What does "I" refer to? [Archive]

syndicat

1st June 2011, 23:19

In fact this does not show "I" is a referring expression. Quite apart from the fact that you assume this "someone" is male, you are using "I" as a (name) variable in premiss (1). You failed to justify this, and it's not hard to see why. "I" can't be a name, nor can "I" be a name variable unless you can show that someone has ever been called "I". If not, you can't legitimately use "x" in line (2) to go proxy for it.

"he" is a variable quantified on "I". now the individual referred to by "I" in (1) happens to be male. but this usage is merely to conform to English protocol. It is of no logical relevance and maleness has no role in this argument. So you are clutching at straws. to see that you're just blowing smoke, consider the following inference:

(1*) Jack weighs 185 pounds
(2*) Lucinda is Jack's neighbor and also weighs 185 pounds

(3) therefore someone is such that Jack has the same weight she has.

We have to use "she" for the variable in (3) because we generalized on a female. But this is just English protocol since pronouns have gender in English.

In regard to your second sentence, you seem to not understand the role of logic. Logic is about accounting for the validity of arguments as stated in a natural language, English in this case. So, your reply begs the question. That's because you are assuming, without argument that (1) and (2) are not well-formed, i.e. grammatical and perfectly understandable English sentences. But in fact they are grammatical and understandable English sentences.

Moreover, the argument is valid. (2) does deductively follow from (1). so, the issue is how to account for the deductive validity of this argument.

Now, how do we account for this validity? what I showed is that predicate logic is quite adequate to account for the validity. What we do in logic is we construct an analogue or translation of the sentence into predicate logic.

But, quite apart from these technical niggles, the main problem with your argument is that your meta-claim "this inference is valid in predicate logic and would not be if "I" were not a referring expression" does not itself follow. The truth conditions for line (2) depend on finding a name to replace "x". So, (2) is true just in case you can do this and form a true sentence from it, false if that sentence is itself false. (2) is truth-valueless if there is no such name and thus no such sentence. Hence the truth-conditions for (2) depend on there being a name (a referring expression) that we can use in this way.

Again, you don't understand logic. if your assumption here were true, it would be impossible to reason about or make existential generalizations from references to things for which we have no name. Now, in fact in this case I could substitute a name for "x" since I happen to have a name. but you're wrong in what you say about truth-conditions for the reason stated above. for example if i were to say:

"that bright star is redish"

the sentence's truth does not depend on me or anyone having a name for the star.

In the example i discusssed, I was giving evidence that "I" is a referring expression, by providing a valid English argument whose validity depends on "I" being a referring expression. to respond by saying "I" can't be a referring expression is to obviously beg the question.

and you're just throwing sand in the air when you introduce an argument that has a different logical structure than the one i used:

(1) Jack and somebody are both natives of Los Angeles

(2) hence there is someone such that Jack and (s)he are both natives of Los Angeles. (1) Jack and somebody are both natives of Los Angeles

(2) hence there is someone such that Jack and (s)he are both natives of Los Angeles.

the fact that this argument is invalid whereas the one i gave is not shows that the two arguments are not logically analogous...and therefore this is an irrelevant attempt to throw sand in the air.

the word "I" is a proper pronoun. Logicians and philosophers of language treat it as an indexical, such as "You" or "here" or "now" or "this" or "that". these are all context dependent to be hooked up with a referent. Just as the others obtain referents pragmatically from a feature of the situation, it is entirely reasonable to expect that this is so for "I". and the usual proposal is that there is a pragmatic function that takes a token of "I" to the person or communicating being (could be a computer) generating the token.

if you don't treat "I" as a referring expression, then you have a hard time accounting for why the following are true sentences:

I am a native of Los Angeles.
I am older than James.
I am watching a bird sitting on the apple tree.
I weigh 185 pounds.

In the case of the last of these, I am predicating a weight of myself. Either I have that weight or not. If not, the sentence is false. If I do have that weight, the sentence is true.

So in fact these are subject-predicate sentences in which a property is attributed to an object...the object that is the referent of "I".

To put this point another way, compare:

Jack weighs 185 pounds.
I weigh 185 pounds.

Each sentence predicates the same property. Buf if the first predicates that property of Jack, what does the second sentence predicate that property of? To suppose it does not is to say these sentences are not in fact doing the same thing, that is, predicating a weight of a person. Why, then, should they not be viewed as consisting of a referring expression and a predicate?

LuÃs Henrique

2nd June 2011, 03:46

Well, the point is that "I" is not a referring expression to begin with.

Referring expression comprise Definite Descriptions (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Definite_description), like "The President of the USA", and Proper Names (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proper_noun), like "Karl Marx". "I" can't serve in either role.

Now the personal pronoun "I" has many uses:

1. I disagree.

2. Who am I?

3. Do what I say.

and so on.

In such cases, the use of this pronoun serves merely to draw attention to the one saying whatever it is that has been said.

So, to paraphrase Wittgenstein, a whole metaphysic (i.e., much of German Idealist Philosophy (http://www.iep.utm.edu/germidea/)) is dissolved by a drop of grammar.

1. The President of the USA disagrees.

2. Who is the President of the USA?

3. Do what the President of the USA says.

1. Karl Marx disagrees.

2. Who is Karl Marx?

3. Do what Karl Marx says.

Really...

Luís Henrique

syndicat

2nd June 2011, 18:57

Referring expression comprise Definite Descriptions (http://www.anonym.to/?http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Definite_description), like "The President of the USA", and Proper Names (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proper_noun), like "Karl Marx". "I" can't serve in either role.

This is a false assertion. Demonstratives such as "this", "that", "here", "now, and pronouns such as "You", "I", "They", "We" are all referring expressions. R.L.'s viewpoint is simply a weird & idiosyncratic form of dogmatism.

Thirsty Crow

2nd June 2011, 19:07

It refers to the speaker of an utterance or the writer of a sentence. It's that simple, IMO, though we could go into the details of micro-rhetorics of the usage of the pronoun in specific situations.

LuÃs Henrique

2nd June 2011, 19:18

It refers to the speaker of an utterance or the writer of a sentence.

In ordinary language, at least... :laugh:

Luís Henrique

syndicat

2nd June 2011, 19:43

In ordinary language, at least... :laugh:

in other words, in the English language. and we weren't talking about any other language.

LJJW

2nd June 2011, 20:54

Syndicat argued:

In regard to your second sentence, you seem to not understand the role of logic. Logic is about accounting for the validity of arguments as stated in a natural language, English in this case. So, your reply begs the question. That's because you are assuming, without argument that (1) and (2) are not well-formed, i.e. grammatical and perfectly understandable English sentences. But in fact they are grammatical and understandable English sentences.

Sure, informal logic is as you say, but that is only one branch of logic, as I am sure you know. To restrict logic in the way you suggest would be rather like restricting mathematics to counting and weighing.

In fact my point wasn't that the sentences you mention weren't well formed (or grammatical, etc.), but that you were assuming without proof that "I" is a referring expression. My counter-example shows that the inference can be valid even if the term in question is not a referring expression.

Moreover, the argument is valid. (2) does deductively follow from (1). so, the issue is how to account for the deductive validity of this argument.

Now, how do we account for this validity? what I showed is that predicate logic is quite adequate to account for the validity. What we do in logic is we construct an analogue or translation of the sentence into predicate logic.

