How do you Resolve the Problem of Infinite Regress for Epistemic Justification

[¿Que?]

1. Knowledge is justified true belief
2. If S is justified in believing p based on q, then q must be justified.
3. But if S must be justified in believing q based on r, then r too must also be justified.
4. and so on and so on.

This is the problem of infinite regress. How do you resolve it?

[turquino]

We could just scratch out the 'true' part of 1. Then there is no constraint on what q justifies p other than that S justifies it. Justification for knowledge becomes holistic: p is justified by q,r,s,etc., which are in turn justified by p. It's like a big dictionary of all our knowledge in which we keep looking up justifications only to find they reference other definitions of justification and each other. There is no linear infinite regress because none of the justifications can be pulled out of this holistic system of knowledge and still be justifications. This, I think, is the antifoundationalist response to these sort of questions about knowledge.

[JazzRemington]

Depends on what you mean by "justified," probably. The reality of the situation is not that justifications need come to an end, but that they eventually come to the point where they don't make any sense and thus are of no use according to this paradigm.

And you'd have to explain how 1) is not subject to your argument because according to the rest of it, it should be. It even seems like a tautology if one were to make actual use of the word as it's defined.

[Meridian]

1. Knowledge is justified true belief
"He has a lot of knowledge".

Words are determined by their use, the words themselves can not determine how we use them. The meaning of a word can not merely be other words, or else we would never be able to understand language. Describing the meaning of a word, naturally using words, can only really be a helpful act, no essential definition can be made. This includes "knowledge". Instead of attempting to derive the true nature of such a thing, you should simply try and research in which ways the word is being used by those who speak English (or the equivalent word in other languages).

[Technocrat]

We could just scratch out the 'true' part of 1. Then there is no constraint on what q justifies p other than that S justifies it. Justification for knowledge becomes holistic: p is justified by q,r,s,etc., which are in turn justified by p. It's like a big dictionary of all our knowledge in which we keep looking up justifications only to find they reference other definitions of justification and each other. There is no linear infinite regress because none of the justifications can be pulled out of this holistic system of knowledge and still be justifications. This, I think, is the antifoundationalist response to these sort of questions about knowledge.

I've heard this argument before, but it still seems like an infinite regress to me:

p is justified by a set of beliefs (q, r, s, etc)

q, r, s, etc are justified by p.

How is that not circular? It might not be a linear infinite regress, but it is still objectionable in that some belief would ultimately be its own justification for believing it, although through a series of beliefs (a justifies b, b justifies c, c justifies d, ... justifies a).

One of the most recent discussions I've seen on this topic is between Laurence Bonjour and Michael Devitt "There is no a priori." I'd have to give the debate to Devitt, although the answer he provides is still far from definitive in my opinion.

[Meridian]

I've heard this argument before, but it still seems like an infinite regress to me:

p is justified by a set of beliefs (q, r, s, etc)

q, r, s, etc are justified by p.

How is that not circular? It might not be a linear infinite regress, but it is still objectionable in that some belief would ultimately be its own justification for believing it, although through a series of beliefs (a justifies b, b justifies c, c justifies d, ... justifies a).

One of the most recent discussions I've seen on this topic is between Laurence Bonjour and Michael Devitt "There is no a priori." I'd have to give the debate to Devitt, although the answer he provides is still far from definitive in my opinion.
The problem is with the number 1 point made in the original post. Knowledge is a term used in many different ways, and saying f.ex. that "she has knowledge of politics" does not mean anything like 'justified true belief'. In fact, attempting to find any essential meaning to the word "knowledge", or discovering what it 'really is', simply by using other words, is a dead end. We do not strip away the clothes of reality by reordering our words, we only create malformed sentences.

This is word juggling, which can tend to produce such inconsequential 'problems' of paradoxes and circular reasoning.

[¿Que?]

We could just scratch out the 'true' part of 1. Then there is no constraint on what q justifies p other than that S justifies it. Justification for knowledge becomes holistic: p is justified by q,r,s,etc., which are in turn justified by p. It's like a big dictionary of all our knowledge in which we keep looking up justifications only to find they reference other definitions of justification and each other. There is no linear infinite regress because none of the justifications can be pulled out of this holistic system of knowledge and still be justifications. This, I think, is the antifoundationalist response to these sort of questions about knowledge.
This is the coherence theory, and I believe technocrat provides an adequate response. In any case, if you take out the "true" part, then you'd be claiming that all justified beliefs are knowledge, when in fact some justified beliefs can be false, in which case, they can't very well be knowledge, can they?


Depends on what you mean by "justified," probably. The reality of the situation is not that justifications need come to an end, but that they eventually come to the point where they don't make any sense and thus are of no use according to this paradigm.

And you'd have to explain how 1) is not subject to your argument because according to the rest of it, it should be. It even seems like a tautology if one were to make actual use of the word as it's defined.
Justification is difficult to define. A justified belief is one in which we have good reasons to believe it, but what constitutes a good reason?


"He has a lot of knowledge".

Words are determined by their use, the words themselves can not determine how we use them. The meaning of a word can not merely be other words, or else we would never be able to understand language. Describing the meaning of a word, naturally using words, can only really be a helpful act, no essential definition can be made. This includes "knowledge". Instead of attempting to derive the true nature of such a thing, you should simply try and research in which ways the word is being used by those who speak English (or the equivalent word in other languages).
"he has a lot of knowledge" is a proposition. That proposition is either true or false. Knowledge in the way epistemologists use it is defined by the conditions that a proposition is true, and that an individual is justified inn believing the proposition, and do. See 1).



One of the most recent discussions I've seen on this topic is between Laurence Bonjour and Michael Devitt "There is no a priori." I'd have to give the debate to Devitt, although the answer he provides is still far from definitive in my opinion.
I'll have to check this out. It sounds interesting :thumbup1:

Unfortunately, you are all wrong. The correct answer is that justification is based on social context. See here: http://www.jstor.org/pss/20009716

[syndicat]

the problem with the argument is that it assumes that justifications always occur by way of linear chains of reasoning....A believes P by inferring it from Q, A believes Q by inferring it from S, etc.

but in fact justification isn't always by linear chains of reasoning. when people reason by the method of hypothesis...coming up with a hypothesis to explain something they observe...this is not a linear chain of reasoning. hypotheses can mutually support each other like a web or network.

[JazzRemington]

Justification is difficult to define. A justified belief is one in which we have good reasons to believe it, but what constitutes a good reason?

You'll have to explain that, not me. Otherwise, your idiosyncratic definition of "knowledge" won't work because the inability to explain what you mean by "good reason" renders the definition nonsensical - which means it cannot be true or false. By the standards provided, it would mean 1) would be unjustified and thus the entire argument would fall apart.

