Questions for Demarchists

[The Man]

So is your whole ideology kinda revolving around the thought of like Jury Duty? Like you get a letter in the mail saying "Your a community representative for this week"?

Also, let's say were in a Communist Society. What if some uneducated idiots decide to repeal the laws of Communism? And what if a delegate becomes tyrannical? Should they be instantly recallable?

[Die Neue Zeit]

Demarchy need not go hand in hand with delegation. There's statistical representation and then there's statistical delegation. I don't like the latter because it can feed cultural mob-rule prejudices like delegates being recalled simply for having funky hairstyles:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/delegation-vs-representationi-t142506/index.html?p=1880553
http://www.revleft.com/vb/workers-power-t145122/index.html?p=1930359

[Jose Gracchus]

You sound like James Madison with your very un-communist terror of "mob rule."

[synthesis]

So is your whole ideology kinda revolving around the thought of like Jury Duty? Like you get a letter in the mail saying "Your a community representative for this week"?

Also, let's say were in a Communist Society. What if some uneducated idiots decide to repeal the laws of Communism? And what if a delegate becomes tyrannical? Should they be instantly recallable?

Putting aside the question of delegates operating within a larger framework of rules and regulations and the like, how would this be different from "representation"? I guess it's hard to answer this question without knowing what the proposed alternatives would be. I don't think any pro-demarchy person would argue that the system would not have flaws, but rather that it would have less of them compared to other systems.

[Die Neue Zeit]

You sound like James Madison with your very un-communist terror of "mob rule."

I had this discussion with comrade MarxSchmarx two months ago, perhaps also in a discussion with syndicat. He said that, beyond the economic and political spheres, the value of radical democracy is diminished.

[Demogorgon]

I don't support full demarchy, rather I would incorporate elements of it into a wider democratic system (and if it proved to work very well expand on it), but to answer the question people who are randomly selected on a demographically representative basis and provided sufficient information on a subject typically reach very sophisticated conclusions often quite different from what the public would back without full information available. Effectively demarchy seeks to find the informed will of the people. Bringing in elements off it reduces the chances of bad decisions being made.

[graymouser]

Demarchy in Athens acted relatively predictably: the function of the archontes diminished to the point where the office was basically nominal. Real leadership even at the height of Athenian democracy was mainly military and concentrated around the strategoi (generals). If you are a careful student of human history, with certain exceptions such as jury duty, randomly selected individuals do not command enough authority to actually function as a basis for a government.

In the cases of certain administrative positions that have no leadership association, it could be useful to avoid a bureaucratic caste developing. If you had a work group of software developers, for instance, having a random member of the group take responsibility for the day-to-day coordination of work, that rotates every couple of weeks, would be infinitely better than having a professional "manager." But beyond a relatively limited scope, I think demarchy is actively harmful. If real power isn't out in the open and transparent, it will accrete in unaccountable places where individuals simply cannot be removed. (This is similar to the lesson of Jo Freeman's "Tyranny of Structurelessness.")

[Jose Gracchus]

I had this discussion with comrade MarxSchmarx two months ago, perhaps also in a discussion with syndicat. He said that, beyond the economic and political spheres, the value of radical democracy is diminished.

Why don't you produce some evidence that these tendencies were actually manifested in historical instances of radical democracy, rather than airily supposing that it may be true in the realm of pure theory? For a so-called communist, you are much adored of abstract system-building, untouched by empirical evidence when it does not suit the [preconcieved] outcome.

As for demarchy, I totally agree with greymouser. In practice power would inevitably accrete in the think tanks and hired specialists designed to "assist" the policy-juries. They would become the real power makers, with policy-juries capacity to take the initiative in policy-formation obviously low. In limited instances I could see it as desirable, for instance making sure some blood and statistical representation remained at the level of neighborhood, workplace and productive institutions. Perhaps workers' councils' electoral commissions could be composed in the manner - at least partially - of a grand jury, helping to avoid the encrustation of top-down rule and party rubber-stamping. I think like the example he gives, it would be an excellent tool for keeping people involved. There's no way you can fill the House of Representatives with a random selection of people like Cockshott suggests, and imagine this as some magic panacea against negative political outcomes. There is no attempt to critically analyze the Athenian model in its real historical context.

[Vladimir Innit Lenin]

Demarchy need not be a lottery service. That would be absolute demarchy. I would prefer a non-demarchy system that nonetheless incites demarchy - yearly terms at local, regional and national levels of government, anybody who serves one term cannot then serve again for a number of years in any other government position (talking about the executive and legislative functions here only, not the judicial functions or bureaucracy, the latter of which will obviously not be an elected position, simply a job).

Demarchy in itself is flawed because it is a defensive strategy - seeking to defend against the rise of a dictatorship of the individual or of a small intra-class clique -, however the outcome of theoretical demarchy - the end of long-term rule by individuals or cliques - is in fact extremely desirable.

The next stage of democracy from the bourgeois democracy of the Capitalist world, or even the fairly questionable democratic procedures that existed in 20th century Socialism, will be where there is a true dialectical relationship between the political system that will exist in a Socialist democracy, and the people. The system will be above the people, in that there will be no dictatorship of one/clique, no long-term rule which is inherently undemocratic and no manipulation of the bureaucracy to ensure favourable electoral/voting outcomes, but the people will control the system in the sense that it will be a local, radical, extreme form of democracy whereby people do not have to bow down to 'the party', or wait 5 years to kick the entire government out.