Agreed, but that does not show "I" is a referring expression, nor that it can legitimately function like 'he', etc. Is "I" anaphoric? No. Is it relative? No (or if it is, you have failed to show it is). In which case, it cannot be bound by a standard quantifier. So your formal argument is not a wff. [Or if it is, we need to see the formation rules, and proof of consistency, etc.]

Again, you don't understand logic. if your assumption here were true, it would be impossible to reason about or make existential generalizations from references to things for which we have no name. Now, in fact in this case I could substitute a name for "x" since I happen to have a name. but you're wrong in what you say about truth-conditions for the reason stated above. for example if i were to say:

"that bright star is reddish"

the sentence's truth does not depend on me or anyone having a name for the star.

In the example i discussed, I was giving evidence that "I" is a referring expression, by providing a valid English argument whose validity depends on "I" being a referring expression. to respond by saying "I" can't be a referring expression is to obviously beg the question.

and you're just throwing sand in the air when you introduce an argument that has a different logical structure than the one i used:

But, I nowhere said that it was impossible to argue this way:

about or make existential generalizations from references to things for which we have no name.

You then present us with an example:

"that bright star is reddish"

the sentence's truth does not depend on me or anyone having a name for the star.

Of course not, but then 'that star' is identified by a demonstrative -- or it is a relative pronoun? You failed to say which. These have different logics, so you will need to be more precise.

But, none of this shows "I" is a referring expression, something you continue to assume without proof -- ignoring once again the counter-arguments Rosa supplied.

and you're just throwing sand in the air when you introduce an argument that has a different logical structure than the one i used.

the fact that this argument is invalid whereas the one i gave is not shows that the two arguments are not logically analogous...and therefore this is an irrelevant attempt to throw sand in the air.

I don't agree. It shows that an argument can be valid [I]even if the relevant term in the premiss isn't a referring expression.

Now, it may or may not be true that in your argument "I" is a referring expression, but your argument does not show this. As we can see, an argument can be valid even if it isn't using a referring expression. You need to show on independent grounds that "I" is as you say. Your argument does not show this. On the contrary, Rosa's (independent) arguments show that "I" isn't a referring expression.

the word "I" is a proper pronoun. Logicians and philosophers of language treat it as an indexical, such as "You" or "here" or "now" or "this" or "that". these are all context dependent to be hooked up with a referent. Just as the others obtain referents pragmatically from a feature of the situation, it is entirely reasonable to expect that this is so for "I". and the usual proposal is that there is a pragmatic function that takes a token of "I" to the person or communicating being (could be a computer) generating the token.

How does this show it's a referring expression? It cannot gain a reference like "he" or she" do, since the person who utters it is in no doubt who uttered "I", and cannot be mistaken or in error who uttered "I", as Rosa pointed out. This is not so with referring expressions, which can, and often do, fail to refer.

if you don't treat "I" as a referring expression, then you have a hard time accounting for why the following are true sentences:

I am a native of Los Angeles.
I am older than James.
I am watching a bird sitting on the apple tree.
I weigh 185 pounds.

In the case of the last of these, I am predicating a weight of myself. Either I have that weight or not. If not, the sentence is false. If I do have that weight, the sentence is true.

So in fact these are subject-predicate sentences in which a property is attributed to an object...the object that is the referent of "I".

Once more, how do any of these show "I" is a referring expression?

Now, let's use non-referring expressions in each case:

1. No one is a native of Los Angeles.
2. Someone is older than James.
3. Nobody is watching a bird sitting on the apple tree.
4. Most players weigh 185 pounds.

Do these show that "No one", "Someone", "Nobody" and "Most players" are referring expressions? Hardly. Same with "I".

So in fact these are subject-predicate sentences in which a property is attributed to an object...the object that is the referent of "I".

But, in 2. above, for example, something is being predicated of someone, but that does not show "someone" is a referring expression. Same with "I", again.

Jack weighs 185 pounds.
I weigh 185 pounds.

Each sentence predicates the same property. But if the first predicates that property of Jack, what does the second sentence predicate that property of? To suppose it does not is to say these sentences are not in fact doing the same thing, that is, predicating a weight of a person. Why, then, should they not be viewed as consisting of a referring expression and a predicate?

Compare your example with the following:

5. Jack weighs 185 pounds.
6. Someone weighs 185 pounds.

So, unless you think "someone" is a referring expression, this argument of yours won't work either.

Now, "I" may indeed be as you say, but you have yet to show it is.

LJJW

2nd June 2011, 20:57

Luis Henrique argued:

1. The President of the USA disagrees.

2. Who is the President of the USA?

3. Do what the President of the USA says.

1. Karl Marx disagrees.

2. Who is Karl Marx?

3. Do what Karl Marx says.

Really...

I haven't asked Rosa -- she's away on holiday in Norway right now -- but I do not think you have understood her aright. She is not saying these are true sentences, or that she agrees with them, or even that any of them follow from one or more of the rest, only that they illustrate the use of "I" in English, that's all:

1. I disagree.

2. Who am I?

3. Do what I say.

LJJW

2nd June 2011, 20:59

Syndicat then added this:

This is a false assertion. Demonstratives such as "this", "that", "here", "now, and pronouns such as "You", "I", "They", "We" are all referring expressions. R.L.'s viewpoint is simply a weird & idiosyncratic form of dogmatism.

In fact, if you look at what Rosa posted, she nowhere denies that the pronouns you list are referring expressions -- only that "I" is.

And since to have yet to show she is wrong, I think you are being a little unfair calling her 'dogmatic'.

LuÃs Henrique

2nd June 2011, 21:13

in other words, in the English language. and we weren't talking about any other language.

Here, from the link in the OP, an example of "I" in some non-ordinary language...

"I could suppose I had no body," wrote Descartes, "but not that I was not", and inferred that "this I" is not a body.

Evidently, if one was in need for a good practical example in support for a Wittgensteinian rebuffal of philosophic sophistry based on misuse of language, this would be the one.

"This I"...: definitely, not ordinary language.

Luís Henrique

LuÃs Henrique

2nd June 2011, 21:25

Luis Henrique argued:

I haven't asked Rosa -- she's away on holiday in Norway right now -- but I do not think you have understood her aright. She is not saying these are true sentences, or that she agrees with them, or even that any of them follow from one or more of the rest, only that they illustrate the use of "I" in English, that's all:

1. I disagree.

2. Who am I?

3. Do what I say.

The problem is not that I didn't understand her correctly, but that I did not understand her at all.

She writes this:

Referring expression comprise Definite Descriptions (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Definite_description), like "The President of the USA", and Proper Names (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proper_noun), like "Karl Marx". "I" can't serve in either role.

Now the personal pronoun "I" has many uses:And so, like the Wittgensteinian she is, she is arguing that "I" on one hand, and "Karl Marx" or "The President of the United States", are different because their use is different. Accordingly, she states that "I" can't serve in the role of either proper names or definite descriptions, but apparently doesn't explain why, and then immediately proceeds to point out some uses of the pronoun "I", which, in context, seems to signal that she is giving examples of the use of "I" that cannot be matched by "Karl Marx" or "The President of the United States". And so I pointed that those are examples in which "I", "Karl Marx", and "The President of the United States" are certainly grammatically interchangeably.

