caramelpence
16th April 2011, 22:15
This is an extract from a recent thesis that I thought might be worth posting here.
Contesting the nation in German Maoism
The KPD/ML was marked by an orientation towards questions of geopolitics and identity. It shifted from a pronounced fear of West German militarism to a nationalist politics that characterized the West German government as an inadequate champion of nationhood. This shift corresponded to the changing policy of the PRC and occurred in the context of the Ostpolitik agreements. The rhetoric of the PRC after the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia incorporated the familiar themes of revisionism but also accused the Soviets of 'social imperialism', a term that had not hitherto been used. The non-Soviet states of the Warsaw Pact were described as 'colonies' and 'vassals'. Although this rhetoric did not win Warsaw Pact states over to the PRC, as part of its efforts to create tensions within the Soviet bloc the PRC orientated itself towards Ostpolitik. It sought to use Ostpolitik to divide the DDR from the Soviet Union by treating the policy as 'an imminent threat to East Germany'. The signing of the Moscow Treaty in August 1970 was therefore followed by a Renmin Ribao editorial which accused the Soviets of having 'totally ignored' the DDR's sovereignty by making excessive concessions to the BRD and promising concessions on issues such as Berlin. The authors alleged that the agreement represented a 'global Munich' and described the West German government as 'the West German monopolistic clique eager to turn back the clock of history to become first a so-called “economic great power,” then a “military great power,” and eventually to revive Hitler's old dream of a “Pan-German Empire”'.1
The KPD/ML also argued along these lines. Ostpolitik as a whole allegedly represented the Soviet Union agreeing to 'wash German imperialism of its crimes' so that the BRD could appear 'politically “respectable”'. In this way, the Soviets were responsible for 'legitimating and supporting new acts of annexation and aggression by the BRD-revanchists'.2 For the BRD, Ostpolitik reportedly involved a change in tactics only. Whereas Adenauer 'wanted to annex the DDR and the Polish regions beyond the Oder and Neisse with violence', Brandt used 'the olive branch and money-bag', whilst remaining 'firm' in his objective.3 The party described the Moscow Treaty as a 'plot between two imperialist big powers' and a 'cynical mockery of the sovereignty of the DDR'. In pointing out why the Treaty was a betrayal of the DDR, the party questioned 'what it means when it says in the Agreement that the BRD acknowledged the borders between the BRD and the DDR to be inviolable but at the same time does not recognize the DDR in international law'. They also stressed that the Preamble referred to the establishment of relations between the BRD and the Soviet Union fifteen years hitherto and that this event had involved the exchange of a letter between Adenauer and Bulganin, in which Adenauer had emphasized that relations did not entail acceptance of the existing borders of the Germanies or the relinquishment of the BRD's right to speak for Germans not under its territorial control. They emphasized that the Treaty had not involved the DDR being asked 'its opinion' on the management of Berlin, 'although Berlin lies undeniably on the territory of the DDR'.4 These arguments implied that the recognition of the territorial status quo and the rejection of all past and future territorial claims were not enough to prevent the BRD from challenging the territorial sovereignty of the DDR. In this context, it is clear why Kühn suggests that a defining feature of German Maoism was a commitment to conspiracy theories and a desire to distinguish right from wrong in ways that left little room for nuance. This conspiratorial thread manifested itself not only in relation to Ostpolitik but also internal issues, such that drugs were characterized as a tool of demoralization controlled by the bourgeoisie.5
There was a basis for the party's concerns, as they reflected certain aspects of the Treaty's content. It embodied a non-use of force agreement and recognized the territorial status-quo, albeit through references to 'the existing real situation' rather than the term 'recognition'. Although the existing boundaries were declared inviolable and West Germany declared no outstanding territorial demands, the boundaries were not defined as unalterable.6 The declarations of intent that were published alongside the Treaty and the BRD's letter on reunification also committed the BRD to negotiations with the DDR. Although this was the first time that the DDR had been acknowledged in a BRD diplomatic communication, this was outweighed by the fact that, as part of its recognition of the territorial status quo, the BRD had recognized the Oder-Neisse line. Given the location of this line, and the fact that the Treaty resulted from negotiations between the BRD and the Soviet Union, this suggests that the Soviets were more interested in the guarantee of West Germany than defending the DDR.7 The declarations of intent also acknowledged that the Treaty would be considered part of a 'united whole', containing treaties between the BRD and Poland, and with Czechoslovakia, which dealt with issues 'connected with the invalidity of the Munch agreement', although the Soviets had initially made the BRD declaring the Munich agreement invalid from the start a precondition for other treaties. Most importantly, the BRD agreed to de facto recognition of the DDR, UN admission for the two Germanies and rejection of the Hallstein doctrine. At no point, however, did it agree to diplomatic recognition of the DDR, emphasizing instead the 'special relationship' between the two states. It has been justly argued by Griffith that the main loser in the aftermath of the Treaty was the DDR, as the Treaty threatened the policy of Abgrenzung and the DDR's usage of BRD militarism as a justification for its existence, with increased contacts between the Soviets and the BRD also lessening the former's reliance on the DDR for technology and credits.8
