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kasama-rl
11th April 2011, 01:05
Vern Gray has written a pointed essay on the communist controversy over class truth.. Over the next week, we will be publishing excerpts of this work on Kasama (http://kasamaproject.org). Meanwhile we urge you to read the whole thing, which appears in three parts on our sister site Khurkuri. Class Truth – An Essential Concept

by Vern Gray


Part 1: Reality, Truth and Reflection (http://www.khukuritheory.net/on-the-concept-of-class-truth-i/)
Part 2: Class Truths in the Natural Sciences (http://www.khukuritheory.net/on-the-concept-of-class-truth-ii/)
Part 3: Interpreting or Contemplating the World, and Changing It (http://www.khukuritheory.net/on-the-concept-of-class-truth-iii/)

* * * * * * * *
Intro by Mike Ely
We live in a world of deception and self deception. The most basic features of capitalist society, including exploitation itself, are shrouded in mystical veils. Wars are launched and waged based on lies that hide the real interests for which people kill and die.
For those reasons alone, truth is a life and death matter.
Meanwhile, to change the world, large numbers of people need to know their society deeply and dynamically. Imagine how ambitious it is for the formerly oppressed to aspire to be masters of society. Here are the powerless, the despised, the untrained, the once passive, the often illiterate, the constantly desperate — and yet through a revolutionary process (of training, struggle, summation and transformation) something new has to emerge.
For that reason too, the partisans of a revolutionary movement need methods for uncovering what is true and what is not.
Among communists there are important explorations and long-standing controversies surrounding the question of truth. Vern Gray has waded into those waters in an ambitious way. He starts by laying bare the importance of these issues — and revisiting key concepts and questions. And in the process he carefully constructs a polemical argument in defense of a communist concept of “class truth.”
This involves, among other things, the question of how much truth exists and emerges independent of the interests of sharply antagonistic forces in human society. It ask what the role of practice (including class struggle) is in deepening human understandings. And it involves a much needed critique of certain forms of scientism.
Vern writes in his opening page:
“In one of several contradictory sets of theses, the old International Communist Movement held that the proletariat had no interest in perpetuating any form of exploitation or oppression; and by the same token it had no interest in maintaining any illusions. Yet it came to interpret the class interests of the proletariat in such a way as to ensure that some illusions would be maintained and others created. In this way those conceived interests were allowed, time and again, to override the truth.”
In other words, communists have argued that they (being the conscious representatives of a coming liberation) have no interest in promoting falsehoods, and yet (in key moments of our history) new socialist states developed mythologies and expedient self-justifications that were (often crudely) far from truth.
How do we understand this experience? Where do we go from here?
In a footnote [#73], Vern raises one major historical controversy as an example, and intersects with discussions (http://kasamaproject.org/2010/11/05/historical-socialism-and-stalin-need-better-defenders/) we have held here on Kasama:
“One major measure of the real damage done by political truth in the history of the ICM concerns the Great Purges in the USSR. If the purges are not summed up, then a form of political truth is perpetuated.”
Challenging an idealist denial of class truth… that downgrades the role of practice
In addition, Vern Gray is engaging a more recent controversy of the communist movement in the United States.
A few years ago, Bob Avakian (of the Revolutionary Communist Party) announced (http://revcom.us/a/1262/avakian-epistemology.htm) that he had made (over two decades earlier) an “epistemological rupture” with the previous communist movement on this question of truth — and specifically in his rejection of the concept of class truth.
He said:
“From the time of Conquer the World [1981] (http://revcom.us/bob_avakian/conquerworld/)I have been bringing forward an epistemological rupture with a lot of the history of the ICM , including China and the GPCR [Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution], which had this thing arguing that there is such a thing as proletarian truth and bourgeois truth.”
This startling revelation of a previously unnoticed rupture forms the philosophical leg of Avakian’s assertion that he has created a new synthesis of communist theory — and that his work is a world-historic development-and-negation of previous Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.
Vern Gray explores this assertion (in a detailed set of endnotes) — and argues that while the previous communist movement had a troubled relationship to truth (both in theory and in its production of ideas), Avakian’s approach involves a mistaken attempt to resolve those important controversies.
This short excerpt from Vern’s essay (from note46) gives a sense of how that line struggle is joined:
“When the RCP’s new [I]Constitution was published in 2008, it contained a new formulation by Bob Avakian regarding the “theory/practice/theory dynamic”:
‘There is a back-and-forth interaction between the development of line and the transformation of the world that drives this whole process. This is the theory/practice/theory dynamic, and it is the heart of party life.’
“Avakian’s description of this dynamic is as follows:
‘proceeding at any given time on the basis of our theory and line, as determined collectively and through the structures, channels and processes of the party; extracting lessons from our practice and raising these up to the level of theoretical abstraction, but also drawing from many other sources (including the thinking and insights of others), and applying the scientific outlook and method of communism, dialectical materialism, to repeatedly synthesize all this to a higher level, in the development of and through the wrangling over theory and line—which is then returned to and carried out in practice, on what should be a deepened and enriched basis. And on . . . and on . . . and on . . .’
“I want to call attention here to the fact that while a party’s own practice is correctly referred to as only one of the sources of knowledge, there is only a vague reference to “extracting lessons” from it. After a new line is formulated, the party “carries it out” in practice. There is no sense here that the party’s line is being tested in practice or that it is being determined whether it corresponds to the objective world. With this weak link between practice and theory, it is not at all clear how or why the theoretical line ‘should be’ deepened and enriched. Contrast all this with Mao’s explanation of the relation of practice to theory, in which practice is clearly principal overall and is the site where it is seen whether ideas accurately anticipate, or predict, the actual results of practice…”
A theme runs through Vern Gray’s essay that we need a radical new leap in communist understandings (including in our philosophy of truth), but that this leap still lies ahead of us as a challenge. And, then, best of all, he sketches valuable lines of inquiry on this important question of truth — for us to explore and debate.