Luis Henrique

LuÃs Henrique

2nd June 2011, 22:38

In fact, if you look at what Rosa posted, she nowhere denies that the pronouns you list are referring expressions -- only that "I" is.

Maybe, but she certainly does not explain why "I" is not a referring expression.

And that will be difficult to do, unless we explain what a "referring expression" is. In ordinary language, we would use "referring expression" when mentioning expressions that refer to something; and since "I" seems to be an expression, and seems to refer to something, we would, in ordinary language, say that "I" is a referring expression.

Evidently, one problem here is that "referring expression" is not ordinary language, but especialist jargon; it has to be explained to those of us who aren't specialists in the field.

And this wasn't explained - indeed, not explaining such things seems to be a principle for Rosa - and so this turns into a dispute in which each side demands proof from the other, but - especially the Rosaites - isn't willing to give any.

And since it was that "side" that made the original claim - that "I" is not a referring expression - it seems that it should be that side also to make the first move to provide some evidence.

And since to have yet to show she is wrong, I think you are being a little unfair calling her 'dogmatic'.

Well, I am pretty sure that she is abyssaly dogmatic, but indeed not for this. For this, I would say that she is extremely unwilling to explain what she means, and usually recurs to the safehouse of "ordinary language" (which is a contorted way of calling everybody else imbeciles) while dealing with language that is not ordinary at all.

Luís Henrique

syndicat

3rd June 2011, 01:44

Sure, informal logic is as you say, but that is only one branch of logic, as I am sure you know. To restrict logic in the way you suggest would be rather like restricting mathematics to counting and weighing.

again, you show that you don't understand logic. if you think you do, then please explain what "informal logic" is supposed to be.

Formal logic is about accounting for the validity of inferences by showing how they exhibit certain forms or structures which we have reason to believe are valid.

The way we use predicate logic to do this is by translating sentences from a natural language, English in this case, into the symbolic logic.

To begin to understand how predicate logic works, you first need to know what a predicate is. A predicate is an expression such that when you fill the blanks in it with a referring expression you get a simple subject/predicate sentence. So "...weighs 185 pounds" is a predicate because we can fill in the blank with various referring expressions:

That guy weighs 185 pounds.
That sofa weighs 185 pounds.
Jack weighs 185 pounds.

Now, predicates can also be used together with quantifiers. When doing translations from English to predicate logic, we do this in stages by restating the quantifier into a more fully expressed form. so

(1) some dogs weigh 185 pounds

becomes

(2) something is such that it is a dog and it weighs 185 pounds.

This brings out the binding of the predicate to a quantifier through the introduction of the variables, "it". Note that this also brings out the presence of the predicate "...weighs 185 pounds" which we already showed to be a predicate.

Now,

(3) I weigh 185 pounds

is true. and it predicates the same property as "...weighs 185 pounds". It's perfectly analogous to:

(4) That guy weighs 185 pounds
(5) Jeremiah weighs 185 pounds

and so forth. so if you think that (3) is NOT a simple subject-predicate sentence, with "I" designating the subject, it is up to you to provide reason for thinking it is not.

You try to argue against this by introducing the following examples:

1. No one is a native of Los Angeles.
2. Someone is older than James.
3. Nobody is watching a bird sitting on the apple tree.
4. Most players weigh 185 pounds.

The problem is, all of these are expressions which can be analyzed in terms of predicates and quantifiers. But that is not a plausible proposal as far as "I" is concerned. We can see this if we go back to my original argument:

(1) Jack and I are both natives of Los Angeles

(2) hence there is someone such that Jack and (s)he are both natives of Los Angeles.

This argumen is valid. (2) follows from (1). If you ask, "Who is this someone?" the person can be designated in various ways, including by that person using "I".

The fact that this argument is obviously valid shows you're wrong.

What logic does is come up with theories about inference based on trying to account for broad groups of valid inferences as stated in natural language. My argument above is such an argument and is therefore part of the data that logic needs to account for. You've provided no reason whatsoever for rejecting the validity of that argument. If you say it can't be valid because "I" isn't a referring expression and thus can't be generalized on with the existential quantifier, then you're obviously begging the question. But in fact this is what you've been doing all along.

Agreed, but that does not show "I" is a referring expression, nor that it can legitimately function like 'he', etc. Is "I" anaphoric?

again, not all referring pronouns or demonstratives are anaphoric. "here", "now", "you", "that guy", "this house". these are not anaphoric. but they are referring expressions.

Suzy: "Nobody saw the siamese cat in the backyard."
Me: "But somebody did, because I did."

in this case I'm existentially generalizing on "I". I could reproduce examples like this. There are countless valid arguments that can be generated that assume that "I" is a referring expression.

Nor have you provided any argument whatever to show that "I" is not a referring expression. You keep making aanlogies with quantifiers. But in those cases we have a ready analysis of why the predicate can be attached to an expression that isn't a singular term. Are you going to argue that "I" is a quantifier? If not, then your use of those alleged counter-examples doesn't prove your point.

Moreover, since the '70s there has been a lot of work in the field of pragmatics, as it is sometimes called, in which formal logic and formal semantics account for demonstratives...."I", "You", "that", "this", "now" "here". The most common view is that these are very primitive referring expressions, expressions that refer in a very direct and immediate way. They are more basic referring expressions, in the life of human communication, than proper names. we can think of "I" as having associated with it a pragmatic function that takes the token of "I" to a referent, namely, the person or object that generated the token. like other demonstratives "I" is thus context dependent. Why would "here", "now", "this", "that" be context dependent to determine a referent while "I" is somehow completely different?

Moreover, you seem to think that definite descriptions are referring expressions. But in Bertrand Russell's famouse analysis, they are not. They are quantifiers. Since Keith Donnellan's discussion of the various kinds of uses of definite descriptions back in the '70s, many in philosophy of language and logic have come to accept that sometimes definite descriptions function in the way that Russell suggested, as quantifiers, and in other cases they function more like demonstratives. so if someone says "the guy over there with a martini in his hand is Isabel's husband." the expression "the guy over there with a martini in his hand" can refer even if he doesn't have a martini but something else in his hand. the point of the definite description here is like pointing a finger, it is to direct the hearer's attention to the subject of the sentence, which then goes on to predicate a property of him.

ar734

3rd June 2011, 02:46

ar734

3rd June 2011, 03:04

[QUOTE=syndicat;2131336

Now, predicates can also be used together with quantifiers. When doing translations from English to predicate logic, we do this in stages by restating the quantifier into a more fully expressed form. so

(1) some dogs weigh 185 pounds

becomes

(2) something is such that it is a dog and it weighs 185 pounds. [/QUOTE]

Doesn't "something is such that it is a dog and it" quantify or modifiy the subject rather than the object? Wouldn't a quantifier of the object be "Some dogs weigh 185 lbs. dripping wet?" In fact, isn't "185 pounds" already a predicate with a quantifier, or what they used to call a predicate adjective?

How is (2) different from saying: Some things are dogs and some dogs weigh 185 pounds? Or There is a thing that is a dog and it weighs 185 pounds?

LuÃs Henrique

3rd June 2011, 03:07

If "I" refers to a person making a statement, then when Wal-Mart files a tax return and makes a statement that the contents of the tax return are true, then Wal-Mart is a person? Of if Chrysler Corp. says that its cars are "imported" from Detroit, that statement makes Chrysler a person?