The arguments of the KPD/ML also reflected the depth of anti-militarist sentiment in Germany, especially in the 1950s, in the debates around rearmament, conscription, and nuclear weapons. The depth of this sentiment was such that, based on polling results, and in spite of government attempts to emphasize the Soviet threat, a substantial minority were always opposed to rearmament. Anti-militarism was not necessarily synonymous with pacifism, however. It has been argued that 'a good part of public opinion against rearmament was based on national, if not outright nationalist, attitudes' because rearmament would not have led to a German national army, and Germans were strongly against German soldiers having to serve in a European army, rather than because they were opposed to armed force in the abstract. Although there were other anti-militarist perspectives that were not nationalist, such as genuine pacifism, and those who saw the new state as an 'alien imposition' that could not protect the integrity of the German military,9 the existence of this nationalist current within anti-militarism suggests that the shift of the KPD/ML to an openly nationalist posture was not a total break with previous emphases. This shift took place alongside a change in Chinese foreign policy, ultimately resulting in diplomatic relations between the BRD and PRC in October 1972, shortly after Nixon's meeting with Mao, and in the context of the PRC's entry into the UN in 1971, PRC support for European integration, increasing economic contact between the two countries, and visits by prominent German politicians.10 A shift towards the Second World was also given ideological expression in the Three Worlds Theory, put forward by Deng Xiaoping before the UN General Assembly in April 1974, in which a 'new categorization of the principal actors' identified the superpowers as the main enemy.11 Renewed emphasis was placed on the concept of the intermediate zone, a component of the CPC's vocabulary dating back to the 1940s.12
The KPD/ML's changing stance was reflected in their Declaration on the National Question, 'Deutschland dem Deutschen Volk!' published in 1974. In engaging with issues of nationhood, the party remained consistent with the history of the German radical left, that is, its willingness to assume the mantle of nationhood in order to engage with popular forces. The nationalist orientation of the interwar KPD from 1919 onwards involved the party seeking to engage with völkisch elements during the Ruhr occupation in 1923, whereby Communists adopted the discourse of anti-Semitism. This initial period was carried out under the leadership of Radek and became known as the Schlageteriade, and was followed by the Scheringer Kurs in 1930-2, during which the party sought to convince members of the NSDAP to follow the example of ex-soldier Richard Scheringer by changing allegiances and joining the KPD. The interwar period also witnessed the interaction of nationalism and radicalism in the ideas of Ernst Niekisch, as well as other theorists of the Conservative Revolution, whose arguments, Kühn suggests, run 'like a red thread trough the history of the different Maoist organizations'.13 During the post-war period, the nationalist dimension of radical politics emerged in the ideas of Rudi Dutschke, who, whilst operating in a context that made it difficult for radicals to take a positive attitude towards German reunification, called on the left to orientate itself towards Germany's divided condition. He argued that the social liberation of Germany depended on its national independence, in the same way as the Third World, generating a lively debate in the 1970s over the impact of nationalism on Dutschke's thought.14
The KPD/ML's own nationalist vision was based on the premise that the German situation was comparable to the Third World. They argued, on the subject of whether 'the contradiction between the superpowers and the German nation has become the main contraction', that 'not only the countries of the Third World are exploited, oppressed and threatened by US imperialism and Russian social-imperialism', rather, 'the smaller and mid-level capitalist and imperialist states of the Second World' were also subject to their 'influence and control'.15 They similarly asserted that 'our country is divided and occupied by foreign troops' and that 'on German territory the armies of the two superpowers stand armed to the teeth and opposed to each other'. The term for occupation in this context, besetzung, was used in other contexts to refer to countries such as Vietnam. The division of Germany and its occupation by the superpowers reportedly posed 'the danger for our people and country of being caught up in a military conflict between the superpowers and becoming a battleground'. The party therefore maintained an anti-militarist impulse but the superpowers became identified as the main sources of danger and Germany itself was identified as the main victim of a prospective war.