That, I believe, should be the formation of the next Socialist democracy. Whether or not it will is up to us.

[Die Neue Zeit]

Why don't you produce some evidence that these tendencies were actually manifested in historical instances of radical democracy, rather than airily supposing that it may be true in the realm of pure theory? For a so-called communist, you are much adored of abstract system-building, untouched by empirical evidence when it does not suit the [preconcieved] outcome.

I think the strictly legislative process in Ancient Athens is the prime example of cultural mob rule. People were put on trial for cultural deviations here and there.

"So-called communist"? I had Kautsky's pro-bureaucracy book Parliamentarism, which Lenin cited in WITBD, in mind.


As for demarchy, I totally agree with greymouser. In practice power would inevitably accrete in the think tanks and hired specialists designed to "assist" the policy-juries.

Graymouser completely ignored the role that stratified sampling (and other forms of probability sampling) could play in the main bodies instead of all-out, unfiltered random selection.

I pointed this out to him at least a couple of times in the past, but he evaded the subject.

I bet he'd evade it even more since I raised the subjects of job slots and nomenclatures as bureaucratic processes within a framework of stratified sampling within the main bodies themselves. :p


anybody who serves one term cannot then serve again for a number of years in any other government position (talking about the executive and legislative functions here only, not the judicial functions or bureaucracy, the latter of which will obviously not be an elected position, simply a job)

One filter for random selection can specifically negate incumbency.

[Die Neue Zeit]

If you are a careful student of human history, with certain exceptions such as jury duty, randomly selected individuals do not command enough authority to actually function as a basis for a government.

Define "randomly selected."


In the cases of certain administrative positions that have no leadership association, it could be useful to avoid a bureaucratic caste developing. If you had a work group of software developers, for instance, having a random member of the group take responsibility for the day-to-day coordination of work, that rotates every couple of weeks, would be infinitely better than having a professional "manager." But beyond a relatively limited scope, I think demarchy is actively harmful. If real power isn't out in the open and transparent, it will accrete in unaccountable places where individuals simply cannot be removed. (This is similar to the lesson of Jo Freeman's "Tyranny of Structurelessness.")

Within a stratified sampling framework and other radical democratic measures for the main bodies themselves, job slot systems, nomenclatures (yes, the "Stalinist nomenklatura" list and job slot systems), and other bureaucratic processes can work just great (with no perks or privileges).

[graymouser]

Graymouser completely ignored the role that stratified sampling (and other forms of probability sampling) could play in the main bodies instead of all-out, unfiltered random selection.

I pointed this out to him at least a couple of times in the past, but he evaded the subject.
Outside of small, highly specialized groups, sampling will not evade the problem of diminution of authority which is manifestly present in any situation where demarchy is used. There is no situation where you could use it above the level of a sort of routine position, and in such cases (like the one I pointed out with a work group of software engineers) you could achieve basically the same result by having elections and not allowing the last person in the position to have another round. Anyone who has actual authority and is not just a coordinator would need electoral authority to avoid the problems of a hidden leadership arising.

Besides, having a government formed demarchically is going to amount to random sampling. That's what Cockshott is on about, if not you.


I bet he'd evade it even more since I raised the subjects of job slots and nomenclatures as bureaucratic processes within a framework of stratified sampling within the main bodies themselves. :p
How is this meant to work? What is meant to be demarchic in your example? The "main bodies" or just the "nomenclatures"? How are the "strata" for your sample supposed to be generated? Just throwing around extra terminology doesn't solve your theoretical problems.

[Die Neue Zeit]

Let's begin by outlining first what exactly the nomenklatura system was (and btw, this was real practice, so this isn't "abstract system-building, untouched by empirical evidence"), which was perfected by Stalin but conceived by Sverdlov's emphasis on personal networks (http://www.revleft.com/vb/sverdlov-vs-lenin-t151054/index.html):

http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=CMR_442_0219 (another link)


Party and state organizations must be staffed — and the party took this function upon itself from the very beginning, for the party’s own cadres in the first place. Quite soon though, all the key positions of power and influence in the state were included in what became an intricate procedure being worked and reworked as the system passed through ever more complicated stages.

“Nomenklatura” meant, at first, a list of key jobs in party and state administrations to be filled by politically reliable and professionally competent personnel. But the term came to be used to denote the whole, ever more complicated set of procedures of selecting personnel for jobs of responsibility, from the highest to the lowest in all the administrations.

[...]

The Politburo was the final arbiter on posts from the crucial list No. 1, after they were scrutinized by the two lower bureaus. This concerned both nominations and dismissals.

Related to this is what historians call the "job slot system" (so this isn't my term): so-and-so a Party member is a member of the Central Committee or Politburo not because of charisma, general competence, etc. but because of holding another Party or state position. For example, either a Minister of Defense or a Chairman of the Department of Defense Industry of the CC CPSU was entitled to a seat in the Politburo. The same went for the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, despite being a figurehead.

Stratified sampling filters for those competent enough to fill the crucial positions spread across many nomenclatures or lists, and then randomly selects among the filtered candidates.

[Cue "Stalinism! Stalinist!" ;) ]

[graymouser]

Let's begin by outlining first what exactly the nomenklatura system was (and btw, this was real practice, so this isn't "abstract system-building, untouched by empirical evidence"), which was perfected by Stalin but conceived by Sverdlov's emphasis on personal networks (http://www.revleft.com/vb/sverdlov-vs-lenin-t151054/index.html):

http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=CMR_442_0219 (another link)



Related to this is what historians call the "job slot system" (so this isn't my term): so-and-so a Party member is a member of the Central Committee or Politburo not because of charisma, general competence, etc. but because of holding another Party or state position.

