especially in October, 1919, at which the new Republic seemed to be on the point of succumbing. But neither the White Armies, nor Poland's entry into the war, nor the peasant risings, nor famine could overcome its indomitable will-power, and, galvanized by Lenin, it's ragged battalions triumphed over fourteen nations." These words appeared in a report by Monsieur Mallet, a reactionary journalist who had the capitalist cause at heart and was, in every respect, very much biased.
At this point I want to reveal the personal part played by Stalin during this period.
Wherever on the Civil War front the danger was greatest, there Stalin was sent.
"Between 1918 and 1920, Stalin was the only man whom the Central Committee kept sending from one front to another, to the point at which the Revolution was in the gravest peril." ( Kalinin.)
"Wherever the Red Army faltered, whenever the counter-revolutionary forces were piling success on success, when at any moment the excitement and confusion and discouragement might turn into panic, at that point Stalin would arrive. He would not sleep a wink, but would take complete charge and would organize, smash, and drive until the turning point was reached and the situation was in hand." (Kaganovich)
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York: The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 61

So that, in his own words: "I was turned into a specialist for cleaning out the Augean stables of the War Department."
This is one of the most astonishing periods of Stalin's career, and one of which the least is known. The way in which he behaved, and the success which he obtained on the battle fronts during two years, would have been sufficient to make a professional soldier famous and a popular hero.
Here are a few glimpses which Voroshilov and Kaganovich give us into the "military work" during this turbulent time of the man whom Kaganovich calls: "One of the most famous organizers of the victories of the Civil War."
In the course of two years, Stalin found himself on the Tsaritsyn front with Voroshilov & Minim, on the Third Corps front at Perm with Dzerzhinsky, on the Petrograd front (against Yudenich's first advance), on the western front at Smolensk (the Polish counter-offensive), on the southern front (against Denikin), again on the Polish front in the west, in the region of Jitomir, and again on the southern front (against Wrangel).
Barbusse, Henri. Stalin. New York: The Macmillan company, 1935, p. 62

Increasingly Lenin had come to rely on Stalin, who was in most things the antithesis of Trotsky. He rarely addressed the troops or meetings of any kind, but when he did he spoke in simple terms. He was the realist, who coldly assessed men and situations, and was usually sound in his conclusions. He remained calm and self-possessed. He was difficult only in his antagonisms towards certain people and when his advice was rejected.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 140

His [Zhukov] relations with Stalin were on occasions stormy, but they were based on mutual respect. From many incidents related by Zhukov in his memoirs, written after Stalin's death, it is clear that he never questioned Stalin's authority and that he regarded him as a leader of profound wisdom and mastery of affairs, even in the military field.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 315

Stalin dominated the [ Tehran] conference. He was brief and incisive in his comments, clear about his objectives, patient and inexorable in pursuing them. Brooke considered that he had an outstanding military brain, and observed that in all his statements he never once failed to appreciate all the implications of a situation with quick, unerring eye, and "in this respect he stood out compared with Roosevelt and Churchill." The head of the U.S. military mission in Moscow had noted that no one could fail to recognize "the qualities of greatness in the man." Combined with this essential greatness, there was a charm and at times a human warmth....
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 388

Taking care not to show surprise at the question, Konev replied after a little thought, "Stalin is universally gifted. He is brilliantly able to see the war as a whole and this makes it possible for him to direct it so successfully."
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 395

It was his victory, too, because he had directed and controlled every branch of Russian operations throughout the war. The range and burden of his responsibilities were extraordinary, but day by day without a break for the four years of the war he exercised direct command of the Russian forces and control over supplies, war industries, and government policy, including foreign policy.
As he himself acknowledged, he had made mistakes and miscalculations, some with tragic consequences and heavy casualties. The first and perhaps the greatest of his mistakes was his political misjudgment of German plans to invade Russia. He had obdurately refused to believe that Hitler would launch his invasion in June 1941, and, seeking to buy time by placating him, he had taken none of the obvious defense measures.
Again he had been held solely responsible for the terrible Russian losses of 1941 and 1942, and criticized for not following the traditional Russian strategy of retreating into the vastness of the Russian plain....
Defenses organized in depth, however, would hardly have halted the surge of the highly mechanized Wehrmacht in 1941. It had effortlessly crushed the Polish Army, which some British military experts in 1939 had rated above the Red Army in efficiency and morale. It had conquered France and expelled the British from the continent. Acutely aware of the inadequacies of the Russian defenses and the weakness of the Red Army in 1941, Stalin knew that they could not withstand a German attack. He gambled for time so that his urgent mechanization and training programs could build up the Red Army's strength. He lost the gamble.
Stalin knew the military history of his country and well understood the strategy of falling back and using its great spaces. By temperament, however, he was positive and aggressive, eager to attack rather than defend, and this was characteristic of his conduct of Russian strategy throughout the war. He was at the same time capable of tremendous self-control, as he demonstrated in waiting for the Germans to attack in the battle of Kursk, and in general during 1943-45 he was constantly on guard against premature and ill-prepared offensives.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 420

From the first months of the war Stalin gathered around him able senior officers, rejuvenating the High Command. He chose them on merit, and, an astute judge of men, he was constantly raising fairly junior officers to high rank. By the time of the battle of Moscow, he had selected his key commanders in Zhukov, Vasilevsky, Rokossovsky, Konev, and Voronov. To them were added by the time of the battle of Stalingrad Vatutin, Eremenko, Malinovsky, Meretskov, Cherniakhovsky, and others.
Stalin was unchallenged as supreme commander. His most able generals, like Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Konev, and others, who were outstanding among the generals of all countries involved in the war, accepted his authority unquestioningly. In fact, he dominated them not by virtue of office but by force of character and intellect. He inspired deepest respect and also affection. At times he exploded in anger, demanding immediate action; at other times he spoke gently, encouraging and inspiring confidence.
With his disciplined mind and tenacious memory he developed considerable military expertise and technical knowledge. Western officers and engineers present at discussions with him were impressed by his quick and accurate understanding. Alan Brooke, chief of the British general staff, remarked on several occasions on his mastery of military matters. His own commanders considered their reports carefully before submitting them, for he would unfailing way put his finger on any weakness or loose thinking in their presentation.... Moreover, as Zhukov stated, he was always prepared to reverse his own opinions when presented with sound reasons. But he made the final decisions.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 422