This is mere sophistry. "I" refers to the person who is making the statement in which the word "I" appears (that's why when Wal-Mart, or Chrysler Corp. talk about themselves, they don't say "I": because they are not persons), not to a person making any statement:

I am the King of Persia.

We understand that the King of Persia is telling somebody else what he is (or that a person who is not the King of Persia is sarcastically saying that he is, but in anyway is referring to himself).

But,

That idiot is the King of Persia.

We understand that somebody who isn't the King of Persia is saying somebody else is - and not that the person making such statement "is 'I'".

Modern, monopoly capitalism apparently has produced the ideology that a "thing" can literally make a statement. So, the U.S. Supreme Court was merely acknowledging an economic reality when it declared that a corporation was a "person?"

That is what we may call a juridical fiction. For (some) legal purposes, it is convenient to call a corporation (or a foundation, NGO, State, etc.) a person. But noone actually things that Ford is a person in the same sence John Smith is.

It is just that in freaking ordinary language, words have more than one meaning, something that seems impossible to drill into the heads of (pseudo)Wittgensteinians.

Luís Henrique

LuÃs Henrique

3rd June 2011, 03:12

Doesn't "something is such that it is a dog and it" quantify or modifiy the subject rather than the object? Wouldn't a quantifier of the object be "Some dogs weigh 185 lbs. dripping wet?" In fact, isn't "185 pounds" already a predicate with a quantifier, or what they used to call a predicate adjective?

Saying that predicates can be used together with quantifiers doesn't mean that the quantifier applies to the predicate. It means that we can use a predicate and a quantifier, together, both applied to the subject.

How is (2) different from saying: Some things are dogs and some dogs weigh 185 pounds? Or There is a thing that is a dog and it weighs 185 pounds?"Something" is not the same as "some things": "There is something such as freedom of expression" is not to say that "freedom of expression" is a "thing".

Luís Henrique

syndicat

3rd June 2011, 03:28

(2) something is such that it is a dog and it weighs 185 pounds.

Doesn't "something is such that it is a dog and it" quantify or modifiy the subject rather than the object?

what do you mean by "object"? In logic "subject" is what the predicate in the sentence predicates a property of. So "Fearsome" designates the subject in:

Fearsome has an iron grip on Jack's leg.

Wouldn't a quantifier of the object be "Some dogs weigh 185 lbs. dripping wet?" In fact, isn't "185 pounds" already a predicate with a quantifier, or what they used to call a predicate adjective?

Again, what do you mean by "object"? when we talk about something such as that dog over there, it becomes the subject of our discussion, what we are predicating properties of, such as "that dog has short hair."

Now, the dog can be said to be an "object" in ordinary English. but in this case it's also the subject, in the logical sense, of the sentence "that dog has short hair."

How is (2) different from saying: Some things are dogs and some dogs weigh 185 pounds? Or There is a thing that is a dog and it weighs 185 pounds?

Some things are dogs and some dogs weigh 185 pounds

gets translated into predicate logic as a conjunction:

(Ex) Dx & (Ex) (Dx & Wx)

but (2) is represented by (Ex) (Dx & Wx).

so you've just added an irrelevant extra statement that doesn't add any information.

There is a thing that is a dog and it weighs 185 pounds?

Now this does say the same thing as (2). It's just another way of rephrasing the same statement, and it would be symbolized by (Ex)(Dx & Wx) The reason this is different from your previous sentence is that the "it" is a variable bound to "there is".

ar734

3rd June 2011, 03:28

"Something" is not the same as "some things": "There is something such as freedom of expression" is not to say that "freedom of expression" is a "thing".

Luís Henrique

But it is to say that freedom of expression is a something.

ar734

3rd June 2011, 03:30

Well, predicate is the "object" of a verb, which has a subject.

syndicat

3rd June 2011, 03:33

Quantifiers can be bound on a reference to anything whatever we can talk about. So when I say "some" gets parsed as "something is such that", "something" means any item whatever, where anything is an "item" if it has properties. that's because properties are what the predicates attribute to whatever we are talking about what we use the predicates.

syndicat

3rd June 2011, 03:35

Well, predicate is the "object" of a verb, which has a subject.

nope. not in logic. every predicate in logic includes a verb. so

...is red all over
...smokes weed
...loves his wife
...reads the New York Post
...is as tall as Jack

are all predicates. that's because we get a sentence that is true or false if we stick a referring expression into the blank.

LuÃs Henrique

3rd June 2011, 03:36

Now, let's use non-referring expressions in each case:

1. No one is a native of Los Angeles.
2. Someone is older than James.
3. Nobody is watching a bird sitting on the apple tree.
4. Most players weigh 185 pounds.

Do these show that "No one", "Someone", "Nobody" and "Most players" are referring expressions? Hardly. Same with "I".

As syndicat said, "no" and "some" (in that context) are quantifiers. In formal language, they would be replaced by ∃, preceded or not by a minus sign or a tilde. But, whatever "I" is, it is certainly not a quantifier, nor is it short for a quantified subject (as "somebody" is). In other words, it cannot be translated into formal language as ∃ or -∃ (and even less by ∀).

So, maybe you are right in that "I" is not a referring expression, but you are no closer to demonstrating than before you argued that.

It is a fallacy similar to the below:

Whales have no scales.
Whales are not fish.
Sharks have no scales.
Ergo, sharks are not fish.

Luís Henrique

LuÃs Henrique

3rd June 2011, 03:39

But it is to say that freedom of expression is a something.

You asked whether "something is a dog" is the same as "some things are dogs", remember? I gave you your answer, and it is "no".

And saying "a something" is a sin against Holy Ordinary Language, since "something" is not a substanctive, and therefore cannot be preceded by an article. Follow the dogma correctly yourself, if you are going to impose it unto others.

Luís Henrique

ar734

3rd June 2011, 03:41

This is mere sophistry.

Luís Henrique

Only sophistry? Corporate dominance of the real, political, economic world seems to be pretty much absolute, at least so far.

Corporations may not say "I" very much, but they do say "we," or they use their names to refer to themselves, as "GM builds the greatest cars in the universe," or "What's good for GM, etc."

They use the royal "we are not amused," or "The royal family does not do interviews with National Enquirer."

All of which, in ordinary English, it seems to me is the same as saying "I."

LuÃs Henrique

3rd June 2011, 03:42

nope. not in logic. every predicate in logic includes a verb.

And the same in grammar. Indeed, for grammaticians, the verb is the nucleus of the predicate (or of most predicates; a few verbs, such as "to be", are part of "nominal predicates" whose nuclei are nominal).

Luís Henrique

ar734

3rd June 2011, 03:52

nope. not in logic. every predicate in logic includes a verb. so

...is red all over
...smokes weed
...loves his wife
...reads the New York Post
...is as tall as Jack

are all predicates. that's because we get a sentence that is true or false if we stick a referring expression into the blank.

Well, ok. In that sense a predicate can be a verb alone.

As the following are predicates:

is, smokes, loves, reads, is.

Predicate logic, however, at least according to Wiki, is something else entirely, having little to do with ordinary language. Predicate logic looks a lot like programming language.

LuÃs Henrique

3rd June 2011, 03:52

Only sophistry? Corporate dominance of the real, political, economic world seems to be pretty much absolute, at least so far.

