Theological Noncognitivism

[graymouser]

So ChristoferKoch in a recent thread was talking about the position that:


Arguments about God are simply non-sense. It makes no sense to say that "God exists" and it makes no sense to say that "God does not exist"
This is the basic position of theological noncognitivism, which denies not the existence of God but the meaningfulness of religious language to describe anything at all. In George Smith's book Atheism: the Case Against God, one of the main works I've read that goes into noncognitivism, he compares the word "God" to the nonce word "unie," and says that the statement "God exists" is no more meaningful than the statement "an unie exists."

I think noncognitivism has a lot going for it. It's not vulnerable to theodicy or appeals to increasingly vague deities that may just exist anyway, like any other positive atheist arguments. The problem is justifying it.

It seems like most of the atheists who hold to noncognitivist arguments use a falsification-based epistemology to back up the charge of the word "God" being meaningless. But falsificationism hasn't fared so well since Popper, and it's generally not terribly compatible with leftist thought. So what do leftist noncognitivists use to justify the meaninglessness of the word? How can we get to "the word 'God' means nothing"?

[ChrisK]

Not at all. It is a Wittgensteinian approach which asks what account can be given of the word linguistically. In other words, while the word may carry some personal significance for someone, it does not have a public meaning for all people to understand. We then need to remember that language is an inherently public thing, so if a word does not have a public meaning that can be expressed, it is non-sense.

[ComradeMan]

Not at all. It is a Wittgensteinian approach which asks what account can be given of the word linguistically. In other words, while the word may carry some personal significance for someone, it does not have a public meaning for all people to understand. We then need to remember that language is an inherently public thing, so if a word does not have a public meaning that can be expressed, it is non-sense.

Who decided that?

What about Polyani's "I know more than I can tell"?

[Kronsteen]

what do leftist noncognitivists use to justify the meaninglessness of the word? How can we get to "the word 'God' means nothing"?

Ask a religious believer. Listen to their vague, abstract answer. Let's say that's "God is love".

Ask the same believer a week later. Perhaps they say "God is the source of morals".

Ask a load of other believers at different times. "God is the most perfect", "God is my best friend", "God is a father to us all", "God is the one who punishes evil", "God is the creator", "God is the way and the light", "God is Jesus", "God is the father of Jesus", "God is beyond all categories".

So what have you got? A big heap of contradictory and unclear slogans, used to justify whatever believers want at the time. That's what god is.

[ChrisK]

Who decided that?

To quote The Social Network, "Which part?"


What about Polyani's "I know more than I can tell"?

No clue who that is. Unless you mean Polanyi, but even then, he would be wrong. Please tell me, to paraphrase Aristotle, how would one know something without being aware that they know it? Certainly they might not think about it too often, but how does one have knowledge that cannot be known? That makes no sense.

[ComradeMan]

To quote The Social Network, "Which part?"



No clue who that is. Unless you mean Polanyi, but even then, he would be wrong. Please tell me, to paraphrase Aristotle, how would one know something without being aware that they know it? Certainly they might not think about it too often, but how does one have knowledge that cannot be known? That makes no sense.

Sorry for the typo- but who are you to say outright he is wrong? :confused:

Polanyi was noted for the idea of tacit knowledge or something.

What about instinct? Is that not a form on inate knowledge?

[ChrisK]

Sorry for the typo- but who are you to say outright he is wrong? :confused:

Polanyi was noted for the idea of tacit knowledge or something.

What about instinct? Is that not a form on inate knowledge?

You are misusing the word "knowledge". Instincts are not a type of knowledge, one does not know things that are instincts. Knowledge is an inherently conscious and explicit thing. That is how the word is used in our everyday language.

[Revolution starts with U]

He is a person. Any person can say someone is outright wrong. And the weight of Aristotle's criticism next to Joe Blow's criticism are equal in value. The only thing that can tip the scales is proof.
It's basically a reverse appeal to authority to even ask the question "who are you to say someone is wrong."

