Logical Positivism

[ChrisK]

I get awful tired of seeing the accusation of Logical Positivism being thrown around all the time. Most recently Neosyndic has been called anything related to Wittgenstein's early works to be logical positivistic, and this is not a new accusation. It is time actually lay out what counts as logical positivism.

Introductory readings:

Logical Positivism on Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_positivism)

Article on the Vienna Circle (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vienna-circle/)

Rudolph Carnap (http://www.iep.utm.edu/carnap/)

Now then, after reading these there are a few things that should be obvious.

Logical positivism believes in the verification principle. Knowledge can only be gained through empirical testing.
Logical positivism considered math and logic to be tautologies that say nothing about the world. They can only model it.
Logical positivism holds that metaphysics and a priori statements are nonsensical.
Logical positivism wanted to create an ideal language that was free of the ambiguities of ordinary language. (Edit: Hyacinth has cast doubt onto this being central to logical positivism)


This list contains the basic requirements to be considered a logical positivist. If one does not fit this criteria, then that one is not a logical positivist.

So before throwing the phrasing around, please, learn what the hell it actually is.

[black magick hustla]

2 and 3 are held by early wittgenstein. 1) i am not that sure but i imagine that his "picture theory of meaning" is prolly really hard to totally grasp and a lot of people slander it of verificationism. 4) is def. not true of wittgenstein, although he did believe that the logical manifold held together the facts of the world.

[ChrisK]

2 and 3 are held by early wittgenstein.

Certainly. I have no problem with that. I was simply giving a list of things that must all be held to be a logical positivist.


1) i am not that sure but i imagine that his "picture theory of meaning" is prolly really hard to totally grasp and a lot of people slander it of verificationism.

I haven't seen this happen, but maybe.


4) is def. not true of wittgenstein, although he did believe that the logical manifold held together the facts of the world.

Eh?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Maldoror:


2 and 3 are held by early wittgenstein.

Witttgenstein did never believed that mathematical propositions were tautologies.

And as far as 3 is concerneed, he had a totally different understanding of what nonsense was, and why such pseudo-propositions were nonsensical. Saying he and the LPs held the same ideas on this is like saying Newton held the same ideas as Ptolemy about the world since they both used numbers.


1) i am not that sure but i imagine that his "picture theory of meaning" is prolly really hard to totally grasp and a lot of people slander it of verificationism.

The picture theory has nothing to do with verification; that is to confuse picturing with depicting (a key detail the VPers got wrong when they read the Tractactus), something Wittgenstein was keen to differentiate.

To picture something for Wittgenstein is to say what the world might be like independently of whether we know what it is like. To depict something is to say what the world actually is like. [This is to put things at their crudest, of course.]

The former is central to his account of language (as I have explained here (http://www.revleft.com/vb/all-philosophical-theories-t148537/index.html)); the latter is peripheral.


4) is def. not true of wittgenstein, although he did believe that the logical manifold held together the facts of the world.

No he didn't.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

By the way, easily the clearest and most accurate introduction to such ideas for beginners (that I have so far seen) can be found in this book:

Roger White, (2006), Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Continuum Books).

[Dean]

One of the biggest conflicts about this is with Popper's falsifiability (and indeed the a priori movement at large) which is a form of needless self-restriction. Even Popper's deductive reasoning is based on induction in practice.

[Lord Hargreaves]

Yeh, or just general accusations of "positivism", that does seem to get thrown around a lot too. But then, it isn't really helpful to go round accusing people of being "metaphysical" either. People should just deal with what is being explicitly argued in a thread, and ignore lazy labelling altogether.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH -- Except, I am using and applying the word 'metaphysical' in a widely accepted sense. If you think otherwise, perhaps you can point to an example where I have mis-used it.

And welcome back.

[OhYesIdid]

See, now I'm curious:
While it looks arrogant, logical positivism doesn't look that bad after reading the "introductory texts".
what's so wrong with it?

[JazzRemington]

There are times when you understand and/or meaningfully respond to a sentence that contains a word that doesn't "point" to anything. By logical positivist standards, that shouldn't be possible (at least according to what a lot of them believe).

[Hyacinth]

The Stanford Encyclopedia article on the Vinna Circle, especially section 2.3 "Overview of Doctrines (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vienna-circle/#OveDoc)," is well worth reading in full (it isn't very long) as it provides a clearer account of what logical positivism is all about.

(4) is not characteristic of logical positivism; while it is certainly a distinguishing feature of Carnap's project, Neurath takes a stance against the possibility (and desirability) the creation of "an ideal language that was free of the ambiguities of ordinary language."

[Hyacinth]

I get awful tired of seeing the accusation of Logical Positivism being thrown around all the time. Most recently Neosyndic has been called anything related to Wittgenstein's early works to be logical positivistic, and this is not a new accusation.
What I get tired of—and am honestly bewildered by—is how "logical positivism" has become a slur. And with people who have a scant idea as to what logical positivism is, where, at best, they have stock "refutations" of straw-men positions that were never held by the positivists in the first place (e.g., the alleged refutation of verificationism as being self-refuting).

This is especially ironic among those who consider themselves leftists, given the socialist leanings of the Vienna Circle (Neurath was a Marxist, minister for socialization and planning in the short-lived Bavarian Soviet Republic; Carnap a member of the USPD). And, despite the common accusations of conservatism against logical positivism, the positivists themselves saw an explicit connection between their philosophical work and their progressive political work; metaphysics is denounced not only because it is nonsense, but rather because it is pernicious reactionary nonsense.

[JimFar]

What I get tired of—and am honestly bewildered by—is how "logical positivism" has become a slur. And with people who have a scant idea as to what logical positivism is, where, at best, they have stock "refutations" of straw-men positions that were never held by the positivists in the first place (e.g., the alleged refutation of verificationism as being self-refuting).

This is especially ironic among those who consider themselves leftists, given the socialist leanings of the Vienna Circle (Neurath was a Marxist, minister for socialization and planning in the short-lived Bavarian Soviet Republic; Carnap a member of the USPD). And, despite the common accusations of conservatism against logical positivism, the positivists themselves saw an explicit connection between their philosophical work and their progressive political work; metaphysics is denounced not only because it is nonsense, but rather because it is pernicious reactionary nonsense.


I think the use of the term "logical positivism" as a slur comes both from Marxist-Leninist writers, who noting the linkage between logical positivism and Ernst Mach's philosophy which had been criticized by Lenin in his Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, subjected it to similar criticism, and from the Frankfurt School and its successors who were attempting to propagate a form of Marxism that was strongly influenced by Heideggerianism. Although those two lines of criticism were quite different, if not inconsistent with one another, they have had the combined effect of convincing many people that logical positivism was a conservative, if not a reactionary philosophy.

[black magick hustla]

mach was not even a logical positivist wtf

[Hyacinth]

I think the use of the term "logical positivism" as a slur comes both from Marxist-Leninist writers, who noting the linkage between logical positivism and Ernst Mach's philosophy which had been criticized by Lenin in his Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, subjected it to similar criticism, and from the Frankfurt School and its successors who were attempting to propagate a form of Marxism that was strongly influenced by Heideggerianism. Although those two lines of criticism were quite different, if not inconsistent with one another, they have had the combined effect of convincing many people that logical positivism was a conservative, if not a reactionary philosophy.
I recently read Cartwright's, et al., Otto Neurath: Philosophy between science and politics (in part on your recommendation in anther thread, IIRC; and also because I was familiar with Neurath's economic work with but a passing familiarity with his philosophy), and am in the process of Carus' Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought: Explication as Enlightenment. Both have been quite enlightening, especially at illuminating the connection between logical positivism and progressive politics, as well as the overtly political conception of philosophy that the positivists had (this is far more pronounced in Neurath, but Carus and others have made the case for it with Carnap as well).

What I find fascinating is that the logical positivists ended up being attacked from both the left and the right (e.g., by, among others, the Austrian school, Popper, Quine [who was quite the reactionary]). In the case of the right, given the political leanings of the positivists, as well as the connection they saw between their philosophy and their politics, it is understandable why the right would attack them. Similarly, the poor reception of positivism among philosophers is hardly surprising, since—if the positivists had their way—traditional philosophy was fit for Hume's bonfire, to be replaced with 'scientific metatheory' (to use Neurath's preferred term) or 'the logical syntax of the language of science' (to use Carnap's expression).

What I don't understand is why there was a similar reaction from the left, other than a slavish devotion to dialectical dogma.

I'm reminded of the opening line of T.P. Uschanov's The Strange Death of Ordinary Language Philosophy (http://www.helsinki.fi/~tuschano/writings/strange/): "Which book criticizing certain developments in post-war analytic philosophy won favours from both Karl Popper and the Soviet Union, moved I. A. Richards to write a poem, inspired British situation comedy, caused an angry month-long correspondence in the Times, was the subject of concerned editorials in both that paper and the Economist, and still strikes sparks today?"

I cannot help but thing that whatever received universal condemnation from both the right and the authoritarian 'left' must have something good to it.

[ar734]

It is past time to recognize that philosophy is dead. Logical Positivism, Ordinary Language Philosophy, Post Modernism, Analytical Philosophy, Post-Marxism, etc., etc., all of these are dead philosophies. Hegel may have been the last philosopher, and Marx buried him.

Historical (and possibly dialectical) materialism are scientific theories in the same way that biological evolution is a scientific theory. No one can claim that "evolution" is a philosophy.

The only thing that might be able to revive philosophy is the scientific analysis of philosophy, which so far has not been done. The scientific method, observation, measurement, hypothesis and testing needs to be applied to philosophy.

[ChrisK]

It is past time to recognize that philosophy is dead. Logical Positivism, Ordinary Language Philosophy, Post Modernism, Analytical Philosophy, Post-Marxism, etc., etc., all of these are dead philosophies. Hegel may have been the last philosopher, and Marx buried him.

Historical (and possibly dialectical) materialism are scientific theories in the same way that biological evolution is a scientific theory. No one can claim that "evolution" is a philosophy.

The only thing that might be able to revive philosophy is the scientific analysis of philosophy, which so far has not been done. The scientific method, observation, measurement, hypothesis and testing needs to be applied to philosophy.

Thats a very odd view. Certainly historical materialism was a great blow to philosophy in that we can understand where a philosophy comes from. Yet philosophy was dealt a serious blow by Wittgenstein who showed why philosophy is non-sense.

A scientific analysis of philosophy would be a further waste of time.

[ar734]

. Yet philosophy was dealt a serious blow by Wittgenstein who showed why philosophy is non-sense.

A blow which killed it.


A scientific analysis of philosophy would be a further waste of time.

Anatomy usually begins with the analysis of a corpse.

[ChrisK]

Anatomy usually begins with the analysis of a corpse.

Philosophy is a look into the unspeakable. Thus, it would be a waste of time.

[ar734]

Philosophy is a look into the unspeakable. Thus, it would be a waste of time.

After Auschwitz and Hiroshima, nothing is unspeakable.

Now, if you want to say philosophy is a look into the unknowable, then you descend into mysticism.

[ChrisK]

After Auschwitz and Hiroshima, nothing is unspeakable.

Tell me what "Chack plsit hol" means and then tell me its speakable (really makes sense)

[ar734]

Tell me what "Chack plsit hol" means and then tell me its speakable (really makes sense)

It means "glrc sr%%1! mo*h"

[Luís Henrique]

.

Logical positivism believes in the verification principle. Knowledge can only be gained through empirical testing.
Logical positivism considered math and logic to be tautologies that say nothing about the world. They can only model it.
Logical positivism holds that metaphysics and a priori statements are nonsensical.
Logical positivism wanted to create an ideal language that was free of the ambiguities of ordinary language.

This list contains the basic requirements to be considered a logical positivist. If one does not fit this criteria, then that one is not a logical positivist.

One problem is that this list may very well refer to many people who aren't logical positivists.

#1 of course depends on the definition of "knowledge". There is of course "knowledge" that is not empyrical, such as mathematical knowledge; so this is after all dependent on #2. Or on a miscomprehension of mathematics.

#2 is, as far as I can see, correct. Mathematics and logic are tautological; their interest resides in their ability to operate with empyrical data to reach conclusions about them.

#3 is, as far as I can see, false. "A triangle has three sides" is not a nonsencical statement; tautological, yes, but not nonsencical. "Metaphysics" is here an undefined term - what a logical positivist calls "metaphysics" may well be nonsence; it also may well be different from what a Tomist, a Marxist, a Hegelian, or Wittgenstein call "metaphysics".

#4 is ridiculous if it refers to an actual speakable language; if it refers to a formalised "language" that isn't meant to be spoken, but merely to serve as an analytical tool, then it already exists - it is the "language" of formal logic.

I think we have not yet defined what a logical positivist is.

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

Philosophy is a look into the unspeakable. Thus, it would be a waste of time.

Well, why? A look into the unspeakable is only a waste of time if we try to speak about it. And even then I'm not so sure it is.

Is there something that is really speakable? And, by the way, what does it mean to be "speakable" or "unspeakable"?

Luís Henrique

[ChrisK]

One problem is that this list may very well refer to many people who aren't logical positivists.

#1 of course depends on the definition of "knowledge". There is of course "knowledge" that is not empyrical, such as mathematical knowledge; so this is after all dependent on #2. Or on a miscomprehension of mathematics.

#2 is, as far as I can see, correct. Mathematics and logic are tautological; their interest resides in their ability to operate with empyrical data to reach conclusions about them.

#3 is, as far as I can see, false. "A triangle has three sides" is not a nonsencical statement; tautological, yes, but not nonsencical. "Metaphysics" is here an undefined term - what a logical positivist calls "metaphysics" may well be nonsence; it also may well be different from what a Tomist, a Marxist, a Hegelian, or Wittgenstein call "metaphysics".

#4 is ridiculous if it refers to an actual speakable language; if it refers to a formalised "language" that isn't meant to be spoken, but merely to serve as an analytical tool, then it already exists - it is the "language" of formal logic.

I think we have not yet defined what a logical positivist is.

Luís Henrique

Yes we have. We have defined that they are all of the things in the list. Those are basic tenants. Their truth or falsity has no bearing on if that is what a logical positivist is or isn't.

[ChrisK]

Well, why? A look into the unspeakable is only a waste of time if we try to speak about it. And even then I'm not so sure it is.

Is there something that is really speakable? And, by the way, what does it mean to be "speakable" or "unspeakable"?

Luís Henrique

It is a waste of time. That is my perspective.

Yes. If you want to know the distinction check this (http://www.revleft.com/vb/all-philosophical-theories-t148537/index.html) out.

[Luís Henrique]

Yes we have. We have defined that they are all of the things in the list. Those are basic tenants. Their truth or falsity has no bearing on if that is what a logical positivist is or isn't.

Historically, logical positivism is a school of thought started in Vienna, under the influence of a few philosophers (Mach, Russell, Wittgenstein), uniting a few other philosophers (Tarski, Von Neumann, Wiener, Quine, Ayer, Carnap, Neurath, von Mises, etc). To make sure that your list defines what a logical positivist is, it would be necessary to show that all those philosophers adhered to all those principles during the time they considered themselves logical positivists, and that no other philosophers, that are not considered logical positivists, do adhere to all of them.

Since your point seems to be that Wittgenstein was not a logical positivist, or that not everybody who is influenced by Wittgenstein is a logical positivists, it would be better to explain where exactly did the logical positivists depart from Wittgenstein, since it seems undeniable that they were in fact influenced by him.

Of course, the validity of these principles is unrelated to the definition of what a logical positivist is. Those are different questions.

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

It is a waste of time. That is my perspective.

Just because it is your perspective it doesn't mean it is true.


Yes. If you want to know the distinction check this (http://www.revleft.com/vb/all-philosophical-theories-t148537/index.html) out.

That is certainly not about the "speakable" and the "unspeakable", but about meaningful and meaningless sentences.

What is "unspeakable"? Religious/mystic experience? Aesthetic plasure? Erotic satisfaction? The colour of the rose? The parfum of the Rose?

Where do you draw the line?

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

Tell me what "Chack plsit hol" means and then tell me its speakable (really makes sense)

In English, at least, it has no meaning. It is easily "speakable", though:



"Chack plsit hol" is not an English valid sentence.
"Chack plsit hol" is gibberish.
"Chack plsit hol" has 13 letters.
"Chack plsit hol" makes no sence at all.
"Chack plsit hol" is an invention of ChristopherKoch.
If you think "Chack plsit hol" makes any sence, you are clearly out or your mind.
"Chack plsit hol" won't change the nature of the universe.
You don't know "Chack plsit hol" about what you are talking about.

All of those seem to be English valid sentences including "Chack plsit hol", so it is not possible to say it is "unspeakable". Most of these sentences, besides, are certainly meaningful, some are even true, and the one of them that is most dubious illustrates the fact that language is conventional.

So, again... what do you mean by "unspeakable"?