The fact that corporate dominance is real and even "absolute" doesn't mean that any reasoning concluding like that is reasonable:

Jews dominate the world.
Jews dominate capitalist corporations.
Ergo, capitalist corporations dominate the world.

Corporations may not say "I" very much, but they do say "we," or they use their names to refer to themselves, as "GM builds the greatest cars in the universe," or "What's good for GM, etc."But "we" is not "I", and it is certainly not used in the same way "I" is.

They use the royal "we are not amused," or "The royal family does not do interviews with National Enquirer."I don't see why Exxon using "we" is "royal we": they are indeed a group of people; "royal we" implies a single person using "we" instead of "I". What pronoun should the members of a corporation use in referring to it? Or they should only talk about it in the third person?

In any way, they would say things like, "in the opinion of Monsanto, genetic engineering is a good thing", as if corporations had opinions, and this would not need first person pronouns to be done, so the problem is elsewhere.

(and, of course, the same usage is common for worker unions, revolutionary parties, anarchist federations, ecologist NGOs, etc, so it is hardly a phenomenon of the capitalist class exclusively.)

All of which, in ordinary English, it seems to me is the same as saying "I."Then your command of ordinary English is not very good, because "we" is certainly not a synonim of "I".

For instance, one can say, "I and my dog went hunting; we came back late in the afternoon", and this doesn't imply that the dog is a person, or that the speaker mistakenly considers his dog a person.

Luís Henrique

LuÃs Henrique

3rd June 2011, 04:01

Well, ok. In that sense a predicate can be a verb alone.

As the following are predicates:

is, smokes, loves, reads, is.

Wrong. "Is" cannot be a predicate, because the verb "to be" demands a complement. Same for "loves". "Reads" maybe: is

Paul reads.

an acceptable English sentence? If so, yes, "reads" may be a predicate.

Some examples of predicates consisting of a verb alone:

barks
dwindled
melts
broke

Predicate logic, however, at least according to Wiki, is something else entirely, having little to do with ordinary language. Predicate logic looks a lot like programming language....and if it is not ordinary language, it must be bollocks.

But, seriously, the fact that predicate logic "looks like programming language" (it doesn't, of course, though the formal language used in it may well do so) doesn't mean that its grammar is like you say (programming languages use "verbs", and some of them can make a predicate alone - HALT, quit, clear, nl, return).

Luís Henrique

ar734

3rd June 2011, 04:05

You asked whether "something is a dog" is the same as "some things are dogs", remember? I gave you your answer, and it is "no".

And saying "a something" is a sin against Holy Ordinary Language, since "something" is not a substanctive, and therefore cannot be preceded by an article. Follow the dogma correctly yourself, if you are going to impose it unto others.

Luís Henrique

OK, freedom of expression is something. What's the difference.

By the way, here is a something from Emily Dickinson:

"A something in a summer’s day,
As slow her flambeaux burn away,
Which solemnizes me.

A something in a summer’s noon,—
An azure depth, a wordless tune, 5
Transcending ecstasy.

ar734

3rd June 2011, 04:18

Wrong. "Is" cannot be a predicate, because the verb "to be" demands a complement.

Luís Henrique

As in, "To be or not to be, that is the question." ? Don't say this means the question is to be or not to be. That begs the question. What is the complement of "to be?" I, me, all humankind, the king, the corporation, the worker, the modern alienated?

ar734

3rd June 2011, 04:42

Jews dominate the world.
Jews dominate capitalist corporations.
Ergo, capitalist corporations dominate the world.

I think the reasoning would be more like:

1.Multi-national corporations dominate the world.
2.Humans cannot be dominated by fictional creations, only by other humans. Religions don't count because those believing in them think they are real.
3.Ergo, multi-national corporations are human beings, and are, therefore persons.

(and, of course, the same usage is common for worker unions, revolutionary parties, anarchist federations, ecologist NGOs, etc, so it is hardly a phenomenon of the capitalist class exclusively.)

That is a good point.

But, that would mean "I" refers to a human being who makes a statement.

[/QUOTE]

LuÃs Henrique

3rd June 2011, 04:42

OK, freedom of expression is something. What's the difference.

Well. *takes a deep breath*

"Something" is not synonimous with "some thing", not even in ordinary language:

Something tells me that John is in love with Jane.

The above is a perfectly valid ordinary English sentence, of which not even the most fanatic Wittgensteinian can say it is "non-sence". But we know that "things" don't tell people anything, don't we?

By the way, here is a something from Emily Dickinson:

"A something in a summer’s day,
As slow her flambeaux burn away,
Which solemnizes me.

A something in a summer’s noon,—
An azure depth, a wordless tune, 5
Transcending ecstasy.Oh, yes. Poetry. As we have learnt, poetry is non-sence. N'est ce pas?

Luís Henrique

LuÃs Henrique

3rd June 2011, 04:50

As in, "To be or not to be, that is the question." ? Don't say this means the question is to be or not to be. That begs the question. What is the complement of "to be?" I, me, all humankind, the king, the corporation, the worker, the modern alienated?

Yeah, in that particular context, the verb "to be" dispenses a complement, and therefore can form a predicate alone. Is that ordinary language?

Luís Henrique

LuÃs Henrique

3rd June 2011, 04:54

I think the reasoning would be more like:

1.Multi-national corporations dominate the world.
2.Humans cannot be dominated by fictional creations, only by other humans. Religions don't count because those believing in them think they are real.
3.Ergo, multi-national corporations are human beings, and are, therefore persons.That is another absurd. The second premise is blatantly false.

But, that would mean "I" refers to a human being who makes a statement.No!

It refers to the person who makes the statement in which the word "I" appears!

Luís Henrique

ar734

3rd June 2011, 05:02

Well. *takes a deep breath*

"Something" is not synonimous with "some thing", not even in ordinary language:

Something tells me that John is in love with Jane.

The above is a perfectly valid ordinary English sentence, of which not even the most fanatic Wittgensteinian can say it is "non-sence". But we know that "things" don't tell people anything, don't we?

Oh, yes. Poetry. As we have learnt, poetry is non-sence. N'est ce pas?

Luís Henrique

Who said poetry is non-sense? It is the language that makes the most sense. Although Marx was a close second.

LuÃs Henrique

3rd June 2011, 05:15

Who said poetry is non-sense?

Wittgenstein.

Luís Henrique

syndicat

3rd June 2011, 20:32

Predicate logic, however, at least according to Wiki, is something else entirely, having little to do with ordinary language. Predicate logic looks a lot like programming language.

i used to teach symbolic logic at the state college level. there would be no point to predicate logic if it had no application to arguments. there is no argument unless there are interpreted sentences, that is, interpreted via translation to a natural language.

in logic there is a distinction between the syntax and the semantics. this is necessary in order to construct proofs of completeness or incompleteness. for example propositional logic and predicate logic with single-place predicates only are provably complete whereas predicate logic with relational predicates is provably incomplete. but these concepts have no meaning without the possibility of interpretation, because that's when truth or falsity enters the picture.

prior to Frege, formal logic was largely conducted in natural language. sometimes place holders were used to describe structures that were thought to ensure validity. Frege introduced a fully symbolic representation of arguments in order to have greater rigor. He did this because he wanted to prove Leibniz's conjecture that math was reducible to logic.

if you take a class in predicate logic, you will learn about building abbreviation schemas. that is, to reduce an argument, stated in natural language such as English, to a symbolic analogue, it's necessary to engage in systematic abbreviation. that is, we take an English predicate such as "...is blond" and we reduce it to a letter, such as "B". we do that because validity in formal logic doesn't depend on the content. so to see more clearly what the logical structure is, we abbreviate the content...predicates and singular terms...to letters. But this is done to then examine the argument for its validity. And the argument being examined is the argument as stated in natural language.

validity and soundness are only concepts that can defined in terms of truth. And without an interpretation into a natural language, there is no truth or falsity. there's just meaningless symbols.