What's wrong with just having knowledge? This is the way the word works in ordinary language and has been used meaningfully for god knows how long. Why is this not acceptable? Because it doesn't mesh with your idiosyncratic definition that has no affect on how the word is normally used?

[Meridian]

"he has a lot of knowledge" is a proposition. That proposition is either true or false. Knowledge in the way epistemologists use it is defined by the conditions that a proposition is true, and that an individual is justified inn believing the proposition, and do. See 1).
See my response. They/you are creating an illicit problem, or an inconsequential one, because what they/you engage in is word juggling. "Knowledge" is not used that way. You can have knowledge of something, and this does not have anything to do with justified beliefs. "She has knowledge of politics", for example. Separate terms with separate uses. Words can not rely on each other for meaning, only their common usage.

Common usage is out in the open. If you are having problems with understanding what knowledge is, you are having a problem with the English language.

[¿Que?]

"Knowledge" is not used that way.
Exactly how does the proposition "S knows that p is true" constitute an unorthodox use of the word knowledge? The problem is only partly linguistic, but you have to acknowledge the epistemic dimension. "She knows politics" is one use of the word, and "she knows that Obama is a politician" is a different usage. Politics is only a word, whereas "Obama is a politician" is a proposition. Both are valid use of the word, however, I am referring specifically to the latter.


but in fact justification isn't always by linear chains of reasoning. when people reason by the method of hypothesis...coming up with a hypothesis to explain something they observe...this is not a linear chain of reasoning. hypotheses can mutually support each other like a web or network.
But a web or netowrk of hypothesis will result in circular logic. It may be internally consistent, but it does not suggest any knowledge.


You'll have to explain that, not me. Otherwise, your idiosyncratic definition of "knowledge" won't work because the inability to explain what you mean by "good reason" renders the definition nonsensical - which means it cannot be true or false. By the standards provided, it would mean 1) would be unjustified and thus the entire argument would fall apart.

What's wrong with just having knowledge? This is the way the word works in ordinary language and has been used meaningfully for god knows how long. Why is this not acceptable? Because it doesn't mesh with your idiosyncratic definition that has no affect on how the word is normally used?
Are you against systematic use of words then? What then of pretty much every scientific discipline ever invented? Science makes language formal and systematic in order to understand the world. It cannot rely on normal usage, because normal usage varies too much depending on context.

[Meridian]

Are you against systematic use of words then? What then of pretty much every scientific discipline ever invented? Science makes language formal and systematic in order to understand the world. It cannot rely on normal usage, because normal usage varies too much depending on context.
Ordinary language is systematic use of words.

Many sciences, other fields and various subcultures employ technical language, but they are not exempt from having to follow normal language as well, in their every day lives. Insofar as they use ordinary language in a technical manner, they either follow the conventions already existent or they alter it, creating new terms, which does not describe what is already covered by ordinary language. They do not attempt to alter the ordinary language itself, which after all works perfectly well, for billions of people every day.

[ar734]

This is the problem of infinite regress. How do you resolve it?

First, there is no such thing as infinite regression. The universe is not infinitely old. If you look at the knowledge of "capitalism", it is not an infinite regression. Capitalism developed out of real, finite, concrete, social and economic circumstances. It developed out of feudalism. Feudalism developed from the collapse of slavery. Slavery developed from the early stages of family, tribe, clan, etc.

Or take the evolution of human beings. They developed over millions of years from early primates. There is nothing infinite about this regression. It can be specifically studied and described.

Determining the origin of knowledge is extremely difficult, but not impossible. Every few years a giant intellect comes along who expands our understanding of knowledge; unfortunately in the last 75 yrs these intellects have not shown up, except maybe for Hawking.

[JazzRemington]

Are you against systematic use of words then? What then of pretty much every scientific discipline ever invented? Science makes language formal and systematic in order to understand the world. It cannot rely on normal usage, because normal usage varies too much depending on context.

Like Meridian said, language is pretty much systematic use of words. When a scientist makes use of a word in a very narrow and specialized manner, he/she doesn't make any broader claim as to the meaning of the word in general. It's just providing another context in which the word can be used in a specific way. When philosophers use words, they try to find the meaning behind the word as if it existed in the abstract and as if their "findings" work for all instances of the word. This is what epistemologists are doing: they're assigning an a-priori substantive definition to a word and then trying to make an argument as to the substantive nature of the word.

And you aren't trying to compare philosophy to science, are you?

[syndicat]

But a web or netowrk of hypothesis will result in circular logic. It may be internally consistent, but it does not suggest any knowledge.


your objection begs the question. that's because "circularity" is defined as a defect of a linear chain of reasoning.

if we deduce C from a series of steps starting only with premises P1 and P2, and if C just is another way of stating P1 or P2, or if there is no possibility of having any reason to believe P1 or P2 without this being based on C, then this is called "circular". but note that this is a linear chain of reasoning because C depends on only P1 and P2.

but with a web of mutually supporting hypotheses there is not just the linear chain of A depending on B depending on C and so on, there are side-to-side supports in terms of a hypothesis fitting with other hypotheses that we have independent reasons to accept.

[ar734]

but with a web of mutually supporting hypotheses there is not just the linear chain of A depending on B depending on C and so on, there are side-to-side supports in terms of a hypothesis fitting with other hypotheses that we have independent reasons to accept.

There is no logical reason why a "web" of hypotheses cannot be a circular argument. If enough of the strands or "side to side supports" refer or relate back to the original strands, then the argument becomes circular, or more accurately, spherical. There would necessarily be a lot of loose strands; you would have to use judgment to decide at what point the argument is spherical.

[syndicat]

There is no logical reason why a "web" of hypotheses cannot be a circular argument. If enough of the strands or "side to side supports" refer or relate back to the original strands, then the argument becomes circular, or more accurately, spherical.

your reply makes "circularity" so vague as to be meaningless. this is a pretty desperate gambit.

[ar734]

your reply makes "circularity" so vague as to be meaningless. this is a pretty desperate gambit.

Not really. A line that turns back on itself is a metaphor of a "circular" argument. A web that turns back on itself is a metaphor of a three dimensional circle, or a sphere. Just because you transform a line into a web does not remove the possibility of a circular argument.

[syndicat]

Just because you transform a line into a web does not remove the possibility of a circular argument.

if there's no longer that single line of transmission of justification, it makes no sense...in geometry or in logic...to talk about "circularity".

[ar734]

:laugh:
if there's no longer that single line of transmission of justification, it makes no sense...in geometry or in logic...to talk about "circularity".

Why not? A web can easily turn back on itself and become a sphere. If a depends on b,c...which depends on d,e,f....which is defined by a,b,c..All conclusions, although containing multiple lines, are still defined by the original proposition.