Luís Henrique

[JazzRemington]

In English, at least, it has no meaning. It is easily "speakable", though:



"Chack plsit hol" is not an English valid sentence.
"Chack plsit hol" is gibberish.
"Chack plsit hol" has 13 letters.
"Chack plsit hol" makes no sence at all.
"Chack plsit hol" is an invention of ChristopherKoch.
If you think "Chack plsit hol" makes any sence, you are clearly out or your mind.
"Chack plsit hol" won't change the nature of the universe.
You don't know "Chack plsit hol" about what you are talking about.


All of those seem to be English valid sentences including "Chack plsit hol", so it is not possible to say it is "unspeakable". Most of these sentences, besides, are certainly meaningful, some are even true, and the one of them that is most dubious illustrates the fact that language is conventional.

The only reason most of those sentences are meaningful is because they are statements about gibberish. You're confusing statements about gibberish with the gibberish itself.

And if you notice, you haven't explained what "chack plsit hol" actually means...

[Luís Henrique]

The only reason most of those sentences are meaningful is because they are statements about gibberish. You're confusing statements about gibberish with the gibberish itself.

And if you notice, you haven't explained what "chack plsit hol" actually means...

Of course I have. I said it has absolutely no meaning (except in the last sentence, where a meaning is attributed to it, turning it from gibberish to neologism).

When I say "God doesn't exist", is this gibberish, or a statement about gibberish?

The point is, there is a difference between the meaningless and the "unspeakable". As shown in my previous post, the meaningless is easily speakable. What is the "unspeakable", then?

Luís Henrique

[JazzRemington]

Of course I have. It has absolutely no meaning (except in the last sentence, where a meaning is attributed to it, turning it from gibberish to neologism).

Actually, because the phrase is meaningless, it can't be used in a neologism meaningfully.


The point is, there is a difference between the meaningless and the "unspeakable". As shown in my previous post, the meaningless is easily speakable. What is the "unspeakable", then?

Luís Henrique

Usually describing something as "unspeakable" means any explanation or description cannot be expressed meaningfully. This is the case with the aforementioned phrase - you cannot express what it means in any meaningful way. Period.

[Luís Henrique]

Actually, because the phrase is meaningless, it can't be used in a neologism meaningfully.

Of course it can. I just did it.

You may not know what "chack plsit hol" means, but I am pretty sure that if someone tells you something like "stop doing that now, you ugly chack plsit hol", you will understand it quite clearly, and quite certainly dislike it.


Usually describing something as "unspeakable" means any explanation or description cannot be expressed meaningfully. This is the case with the aforementioned phrase - you cannot express what it means in any meaningful way. Period.Is it? When ChristopherKoch says, "Philosophy is a look into the unspeakable", he doesn't seem to be doing that. If so, he would say something like "philosophy is unspeakable". The way he says leads me to think he is talking about something that can be looked upon, but that cannot be talked about.

Or, if you mean the "unspeakable" is a subject about which any sentence is meaningless, you are only saying that the subject is beyond comprehension, not that it doesn't exist. Do we believe that everything that actually exists is comprehensible? That everything that is comprehensible necessarily exists?

Take again these sentences:



God exists
God doesn't exist

If one of them makes no sence (and thence "god" is unspeakable), the other necessarily makes no sence too. In other words, anyone can hold the view that "God exists" doesn't make sence, and still believe in God (as in, "God exists doesn't make any sence, of course, because God is beyond meaning, God is unspeakable, and so saying that He merely exists doesn't even start to make justice to His being above being and non-being".

Evidently the idea that God is unspeakable is incompatible with atheism, isn't it?

So, is this what you mean by "unspeakable"?

Luís Henrique

[JazzRemington]

Of course it can. I just did it.

You may not know what "chack plsit hol" means, but I am pretty sure that if someone tells you something like "stop doing that now, you ugly chack plsit hol", you will understand it quite clearly, and quite certainly dislike it.

In that case, we'd normally say you've coined a new phrase.


Or, if you mean the "unspeakable" is a subject about which any sentence is meaningless, you are only saying that the subject is beyond comprehension, not that it doesn't exist. Do we believe that everything that actually exists is comprehensible? That everything that is comprehensible necessarily exists?

Take again these sentences:



God exists
God doesn't exist

If one of them makes no sence (and thence "god" is unspeakable), the other necessarily makes no sence too. In other words, anyone can hold the view that "God exists" doesn't make sence, and still believe in God (as in, "God exists doesn't make any sence, of course, because God is beyond meaning, God is unspeakable, and so saying that He merely exists doesn't even start to make justice to His being above being and non-being".

Evidently the idea that God is unspeakable is incompatible with atheism, isn't it?

So, is this what you mean by "unspeakable"?

Luís Henrique

You're conflating existence and meaningfulness.

[ChrisK]

Just because it is your perspective it doesn't mean it is true.

It is thought. I have linked to the thread about this numerous times. Rosa outlined exactly why it is a waste of time.


That is certainly not about the "speakable" and the "unspeakable", but about meaningful and meaningless sentences.

What is "unspeakable"? Religious/mystic experience? Aesthetic plasure? Erotic satisfaction? The colour of the rose? The parfum of the Rose?

Where do you draw the line?

Luís Henrique

I was using unspeakable to mean non-sense. It was a poor choice of words on my part.

[ChrisK]

In English, at least, it has no meaning. It is easily "speakable", though:



"Chack plsit hol" is not an English valid sentence.
"Chack plsit hol" is gibberish.
"Chack plsit hol" has 13 letters.
"Chack plsit hol" makes no sence at all.
"Chack plsit hol" is an invention of ChristopherKoch.
If you think "Chack plsit hol" makes any sence, you are clearly out or your mind.
"Chack plsit hol" won't change the nature of the universe.
You don't know "Chack plsit hol" about what you are talking about.

All of those seem to be English valid sentences including "Chack plsit hol", so it is not possible to say it is "unspeakable". Most of these sentences, besides, are certainly meaningful, some are even true, and the one of them that is most dubious illustrates the fact that language is conventional.

So, again... what do you mean by "unspeakable"?

Luís Henrique

You have yet to tell us what "Chack plsit hol" means. Its a bunch of gibberish, thats the point.

[Luís Henrique]

In that case, we'd normally say you've coined a new phrase.

Yup. It can be made to whatever pronounceable sequence of sounds.


You're conflating existence and meaningfulness.

Nope. I am distinguishing one from the other. You are the ones confusing them, as Cristopher just admitted.

And I am also asking: is there any reason to believe that "something" about which no meaningful sentence can be uttered necessarily doesn't exist?

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

You have yet to tell us what "Chack plsit hol" means. Its a bunch of gibberish, thats the point.

I have already told you what it means. It means nothing, at least until somebody coins a meaning to it.

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

It is thought. I have linked to the thread about this numerous times. Rosa outlined exactly why it is a waste of time.

Sorry. I see no reason to read anything by that person.


I was using unspeakable to mean non-sense. It was a poor choice of words on my part.

Thanks for that; it is always nice to debate honest people.

Luís Henrique

[JazzRemington]

Yup. It can be made to whatever pronounceable sequence of sounds.

But this isn't the case with the aforementioned phrase. What would one normally think of someone who always says something and then always has to explain what is meant by it? Do you even know why people coin words to begin with?


Nope. I am distinguishing one from the other. You are the ones confusing them, as Cristopher just admitted.

I don't see how that's possible on my account, as I've just suggested there is a difference. And the only thing he admitted was a poor choice of words.


And I am also asking: is there any reason to believe that "something" about which no meaningful sentence can be uttered necessarily doesn't exist?

You want me to prove a negative? At any rate, it would depend upon the situation. Hell, I don't even understand the point of this question. All I ever said was that there were some words that don't "point" to anything but can be included in sentences that can be readily understood.

[Luís Henrique]

But this isn't the case with the aforementioned phrase. What would one normally think of someone who always says something and then always has to explain what is meant by it? Do you even know why people coin words to begin with?

Well, it depends on why one would think the coining of a new word is necessary. There are many reason for that: new objects, social prejudice against some words (the cycle of disphemysation/euphemysation for instance), aesthetic considerations, safety considerations (thieves' slang), economy considerations (byke instead of bycicle), disambiguation (vynil for a particular kind of record), humour, etc.

Good neologisms "catch" immediately and are usually understood without need of explanations.


I don't see how that's possible on my account, as I've just suggested there is a difference.Well, what you seem to be saying is that, once some sentence or phrase is deemed "meaningless" it follows that it refers to something inexistent. But first there is a formal problem with that: if a sentence of the kind "x exists" is deemed meaningless, then its negation is also meaningless, so "x does not exist" is also meaningless. And so it follows that we cannot conclude for the inexistence of a subject from the meaninglessness of statements about it (this seems to have been Wittgenstein's own position - when he talked about "the unspeakable" he was not talking about something that had no existence or importance, but, on the contrary, about something that was "beyond" mere speech or experience. His metaphysics would then be a metaphysics of silence). Second there is a content problem: the (in)existence of something doesn't seem to follow from its meaningful(less)ness. Is this a postulate of your theory, and, if so, is it meaningful, as it doesn't look to be either analytical nor empyrical? Or do you claim this to derive from something else, and, in this case, from what?


And the only thing he admitted was a poor choice of words.Ah, but the poorness of such choice stems directly from the confusion of two different things: "meaninglessness" (which is a property of linguistic statements) and "unspeakability" (which is a property of non-linguistic subjects of language), the latter being further taken as a synonim or perhaps an index of "inexistence".


You want me to prove a negative?Well, why not?


At any rate, it would depend upon the situation. Hell, I don't even understand the point of this question. All I ever said was that there were some words that don't "point" to anything but can be included in sentences that can be readily understood.But if they can be readily understood how are they "meaningless"? Or do you mean that the intelligibility of sentences is different from the intelligibility of the words that take part in it?

The problem however is much the opposite: the issue of whether some words may point to "something" that has an existence outside from the subjectivity of the speaker but about which no "meaningful" sentences can be uttered.

To give you a not excessively metaphysic example. All our direct experience of matter is of something either in solid, liquid, or gaseous state. But these "states of matter" are properties based on the relations between molecules, so we must logically infer that individual atoms are not solid nor liquid nor gaseous. Are we able to meaningfully talk about what is this existence of matter outside the empyrical states under which we are acquainted to?

Luís Henrique

[JazzRemington]

Well, it depends on why one would think the coining of a new word is necessary. There are many reason for that: new objects, social prejudice against some words (the cycle of disphemysation/euphemysation for instance), aesthetic considerations, safety considerations (thieves' slang), economy considerations (byke instead of bycicle), disambiguation (vynil for a particular kind of record), humour, etc.

Good neologisms "catch" immediately and are usually understood without need of explanations.

I don't see what this has to do with the situation at hand.


Well, what you seem to be saying is that, once some sentence or phrase is deemed "meaningless" it follows that it refers to something inexistent.

Where did I argue that as being the case? If anything, I argued that a lot of logical positivists believed that.


Ah, but the poorness of such choice stems directly from the confusion of two different things: "meaninglessness" (which is a property of linguistic statements) and "unspeakability" (which is a property of non-linguistic subjects of language), the latter being further taken as a synonim or perhaps an index of "inexistence".

OK?


Well, why not?

You seriously don't understand the fallacy of being required to prove a negative?


But if they can be readily understood how are they "meaningless"? Or do you mean that the intelligibility of sentences is different from the intelligibility of the words that take part in it?

Once again, all I said was that it's possible for a word not to "point" to something and still be included in a sentence that is readily understood. Which, by standards of most logical positivists, should not possible. What part of this do you not understand? I'm beginning to think you're deliberately making obfuscating arguments for some end that you don't want to be clear about. Hell, you won't even explain what you mean by "meaningful" and "existence."


To give you a not excessively metaphysic example. All our direct experience of matter is of something either in solid, liquid, or gaseous state. But these "states of matter" are properties based on the relations between molecules, so we must logically infer that individual atoms are not solid nor liquid nor gaseous. Are we able to meaningfully talk about what is this existence of matter outside the empyrical states under which we are acquainted to?

Why do you keep on insisting I'm confusing "meaningfulness" with "existence"?

[Luís Henrique]

I don't see what this has to do with the situation at hand.

Well, it was a direct answer to a question of yours.


Where did I argue that as being the case? If anything, I argued that a lot of logical positivists believed that.Fine. So you don't. Excellent.


You seriously don't understand the fallacy of being required to prove a negative?http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/richard_carrier/theory.html
http://scienceblogs.com/evolvingthoughts/2008/06/you_can_prove_a_negative.php
http://www.graveyardofthegods.net/articles/cantprovenegative.html

There is no fallacy involved.


Once again, all I said was that it's possible for a word not to "point" to something and still be included in a sentence that is readily understood. Well, sorry, then; it quite clearly seemed to me that you were making the opposite point.


Which, by standards of most logical positivists, should not possible. What part of this do you not understand?As above, it seemed to me that you agreed with them. Glad to learn that you don't. That also means, I suppose, that you also don't agree with Wittgenstein?


I'm beginning to think you're deliberately making obfuscating arguments for some end that you don't want to be clear about.Ad hominem.

The secret, unspeakable end is merely that I want to clarify what we are talking about.


Hell, you won't even explain what you mean by "meaningful" and "existence."Well, I am not making bold statements about either.

But that's the point: before we start "talking" about "meaning" and "existence", we should define both.

The logical positivists defined "meaning" through their criterium of verifiability. It is a workable definition; until we reach the conclusion that it entails contradictions, I propose we stick with it. Or do you have a better definition?

When it comes to "existence", things are trickier. I don't have any good definition of it, so I am merely using the common place usage. Do you have a workable definition?


Why do you keep on insisting I'm confusing "meaningfulness" with "existence"?As above, you seemed to be doing that; perhaps I confused your position with Christopher's. If "meaningfulness" and "existence" are unrelated things, I don't think it is trivial to say that any discussion about the "unspeakable" is necessarily a waste of time, which seems to be his point.

Luís Henrique

[Hoipolloi Cassidy]

I'll tell you, 'cause I heard this recently from an old philosopher who had heard if from the rector of a University in Yougoslavia. The Rector, of course, would never have become Rector unless he'd been loyal to Tito from the git-go, which happened thus:

Some time during WWII this future rector decided to join Tito's partisans, so he went over to their lines. He was immediately brought in for questioning over his ideological leanings. When he explained that he was a Logical Positivist there was general suspicion: how did he explain Logical Positivism and how did that relate to Marxism? The philosopher proceeded to explain Logical Positivism. As he got to the part about mathematics a commissar cut him off: "You know math? - Yes, of course! - Trigonometry? - Obviously - Good! Artillery!"

:laugh::laugh::laugh::laugh::laugh::laugh:

[JazzRemington]

As above, it seemed to me that you agreed with them. Glad to learn that you don't. That also means, I suppose, that you also don't agree with Wittgenstein?

Young or Old?


There is no fallacy involved.

You should pay close attention to those links. The last one even says "of course you can’t prove that God doesn’t exist – no one even knows what God is supposed to be." Now, if we replace "God" with "'meaningful' and 'exist'"...


Ad hominem.

The secret, unspeakable end is merely that I want to clarify what we are talking about.

And how is what I said an ad-hominem? Sometimes an ad-hominem isn't a logical fallacy, especially if it's relevant to the issue at hand.


But that's the point: before we start "talking" about "meaning" and "existence", we should define both.

You should, since you're asking a question about them.


The logical positivists defined "meaning" through their criterium of verifiability. It is a workable definition; until we reach the conclusion that it entails contradictions, I propose we stick with it. Or do you have a better definition?

When it comes to "existence", things are trickier. I don't have any good definition of it, so I am merely using the common place usage. Do you have a workable definition?

My point is that logical positivists seemingly have very narrow meanings of "meaningful" and "exist."

[Luís Henrique]

Young or Old?

Both.


You should pay close attention to those links. The last one even says "of course you can’t prove that God doesn’t exist – no one even knows what God is supposed to be." Now, if we replace "God" with "'meaningful' and 'exist'"...It also says this:


Clearly, it’s possible to prove a negative statement. The real problem here is clearly the nature of the positive statement being refuted. When a person asserts that God exists, he does not specify the nature of God – that is, is God small, large, blue, red? And where is he? Of course it is not possible to prove that God does not exist, if “God” is a thing that has no definition, no characteristics, and no location. In fact, you can prove just about any kind of negative you can think of – except for (surprise!) the non-existence of mystical beings. When you get right down to it, the statement “you cannot prove a negative” is really just a different way of saying “You can’t prove me wrong because I don’t even know what I’m talking about.”(emphasys mine)

So, unless you are implying that "meaning" and "existence" are mystical beings, we should be able to discuss them, shouldn't we?