Meridian

5th June 2011, 14:57

Wittgenstein.

Luís Henrique
Do you think that attempting to convince others of the truth of your statements is the only reason and way people use language?

LuÃs Henrique

5th June 2011, 15:41

And so, like the Wittgensteinian she is, she is arguing that "I" on one hand, and "Karl Marx" or "The President of the United States", are different because their use is different.

One problem, indeed, seems to be the notion of use of a word.

Let's take for instance two different proper names, such as '"John" and "Edward".

In one level, "John" and "Edward" have the same use. They both can be the nucleus of a subject:

John went to the movies.
Edward went to the movies.

Both have a genitive form:

John's wife went to the movies.
Edward's wife went to the movies.

Neither can be used as the nucleus of a verbal predicate:

*Charles Johns very much going to the movies.
*Charles Edwards very much going to the movies.

Etc.

On another level, I only use "John" to refer or point to, or to call people called "John", and I only use "Edward" to refer or point to, or to call people called "Edward", and so their use is different. I am not sure that Wittgenstein (or Ms Lichtenstein) is explicit about how they use the word "use" in this context; and if their use of this key word is vague, imprecise, or can only be defended by appeals to "ordinary language", then I fear that the whole thing is founded on a fallacious quid pro quo.

Luís Henrique

LJJW

5th June 2011, 16:05

Syndicat argued as follows:

again, you show that you don't understand logic. if you think you do, then please explain what "informal logic" is supposed to be.

I think you already know.

But in case you don't, type 'Informal Logic' into Google (or check the Logic section of your local University Library); you will see that there has been a veritable cottage industry on this topic since at least the mid-1970s. There's even a whole page devoted to it at the Stanford Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. I even recall you accusing Rosa -- a few years back, on another board -- of ignoring informal logic, something you said you had taught for several years. Perhaps you forgot?

On a side issue, I'd never dream of accusing you of knowing no logic, even though you have posted several howlers here over the last few days -- and years. [I have been reading these debates on RevLeft and at the Politics Forum you used to frequent, since early 2007. I'm only posting here since Rosa can't.]

Formal logic is about accounting for the validity of inferences by showing how they exhibit certain forms or structures which we have reason to believe are valid.

The way we use predicate logic to do this is by translating sentences from a natural language, English in this case, into the symbolic logic.

To begin to understand how predicate logic works, you first need to know what a predicate is. A predicate is an expression such that when you fill the blanks in it with a referring expression you get a simple subject/predicate sentence. So "...weighs 185 pounds" is a predicate because we can fill in the blank with various referring expressions:

That guy weighs 185 pounds.
That sofa weighs 185 pounds.
Jack weighs 185 pounds.

Now, predicates can also be used together with quantifiers. When doing translations from English to predicate logic, we do this in stages by restating the quantifier into a more fully expressed form. so

(1) some dogs weigh 185 pounds

becomes

(2) something is such that it is a dog and it weighs 185 pounds.

This brings out the binding of the predicate to a quantifier through the introduction of the variables, "it". Note that this also brings out the presence of the predicate "...weighs 185 pounds" which we already showed to be a predicate.

Now,

(3) I weigh 185 pounds

is true. and it predicates the same property as "...weighs 185 pounds". It's perfectly analogous to:

(4) That guy weighs 185 pounds
(5) Jeremiah weighs 185 pounds

and so forth. so if you think that (3) is NOT a simple subject-predicate sentence, with "I" designating the subject, it is up to you to provide reason for thinking it is not.

Thanks, but like Rosa, I studied logic to postgraduate level; that's how we met. And, like you I have even taught the subject at University (for a few years).

Moreover, I have given you my reasons, but you seem not to have noticed them. What we still lack are [I]your reasons for thinking "I" is a referring expression. Sure, you keep saying it is, and I have even acknowledged you might be right. What you need to do is show you are right, and logic can't do that.

You try to argue against this by introducing the following examples:

1. No one is a native of Los Angeles.
2. Someone is older than James.
3. Nobody is watching a bird sitting on the apple tree.
4. Most players weigh 185 pounds.

The problem is, all of these are expressions which can be analyzed in terms of predicates and quantifiers. But that is not a plausible proposal as far as "I" is concerned.

I'm sorry, but I do not recall saying they were. Perhaps you'd be kind enough to show me where I did, if you still think so?

The point of my examples is reasonably clear; they show that this earlier claim of yours isn't correct:

So in fact these are subject-predicate sentences in which a property is attributed to an object...the object that is the referent of "I".

For example, in 2., above, we are predicating something of someone, but someone isn't a referring expression. So, what you say about "I" above does not follow

Now, as I said in my last post, and again above, you might be right that "I" is a referring expression, you might not (I think not), but none of your arguments show it is -- you just keep repeating yourself (and so do I to make this point!). As you do again:

We can see this if we go back to my original argument:

(1) Jack and I are both natives of Los Angeles

(2) hence there is someone such that Jack and (s)he are both natives of Los Angeles.

This argument is valid. (2) follows from (1). If you ask, "Who is this someone?" the person can be designated in various ways, including by that person using "I".

The fact that this argument is obviously valid shows you're wrong.

It is indeed valid; I agree. But then my counter-example (see below) shows that an uncontroversially non-referring expression can occur in (1) and yet the argument remains valid. So the validity of your example does not depend on "I" being a referring expression. [The way you argued, this argument of yours would be invalid if "I" were not a referring expression. But, as my counter-example below shows, it does not have to be for the argument to be valid.]

Of course, if you have independent reasons for showing "I" is a referring expression, no problem. But if you do, you have unwisely kept them to yourself (all the while ignoring Rosa's arguments to the contrary).

Here's my counter-example, again:

(1) Jack and somebody are both natives of Los Angeles

(2) hence there is someone such that Jack and (s)he are both natives of Los Angeles.

Syndicat then argued as follows:

What logic does is come up with theories about inference based on trying to account for broad groups of valid inferences as stated in natural language. My argument above is such an argument and is therefore part of the data that logic needs to account for. You've provided no reason whatsoever for rejecting the validity of that argument.

Perhaps you can show me where I rejected this argument as valid?

What I did reject, however, if you'd be kind enough to check, is your meta-inference that it's validity depends on "I" being a referring expression -- which you have yet to show is the case.

If you say it can't be valid because "I" isn't a referring expression and thus can't be generalized on with the existential quantifier, then you're obviously begging the question. But in fact this is what you've been doing all along

This isn't correct, either; in fact I have all along said you might be right.

What you need to do is show you are right. None of your arguments do this -- and I venture to suggest that none will ever manage to do it while you rely only on logic. You need to construct a philosophical case, independent of the logic you keep using, and provide a few independent reasons why "I" is a referring expression (thus copying Rosa's approach), at the same time as showing where her arguments go wrong. But I have made this point several times...

again, not all referring pronouns or demonstratives are anaphoric. "here", "now", "you", "that guy", "this house". these are not anaphoric. but they are referring expressions.