Stratified sampling filters for those competent enough to fill crucial positions, and then randomly selects among the filtered candidates.
The "nomenklatura" system itself would probably be a disaster; the Stalinist bureaucracy was created because of necessity, given the overall low technical level in Russia, and it turned out to be a bloody nightmare. Trying to revamp or revitalize it, even with "radical democratic" measures, would likely fail. What would be needed are participatory committees with rotating elected leadership, not bureaucrats appointed by lot.

You still haven't discussed the problem of selecting the "main bodies" by sortition. There is no stratification that could make this work, as I've discussed several times; you're talking about representation for all workers in a country. If the "main bodies" don't have authority, it stands to reason that the "nomenklatura" derived from them also won't have authority. And power would still accrete in the hidden spaces left open by demarchy.

[Die Neue Zeit]

The "nomenklatura" system itself would probably be a disaster; the Stalinist bureaucracy was created because of necessity, given the overall low technical level in Russia, and it turned out to be a bloody nightmare. Trying to revamp or revitalize it, even with "radical democratic" measures, would likely fail. What would be needed are participatory committees with rotating elected leadership, not bureaucrats appointed by lot.

Although databases can facilitate very basic filters and use primary and secondary keys to link across the many nomenclatures, those same lists and manual input (discussion) would still be necessary, especially for mass class parties utilizing the old SPD model.

Without bureaucratic processes, councilist adventurism masking itself as "participatory committees" would be an even bigger disaster. BTW, the manual input I mentioned above is made by real participatory committees, those that integrate themselves into bureaucracy-as-process.


You still haven't discussed the problem of selecting the "main bodies" by sortition. There is no stratification that could make this work, as I've discussed several times; you're talking about representation for all workers in a country. If the "main bodies" don't have authority, it stands to reason that the "nomenklatura" derived from them also won't have authority. And power would still accrete in the hidden spaces left open by demarchy.

Yes I have. Past experience in some other position, current experience in a crucial position, specialized educational background, years of service in the Party, etc. are filters for job slots and nomenclatures within a framework of random selection.

In fact, my point is to concentrate power within the "manual input" side of the nomenclature system, such that the main bodies won't need "policy expert" bodies on the side. Any think tanks way down in the pecking order (Academy of Sciences and the like) can be filled by members of something like the Politburo, Orgburo, Secretariat, Cadres Department, etc.

[graymouser]

Although databases can facilitate very basic filters and use primary and secondary keys to link across the many nomenclatures, those same lists and manual input (discussion) would still be necessary, especially for mass class parties utilizing the old SPD model.
Why the hell are you talking about database design? I'm a software developer, I work with databases every day; please don't start talking about "primary and secondary keys." Computer programmers have an aphorism that fits what you are talking about here quite well: garbage in, garbage out. It's all about how it's designed.


Without bureaucratic processes, councilist adventurism masking itself as "participatory committees" would be an even bigger disaster. BTW, the manual input I mentioned above is made by real participatory committees, those that integrate themselves into bureaucracy-as-process.
The point is that having participatory committees based on workers' councils is the only way you could be assured of relative transparency. This worship of bureaucracy that you have going on indicates that something is seriously cracked in your concept of post-capitalist society.


Yes I have. Past experience in some other position, current experience in a crucial position, specialized educational background, years of service in the Party, etc. are filters for job slots and nomenclatures within a framework of random selection.

In fact, my point is to concentrate power within the "manual input" side of the nomenclature system, such that the main bodies won't need "policy expert" bodies on the side. Any think tanks way down in the pecking order (Academy of Sciences and the like) can be filled by members of something like the Politburo, Orgburo, Secretariat, Cadres Department, etc.
So you basically think that Stalinism where the bureaucracy is selected by lot and qualification is a-okay for a post-capitalist society.

[RED DAVE]

I had this discussion with comrade MarxSchmarx two months ago, perhaps also in a discussion with syndicat. He said that, beyond the economic and political spheres, the value of radical democracy is diminished.Well I guess that settles it! But you don't believe in revolutionary workers democracy anyway.

RED DAVE

[Paul Cockshott]

There's no way you can fill the House of Representatives with a random selection of people like Cockshott suggests, and imagine this as some magic panacea against negative political outcomes.
There are certainly no magic panaceas for anything, but my contention is that the people themselves are the best judge of their own interests, and that since the entire people can not have a discussion or debate leading up to a decision, it is better that a random sample of the people make the decisions.
What do you mean by 'negative political outcomes? Ones that dont go the way you want?

[Vladimir Innit Lenin]

Yes I have. Past experience in some other position, current experience in a crucial position, specialized educational background, years of service in the Party, etc. are filters for job slots and nomenclatures within a framework of random selection.


This is precisely the problem I alluded to in my 'Professional Revolutionaries' thread.

Your system would essentially entrench a group of technocrats and bureaucrats (I know you like your bureaucracy, but I mean this in the perjorative, not neutral, sense) in all the important party and government positions. If this was 1917 then i'd possibly, with some naivety, support your position. However, history has shown that the entrenchment of a nomenclature, leads to top-down rule, dictatorship of the few (in the sense of long-term rule established by the job-slot and nomenclature systems) and democracy only in the extreme abstract.