[graymouser]

Not at all. It is a Wittgensteinian approach which asks what account can be given of the word linguistically. In other words, while the word may carry some personal significance for someone, it does not have a public meaning for all people to understand. We then need to remember that language is an inherently public thing, so if a word does not have a public meaning that can be expressed, it is non-sense.
I don't think I would feel comfortable with that approach to noncognitivism. Given that there is a popular conception of a "spirit" (i.e. a disembodied mind) and God is considered to be some such spirit, to say that it's simply nonsense is claiming way too easy of a victory. I'm not arguing at all for a deity or even against noncognitivism, just that this particular justification seems too facile.

[ChrisK]

I don't think I would feel comfortable with that approach to noncognitivism. Given that there is a popular conception of a "spirit" (i.e. a disembodied mind) and God is considered to be some such spirit, to say that it's simply nonsense is claiming way too easy of a victory. I'm not arguing at all for a deity or even against noncognitivism, just that this particular justification seems too facile.

My approach, while it can use the ordinary meaning of something like spirit, would point out that "god" is not always defined as a "spirit" but that the definition is a floating one. IE the word itself has no meaning.

Also, it can be argued that propositions about god are non-sense because you cannot give an account for how the world would have to be for what is said about "god" to be true.

[Thirsty Crow]

But falsificationism hasn't fared so well since Popper, and it's generally not terribly compatible with leftist thought.Can you explain this?

[Revolution starts with U]

I think spirit is another nonsense term that changes with every usage. Is it spirit as in the "spirit of america" or spirit as in "we have spirit?"
One use seems to suggest the essence of something, or what makes something what it is. But the other is slightly different, suggesting spirit is more like a muse, or a thing to be used.

[ChrisK]

Can you explain this?

Popper claimed that historical materialism cannot be falsified, making Marxism non-scientific.

[graymouser]

My approach, while it can use the ordinary meaning of something like spirit, would point out that "god" is not always defined as a "spirit" but that the definition is a floating one. IE the word itself has no meaning.
Does this approach rule out a lot of other terms as nonsensical from the outset? I would see the question of consistency on this being a problem with actually using this argument for noncognitivism. So you can say that "God" is nonsense, but concepts such as "freedom" also seem to be difficult to pin down. Not being familiar with Wittgenstein beyond some vague summaries I've read, I'm genuinely wondering how you draw these lines.


Also, it can be argued that propositions about god are non-sense because you cannot give an account for how the world would have to be for what is said about "god" to be true.
Now, that's an interesting angle, and I like it. You cannot reconcile our world with anything described as "God," either because the term is inadequately defined, or because the description does not square with the world. Therefore we cannot say the term is sufficiently described.

[ChrisK]

Does this approach rule out a lot of other terms as nonsensical from the outset? I would see the question of consistency on this being a problem with actually using this argument for noncognitivism. So you can say that "God" is nonsense, but concepts such as "freedom" also seem to be difficult to pin down. Not being familiar with Wittgenstein beyond some vague summaries I've read, I'm genuinely wondering how you draw these lines.

Philosophical terms for the most part. We draw these lines by asking how is the word used in ordinary language. Words like "God" don't seem to have a meaning in ordinary language other than some vague feeling.


Now, that's an interesting angle, and I like it. You cannot reconcile our world with anything described as "God," either because the term is inadequately defined, or because the description does not square with the world. Therefore we cannot say the term is sufficiently described.

I prefer this version too.

[graymouser]

Can you explain this?
Aside from what ChristoferKoch said, Popper's falsification is simply bunk from how the scientific method works. His concept was that scientific ideas falsify previous, less accurate ones - when science works in the opposite way, basing itself on being more true and therefore able to consider more positive criteria. We can see this in the current impasse of theoretical physics: both General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics are held to be true because they positively relate to specific phenomena, but at extremes of small and large matter they break down. However, when a "Theory of Everything" is discovered it won't displace the Standard Model except at the fine points where the SM already breaks down. For most of the universe, the Standard Model works, it's mostly in cosmology and fine detail that it doesn't produce accurate results.