I agree they can be. What you have yet to do is justify your translation of "I" into predicate logic as if it were a referring expression, provide the formations rules and demonstrate its consistency, etc. Short of that, this translation of yours from earlier is not a wff:

1) N(J,L) & N(I,L)
(2) hence, (Ex) (N(J,L) & N(x,L))

Syndicat then argued:

Suzy: "Nobody saw the siamese cat in the backyard."
Me: "But somebody did, because I did."

in this case I'm existentially generalizing on "I". I could reproduce examples like this. There are countless valid arguments that can be generated that assume that "I" is a referring expression.

Indeed, on that assumption, but you have yet to justify that assumption. You keep forgetting to do this for some reason. [And the 'countless' examples you mention -- I venture to suggest, too -- will still work even though/if "I" isn't a referring expression. So this claim of yours can work both ways.]

Nor have you provided any argument whatever to show that "I" is not a referring expression. You keep making analogies with quantifiers. But in those cases we have a ready analysis of why the predicate can be attached to an expression that isn't a singular term. Are you going to argue that "I" is a quantifier? If not, then your use of those alleged counter-examples doesn't prove your point.

Well, as my posts implied, I was relying on Rosa's arguments, which you have yet to address. She might be wrong (but I do not think so), but ignoring her (or them) is not the same as refuting her (or them).

So, as things now stand, we have her arguments that show "I" is not a referring expression (which everyone has ignored) and no arguments that show it is.

Opening rounds to her, I think...

But in those cases we have a ready analysis of why the predicate can be attached to an expression that isn't a singular term. Are you going to argue that "I" is a quantifier? If not, then your use of those alleged counter-examples doesn't prove your point.

No, but you have yet to show that when you apply predicate logic to it, your schemas are wffs.

And, to repeat, my counter-example was aimed at showing that an inference can be valid even if the term in question in the premiss, whatever it is, is not a referring expression. You argue as if this were never the case -- indeed, your meta-claim depends on this.

Moreover, since the '70s there has been a lot of work in the field of pragmatics, as it is sometimes called, in which formal logic and formal semantics account for demonstratives...."I", "You", "that", "this", "now" "here". The most common view is that these are very primitive referring expressions, expressions that refer in a very direct and immediate way. They are more basic referring expressions, in the life of human communication, than proper names. we can think of "I" as having associated with it a pragmatic function that takes the token of "I" to a referent, namely, the person or object that generated the token. like other demonstratives "I" is thus context dependent. Why would "here", "now", "this", "that" be context dependent to determine a referent while "I" is somehow completely different?

Thanks again, but I was already aware of this. And I am well aware, too, that "I" is widely regarded as a referring expression; I merely point out that we have yet to see even one good reason why it is -- certainly you have yet to produce one.

Moreover, you seem to think that definite descriptions are referring expressions. But in Bertrand Russell's famous analysis, they are not. They are quantifiers. Since Keith Donnellan's discussion of the various kinds of uses of definite descriptions back in the '70s, many in philosophy of language and logic have come to accept that sometimes definite descriptions function in the way that Russell suggested, as quantifiers, and in other cases they function more like demonstratives. so if someone says "the guy over there with a martini in his hand is Isabel's husband." the expression "the guy over there with a martini in his hand" can refer even if he doesn't have a martini but something else in his hand. the point of the definite description here is like pointing a finger, it is to direct the hearer's attention to the subject of the sentence, which then goes on to predicate a property of him.

Fine, we can debate this controversial topic in another thread. [I am, incidentally, well aware of the history of the debates about Russell's theory of Definite Descriptions, as I am of Donnellan's paper, and those of many others before and since, but thanks again!]

Moreover, it's worth recalling that it was Rosa who claimed this, not me. Perhaps you should e-mail her with the glad tidings. She can take care of herself, as the threads here indicate.

However, this thread is about "I", which you (and the others who post here) have yet to show is a referring expression.

LJJW

5th June 2011, 16:29

Luis wrote:

And so, like the Wittgensteinian she is, she is arguing that "I" on one hand, and "Karl Marx" or "The President of the United States", are different because their use is different. Accordingly, she states that "I" can't serve in the role of either proper names or definite descriptions, but apparently doesn't explain why, and then immediately proceeds to point out some uses of the pronoun "I", which, in context, seems to signal that she is giving examples of the use of "I" that cannot be matched by "Karl Marx" or "The President of the United States". And so I pointed that those are examples in which "I", "Karl Marx", and "The President of the United States" are certainly grammatically interchangeably.

I have read what she posted, and I can't see this argument in her comments. Perhaps you can show me where she said this?

And she did explain why "I" isn't a referring expression; I think if you re-read her posts you will be able to see this for yourself. If not, I'll be happy to point it out to you.

What you need to do is address these arguments, and explain why you think she is wrong. And then you need to say why you think "I" is a referring expression. Many posters here seem happy merely to assert it is; we have yet to see a single good reason.

And that will be difficult to do, unless we explain what a "referring expression" is. In ordinary language, we would use "referring expression" when mentioning expressions that refer to something; and since "I" seems to be an expression, and seems to refer to something, we would, in ordinary language, say that "I" is a referring expression.

[Weren't you the one who was having difficulties identifying ordinary language a few weeks ago? Perhaps you have managed to do this in the meantime. I hope so.]

Yes, I have seen you and others assert that "I" is a referring expression, several times, but an assertion (no matter how many times it is repeated) is not proof. [Especially when Rosa's arguments suggest otherwise.]

Evidently, one problem here is that "referring expression" is not ordinary language, but specialist jargon; it has to be explained to those of us who aren't specialists in the field.

And this wasn't explained - indeed, not explaining such things seems to be a principle for Rosa - and so this turns into a dispute in which each side demands proof from the other, but - especially the Rosaites - isn't willing to give any.

On the contrary, I think she explains herself rather well most of the time. What did you have in mind that you need further help with?

And since it was that "side" that made the original claim - that "I" is not a referring expression - it seems that it should be that side also to make the first move to provide some evidence.

As far as I can see, Rosa did do this. What this thread still lacks is a convincing (or even slightly convincing) attempt made by those who think "I" is a referring expression to show why it is -- over and above merely asserting it is, repeatedly.

Luis later posted this:

As syndicat said, "no" and "some" (in that context) are quantifiers. In formal language, they would be replaced by ∃, preceded or not by a minus sign or a tilde. But, whatever "I" is, it is certainly not a quantifier, nor is it short for a quantified subject (as "somebody" is). In other words, it cannot be translated into formal language as ∃ or -∃ (and even less by ∀).

So, maybe you are right in that "I" is not a referring expression, but you are no closer to demonstrating than before you argued that.

It is a fallacy similar to the below:

Whales have no scales.
Whales are not fish.
Sharks have no scales.
Ergo, sharks are not fish.

I have already answered Syndicat about this, so perhaps you should read my reply to him (I am assuming he is a he! Apologies if I am wrong!). And I fail to see how what I posted is an example of your fallacious argument. You perhaps need to explain yourself more clearly -- taking a leaf out of Rosa's book, maybe?

So, maybe you are right in that "I" is not a referring expression, but you are no closer to demonstrating than before you argued that.