And, besides that, I deny that “...'God' is a thing that has no definition": it is clearly defined as "the uncreated creator of the Universe", so it is evidently possible to prove its inexistence: all you have to do is to show that either the universe is uncreated, or that no such thing as an uncreated being is possible. The article is simply wrong about this - or so is my take about it, but then I am not an agnostic, either of the naïve or of the sophisticated brand: I am an atheist, and to me "God doesn't exist" makes perfect sence.


And how is what I said an ad-hominem? Sometimes an ad-hominem isn't a logical fallacy, especially if it's relevant to the issue at hand.Which isn't the case. So the point stands: it is an ad hominem.


You should, since you're asking a question about them.So, I should provide the definition because I am the one talking about them? But so are you:


My point is that logical positivists seemingly have very narrow meanings of "meaningful" and "exist."Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

At this point I will claim "victory" on the issue of the distinction of "meaningfulness" and "existence". My point is that they cannot be conflated; JazzRemington seems to be of the same opinion, and ChristopherKoch has admitted that he misused words, giving the impression that he conflates them, but that this is not the case.

Evidently, a proper discussion on the relation between "existence" and "meaning" is still in order: while it seems we all agree that "absence of meaning" of the referent does not imply "non-existance" of the refered, none of us brought up even a shade of evidence for this conclusion.

So, back to the main point of this thread: logical positivism.

Up to now, Christopher listed 4 tenets that he says are essential to logical positivism, and said that anyone who does not hold to these four tenets cannot be classified as a logical positivist. Hyacinth pondered that tenet #4 isn't held by all logical positivists, which was not effectively contested; and I have made the point that tenet #1 is a logical consequence of tenet #2. If so, this would reduce the "actual tenets" of logical positivism to #2 and #3. Which maldoror said were held by "early Wittgenstein".

So up to now we don't have actually a good set of criteria to distinguish the thought of the logical positivists from the thought of young Wittgenstein. So, are Hyacinth, me, and/or maldoror wrong, or was Wittgenstein a logical positivist when young? And if the latter, how (and when) exactly he changed his views departing from logical positivism into something else? Or if it is the case that he always was a logical positivist, and it is the thought of ChristopherKoch that departs significantly from both Wittgenstein and logical positivism, then exactly what are the differences between ChristopherKoch and logical positivists?

Luís Henrique

[JazzRemington]

Both.

I don't think old Wittgenstein said anything to that end.


So, unless you are implying that "meaning" and "existence" are mystical beings, we should be able to discuss them, shouldn't we?

Point being that your use of "meaningful" and "existence" is far too vague to be of any use in proving a negative. Even if they are mystical beings, you can still discuss them. How do you think people talk about the Germanic god Thor in mythology and folklore discussions?


Which isn't the case. So the point stands: it is an ad hominem.

I never said an ad-hominem isn't always an ad-hominem. I said it wasn't always fallacious...which IS the case in this situation because you aren't being clear on what you mean by "meaningful" and "existence" in your aforementioned question to me. Period. Since you refuse you clarify what you mean by the two, I have no other choice but to assume you're doing it on purpose.


So, I should provide the definition because I am the one talking about them? But so are you:

I didn't say talking, I said asking. Describing people that believe things based on narrow usage of words doesn't necessarily entail me having to explain what they meant, if that's at all possible. Especially when it's been done already to death. You asked me a question as to whether or not meaningless sentences implies non-existence, and I replied it depends on what you mean by "meaninglessness" and "existence."


Evidently, a proper discussion on the relation between "existence" and "meaning" is still in order: while it seems we all agree that "absence of meaning" of the referent does not imply "non-existance" of the refered, none of us brought up even a shade of evidence for this conclusion.

*sigh* Like I've been saying, it depends on what you mean by "meaningful" and "existence."

[Luís Henrique]

Since you refuse you clarify what you mean by the two, I have no other choice but to assume you're doing it on purpose.

Ah, but I don't refuse to clarify:

On "meaning":


The logical positivists defined "meaning" through their criterium of verifiability. It is a workable definition; until we reach the conclusion that it entails contradictions, I propose we stick with it.

On "existence":


I am merely using the common place usage.

So you can discuss them under these definitions, or you can reject the definitions and come with your own, or reject the possibility of defining the terms.


I didn't say talking, I said asking. Describing people that believe things based on narrow usage of words doesn't necessarily entail me having to explain what they meant, if that's at all possible. Especially when it's been done already to death. You asked me a question as to whether or not meaningless sentences implies non-existence, and I replied it depends on what you mean by "meaninglessness" and "existence."

How that? You saying that the logical positivists have too narrow meanings for these words implies your definition of these concepts - not on mine.


*sigh* Like I've been saying, it depends on what you mean by "meaningful" and "existence."

I have already told you.

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

I don't think old Wittgenstein said anything to that end.

And what did young Wittgenstein say?

Luís Henrique

[JazzRemington]

So you can discuss them under these definitions, or you can reject the definitions and come with your own, or reject the possibility of defining the terms.

[...]

How that? You saying that the logical positivists have too narrow meanings for these words implies your definition of these concepts - not on mine.

I don't have my own definition of "existence." If you use the word the way it's normally used, you'd sometimes be expected to clarify what you mean by something existing by giving, say, a location or time frame. So, "God exists" can be made to have sense by qualifying it, e.g., thusly: "God exists in the Christian bible." This is the same way as saying someone exists as a character in a story, or just in a story. Logical positivists seem to mean "to exist" in an absolute sense without any qualifications.


And what did young Wittgenstein say?

I don't particularly care what young Wittgenstein wrote, so I fail to see the point in this.

[Luís Henrique]

I don't have my own definition of "existence." If you use the word the way it's normally used, you'd sometimes be expected to clarify what you mean by something existing by giving, say, a location or time frame.

Ah, I see. So I need to provide thorough definitions of the words I use, but you have the privilege of using words "in the way they are normally used".


So, "God exists" can be made to have sense by qualifying it, e.g., thusly: "God exists in the Christian bible." This is the same way as saying someone exists as a character in a story, or just in a story. Logical positivists seem to mean "to exist" in an absolute sense without any qualifications.

Well, they don't do this. They were intelligent enough to admit that fantastic entities "exist" as subjects of what they would call "poetry". There are many problems with logical positivism, but this isn't one of them.


I don't particularly care what young Wittgenstein wrote, so I fail to see the point in this.

Good.

I wonder however why you waste both your time and mine asking me to qualify my question about Wittgenstein if you never had any intention of replying to it.

Luís Henrique

[ChrisK]

Sorry. I see no reason to read anything by that person.

Fine, if you want to understand and don't want to read Rosa read the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations. Good luck

[ChrisK]

And what did young Wittgenstein say?

Luís Henrique

Something very different than the Logical Positivists. The logical positivists were famous for having misread the Tractatus and claiming that they were in line with his point of view.

[JazzRemington]

Ah, I see. So I need to provide thorough definitions of the words I use, but you have the privilege of using words "in the way they are normally used".

You did say you were using "to exist" as it's normally used. And I added that when it's normally used it's some times used with a qualifier.


Well, they don't do this. They were intelligent enough to admit that fantastic entities "exist" as subjects of what they would call "poetry". There are many problems with logical positivism, but this isn't one of them.

I didn't say that was a problem of logical positivism. I said one of the problems was that one can utter a sentence that contains a meaningless (by their standards) term but yet have the sentence be perfectly understood.


Good.

I wonder however why you waste both your time and mine asking me to qualify my question about Wittgenstein if you never had any intention of replying to it.

Well, the way you responded to my query suggested that you meant old Wittgenstein and not young because you specifically stated as such. My answer thus was that I was unaware of old Wittgenstein raising any such argument (aside from in a thought experiment of some kind). Now it seems you're moving the goal post. I never cared to begin with what young Wittgenstein wrote.

[Luís Henrique]

Fine, if you want to understand and don't want to read Rosa read the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations. Good luck
Something very different than the Logical Positivists. The logical positivists were famous for having misread the Tractatus and claiming that they were in line with his point of view.
Well, the way you responded to my query suggested that you meant old Wittgenstein and not young because you specifically stated as such. My answer thus was that I was unaware of old Wittgenstein raising any such argument (aside from in a thought experiment of some kind). Now it seems you're moving the goal post. I never cared to begin with what young Wittgenstein wrote.

:laugh::laugh::laugh::laugh::laugh::laugh::laugh:

It seems you people really want everybody else to simply bow and accept whatever you seem to believe. Explaining it to us is beyond question; answering questions is impossible (besides, how dare anyone question your holy beliefs?); having a normal discussion is impossible; and if one tries it is certainly because we have a secret agenda against you.

Just how ridiculous!

Luís Henrique

[JazzRemington]

It seems you people really want everybody else to simply bow and accept whatever you seem to believe. Explaining it to us is beyond question; answering questions is impossible (besides, how dare anyone question your holy beliefs?); having a normal discussion is impossible; and if one tries it is certainly because we have a secret agenda against you.

I really don't know what you're talking about. All I did was answer your question about what the young Wittgenstein believed in regards to "meaninglessness implies non-existence" and you throw a fit when I call you on trying to move the goal post.

[Luís Henrique]

I really don't know what you're talking about. All I did was answer your question about what the young Wittgenstein believed in regards to "meaninglessness implies non-existence" and you throw a fit when I call you on trying to move the goal post.

Well, it is obvious that you don't have a hint about what you are talking about.

"It is impossible to prove a negative"... ha, ha, ha.

Luís Henrique

[ChrisK]

:laugh::laugh::laugh::laugh::laugh::laugh::laugh:

It seems you people really want everybody else to simply bow and accept whatever you seem to believe. Explaining it to us is beyond question; answering questions is impossible (besides, how dare anyone question your holy beliefs?); having a normal discussion is impossible; and if one tries it is certainly because we have a secret agenda against you.

Just how ridiculous!

Luís Henrique

Not at all. It would just take a very long time to write it all down and there are perfectly serviceable explanations out there. Anyway, here is an explanation of those ideas.


I claim no originality here, except in the way these ideas have been presented. They have in fact been adapted from Wittgenstein's (http://www.iep.utm.edu/wittgens/) early and middle period.

Here's why philosophical theories make no sense:

Metaphysical vs Empirical Propositions

Consider a typical philosophical/metaphysical (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics) thesis:

M1: To be is to be perceived.

Contrast this with a typical empirical (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empirical) proposition (i.e., a proposition/sentence about matters of fact):

M2: Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital.

The seemingly profound nature of theses like M1 is linked to rather more mundane features of the language in which they are expressed: that is, they are connected with the fact that the main verb they use is almost invariably in the indicative (http://www.lousywriter.com/verbs_indicative_mood.php) mood.

[Sometimes, this mood is augmented/beefed-up with subjunctive (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjunctive_mood) and/or modal qualifiers (such as 'must', 'can't', 'necessary', etc.) -- which, incidentally, only add to the confusion. We will see why below.]

This apparently superficial grammatical facade hides a deeper logical form -- several in fact. This is something which only becomes plain when such sentences are examined more closely.

M1-type expressions look as if they revealed profound truths about reality since they resemble empirical propositions. In the event, they turn out to be nothing at all like them.

To see this, consider again this ordinary empirical proposition:

T1: Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital.

Compare this with these similar-looking indicative (but nonetheless typically metaphysical) sentences:

T2: Time is a relation between events.

T3: Motion is inseparable from matter.

First, in order to understand T1, it is not necessary to know whether it is true or whether it is false.

Contrast this with the comprehension of T2 and T3; understanding either of these goes hand-in-hand with knowing they are both true (or, alternatively, knowing they are both false, as the case may be). Their truth thus follows either (1) from the meaning the words they contain, (2) from specific definitions or (3) from a handful of 'thought experiments' -- i.e., [I]from yet more words.

In relation to T2, (2) above might be something like "Events take place in time". With T3, it might be "Motion is a form of the existence of matter" -- as Engels and Lenin believed -- and so on. To be sure, (1)-(3) might also be prefaced by some sort of 'philosophical argument' -- but these are just more words, too; no evidence is needed. It's not possible to devise experiments to test propositions like T2 and T3. What would they even look like?

This now intimately links the truth-status of sentences like T2 and T3 with meaning, not factual confirmation, and hence not with a confrontation with material reality. Their truth-status is thus independent of, and anterior to, the search for supporting evidence -- not that such a search is relevant anyway, or, indeed, that it is ever carried out. [Again, what would you or could you look for to confirm T2 or T3?]

In contrast, understanding T1 is independent of its confirmation or disconfirmation. Indeed, it would be impossible to do either of these if T1 had not already been understood. Plainly, the actual truth/falsehood of T1-type propositions follows from the way the world happens to be, and is not solely based on the meaning of certain expressions. Their truth cannot be read-off from the words they contain, unlike T2- and T3-type sentences.

Empirical propositions are typically like this; they have to be understood first before they can be confronted with the evidence that would establish their truth-status. In contrast, metaphysical propositions carry their truth or their falsehood on their faces, as it were, and need no evidence to establish either of these. Understanding them is one and the same as knowing their truth-status. That is why it is impossible even to conceive of ways of confirming them.

So, to sum up: here we have two sorts of indicative sentences, each with a radically different logical 'relation' to the world.

Understanding the first sort (i.e., those like T1) is independent of ascertaining their truth-status, whereas their actual truth or falsehood depends on the state of the world.

With the second sort (i.e., those like T2 or T3), their truth or falsehood is not dependent on the state of the world, but follows solely from the meaning of the words they contain (or from the meaning of those in the argument from which they were 'derived'). To understand them is ipso facto to know they are true or to know they are false.

Second, metaphysical theses (like T2 and T3) were in fact deliberately constructed by philosophers in order to transcend the limitations of the material world. This approach was justified on the grounds that it allowed them to uncover underlying "essences", thus revealing nature's "hidden secrets", i.e., the fundamental principles by means of which the 'deity' had created the world. This idea then linked language with the underlying nature of reality. That idea still remains to this day, even though its theological origin has been forgotten. That is why metaphysical 'truths' are still being read off from language/thought alone, even by atheists.

Theses like these are deemed "necessarily true" (or "necessarily false"), and are thus held to express genuine knowledge of these fundamental aspects of reality -- unlike contingent (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingency_(philosophy))/empirical propositions whose actual truth-status can alter with the wind.

[After all, Tony Blair might sell his copy of Das Kapital -- or buy the book if he does not already own it. 'Philosophical knowledge' -- 'genuine knowledge' -- cannot depend on such changeable features of reality.]

Traditionally, this meant that empirical propositions like T1 were considered to be epistemologically (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology) inferior to T2- and T3-type sentences, since they were deemed incapable of revealing such fundamental knowledge. Indeed, "philosophical knowledge" (yielding absolute certainty) has always been seen as the sole preserve of T2- and T3-type sentences.

This, of course, means that whatever happens in the material world, they remained eternally true, since they are not generated from experience, but are derived from thought alone.

Metaphysical propositions thus masquerade as especially profound, 'super-empirical' truths which cannot fail to be true or cannot fail to be false, as the case may be. Plainly, they do this by aping the indicative mood, but they go way beyond it.

Thus, what they say does not just happen to be so, as is the case with ordinary empirical truths. What T2- and T3-type sentences say cannot possibly be otherwise. The world must conform to whatever they say, not the other way round. They determine the logical form of any possible world. This is not surprising given the theological origin of such ideas; after all 'god' spoke (so the Bible tells us) and reality just sprang into existence. Hence, on this view, the world is little more than condensed language. In that case, once these 'secrets' have been ascertained, they tell us how the world must be. No wonder then that such truths follow from language alone.

This also accounts for the frequent use of modal terms (like "must", "necessary" and "inconceivable") -- as in "I must exist if I can think" [Descartes (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ren%C3%A9_Descartes)], "Time must be a relation between events" [Kant (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immanuel_Kant)], "Being must be the same as and yet different from Nothing, the contradiction resolved in Becoming" [Hegel (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georg_Wilhelm_Friedrich_Hegel)] or "Existence can't be a predicate" [Russell (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bertrand_Russell)]. Everything in reality must be this or it must be that.

Contrast this with T1. If anyone were to question its truth, the following response: "Tony Blair must own a copy of Das Kapital" would be highly inappropriate -- unless, of course, T1 itself were the conclusion of an inference of some sort (such as: "Tony Blair told me he owned a copy, so he must own one"), or it was based on a direct observation statement (such as, "I saw his wife buy him a copy and give it to him, and I spotted it on his bookshelf a couple of minutes ago"). But even then, the truth or falsehood of T1 would still depend on an interface with material reality at some point.

So, with T1-type sentences, the world dictates to us whether what they say is true or false. We do not dictate to reality what it must contain, or what it must be like.

With respect to T2- and T3-type sentences, things are radically different: because their truth-values (true or false) can be determined independently and in advance of the way the world happens to be, philosophers use them to dictate to reality what it must be like.

