"Tabula Rasa"

[NewSocialist]

A lot of intellectuals (see Peter Singer, Herbert Gintis, Steven Pinker, Robert Wright, etc.) complain that Marx's account of "human nature" is fundamentally flawed, due to the fact Marx considered it to be a mere reflection of the social relations of production, and thus infinitely malleable --while in reality, a lot of our behaviors are innately derived. The "human nature" argument is a favorite one employed by reactionaries, and, let's face it, it's worked greatly to dissuade people from even considering the possibility of social change.

Both sides in the current "nature-nurture" debate readily concede that genes and environment account for human behavior, the main conflict seems to be to what extent one is more influential than the other.

My question is simply this: To what extent does communism depend on the malleability of human nature? I personally believe that there is a great deal of plasticity in human nature, but I don't believe it's an infinite amount. Clearly, a significant part of Marx's theory of historical materialism is undermined if we accept certain fixed aspects of human nature, but does that render the entire communist project unachievable? I don't believe it does, but it does make it somewhat more challenging than many theorists have hitherto thought (since we have to take into consideration incentive issues and the like).

Before answering, please bear in mind that I'm not really that interested if you don't believe in human nature if you can't qualify why you don't believe in it with some sort of reliable data. Also, don't ask why I posted this in the science section instead of philosophy, since this question has to do with psychology (which is supposed to be covered in this section).

Here's an example of the human nature argument --Steven Pinker explaining The Blank Slate: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CuQHSKLXu2c

[jake williams]

I think you have to separate out the different points you'd like to make, or the questions you're asking.

First, I don't think that Marx believed that any meaningful "human nature" was infinitely and/or arbitrarily variable simply on account of narrow social changes. Such a notion would be idealism in the extreme. If Marx believed this he was wrong, but I don't think it's likely.

The point is really that what in class societies is ascribed to being an ahistorical, abstract human nature is really simply the point of intersection of particular historical conditions, on the one hand, and particular biological conditions, on the other. The latter, themselves, aren't static - genes change. (And moreover, particular genes have different effects when organisms live in different material circumstances. So a set of food preferences, with an extreme desire for fats and sugars, serves a hunter-gatherer pretty well. It serves less well modern humans with different food choices.)

This anti-historicism has long been proclaimed - that, for example, in slave society, some group of people are clearly and obviously naturally slaves and others, naturally slave owners. This was asserted, by, say, Aristotle, as simply an immutable fact of the human organism. But clearly this is false, something that becomes clear when historical circumstances change.

As to your bolded question, I'm not sure what it's even asking. No Marxists believe that a communist society will arise on the back of a spontaneous change in "human nature". No organisms, humans or otherwise, change spontaneously, and such a belief would be fundamentally anti-materialist and anti-marxist. If what you're asking is if a change to a communist society would necessarily entail a change in "human nature", then the answer is almost certainly yes, but not causatively, as I already said. The fact is simply that changes in historical-material circumstances alter what we call "human nature".

So no, I don't believe that any fact of "human nature" is a barrier at all to the achievement of a communist society. Not only has no one posed a credible reason as to why this would be case, any more credible than Aristotle's assertion that some individuals were natural slaves; the historical circumstances which will, barring the extinction of civlization, produce a communist society are the sort that act on and dynamically produce what we would call "human nature".

[mikelepore]

My question is simply this: To what extent does communism depend on the malleability of human nature?

Human nature makes some forms of communism workable and some forms of communism unworkable. It cannot make all forms workable, and it cannot make all forms unworkable.

[NewSocialist]

First, I don't think that Marx believed that any meaningful "human nature" was infinitely and/or arbitrarily variable simply on account of narrow social changes. Such a notion would be idealism in the extreme. If Marx believed this he was wrong, but I don't think it's likely.

In the Theses on Feuerbach (IV), Marx wrote:

". . . the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relation."

As Peter Singer noted, "It follows from this belief that if you can totally change the 'ensemble of the social relations,' you can totally change human nature. This claim goes to the heart of Marxism and of more broadly marxist (with a small 'm') thinking. As a result, it affects much of the thought of the entire left." Indeed, it seems to be the cornerstone of historical materialism:

"The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness." (Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy).

The above quotation from Marx is quite clearly a statement of economic reductionism, which, again, seems to serve as the foundation of historical materialism. Now even the crudest genetic reductionist will acknowledge that the mode of production will influence human behavior to a certain extent, but no contemporary biologist involved in the nature-nurture debate would claim that the totality of consciousness is determined by the mode of production people live under --hence why I ask my question.