It was his victory, above all, because it had been won by his genius and labors, heroic in scale. The Russian people had looked to him for leadership, and he had not failed them. His speeches of July 3 and November 6, 1941, which had steeled them for the trials of war, and his presence in Moscow during the great battle for the city, had demonstrated his will to victory. He was for them a semi-mystical figure, enthroned in the Kremlin, who inspired them and gave them positive direction. He had the capacity of attending to detail and keeping in mind the broad picture, and, while remembering the past and immersed in the present, he was constantly looking ahead to the future.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 424

In examining Stalin's strategic thinking, I have to say right away that he was superior to many of his advisers in a number fields,.... As Supreme Commander-in-chief his strength lay in his absolute power. But it was not this alone that raised him above the other military leaders. Unlike them, he could see the profound dependence of the armed struggle on an entire spectrum of other, non-military factors: economic, social, technical, political, diplomatic, ideological and national. Better than the other members of the Headquarters Staff, he knew the country's real possibilities in terms of its agriculture and industry. His thinking was more global, and it was this that placed him above the others in the military leadership. The military facet was only one of many.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 474

It was while the military strength of the Soviets was at its nadir that the revolts of the Social Revolutionaries and the attempt on Lenin's life took place.
At that moment of supreme danger, nearly all members of the government left Moscow and hurried to the most vital sectors of the front. At the Kremlin Lenin with the few technical assistants directed the entire struggle, keeping in constant touch with the men on the spot. Two men were sent to retrieve the position where it looked most menacing. To try to save the capital from the military threat the Commissar of War, Trotsky, set out in his armored train, which was to become legendary in the civil war, to Svyazhsk, near Kazan. Stalin, accompanied by an armed guard of nearly battalion strength, went to Tsaritsyn on the Volga to try to save the capital from the starvation that threatened it. He was to arrange the transport of grain from the northern Caucasus to Moscow. His assignment, which was essentially civilian, was expected to last a short time, after which he was to proceed further south to Baku. But his stay at Tsaritsyn was prolonged by unforeseen circumstances; and the longer it lasted the deeper did it involve himself in the conduct of the civil war in the south and in a controversy with Trotsky, until in the end his trip to the Volga town became a landmark in his career.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 195

The day after his arrival on June 7, 1918, he reported to Lenin on his first moves. He found a 'bacchanalia of profiteering' in the Volga area and his first step was to decree the rationing of food and control of prices at Tsaritsyn. The Soviet official in charge of trade would be arrested. 'Tell Schmidt [The Commissar of Labor] not to send such rascals any more.' This was the language of the energetic administrator with a penchant for control and repression--both, given all the circumstances, probably justified. He had no liking for the ultra-democratic chaos that was left over from the Revolution. 'Railway transport has been completely disorganized by the joint efforts of a multitude of Collegium's and revolutionary Committees.' After they had deposed the old managements in industry and administration, the Bolsheviks first tried control by committee. They were now engaged in scrapping that ultra-democratic but unworkable system and re-establishing individual management and individual responsibility. The left Communists passionately objected to the change. Stalin left no doubt where he stood. He appointed commissars to overcome the chaos in transport.
After a month at Tsaritsyn he asked for special military powers on the southern front. In view of the operations of Krasnov's Cossacks, the provisioning of Moscow had become primarily a military matter. In reply to a communication from Lenin on the outbreak of the Social Revolutionary mutinies, he assured Moscow that 'everything will be done to prevent possible surprises here. Rest assured that our hand will not tremble.' The rail connection between Tsaritsyn and the farming land of the northern Caucasus 'has not yet been restored. I am driving and scolding everybody who needs it. Rest assured that we shall spare nobody, neither ourselves nor others, and that we shall deliver the bread....' In his messages practical soberness mixed with a queer relish for expressions of ruthless determination.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 196

The regeneration of the army, of its morale, and of its commanding staff was one of Russia's most remarkable achievements, for which credit was due to Stalin.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 497

It must be admitted that Koba is a first-rate tactician....
Litvinov, Maksim Maksimovich. Notes for a Journal. New York: Morrow, 1955, p. 111

At that time Lenin was continually receiving official military reports from both Trotsky and Stalin simultaneously. Trotsky's reports are known to us from his published memoirs; but up to the present only a few of Stalin's reports have been seen in print. One of these, which was sent in the autumn of 1919 and makes only 70 lines on the printed page, threw over the whole official strategic plan and introduced another. This was accepted by the Government in Moscow. The result of Stalin's 70 lines of print was to change the whole situation in Russia's favor. Denikin was driven into the Black Sea and the Ukraine was liberated. Here was another proof that successful strategy in war does not come from the plans thought out by the professors in military academies but rather from the practical man-on-the-spot who understands all the immediate circumstances and has the character and insight to seize the decisive moment.
Ludwig, Emil. Leaders of Europe. London: I. Nicholson and Watson Ltd., 1934, p. 362

In the message to Lenin of July 7 already quoted, Stalin had pressed to be given military as well as civilian authority. Three days later, Stalin sent a further message:
"For the good of the cause I must have military powers... but I have received no reply. Very well. In that event I myself, without formalities, will remove the army commanders and commissars who are ruining things. That's what the interest of the cause bids me do, and naturally the absence of a piece of paper from Trotsky won't stop me."
Bullock, Alan. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. New York: Knopf, 1992, p. 99

Charged with restoring the passage of grain from this turbulent region, Stalin shouldered a weighty burden. But he never flinched; he carried his responsibilities with pride and imparted his determination to his fellow travelers.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 165

he [Stalin] spent the Civil War mainly on or near the fighting fronts. Recalled to Moscow in October 1918, he resumed his work in the Party Central Committee and Sovnarkom. But by December he was off again. The White Army of Admiral Kolchak had swept into the Urals city of Perm and destroyed the Red Army units there. Stalin and Dzerzhinsky were sent to conduct an inquiry into the reasons for the military disaster. They returned and made their report at the end of January 1919. Stalin stayed in Moscow again until being dispatched in May to Petrograd and the Western Front against the invasion by General Yudenich from Estonia. In July he moved on to a different sector of the same front at Smolensk. In September he was transferred to the Southern Front, where he stayed into 1920.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 172

The Central Committee recognized his worth by its successive use of him on the Southern Front, the Western Front, again the Southern Front, the South-Western Front and the Caucasian Front. Qualities which earned him praise were his decisiveness, determination, energy, and willingness to take responsibility for critical and unpredictable situations.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 173