In that case, once they have been understood, metaphysical propositions like T2 and T3 guarantee their own truth or their own falsehood. They are thus true a priori (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_priori).

So: to understand a metaphysical thesis is to know it is true (or to know it is false). That is why, to their inventors, they appear to be so certain, self-evident, and, in many cases, absolutely true. Their intimate connection with language means that questioning their veracity seems to run against the grain of our understanding, not of our experience. Indeed, they appear to be self-evident precisely because they need no evidence to confirm their truth-status; they provide their own 'evidence', and testify on their own behalf. Their veracity follows from the alleged meaning of the words they contain. They, not the world, guarantee their own truth or guarantee their own falsehood.

Unfortunately, this divorces such theses from material reality, since they are true or false independently of any apparent state of the world.

In that case, any thesis that can be judged true or judged false on conceptual/linguistic grounds alone cannot feature in a materialist account of reality, only an Idealist one. [Why that is so is explained if you follow the links posted at the end.]

Now, these assertions might appear to be somewhat dogmatic, but as we shall see, the opposite view is the one that is dogmatic, since it is based on a ruling-class view of reality -- which has to be imposed on the world -- and on a view whose validity is not sensitive to empirical test. [Why that is so will be explained below.]

Worse still, it collapses into incoherence when examined closely -- as we will also see.

The Slide Into Non-sense

The paradoxical nature of metaphysical theses illustrates the ineluctable slide into non-sense that all philosophical theories undergo whenever their proponents try to undermine either the vernacular or the logical and pragmatic (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pragmatics) principles on which it is based -- those that, for example, ordinary speakers regularly use to state contingent truths or falsehoods about the world without such a fuss.

[It is worth pointing out that "non-sense" is not the same as "nonsense (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nonsense)". The latter word has various meanings varying from the patently false (such as "Karl Marx was a shape-shifting lizard") to plain gibberish (such as "783&£$750 ow2jmn 34y4&$ 6y3n3& 8FT34n").

The former word relates to indicative sentences that turn out to be incapable of expressing a sense (no matter what we try to do with them), that is, they are incapable of being true or they are incapable of being false. Here, therefore, the indicative/fact-stating mood has been mis-used/mis-applied. So, when they are employed to state fundamental truths about reality, they seriously misfire since they can't possibly do this. (This section will explain why that is so.)

So, non-sensical sentences aren't patently false, nor are they plain gibberish.

Finally, the word "sense" is being used in the following way: it expresses what we understand to be the case if the proposition in question is true (or what fails to be the case if it is false), even if we do not know whether it is actually true or whether it is actually false.

For example, everyone (who knows English, who knows who Tony Blair and what Das Kapital are) will understand T1 (i.e., "Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital") upon hearing or reading it. They grasp its sense --, that is, they understand what the world would have to be like for T1 to be true or what the world would have to be like for T1 to be false.

More importantly, the same situation, if it obtains, will make T1 true, as it will make T1 false, if it does not obtain. (The significance of that comment will become clear below.)]

Intractable logical problems soon begin to emerge with regard to such putatively empirical, but nonetheless metaphysical sentences if an attempt is made to restrict or eliminate one or other of the paired semantic (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantics) possibilities associated with ordinary empirical propositions: i.e., truth and falsehood.

This occurs, for example, when an apparently empirical proposition is declared to be "only true" or "only false" -- or, more pointedly, 'necessarily' the one or the other -- perhaps as a "law of cognition", or, more likely, when a 'necessary' truth or 'necessary' falsehood is mis-identified as a particularly profound sort of empirical thesis, using the indicative mood (etc.).

As we will see, this tactic results in the automatic loss of both semantic options, and with that goes any sense the original proposition might have had, rendering it non-sensical.

This is because an empirical proposition leaves it open as to whether it is true or whether it is false; that is why its truth-value (true/false) cannot simply be read-off from its content, why evidence is required in order to determine its semantic status (true/false, once more), and why it is possible to understand it before its truth or falsehood is known. If that were not so, it would be impossible to ascertain its truth-status; it's not possible to confirm or confute an indicative sentence if no one understands it.

When this is not the case -- i.e., when either option (truth or falsehood) is closed-off, or when a proposition is said to be "necessarily true" or "necessarily false" -- evidence clearly becomes irrelevant. Thus, whereas the truth or falsehood of an empirical proposition cannot be ascertained on linguistic, conceptual or semantic grounds alone, if the truth or falsehood of a proposition is capable of being established solely on the basis of such linguistic/structural factors, that proposition cannot be empirical -- despite its use of the indicative mood.

If, however, such a proposition is still regarded by those who propose it as a truth, or as a Super-truth about the world, about its "essence", then it is plainly metaphysical.

[A 'Super-truth' superficially resembles an ordinary scientific truth, but is in fact nothing like it. Super-truths transcend anything the sciences can confirm or confute. T2 and T3 above are excellent examples of this. Their alleged truth depends solely on meaning not on the way the world happens to be.]

Otherwise the truth or falsehood of such propositions would be world-sensitive, not solely thought-, meaning- or concept-dependent. And that explains why the comprehension of metaphysical propositions appears to go hand in hand with knowing their 'truth' (or knowing their 'falsehood'): their truth-status is based solely on features of thought, language or meaning, not on the material world.

This means that they can't be related to the material world or anything in it, and hence they can't be used to help change it.

To recap: an empirical proposition derives its sense from the truth possibilities it appears to hold open (which options will later be decided upon one way or the other by a confrontation with the material world). That is why the actual truth-value of, say, T1 (or its contradictory, T4, below) does not need to be known before it is understood; but it is why evidence is relevant to establishing that truth-value.

T1: Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital.

T4: Tony Blair does not own a copy of Das Kapital.

In order to comprehend T1 or T4, all that is required is some grasp of the possibilities that both of these propositions hold open. T1 and T4 both have the same content, and both are made true or made false by the same situation obtaining, or not obtaining, respectively.

It is also why it is easy to imagine T1 to be true even if it is false, or false even if it is true. In general, the comprehension of empirical propositions involves an understanding of the conditions under which they would/could be true, or would/could be false; as is well-known, these are otherwise called their "truth-conditions". That, of course, allows anyone so minded to confirm their actual truth-status by comparison with the world, since they would in that case know what to look for or expect.

These non-negotiable facts about language also underpin the Marxist emphasis on the social -- and hence the communal and communicational -- nature of discourse.

[This is because they account for our ability to grasp empirical propositions before we know whether they are true, or whether they are false. This is not to argue that other uses of language are not important, but fact-stating language is intimately connected with our capacity to understand nature, and thus to control it -- and that links it with our survival on this planet. It is also the form of language that is aped by metaphysical discourse.]

This flies in the face of metaphysical and representational theories, which emphasise the opposite: that to understand a proposition goes hand-in-hand with automatically knowing it is true (or automatically knowing it is false) -- by-passing the confirmation/disconfirmation stage, thus reducing the usual 'truth-conditions' to only one option.

However, there are other serious problems faced by this approach to language over and above the fact it would make it impossible to communicate (and thus to form) knowledge.

[Representationalism will be explained in my next post, as will the fact that, if true, it would make communication impossible.]

If a proposition looks as if it were empirical, because it uses the indicative mood, and yet it can only be false (as seems to be the case with, say, L1, below, according to Lenin) then, as we will see, paradox must ensue.

Consider, therefore, the following sentences, the first of which Engels and Lenin declared "unthinkable" (in the case of L2, presumably because it is "necessarily true"):

L1: Motion sometimes occurs without matter.

L2: "Motion without matter is unthinkable." [Lenin (1972) Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, p.318. Italic emphasis in the original.]

Unfortunately for Lenin, in order to declare L1 necessarily (and always) false, Lenin had to think the offending words, "matter without motion". In order to declare it "unthinkable" those words patently had to go through his mind. That is, he had to do what he had just told us no one can do -- i.e., think these words!

But, if the truth of L1 is to be permanently excluded by holding it as necessarily false (or "unthinkable"), then, plainly, whatever would make it true has to be ruled out conclusively.

And yet, anyone doing that would have to know what L1 rules in (i.e., they would have to know what would make L1 true) so that they could comprehend what was being disqualified by its rejection (as always and necessarily false).

However, that is precisely what cannot be done if what L1 itself says is permanently ruled out on semantic/conceptual grounds, and we cannot even think it.

Consequently, if a proposition like L1 is declared necessarily false this charade (i.e., the permanent exclusion of its truth) cannot take place -- since it would be impossible to say and/or to think what could count as making it true.

But, because the truth of L1 cannot even be conceived, Lenin was in no position to say what was excluded by its rejection. He could not now say -- or think -- what he is ruling out!

His own words thus undermined what he thought he wanted to say!

Alas, this now prevents any account being given of what would make L1 false, let alone 'necessarily' false. Given this twist, and paradoxically, L1 could now be declared necessarily false only if it was not capable of being thought of as necessarily false!

That is: L1 could only be declared necessarily false if what would make it true could at least be entertained just in order to rule it out as false.

But, according to Lenin, the conditions that would make L1 true cannot even be conceived, so this train of thought cannot be joined at any point. And, if the truth of L1 cannot be conceived, then neither can its falsehood, for we would not then know what was being ruled out.

If we are incapable of thinking these words, we certainly cannot think them false.

In that case, L1 can neither be accepted nor rejected by anyone, for no one would know what its content committed them to so that it could be either countenanced or repudiated. Hence, L1 would lose any sense it had, since it could not under any circumstances be true, or under any circumstances be false.

This is in fact just another consequence of the point made earlier that an empirical proposition and its negation have the same content (they express the same possible state of affairs). If one option is ruled out, the other goes out of the window with it, which is what we have now seen happen to Lenin's words.

It is also connected with the non-sensicality of all metaphysical 'propositions', for their negations do not have the same content as the original non-negated 'proposition'. (Why that is so will be explained presently.)

["Proposition" is in 'scare quotes' here, since if it's not clear what is being proposed, then plainly nothing has yet been proposed.]

Indeed, because their negations do not picture anything that could be the case in any possible world, they have no content at all. That, of course, empties the content of the original non-negated proposition.

As we can now see, the radical misuse of language governing the formation of what look like empirical propositions (like L2) in fact involves an implicit reference to the sorts of conditions that underlie their normal employment/reception.

L2: Motion without matter is unthinkable.

L1: Motion sometimes occurs without matter.

L3: Motion never occurs without matter.

Hence, when such sentences are entertained, even momentarily, a pretence (often genuine) has to be maintained that they actually mean something, that they are capable of being understood, and thus that they are capable of being true or capable of being false. This is done even if certain restrictions are later placed on what they seem to imply -- as in L2. In that case, a pretence has to be maintained that we understand what might make such propositions true, and their 'negations' false, so that those like L1 can be declared 'necessarily' false, or "unthinkable".

But, this entire exercise is an empty charade, for no content can be given to propositions like L2.

With respect to motionless matter, even Lenin had to admit that! Indeed, he it was who told us this 'idea' was "unthinkable".

[Recall, writing those very words meant he had to think the 'unthinkable'!]

The same comments also apply to all the 'necessary truths' that have been concocted by philosophers since Anaximander (http://www.iep.utm.edu/anaximan/) was a lad.

[This does not imply they all used the phrase "necessary truth", but the theses they cobbled-together weren't materially different from such Super-truths.]

We can see why this is so if we consider another typical metaphysical thesis and its supposed negation:

L4: Time is a relation between events.

L5: Time is not a relation between events.

As we have seen, the alleged truth of L4 is derived from the meaning of the words it contains. In that case, if its truth is denied, in, say, L5, then that would amount to a change in the meaning of the words it used.

[That is because sentences like L4 define what a given philosopher means by "time".]

So, if time isn't a relation between events, then the word "time" must now have a different meaning. And if that is so, L4 and L5 cannot represent the same state of affairs. They have a different content.

So, despite appearances to the contrary, L5 is not the negation of L4!

That is because the subject of each sentence is different.

To see this point, compare the following:

L6: George W Bush is the 43rd President of the United States.

L7: George H W Bush is not the 43rd President of the United States.

These aren't the negations of one another since they relate to two different individuals, George W Bush and his father, George H W Bush. They are true or false under entirely different conditions since they do not have the same sense, the same empirical content. They have different subjects.

The same comment applies to a metaphysical proposition (such as L4) and what appears to be its negation (i.e., L5).

If now L4 is deemed "necessarily true", then we would have to declare its alleged negation (L5) "necessarily false". But, L5 isn't the negation of L4 (since they both have different subject terms), and so -- as we discovered with Lenin's predicament above -- if we reject L4 by means of L5, we would have no idea what we were ruling out, and thus no idea what we were ruling in.

In that case, we would be in no position to declare L4 "necessarily true".

[That is because to declare a sentence "true" is ipso facto to declare it "not false". But, if we can't do that (and plainly we can't do it if we have no idea what we are ruling out since to do so changes the subject of the original sentence!), we can't then say the original sentence is true.]

The same applies if we declare, say, L4 "necessarily false", but I will omit the tedious details.]

In which case, metaphysical propositions can neither be true nor false. They thus lack a sense, [b]and there is nothing that can be done to rectify the situation.

They are thus non-sensical.

Imposed on Reality

Another odd feature of metaphysical theses is also worth highlighting: since the truth-values of defective sentences like these are plainly not determined by the world, they have to be given a truth-value by fiat. That is, they have to be declared "necessarily true" or "necessarily false", and this is plainly because their truth-status cannot be derived from the world, with which they cannot now be compared.

Or, more grandiloquently, their opposites have to be pronounced "unthinkable" by a sage-like figure -- a philosopher of some sort.

Metaphysical decrees like this are as common as dirt in traditional thought.

Such philosophical 'gems' have 'necessary' truth or 'necessary' falsehood bestowed on them as a gift. Instead of being compared with material reality to ascertain their truth-status, that is derived solely from, or compared only with other related theses (or to be more honest, these philosophical 'gems' are compared with yet more obscure jargon) as part of a terminological gesture at 'verification'. Their bona fides are thus thoroughly Ideal and 100% bogus. 'Confirmation' takes place only in the head of the theorist who dreamt them up.

The normal cannons that determine when something is true or false (i.e., a comparison with reality) have thus to be set aside, and a spurious 'evidential' ceremony substituted for it -- or, if it is carried out in advance, it is performed in the head as a sort of 'thought experiment'.

[As far as DM is concerned, this is invariably part of a very hasty and superficial consideration of the 'concepts' involved.]

[DM = Dialectical Materialism.]

In which case, these 'gems' have to be imposed on reality, since they plainly weren't derived from it.

As far as Traditional Philosophy (Metaphysics) is concerned, we know this is precisely what happened as the discipline developed; philosophers simply invented increasingly complex jargonised expressions, juggled with obscure terminology, and derived countless 'truths' from thought/language alone. [This is also how DM was developed.]

However, and alas for their inventors, none of these 'truths' can be given a sense, no matter what is done with them; as we have discovered, they are all non-sensical.

Distorted Language

We have seen how metaphysical and DM theses are based on a distorted use of the indicative mood.

[There are other serious mis-uses of language at work here. I won't enter into them in this summary or it will be too long. More details can be found if you follow the links posted at the end.]

This, of course, illustrates why Marx said the following:

The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels, (1970) The German Ideology, Students Edition, p.118. Bold emphasis added.]


Notice that philosophy is based on:

the distorted language of the actual world.


Since the indicative mood deals with what we have to say about the "actual world" we can now see how perceptive Marx was.

Traditional Thought

There are several reasons why traditional theorists attempted to derive such fundamental 'truths' from thought alone. One of them is the following:

This way of conceptualising the relationship between reality and our ideas about it depends on the ancient belief that behind appearances there exists a hidden world -- accessible to thought alone -- which is more real than the material universe we see around us.

This approach was concocted by ideologues of the ruling class, who have always viewed reality this way. They invented it because if you belong to, benefit from or help run a society which is based on gross inequality, oppression and exploitation, you can keep order in a number of ways.

The first and most obvious way is through violence. This will work for a time, but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation (among other things) -- as wee can now see happening in Egypt, for example.

Another way is to persuade the majority -- or a significant section of 'opinion formers', philosophers, theologians, administrators, 'intellectuals' and editors, etc. -- that the present order either works for their benefit, is ordained of the 'gods', or is 'natural' and cannot be fought against, reformed or negotiated with. In this way, the ruling class makes sure it's idea rule --, as, indeed, Marx noted:

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch.'" [Ibid., pp.64-65. Bold emphasis added.]


Hence, a world-view is necessary for each ruling-class to carry on ruling in the same old way.

While the content of this ruling ideology may have changed with each new mode of production, its form has remained largely the same for thousands of years: Ultimate Truth is ascertainable by thought alone and it can therefore be imposed on reality, dogmatically.

And that is why all of traditional philosophy is dogmatic and thus non-sensical.