This is simply re-defining the linear, circular argument as a multi-linear, three-dimensional spherical argument. The invalidity of the argument is still proved.

[syndicat]

Why not? A web can easily turn back on itself and become a sphere. If a depends on b,c...which depends on d,e,f....which is defined by a,b,c..All conclusions, although containing multiple lines, are still defined by the original proposition.



you've just described a linear chain of reasoning, not an abductive web of supporting hypotheses. i think you should try to find out about what adductive reasoning, the method of hypothesis and test, is all about before talking about it.

[ar734]

you've just described a linear chain of reasoning, not an abductive web of supporting hypotheses. i think you should try to find out about what adductive reasoning, the method of hypothesis and test, is all about before talking about it.

You should learn how to spell; is it abductive or adductive? There is nothing about abduction which requires a "web" explanation. As: the sun appears to go around the earth; how to explain this? An abductive hypothesis says that the earth is stationary and the sun moves around it. How to prove this? Well, look at the sun going around the earth! That is a circular argument.

Adding a web of planets circling Earth does not change the circular nature of the argument.

[¿Que?]

Ok, Syndicat, I think I finally get what you're saying. If proposition p is justified and true (knowledge) it is folly to think that justification is the direct result of just one other proposition (r). p is not justified because of r, but rather, because r, s, t u, v all form a "web" of interrelated justification. More than one proposition goes into the justification of p.

If I understand correctly, that doesn't necessarily explain much. All the propositions that are used to justify p, all the evidence, such as e1, e2, e3...en, these are all a set of propositions. We will not worry about how they relate to each other, but how they relate to the proposition we are concerned with, p, so that we can know if S (a subject) actually knows p.

But each one of those proposition also requires evidence and is similar in the way they are justified as p. Now if we are talking about a closed set of propositions, a bunch of e's, then I can propose a similar set, not-e1, not-e2, not e3...not-en. How is your set more valid than mine?

It needs to be justified, and as such, you have not really solved the problem of infinite regress.

I'll get to everybody else eventually...maybe.

[Kronsteen]

The question which started this thread has a premise, and that premise is called Foundationalism.

Foundationalism is the notion that all the facts in the universe are a big branching pile, each layer supported by the layer below, down and down, until you get to a small number of extremely basic, highly abstract and general facts at the bottom, which are absolutely certain and can never be doubted.

Some people think of philosophy as the search for these founding facts, from which everything else can be built. Descartes thought he'd found two founding facts - that he was thinking...and that god wouldn't lie to him. I don't think I need to explain what's wrong with that system.

But what if the facts of the universe aren't a pile standing on solid ground, but a floating laticework, each part supporting the rest but not anchored to any fixed point?

The problem with foundationalism is that, if you can't find founding facts, you're forced either into positing an infinite pile (like the famous image of 'turtles all the way down'), or into solipsism - the notion that there is no such thing as truth because there is no absolute proof.

Some left thinkers perfer to reject foundationalism, though it is a very pervasive idea in western culture.

[syndicat]

The question which started this thread has a premise, and that premise is called Foundationalism.

Foundationalism is the notion that all the facts in the universe are a big branching pile, each layer supported by the layer below, down and down, until you get to a small number of extremely basic, highly abstract and general facts at the bottom, which are absolutely certain and can never be doubted.

Some people think of philosophy as the search for these founding facts, from which everything else can be built. Descartes thought he'd found two founding facts - that he was thinking...and that god wouldn't lie to him. I don't think I need to explain what's wrong with that system.



right. both of the people i've been responding to make this assumption. this was the dominant theme in philosophy for 300 years after Descartes.

since the '60s-'70s era foundationalism has been mostly rejected by western academic philosophy. foundationalism leads straight to idealism. this was what led to the idealism of Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Hegel, etc.

foundationalism is based on what Wilfred Sellars calls "the Myth of the Given" -- that there are immediately given facts in sense perception (and introspection) which form the foundation on which the rest of our knowledge is based. but all sense perception involves interpretation, so that it isn't possible to separate out a "pure given", apart from our interrelated hypotheses about the world.

thus basicness in the web of belief is relative. that is, some of our beliefs are closer to our actual sensory interactions with the world, things we've experienced first hand. these have more epistemic value than things further away from the interaction with facts independent of us. but in saying this, i'm saying some of our hypotheses are more fundamental, more entrenched in our beliefs than others, but we should interpret this as meaning there are more links from them to other hypotheses. if some of your hypotheses have been tested many times in your experience and continue to hold up, this makes them stronger.

another part of this is that we should condider that our cognitive faculties are evolved biological traits. we have them because they have been highly adaptive for our ancestors. we can make mistakes, but our faculties have been adapted to pick up facts about our world, the world we inhabit.

[ar734]

"the Myth of the Given" -- that there are immediately given facts in sense perception (and introspection) which form the foundation on which the rest of our knowledge is based...

we can make mistakes, but our faculties have been adapted to pick up facts about our world, the world we inhabit.

First you say facts are a "myth of the given", relative, impossible to know, and then you say our faculties are adapted to pick up "facts about our world." This is known as a contradiction.

If you want to say reality or fact is impossible to know, that is fine; Plato began this type of idealist philosophy 2500 yrs ago.

On the other hand if you claim there are facts we can know, or "pick up" then you have to abandon idealism and accept scientific rationalism.

You can't have it both ways.

1. Give us a fact which is a myth.
2. Give us a fact about our world which we pick up.

[Kronsteen]

First you say facts are a "myth of the given", relative, impossible to know, and then you say our faculties are adapted to pick up "facts about our world." This is known as a contradiction.


You are fundamentally misunderstanding the point. And sneering about it, which doesn't help.

The point that, in a non-foundationalist epistemology, facts exist relative to other facts, without being tethered down to 'superfacts' - founding, indupitable, undoubtable facts which themselves don't need to be tethered down. You're somehow conflating this with an assertion no-one's made, that observation is impossible.

In short: You're confusing epistemic relativism with solipsism.

I suggest you re-read Syndikat's post, and perhaps even my own humble one before that.

[syndicat]

First you say facts are a "myth of the given", relative, impossible to know, and then you say our faculties are adapted to pick up "facts about our world." This is known as a contradiction.



now you're putting words in my mouth. I never said that "facts are impossible to know." Go back thru my posts here and you will not find any such statement. It's a question of what knowledge is. I said that the way we know the world is thru the method of forming hypotheses to explain our experience and testing these hypotheses in practice.

On the other hand, the foundationalism you espouse does lead directly to skepticism because our claims to knowledge about reality cannot be justified on that basis.

when Wilfrid Sellars talked about "the Myth of the Given," he wasn't espousing skepticism. he wasn't saying it's impossible to know facts. he was talking about the way we acquire knowledge. it isn't by getting a direct shot at facts in a pure "given".