The divided condition of Germany was allegedly the responsibility of the West German bourgeoisie on the grounds that, following the war, they 'saw that they no longer had the opportunity to re-establish their rule over the whole of Germany' and 'now serve the US imperialists as a tool, in order to sabotage the Potsdam Agreement, to release West Germany from the alliance of the Germans'. Their failure to defend the German nation was demonstrated by the fact that 'they did not shy away from accepting the occupation of West Germany by the troops of the Western powers until the year 2005, through the Paris Agreements'. The DDR initially played a progressive role in relation to reunification by seeking 'reunification on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement', but became complicit in national division as the ruling class 'can only support its fascist domination over our class brothers in the DDR on the bayonets of Soviets social imperialists' and 'must follow the commands of their imperialist bosses in Moscow'.16 The DKP, too, were accused of being 'servants of the new Tsars in the Kremlin, agents of the Russian social-imperialists, who want to make our country defenceless against Russian aggression'.17 The party responded to the Soviet threat by calling for 'a broad united front' consisting of all 'classes, strata, parties, organizations and individuals' who stand 'in contradiction with the two superpowers, in contradiction with the monopoly bourgeoisie and other reactionary forces that betray the interests of the nation'.18
In order to affirm the continued existence of a German nation, the party pointed towards Stalin's criteria for the existence of nations, namely that a nation is 'a historically constituted stable community of people' based on 'language, territory, economic life, and a psychological disposition manifested in a common culture'. On this basis they stressed that 'undoubtedly the Germans in East and West speak now, as previously, the same language', that they also 'inhabit the same territory' and that even though the German economy had ceased to be unified due to each state being part of a separate economic bloc, 'this momentary division shows that they actually belong to a single economic unit – so must the DDR import black coal from Poland, whilst mines are being closed in the Ruhr'.19 The party also gave special acknowledgement to the notion that the DDR constituted a separate nation. They rejected this theory as 'a chauvinist theory of the Kremlin' and 'an act of violence'. The party argued that a theory of this kind, according to which 'class struggle decides everything', 'sounds very radical, but is in reality nothing other than a lazy trick and fascist big-power propaganda', and that, whilst there were socialist and capitalist concepts of nationhood, this did not entail the 'death of the nation', as demonstrated by the cases of Korea and Vietnam, where nations continued to exist despite territorial division.20 The party also pointed towards an alternative conception of the national past and a conception of Communist duty in which supporting the nation was given a central role. The 'character of the German nation' was, for the party, the product of a long series of struggles throughout its history, including 'the peasant wars', 'the bourgeois revolution', and 'the struggles of the working class', all of these struggles giving voice to the desire of the German people to 'live as free people in a free country'. The party asserted that 'the history of our people reflects, like the history of all peoples, the struggle of progressive against reactionary forces', and 'there is no force in the world' that can 'extinguish these glorious traditions from the consciousness of our people'. Thus, whilst 'bad traditions come and go, just like people, and the class forces that originated them', these 'glorious traditions will live forever' and Communists had to 'carry forward these glorious traditions of the German people'.