Avoidance of unnecessary risk was one thing, and Stalin took this to an extreme. But it is scarcely fair on Stalin to claim that he was a coward. Probably his behavior stemmed rather from an excessive estimate of his own indispensablility to the war effort. He looked on his military and political subordinates and thought they could not cope without him. Nor was he afraid of personal responsibility once he had got over the shock of 22 June 1941. He lived or died by his success in leading army and government. He exhausted every bone in his body for that purpose. And Zhukov credited Stalin with making up for his original military ignorance and inexperience. He went on studying during the fighting, and with his exceptional capacity for hard work he was able to raise himself to the level where he could understand most of the military complexities in Stavka [the Supreme military command]. Khrushchev later caricatured Stalin as having tried to follow the campaigns on a small globe he kept in his office, and this image has been reproduced in many subsequent accounts. In fact Stalin, while scaring his commanders and often making wholly unrealistic demands upon them, earned their professional admiration.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 457

I would only add that Stalin was just as categorical with other people. He required similar discipline from every representative of the GHQ. We were permitted to move as we thought fit only within the boundaries of the fronts whose actions we were to coordinate. If we wished to move to other fronts we had to obtain special permission from Stalin. My feeling is that the lack of any indulgence to a GHQ representative was justified in the interests of efficient control of hostilities. Stalin very attentively followed the course of events at the front, quickly reacted to all changes in them and firmly held troop control in his own hands.
Vasilevskii, Aleksandr M. A Lifelong Cause. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981, p. 285

Pestkovsky writes that Stalin became "Lenin's deputy in the leadership of fighting revolutionary actions. He was in charge of watching after military operations on the Don, the Ukraine, and in other parts of Russia.
Trotsky, Leon, Stalin. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1941, p. 246

*Regarding the Civil War period.

And this:


STALIN SAW WORLD WAR II NAZI ATTACK COMING

Stalin was convinced that it was just a matter of time until the Soviet Union would again be invaded by hostile capitalist powers seeking to dismember and destroy the first Socialist State. Stalin considered it his sacred obligation to see to it that when the time came the attackers would not be able to accomplish this. The fulfillment of this task justified all means.
Scott, John. Behind the Urals, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1942, p. 64

From Molotov's answers to Stalin's questions I concluded that his trip [to Germany in November 1940] had strengthened our general conviction that war was inevitable and probably imminent.
Talbott, Strobe, Trans. and Ed. Khrushchev Remembers. Boston: Little Brown, c1970, p. 132

Hitler's film [a cinematic spectacular to frighten adversaries by showing the German capture of Danzig] was sent to us anyway, and we watched it in the Kremlin with Stalin. It was very depressing. We knew very well that we were the next country Hitler planned to turn his army against.
Talbott, Strobe, Trans. and Ed. Khrushchev Remembers. Boston: Little Brown, c1970, p. 135

We had dinner. Stalin was in high spirits. He was glad that the Treaty had been signed. He said, "Well, we deceived Hitler for the time being," or something like that, showing he understood the inevitability of war and that while the Treaty postponed the war, it only gave us some time.
Schecter, Jerrold. Trans & Ed. Khrushchev Remembers: the Glasnost Tapes. Boston: Little, Brown, c1990, p. 53

With Poland, France, Denmark, Holland, Norway, Luxembourg, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Romania all occupied, now it was the USSR's turn. Stalin understood that war was inevitable.
Schecter, Jerrold. Trans & Ed. Khrushchev Remembers: the Glasnost Tapes. Boston: Little, Brown, c1990, p. 54

I left on Friday, and on Saturday [June 21st] I was in Kiev. By then Stalin himself understood that the war was about to begin. So how can anyone still say it was a surprise attack?
Schecter, Jerrold. Trans & Ed. Khrushchev Remembers: the Glasnost Tapes. Boston: Little, Brown, c1990, p. 56

CHUEV: All the history books say that Stalin miscalculated the beginning of the war.
MOLOTOV: To some extent, but it was impossible not to miscalculate. How could you know when the enemy would attack? We knew we would have to deal with him, but on what day or even what month....
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 21

CHUEV: It is known there were 14 dates?
MOLOTOV: We are blamed because we ignored our intelligence. Yes, they warned us. But if we had heeded them, had given Hitler the slightest excuse, he would've attacked us earlier.
We knew the war was coming soon, that we were weaker than Germany, that we would have to retreat. The question was, retreat to where--to Smolensk or to Moscow, that's what we discussed before the war.
We knew we would have to retreat, and we needed as much territory as possible. We did everything to postpone the war. And we succeeded-- for a year and ten months. We wished it could have been longer, of course. Stalin reckoned before the war that only in 1943 would we be able to meet the Germans as equals.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 22

CHUEV: But there were intelligence reports...
MOLOTOV: What is written about this is contradictory. From my point of view, there couldn't have been another beginning for that war. We delayed it and, in the end, we were caught asleep; it turned out to be unexpected. I think we could not have relied on our intelligence. You have to listen to them, but you also have to verify their information. Intelligence agents could push you into such a dangerous position that you would never get out of it. Provocateurs everywhere are innumerable. That's why you can't trust intelligence without constant and scrupulous checking and re-checking.
Some naive people, philistines, have written in their reminiscences: the intelligence agents spoke out, deserters from the enemy crossed the border...
You couldn't trust such reports. But if you were too distrustful you could easily go to the other extreme.
When I was the Predsovnarkom I spent half a day reading intelligence reports. The only thing missing was the date of the invasion! And if we had trusted these reports [and gone on a war footing] the war could have started much earlier....
On the whole, everyone expected the war would come and it would be difficult, impossible for us to avoid. We delayed it for a year, for a year and a half.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 22

CHUEV: Khrushchev used Churchill's words saying that he had warned Stalin. Stalin said later, "I didn't need any warnings at the time. I knew the war was coming, but I thought I could gain another half a year." That is why Stalin is blamed. He relied upon himself and thought he could delay the war.
MOLOTOV: That's stupid. Stalin couldn't rely upon himself; in this case he had to rely upon the whole country.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 28

CHUEV: Churchill's memoirs. He excoriates you, alleging that you helped Hitler in 1940 during the battle for France.... Also, Stalin and Molotov should have known that in one year they would have to fight Hitler!
MOLOTOV: We knew, we knew it very well.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 414