[¿Que?]

In my defense, I was never arguing for any set of superfacts. The problem is that circular reasoning, the only logical result from the coherentist approach (what Kronsteen and Syndicat seem to be advocating) does not resolve the problem of infinite regress and I made the point as to why when I posited another set of beliefs based on the negation of the first. One proposition, or a set of propositions still need to be justified against their negation. There has to be a reason to believe that p is true and not not-p.

I think the contextualist theory (the Annis article I posted. It's on JSTOR, if you don't have access, I will get you a copy) does resolve infinite regress, but only as relative to a certain social context. There are contextually-basic beliefs, but they only have privileged status in that particular context, they are not universal basic beliefs. It has little to do with individual justification, but rather recognizes the social character of justification.

On the issue of sense-perception, I absolutely agree that one cannot derive basic beliefs from this. The foundationalist theory also leads to circular argument. The reason I believe this is that because of sense data, we believe in sense data, but we are only aware of sense data because we believe it exists. So yes, foundationalism is not the answer, but neither is coherentism.

[ar734]

[QUOTE=Kronsteen;2074194]

In short: You're confusing epistemic relativism with solipsism.

/QUOTE]



All facts are relative, no fact is tied down, there is no solid ground of truth, all facts are tied to each other, floating on an ocean of relativity, floating like a kind of gigantic raft of plastic junk in the Pacific Ocean. Or rather like a gigantic galaxy embedded in the space-time continuum.

In this sense Heisenberg's uncertainty principle applies to any fact.

However, how does any of this apply to socialism and capitalism? Capital would be happy to accept the argument that everything is relative, that there is no fixed reality; the capitalist simply continues profiting from the existing system. There is no need to change anything because all change is relative, nothing fixed. This is probably why capital is more or less happy with the post-modern, post-marxist, post-structural attitude.

If, however, man makes his own facts, within certain limits, then socialism can destroy capitalism. These socialist facts must be real, concrete, not simply relative, otherwise a real revolution could not be accomplished.

The floating "latticework" must still be made with real material. Even solid ground can be created. Holland has been doing it for centuries.

[Kronsteen]

circular reasoning

There is a difference between a circular argument and a tautology. If there were not, arithmetic statements could never be true.


the coherentist approach (what Kronsteen and Syndicat seem to be advocating) does not resolve the problem of infinite regress

Infinte regress is only a problem in a foundationalist epistemology. That's the point.

If you're saying a 'coherentist' approach still produces chains of justification, going round and round instead of back and back, you're right.
But that's only a problem if you accept the foundationalist assumption that the chain has to be linear and finite.


I think the contextualist theory (the Annis article I posted. It's on JSTOR, if you don't have access, I will get you a copy) does resolve infinite regress, but only as relative to a certain social context. There are contextually-basic beliefs, but they only have privileged status in that particular context, they are not universal basic beliefs. It has little to do with individual justification, but rather recognizes the social character of justification.

Sounds like the later Wittgenstein. Which could be described as a multi-coherentist approach to culture as opposed to reality - that there may be many self-consistent belief system within a culture, but they're not consistent with each other.

Actually, if we're talking about cultural beliefs as opposed to scientific facts, self-consistency has never been necessary. But that's a whole other discussion.


foundationalism is not the answer, but neither is coherentism.

If you have a Third Way, I'd be very interested to hear it.

[ar734]

:blushing:[QUOTE=syndicat;2074024

Wilfred Sellars calls "the Myth of the Given" -- that there are immediately given facts in sense perception (and introspection) which form the foundation on which the rest of our knowledge is based. [/QUOTE]


You say that we can't separate facts from hypotheses about the facts. Yet you also say that there are some facts independent of us, facts about our world. But you disagree with the "foundationalists" (whatever that means) who claim that there are facts on which we base knowledge.

Either facts are dependent, relative to our hypotheses, or facts exist independently of humans. It may be true that certain social facts are dependent on humans. But there is an entire universe of facts which existed long before humans and will exist longer after humans have gone.

For instance, a dinosaur bone is a fact. But, according to Sellars there is no such thing as a dinosaur bone existing apart from human perception or hypothesis.

This kind of "philosophy" is best described as the "Poverty of Philosophy."

[Kronsteen]

Or rather like a gigantic galaxy embedded in the space-time continuum.

In this sense Heisenberg's uncertainty principle applies to any fact.

Please stop trying to misapply ideas from science to areas where they have no meaning. Deepak Chopra does that, and you don't want to be like Deepak Chopra, do you?


Capital would be happy to accept the argument that everything is relative, that there is no fixed reality;

It does accept this when convenient - even though the idea of 'everything is relative' simply doesn't imply that 'there is no fixed reality'.


If, however, man makes his own facts, within certain limits, then socialism can destroy capitalism. These socialist facts must be real, concrete, not simply relative, otherwise a real revolution could not be accomplished.

Once again you're confusing epistemic relativism with something unreal, unconcrete. Relativism is not subjectivism, any more than it's solipsism. If two objects are ten feet apart, relative to each other, that doesn't mean the distance is unreal.

[Kronsteen]

Either facts are dependent, relative to our hypotheses, or facts exist independently of humans.

You're jumping between two very different notions of 'fact'.

One is the content of a declarative sentence, and is therefore obviously influenced by factors of language, culture, history, ideology etc.

The other is something that is true in the universe whether anyone knows it or not. Something that would be the case even though it's completely undetectable and incompehensible to our limited intellects.

It's obviously pointless to try to discuss the latter - philosophers and theologins who try wind up talking gibberish. We have to restrict ourselves to the former - and take it as an article of faith that facts of the first type are enough for our purposes in a universe that's presumably composed of facts of the second type.

Though of course it may not be, because we can't know.

[ChrisK]

In my defense, I was never arguing for any set of superfacts.

Yes you are Travis. "Knowledge is justified true belief" is a claim about the nature of knowledge itself. That is a superfact.

[syndicat]

You say that we can't separate facts from hypotheses about the facts.

You are very confused. I say no such thing. If you want to respond to what I do say, it might be helpful to actually quote what you are responding to, rather than making things up.

A hypothesis is a statement or sentence. We put it forward to explain other things, such as things we have experienced. What would it mean to "separate" a hypothesis from a "fact"?

Facts are what make statements or beliefs true. Facts are ways things actually are. If I say "The lights are on in this room", this made true by the state of affairs of the lights being on. If this is the real situation, then this is a fact. That's what facts are.

If i go outside in the evening and look around the corner and see the lights on down the street, I might think "Sam's market is still open". This is a hypothesis. I accept it because it's a good explanation of what I experience. Now, I might check the hypothesis. I can do this by walking down the street and seeing if the store is actually open. It might be the case the market is closed but they left their lights on. In that case my hypothesis was false. If the store is still open for business, this is the fact that would make my hypothesis true.