Examples of a progressive nationalist tradition reportedly included 'the soldiers who deserted to the Red Army in order to fight Hitler-fascism', 'the students of the White Rose', 'the citizens of Nordhorn, Klausheide and adjacent areas, when they fought against the bombing range at Nordhorn', and 'the farmers, who went to war against the terror-manoeuvres of the occupation troops'.21 The party acknowledged its nationalism and defended itself against accusations of chauvinism by arguing that 'proletarian internationalism and proletarian patriotism are two sides of the same coin' and that the meaning of proletarian patriotism was to 'fight for the liberation of the nation' whilst supporting 'all other peoples in their fight for the winning or protection of their full national sovereignty'. This concept of nationalism was opposed to 'bourgeois chauvinism' in that bourgeois chauvinism was reportedly not concerned with 'the interests of the nation' but was 'the ideology of the ruling capitalist class'. The bourgeoisie were therefore 'no longer in the position, to take up the leadership of the nation' during 'the imperialist phase of capitalism', such that 'this mission' could only be taken up by the working class, and 'stands not in contradiction with the special class interests and tasks of the working class, on the contrary, the fulfilment of its national mission facilitates the resolution of its class mission'. In this way, 'the struggle for the national unity of Germany is an inseparable component of the socialist revolution'. The party proclaimed that 'the reunification of our fatherland cannot take place peacefully, through voting, agreements between the two German governments, or the generosity of the two superpowers' but only through 'the armed revolutionary struggle of the German people', leading to a 'unified, independent, socialist Germany'.22
In distinguishing between nationalisms, the KPD/ML differed from the PLP, whose rejection of any distinction between revolutionary and reactionary nationalism was one of the factors that led the party to break with Maoism in the early 1970s, in the context of detente.23 The party's conception of socialist nationalism was developed amidst broader debates around the meaning of German nationhood. These were promoted by Ostpolitik, as policy disagreements were closely connected to questions of German history and specifically how Germans should orientate themselves towards Hitler's accession in 1933 versus Germany's defeat in 1945, as well as how the relationship between Nazism and events such as the foundation of the Reich in 1871 should be understood. In the BRD, competing conceptions of nationhood included a state-cantered and territorial conception associated with the CDU. In their condemnations of Ostpolitik, the CDU used epithets such as 'a second Versailles' and 'the capitulation of Germany'. These terms reflected the breadth of the ideological differences involved. There was also a social and liberal conception which was cultural in its emphasis and took 1848 rather than 1871 as its reference point.24 In addition to these official perspectives, Jürgen Habermas articulated a constitutional patriotism based on loyalty to the BRD's combination of democracy and stability. This position emerged in the late 1970s but was an important dimension of left-liberal conceptions of nationhood, amidst rejections of ethnic constructions as well as 'DM-nationalism', centred on the BRD's economic achievements. Also of importance were regional identities, especially in southern Germany, which enabled a rejection of Nazism as a Prussian phenomenon, and the growing importance of European identity over the post-war period.25 The DDR's conception of nationhood had been articulated during the course of the state's creation, and was centred on a founding myth of liberation from fascism.26 In this way, the KPD/ML's nationalist articulations took place in a broader context. At the same time, a 1978 Spiegel article suggests that assuming a nationalist orientation created tensions both inside the party and between organizations, such that 'the Theory of Three Worlds of Peking is causing ideological problems for West German Maoists'. It was at this time, following Mao's death, that the KPD/ML became 'fixated on Albania', according to the same article, marking the end of its Maoist phase.27
1 - B. Schaefer, 'Ostpolitik, “Fernostpolitik,” and Sino-Soviet Rivalry' in C. Fink, B. Schaefer (eds.), Ostpolitik 1969-1974 (Washington DC, 2009), pp. 129-37.
2 - RM 10/1972 pp. 1-2.
3 - RM May/1970, p. 8.
4 - RM 08/1970, pp. 1-5.
5 - Kühn, Stalins Enkel, pp. 123-5.
6 - W.E. Griffith, The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge and London, 1978), pp. 190-2.
7 - M.E. Sarotte, Dealing with the Devil (North Carolina, 2001), pp. 68-9.
8 - Griffith, The Ostpolitik, p. 193.
9 - M. Geyer, 'Cold War Angst' in H. Schissler (ed.), The Miracle Years (Princeton and Oxford, 2001), pp. 379-85.
10 - Schaefer, 'Ostpolitik, “Fernostpolitik”', pp. 137-47.
11 - J. Camilleri, Chinese Foreign Policy (Oxford, 1980), p. 140.
12 - Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War (New York, 2004), pp. 17-23.
13 - Kühn, Stalins Enkel, pp. 126-31.
14 - Benicke, 'Von Adorno', pp. 103-7.
15 - RM 33/1975 Insert, p. 1.
16 - RM 05/1975, p. 6.
17 - RM 33/1975 Insert, p. 7.
18 - RM 14/1975, p. 6.
19 - RM 05/1974, p. 6.
20 - RM 03/1975, pp. 2-4.
21 - RM 05/1974, pp. 6-7.
22 - RM 32/1974, p 6.
23 - Alexander, Maoism, pp. 20-1.
24 - E. Wolfrum, Die Geglückte Demokratie (Stuttgart, 2006), pp. 305-15.
25 - M. Fulbrook, German National Identity after the Holocaust (Oxford,1999), pp. 179-202.
26 - M. Fulbrook, The People's State (New Haven and London, 2005), pp. 24-33.