[JazzRemington]

Well, it is obvious that you don't have a hint about what you are talking about.

"It is impossible to prove a negative"... ha, ha, ha.

Luís Henrique

Where did I say that? I just said it was difficult to prove a negative involving two words that were being used vaguely. The articles you linked suggested the same. What does that even have to do with the question about Wittgenstein?

[Luís Henrique]

Well. So you really want me to (re)read the holy scriptures.

A few observations and questions:

first, this text starts by an explanation and affirmation of a verification principle - or tenet #1 of logical positivism. Then it makes quite clear that it adheres to tenet #3 of logical positivism - that metaphysics are non-sence. It doesn't deal on matters relative to tenet #2, so it is impossible to know if its author adheres to such tenet - it remains as an open possibility.

So, and considering that we have to reject tenet #4 as unrepresentative of logical positivism, where exactly does the above text depart from logical positivism?

second, the text contains a few illogicalities and oversimplifications that are worth being pointed. One clear oversimplification is its rigid division of indicative senteces between "empyrical" and "metaphysical".

Here are two examples the text gives us:

1. To be is to be perceived. (metaphysical)
2. Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital. (empyrical)

Those sentences certainly fall into the categories ascribed to them. But this is often not the case. Take for instance:

3. It is impossible to build a perpetuum mobile.
4. The Sun is made of fire.
5. Tony Blair is a Marxist.

None of them is actually metaphysical - but all of them present evident difficulties to be classified as empyrical (3. independs of direct empyrical verification to be held as true, 4. seems to change its status historically, as empyrical evidence about the matter of which the Sun is made was impossible to obtain in 1800 but is commonplace today, and 5. depends on the definition of a quite complex term - "Marxist" - that is much more difficult to "understand" than "owns a copy of Das Kapital", and so may be empyrical or metaphysical depending on the definition of "Marxist" we are using).

An also quite clear illogicality - or perhaps even a sophism - is the discussion of Lenin's assertion that "motion without matter is unthinkable". It is held that, since Lenin obviously thought the words "motion without matter", he has contradicted himself, showing that it is perfectly possible to thin "motion without matter". But this is clearly an invalid reasoning. The use of the words "motion without matter" doesn't actually imply thinking motion without matter. The example of sentence 3. above may explain what I am saying. A similar idea can be expressed by

6. A functioning perpetuum mobile is unthinkable.

If we follow the text, we will exclaim, "but you have just thought of a functioning perpetuum mobile! You have just used those precise words!" What happens, though, is that when I think the words "functioning perpetuum mobile" I am not actually thinking of a functioning perpetuum mobile. Indeed, any machine of that kind that I - or anybody else - can think of is either not functioning or not a perpetuum mobile (or, more probably, neither). So while I can utter the words "functioning perpetuum mobile", I am at most thinking of the words, not of the actual thing. Same goes for "triangular circle", "the opposite side of a Moebius strip", or "a man who is his own father". And so the text incurs in a conflation between two things that a correct analysis easily shows are different.

Luís Henrique

[JazzRemington]

The point is that, at least by what Rosa wrote, you have to understand the sentence before you can determine if it's true or false, or whatever evidence would can be used to determine such. The responses you gave (e.g. no direct evidence of the sun being fire was available before 1800 or whether Tony Blair is a Marxist depends on what is meant by "Marxist") is a suggestion of what would constitute evidence to support or not support the examples you gave. If you didn't understand the examples you gave, you wouldn't even be able to do that. Period.


And so the text incurs in a conflation between two things that a correct analysis easily shows are different.

What conflation and where are you seeing it supposedly?

[Philosopher Jay]

I am wondering about the sentence "Every sister had at least one brother or sister." Should this be considered Metaphysical?

[Luís Henrique]

The point is that, at least by what Rosa wrote, you have to understand the sentence before you can determine if it's true or false, or whatever evidence would can be used to determine such.

Certainly, but then to Rosa you can only understand the sentence if it refers to something empyrically observable. But what is "empyrically observable"?


The responses you gave (e.g. no direct evidence of the sun being fire was available before 1800 or whether Tony Blair is a Marxist depends on what is meant by "Marxist") is a suggestion of what would constitute evidence to support or not support the examples you gave.

Problem is, before 1800 there was no means of knowing what the sun was made of. And so, either that was a metaphysical sentence that changed into an empyrical sentence due to technological advance, or the metaphysical quality of a sentence depends on a quite expanded notion of "empyrical testing".


If you didn't understand the examples you gave, you wouldn't even be able to do that.

Well, evidently previous to Lavoisier nobody actually understood what fire is. I take that all sentences containing the word "fire" were meaningless up to Priestley? Or what is actually meant here by "understanding"?


What conflation and where are you seeing it supposedly?

I think I explained it quite well.

Can you think of the fourth side of a triangle?

Luís Henrique

[JazzRemington]

Certainly, but then to Rosa you can only understand the sentence if it refers to something empyrically observable. But what is "empyrically observable"?

Where are you getting that from? Be specific.


Problem is, before 1800 there was no means of knowing what the sun was made of.[...]

Like I said, if you didn't understand the example you gave you wouldn't even be able to respond in that manner. Period.


I think I explained it quite well.

Evidently not.


Can you think of the fourth side of a triangle?

If I recall Rosa made such arguments before.

[Luís Henrique]

Where are you getting that from? Be specific.

Here:


In contrast, understanding T1 is independent of its confirmation or disconfirmation. Indeed, it would be impossible to do either of these if T1 had not already been understood. Plainly, the actual truth/falsehood of T1-type propositions follows from the way the world happens to be, and is not solely based on the meaning of certain expressions. Their truth cannot be read-off from the words they contain, unlike T2- and T3-type sentences.

See? A non-metaphysical sentence is an empyrical sentence, ie, a sentence that refers to something observable.


Like I said, if you didn't understand the example you gave you wouldn't even be able to respond in that manner.

Well?

The point stands. If you need to "understand" what you are talking about to produce meaningful sentences, then all sentences about fire before Lavoisier would be meaningless.

Unless, of course, the word "understand" has more than one meaning.


Period.

Can you please stop that? If you don't want to discuss, stop discussing, but claiming victory in such way is really irritating.


Evidently not.

Well, what haven't you been able to understand?

Thinking about some thing is quite different from thinking words that would refer to that thing. Rosa conflates those things, and, so, tells us that, because Lenin wrote the words "motion without matter", he actually thought about motion without matter.


If I recall Rosa made such arguments before.

Maybe, but I am not talking to Rosa, and I frankly don't care if she made such argument or not. Either you can think about the fourth side of a triangle, or you can't. If you can, then explain me what it is. If you can't, then how can you utter the words, "fourth side of the triangle"?

(It is, evidently, because you can say those words without actually thinking of their self-contradictory "meaning".)

Luís Henrique

[syndicat]

ruling-class view of reality

i doubt that the "ruling class" thinks hardly at all about such things as the nature of time. moreover, class position by itself cannot determine beliefs. that is the worst sort of vulgar Marxism.

and if time being merely a relation between events were so obviously true, why is there historically a controversy in philosophy over exactly this point? there are those who hold that there are absolute times, and those who hold that there are not.

also, the claim that there are sentences whose truth "follows from the meaning of the words" is no longer an idea that is uncontroversial in philosophy since Quine's attacks on the analytic/synthetic distinction back in the '60s.

what does it mean to say the truth of a sentence follows from the meaning of the words? if the sentence is true, then there needs to be something in the world that makes it true or in virtue of which it is true. This is inconsistent with saying the sentence is "nonsensical." if it's "nonsensical" it can't be true, and if it's not true, it's not "true in virtue of the meaning of the words."

[JazzRemington]

See? A non-metaphysical sentence is an empyrical sentence, ie, a sentence that refers to something observable.

And you're absolutely sure "empirical sentence" refers to observability in the way Rosa was using it?


The point stands. If you need to "understand" what you are talking about to produce meaningful sentences, then all sentences about fire before Lavoisier would be meaningless.

You said "problem is, before 1800 there was no means of knowing what the sun was made of," so evidently the problem is of "knowing" and not "understanding." It's called different standards of what constitutes "knowing something." We could just as well say that they knew the sun was made of fire but for the wrong reasons because if they didn't know (in any sense of the word), they wouldn't have been able to suggested it.


Can you please stop that? If you don't want to discuss, stop discussing, but claiming victory in such way is really irritating.

I said it because it is the case. If you didn't understand your example, you wouldn't even been able to bring up the fact that people before the 1800s knew the sun was made of fire. You'd say something along the lines of "I don't understand this sentence."


Well, what haven't you been able to understand?

Thinking about some thing is quite different from thinking words that would refer to that thing. Rosa conflates those things, and, so, tells us that, because Lenin wrote the words "motion without matter", he actually thought about motion without matter.

And what would this "thinking about some thing" consist of, if it's evidently different from "thinking words that would refer to the thing"?


Maybe, but I am not talking to Rosa, and I frankly don't care if she made such argument or not. Either you can think about the fourth side of a triangle, or you can't. If you can, then explain me what it is. If you can't, then how can you utter the words, "fourth side of the triangle"?

Because there's a difference between a visualization and a thought. You can think "four sided triangle," but not visualize it.

[ChrisK]

Well. So you really want me to (re)read the holy scriptures.

No. Thats a very basic summary. If you have trouble with it, I can't help you.


A few observations and questions:

first, this text starts by an explanation and affirmation of a verification principle - or tenet #1 of logical positivism. Then it makes quite clear that it adheres to tenet #3 of logical positivism - that metaphysics are non-sence. It doesn't deal on matters relative to tenet #2, so it is impossible to know if its author adheres to such tenet - it remains as an open possibility.


What verification principle? Where does it argue that there must be empirical verification?
Wrong sort of non-sense. Try again.
No, the author does not.



second, the text contains a few illogicalities and oversimplifications that are worth being pointed. One clear oversimplification is its rigid division of indicative senteces between "empyrical" and "metaphysical".

Here are two examples the text gives us:

1. To be is to be perceived. (metaphysical)
2. Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital. (empyrical)

Those sentences certainly fall into the categories ascribed to them. But this is often not the case. Take for instance:

3. It is impossible to build a perpetuum mobile.
4. The Sun is made of fire.
5. Tony Blair is a Marxist.

None of them is actually metaphysical - but all of them present evident difficulties to be classified as empyrical (3. independs of direct empyrical verification to be held as true, 4. seems to change its status historically, as empyrical evidence about the matter of which the Sun is made was impossible to obtain in 1800 but is commonplace today, and 5. depends on the definition of a quite complex term - "Marxist" - that is much more difficult to "understand" than "owns a copy of Das Kapital", and so may be empyrical or metaphysical depending on the definition of "Marxist" we are using).

Actually no, two of those are empirical propositions.


The first is an example of a scientific rule. It is of the class of non-sense that states rules. It is a type of non-sense that shows something about the world.
The second is an emprical proposition because it can be true or false and an account can be given on the conditions by which it can be known. No need to verify it.
The third is an empirical proposition because we can give an account of the world in which it is possible for Tony Blair to be a Marxist without having to change the definition of Marxism. It just so happens to be false.



An also quite clear illogicality - or perhaps even a sophism - is the discussion of Lenin's assertion that "motion without matter is unthinkable". It is held that, since Lenin obviously thought the words "motion without matter", he has contradicted himself, showing that it is perfectly possible to thin "motion without matter". But this is clearly an invalid reasoning. The use of the words "motion without matter" doesn't actually imply thinking motion without matter.

You obviously thought it when you wrote it down. Please tell me, how do you say it without thinking it?


The example of sentence 3. above may explain what I am saying. A similar idea can be expressed by

6. A functioning perpetuum mobile is unthinkable.

If we follow the text, we will exclaim, "but you have just thought of a functioning perpetuum mobile! You have just used those precise words!" What happens, though, is that when I think the words "functioning perpetuum mobile" I am not actually thinking of a functioning perpetuum mobile. Indeed, any machine of that kind that I - or anybody else - can think of is either not functioning or not a perpetuum mobile (or, more probably, neither). So while I can utter the words "functioning perpetuum mobile", I am at most thinking of the words, not of the actual thing. Same goes for "triangular circle", "the opposite side of a Moebius strip", or "a man who is his own father". And so the text incurs in a conflation between two things that a correct analysis easily shows are different.

Luís Henrique

This is a bad analogy. You have confused a scientific rule with a metaphysical proposition.

[Luís Henrique]

And you're absolutely sure "empirical sentence" refers to observability in the way Rosa was using it?

Haven't you read the text?


You said "problem is, before 1800 there was no means of knowing what the sun was made of," so evidently the problem is of "knowing" and not "understanding." It's called different standards of what constitutes "knowing something." We could just as well say that they knew the sun was made of fire but for the wrong reasons because if they didn't know (in any sense of the word), they wouldn't have been able to suggested it.


So "knowing" and "understanding" are different things? Can you perhaps explain us what the difference is?

Actually, that was my point: "knowledge" or "understanding" are complex notions, and each of these words covers many different though related meanings. Everyone from the palaeolythical on "knew" what fire was and even "understood" it in a sence. But only in the late 18th century there was scientific "knowledge" or scientific "understanding" of what fire is.

And no, it isn't always true that you must even know what something is to have empyrical proof that it is the case. Suppose that a thousand years in the future, archaelogists discover a list of Tony Blair possessions. Among many other items, there is one called "copy of Das Kapital". Now, in this hypothetical future, no one knows what Das Kapital is. But now they empyrically know that a man called Tony Blair owned a copy of something they don't know what it is.

(And, please, do you actually think the Sun is made of fire?)


I said it because it is the case. If you didn't understand your example, you wouldn't even been able to bring up the fact that people before the 1800s knew the sun was made of fire. You'd say something along the lines of "I don't understand this sentence."

If I didn't "understand" or if I didn't "know"?


And what would this "thinking about some thing" consist of, if it's evidently different from "thinking words that would refer to the thing"?

Can you actually think of "motion without matter"? If there is motion, what is moving?


Because there's a difference between a visualization and a thought. You can think "four sided triangle," but not visualize it.

So, if your math teacher asks you, "think of a triangle", do you think the word triangle or do you imagine the actual shape?

You can say "four sided triangle", but you cannot explain what it is - so you can think the words, but you cannot think of the supposed geometrical shape. It is in this way that Lenin meant "unthinkable" - it may not be the best choice of words, but it certainly doesn't turn his thought into impenetrable metaphysics.

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

No. Thats a very basic summary. If you have trouble with it, I can't help you.

Of course you can't; you don't understand it any better than I do.





What verification principle? Where does it argue that there must be empirical verification?
Wrong sort of non-sense. Try again.
No, the author does not.

Of course it argues for a verification principle. Very clearly indeed.


Actually no, two of those are empirical propositions.

Well, of course. Actually the three of them are.




The first is an example of a scientific rule. It is of the class of non-sense that states rules. It is a type of non-sense that shows something about the world.
The second is an emprical proposition because it can be true or false and an account can be given on the conditions by which it can be known. No need to verify it.
The third is an empirical proposition because we can give an account of the world in which it is possible for Tony Blair to be a Marxist without having to change the definition of Marxism. It just so happens to be false.



So the first sentence is non-sence but tells us something about the world? But, if it makes no sence, how can it say something meaningful about the world?

The second sentence is empyrical, but this is not trivial.

You say it is empyrical because it can be true or false, but this is not the case. It can be true or false because it is empyrical, ie, because you can devise an experiment to test its truthness. But the problem is, do you have to devise an experiment that is actually practicable, or just imagining an experiment however impracticable is enough?

Because if the latter, then a sentence like "there is something like life after death" may well be an empyrical sentence - and I think you agree with me that this clearly is not the case.


You obviously thought it when you wrote it down. Please tell me, how do you say it without thinking it?

I thought of the words, evidently. But this is very different of thinking about what the words mean. If you try to think of what "motion without matter" means, you will see that you cannot come up with anything.


This is a bad analogy. You have confused a scientific rule with a metaphysical proposition.

So what is the scientific rule and what is the scientific rule? As far as I see, the four phrases mentioned in that paragraph, namely, "functioning perpetuum mobile", "triangular circle", "the opposite side of a Moebius strip", and "a man who is his own father" are neither scientific rules nor metaphysical propositions. One of them is a practical impossibility, the other three are logical contradictions.

Luís Henrique

[JazzRemington]

Haven't you read the text?

Have you? She wrote that people can still understand the sentence "Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital" without knowing whether or not it's true. And given that you've suggested earlier that the only way to understand/know something is through direct observation...


So "knowing" and "understanding" are different things? Can you perhaps explain us what the difference is?

The words may mean the same thing or not, depending on how they are used. If I knew that there is such a thing as fusion, but couldn't explain, e.g. what it is, how it's used, who are the major people responsible for it, its history, etc., we'd normally say either that I don't know anything about it or I don't understand it. " It's not so much the difference between "knowing" and "understanding," but of knowing X is the case and explaining, e.g., what X is or why X is the case.