Yet you also say that there are some facts independent of us, facts about our world.

I didn't discuss whether facts are "independent of us" or not. Again, you're making shit up. Some facts certainly are "independent of us" tho.



But you disagree with the "foundationalists" (whatever that means) who claim that there are facts on which we base knowledge.

No. this is not what foundationalism is. Foundationalism is about how we have knowledge about facts. Get it? They claim that some facts are ones that we have a direct shot at in sensory perception and introspection. Our knowledge of those facts is the foundation for the rest of our knowledge, according to them.



Either facts are dependent, relative to our hypotheses, or facts exist independently of humans. It may be true that certain social facts are dependent on humans. But there is an entire universe of facts which existed long before humans and will exist longer after humans have gone.

For instance, a dinosaur bone is a fact. But, according to Sellars there is no such thing as a dinosaur bone existing apart from human perception or hypothesis.

You are, as I say, very confused. Sellars doesn't deny there are facts independent of us. He claims we never have a direct shot at facts that provides us with an "indubitable foundation of knowledge."

From the fact that we don't have an immediate awareness of facts, it doesn't follow that facts don't exist. And it doesn't follow they don't exist independently of us.

In the history of philosophy it is the Cartesian view (that is, foundationalism) about how we acquire knowledge that led to skepticism and idealism, and people denying there are any facts independent of our consciousness. so you have the situation reversed.

[ar734]

I say no such thing.





Here's what you said:

" but all sense perception involves interpretation, so that it isn't possible to separate out a "pure given", apart from our interrelated hypotheses about the world."

," but our faculties have been adapted to pick up facts about our world, the world we inhabit."

There are facts about the world which we pick up; but we can't separate fact from hypothesis.

Maybe you can make sense out of that, but I can't.
__________________

[ar734]

You're jumping between two very different notions of 'fact'.

One is the content of a declarative sentence, and is therefore obviously influenced by factors of language, culture, history, ideology etc.

The other is something that is true in the universe whether anyone knows it or not. Something that would be the case even though it's completely undetectable and incompehensible to our limited intellects.



Well, if you say science has nothing to do with philosophy, then you need to explain the Marxist argument that class antagonism, economics, etc., are ultimately, perhaps indirectly, responsible for the social superstructure which includes philosophy.

[syndicat]

Here's what you said:

" but all sense perception involves interpretation, so that it isn't possible to separate out a "pure given", apart from our interrelated hypotheses about the world."

yes. this is about how we know about the world. it's not about facts.




," but our faculties have been adapted to pick up facts about our world, the world we inhabit."

There are facts about the world which we pick up; but we can't separate fact from hypothesis.

What does it mean to say "We can't separate fact from hypothesis"?

Just above I explained how facts and hypotheses are different. Hypotheses are beliefs or statements. They are true if they represent the world as it is, false otherwise. It is the facts that make a hypothesis true if it is, and if the hypothesis is false, the facts needed to make it true are missing.

In my previous example, if the store is not open for business, then there is a fact that isn't there -- the store being open now -- and that's why the hypothesis "Sam's market is still open" is false.

When we pick up facts about the world, that simply means we acquire beliefs that are true. Thus these beliefs correspond to the facts. If I see a big gray cat lounging next door, I can say "There's a big gray cat lying around next door." This is a statement. It is made true by the fact...the big gray cat lying there. The fact and the statement are two different things. Hypotheses are statements we make or beliefs we acquire. Whether they are true or not depends on what the facts are.

We can distinguish a hypothesis from the facts that would make it true because there is a distinction between things that are true -- beliefs, statements -- and the things that make them true or false...the facts.

[¿Que?]

Yes you are Travis. "Knowledge is justified true belief" is a claim about the nature of knowledge itself. That is a superfact.
No sir, it's called a premise. That doesn't mean it doesn't need to be justified, and as I have said, in accordance with the numerous people that seem to disagree just to disagree, its justification depends on the issue-context and objector group.

Maybe you want to say that the definition of knowledge is entirely dependent on how people use it? So how is that different from what I'm saying.

[ChrisK]

No sir, it's called a premise. That doesn't mean it doesn't need to be justified, and as I have said, in accordance with the numerous people that seem to disagree just to disagree, its justification depends on the issue-context and objector group.

Maybe you want to say that the definition of knowledge is entirely dependent on how people use it? So how is that different from what I'm saying.

And your premise is non-sense. Knowledge is definable in many ways. But when defining it as use, no one means it must be justified. Philosophers might claim that knowledge ought to be justified, but that doesn't mean that we necessarily are justified in that belief.

Take the proposition, "I know that you are having an affair." Is "know" here justified? Or can it be based on suspicion alone? Often times it is, other times it is not.

[Kronsteen]

Well, if you say science has nothing to do with philosophy

Um. I said nothing of the kind. In fact I take William James' view that the philosophy of X is the difficult and protracted process of trying to form the science of X.


then you need to explain the Marxist argument that class antagonism, economics, etc., are ultimately, perhaps indirectly, responsible for the social superstructure which includes philosophy.

That is the argument and I accept it. It's no coincidence that the technology for industrialisation appeared when capitalism became dominant, nor that methods and habits of mind needed for science became codified and encouraged when the economic system needed them.

The same habits of mind which made possible the analysis of capitalism we call Marxism.

[¿Que?]

And your premise is non-sense. Knowledge is definable in many ways. But when defining it as use, no one means it must be justified. Philosophers might claim that knowledge ought to be justified, but that doesn't mean that we necessarily are justified in that belief.

Take the proposition, "I know that you are having an affair." Is "know" here justified? Or can it be based on suspicion alone? Often times it is, other times it is not.
But I'm not saying knowledge has to be justified. Knowledge is an epistemic process. Belief is what has to be justified. Such as, "Knowledge is justified true belief" is an belief of mine. I can justify it by saying it is the only definition that approximated common usage.

Consider your example, "I know you are having an affair." Isn't that the same as saying, "I believe you are having an affair, and I am justified in believing it as well." I think the two are almost synonymous. Almost, but not quite. The only way they would be truly synonymous is if I was actually having an affair. Otherwise, the proposition, "I know you are having an affair" is false, and a false beleif cannot be considered knowledge, even by common usage.

One other example. "I know the sky is green." The sky is not green, therefore I really don't know what color the sky is. The proposition is false, and therefore not knowledge.

[ChrisK]

But I'm not saying knowledge has to be justified. Knowledge is an epistemic process. Belief is what has to be justified. Such as, "Knowledge is justified true belief" is an belief of mine. I can justify it by saying it is the only definition that approximated common usage.