Council adventurism, as you so deride it, would have a far better chance of establishing the extreme form of democracy that Socialism must entail. It may not lead to the exact policies that one ideology calls for, but that is democracy. Leninists must work with Luxemburgists and orthodox Marxists, non-doctrinnaire Communists, Trots, Maoists, Anarchists and so on.

I sense that your advocacy of nomenclature is based on self-interest; preservation of Marxist-Leninist ideology as hegemonical, in any future Socialist revolution. In reality, what would be healthier would be competing leftist forces establishing a healthy democracy, leading to the education and class/political consciousness of the general populace, leading through a phase of de-tribalising politics towards a no-party system, such as the system used in local CDR meetings and elections in Cuba.

[Die Neue Zeit]

Why the hell are you talking about database design? I'm a software developer, I work with databases every day; please don't start talking about "primary and secondary keys." Computer programmers have an aphorism that fits what you are talking about here quite well: garbage in, garbage out. It's all about how it's designed.

I just wanted to mention the technological aspect, and kudos for your career. :D


The point is that having participatory committees based on workers' councils is the only way you could be assured of relative transparency. This worship of bureaucracy that you have going on indicates that something is seriously cracked in your concept of post-capitalist society.

Your model leaves out any role for mass worker institutions like the pre-war SPD. For starters, key positions within the alternative culture (cultural societies, recreational clubs, funeral homes, food banks and pantries, etc.) would have to be identified and at least a few nomenclatures should be made to list those positions and those qualified to take upon the related responsibilities. Much of the composition of key party-movement councils would have to be determined by job holdings in other areas of the party-movement.


So you basically think that Stalinism where the bureaucracy is selected by lot and qualification is a-okay for a post-capitalist society.

Not every bureaucratic process is "Stalinist." As you know the other part of the nomenklatura discussion by historians is the perks and privileges enjoyed by those making it to the lists, patronage networks / organizational tails, etc.

[Die Neue Zeit]

This is precisely the problem I alluded to in my 'Professional Revolutionaries' thread.

Your system would essentially entrench a group of technocrats and bureaucrats (I know you like your bureaucracy, but I mean this in the perjorative, not neutral, sense) in all the important party and government positions. If this was 1917 then i'd possibly, with some naivety, support your position. However, history has shown that the entrenchment of a nomenclature, leads to top-down rule, dictatorship of the few (in the sense of long-term rule established by the job-slot and nomenclature systems) and democracy only in the extreme abstract.

Comrade, perhaps you were alluding to the key problem of Brezhnev's "stability of cadres" personnel approach: leaving an aging gerontocracy in power.

Just as "years of service in the Party" can be one filter, so does my initial response to a post of yours above apply - "One filter for random selection can specifically negate incumbency."

All points of the bureaucracy can still be recallable, and should be. It is just that the process of filling them doesn't resort to the highly impractical "Elect all officials!"


Leninists must work with Luxemburgists and orthodox Marxists, non-doctrinaire Communists, Trots, Maoists, Anarchists and so on.

Look up Quota Sampling for inter-tendency work. It's also in my Theory thread on Practical Issues and Revisiting the Party Question.

I mention various sampling methods as applications to institutional organization.

[RED DAVE]

There are certainly no magic panaceas for anything, but my contention is that the people themselves are the best judge of their own interests, and that since the entire people can not have a discussion or debate leading up to a decision, it is better that a random sample of the people make the decisions.
What do you mean by 'negative political outcomes? Ones that dont go the way you want?Considering that discussions like this are presumably about socialism, the workers state, I find it fabulous that in your structural descriptions of future society, as above, neither you nor DNZ ever seem to mention workers democracy or the working class.

RED DAVE

[Jose Gracchus]

There are certainly no magic panaceas for anything, but my contention is that the people themselves are the best judge of their own interests, and that since the entire people can not have a discussion or debate leading up to a decision, it is better that a random sample of the people make the decisions.
What do you mean by 'negative political outcomes? Ones that dont go the way you want?

I explained what I meant, so I do not know why you are being obtuse. As I have said before, the professional or semiprofessional employees which must assist [especially at the outset] a randomly-filled decision-making body with policy-making, will in practice accrete all the significant political power. In Athens, even formally the Boule was but an executor and guiding committee for the mass assembly, the Ekklesia. Even your "abstract system-building" dispenses with these formal features of the Athenian democracy, with no credible - in my eyes - attempt to deal with them. What fills the roles of the other Athenian institutions of state? There was not but a single body filled by lot which did all. I've ready Towards A New Socialism. I found its economics pretty interesting, but the politics quite weak. You explicitly call for an all-EU assembly to be filled by lot, and given general authority over the affairs of state. That's not relying upon the Athenian constitution, but one curious feature of it, and apotheosizing sortition over election as a panacea, without respect for the specific features.

And as greymouser pointed out, this is before going into the actual historical realities of the Athenian polity, and the political dynamics of ruling sortition in practice, which so far as I have seen you have not deigned even to acknowledge.

I think that Takis Fotopoulos' "Inclusive Democracy" is the only credible attempt, however flawed, to expand on the Athenian constitution as inspiration. And even he clearly sees that it is not scalable by indefinitely large-area-of-responsibility decision-making bodies, filled by lot without relation to any of the other Athenian constitutional institutions, essentially limiting it to the plausible scale of the Ekklesia. No attempt I've see has been made to credibly see this through to nation or continental scales.