27 - Der Spiegel 43/1978, pp. 82-3.
Contesting the nation in German Maoism
The KPD/ML was marked by an orientation towards questions of geopolitics and identity. It shifted from a pronounced fear of West German militarism to a nationalist politics that characterized the West German government as an inadequate champion of nationhood. This shift corresponded to the changing policy of the PRC and occurred in the context of the Ostpolitik agreements. The rhetoric of the PRC after the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia incorporated the familiar themes of revisionism but also accused the Soviets of 'social imperialism', a term that had not hitherto been used. The non-Soviet states of the Warsaw Pact were described as 'colonies' and 'vassals'. Although this rhetoric did not win Warsaw Pact states over to the PRC, as part of its efforts to create tensions within the Soviet bloc the PRC orientated itself towards Ostpolitik. It sought to use Ostpolitik to divide the DDR from the Soviet Union by treating the policy as 'an imminent threat to East Germany'. The signing of the Moscow Treaty in August 1970 was therefore followed by a Renmin Ribao editorial which accused the Soviets of having 'totally ignored' the DDR's sovereignty by making excessive concessions to the BRD and promising concessions on issues such as Berlin. The authors alleged that the agreement represented a 'global Munich' and described the West German government as 'the West German monopolistic clique eager to turn back the clock of history to become first a so-called “economic great power,” then a “military great power,” and eventually to revive Hitler's old dream of a “Pan-German Empire”'.1
The KPD/ML also argued along these lines. Ostpolitik as a whole allegedly represented the Soviet Union agreeing to 'wash German imperialism of its crimes' so that the BRD could appear 'politically “respectable”'. In this way, the Soviets were responsible for 'legitimating and supporting new acts of annexation and aggression by the BRD-revanchists'.2 For the BRD, Ostpolitik reportedly involved a change in tactics only. Whereas Adenauer 'wanted to annex the DDR and the Polish regions beyond the Oder and Neisse with violence', Brandt used 'the olive branch and money-bag', whilst remaining 'firm' in his objective.3 The party described the Moscow Treaty as a 'plot between two imperialist big powers' and a 'cynical mockery of the sovereignty of the DDR'. In pointing out why the Treaty was a betrayal of the DDR, the party questioned 'what it means when it says in the Agreement that the BRD acknowledged the borders between the BRD and the DDR to be inviolable but at the same time does not recognize the DDR in international law'. They also stressed that the Preamble referred to the establishment of relations between the BRD and the Soviet Union fifteen years hitherto and that this event had involved the exchange of a letter between Adenauer and Bulganin, in which Adenauer had emphasized that relations did not entail acceptance of the existing borders of the Germanies or the relinquishment of the BRD's right to speak for Germans not under its territorial control. They emphasized that the Treaty had not involved the DDR being asked 'its opinion' on the management of Berlin, 'although Berlin lies undeniably on the territory of the DDR'.4 These arguments implied that the recognition of the territorial status quo and the rejection of all past and future territorial claims were not enough to prevent the BRD from challenging the territorial sovereignty of the DDR. In this context, it is clear why Kühn suggests that a defining feature of German Maoism was a commitment to conspiracy theories and a desire to distinguish right from wrong in ways that left little room for nuance. This conspiratorial thread manifested itself not only in relation to Ostpolitik but also internal issues, such that drugs were characterized as a tool of demoralization controlled by the bourgeoisie.5
There was a basis for the party's concerns, as they reflected certain aspects of the Treaty's content. It embodied a non-use of force agreement and recognized the territorial status-quo, albeit through references to 'the existing real situation' rather than the term 'recognition'. Although the existing boundaries were declared inviolable and West Germany declared no outstanding territorial demands, the boundaries were not defined as unalterable.6 The declarations of intent that were published alongside the Treaty and the BRD's letter on reunification also committed the BRD to negotiations with the DDR. Although this was the first time that the DDR had been acknowledged in a BRD diplomatic communication, this was outweighed by the fact that, as part of its recognition of the territorial status quo, the BRD had recognized the Oder-Neisse line. Given the location of this line, and the fact that the Treaty resulted from negotiations between the BRD and the Soviet Union, this suggests that the Soviets were more interested in the guarantee of West Germany than defending the DDR.7 The declarations of intent also acknowledged that the Treaty would be considered part of a 'united whole', containing treaties between the BRD and Poland, and with Czechoslovakia, which dealt with issues 'connected with the invalidity of the Munch agreement', although the Soviets had initially made the BRD declaring the Munich agreement invalid from the start a precondition for other treaties. Most importantly, the BRD agreed to de facto recognition of the DDR, UN admission for the two Germanies and rejection of the Hallstein doctrine. At no point, however, did it agree to diplomatic recognition of the DDR, emphasizing instead the 'special relationship' between the two states. It has been justly argued by Griffith that the main loser in the aftermath of the Treaty was the DDR, as the Treaty threatened the policy of Abgrenzung and the DDR's usage of BRD militarism as a justification for its existence, with increased contacts between the Soviets and the BRD also lessening the former's reliance on the DDR for technology and credits.8