At the same time, Stalin and Molotov transferred substantial numbers of army units from Siberia in April, May, and early June 1941 to protect our Western borders.
Sudoplatov, Pavel. Special Tasks. Boston: Little, Brown, c1993, p. 120

If one excepts the thesis that Stalin had long ago decided that Nazi Germany was his enemy, that he was willing to except all manner of disrepute to maintain peace with Germany while he built up his strength, that in the autumn of 1940 he perceived that Germany could no longer win a quick and easy war in the West and must therefore turn against Russia--a turn which he could no longer avert--his policy in 1941 can be understood without difficulty. He saw that he was the next object of German attack, and from that it followed logically that Britain, and behind Britain America, were henceforth his potential allies, no matter what might have happened before in the days of Munich and Chamberlain. Clear-sighted as he was, Stalin knew that Yugoslavia and Greece could offer small resistance to the Germans; yet nevertheless he ventured to offer Germany virtual defiance in Yugoslavia's behalf, and almost simultaneously began moving Soviet troops westward from Siberia.
Duranty, Walter. Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 260

Stalin's prewar speeches show that he was under no delusions about Nazi intentions. He knew the attack would come sooner or later and that he was simply buying time in signing the nonaggression treaty.
Cameron, Kenneth Neill. Stalin, Man of Contradiction. Toronto: NC Press, c1987, p. 126

Malenkov had a file containing a draft decree from the chief administration of political propaganda in the Red Army, which Zaporozhets had given to him in the middle of June. Malenkov had given the draft to Stalin on June 20. It had been in preparation since Stalin's speech to the military graduates on May 5, 1941, when he [Stalin] said that war was inevitable and that we must prepare unconditionally to destroy Fascism.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 406

On 5 May 1941 he [Stalin] addressed the ceremony for graduates of military academies in Moscow. His words, unreported in the press at the time, were combative. Instead of the reassuring words he issued to the media about Germany, he declared:
“War with Germany is inevitable. If Comrade Molotov can manage to postpone the war for two or three months through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that will be our good fortune, but you yourselves must go off and take measures to raise the combat readiness of our forces.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 407

I [Budu] realize today that he [Stalin] must have foreseen the war as far back as 1935, for the said to me then, 'I'm sure the Anglo-Saxons are going to have to ask us to help them against Hitler's Germany one of these days. They'll never be able to conquer the Reich without us.'
Svanidze, Budu. My Uncle, Joseph Stalin. New York: Putnam, c1953, p. 210

Stalin knew his business, too, and was not taken in by the ease with which he had got his way. A little later, he was overheard to tell Molotov that by giving him Lithuania with so little argument, Hitler had in effect declared war on the Soviet Union. Stalin understood all too clearly that the only reason Hitler had done so was because he intended to take it back again as soon as the time was right.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher. The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 355

Ribbentrop had no doubt that Hitler was sincere, and that he truly believed the understanding with the Soviet Union was permanent. Stalin, however, was less gullible. Although he admired Hitler's ruthlessness, he had no illusions about his integrity and knew he would turn on the Soviet Union as soon as it suited him.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher. The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 359

Zhukov immediately set about speeding up the improvements in the military system which they had already begun, cutting bureaucracy, weeding out incompetent commanders, and generally gearing up for the fight which was so obviously looming on the horizon.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher. The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 553

There can be few better examples of Stalin's twin aims of placating Hitler and preparing his own people than the events surrounding the speech he made at a grand banquet in the Kremlin on May 5, 1941, for several 100 graduates of 16 military academies and nine university military faculties....
...the Pravda report could also refer to the possibility of new concessions and some sort of new deal. But was that what Stalin had really said? Later, during the war, Hilger [a high ranking Nazi] talked to many captured [Russian] officers who had been at the banquet. Their version of what Stalin had said was quite different from that which had been so carefully fed to the Germans through the DNB [German news agency] man. When a high-ranking general had proposed a toast to the peace policy of the Soviet Union, Stalin had replied, "The slogan 'long live the peace policy of the Soviet Union' is now outdated. It's about time to end this old nonsense." And when someone else toasted the friendship with Germany, Stalin was said to have replied that the Soviet people should stop praising the German army to the skies.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher. The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 574

Other sources give Stalin's speech as following this line much more closely than the leaked version. "Our glorious Red Army," he is reported as saying, "must be prepared to fight fascist Germany at any moment." Needless to say, the Soviet government would try "by all means at its disposal to delay a German attack... at least until the autumn." By then it would be too late for that year. Autumn rains and the onset of winter would reduce the mobility of any invading army. If this strategy succeeded, if Germany could be kept at bay for the whole of 1941, then "almost inevitably" there would be a war in 1942. But that war would be fraught in circumstances much more favorable to the USSR. For one thing, the Red Army would be better trained and equipped. It would be in a position to take the initiative. Indeed, to forestall a German attack, the USSR might have to strike first.
From the Soviet domestic point of view, it did not matter what Stalin actually said. The gist of his speech - that the country was in imminent danger from Germany - was all over Moscow within 24 hours, and Muscovites drew their own conclusions. Their worst fears must have seemed confirmed when they read in Pravda on May 6, along with the brief and ambiguous report of his speech, the much more surprising news that he had replaced Molotov as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, the Soviet prime minister, thus becoming head of the government as well as the party....
... It was a signal to the Soviet people that the international situation had grown so dangerous that the USSR could no longer be left in the hands of lesser men: only the great Stalin himself could be trusted to lead the country through the treacherous quicksands that lay ahead.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher. The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 575

While continuing to placate Hitler with every means at his disposal, Stalin was also concerned to go on warning him, as tactfully as possible, that the Soviet Union would defend herself if attacked. Until mid-May, he did not take too much trouble to hide the steadily increasing build-up of his forces in the west, allowing British, German, and other military attaches to travel through the areas where they were concentrating. The attaches reported seeing train after train heading west loaded with troops, tanks, and mechanized equipment. They also noted that 1000 people a day were being called up for military service in Moscow alone, and that in early May the youngest age-group was called up six months early. Kollontai, the Soviet minister in Sweden, was allowed to say that never in history had more powerful Russian forces been massed in the west - the general consensus in the international intelligence community was that well over 60 percent of the Red Army was already massed in the West, and more were arriving all the time. Another secret that was not too well kept was that factories around Moscow were being transferred to the safety of the lands beyond the Urals.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher. The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 581