RED DAVE: As I do not care too much for this system-building I'm not eager to defend it. However, the sortitive principle would fill bodies by essence with majority working class membership. That seems pretty intuitive. Paul's economic proposals involve direct supplanting of marginalist prices with Marxian labor values, which intrinsically is to the benefit of exploiters only, by definition.

[Vladimir Innit Lenin]

Comrade, perhaps you were alluding to the key problem of Brezhnev's "stability of cadres" personnel approach: leaving an aging gerontocracy in power.

Just as "years of service in the Party" can be one filter, so does my initial response to a post of yours above apply - "One filter for random selection can specifically negate incumbency."

All points of the bureaucracy can still be recallable, and should be. It is just that the process of filling them doesn't resort to the highly impractical "Elect all officials!"



Look up Quota Sampling for inter-tendency work. It's also in my Theory thread on Practical Issues and Revisiting the Party Question.

I mention various sampling methods as applications to institutional organization.

You see, the problem with your approach of filters, random selection, quota sampling and so on is not in what they theoretically achieve - they are honourable solutions to the nomenclature problem in theory and so i'll refrain from shouting STALINIST! STALINIST!, but in practice it is highly improbable that the power of recall and such will have any effect on a bureaucracy that is at first filled with long-standing party members and well-known, already powerful Socialists.

You mention the Brezhnev gerentocracy. But that gerentocracy did not become old and brittle overnight - the same, or similar, names had been the nomenclature for decades.

I do agree that the mantra of 'elect all officials' is unworkable, but the problem with your system is that, if extended from the bureaucratic realm to the political executive and legislative, it will surely lead to the same mistakes being made as were made in the USSR under Stalin. Indeed, it would be difficult to call it a mistake if that were to happen, more 'idiocy'.;)

The bureaucracy question is a difficult one. The answer is really to hand power at the beginning to workers' councils at local and regional level, with annual multi-Socialist elections, recallable delegates (delegates, not representatives), stringent term and re-serving limits and curbs on the power of the national assembly - and any politburo-type body - relative to the power wielded at regional assembly and town/district council level. Thus, the bureaucracy question never really becomes as serious as you make it out to be, as the bureaucracy jobs will become just those - jobs -, rather than jobs that are dependant for perks, power and privilege on a politburo or central committee that itself receives mass perks, power and privilege.

[Die Neue Zeit]

You see, the problem with your approach of filters, random selection, quota sampling and so on is not in what they theoretically achieve - they are honourable solutions to the nomenclature problem in theory and so i'll refrain from shouting STALINIST! STALINIST!, but in practice it is highly improbable that the power of recall and such will have any effect on a bureaucracy that is at first filled with long-standing party members and well-known, already powerful Socialists.

You mention the Brezhnev gerentocracy. But that gerentocracy did not become old and brittle overnight - the same, or similar, names had been the nomenclature for decades.

"Stability of cadres" was a response to the personnel instability of the Stalin and Khrushchev eras. One was riddled with fear of bullets (only in a specific period filled literally with bullets), while the other was riddled with personnel shuffles left, right, and center.

BTW, I wasn't referring to you re. "Cue 'Stalinism'" but to other posters.


I do agree that the mantra of 'elect all officials' is unworkable, but the problem with your system is that, if extended from the bureaucratic realm to the political executive and legislative, it will surely lead to the same mistakes being made as were made in the USSR under Stalin. Indeed, it would be difficult to call it a mistake if that were to happen, more 'idiocy'.;)

The bureaucracy question is a difficult one. The answer is really to hand power at the beginning to workers' councils at local and regional level, with annual multi-Socialist elections

If you're emphasizing local and regional power, why elections and not sortition?


Thus, the bureaucracy question never really becomes as serious as you make it out to be, as the bureaucracy jobs will become just those - jobs -, rather than jobs that are dependant for perks, power and privilege on a politburo or central committee that itself receives mass perks, power and privilege.

As Paul said above, random selection is not a panacea. Other measures based on the experience of the Paris Commune and more would have to be in place to remove that negative side of the nomenklatura system.

[chegitz guevara]

Perhaps there could be a way to combine demarchy with democracy. One person explained to me a system by which the probably of someone being selected was based on their popular vote, so the one with the most votes stands the best chance of being selected.

The opposite, though, could be interesting. A large number of citizens are selected at random, and then the public votes from among them. Choice is retained. It's not absolutely random.

Alternatively, we could use demarchy for a lower house, and elections for an upper house.

[Paul Cockshott]

You explicitly call for an all-EU assembly to be filled by lot, and given general authority over the affairs of state. That's not relying upon the Athenian constitution, but one curious feature of it, and apotheosizing sortition over election as a panacea, without respect for the specific features.
I dont just argue for all decisions to be taken by an assembly selected by lot. I argue that key issues should be decided by a general vote of the whole people using for example mobile phone voting.

[Paul Cockshott]

Considering that discussions like this are presumably about socialism, the workers state, I find it fabulous that in your structural descriptions of future society, as above, neither you nor DNZ ever seem to mention workers democracy or the working class.

RED DAVE
As Aristotle remarked the poor are many whereas the rich are few. A sortition based system changes the class composition of the assembly by drawing it predominantly from the working classes. As such democracy and the rule of the working classes are the same thing.

[Jose Gracchus]

E-voting suffers similar problems as other forms of referenda. It is in no way a 'virtual' assembly, since the possibility for thorough and informal discussion, deliberation, and formulation of voting issues and policy is prohibited by nature. There's a reason the plebiscite has been much beloved by authoritarians over its ugly history: because it reduces the mass to passive recipients, passive ratifiers over decisions framed and policies formulated elsewhere. Giant juries, especially "the day after" the revolution, are not going to be doing this, certainly not unaided. They will inevitably be leaning on this or that institution of the party, or other groups of spetsy. That is where power in fact will end becoming ensconced.