black magick hustla
11th April 2011, 01:50
As a physicist, I read the second section. I think there are some problems.

1) The article assumes all philosophers are continental. In the ango-american academe, most philosophers are analytical, so the problem of Subject-Object is not posed in the same terms as in Europe, where "post-structuralists" were the disciples of Kant. Most analytical philosophers are non-reductionist Physicalists so the "Subject-Object" problem is not even considered.

2) Some post-structuralists were really excited about quantum physics and special relativity, because it gave credence to their emphasis on the "subject" i.e. the observer. I think this is looking to hard into quantum mechanics and is rooted on an inability to consider the history of Modern Physics thought. Quantum Mechanics is a mathematical formalism to encompass certain results in labs that boggled the mind of a lot of scientists. There is no existential problem in the issue. Quantum Mechanics is nothing more than a mathematical framework, a tool - it does not say anything except it gives good results. Beyond understanding that, there is a no-man's philosophical land.

ChrisK
11th April 2011, 02:53
I'll post on this sometime this week.

black magick hustla
11th April 2011, 03:08
there is no class true there is just what is true. shit isnt true or false because somebody said it

ChrisK
12th April 2011, 18:30
Okay, I've read part one and have a critique of it. I don't disagree that classes have different perspectives, but I do have some problems with the article.

Introduction
Early on, it is claimed that


To determine whether something is true, there has to be some way of verifying it.

This assumes that the correspondence theory of truth is true, without having a way of showing that it is true. While he argues for the correspondence theory of truth, he does so without any appeal to practice, which is his verification principle. In other words, the claim is that practice determines truth, and correspondence theory of truth is true, which is considered true without practice.

Reality
The claims about reality are non-sense. These are serious metaphysical claims that were shown to be non-sense here (http://www.revleft.com/vb/all-philosophical-theories-t148537/index.html).

Further there are two materialist assumptions that are made in this article.


[Matter] undergoes continual change that is driven by the unity and struggle of contradictions.

I would love for anyone to prove that matter is comprised of a unity and struggle of contradictions. I have yet to see any contradictions in matter and have yet to seen this proven.


[Matter] tends to be organized into various configurations, aggregations, and structures that are themselves subject to change, coming into existence and passing away.

Does all of matter do this? Proton's would be comprised of matter in this case (being comprised of quarks), but proton's do not appear to change according to proton decay. This is an example of matter that does not change.

Truth
The main problem with this section is how it treats truth as an object. A general objection to this would be that the way truth claims function are as predicates and not names. The basic form of this proposition is "x is true." We also say "It is true that x." Truth is used as a predicate, not a name.

At the same time, the article makes claims that "truth is forged" which is treating a predicate as a name. This is an illegitimate use of the word "true".

The other problem is that of correspondence. The article here defends the correspondence theory of truth by claiming that truth corresponds to things in reality. This general view of truth fails because there are many truths that do not correspond to things in reality. For example, we know that "0+0=0", but we have nothing in reality that corresponds to this.

Class Truth
Here we have the problem of reality and truth. The author is claiming that investigating about the world, changes reality. Not only is this claim unsubstantiated, it is non-sensical. This is a strong metaphysical claim, which implies that reality is ideal and not material, which contradicts the earlier position that reality is material.

Further, the problem is compounded in the learning example. The claim is that a pollster who is looking for information, learns something and the person being polled also learns something. That is a serious stretch. How on Earth is the pollee changed? Claiming they learned something is not necessarily true, nor do they have a different perspective from their participation.

Also, the claim is made that if the pollster were a revolutionary gave the poll it would be different. How? That makes no sense.

Anyway, thats what I have so far. I'll look at part two later.

Edit: I forgot to add that the use of practice as a reason for truth is illegitimate. This ties them to the pragmatic theory of truth, which relies on the correspondence theory of truth. The problem with this is that it means anything at all can be true so long as practice makes it so. This makes Ptolemaic physics true because in practice the Sun revolves around the Earth.

Revmind84
10th May 2011, 14:53
Objective truth, not class truth

syndicat
14th May 2011, 00:18
well, a lot of very vague, obscure and silly things are said in the first part of this piece, which is all I could get myself to read.