Whether or not he succeeded in stalling Hitler, Stalin still needed to speed up the preparation of the Soviet people for the coming war. Throughout May, there was a constant series of civil defense exercises throughout the Soviet Union. The leading role in these was taken by and organization called the Osoaviakhim League.... After the summer of 1940 and the fall of France, the League grew in size until it boasted nearly 12 million volunteer members, many of them children. They took part in the numerous black-outs and practice alerts which were held in every large city from Kiev to Alma Ata.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher. The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 582

On May 15 and 16, 1941, a particularly large-scale civil defense exercise was staged at Ramenskoye, a town some 20 kilometers east of Moscow. This involved some 20,000 civilians and was based on a scenario which assumed the worst: four groups of enemy paratroops were said to have been dropped in the area and a number of neighboring villages were supposed to be under artillery bombardment; incendiary bombs were supposed to have been dropped on the surrounding countryside and forest, starting a number of fires; and to cap it all, Ramenskoye itself was assumed to have suffered a gas attack.
Read, Anthony and David Fisher. The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 583

In an address to the new graduates of the Soviet military academies on May 5, 1941, Stalin came closest to recognizing the threat. He stated that a German surprise attack could not be ruled out in the immediate future, but that the government would try by diplomatic means to put it off till autumn, too late in the year for the Germans to attack.
Randall, Francis. Stalin's Russia. New York: Free Press,1965, p. 272

Volodya says, "I think that Stalin had no doubt that Hitler would attack the Soviet Union. Stalin's aim was to win time. He saw it as his task to put off the beginning of the war with the giants of the imperialist world so as to wait until the contradictions between them had been aggravated, and win time in this way. The Stalin played the game of giving Hitler no motive for provocation.
Richardson, Rosamond. Stalin’s Shadow. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994, p. 277

STALIN DIRECTED THE DEFENSE OF MOSCOW IN WWII

Stalin personally directed the defense of Moscow and the operations of the Red Army; he inspired men and commanders, and supervised the building of the defense works at the approaches to the Soviet capital.
Alexandrov, G. F. Joseph Stalin; a Short Biography. Moscow: FLPH, 1947, p. 163

If you seek any more information on his military career,ask away good comrades,i will be here.

[SacRedMan]

and what with the GULAG's then?

[pranabjyoti]

and what with the GULAG's then?
Necessary to control counter-revolution and teach the old bloodsuckers some lessons. THEY ARE A MUST UNTIL AND UNLESS ALL THE REMAINS OF THE PREVIOUS SYSTEM WILL BE DESTROYED.

[Marxach-Léinínach]

and what with the GULAG's then?
Glorified prisons. By the end of Stalin's life a lesser percentage of the Soviet population were in the Gulags than Americans are currently in US prisons

[pranabjyoti]

Glorified prisons. By the end of Stalin's life a lesser percentage of the Soviet population were in the Gulags than Americans are currently in US prisons
Just want to add one point. Without Gulags, there would be Guantanamo and Abu-Ghribe. If I have to choose, I (probably anyone with little common sense) will choose the first than the later.

[Die Rote Fahne]

Stalin's Russia > Tsarist Russia.

Doesn't mean Stalin was the Jesus of Russian socialism. He was a dictator, regardless if he believed in Marxism, his methods were backasswards.

The war probably caused many limitations, but I highly doubt the state would ever moved away from the bureaucratic collectivist nature it had attained if the war never occured. Stalin's nationalism was one of the major issues I have with him. It created divisions internationally, regardless of how it may or may not have strengthened internally. As well, the general paranoia, the purges, the distancing from any sort of democracy, farther than Lenin could of wanted (note the councils and how they lost power, unelected bureaucrats, stricter authority over the nation, etc.), all attributed to the Soviet collapse.

Stalin wasn't a hero. He was a man, who attained power without vote, who held power and never allowed his leadership or role be questioned or put up to a vote.

Totalitarianism is bad in all forms. Whether it's by a fascist or a socialist.

[pranabjyoti]

Totalitarianism is bad in all forms. Whether it's by a fascist or a socialist.
Until classes exist, there should be TOTALITARIANISM, what is our duty is to choose the right class. Petty-bourgeoisie liberals kindly clear Revleft and sell your DEMOCRACY elsewhere.

[Die Rote Fahne]

Until classes exist, there should be TOTALITARIANISM, what is our duty is to choose the right class. Petty-bourgeoisie liberals kindly clear Revleft and sell your DEMOCRACY elsewhere.

Cocaine is a helluva drug.

[KC]

This thread is full of so much trash wow.



and what with the GULAG's then?

If you're interested in learning about the GULag system and how it developed I would highly recommend Oleg Khlevniuk's The History of the Gulag as one of the best, if not the best, works on the subject.

[Per Levy]

Until classes exist, there should be TOTALITARIANISM, what is our duty is to choose the right class. Petty-bourgeoisie liberals kindly clear Revleft and sell your DEMOCRACY elsewhere.

quite honestly fuck you, your totalitarian dictatorship is not what the proletariat of the world is fighting for, nor is it anything that should be desired by anyone who calls themself socialist/communist in any way. sometimes i wonder how many members of revleft would be left here if you and the likes of you would have supreme power here, and how many members would be "purged".

[SacRedMan]

Oleg Khlevniuk's The History of the Gulag

If it isn't revisionist and doesn't puts in some lies and so on, than I will look after it and buy it.

[Rooster]

Until classes exist, there should be TOTALITARIANISM, what is our duty is to choose the right class. Petty-bourgeoisie liberals kindly clear Revleft and sell your DEMOCRACY elsewhere.

Why are you defending totalitarianism? It's a specific thing and it's different from the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. And I also don't think the DotP has to be undemocratic or totalitarian to function as a means of removing capitalism.

[Blackscare]

No he is referring to many viewing him as a man who helped implement Marxist derived socioeconomic policies that helped the people by making the USSR into an economic and cultural power and organising the effort to defeat Nazism that was plaguing the world at the time. :rolleyes:

Hate to burst your bubble but more often than not it seems to just be crude patriotism than any deep adherence to M-L ideology.

[pranabjyoti]

Why are you defending totalitarianism? It's a specific thing and it's different from the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. And I also don't think the DotP has to be undemocratic or totalitarian to function as a means of removing capitalism.
Then, sorry to say, you are just unable to understand the meaning of "class dictatorship". Imperialist scumbugs and petty-bourgeoisie liberal callous intellectuals always refer and will always refer to "dictatorship of proletariat" as TOTALITARIANISM.