The point is really that what in class societies is ascribed to being an ahistorical, abstract human nature is really simply the point of intersection of particular historical conditions, on the one hand, and particular biological conditions, on the other. The latter, themselves, aren't static - genes change. (And moreover, particular genes have different effects when organisms live in different material circumstances. So a set of food preferences, with an extreme desire for fats and sugars, serves a hunter-gatherer pretty well. It serves less well modern humans with different food choices.) What you're referring to is called epigenetics, and you're right, certain genes are influenced by the environment in which they interact. Which specific genes they happen to be and what behaviors they're responsible for are still being uncovered.


This anti-historicism has long been proclaimed - that, for example, in slave society, some group of people are clearly and obviously naturally slaves and others, naturally slave owners. This was asserted, by, say, Aristotle, as simply an immutable fact of the human organism. But clearly this is false, something that becomes clear when historical circumstances change.Yes, but such ludicrous claims aren't being made by the scientific materialists I've mentioned. Their claims are much more modest, and they basically amount to this: certain human behaviors are somewhat biologically fixed. That isn't to say that they adhere to biological determinism, most of them accept that some behaviors are quite malleable, while others are not. How do they determine to what extent a given behavioral trait is malleable? By observing the data collected in behavior genetics, specifically the studies of monozygotic and dizygotic twins reared apart --for example:

http://www.destinyandluck.com/Heritability-from-twin-correlations1.jpg


If what you're asking is if a change to a communist society would necessarily entail a change in "human nature", then the answer is almost certainly yes, but not causatively, as I already said. The fact is simply that changes in historical-material circumstances alter what we call "human nature".Yes, but to what extent and is it sufficient enough to achieve Marx's "higher stage of communism"? Moreover, how does a socialist state cope with human beings as they are when trying to implement a socialist mode of production post-revolution? Surely incentives will have to be addressed, at the very least. Organizing a sufficient method for innovation will also be necessary. Incidentally, I'm aware that many socialist economists (such as David M. Kotz (http://people.umass.edu/dmkotz/Soc_and_Innovation_long_00.pdf)) have already theorized methods which could potentially solve these issues.


So no, I don't believe that any fact of "human nature" is a barrier at all to the achievement of a communist society.Neither do I, but I do think that acknowledging a Darwinian element to our psychology necessitates fundamentally updating historical materialism. One such attempt has already been made by Alan Carling, in his though-provoking essay "Egalitarian Materialism (http://www.columbia.edu/cu/polisci/cspt/papers/2002/carling02.pdf)" --perhaps you, and some of the readers of this thread, would be nice enough to share your views on Carling's essay.


Not only has no one posed a credible reason as to why this would be case, any more credible than Aristotle's assertion that some individuals were natural slavesPhil Gasper wrote a wonderful essay (http://www.network54.com/Forum/88448/thread/1104438276/last-1105554991/Socialism+and+Human+Nature.) wherein he outlines the common objections to communism found within certain segments of the scientific community (mainly evolutionary psychology), which he proceeds to debunk by mainly drawing on the work of Gould and the other famous skeptics of evolutionary psychology. However, it is my view that communists and socialists should be prepared to defend the validity of their political program even in the event that the evolutionary psychologists are ultimately proven correct in their assessment of human nature. The way to do this is to take into consideration the data they present on human nature and create a revolutionary political philosophy and designs for socialist/communist economic institutions that are impenetrable to critique from the likes of Steven Pinker, E. O. Wilson, Peter Singer, Herbert Gintis, Robert Wright, and so forth. I fully realize that is no easy task, but there is more than enough creativity and intelligence on the far left to accomplish this.

[chegitz guevara]

So, they're arguing against stuff Marx wrote in 1843 and 1844 and calling it a critique of Marxism?

[NewSocialist]

So, they're arguing against stuff Marx wrote in 1843 and 1844 and calling it a critique of Marxism?

Historical materialism is a pretty major part of Marxism, is it not? If the theory posits that all human behavior is the direct result of the mode of production people live under, and there is evidence to the contrary, then that particular aspect of Marxism (historical materialism) theory needs to be revised --as Alan Carling (http://www.columbia.edu/cu/polisci/cspt/papers/2002/carling02.pdf) has attempted to do so-- and we have to take into consideration the implications "human nature" has when constructing a post-capitalist society.

[chegitz guevara]

The stuff Marx wrote in 1843 and 1844 is before his development of historical materialism. He's still groping around at this point. He hasn't even done his theses on Feuerbach and broken with his idealism yet.

I'm not saying this stuff isn't important for understand the development of Marx's thought, but it's like critiquing the Beatles based on Please, Please Me.

[ZeroNowhere]

The stuff Marx wrote in 1843 and 1844 is before his development of historical materialism. He's still groping around at this point. He hasn't even done his theses on Feuerbach and broken with his idealism yet.
Marx had quite definitely broken with idealism by the 1844 manuscripts. In fact, he didn't really break with his 1844 manuscripts in any significant manner through the rest of his development, either.