The arguments of the KPD/ML also reflected the depth of anti-militarist sentiment in Germany, especially in the 1950s, in the debates around rearmament, conscription, and nuclear weapons. The depth of this sentiment was such that, based on polling results, and in spite of government attempts to emphasize the Soviet threat, a substantial minority were always opposed to rearmament. Anti-militarism was not necessarily synonymous with pacifism, however. It has been argued that 'a good part of public opinion against rearmament was based on national, if not outright nationalist, attitudes' because rearmament would not have led to a German national army, and Germans were strongly against German soldiers having to serve in a European army, rather than because they were opposed to armed force in the abstract. Although there were other anti-militarist perspectives that were not nationalist, such as genuine pacifism, and those who saw the new state as an 'alien imposition' that could not protect the integrity of the German military,9 the existence of this nationalist current within anti-militarism suggests that the shift of the KPD/ML to an openly nationalist posture was not a total break with previous emphases. This shift took place alongside a change in Chinese foreign policy, ultimately resulting in diplomatic relations between the BRD and PRC in October 1972, shortly after Nixon's meeting with Mao, and in the context of the PRC's entry into the UN in 1971, PRC support for European integration, increasing economic contact between the two countries, and visits by prominent German politicians.10 A shift towards the Second World was also given ideological expression in the Three Worlds Theory, put forward by Deng Xiaoping before the UN General Assembly in April 1974, in which a 'new categorization of the principal actors' identified the superpowers as the main enemy.11 Renewed emphasis was placed on the concept of the intermediate zone, a component of the CPC's vocabulary dating back to the 1940s.12
The KPD/ML's changing stance was reflected in their Declaration on the National Question, 'Deutschland dem Deutschen Volk!' published in 1974. In engaging with issues of nationhood, the party remained consistent with the history of the German radical left, that is, its willingness to assume the mantle of nationhood in order to engage with popular forces. The nationalist orientation of the interwar KPD from 1919 onwards involved the party seeking to engage with völkisch elements during the Ruhr occupation in 1923, whereby Communists adopted the discourse of anti-Semitism. This initial period was carried out under the leadership of Radek and became known as the Schlageteriade, and was followed by the Scheringer Kurs in 1930-2, during which the party sought to convince members of the NSDAP to follow the example of ex-soldier Richard Scheringer by changing allegiances and joining the KPD. The interwar period also witnessed the interaction of nationalism and radicalism in the ideas of Ernst Niekisch, as well as other theorists of the Conservative Revolution, whose arguments, Kühn suggests, run 'like a red thread trough the history of the different Maoist organizations'.13 During the post-war period, the nationalist dimension of radical politics emerged in the ideas of Rudi Dutschke, who, whilst operating in a context that made it difficult for radicals to take a positive attitude towards German reunification, called on the left to orientate itself towards Germany's divided condition. He argued that the social liberation of Germany depended on its national independence, in the same way as the Third World, generating a lively debate in the 1970s over the impact of nationalism on Dutschke's thought.14
The KPD/ML's own nationalist vision was based on the premise that the German situation was comparable to the Third World. They argued, on the subject of whether 'the contradiction between the superpowers and the German nation has become the main contraction', that 'not only the countries of the Third World are exploited, oppressed and threatened by US imperialism and Russian social-imperialism', rather, 'the smaller and mid-level capitalist and imperialist states of the Second World' were also subject to their 'influence and control'.15 They similarly asserted that 'our country is divided and occupied by foreign troops' and that 'on German territory the armies of the two superpowers stand armed to the teeth and opposed to each other'. The term for occupation in this context, besetzung, was used in other contexts to refer to countries such as Vietnam. The division of Germany and its occupation by the superpowers reportedly posed 'the danger for our people and country of being caught up in a military conflict between the superpowers and becoming a battleground'. The party therefore maintained an anti-militarist impulse but the superpowers became identified as the main sources of danger and Germany itself was identified as the main victim of a prospective war.