[TheVoiceOfTheVoiceless]

No he is referring to many viewing him as a man who helped implement Marxist derived socioeconomic policies that helped the people by making the USSR into an economic and cultural power and organising the effort to defeat Nazism that was plaguing the world at the time. :rolleyes:

Wow, you beat the Nazis. Big whoop. How many were murdered during his reign? How many went hungry due to his policies? What's the difference between him and Hitler to the average worker?

[TheVoiceOfTheVoiceless]

Can't say I am happy to see Uncle Joe's poster there, as I think it spreads the idea that all communists are Stalinists, and that Stalin was the ideal communist.


or A communist, for that matter

[TheVoiceOfTheVoiceless]

Also the "carving up of Europe" was in many cases retaking Soviet land that was taken by Germany in World War One and Poland in the Polish-Soviet War.
Nationalism? What ever happened to the dissolution of the nation-state?

[Rooster]

Then, sorry to say, you are just unable to understand the meaning of "class dictatorship". Imperialist scumbugs and petty-bourgeoisie liberal callous intellectuals always refer and will always refer to "dictatorship of proletariat" as TOTALITARIANISM.

That's a cheek. I think you must be misunderstanding both terms. Or you really do support totalitarianism. Which, I think, goes totally against the whole idea of the DotP. Maybe you could elucidate us with how you can reconcile both these ideas.

[ComradeGrant]

I see a lot of assumptions, trash, baseless arguments, and caps lock in this thread. So Stalin was on some buses, woo hoo. Regardless of his role in history this makes us look dogmatic and cultish. We need to exemplify theory and action, not individuals.

[Philosopher Jay]

Stalin died 57 years ago, coincidentally in the year I was born. The world that Stalin lived in is quite different from the world today. Any discussion of his actions, like discussing the actions of Napoleon or Queen Elizabeth, can only be for Academic purposes.

We should agree that the task at hand is the socialist liberation of the working class.
Fantasizing ourselves as the dictator of the Soviet Union in that time period and pronouncing that we would have done this or that, following his policies or other ones, serves little purpose. These are daydreams that do not serve the tasks at hand for socialist revolutionaries in the year 2011.

[Omsk]

Wow, you beat the Nazis. Big whoop.
Users should be infracted for posts like that.


What's the difference between him and Hitler to the average worker?
Because not all workers are bloody English or Americans,the workers in the SU were slavs,and Hitlers plan for Slavs was their extermination!

[Volcanicity]

Stalin died 57 years ago, coincidentally in the year I was born. The world that Stalin lived in is quite different from the world today. Any discussion of his actions, like discussing the actions of Napoleon or Queen Elizabeth, can only be for Academic purposes.

We should agree that the task at hand is the socialist liberation of the working class.
Fantasizing ourselves as the dictator of the Soviet Union in that time period and pronouncing that we would have done this or that, following his policies or other ones, serves little purpose. These are daydreams that do not serve the tasks at hand for socialist revolutionaries in the year 2011.
Finally a voice of reason.

This constant bickering over dead leaders is counter-productive and does'nt help the left in 2011 at all.

People uneducated about Communism/Socialism constantly seeing these images just associate us with oppression through year's of propaganda from mainstream media.

It really is time to leave the glorification of these figures behind and move on to educate people about the continued relevancy and importance of Communism/Socialism and that it's not at all about GULAG's,starvation and paranoia which is what they have been fed and that these figures images in their minds will always represent.

[Marxach-Léinínach]

Wow, you beat the Nazis. Big whoop...What's the difference between him and Hitler to the average worker?
http://www.antifeministtech.info/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/picarddoublefacepalm.jpg

How many were murdered during his reign?
A fair amount, most of whom deserved it.

How many went hungry due to his policies?
How many would've died during the Nazi invasion if it hadn't been for those policies?

Nationalism? What ever happened to the dissolution of the nation-state?
Oh great, the old "OMG YOU'RE ADDRESSING THE WRONGS OF IMPERIALISM, THAT'S LIKE, NATIONALISM" schtick

[pranabjyoti]

Finally a voice of reason.

This constant bickering over dead leaders is counter-productive and does'nt help the left in 2011 at all.

People uneducated about Communism/Socialism constantly seeing these images just associate us with oppression through year's of propaganda from mainstream media.

It really is time to leave the glorification of these figures behind and move on to educate people about the continued relevancy and importance of Communism/Socialism and that it's not at all about GULAG's,starvation and paranoia which is what they have been fed and that these figures images in their minds will always represent.
THE LEADER WAS DEAD! LONG LIVE THE LEADER (IDEOLOGY)!
Actually, this discussion isn't about just dead leaders, but analysis of the past from class viewpoint. Stalin is actually representative of "dictatorship of proletariat" and what proletariat can achieve. Until and unless, there would be proletariat and the matter of "dictatorship of proletariat", Stalin will remain.

[GallowsBird]

Wow, you beat the Nazis. Big whoop. How many were murdered during his reign? How many went hungry due to his policies? What's the difference between him and Hitler to the average worker?

Maybe bcause Stalin didn't put invade the territories of Slavic nations just so he could massacre them, put them in camps and steal their territories so they can be given to German settlers? Just a guess. :rolleyes:

[Volcanicity]

THE LEADER WAS DEAD! LONG LIVE THE LEADER (IDEOLOGY)!
Actually, this discussion isn't about just dead leaders, but analysis of the past from class viewpoint. Stalin is actually representative of "dictatorship of proletariat" and what proletariat can achieve. Until and unless, there would be proletariat and the matter of "dictatorship of proletariat", Stalin will remain.
This discussion started out about Stalin's image on the side of a bus.

In the eyes of people uneducated about Communism Stalin is representative of oppression and lack of freedom through the brain-washing of mainstream media and nothing else.

The word dictatorship in their minds equals tyranny and the opposite of democracy not in the sense we would use it in the term "dictatorship of the proletariat", which is why I said we should be educating people and not glorifying and putting up portraits of long dead leader's images.

[GallowsBird]

Nationalism? What ever happened to the dissolution of the nation-state?

We are talking about reclaiming socialists lands from a capitalist country that took them while the socialist country was weak. Or are you saying that capitalists should be allowed to conquer parts of socialist countries without the socialist country trying to reclaim them? :confused:

[Rooster]

lol im sorry durdles and Philosopher Jay, but I think some people think otherwise.