Everyone from the palaeolythical on "knew" what fire was and even "understood" it in a sence. But only in the late 18th century there was scientific "knowledge" or scientific "understanding" of what fire is.

What does "having a scientific understanding" of what fire is have to do with using the word meaningfully at any point in history?


And no, it isn't always true that you must even know what something is to have empyrical proof that it is the case. [...]

What if the hypothesis was that Tony Blair owned a book by Karl Marx? You'd have to know that "Das Kapital" is a book and that it was written by Karl Marx for the list of possessions including "Das Kapital" to be counted as empirical evidence (not proof) to support your hypothesis. The only reason your example works is because you pre-suppose they know what a list of possessions is. If they didn't, they wouldn't even know that the man owned anything.


(And, please, do you actually think the Sun is made of fire?)

I was only using your example.


If I didn't "understand" or if I didn't "know"?

Well, if they mean the same thing in this context, I don't see the point in asking.


Can you actually think of "motion without matter"? If there is motion, what is moving?

Do you mean the words or the thing? Because the former involves thinking and the other visualizing. Like I said, you can think "motion without matter" but whether or not you can visualize it is a different question.


So, if your math teacher asks you, "think of a triangle", do you think the word triangle or do you imagine the actual shape?

Even if I did imagine the shape, it'd still be a visualization and not a thought. Unless you're referring to something like a description of a triangle.


You can say "four sided triangle", but you cannot explain what it is - so you can think the words, but you cannot think of the supposed geometrical shape. It is in this way that Lenin meant "unthinkable" - it may not be the best choice of words, but it certainly doesn't turn his thought into impenetrable metaphysics.

And how do you know this is what Lenin was thinking? We have no empirical evidence (by your standards) of a thought process outside of the words used to express them. You can't very well ask him what he meant.

[Luís Henrique]

Have you? She wrote that people can still understand the sentence "Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital" without knowing whether or not it's true. And given that you've suggested earlier that the only way to understand/know something is through direct observation...

Oh, good grief.

You can know whether Tony Blair owns or not a copy of Das Kapital without knowing what a copy of Das Kapital is. You can also understand the question, "does Tony Blair own a copy of Das Kapital?" without knowing if he owns one or not.

But what the text makes clear is that the fact that we can understand the question is a consequence of the fact that there is (or that we can imagine, I suppose) an empyrical test for the question.

In that, I can't see it departing in any way from logical positivism.


The words may mean the same thing or not, depending on how they are used. If I knew that there is such a thing as fusion, but couldn't explain, e.g. what it is, how it's used, who are the major people responsible for it, its history, etc., we'd normally say either that I don't know anything about it or I don't understand it. " It's not so much the difference between "knowing" and "understanding," but of knowing X is the case and explaining, e.g., what X is or why X is the case.
Exactly. The words can be used as synonims, and they can be used in contrasting meanings.


What if the hypothesis was that Tony Blair owned a book by Karl Marx? You'd have to know that "Das Kapital" is a book and that it was written by Karl Marx for the list of possessions including "Das Kapital" to be counted as empirical evidence (not proof) to support your hypothesis. The only reason your example works is because you pre-suppose they know what a list of possessions is. If they didn't, they wouldn't even know that the man owned anything.Evidently. These things would have to be analysed case by case. If they didn't know what a list of possessions is, they would learn very little from it, except perhaps that a copy of Das Kapital (like perhaps a house, a car, etc) is something that can be listed under a list of possessions. If they didn't understand the concept of "ownership", they wouldn't be able to know what a list of possessions is, beyond the fact that it is a list of material objects - and even that even if they knew what a car, a house, etc., are material objects.

You can know things in the sence you know they exist or existed, without knowing exactly what they are or were (for instance, Greek fire or sylphium). If you don't understand this fact - that knowledge doesn't imply a clear cut distinction between knowing and not knowing, you won't be able to put up any reasonable epistemology.


Do you mean the words or the thing? Because the former involves thinking and the other visualizing. Like I said, you can think "motion without matter" but whether or not you can visualize it is a different question.I mean that thinking the words is a different thing from thinking the thing. Evidently, as a triangle is a shape, thinking of it involves a visualisation. But there are examples that don't depend on visualisation. You can certainly think the words "John is his own father", or "John is the father of his own mother", but you certainly can't think of such relations in any meaningful way, other than they are impossible or self-contradictory. The distinction between "thinking" and "visualising" would not hold here.


Even if I did imagine the shape, it'd still be a visualization and not a thought. Unless you're referring to something like a description of a triangle.
The issue is that a phrase like "the fourth side of a triangle" makes no sence because the definition of a triangle is that it is a geometrical shape with only three sides, and no more than that. If it has a fourth side, then it is not a triangle. This is the only way to think consequently on this subject. It shows that there is a third category of sentences, which are neither "empyrical" nor "metaphysical".


And how do you know this is what Lenin was thinking? We have no empirical evidence (by your standards) of a thought process outside of the words used to express them. You can't very well ask him what he meant.Let's have a look on the seventh and last proposition of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus:


Whereof one cannot speak, one must pass over in silence.

You see that he uses the phrase "whereof one cannot speak". But he is refering to things that can be spoken of; that is indeed his point. Whereof one cannot speak [in a meaningful way], on must [so not to talk gibberish] pass over in silence. According to Rosa's "method", however, Wittgenstein's sentence is foolery, because of course we can very well speak of God, the unthinkable, the anihillatory qualities of Nothing, life after death, the identity between being and being perceived, the identity between being and not being, etc, etc, etc.

Just like Wittgenstein says 'one cannot speak' about things that are, if anything, overspoken through the history of philosophy, Lenin says 'it is unthinkable' when he quite certainly means 'it cannot be thought about in a meaningful way'. And this is a widespread way to use the word "unthinkable". Making a whole phylosophic point out of the fact that Lenin thought the phrase while saying that its referent is "unthinkable", frankly, is just specious, sophistic reasoning.

As we would normally expect of its author.

Luís Henrique

[JazzRemington]

Oh, good grief.

You can know whether Tony Blair owns or not a copy of Das Kapital without knowing what a copy of Das Kapital is.

And what would this consist of?


But what the text makes clear is that the fact that we can understand the question is a consequence of the fact that there is (or that we can imagine, I suppose) an empyrical test for the question.

Where are you getting that from? Point out the exact place in the text that you are getting this from and then demonstrate why you're interpretation is correct.


Evidently. These things would have to be analysed case by case. If they didn't know what a list of possessions is, they would learn very little from it, except perhaps that a copy of Das Kapital (like perhaps a house, a car, etc) is something that can be listed under a list of possessions. If they didn't understand the concept of "ownership", they wouldn't be able to know what a list of possessions is, beyond the fact that it is a list of material objects - and even that even if they knew what a car, a house, etc., are material objects.

That's the wonderful thing about hypothetical reasoning: you can make anything up to support your case.


You can know things in the sence you know they exist or existed, without knowing exactly what they are or were (for instance, Greek fire or sylphium).

That's what I've been saying.


I mean that thinking the words is a different thing from thinking the thing.

And what do these two actions consist of?


Evidently, as a triangle is a shape, thinking of it involves a visualisation.

Depends on what "thinking of it" consists of. Geometric proofs involving triangles don't have to depend upon pictures of anything.


But there are examples that don't depend on visualisation. You can certainly think the words "John is his own father", or "John is the father of his own mother", but you certainly can't think of such relations in any meaningful way, other than they are impossible or self-contradictory. The distinction between "thinking" and "visualising" would not hold here.

"Thinking" involves something like an internal monologue, whereas "visualizing" involves pictures (even if they have something like a caption beneath them).


The issue is that a phrase like "the fourth side of a triangle" makes no sence because the definition of a triangle is that it is a geometrical shape with only three sides, and no more than that. If it has a fourth side, then it is not a triangle. This is the only way to think consequently on this subject. It shows that there is a third category of sentences, which are neither "empyrical" nor "metaphysical".

If you didn't understand the phrase "four sided triangle," you wouldn't have responded with the definition of a triangle and the assertion that it's impossible.


Let's have a look on the seventh and last proposition of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus:

You see that he uses the phrase "whereof one cannot speak". But he is refering to things that can be spoken of; that is indeed his point. Whereof one cannot speak [in a meaningful way], on must [so not to talk gibberish] pass over in silence. According to Rosa's "method", however, Wittgenstein's sentence is foolery, because of course we can very well speak of God, the unthinkable, the anihillatory qualities of Nothing, life after death, the identity between being and being perceived, the identity between being and not being, etc, etc, etc.

Just like Wittgenstein says 'one cannot speak' about things that are, if anything, overspoken through the history of philosophy, Lenin says 'it is unthinkable' when he quite certainly means 'it cannot be thought about in a meaningful way'. And this is a widespread way to use the word "unthinkable". Making a whole phylosophic point out of the fact that Lenin thought the phrase while saying that its referent is "unthinkable", frankly, is just specious, sophistic reasoning.

And how do you know Lenin meant this?

[ChrisK]

Of course you can't; you don't understand it any better than I do.

Ahhh, so if you don't get it nobody does.



Of course it argues for a verification principle. Very clearly indeed.

Where?


Well, of course. Actually the three of them are.

No, two of them are. An empirical proposition is one that asserts something that is either true or false, for which an account of the world can be given in which it can be true.

One of them is a rule. Rules are neither true or false, just good or bad.


So the first sentence is non-sence but tells us something about the world? But, if it makes no sence, how can it say something meaningful about the world?

Because non-sense is defined in the Wittgensteinian sense. A statement is non-sense if no account can be given as to how the world would have to be for it to be true or false. There are two types of non-sense.


Metaphysical statements are non-sense because they claim to be necessarily true, but can only be true by definition. Basically, this statement is true based solely on the meanings of the words used; the only way for it to be false is to redefine the subject of the proposition.
Rules are non-sense because they can not be true or false. They are only useful or unuseful. These propositions give an account as to how to view the world. They show something about the world.



The second sentence is empyrical, but this is not trivial.

You say it is empyrical because it can be true or false, but this is not the case. It can be true or false because it is empyrical, ie, because you can devise an experiment to test its truthness. But the problem is, do you have to devise an experiment that is actually practicable, or just imagining an experiment however impracticable is enough?

That is not the definition of an empirical proposition. You do not need an experiment to test its truth. You just need to be able to give an account of a state of affairs for which this is would be true.


Because if the latter, then a sentence like "there is something like life after death" may well be an empyrical sentence - and I think you agree with me that this clearly is not the case.

No, the statement that "there is something like life after death" is a metaphysical proposition.


I thought of the words, evidently. But this is very different of thinking about what the words mean. If you try to think of what "motion without matter" means, you will see that you cannot come up with anything.

But the same is true of "motion with matter". The statement that you make is true based purely on the meanings of the words. Thus it is non-sense.


So what is the scientific rule and what is the scientific rule? As far as I see, the four phrases mentioned in that paragraph, namely, "functioning perpetuum mobile", "triangular circle", "the opposite side of a Moebius strip", and "a man who is his own father" are neither scientific rules nor metaphysical propositions. One of them is a practical impossibility, the other three are logical contradictions.

Luís Henrique

Those are phrases, not propositions. If you were paying attention you would know that this deals only with propositions, not phrases.

[Meridian]

I am wondering about the sentence "Every sister had at least one brother or sister." Should this be considered Metaphysical?
No, it is grammatical. There is a prevalent tendency to consider the function of statements to be solely descriptive, while in their utterances they are understood in relation to everyone else's usage of the terms involved, ie. grammar. This is where the 'life' of a sentence derives. So a declarative sentence not only forms a description, it also qualifies. The example above is a statement about what qualifies the term "sister", if to some degree misshapen.

[Philosopher Jay]

Thank you. I think you're right, it is grammatical and it is "misshapen." It is shaped like a descriptive sentence about the world that disguises the grammatical nature.

The sentence "A sister is a female having the same parents as another or one parent in common with another" is clearly grammatical (definitional). This sentence resembles the sentence, "Every cat has whiskers." This is a sentence that is descriptive and could be verified by gathering every cat and checking for whiskers.

The sentence "Every sister had at least one brother or sister," seems to be similar in that we could gather every sister and check to see if they had a brother or sister." In the first case, we could find a cat without whiskers, so the sentence could be proved false; however, in the second case gathering every sister would be a waste of time, as one could not find one who had not had a sibling.

[Luís Henrique]

Ahhh, so if you don't get it nobody does.

Well, no.

I am quite acquainted and comfortable with the idea that there are subjects that other people understand better - even much better - than me.

When I ask about those subjects to people who supposedly understand them better than me, however, I expect one of the following:



an actual explanation of the subject, even if dumbed down so that a layman like me can understand it;
an explanation of why it is impossible to explain it in simple words to someone who doesn't understand some prerequisites ("I can't explain calculus to you if you don't know what a function is")
a reference to some well established authority in the field.

When I ask questions to you about this subject, however, I instead get things like:



You are dumb;
It is obvious, so it doesn't need to be explained;
I don't want to explain it to you;
I can't explain it to you unless you believe in it first;
Read Rosa Lichtenstein.

The first four of which are quite certain marks of charlatanism - and the fifth would depend of the status of Rosa Lichtenstein as an "authority in the field". As my personal experience with her is that she, again, can only retort with



You are dumb;
It is obvious, so it doesn't need to be explained;
I don't want to explain it to you;
I can't explain it to you unless you believe in it first;
Read Rosa Lichtenstein,

and as my reading of her (in)famous articles shows me that she depends on several illogicalities, sophism, and word plays, my overall impression is that all of this is charlatanism.

Of course, you could dispell such impression, if you tried to explain your points instead of pretending to be offended by any questioning of your dogmas. But I won't hold my breath.


Where?It would be easier if you, instead of asking "where" as if I hadn't yet shown you where I read verificationism into Rosa's text, could explain (in "ordinary language" would be even better), what the difference is between your/Rosa's/Wittgenstein's versus logical positivist's understanding of empyrical/metaphysical sentences.


No, two of them are. An empirical proposition is one that asserts something that is either true or false, for which an account of the world can be given in which it can be true.So an empirical proposition like

"Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital" is empyrical because an account of the world can be given in which "Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital" can be true.

But how do we know whether an account of the world can be given in which "Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital" can be true, or not?

What does it mean "to give an account of the world in which 'Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital' can be true"?

Can you give me an an account of the world in which "'Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital' can be true"?


One of them is a rule. Rules are neither true or false, just good or bad.Ah, so then there are now three different kinds of sentences: empyrical sentences, metaphysical sentences, and rules.

But it would seem that there are different kind of rules too: good and bad rules. What is a good rule, and what is a bad rule?


Because non-sense is defined in the Wittgensteinian sense.So it is not "ordinary language", is it?


A statement is non-sense if no account can be given as to how the world would have to be for it to be true or false.Well, I can give you an account of how the world would have to be if the sentence "God does not exist" was true. Does this mean that "God does not exist" is now an empyrical sentence?


There are two types of non-sense.


Metaphysical statements are non-sense because they claim to be necessarily true, but can only be true by definition. Basically, this statement is true based solely on the meanings of the words used; the only way for it to be false is to redefine the subject of the proposition.
Rules are non-sense because they can not be true or false. They are only useful or unuseful. These propositions give an account as to how to view the world. They show something about the world.

So there is a kind of non-sense that "shows something about the world"? But if it shows something about the world, how does it have no sence?


That is not the definition of an empirical proposition. You do not need an experiment to test its truth. You just need to be able to give an account of a state of affairs for which this is would be true.Which is just a complicated (ie, not very "ordinary language"-ish) way to say that you can think of an experiment to test its truth.


No, the statement that "there is something like life after death" is a metaphysical proposition.Well, why? I certainly can "give an account of a state of affairs for which this is would be true".


But the same is true of "motion with matter". The statement that you make is true based purely on the meanings of the words. Thus it is non-sense.What is non-sence? "Motion without matter", or "Motion without matter is unthinkable"?


Those are phrases, not propositions. If you were paying attention you would know that this deals only with propositions, not phrases.And this is the text where I would be "confusing a scientific rule with a metaphysical proposition":


6. A functioning perpetuum mobile is unthinkable.

If we follow the text, we will exclaim, "but you have just thought of a functioning perpetuum mobile! You have just used those precise words!" What happens, though, is that when I think the words "functioning perpetuum mobile" I am not actually thinking of a functioning perpetuum mobile. Indeed, any machine of that kind that I - or anybody else - can think of is either not functioning or not a perpetuum mobile (or, more probably, neither). So while I can utter the words "functioning perpetuum mobile", I am at most thinking of the words, not of the actual thing. Same goes for "triangular circle", "the opposite side of a Moebius strip", or "a man who is his own father". And so the text incurs in a conflation between two things that a correct analysis easily shows are different.