I think demarchy/sortition is best implemented, if at all possible, as a later tool. Perhaps the political constitution of the "upper phase" of communism. It will be some time before the thorough disintegration of the stupidifying capitalist division of labor and distribution of intellectual skills and training is defeated by "lower" communism, at least a generation [Engels' guess, anyway]. In the short term, I think along with proportional representation and strict responsibility to base assemblies and institutions, the council system could be made more robust by filling part of it with workers selected by lot, or by having electoral commissions composed of workers by lot, to defeat party gleichschaltung. Combined with a council system could be something of what is called 'village democracy' or what Fotopoulos suggests on the basis of individual city wards or small towns. Many tasks at the neighborhood/ward or workplace/commercial or industrial district level could be reasonably assumed by something like selection by lot. I believe it has to be checked by the capacity of direct personal involvement by the represented groups in question, something obviously impossible when filling bodies by lot at the national level. I'm with greymouser mostly.

[Paul Cockshott]

E-voting suffers similar problems as other forms of referenda. It is in no way a 'virtual' assembly, since the possibility for thorough and informal discussion, deliberation, and formulation of voting issues and policy is prohibited by nature. There's a reason the plebiscite has been much beloved by authoritarians over its ugly history: because it reduces the mass to passive recipients, passive ratifiers over decisions framed and policies formulated elsewhere. Giant juries, especially "the day after" the revolution, are not going to be doing this, certainly not unaided. They will inevitably be leaning on this or that institution of the party, or other groups of spetsy. That is where power in fact will end becoming ensconced.


A party can only influence a demarchic assembly to the extent that the party has a huge mass membership. There would be conflict within a demarchic assembly between supporters of different parties, but all parties' members added together will still only be a minority of the assembly. Why do you assume that only a single party will exist?
Why do you assume that real issues can not be put to referenda without a prior decision having been taken?
Why do you assume that they are just ratifications?
Was the Italian referendum on divorce for example not a genuine decision by the electorate in favour of divorce and against the policies of the Nazarene cult?
Was the recent Icelandic referendum which rejected the terms of the bailout of Icesave just an instance of authoritarianism?
Was the referendum in Strathclyde in 1994 which overwhelmingly rejected water privatisation just an instance of authoritarianism?

It is also possible to use a referendum, with a slightly more complicated voting mechanism to decide on issues like the overall mix and balance of expenditure on public services, the level of taxation etc. In the absence of such mechanisms how can the people as a whole prevent the socialist state turning into a mechanism for their exploitation?

[Zederbaum]

E-voting suffers similar problems as other forms of referenda. It is in no way a 'virtual' assembly, since the possibility for thorough and informal discussion, deliberation, and formulation of voting issues and policy is prohibited by nature.
The holding of plebiscites, especially on important issues such as the priority areas for investment, levels of taxation etc would be more likely to encourage local political meetings where issues can be thrashed out in person. So I'm not too sure that it would lead to the population becoming passive recipients, at least no more than any other system, and possibly a good deal less.

It's possible that a small number of plebiscites on important issues (war/peace, investment/taxation etc) would garner more interest than an intensive series of grassroots council meetings which would be necessary to issue mandates to delegates, supervise them etc.



There's a reason the plebiscite has been much beloved by authoritarians over its ugly history: because it reduces the mass to passive recipients, passive ratifiers over decisions framed and policies formulated elsewhere. Giant juries, especially "the day after" the revolution, are not going to be doing this, certainly not unaided. They will inevitably be leaning on this or that institution of the party, or other groups of spetsy. That is where power in fact will end becoming ensconced.But that occurs in very particular circumstances; it is hardly a surprise that a heavily authoritarian state such as 1930s Germany or even the incomparably milder regime of Louis Napoleon can force its will on the population. Even plebiscites in liberal democracies can be heavily skewed by the forces the wealthy can bring to bear.

The situation changes, however, in a situation where there has been a working class revolution. The equalisation of wealth alone would significantly level the playing field in the dissemination of information. The right wing would no longer be able to set the terms of the debate once they lose control of the mass media.

There would also be a more positive role for political parties as representations of particular tendencies; rather than existing as electoral machines as they do today they would have a useful function in clarifying proposals and offering critiques.

[RED DAVE]

A party can only influence a demarchic assembly to the extent that the party has a huge mass membership. There would be conflict within a demarchic assembly between supporters of different parties, but all parties' members added together will still only be a minority of the assembly. Why do you assume that only a single party will exist?

Why do you assume that real issues can not be put to referenda without a prior decision having been taken?
Why do you assume that they are just ratifications?

Was the Italian referendum on divorce for example not a genuine decision by the electorate in favour of divorce and against the policies of the Nazarene cult?

Was the recent Icelandic referendum which rejected the terms of the bailout of Icesave just an instance of authoritarianism?

Was the referendum in Strathclyde in 1994 which overwhelmingly rejected water privatisation just an instance of authoritarianism?

It is also possible to use a referendum, with a slightly more complicated voting mechanism to decide on issues like the overall mix and balance of expenditure on public services, the level of taxation etc. In the absence of such mechanisms how can the people as a whole prevent the socialist state turning into a mechanism for their exploitation?Note the consideration of the independent role of the working class and workers control of production at the workplace level on up. What does any of this have to do with socialism.