[GallowsBird]

Finally a voice of reason.

This constant bickering over dead leaders is counter-productive and does'nt help the left in 2011 at all.

People uneducated about Communism/Socialism constantly seeing these images just associate us with oppression through year's of propaganda from mainstream media.

It really is time to leave the glorification of these figures behind and move on to educate people about the continued relevancy and importance of Communism/Socialism and that it's not at all about GULAG's,starvation and paranoia which is what they have been fed and that these figures images in their minds will always represent.

I do agree with you, but we should actually educate people to why the views of the USSR and especially Marxism-Leninism are wrong rather than avoid anything related to them. And we should also show that we, Marxist-Leninists, do move with the times, contrary to what people think. Marxist-Leninists have always moved with the circumstances of their times, but not (despite what some may claim) be untrue to the central tenants of our Marxist ideology. We are as "modern" and "relevant" as any of course (but now I am veering of topic).

[GallowsBird]

lol im sorry durdles and Philosopher Jay, but I think some people think otherwise.

If that is a reply to me then no, I mostly agree with Durdles (a member I respect) and Philosopher Jay, but I do feel the need to reply to someone mis-characterising my views. :rolleyes:

[Volcanicity]

I do agree with you, but we should actually educate people to why the views of the USSR and especially Marxism-Leninism are wrong rather than avoid anything related to them. And we should also show that we, Marxist-Leninists, do move with the times, contrary to what people think. Marxist-Leninists have always moved with the circumstances of their times, but not (despite what some may claim) be untrue to the central tenants of our Marxist ideology. We are as "modern" and "relevant" as any of course (but now I am veering of topic).
No I agree with you which is why I'm saying the education of people whose only views of Communism/Socialism has come from the media is the most important thing.

The ideology of the left of whatever tendency should be focused on and not this constant putting up and glorification of dead leaders whose image and not their views are more well known. I'm not saying their ideology and view point aren't relevant just the imagery which in the eyes of the unaware means just one thing.

[GallowsBird]

No I agree with you which is why I'm saying the education of people whose only views of Communism/Socialism has come from the media is the most important thing.

The ideology of the left of whatever tendency should be focused on and not this constant putting up and glorification of dead leaders whose image and not their views are more well known. I'm not saying their ideology and view point aren't relevant just the imagery which in the eyes of the unaware means just one thing.

Yes that is a good point. And it is very true. Most people don't know anything about Socialism never mind which ideology is which so you are right, the media is the tool that is used the most for the "education" of the masses.

[Omsk]

@Gallows:I think comrade Toppler and i have opened a number of threads on the question of anti-socialist propaganda.Search for them if you wish.

In any case,i guess this thread will attract more and more simplistic people like the user who's comment to the Soviet victory over Nazism was something along the lines of: "Big deal.."

[Delenda Carthago]

ElNRFlFw4xY

[pranabjyoti]

In the eyes of people uneducated about Communism Stalin is representative of oppression and lack of freedom through the brain-washing of mainstream media and nothing else.
For a long time in history, atheism was something closely related to anything immoral, inhuman to most of the mankind. Does that mean we should say yes "God exists"? It's common people callousness and I myself want to stay with objective truth than with "ignorant" people. That's the basic teaching of science and of course Marxism.

The word dictatorship in their minds equals tyranny and the opposite of democracy not in the sense we would use it in the term "dictatorship of the proletariat", which is why I said we should be educating people and not glorifying and putting up portraits of long dead leader's images.
As I said above.

[The Dark Side of the Moon]

Stalin was a murdering c*nt. Stalin is loved by many throughout Eurasia? I think you're referring to something called Stockholm Syndrome.
so he may have done the great purge, if he was a murdering ****, then why did the soviet union surpass the united states

if you really want murder, check out how many people the united states has killed

[Volcanicity]

For a long time in history, atheism was something closely related to anything immoral, inhuman to most of the mankind. Does that mean we should say yes "God exists"? It's common people callousness and I myself want to stay with objective truth than with "ignorant" people. That's the basic teaching of science and of course Marxism.
I'm talking about educating people about the actual principals of Communism/Socialism away from the glorifying imagery.Actually teaching the objective truth.

To the majority of people ignorant of Communism, Lenin,Stalin,Mao,Trotsky etc all mean the one thing because of the media's portrayal which means they see these portraits of leaders and never get past them to learning about the truth.

A lot of people don't even realise there are differing tendencies for them it's all the same thing:Communism=oppression.

[SacRedMan]

ElNRFlFw4xY

I bet that those guys never read The Communist Manifest nor The Capital.

[Omsk]

I bet that those guys never read The Communist Manifest nor The Capital.

Oh please,don't be delusional,hardly any workers actually read the Manifesto nor the Kapital.

[pranabjyoti]

I'm talking about educating people about the actual principals of Communism/Socialism away from the glorifying imagery.Actually teaching the objective truth.
If you really want to teach people, first hit them at their point of ignorance. Those persons weren't just some persons, but embodiment of the ideology which you want to teach. So, by keeping silent about them (actually saying "yes" to imperialist propaganda), I have doubt that whether you can teach the ideology.

To the majority of people ignorant of Communism, Lenin,Stalin,Mao,Trotsky etc all mean the one thing because of the media's portrayal which means they see these portraits of leaders and never get past them to learning about the truth.
True about the European and other "western" countries, totally false about the working class and most people belonging to the third world and THEY ARE THE MAJORITY OF PEOPLE OF THE WORLD AT PRESENT.

A lot of people don't even realise there are differing tendencies for them it's all the same thing:Communism=oppression.
Their callousness. Don't worry, historical processes will teach them well. They will some day find themselves lagging behind in many respects from the rest of the world. Let social evolution do its job.

[SacRedMan]

Oh please,don't be delusional,hardly any workers actually read the Manifesto nor the Kapital.

And we all know what the result of that was.

[Omsk]

And we all know what the result of that was.

Tell us please..

On a side note,ordinary workers are not required to read the Kapital or the Manifesto,but party member should do that,as a professional revolutionary group.

[SacRedMan]

Tell us please..

Oh, so you forgot about Ceausesceau, Pol Pot, the GULAG's,...

[Omsk]

Oh, so you forgot about Ceausesceau, Pol Pot, the GULAG's,...