So, again: what scientific rule am I confusing with what metaphysical proposition?

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

i doubt that the "ruling class" thinks hardly at all about such things as the nature of time. moreover, class position by itself cannot determine beliefs. that is the worst sort of vulgar Marxism.

Well, exactly. In fact the whole pseudo-historic coda in Rosa's article is bogus. Metaphysical ideas are much older than class divisions; they were - and to a great extent still are - responses to insoluble problems faced by human communities much before class stratification arose, like death and suffering, not fabrications by some a-historical "rulling class" to ensure its domination.

Luís Henrique

[Meridian]

Ah, so then there are now three different kinds of sentences: empyrical sentences, metaphysical sentences, and rules.
This is a confusion of sentence forms. I would suggest Philosophical Investigations by Wittgenstein on this.


But it would seem that there are different kind of rules too: good and bad rules. What is a good rule, and what is a bad rule?.
One feature of a rule is that it does not predicate about anything. In this respect it is like a command. So, if a person asks, "is this command correct?" All they would be asking is; "is this command good?" Is it helpful, useful, according to guidelines, and so on. The point is that its application is independent of a subject, since it does not predicate. The same is true of rules.


Well, I can give you an account of how the world would have to be if the sentence "God does not exist" was true. Does this mean that "God does not exist" is now an empyrical sentence?
No, it means you are delusional.


So there is a kind of non-sense that "shows something about the world"? But if it shows something about the world, how does it have no sence?
Rules do not predicate about or represent the world, but they are useful for the method of understanding it. They can offer a paradigm, so to speak. Say, if we understand society as a class composition, consisting of classes with divergent interests, and use that as a rule in understanding phenomena. This is a helpful perspective, but the usefulness of the rule will vary depending on what is being considered.


Which is just a complicated (ie, not very "ordinary language"-ish) way to say that you can think of an experiment to test its truth.
No, the point that is being made here is that empirical propositions are logically contingent. Which means that they are not necessarily true (tautologous), nor necessarily false (contradictory). This is another way of saying that their truth function is not simply dependent on features of language.


Well, why? I certainly can "give an account of a state of affairs for which this is would be true".
Then you would be using a new form of the word "life", which breaks with the grammar of "life" describing living, aging and growing things, and a new form of the word "dead", which breaks with the grammar of "death" that describes the end of living, aging and growing things. You would either be describing a continuation of someones life, which means they are not dead, or you would be talking about 'death' and 'life', which are not words that others use.


What is non-sence? "Motion without matter", or "Motion without matter is unthinkable"?
The first is not a sentence, so while it can be nonsense (like "iajvnf3djf") it isn't non-sense in the Wittgensteinian use of the term. The latter is non-sense, for several reasons. One of which is that a declarative sentence that makes sense is one where its fulfillment (and non-fulfillment) is thinkable, so the proposition is either non-sense or it is false.


And this is the text where I would be "confusing a scientific rule with a metaphysical proposition":


Originally Posted by Luís Henrique
6. A functioning perpetuum mobile is unthinkable.

If we follow the text, we will exclaim, "but you have just thought of a functioning perpetuum mobile! You have just used those precise words!" What happens, though, is that when I think the words "functioning perpetuum mobile"
I am not actually thinking of a functioning perpetuum mobile. Indeed, any machine of that kind that I - or anybody else - can think of is either not functioning or not a perpetuum mobile (or, more probably, neither). So while I can utter the words "functioning perpetuum mobile", I am at most thinking of the words, not of the actual thing. Same goes for "triangular circle", "the opposite side of a Moebius strip", or "a man who is his own father". And so the text incurs in a conflation between two things that a correct analysis easily shows are different.


So, again: what scientific rule am I confusing with what metaphysical proposition?

Here you are confusing imagining an object and thinking a thought. The reason we can not, for example, imagine a triangular square is that the grammatical rules for "triangular" contains that the shape has three sides,
while the grammatical rules of "square" contains four sides. However, your example has a flaw, namely that any person can think of some object which has continuous movement; they can even imagine it. They would
not know the exact details of its function, but anyone can imagine some wheel turning continuously with water pushing it without any loss in energy. It is when the grammar of words overlap with another while they have conflicting meaning that we have problems imagining a combination of objects.

[Luís Henrique]

No, it means you are delusional.

Well, why?

If God doesn't exist, the world would exacly like it is. What is delusional here?


No, the point that is being made here is that empirical propositions are logically contingent. Which means that they are not necessarily true (tautologous), nor necessarily false (contradictory). This is another way of saying that their truth function is not simply dependent on features of language.Ah... and since their truth function is not simply dependent on features of languages, it depends on exactly what?

They being or not being the case, isn't it?

And how do we know that something is or is not the case?

There is no way out of it: your premises radicate in verificationalism, for the good or the bad.


Then you would be using a new form of the word "life", which breaks with the grammar of "life" describing living, aging and growing things, and a new form of the word "dead", which breaks with the grammar of "death" that describes the end of living, aging and growing things. You would either be describing a continuation of someones life, which means they are not dead, or you would be talking about 'death' and 'life', which are not words that others use.Well, you are giving a definition of "life" and "death" that goes well beyond "ordinary language".

In ordinary language, "death" is what happens when someone, well, dies, ie, stops moving, breathing, etc, and then starts to rotten. What is dying, or what is death, is actually unknown outside these very limited empyrical observations. Nowhere it is implied in the idea of "death" that the individual ceases to exist as an individual in all possible ways. Maybe he reincarnates into other beings; maybe he goes to some heaven/lymbo/gehenna/valhalla/whatever.

To say that the word "death" grammatically implies what you and me believe happens to the individual upon its death is simply false.


The first is not a sentence, so while it can be nonsense (like "iajvnf3djf") it isn't non-sense in the Wittgensteinian use of the term. The latter is non-sense, for several reasons. One of which is that a declarative sentence that makes sense is one where its fulfillment (and non-fulfillment) is thinkable, so the proposition is either non-sense or it is false.But Rosa's sophystic argument we were discussing was exactly that when we think the words, we think the thing. And so, if poor Lenin had to think, "motion without matter" in order to utter "motion without matter is unthinkable", he would be contradicting himself. Now you tell us that a sentence that makes sence is one where its (non)fulfillment is thinkable. But, of course, according to Rosa's sophism, the fulfillment of any utterable sentence is thinkable...


Here you are confusing imagining an object and thinking a thought.Nope. Sorry, but the confusion is yours. It is you who confuses thinking the words that describe something with thinking of the thing itself.


The reason we can not, for example, imagine a triangular square is that the grammatical rules for "triangular" contains that the shape has three sides, while the grammatical rules of "square" contains four sides.Well, yes. That's exactly the problem.


However, your example has a flaw, namely that any person can think of some object which has continuous movement; they can even imagine it. They would not know the exact details of its function, but anyone can imagine some wheel turning continuously with water pushing it without any loss in energy.Exactly. And then we see that the grammar of our thoughts is not a perfect mirror of what an idealist would call the "grammar" of the Universe. We can imagine impossible things; we can think of inexistent and impossible things. We can write a whole treaty on unicorns or the attributes of God. And these works could be perfectly grammatical.

If we were to take your argument about the agrammaticality of "life after death" as valid, we would have to also believe that "perpetuum mobile" is an agrammatical expression.

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

Tractatus, proposition 2.223:

So how do we tell if a proposition is true or false? We must compare it with reality.

and


The way one verifies the correctness of a proposition is by inspecting the proposition to see if it indeed reflects reality

Luís Henrique

[LJJW]

I'm sorry once again for the delay in replying, but I have been pre-occupied with other things of late, once more. I have just spent the last day or so writing several responses to your posts, and that of many others. I hope to post a little more regularly in the coming months.

Luis, you wrote:


But, of course, according to Rosa's sophism, the fulfilment of any utterable sentence is thinkable.

But, where has she said this?

Or even the following?


when we think the words, we think the thing...

Her point is that in many cases we can't do this. [Why that gets Lenin into difficulties, see below.]

Luis, you then quoted Wittgenstein:



Tractatus, proposition 2.223:

So how do we tell if a proposition is true or false? We must compare it with reality.


In fact, he actually said this (Pears and McGuiness translation):


in order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality.

The Ogden translation has this passage as follows:


In order to discover whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality.

No mention of a proposition here. Indeed, Wittgenstein uses "Bild" (picture) not "Satze" (sentence/proposition).

Now this quotation:


The way one verifies the correctness of a proposition is by inspecting the proposition to see if it indeed reflects reality,

doesn't look like anything Wittgenstein would have said. Where did you get it from, Luis?

Tractatus. Did you copy it from the Philosophical Forum? I'd post a link to a page there where someone at that site actually quotes Wittgenstein to this effect, but I can't post links yet! Even so, anyone can find it by pasting your quote into Google.]

Wittgenstein didn't start using the word "verify" (in such contexts) until the early 1930s (the word does not appear in the Tractatus), and it's quite clear from his discussions with the Vienna Circle (recorded for us by Waismann -- for example, pp.47, 79, 227 and 243-46; see also his Philosophical Remarks, pp. 200, 289.) that he did not mean it in the way that the Logical Positivists [LP-ers] meant it, although, at some points he comes very close to intending what they meant by it.

But he soon dropped this way of talking. So, although the word (along with "unverifiable") occurs in the Investigations (pp.102e, 223e), it's being used there in the way Marx and Engels used it (see below) but he has now watered it down to the following:


"Asking whether and how a proposition can be verified is only a special form of the question 'How do you mean?' The answer is a contribution to the grammar of the proposition." [p.119e]

[He is here beginning to make the mistake I mention below -- confusing sentences with names; that is, he is beginning to attribute a use, and thus a grammar, to sentences, and not just words. He is also beginning to confuse what our words mean with what we mean by our use of them, that is, with what we wish to achieve by means of them. This then allows him to blur the distinction between sentences and words (and thus sentences with names), and then later to start talking about the meaning of sentences, at which point he became hopelessly lost. Fortunately, this formed only a minor part of his later work, but it has misled scores of Wittgensteinians ever since. Indeed, Rosa points this out herself.

Of course, there is nothing wrong with talking about the use of a sentence, but in doing so, we have to be careful not to make the above mistakes. Voloshinov, for example, fell into this trap over and over again; so do most Wittgensteinians.

Incidentally, I have used the most recent, fourth edition of the Investigations here (i.e., what is called Wittgenstein (2009) in my other reply to you; the second edition is Wittgenstein (1958)).]

Earlier you argued as follows, Luis:


You see that he uses the phrase "whereof one cannot speak". But he is referring to things that can be spoken of; that is indeed his point. Whereof one cannot speak , on must [so not to talk gibberish] pass over in silence. According to Rosa's "method", however, Wittgenstein's sentence is foolery, because of course we can very well speak of God, the unthinkable, the anihillatory qualities of Nothing, life after death, the identity between being and being perceived, the identity between being and not being, etc, etc, etc.

I'm sorry, once more, but where did Rosa say this was "foolery"? In fact, I don't think she has passed a comment on this obscure passage from the Tractatus. Perhaps you know differently? [Remember, non-sense is not "foolery".]


Just like Wittgenstein says 'one cannot speak' about things that are, if anything, overspoken through the history of philosophy, Lenin says 'it is unthinkable' when he quite certainly means 'it cannot be thought about in a meaningful way'. And this is a widespread way to use the word "unthinkable". Making a whole philosophic point out of the fact that Lenin thought the phrase while saying that its referent is "unthinkable", frankly, is just specious, sophistic reasoning.

I'm not sure you have got the point of this comment by Wittgenstein. He is merely saying that there is a limit to what can be said, and beyond that, there is, or should be, silence.

Earlier still you argued as follows:


It would be easier if you, instead of asking "where" as if I hadn't yet shown you where I read verificationism into Rosa's text, could explain (in "ordinary language" would be even better), what the difference is between your/Rosa's/Wittgenstein's versus logical positivist's understanding of empirical/metaphysical sentences.

I have checked back in this thread, and I can't see where you have shown that Rosa appeals to, or even so much as hints at the use of the verificationist principle. Did I miss something? [Again, on this see below.] I'm sorry to have to ask you to help me out again, but I really could not find it.

As she points out in the longer version of the piece Chris posted (and recall that this shorter essay was written for novices, so she could hardly go into technical details, nor could she introduce too many complexities -- or it would defeat its purpose), she says that if anyone has a problem with "empirical" they should substitute for it "factual".

Of course, if you are still in doubt about the meaning of either term, you might find this comment by Marx and Engels of some help:


The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas.... They are the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which they live, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity. These premises can thus be verified in a purely empirical way....

"The fact is, therefore, that definite individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into these definite social and political relations. Empirical observation must in each separate instance bring out empirically, and without any mystification and speculation, the connection of the social and political structure with production. The social structure and the State are continually evolving out of the life-process of definite individuals, but of individuals, not as they may appear in their own or other people's imagination, but as they really are; i.e. as they operate, produce materially, and hence as they work under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will." [Marx and Engels [I]The German Ideology (1970), pp.42, 46-47. Bold emphases added.]

Or this comment by Engels:



We all agree that in every field of science, in natural and historical science, one must proceed from the given [I]facts,... therefore in theoretical natural science too the interconnections are not to be built into the facts but to be discovered in them, and when discovered to be verified as far as possible by experiment.

"Just as little can it be a question of maintaining the dogmatic content of the Hegelian system as it was preached by the Berlin Hegelians of the older and younger line." [Dialectics of Nature, p.47. Bold emphases added.]


Rosa is using these terms in more-or-less the same way.

However, the difference between Rosa's use of these terms and their use by the LP-ers is also quite easy to understand. If the truth or the falsehood of a proposition (or indicative sentence) can be determined without reference to the world (that is, if evidence is irrelevant to establishing its truth-value), then that proposition isn't empirical (or factual). If, on examination, no sense can be made of that proposition, no matter what we do with it, then it is non-sensical.

In long version of this essay, she points out that not much hangs on the word "metaphysical"; she is quite happy to substitute the above considerations (with a few added qualifications) for it -- which means her view is rather like that expressed by Engels when he talks about the "dogmatic" nature of Hegel's system.

For Wittgenstein, propositions that cannot be verified still have a sense. I venture to suggest you will not find a single LP-er who said this, or who would have said this. Rosa holds the same view.

Until late on in life -- when he did begin to do so -- Wittgenstein never referred to the 'meaning of a proposition' (but by then his thought was already in rapid decline).

So, LP-ers would not have expressed things this way. [For example, like Frege and Russell -- and many others since --, they confused propositions with names, which is why they referred to the meaning (or reference -- Bedeutung) of propositions -- that on its own helps encourage the confusion of sentences with names. As I noted above, only late in life did Wittgenstein begin to do this. As far as I am aware Rosa hasn't done this anywhere in her work, or here.]

Of course, there is much more to it than this, but you can find more details in the essay Chris added a few pages ago (I'm afraid I still can't post links yet!), and even more at Rosa's site (in her essay Twelve Part One, where you will also find references to secondary works which cover these points more extensively).

Now you have also said that you do not wish to read any more of her material; fine, but then there is not much anyone can do to assist you further, short of reproducing an 85,000 word essay here (which is the length of the aforementioned essay) in my own words (but parts of it were my own words!), which I don't think you'd want to read anyway.

With all due respect, the only thing I can suggest in such circumstances is that you either overcome this 'problem' yourself, or you stop asking questions about her work.

You also argued as follows, Luis:



A few observations and questions:

first, this text starts by an explanation and affirmation of a verification principle - or tenet #1 of logical positivism. Then it makes quite clear that it adheres to tenet #3 of logical positivism - that metaphysics are non-sense. It doesn't deal on matters relative to tenet #2, so it is impossible to know if its author adheres to such tenet - it remains as an open possibility.

So, and considering that we have to reject tenet #4 as unrepresentative of logical positivism, where exactly does the above text depart from logical positivism?

second, the text contains a few illogicalities and oversimplifications that are worth being pointed. One clear oversimplification is its rigid division of indicative sentences between "empirical" and "metaphysical".

Here are two examples the text gives us:

1. To be is to be perceived. (metaphysical)
2. Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital. (empirical)

Those sentences certainly fall into the categories ascribed to them. But this is often not the case. Take for instance:

3. It is impossible to build a perpetuum mobile.
4. The Sun is made of fire.
5. Tony Blair is a Marxist.

None of them is actually metaphysical - but all of them present evident difficulties to be classified as empirical (3. independs of direct empirical verification to be held as true , 4. seems to change its status historically, as empirical evidence about the matter of which the Sun is made was impossible to obtain in 1800 but is commonplace today, and 5. depends on the definition of a quite complex term - "Marxist" - that is much more difficult to "understand" than "owns a copy of Das Kapital", and so may be empirical or metaphysical depending on the definition of "Marxist" we are using).