The divided condition of Germany was allegedly the responsibility of the West German bourgeoisie on the grounds that, following the war, they 'saw that they no longer had the opportunity to re-establish their rule over the whole of Germany' and 'now serve the US imperialists as a tool, in order to sabotage the Potsdam Agreement, to release West Germany from the alliance of the Germans'. Their failure to defend the German nation was demonstrated by the fact that 'they did not shy away from accepting the occupation of West Germany by the troops of the Western powers until the year 2005, through the Paris Agreements'. The DDR initially played a progressive role in relation to reunification by seeking 'reunification on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement', but became complicit in national division as the ruling class 'can only support its fascist domination over our class brothers in the DDR on the bayonets of Soviets social imperialists' and 'must follow the commands of their imperialist bosses in Moscow'.16 The DKP, too, were accused of being 'servants of the new Tsars in the Kremlin, agents of the Russian social-imperialists, who want to make our country defenceless against Russian aggression'.17 The party responded to the Soviet threat by calling for 'a broad united front' consisting of all 'classes, strata, parties, organizations and individuals' who stand 'in contradiction with the two superpowers, in contradiction with the monopoly bourgeoisie and other reactionary forces that betray the interests of the nation'.18
In order to affirm the continued existence of a German nation, the party pointed towards Stalin's criteria for the existence of nations, namely that a nation is 'a historically constituted stable community of people' based on 'language, territory, economic life, and a psychological disposition manifested in a common culture'. On this basis they stressed that 'undoubtedly the Germans in East and West speak now, as previously, the same language', that they also 'inhabit the same territory' and that even though the German economy had ceased to be unified due to each state being part of a separate economic bloc, 'this momentary division shows that they actually belong to a single economic unit – so must the DDR import black coal from Poland, whilst mines are being closed in the Ruhr'.19 The party also gave special acknowledgement to the notion that the DDR constituted a separate nation. They rejected this theory as 'a chauvinist theory of the Kremlin' and 'an act of violence'. The party argued that a theory of this kind, according to which 'class struggle decides everything', 'sounds very radical, but is in reality nothing other than a lazy trick and fascist big-power propaganda', and that, whilst there were socialist and capitalist concepts of nationhood, this did not entail the 'death of the nation', as demonstrated by the cases of Korea and Vietnam, where nations continued to exist despite territorial division.20 The party also pointed towards an alternative conception of the national past and a conception of Communist duty in which supporting the nation was given a central role. The 'character of the German nation' was, for the party, the product of a long series of struggles throughout its history, including 'the peasant wars', 'the bourgeois revolution', and 'the struggles of the working class', all of these struggles giving voice to the desire of the German people to 'live as free people in a free country'. The party asserted that 'the history of our people reflects, like the history of all peoples, the struggle of progressive against reactionary forces', and 'there is no force in the world' that can 'extinguish these glorious traditions from the consciousness of our people'. Thus, whilst 'bad traditions come and go, just like people, and the class forces that originated them', these 'glorious traditions will live forever' and Communists had to 'carry forward these glorious traditions of the German people'.