In the Theses on Feuerbach (IV), Marx wrote:

". . . the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relation."Marx was commenting on Feuerbach, and more specifically his conception of God as the alienation of the human essence, in which he reduces God to the sentiment of an abstract human individual, which is the sense in which Marx was speaking of this (incidentally, it is often claimed that Marx's 1844 manuscripts are still overly 'Feuerbachian' because Marx refers to 'man', as if Marx's critique of Feuerbach in 'The German Ideology' was simply for using the word rather than basing his analysis on an abstract man, man who is abstracted from society and 'not born of woman', as Engels put it). You, on the other hand, are being noticeably oblivious to this context.

[graymouser]

Historical materialism is a pretty major part of Marxism, is it not? If the theory posits that all human behavior is the direct result of the mode of production people live under, and there is evidence to the contrary, then that particular aspect of Marxism (historical materialism) theory needs to be revised --as Alan Carling (http://www.columbia.edu/cu/polisci/cspt/papers/2002/carling02.pdf) has attempted to do so-- and we have to take into consideration the implications "human nature" has when constructing a post-capitalist society.
Exactly what "human nature" is, has remained an almost entirely obscure question. And you haven't brought out what specifically about "human nature" is a problem for historical materialism.

However, at the level you are talking about it's necessary to remember that HM is not talking about individual humans but about social classes. That is, humans are not simply isolated individuals acting in their own interests, but are part of large divisions of society. And for Marx, these classes were qualitatively different from the individuals that comprise them - that is, as a class they were not the same as the individuals in the class. To take this out of the abstract: the bourgeoisie are not necessarily cruel or inhuman as individuals; some of them may be genuine philanthropists at heart. But as a class, they are collective exploiters, and their class interest forces them to act as such. Likewise, the proletariat as individuals are not necessarily philanthropists, some may be quite selfish, yet as a class their interests force them to donate large sums of their time and effort to enriching the bourgeoisie, with only a relative little left for them.

Marx was not analyzing human nature, but class society, and he saw as the actors in history not individuals but large classes of men and women. Human nature (whatever that means) may bring about certain nuances of the larger struggle, and may become issues once that struggle is finally resolved, but it is not a force in the grander picture Marx was painting with historical materialism.

[danyboy27]

The way i see it is quite simple. Marxism understanding of human nature exceed capitalism understanding in any way.

Power sharing is necessary for a better application of it, that why the mean of production have to be shared and controlled by worker.

ther history of humanity show us that dictatorship in general is not a verry reliable and efficient way to control power.

Of course there will always be people who will try to have it all, and that precisely why communism is necessary, to avoid 1 or 2 % of the population to get mad with power and mismanage the power they would acquire.

The fact that there will always be folks who want it all is hardly an argument of human nature against communism, one could also argues its human nature to kill to get what he want (we are annimals after all), but we still arrest and jail those who kill other humans in society in general beccause has a society we decided to gave up most of our natural right to trade it with civil rights.

Capitalists on the other hand dosnt understand human nature, they dont understand the inherent risk of putting all this power and control in the hand of a fews, the mismanagement of ressources and the usless war waged to gather those out of reach.

[mikelepore]

I will explain what I meant in my previous post about some forms of socialism being possible or impossible, with "human nature" as given, while socialism itself can never be found to be impossible.

Consider an analogy. Suppose the automobile had just been invented for the first time. A critic says, "Your automobile contraption is useless. You might be away from home and it begins to rain. Then the passengers will get wet." The inventor answers, "All that means is we might want to put a roof over it." Then the critic says, "It's still a useless invention. You might be far from home when it gets dark, and you won't be able to see the road." The inventor answers, "That could be fixed by putting lights on it." Then the critic says, "Still, it would be dangerous not being able to see in back of the vehicle." The critic answers, "If that's a problem, we could attach some mirrors."

Similarly, when critics say that "socialism wouldn't work", "socialism is dictatorship", etc., what they are really objecting to is particular forms, all of which can be adjusted, if the people consider it desirable to adjust them.

For example, when the critics say, "socialism would never work because there would be no inventive if everyone received the same income", the critics are easily answered by pointing out that having everyone receive the same income is only one of the particular forms that some socialists have suggested, and such a form isn't automatically implied by the general concept of public ownership and democratic management of the industries.

Socialists should keep this in mind whenever critics recite their customary slogans, "socialism is against human nature", "socialism means the loss of individual freedom", etc. We will find that, in every case, the points that the critics raise will refer only to particular forms that they have heard socialism would take, and the critics are mistaking objections to these particular forms for objections to the general principle.