Consider your example, "I know you are having an affair." Isn't that the same as saying, "I believe you are having an affair, and I am justified in believing it as well." I think the two are almost synonymous. Almost, but not quite. The only way they would be truly synonymous is if I was actually having an affair. Otherwise, the proposition, "I know you are having an affair" is false, and a false proposition cannot be considered knowledge, even by common usage.

One other example. "I know the sky is green." The sky is not green, therefore I really don't know what color the sky is. The proposition is false, and therefore not knowledge.

Now you are contradicting yourself. You are creating the identity statement "knowledge is justified true belief." If that is an identity or a definition, then you are claiming that justification is part of knowledge.

[¿Que?]

Now you are contradicting yourself. You are creating the identity statement "knowledge is justified true belief." If that is an identity or a definition, then you are claiming that justification is part of knowledge.
Ok. Please elaborate, because I don't see how that is incorrect or a contradiction.

[ChrisK]

Ok. Please elaborate, because I don't see how that is incorrect or a contradiction.

You just said knowledge does not require justification, only belief does. But you called knowledge "justified true belief" making knowledge something that needs to be justified.

[¿Que?]

You just said knowledge does not require justification, only belief does. But you called knowledge "justified true belief" making knowledge something that needs to be justified.
Because I'm saying belief needs to be justified, not knowledge. Knowledge, in a very rudimentary sense, is a type of belief. Obviously, it's much more complicated than that, but we can start there.

[ChrisK]

Because I'm saying belief needs to be justified, not knowledge. Knowledge, in a very rudimentary sense, is a type of belief. Obviously, it's much more complicated than that, but we can start there.

That doesn't make any sense. If belief needs justification and knowledge is a type of belief, then knowledge needs justified.

[¿Que?]

That doesn't make any sense. If belief needs justification and knowledge is a type of belief, then knowledge needs justified.
Take this analogy:
mirage -> knowledge
light -> belief
refraction -> justification

A mirage is refracted light. Would you say a mirage requires refraction. Sure. Knowledge requires justification. Would you say that the mirage is being refracted. No, the light is. Knowledge is not what's being justified, its the belief.

[ChrisK]

Take this analogy:
mirage -> knowledge
light -> belief
refraction -> justification

A mirage is refracted light. Would you say a mirage requires refraction. Sure. Knowledge requires justification. Would you say that the mirage is being refracted. No, the light is. Knowledge is not what's being justified, its the belief.

No, but a component is justification. You have said so, and not all belief that is knowledge is justified belief. That was the point of the proposition.

Since knowledge requires justification, then you have made the mistake that I criticized you for.

[ar734]

Um. I said nothing of the kind. In fact I take William James' view that the philosophy of X is the difficult and protracted process of trying to form the science of X.


..
.Please stop trying to misapply ideas from science to areas where they have no meaning

Well, ok, which is it, science forms philosophy or science has no meaning for philosophy?

[ar734]

We can distinguish a hypothesis from the facts that would make it true because there is a distinction between things that are true -- beliefs, statements -- and the things that make them true or false...the facts.

I think it would be more accurate to say: There are beliefs which may or may not be true and there are facts which can prove the beliefs true or false.

You look down the street and see lights. You have been down the street a thousand times before, in fact you live nearby and often shop at Sam's Market. When you say that you believe, therefore, that Sam's Market is open, is this some kind of scientific hypothesis which you can then test? No. It is merely a conclusion based on prior experience.

Now, if you have never been down the street before and had no knowledge of what was on the street, and you saw some lights, then you might form an hypothesis and then test it. If it is late at night and you are by yourself in a strange city, then you might believe that members of the social underclass are hanging around and you decide not to test your hypothesis.

You might believe that the light is from an alien spacecraft which is kidnapping earthlings, but you decide not to test that hypothesis.

You might believe that the light is from a nice, neighborhood ice cream shop, so you decide to take your 9 yr old kid down a dark street in a strange city to test your belief or not.

Or, if you have an armed force with you (aka, the police, state) then you might decide it is safe to test your hypotheses.

[syndicat]

You look down the street and see lights. You have been down the street a thousand times before, in fact you live nearby and often shop at Sam's Market. When you say that you believe, therefore, that Sam's Market is open, is this some kind of scientific hypothesis which you can then test? No. It is merely a conclusion based on prior experience.



you're confusing two different things: the evidential relationship and the relationship between representations and what makes them true. If I believe there are lights on the end of the block and i infer that Sam's market is still open, both are beliefs. in each case whether they are true or not depends on what the facts are.

moreover, it doesn't matter how many times i've been down the block as far as what the nature of the inference is. it is an abductive inference or inference to the best explanation in either case. if i have been to the market in the evening many times, then I simply have stronger evidence for the hypothesis. but it's still a hypothesis in the sense that the reason I have for believing it is that it explains things I've experienced in this case, namely, the lights being on. it also fits in with other things I know, such as that stores usually put their lights on in the evening, this store in the past has been open in the evening etc. these side-ways supports strengthen a hypothesis.

[Kronsteen]

Well, ok, which is it, science forms philosophy or science has no meaning for philosophy?

Neither.

Science is a set of methods used to find answers - involving observation, testing, quantification, repetition, correlating, deduction, attempted refutation and more - that you can only use on questions that are sufficiently specific and meaningful for this kind of analysis.

Philosophy is a process of trying to get the questions to the level where they can be investigated scientifically. You can think of it as a kind of nursery school for what will one day be sciences.

"What is the difference between memory and imagination?" is a philosophical question. "What are the effects of alcohol on memory conflation?" is a scientific one.

It's a continuum. The 'soft sciences' - psychology, linguistics, sociology etc. - are areas of philosophy that haven't quite got there yet. They're in high school.

[¿Que?]

No, but a component is justification. You have said so, and not all belief that is knowledge is justified belief. That was the point of the proposition.

Since knowledge requires justification, then you have made the mistake that I criticized you for.
That's because a justified belief can still be false. Therefore, in order for a belief to constitute knowledge, it has to be true as well as be justified.

I still don't understand why you object to this definition.

[Kronsteen]

That's because a justified belief can still be false. Therefore, in order for a belief to constitute knowledge, it has to be true as well as be justified.

You keep referring to a world of unknown truths. Can you give an example of something which is true but which no one knows about? You can't? Why not? Exactly.

What about beliefs which are unjustified but which, unknown to anyone, are true? If you hold such a belief, do you have knowledge or not? Think carefully before you answer.

[JazzRemington]

That's because a justified belief can still be false. Therefore, in order for a belief to constitute knowledge, it has to be true as well as be justified.

I still don't understand why you object to this definition.

It's a nonsense definition because you can't explain what you mean by it. Again, this means it cannot be true or false, which further means knowing it cannot constitute knowledge. Hell, the only reason there's a "problem" is because you're specifically defining "knowledge" in a certain way that effectively creates the problem you claim exists.