RED DAVE

[Jose Gracchus]

A party can only influence a demarchic assembly to the extent that the party has a huge mass membership.

That's either willful crap or you have no idea how modern government functions. Two-hundred-man juries are not going to have the capacity to draft legislation and conduct all manner of policy-making and research activities, as well as hold to account the executors of policy [which you have paid no mind to their selection and the dynamics of their access to power, aside I imagine from presuming they will be responsible in much the manner as liberal democracies' civil servants are]. In all hitherto revolutions, large segments of these bureaucrats and officialdom in essence strike against the revolution, attempting to withdrawal their services and expertise in order to force the government to heel.

Tomorrow the U.S. Congress is filled by lot. Then what? The Congressional Budgetary Office will mind the norms of liberal democracy and legal government, and obey the near-six-hundred-man jury? What about the GAO? What about the enormous constellation of think tanks, policy conferences, and personal staffs?


There would be conflict within a demarchic assembly between supporters of different parties, but all parties' members added together will still only be a minority of the assembly. Why do you assume that only a single party will exist?

The bourgeois parties are simply going to protest and resist by force since institutionally they exist to put professional politicians in power to carry out the policies by their institutional constituents and major donor coalitions. The only parties which will collaborate with the state are major workers' parties, presuming this would ever happen. The demarchic assembly would be forced to lean on the professional policy-making capacities of the party machine in order to get anything done, and in order to coordinate political activities across different levels of governance and with mass organizations and popular political activities and agitation.

An atomized selection of individuals, no matter how statistically representative of the greater population from which they are selected, will not be capable of these activities.


Why do you assume that real issues can not be put to referenda without a prior decision having been taken?

Are you being serious? Someone will have to frame a policy decision or choice into a A or B, yes or no format before it can be set to the public according to atomized individual votes. For crying out loud, this is even necessary in small professional bodies [relatively speaking], like the U.S. Congress, who must delegate out the drafting and policy-making work to individual committees and commissions. Who controls the framing will, in fact, control politics.


Why do you assume that they are just ratifications?

Because me and two hundred and fifty million people cannot fairly collaborate on what the bills are that will be put to vote.


Was the Italian referendum on divorce for example not a genuine decision by the electorate in favour of divorce and against the policies of the Nazarene cult?

Of course it is. But the actual political work before it was submitted to the public to ratify policy made elsewhere, was done by professional political organizations, political parties, lobbying groups, and the like. Can you not really conceptualize this?


Was the recent Icelandic referendum which rejected the terms of the bailout of Icesave just an instance of authoritarianism?
Was the referendum in Strathclyde in 1994 which overwhelmingly rejected water privatisation just an instance of authoritarianism?

See above.


It is also possible to use a referendum, with a slightly more complicated voting mechanism to decide on issues like the overall mix and balance of expenditure on public services, the level of taxation etc. In the absence of such mechanisms how can the people as a whole prevent the socialist state turning into a mechanism for their exploitation?

I never said referenda were totally useless, or even that a whole breadth of politics should not be sent over to mass ratification. I, in fact, do believe that to be the case. I think you haven't thought through HOW things get on the ballot, by whom, and according to what players.

What I actually said was referenda are not a substitute for the role of Ekklesia [mass participative public assembly] versus the Boule council [guiding committee filled by statistical sampling of population by lot]. Your political proposal is basically: let's make everything the Boule and hope referenda fill in all the gaps. Whether or not the Athenian constitution and selection by lot actually worked as advertised you ignore completely.

I also said you haven't at all tackled the real historical problems and dynamics of the Athenian constitutional system, but have boiled it down to a simplistic choice between "Rome or Greece", and failed to deal with the Athenian constitution thoroughly, simply cherry-picking the lot principle, which was hardly the only democratic decision-making mechanism in Athens. Strategoi were elected, of course. And as before, you've failed to deal with the Ekklesia's relative role even in principle, to say nothing of how it all functioned systemically in historical fact.

[Die Neue Zeit]

A party can only influence a demarchic assembly to the extent that the party has a huge mass membership. There would be conflict within a demarchic assembly between supporters of different parties, but all parties' members added together will still only be a minority of the assembly. Why do you assume that only a single party will exist?

He assumes so probably because I myself outlined a framework for a genuine one-Party state as opposed to what Moshe Lewin called the "no-party state" re. the fictitiously "political" CPSU.

I'd like to see conflict between supporters of different tendencies within the constitutionally entrenched ruling Party (per Article 126) such that the tendencies become "electoral machines" (but for policies only and neither personnel nor separate dues), and I'd also like to see that same Party have the majority of workers as dues-paying Party Citizens (voting members and more) as a sure measure of political support for the new system.

Like Razlatzki, I'd like to see that same constitutionally entrenched ruling Party differentiate itself between the actual political Party with no personnel in state administration (SPD/USPD on steroids), and the state "party" like the CPSU with nomenclatures, job slots, etc. but demarchic and whose "members" are stripped of Party Citizenship in the main political Party.


It is also possible to use a referendum, with a slightly more complicated voting mechanism to decide on issues like the overall mix and balance of expenditure on public services, the level of taxation etc. In the absence of such mechanisms how can the people as a whole prevent the socialist state turning into a mechanism for their exploitation?

Indeed. What posters forget here is that those authoritarians who used plebiscites to their advantage posed Yes/No questions and didn't expand the options.