How is that a result of workers not reading the Manifesto/Kapital?

[pranabjyoti]

Oh, so you forgot about Ceausesceau, Pol Pot, the GULAG's,...
Pol Pot is something controversial and I personally don't believe in most of the "stories of genocide" Khmer Rouge. On the other hand, Ceausescu is far better than middle east despots and Gulags are far better place than Guantanamo and Abu-Ghribe. You have to choose either one or the other, there is nothing in between until and unless we can make a classless society.

[SacRedMan]

How is that a result of workers not reading the Manifesto/Kapital?

They took the power for themself instead of giving it to the proletariat. Klick on the link in my signature.

[gestalt]

Stalin threads are always a joy, the apologists and opponents are so consumed with their defense or derision that they fail to raise real debate. Namely: What did Stalin have to do with the defeat of Nazi Germany and why is his image used to commemorate it?

Just as Uncle Joe never ice axed Trotsky or emptied a chamber into one of the victims of his purges, he also never defended Stalingrad against advancing Wehrmacht forces, liberated the extermination camps of Eastern Europe or marched on Berlin. Those were the accomplishments of the Red Army and the soldiers, worker and peasant, male and female, who comprised it; as well as those who worked in various industries and capacities on the homefront to continue the war effort. Better to find some way to honor those contributions than resurrect a personality cult. That a leader is popular says little about the benefits of their actions, feudal lords and priests may have held the people's favor, Barack Obama is still marginally approved of by the U.S. population, etc.

Stalinists want to dismiss those of us with questions and concerns over the governance of the Soviet Union as "bourgeois leftists," yet fall into the same Great Individual™ interpretation of history which liberals promote. They are either too consumed with battling the dreaded strawmen revisionists and ultraleftists and devising strategies for the ascendancy of the next bureaucratic vanguard class than contributing to the self-liberation of the working masses.

[Rusty Shackleford]

Stalin threads are always a joy, the apologists and opponents are so consumed with their defense or derision that they fail to raise real debate. Namely: What did Stalin have to do with the defeat of Nazi Germany and why is his image used to commemorate it?

and then




Just as Uncle Joe never ice axed Trotsky or emptied a chamber into one of the victims of his purges, he also never defended Stalingrad against advancing Wehrmacht forces, liberated the extermination camps of Eastern Europe or marched on Berlin. Those were the accomplishments of the Red Army and the soldiers, worker and peasant, male and female, who comprised it; as well as those who worked in various industries and capacities on the homefront to continue the war effort. Better to find some way to honor those contributions than resurrect a personality cult. That a leader is popular says little about the benefits of their actions, feudal lords and priests may have held the people's favor, Barack Obama is still marginally approved of by the U.S. population, etc.

Stalinists want to dismiss those of us with questions and concerns over the governance of the Soviet Union as "bourgeois leftists," yet fall into the same Great Individual™ interpretation of history which liberals promote. They are either too consumed with battling the dreaded strawmen revisionists and ultraleftists and devising strategies for the ascendancy of the next bureaucratic vanguard class than contributing to the self-liberation of the working masses.

[Born in the USSR]

Just as Uncle Joe.... never defended Stalingrad against advancing Wehrmacht forces, liberated the extermination camps of Eastern Europe or marched on Berlin. Those were the accomplishments of the Red Army and the soldiers, worker and peasant, male and female, who comprised it.

I am always amazed at this logic.Why should not you continue:"Hitler never himself invaded in the USSR,he personally didn't kill anybody,etc.,etc.Those were the deeds of Wehrmacht and German soldiers,German workers and peasants,male and female,who destroyed cities and burnt villages,who did genocide and holocaust - they are the real criminals of the war,they should be persecuted at Nuremberg.But this fool Hitler took a fright and poisoned himself!"

[El Chuncho]

Why has unpopularwhateverhisnameis not be banned? I am sure he has violated the rules as much as Chicxulub has... :rolleyes:

[Cleansing Conspiratorial Revolutionary Flame]

quite honestly fuck you, your totalitarian dictatorship is not what the proletariat of the world is fighting for, nor is it anything that should be desired by anyone who calls themself socialist/communist in any way. sometimes i wonder how many members of revleft would be left here if you and the likes of you would have supreme power here, and how many members would be "purged".
'quite honestly fuck you, your totalitarian dictatorship is not what the proletariat of the world is fighting for'
Society is inherently Totalitarian, as Society itself inherently injects the currently accepted societal views into the minds of those that are within the existing society.

The Proletariat in its conscious form pushes for the Dictatorship of the Proletariat which refers to society no longer being in the grip of the Bourgeois and completely being controlled by the Proletariat during this period of time. Along with this comes the destruction of the Bourgeois Culture and the replacement of the previous culture with a Proletarian based culture that represents the aspirations of the collective will of mankind.

' sometimes i wonder how many members of revleft would be left here if you and the likes of you would have supreme power here, and how many members would be "purged"
1,800 would remain.

[Geiseric]

Some people on here are saying that it's important to study these things for academic purposes, however its important in my opinion to debate them on a practical basis. If we don't recognize how things failed or succeeded in the past and people are willing to make the same mistakes using the same theory, there is no progress whatsoever.

If parties nowadays do the same tactics and have the same theories as 50 years ago and fail to see that they DIDNT work and aren't working, there is nowhere to go for Socialism. My main problem with Stalinists is that they want production relations after the revolution to revert to those relations 1935 Stalinist U.S.S.R. which for one weren't socialist, even though Stalin claimed that Socialism was achieved, and also because the political system of the oligarchy in charge of the S.R. isn't sustainable. One party states revert to corruption because of the lack of any opposition.

Anyways, if nationalists are using Stalin as a sign of Nationalism and not a sign of Class Consiousness and Socialism, I would see that as a problem. It shows that the cult of personality is very much still alive, and he's looked upon as a George Washington of sorts, like the Father of modern Russia.

[The Intransigent Faction]

What? Portraits of Stalin on Russian buses?! Break out the champagne, folks, 'cause revolution is nigh!!!

[t.shonku]

:thumbup1::thumbup1::thumbup1::thumbup1: Finally our Russian brothers and sisters are doing the right thing !

Long Live Stalin the Liberator !

Without him the Nazi thugs would have destroyed everyone, thanks Comrade Stalin wherever you are you will always remain in our heart :)

Comrade Stalin we love you , you are like a father !

[Geiseric]

are you being sarcastic?