It's possible the author is referring to what is sometimes called a "standpoint" theory. That is, working people in virtue of their day to day relaities of life, their subordinate position in work, the lack of respect and freedom accorded to them, their experience in struggles and so on, have a source for acquiring knowledge which others who do not share their class position do not have. this is called a "class standpoint theory." It's an epistemological position. And it has a certain plausibility.

But a "class standpoint" is a way of acquiring knowledge, a form of access to evidence and understanding of circumstances.

This doesn't make it a form of "truth". What's noteworthy about this piece is that he never really says what a truth is. That is, what is it that has the property of being true or false? In philosophy, these are sometimes called the truth-bearers, the things that can have the property of being true (or being false).

I would say that representations have this property, that is, sentences or beliefs. And this is what one should say if one subscribes to a realist theory of truth, as the author of this piece seems to do.

so the "truths" are sentences or beliefs or statements. Now, it's possible the author is trying to say that some true statements or beliefs, of working class people, are warranted in virtue of the experiences from their standpoint...including practical activities in struggles against employers and in other situations arising due to their class situation.

but it's not clear from the first piece what all he's trying to make of this.

Meridian
14th May 2011, 00:38
shit isnt true or false because somebody said itStatements are true or false, not objects.

black magick hustla
14th May 2011, 17:00
shit=statements

ZeroNowhere
15th May 2011, 07:32
shit=statementsI suppose that this would make the early Wittgenstein a scatologist.

ar734
15th May 2011, 17:49
Statements are true or false, not objects.

There is a tree. The statement is either true or false.

Whether the statement is true or false depends on whether a tree is there or not. So truth is dependent on, or relates to, the existence or non-existence of objects.

ar734
15th May 2011, 18:11
As a physicist, I read the second section. I think there are some problems.



As a physicist can you tell me, on the molecular level, how exactly does ice change or transition to water? Does the hydrogen bond between molecules break, and then, if a certain number break the transition happens? And when the bond breaks is it sudden, gradual, etc?

black magick hustla
15th May 2011, 20:19
As a physicist can you tell me, on the molecular level, how exactly does ice change or transition to water? Does the hydrogen bond between molecules break, and then, if a certain number break the transition happens? And when the bond breaks is it sudden, gradual, etc?
what is the point? when physicists talk about the change of a substance to another it has a practical purpose. it doesn't really matter where you put the "node", it has a very arbitrary aspect and the arbitrariness depends on how easier it makes a chemist/physicists life.

black magick hustla
15th May 2011, 21:28
There is a tree. The statement is either true or false.

Whether the statement is true or false depends on whether a tree is there or not. So truth is dependent on, or relates to, the existence or non-existence of objects.
but objects cannot be true.

Meridian
16th May 2011, 01:48
There is a tree. The statement is either true or false.

Whether the statement is true or false depends on whether a tree is there or not. So truth is dependent on, or relates to, the existence or non-existence of objects.
We do indeed say that some statements are true or false depending on the existence of objects, but not all. "Santa Claus is a generous character", for example. This sentence can be true without the character actually existing.

Most specifically, if a sentence claims that an object exists, its truth is surprisingly enough dependent on whether the object exists.

"I like the color of that dress." This sentence is true or false depending on whether I actually like the color. If there is no dress there that I could be referring to, then I have misspoken, I have thought I saw a dress while there was in fact something else, etc.

That I like the color of that dress remains the point which is stated as true. A listener could not object with "that dress does not exist", since this is a grammatical mistake of mine and not an empirical one. We say "X does not exist" describing something which is fictional, merely an imagination or unreal in some way, whereas "that dress" was an unwarranted use of the terms to begin with.

If the listener objected with "there is no dress there", I would not respond with "then it is not true that I like the color of that dress". As you notice, this makes equally little sense as my original sentence.

syndicat
18th May 2011, 19:12
We do indeed say that some statements are true or false depending on the existence of objects, but not all. "Santa Claus is a generous character", for example. This sentence can be true without the character actually existing.



this is not a representational use of a sentence. it's about a story. we can preface it with "in the Santa Claus myth...." but then we've changed the subject. we're no longer ostensibly referring to some guy. we're talking about what is contained in this myth or story.

now it would be false to say "Ebenezer Scrooge is a generous character." that's because, in the Scrooge tale, he's not generous. again, to have a representation that is true or false, you have to take it as a statement about what is contained in the story, not as an ostensible statement about Scrooge.

now stories and myths do exist. and there are things about them that are true or not true.

ar734
18th May 2011, 20:20
what is the point? when physicists talk about the change of a substance to another it has a practical purpose. it doesn't really matter where you put the "node", it has a very arbitrary aspect and the arbitrariness depends on how easier it makes a chemist/physicists life.

My point was that if a qualitative (say, water to steam) transition occurs when there is a "break" with no intermediate stage then that would seem to be dialectical. Doesn't the hydrogen bond in water do just that? It is there, then at some point (after enough heat has been added) it is not there? I don't mean all the hydrogen bonds all at once, just one bond between two water molecules.