Examples of a progressive nationalist tradition reportedly included 'the soldiers who deserted to the Red Army in order to fight Hitler-fascism', 'the students of the White Rose', 'the citizens of Nordhorn, Klausheide and adjacent areas, when they fought against the bombing range at Nordhorn', and 'the farmers, who went to war against the terror-manoeuvres of the occupation troops'.21 The party acknowledged its nationalism and defended itself against accusations of chauvinism by arguing that 'proletarian internationalism and proletarian patriotism are two sides of the same coin' and that the meaning of proletarian patriotism was to 'fight for the liberation of the nation' whilst supporting 'all other peoples in their fight for the winning or protection of their full national sovereignty'. This concept of nationalism was opposed to 'bourgeois chauvinism' in that bourgeois chauvinism was reportedly not concerned with 'the interests of the nation' but was 'the ideology of the ruling capitalist class'. The bourgeoisie were therefore 'no longer in the position, to take up the leadership of the nation' during 'the imperialist phase of capitalism', such that 'this mission' could only be taken up by the working class, and 'stands not in contradiction with the special class interests and tasks of the working class, on the contrary, the fulfilment of its national mission facilitates the resolution of its class mission'. In this way, 'the struggle for the national unity of Germany is an inseparable component of the socialist revolution'. The party proclaimed that 'the reunification of our fatherland cannot take place peacefully, through voting, agreements between the two German governments, or the generosity of the two superpowers' but only through 'the armed revolutionary struggle of the German people', leading to a 'unified, independent, socialist Germany'.22
In distinguishing between nationalisms, the KPD/ML differed from the PLP, whose rejection of any distinction between revolutionary and reactionary nationalism was one of the factors that led the party to break with Maoism in the early 1970s, in the context of detente.23 The party's conception of socialist nationalism was developed amidst broader debates around the meaning of German nationhood. These were promoted by Ostpolitik, as policy disagreements were closely connected to questions of German history and specifically how Germans should orientate themselves towards Hitler's accession in 1933 versus Germany's defeat in 1945, as well as how the relationship between Nazism and events such as the foundation of the Reich in 1871 should be understood. In the BRD, competing conceptions of nationhood included a state-cantered and territorial conception associated with the CDU. In their condemnations of Ostpolitik, the CDU used epithets such as 'a second Versailles' and 'the capitulation of Germany'. These terms reflected the breadth of the ideological differences involved. There was also a social and liberal conception which was cultural in its emphasis and took 1848 rather than 1871 as its reference point.24 In addition to these official perspectives, Jürgen Habermas articulated a constitutional patriotism based on loyalty to the BRD's combination of democracy and stability. This position emerged in the late 1970s but was an important dimension of left-liberal conceptions of nationhood, amidst rejections of ethnic constructions as well as 'DM-nationalism', centred on the BRD's economic achievements. Also of importance were regional identities, especially in southern Germany, which enabled a rejection of Nazism as a Prussian phenomenon, and the growing importance of European identity over the post-war period.25 The DDR's conception of nationhood had been articulated during the course of the state's creation, and was centred on a founding myth of liberation from fascism.26 In this way, the KPD/ML's nationalist articulations took place in a broader context. At the same time, a 1978 Spiegel article suggests that assuming a nationalist orientation created tensions both inside the party and between organizations, such that 'the Theory of Three Worlds of Peking is causing ideological problems for West German Maoists'. It was at this time, following Mao's death, that the KPD/ML became 'fixated on Albania', according to the same article, marking the end of its Maoist phase.27
1 - B. Schaefer, 'Ostpolitik, “Fernostpolitik,” and Sino-Soviet Rivalry' in C. Fink, B. Schaefer (eds.), Ostpolitik 1969-1974 (Washington DC, 2009), pp. 129-37.
2 - RM 10/1972 pp. 1-2.
3 - RM May/1970, p. 8.
4 - RM 08/1970, pp. 1-5.
5 - Kühn, Stalins Enkel, pp. 123-5.
6 - W.E. Griffith, The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge and London, 1978), pp. 190-2.
7 - M.E. Sarotte, Dealing with the Devil (North Carolina, 2001), pp. 68-9.
8 - Griffith, The Ostpolitik, p. 193.
9 - M. Geyer, 'Cold War Angst' in H. Schissler (ed.), The Miracle Years (Princeton and Oxford, 2001), pp. 379-85.
10 - Schaefer, 'Ostpolitik, “Fernostpolitik”', pp. 137-47.
11 - J. Camilleri, Chinese Foreign Policy (Oxford, 1980), p. 140.
12 - Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War (New York, 2004), pp. 17-23.
13 - Kühn, Stalins Enkel, pp. 126-31.
14 - Benicke, 'Von Adorno', pp. 103-7.
15 - RM 33/1975 Insert, p. 1.
16 - RM 05/1975, p. 6.
17 - RM 33/1975 Insert, p. 7.
18 - RM 14/1975, p. 6.
19 - RM 05/1974, p. 6.
20 - RM 03/1975, pp. 2-4.
21 - RM 05/1974, pp. 6-7.
22 - RM 32/1974, p 6.
23 - Alexander, Maoism, pp. 20-1.
24 - E. Wolfrum, Die Geglückte Demokratie (Stuttgart, 2006), pp. 305-15.
25 - M. Fulbrook, German National Identity after the Holocaust (Oxford,1999), pp. 179-202.
26 - M. Fulbrook, The People's State (New Haven and London, 2005), pp. 24-33.
27 - Der Spiegel 43/1978, pp. 82-3.