[¿Que?]

You keep referring to a world of unknown truths. Can you give an example of something which is true but which no one knows about? You can't? Why not? Exactly.

What about beliefs which are unjustified but which, unknown to anyone, are true? If you hold such a belief, do you have knowledge or not? Think carefully before you answer.
An unknown truth? How am I referring to an unknown truth? As to the second part, that is the problem of internalism versus externalism, and I have no opinion on that...yet.


It's a nonsense definition because you can't explain what you mean by it. Again, this means it cannot be true or false, which further means knowing it cannot constitute knowledge. Hell, the only reason there's a "problem" is because you're specifically defining "knowledge" in a certain way that effectively creates the problem you claim exists.
It's not nonsense, but if you insist, please offer up a better definition...

[JazzRemington]

It's not nonsense, but if you insist, please offer up a better definition...

You've already stated you can't explain what you mean by your definition, which would normally mean it's nonsense. And what does it matter if you can't define a word if you can use it meaningfully? You don't understand what someone means if he/she told you "he has knowledge of a wide variety of topics"? I bet you any money you understood something like that even before you came anywhere near epistemology. Even if you didn't, the explanation would consist of explaining not what is meant by "knowledge" but what is meant by the whole sentence.

[Kronsteen]

An unknown truth? How am I referring to an unknown truth?

You say that if a belief is both justified and true, then that belief is knowledge.

But how could you know about its truth? You can't - you can only infer it, sometimes incorrectly, from the justification. So the truth (or falsity) of your belief, by your definition, has no impact on you.

Which means you don't know when your belief is knowledge. So you don't actually know whether or not you know anything.

And when you believe that you know something - or don't - there's no way to find justification for this belief. Or against it. Not just in practice, but in principle.

Oh, and since you say a belief has to be both justified and true to be knowledge, then your unjustifiable belief about your knowledge can never be knowledge. So once again you can never have knowledge about your own knowledge.

Please explain how this solves any problems in epistemology.

[syndicat]

of course within the foundationalist outlook some beliefs are self-justified, that is, they are "self-evident". this is the importance of supposed basic knowledge where you get a direct shot at the fact itself. basic knowledge is held to be self-justified. that's why it brings the regress of justifications to an end.

[ChrisK]

That's because a justified belief can still be false. Therefore, in order for a belief to constitute knowledge, it has to be true as well as be justified.

I still don't understand why you object to this definition.

Because you are claiming that knowledge is something that must follow certain stipulations. You are now saying that knowledge must be true. Yet how do we use know? "I know that God exists." "How do you know?" "I just do." There is a claim of knowledge that God exists. Does this stipulate true or false?

We also know that it used to be known that the Earth was the center of the universe. That was part of the Ptolemic body of knowledge. Does that make it true?

[ar734]

you're confusing two different things: the evidential relationship and the relationship between representations and what makes them true.

"I'm confusing evidence and representations.", which exactly means what?


If I believe there are lights on the end of the block and i infer that Sam's market is still open, both are beliefs. in each case whether they are true or not depends on what the facts are.

You originally based your scientific test on the fact of the lights being observed and the hypothesis of Sam's Market being open. Now the observed fact of the lights being on becomes an hypothesis. Which actually is closer to your original argument that facts cannot be separated from hypotheses.

So, first you have to prove that lights are on. You see glass bulbs with an odd glow coming from them. This new hypothesis must be proved. You grab one of the bulbs and find that it screws out. You unscrew it. The glow goes away. Another hypothesis. There is an electric current coming out of the socket. You stick your finger in the socket to test this hypothesis. You feel this extremely sharp pain. Yet another hypothesis.

/QUOTE]

As I understand your scientific test, it is this: 1. fact: lights are on. Question: why are lights on? 2. Hypothesis: Sam's Market is open. What do lights have to do with Sam's Market? Well, Sam's Market is open in the evening and they have lights there. Test: look at Sam's Market.

Thus, you are proving that Sam's Market is the reason for the lights because Sam's Market usually have their lights on in the evening. And Sam's Market is usually open in the evening and they usually have their lights on. Therefore, lights in the evening are evidence that Sam's Market is open, and they are open in the evening and when they are open they have their lights on.

This is a classic example of the circular or tautological argument.

A real scientific test: a scientist (Rutherford) observes that the atomic number and the atomic mass of an element are slightly different. An hypothesis to explain this: there exists a new atomic particle. Later tests confirm that, in fact, there is a new particle called a neutron. Also confirmed by the explosion of the atomic bomb.

Kant explained the difference between these two argument as the analytical and synthetic argument. The analytic argument clarifies an already known state of things; the synthetic argument discovers something new, something unknown. (Introduction to The Critique of Pure Reason.)

[syndicat]

You originally based your scientific test on the fact of the lights being observed and the hypothesis of Sam's Market being open. Now the observed fact of the lights being on becomes an hypothesis. Which actually is closer to your original argument that facts cannot be separated from hypotheses.

when I observe the lights being on, i acquire a belief. the belief that the lights are on. that is a representation. I can state what I thus believe as a sentence:

(P) the lights at Sam's market are on.

like any representation -- belief or sentence -- it is true if it corresponds to a fact, false otherwise. a fact is a state of affairs that actually exists or holds. the relevant state of affairs is:

(S) the lights being on at Sam's market

if S actually exists, actually is the case, then my belief P is true, otherwise P is false.

whether something is a fact has nothing to do with how we know things. It is not an epistemological property of anything.

Now, the observation is also a hypothesis. that's because it's an interpretation created by my cognitive faculties in response to the light stream hitting my retinas.

I'll give an example to show that "observations" can in fact embody an element of an interpretation or hypothesis.

Jerold is out in the bush in southern Africa with a native guide. The guide says "Look over there, there's a lion." But Jerrold looks where the guide points and doesn't see a lion. Then suddenly the thing that he had observed as a bush moves, and now he sees it as a lion.

My observation of the lights on Sam's markets embodied also various elements of interpretation...that those are lights, that that is Sam's market, etc.

but you have a tendency to confuse two issues. First, the issue of what makes sentences or beliefs true. This is not an epistemological question. It isn't about how we know things or what evidence we have. It is a semantic question and also a metaphysical question...what is truth? what makes beliefs or statements true? So you confuse the issue of what evidence people have for beliefs or statements with the non-epistemological question of what truth is.