[Paul Cockshott]

Note the consideration of the independent role of the working class and workers control of production at the workplace level on up. What does any of this have to do with socialism.

RED DAVE
I was replying to the suggestion that referendums were the tools of authoritarianism.

[Paul Cockshott]

The points that the Inform candidate makes about the role of think tanks and lobby groups is important. Given a demarchic constitution, such groups would continue to put forward policy proposals. For the working class interest to prevail in economic policy making it would be necessary for the labour movement to advance policy proposals themselves, and for campaigining grass roots organisations to do likewise. There is no guarantee that the economic policies put forward by the labour movement would consistently win approval under such a constitution, but my contention is that under a genuinely representative democratic constitution they would have a much better chance than under the existing forms of constitution.
He or she is right about the difficulty of a body of 200 drafting legislation, but the lot principle can be applied recursively to select sub-committees who will discuss particular issues. At present legislation is not directly drafted by parliamentarians in the UK,( I dont know about outher countries), instead the details are drawn up by professional lawyers employed by the parliament acting at the direction of politicians. There would be a similar need for legal assistance by committees in charge of drafting new legislation.

[Vladimir Innit Lenin]

Perhaps there could be a way to combine demarchy with democracy. One person explained to me a system by which the probably of someone being selected was based on their popular vote, so the one with the most votes stands the best chance of being selected.

The opposite, though, could be interesting. A large number of citizens are selected at random, and then the public votes from among them. Choice is retained. It's not absolutely random.

Alternatively, we could use demarchy for a lower house, and elections for an upper house.

Without becoming superlative on you, that is terrifically interesting.

Though, as I am quite UK-centric in my thought processes with regards to post-revolutionary organisation, I tend to think in terms of only one national assembly, not a lower and upper body. Bicameralism is completely unnecessary for a nation the UKs size.

I like your second idea (random citizens chosen then voted upon), though really you'd need a short list, as opposed to a long list, otherwise it would be impossible for people to have accurate criteria from which to vote upon.

For me, it would be best if a combination of demarchy-then-democracy -where the shortlist of candidates is chosen at random using some of the filters DNZ outlines - came to fruition at local town council level, with delegates from the elected assembly being sent to less frequent regional assembly meetings and even less frequent national assembly meetings. This is of course a UK-centric model, and any national executive body, a la Central Committee/Politburo, would have to be elected in a quite different manner. Perhaps full demarchy.

My main problem with demarchy is that it is not an acceptable means through which to fill the mass bureaucracy, and in fact the existence of demarchy as a stand-alone system of filling political positions encourages, by its very nature, a large bureaucracy.

[Die Neue Zeit]

Comrade Chegitz was referring in part to comrade Zeus the Moose's reference to Moshe Machover's suggestion of random balloting.

[Vladimir Innit Lenin]

It's an interesting idea in theory, though in praxis there are massive flaws with Demarchy still.

Whilst it is a fascinating theoretical exercise to set the parameters of the filters within the demarchy process as such that a certain discrete variable - the most acceptable ('best') candidate for a given position - can be worked out in a fairly scientific way, the problem of power entrenchement and nomenclature still exists.

I ask you this: who sets the filters for any demarchy process of job filling? It is entirely possible that whoever does so, can eliminate undesirable opposition to their own personal or ideological position quite easily, through the adjustment of whichever filters they choose.

Democracy > demarchy, on the mass scale, though on a local scale a combination of the two is rather interesting.

[Die Neue Zeit]

It's an interesting idea in theory, though in praxis there are massive flaws with Demarchy still.

Whilst it is a fascinating theoretical exercise to set the parameters of the filters within the demarchy process as such that a certain discrete variable - the most acceptable ('best') candidate for a given position - can be worked out in a fairly scientific way, the problem of power entrenchement and nomenclature still exists.

I ask you this: who sets the filters for any demarchy process of job filling? It is entirely possible that whoever does so, can eliminate undesirable opposition to their own personal or ideological position quite easily, through the adjustment of whichever filters they choose.

It can be credentials committees/commissions where the positions involved don't take orders from the top, or it can be higher bodies at the top that discuss the matter, or it can be specialized bodies near the top that pass the baton to the higher bodies for ratification. As Lewin wrote above, the Politburo was responsible for ratifying but usually not drafting List #1.

Historians wrote about a "circular flow of power" in Soviet politics, whereby those at the top appointed regional bosses who in term appointed clients of those at the top. A similar "circular flow of power" exists in this scenario of randomly selected bodies at every juncture of the bureaucracy, but without perks.

[Vladimir Innit Lenin]

How would you guarantee no perks?

How can you be so accepting of there being a 'top', in the first place? Should there not be a down-to-up flow of power delegation; policy originating and being accountable to/at, local level, with the higher levels not having the power to subordinate local and regional councils/assemblies?

[Die Neue Zeit]

How would you guarantee no perks?

Ensure that the standard of living is no greater than the median standard of living for a professional or other skilled worker. This goes beyond the Paris Commune's "average skilled workers' wage."


How can you be so accepting of there being a 'top', in the first place? Should there not be a down-to-up flow of power delegation; policy originating and being accountable to/at, local level, with the higher levels not having the power to subordinate local and regional councils/assemblies?

Democratic centralization was the term coined by the German Lassalleans to describe their party organization. Also, I'm referring to the administrative side and not the policy-making side.

[AfricanAztecSamurai]

mob rule is just a headless dictatorship.lynching was mob rule