An also quite clear illogicality - or perhaps even a sophism - is the discussion of Lenin's assertion that "motion without matter is unthinkable". It is held that, since Lenin obviously thought the words "motion without matter", he has contradicted himself, showing that it is perfectly possible to thin "motion without matter". But this is clearly an invalid reasoning. The use of the words "motion without matter" doesn't actually imply thinking motion without matter. The example of sentence 3. above may explain what I am saying. A similar idea can be expressed by

6. A functioning perpetuum mobile is unthinkable.

If we follow the text, we will exclaim, "but you have just thought of a functioning perpetuum mobile! You have just used those precise words!" What happens, though, is that when I think the words "functioning perpetuum mobile" I am not actually thinking of a functioning perpetuum mobile. Indeed, any machine of that kind that I - or anybody else - can think of is either not functioning or not a perpetuum mobile (or, more probably, neither). So while I can utter the words "functioning perpetuum mobile", I am at most thinking of the words, not of the actual thing. Same goes for "triangular circle", "the opposite side of a Moebius strip", or "a man who is his own father". And so the text incurs in a conflation between two things that a correct analysis easily shows are different.

The first point to make is that Rosa's use of "non-sense" is not the same as the LP-ers use of "nonsense". She went into some detail to explain how she was using this semi-technical term. In fact her use of it differs even from that of every other Wittgensteinian; I know, since she and I have discussed this topic for much of the last 20 years, and I agree with her that this novel use of that word brings out what we think Wittgenstein meant by "unsinnig" in the Tractatus), and his middle period. That explanation shows her work bears no resemblance to LP. To argue otherwise would be like saying Marx, Smith and Ricardo held the same beliefs since they all used words like "profit" and "value".

Now, you take Rosa to task for her "rigid" demarcation between metaphysical and empirical sentences, offering these problem cases:



3. It is impossible to build a perpetuum mobile.
4. The Sun is made of fire.
5. Tony Blair is a Marxist.

None of them is actually metaphysical - but all of them present evident difficulties to be classified as empirical (3. independs of direct empirical verification to be held as true, 4. seems to change its status historically, as empirical evidence about the matter of which the Sun is made was impossible to obtain in 1800 but is commonplace today, and 5. depends on the definition of a quite complex term - "Marxist" - that is much more difficult to "understand" than "owns a copy of Das Kapital", and so may be empirical or metaphysical depending on the definition of "Marxist" we are using).

I think she'd agree with you that how we characterise these propositions needs some discussion, but that does not affect the clear distinction itself. but not based on conceptual analysis/thought alone. The same is true incidentally of "Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital". That might very well change its truth-value over time. (In fact, Rosa specifically allows for that in what she wrote.)

You then argued as follows:


And also quite clear illogicality - or perhaps even a sophism - is the discussion of Lenin's assertion that "motion without matter is unthinkable". It is held that, since Lenin obviously thought the words "motion without matter", he has contradicted himself, showing that it is perfectly possible to thin "motion without matter". But this is clearly an invalid reasoning. The use of the words "motion without matter" doesn't actually imply thinking motion without matter. The example of sentence 3. above may explain what I am saying.

Rosa actually considered that objection in the long Essay she wrote (she had to since I posed that very point to her back in 1998 or 1999!), and included a shortened version of it in the passage Chris quoted. The point is that Lenin would have to know what any sentence containing the phrase "motion without matter" implied. As she says at her site:



In order to rule motion without matter out of court, Lenin would have to know what he was trying to exclude. He would have to know what motion without matter was so that he could exclude it as unthinkable, otherwise he might be ruling out the wrong thing. Hence, it would have to be thinkable for Lenin to tell us that it wasn't! This is the bind he gets himself into.

So, Lenin would have to think these words (and what they supposedly referred to) so that he could rule out the possibility that there was any motionless matter in the universe. Otherwise, he would have no idea what he was ruling out. And, if he had no idea what he was ruling out he'd have no idea what he was ruling in, either.

So, the real problem is not that Lenin was contradicting himself, it's that not even Lenin knew what he was talking about!

Moreover, as Rosa goes on to point out (I think you must have missed this), it's not possible to contradict non-sense. Since a non-sensical sentence cannot take a truth-value, no sentence can count as its contradictory. So Lenin wasn't contradicting himself (To be sure, Rosa toys with that possibility until she shows that he isn't even doing that!); he is far too confused to be doing it.

You then offer us this example:



6. A functioning [I]perpetuum mobile is unthinkable.

If we follow the text, we will exclaim, "but you have just thought of a functioning perpetuum mobile! You have just used those precise words!" What happens, though, is that when I think the words "functioning perpetuum mobile" I am not actually thinking of a functioning perpetuum mobile. Indeed, any machine of that kind that I - or anybody else - can think of is either not functioning or not a perpetuum mobile (or, more probably, neither). So while I can utter the words "functioning perpetuum mobile", I am at most thinking of the words, not of the actual thing. Same goes for "triangular circle", "the opposite side of a Moebius strip", or "a man who is his own father". And so the text incurs in a conflation between two things that a correct analysis easily shows are different.

And yet, how would you know what you were ruling out? Unless you knew what a functioning perpetual motion machine is, or could be, your claim that it is unthinkable is just an empty phrase.

But, suppose I say I can think it? Indeed, suppose the inventors of these machines, who still turn up regularly (just type 'History of Perpetual Motion Machines' into Wikipedia), also say they can think it? And, isn't the universe in perpetual motion? According to some scientists, it is. [Just type 'Cyclic Model' into Wikipedia.] So they can think of perpetual motion -- even if they are wrong, they can certainly think it.

Same with the other examples you mention. If time travel is possible, a man can be his own father. Now, time travel might not be possible, but because they think it is possible, many theorists and philosophers actually think a man could be his own father (or they would not be able to consider this classic paradox, and then try to solve it).

A triangular circle is also a possible object of thought. Given homeomorphisms (I'm sorry, I'd post a link to what these are if I could, but just type the word into Wikipedia -- there you will actually see a coffee mug transform into a donut!), it's possible to map a triangle onto a circle. So, topologically, a circle is the same as a triangle (and a square, and a pentagon, and an ellipse...), hence we can think this in mathematics!

Moreover, we can easily define the opposite side of a Moebius Strip as follows: hold the strip between thumb and forefinger; the opposite side to the side which touches your thumb is the side that touches your index finger. This might be a mathematical cheat, sure, but it allows us to think of the opposite side of a Moebius Strip. Mathematically we'd be wrong, but not according to the ordinary meaning of "opposite" or "side".

So, instead of asserting that, say, "A triangular circle is unthinkable", you'd be better off following Wittgenstein's advice here (albeit given in another context) and say that certain combinations of words aren't part of the language; we have no use for them.

However, this can't even be the case with Lenin's declaration, since immobile matter is not unthinkable; indeed, as I am sure you know, motionless matter had been a cornerstone of Aristotelian physics, which went largely unquestioned for well over a thousand years.

It might be that you are confusing these two sentences:

L1: "Matter without motion" is unthinkable.

L2: Matter without motion is unthinkable.

Where L1 means:

L3: The words "Matter without motion" cannot be thought.

L1 and L3 are plainly confused, and are definitely susceptible to the points Rosa made. But, L2 is too, and for the reasons she outlined and which I have re-iterated.

In fact Lenin had already admitted that scientists can think about motionless matter:



And this always happens with people who wish, for 'economy's sake,' to conceive of motion without matter....

We thus see that scientists who were prepared to grant that motion is conceivable without matter were to be encountered forty years ago too, and that 'on this point' Dietzgen declared them to be seers of ghosts. What, then, is the connection between philosophical idealism and the divorce of matter from motion, the separation of substance from force? Is it not 'more economical,' indeed, to conceive motion without matter?

What is essential is that the attempt to think of motion without matter smuggles in [I]thought divorced from matter -- and that is philosophical idealism.

Bold added.

[Again, I can't post links yet, but if you turn to Chapter Five, Part Three of Materialism and Empirio-Criticism [MEC] ('Is Motion Without Matter Conceivable?'), I think you'll be able to check that I haven't misquoted or misrepresented Lenin.]

As I have already pointed out, we know that scientists, and others, were able to think about immobile matter for well over a thousand years. So, those who Lenin is criticising in MEC were merely returning to type.

Now, the real problem with Lenin's declaration isn't so much that he ends up in an awful muddle, but that it follows from an a priori thesis invented by Engels: "Motion is the mode of the existence of matter". So, his declaration that "motion without matter is unthinkable" wasn't based on evidence (since that is ambiguous, at best -- but he quotes none either!), or argument (again, he presents us with none), but on the a priori thesis he inherited from Engels, which Rosa has shown is non-sensical.

[Incidentally, Rosa tells me that in the next few weeks she will be publishing (at her site) a reply to some of the things you have been saying about her and her ideas (both here and at the Philosophy Forum). I'll add the link if I have enough posts by then!]

[Luís Henrique]

In fact, he actually said this (Pears and McGuiness translation):
[snip]
No mention of a proposition here. Indeed, Wittgenstein uses "Bild" (picture) not "Satze" (sentence/proposition).

Oh, OK, you got me. I have quoted it second hand, and it seems that this is a common misquote:

http://forums.philosophyforums.com/threads/wittgenstein-a-summary-41631-2.html
http://philosophical-thot.blogspot.com/p/tractatus-logico-philosophicus.html
http://wittgenstein-ludwig.blogspot.com/2010_12_01_archive.html

Edit: the same (both the second hand quote and the confusion between proposition and picture) goes for this, referring to T.2.223:


Tractatus. Did you copy it from the Philosophical Forum? I'd post a link to a page there where someone at that site actually quotes Wittgenstein to this effect, but I can't post links yet! Even so, anyone can find it by pasting your quote into Google.]Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

I'm sorry, once more, but where did Rosa say this was "foolery"? In fact, I don't think she has passed a comment on this obscure passage from the Tractatus. Perhaps you know differently? [Remember, non-sense is not "foolery".]

Ah, but more often than not, this subtle distinction is forgotten. What Hegel writes is non-sence; per Ms. Lichtenstein, this means that Hegel is a babbling ruling class mystic, and we shouldn't read him. Per some people who take Ms. Lichtenstein at face value, we can even translate 'non-sence' as "not meant to be understood", or "has not meaning", or, of course, "crap".

So, you can't have it both ways. If something is 'non-sence' in Wittgenstein terms, it doesn't follow it is foolery; if we want to demonstrate that something is foolery (or has no meaning, or is a conspiracy by the ruling class, or is crap), merely showing that it is 'non-sence' in Wittgenstein's terms doesn't suffice - and is actually a sophism.


So, Lenin would have to think these words (and what they supposedly referred to) so that he could rule out the possibility that there was any motionless matter in the universe. Otherwise, he would have no idea what he was ruling out. And, if he had no idea what he was ruling out he'd have no idea what he was ruling in, either.The argument that because something can be expressed in words it cannot be "unthinkable" is certainly a sophism, for what the word 'unthinkable' means is not something that cannot be thought, but something that cannot be thought without some illogicality (or something that cannot be thought under some, usually unstated, premises).


You then offer us this example:


6. A functioning perpetuum mobile is unthinkable.

If we follow the text, we will exclaim, "but you have just thought of a functioning perpetuum mobile! You have just used those precise words!" What happens, though, is that when I think the words "functioning perpetuum mobile" I am not actually thinking of a functioning perpetuum mobile. Indeed, any machine of that kind that I - or anybody else - can think of is either not functioning or not a perpetuum mobile (or, more probably, neither). So while I can utter the words "functioning perpetuum mobile", I am at most thinking of the words, not of the actual thing. Same goes for "triangular circle", "the opposite side of a Moebius strip", or "a man who is his own father". And so the text incurs in a conflation between two things that a correct analysis easily shows are different. And yet, how would you know what you were ruling out? Unless you knew what a functioning perpetual motion machine is, or could be, your claim that it is unthinkable is just an empty phrase.I think we perfectly know what a perpetuum mobile is - or would be, if it was possible -: a machine that is able to function for any indefinite time, without any imput of energy. So, we perfectly know what we are ruling out. But what is meant by "unthinkable" is not that you cannot think "gee, how wonderful it would be to have a machine that would be able to function for any indefinite time, without any imput of energy", but that you cannot possibly think of any way of building an actual machine that can function for any indefinite time, without any imput of energy.


A triangular circle is also a possible object of thought. Given homeomorphisms (I'm sorry, I'd post a link to what these are if I could, but just type the word into Wikipedia -- there you will actually see a coffee mug transform into a donut!), it's possible to map a triangle onto a circle. So, topologically, a circle is the same as a triangle (and a square, and a pentagon, and an ellipse...), hence we can think this in mathematics!
Now, besides the same issues as above, this is just simply false. It is possible to map a triangle onto a circle, but this doesn't mean that either the triangle that is being mapped is a circle, nor that the circle onto which it is being mapped is a triangle. From a topological point of view, they are equivalent, just as from a commercial point of view a pair of shoes and fifteen candy bars may be equivalent. But this doesn't mean that you can eat the shoes, or wear the candy bars on your feet, or that the sum of the internal angles of a circle is 180 degrees, or that you can derivate a triangle. Your fallacy is to believe that because two things can be considered from a point of view in which they are equivalent, it follows that we can think of those things as being one and the same thing. If we consider precision in the use of language so central, we may well start by using it in a less sloppy way.


Moreover, we can easily define the opposite side of a Moebius Strip as follows: hold the strip between thumb and forefinger; the opposite side to the side which touches your thumb is the side that touches your index finger. This might be a mathematical cheat, sure, but it allows us to think of the opposite side of a Moebius Strip. Mathematically we'd be wrong, but not according to the ordinary meaning of "opposite" or "side".So, as you see, you have to actually "cheat" (your word, not mine).


So, instead of asserting that, say, "A triangular circle is unthinkable", you'd be better off following Wittgenstein's advice here (albeit given in another context) and say that certain combinations of words aren't part of the language; we have no use for them.If you just "look at how words are used" - in this case, I suggest taking a good look at how the word 'unthinkable' is used - you will see that there is no conundrum here.


However, this can't even be the case with Lenin's declaration, since immobile matter is not unthinkable; indeed, as I am sure you know, motionless matter had been a cornerstone of Aristotelian physics, which went largely unquestioned for well over a thousand years.Oh, oh. I was here thinking that "motion without matter" would refer to something quite different. What you describe sounds a lot more like matter without motion than the other way round.

And yes, Aristotelian physics thought of motionless matter (even though not, as far as I am informed, of matterless movement), but, again, this is not how we use the word 'unthinkable': if I say, "matter without movement is unthinkable", I would probably mean something like, "matter without motion" is incompatible with our knowledge about relativity, or with our conception of an isotopic, centerless space, etc. In other words, "matter without motion" is unthinkable in the frame of a post-Newtonian world.


It might be that you are confusing these two sentences:

L1: "Matter without motion" is unthinkable.

L2: Matter without motion is unthinkable.

Where L1 means:

L3: The words "Matter without motion" cannot be thought.

L1 and L3 are plainly confused, and are definitely susceptible to the points Rosa made. But, L2 is too, and for the reasons she outlined and which I have re-iterated.L1 and L3 aren't confused, they are blatantly false.


In fact Lenin had already admitted that scientists can think about motionless matter:


And this always happens with people who wish, for 'economy's sake,' to conceive of motion without matter....

We thus see that scientists who were prepared to grant that motion is conceivable without matter were to be encountered forty years ago too, and that 'on this point' Dietzgen declared them to be seers of ghosts. What, then, is the connection between philosophical idealism and the divorce of matter from motion, the separation of substance from force? Is it not 'more economical,' indeed, to conceive motion without matter?

What is essential is that the attempt to think of motion without matter smuggles in thought divorced from matter -- and that is philosophical idealism. Bold added.Which again only sets the frame in which Lenin believes motion without matter is "unthinkable": it is incompatible with materialism, it is unthinkable without the concetual scheme of philosophical idealism.


[Incidentally, Rosa tells me that in the next few weeks she will be publishing (at her site) a reply to some of the things you have been saying about her and her ideas (both here and at the Philosophy Forum). I'll add the link if I have enough posts by then!]I suppose I will be called a few names again, then. And that my ideas will be probably misrepresented, so that she can more easily deal with them. And that she will again make some fallacies, probably involving confusion of use and mention. And that she will be able to find some typo, or some mistaken use of this or that word (or invent a mistake where there is none), and substitute derision of that typo or misuse for a reasoned refutation of whatever those "things I have been saying about her and her ideas". Nevermind.

ETA. She's banned here, not, as far as I know, from the Philosophy Forum. So she can very well go to that forum and voice her opinion about the "things I have been saying about her and her ideas" there.

Luís Henrique