So, first you have to prove that lights are on. You see glass bulbs with an odd glow coming from them. This new hypothesis must be proved. You grab one of the bulbs and find that it screws out. You unscrew it. The glow goes away. Another hypothesis. There is an electric current coming out of the socket. You stick your finger in the socket to test this hypothesis. You feel this extremely sharp pain. Yet another hypothesis.



your first sentence makes no sense. what are you talking about when you say i "have to prove that lights are on."

we generally take things that we observe to be better grounded then things we haven't observed. this doesn't mean they aren't also hypotheses.

but hypotheses can be defended by showing they help to account for other hypotheses that are better grounded.

whenever we use hypothesis H to explain various things we believe, P, Q, etc, then we are taking P, Q, etc as data. We are inferring H because it offers a good explanation for P, Q etc.

But P, Q, etc may also be hypotheses. In the example above, that the lights are on down at the market at the end of the block is a stronger hypothesis because it's based on a direct observation. When i infer "Sam's market is still open" this is a hypothesis I am inferring to explain the first belief, that the lights are on, which i obtained by direct observation. It may well be true that "the lights are on at the market at the end of the block" is also a hypothesis. but that doesn't show that it isn't data or evidence for the hypothesis H, that Sam's market is still open.


Thus, you are proving that Sam's Market is the reason for the lights because Sam's Market usually have their lights on in the evening. And Sam's Market is usually open in the evening and they usually have their lights on. Therefore, lights in the evening are evidence that Sam's Market is open, and they are open in the evening and when they are open they have their lights on.

This is a classic example of the circular or tautological argument.


again, you are confused. first of all, I offered no "proof". Proof is a mathematical concept. It doesn't apply to empirical knowledge of contingent facts in our environment. the belief that markets have their lights on when they are open at night is merely a background belief. it is another hypothesis. but my argument didn't use it. I offer the following hypothesis:

(H1) Sam's market is still open

I accept this because it explains this fact

(S1) the light's down at that market still being on.

Or, to put this another way, my belief

(P1) the lights are on down there at the market

is something I believe based on observation.

I offer H1 as an explanation of (P1) being true.

For example, it might be that Sam's market is NOT usually open at night. It might be unusual for it to be open. But in this case the fact the lights are on is evidence it is open. So in fact i need not assume what you say.

Now, it's true that there are many times when I have experienced the lights on when Sam's market has been open in the evening. The more times I have experienced these two things together, the stronger would be the evidence for the conclusion that you suggest, that Sam's market is usually open at night. but that was not what I was arguing nor was I assuming that. it's true that cafes and markets and so on usually have exterior lights on when they're open at night. but that's a side hypothesis...which provides strong support for my argument. but my hypothesis need not assume it.

it's an example of side support or supporting background information, outside the inference itself.

finally, you are confused because you confuse circularity with tautology. these things are completely different. a tautology is not an epistemic property of anything. it is a logical property of certain kinds of sentences. a tautology is a sentence such that the logical structure of it guarantees its truth.

circularity is an epistemological property of certain kinds of arguments...namely linear chains of reasoning. inference to the best explanation, like my little argument about Sam's market, are not linear chains of reasoning, they can draw side support from various and sundry other hypotheses and background information.

[Technocrat]

The problem is with the number 1 point made in the original post. Knowledge is a term used in many different ways, and saying f.ex. that "she has knowledge of politics" does not mean anything like 'justified true belief'. In fact, attempting to find any essential meaning to the word "knowledge", or discovering what it 'really is', simply by using other words, is a dead end. We do not strip away the clothes of reality by reordering our words, we only create malformed sentences.

This is word juggling, which can tend to produce such inconsequential 'problems' of paradoxes and circular reasoning.

Yeah, I think so too. Many of the "problems" in philosophy are the result of the limitations of language.

I think the debate between Devitt and Bonjour is over "justified true belief," with Bonjour claiming that without a priori justification, no justification is possible, and therefore we "commit intellectual suicide" when we reject the a priori.

I disagree with this and think that we need some kind of "starting point" with which to start any conversation. Any attempt to "prove" these basic premises (i.e. first principles) leads to an infinite regress, as Lewis Carrol (among others) famously demonstrated. This doesn't mean that we need to posit something a priori, it means that language is not capable of "proving" a basic premise (because the proof of such a premise would rely on a similar premise). I think this has to do with the limitations of language and is not a problem for what the language is signifying. In other words, something a priori might be linguistically necessary to have justified true belief in the linguistic sense but it is not necessary from an epistemological standpoint.

"
In philosophy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy), a first principle is a basic, foundational proposition or assumption that cannot be deduced from any other proposition or assumption. In mathematics (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematics), first principles are referred to as axioms (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiom) or postulates (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Postulate). Gödel's incompleteness theorems (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems) have been taken to prove, among other things, that no system of axioms can prove its own validity - nor perhaps can it prove every truth (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth) about the set it describes." (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_principle)

[Meridian]

Yeah, I think so too. Many of the "problems" in philosophy are the result of the limitations of language.
The limitations of the philosophers dysfunctional use of language.


I think the debate between Devitt and Bonjour is over "justified true belief," with Bonjour claiming that without a priori justification, no justification is possible, and therefore we "commit intellectual suicide" when we reject the a priori.
The word "justification" is misused here. Does a person need an a priori premise in order to justify anything (outside the practice of philosophy)? No, this would be altering the grammar of the term "justification" to logical senselessness.


I disagree with this and think that we need some kind of "starting point" with which to start any conversation.Conversations start all the time, all over the world, yet 'first principles' and agreed upon 'basic premises' are nowhere to be seen.

[Technocrat]

The limitations of the philosophers dysfunctional use of language.

Yes...

(emphasis added)

The word "justification" is misused here. Does a person need an a priori premise in order to justify anything (outside the practice of philosophy)? No, this would be altering the grammar of the term "justification" to logical senselessness.That's pretty much exactly what I'm saying. I'm in agreement with you.


Conversations start all the time, all over the world, yet 'first principles' and agreed upon 'basic premises' are nowhere to be seen.I meant a "philosophical conversation."

What do you make of this?

"
In 1951, W.V. Quine published his famous essay "Two Dogmas of Empiricism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two_Dogmas_of_Empiricism)" in which he argued that the analytic–synthetic distinction is untenable. In the first paragraph, Quine takes the distinction to be the following:


analytic propositions – propositions grounded in meanings, independent of matters of fact.
synthetic propositions – propositions grounded in fact.

In short, Quine argues that the notion of an analytic proposition requires a notion of synonymy, but these notions are parasitic on one another. Thus, there is no non-circular (and so no tenable) way to ground the notion of analytic propositions." (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic%E2%80%93synthetic_distinction)

I personally find the Quinean hypothesis appealing even if it has many problems.

[ar734]

The phrase "justified true belief" is non-sense, in the sense meant by Wittgenstein. It is abstract, it does not mean anything concrete, it does not refer to a fact or a real relation. The same is true for the phrase "How do you Resolve the Problem of Infinite Regress for Epistemic Justification."

I defy anyone to translate that last phrase into plain English.