In fact, I wasn't trying to demonstrate this -- Wittgenstein did this reasonably well sixty or more years ago; Rosa merely reproduced some of his arguments --, I was in fact defending her against those who, even now, have ignored her arguments, while attempting to show that the obverse claim (that "I" is a referring expression) has not been established yet.

May I respectfully suggest you put your mind to that task?

Wittgenstein

Where did Wittgenstein say poetry is non-sense?

LuÃs Henrique

5th June 2011, 17:26

I have read what she posted, and I can't see this argument in her comments. Perhaps you can show me where she said this?

It seemed implicit.

Anyway, I am sure that the expressions "I", "Karl Marx", and "The President of the United States" cannot be used interchangeably in all contexts. But those examples are not good if the intention is to demonstrate that.

And she did explain why "I" isn't a referring expression; I think if you re-read her posts you will be able to see this for yourself. If not, I'll be happy to point it out to you.I read her posts, and I don't remember any convincing explanation. To me, a convincing explanation has to start by stating what "referring expression" means in this context, and then proceed to show that "I" doesn't match such definition.

It cannot be done by merely talking about the word "I".

What you need to do is address these arguments, and explain why you think she is wrong. And then you need to say why you think "I" is a referring expression. Many posters here seem happy merely to assert it is; we have yet to see a single good reason.I have no idea of whether it is a referring expression or not. As I said, it is a expression, and it seems to refer to something. But this is ordinary language; as we are seeing, the religion of Holy Ordinary Language needs quite extraodinary language as its foundation. Now I am willing to believe that "referring expression" has a technical - ie, non-ordinary language - meaning, of which I am not aware, and even that such technical meaning is widely accepted among the specialists in the fields of both logic and linguistic, instead of being just a Wittgensteinian quirk. And that is what I am demanding: a comprehensible explanation of what do you mean when you say "referring expression".

[Weren't you the one who was having difficulties identifying ordinary language a few weeks ago? Perhaps you have managed to do this in the meantime. I hope so.]Wittgenstein spoke (or at least wrote) in a quite non-ordinary language; and he seems to have had a quite extraordinary concept of what "ordinary language" means.

Language is conventional. Which means that we need to make sure that we are talking about the same thing when we talk to each others. In ordinary language - as I understand it - this is usually no problem; but when talking about science or philosophy, this no longer holds. Precision is necessary.

Yes, I have seen you and others assert that "I" is a referring expression, several times, but an assertion (no matter how many times it is repeated) is not proof. [Especially when Rosa's arguments suggest otherwise.]I don't think I have asserted that "I" is a referring expression; and if I did it, I was merely using ordinary language. But as I have said above, I am open to the possibility that it is not a referring expression, or at least that it is not a referring expression in your (or Wittgenstein's) peculiar dialect, or in the technical jargon of some scientific or philosophical field.

On the contrary, I think she explains herself rather well most of the time. What did you have in mind that you need further help with?Practically everything.

As far as I can see, Rosa did do this. What this thread still lacks is a convincing (or even slightly convincing) attempt made by those who think "I" is a referring expression to show why it is -- over and above merely asserting it is, repeatedly.As far as I can see, she did not.

Where did Wittgenstein say poetry is non-sense?Well, to Wittgenstein, poetry, like religion or philosophy, belongs to the transcendental. And so it cannot be talken about, etc. - and it has no "meaning" in the way that ordinary language has, and consequently makes no "sence". But, of course, to Wittgenstein, being "non-sence" doesn't mean it is unimportant or "false" or a distraction used by the ruling classes in their struggle against us - this is an undue addition of Ms Lichtenstein. Indeed, to Wittgenstein, the transcendental is more important than the mundane; it just cannot be explained in words like Plato, Aquinas, or Hegel have tried to.

Luís Henrique

ar734

5th June 2011, 17:36

if you take a class in predicate logic, you will learn about building abbreviation schemas. that is, to reduce an argument, stated in natural language such as English, to a symbolic analogue, it's necessary to engage in systematic abbreviation. that is, we take an English predicate such as "...is blond" and we reduce it to a letter, such as "B". we do that because validity in formal logic doesn't depend on the content..

Would there not have to be some kind of agreed convention in the systematic abbreviation? Such as B always means "a predicate," A always means a subject, C an adjective, D adverb, E a noun, F a verb, etc.

So "the girl is blonde" becomes A >(=,/, ??) B. Then, C+E>F+C.

Or "the tall girl is blonde mostly" becomes C+C+E>F+C+D

I remember taking transitional grammar (chomsky, etc.) when I was in school. Is that part of predicate logic? sorry, transactional. well, transformational

syndicat

5th June 2011, 19:59

ME:

in this case I'm existentially generalizing on "I". I could reproduce examples like this. There are countless valid arguments that can be generated that assume that "I" is a referring expression.

when i say that the argument assumes that "I" is a referring expression, this means that the argument IMPLIES that "I" is a referring expression, since it wouldn't be valid or make sense otherwise.

you apparently are unaware that "assumes" can be used to refer to a logical relation of implication:

Indeed, on that assumption, but you have yet to justify that assumption.

In effect you're asking me to "justify" the data that any theory of logic must account for. you have things exactly backwards. the theory has to be consistent with the data. and your theory isn't consistent with the data.

in regard to "Informal Logic," I was asking you what you meant by it. your reference to the entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia clarifies this. The problem is, until relatively recently there was no cogent or worthwhile theory of fallacies. When I taught "critical thinking" at CSU, teachers were using texts that simply replicated Aristotle's old schema. but it's well known that this has no foundation and can't be applied consistently. When I taught this junk, i found that students couldn't consistently apply it. So i refused to teach the traditional Aristotelian stuff.

To put this on a more solid foundation, it was necessary to recognize argumentation as occurring in a social context, and to develop a theory of argument in the context of discussion and debate where we try to convince others of courses of action or convey information. The anthology "Fallacies" has a number of very worthwhile articles that elaborate on what I've been saying here.

But this has nothing to do with our present topic. And it is simply wrong to define "informal logic" as dealing with "ordinary language" and "formal logic" as dealing with symbols....somehow in abstraction from natural language. Formal logic uses formal methods but in order to apply them to arguments as stated in a natural language, as well as applications in mathematics and digital electronics control languages...which are both taught in a natural language since all symbolism gets is meaning from a process of rigidification and abbreviation from a natural language.

me:
We can see this if we go back to my original argument:

(1) Jack and I are both natives of Los Angeles

(2) hence there is someone such that Jack and (s)he are both natives of Los Angeles.

This argument is valid. (2) follows from (1). If you ask, "Who is this someone?" the person can be designated in various ways, including by that person using "I".

The fact that this argument is obviously valid shows you're wrong.

and you say that you produced a "counter-example":

(1*) Jack and someone are both natives of Los Angeles
(2*) hence someone is such that he/she are both natives of Los Angeles.

but this is not of the same logical form. try this one:

(a) my neighbor Jack and I both love Sheila
(b) hence there is someone other than Jack such that Jack and he both love Sheila.

now, your counter-example would be:

(a*) my neighbor Jack and someone both love Sheila
(b*) hence there is someone other than Jack such that Jack and he both love Sheila.

but this second argument is invalid. that's because it doesn't follow that there is someone other than Jack who loves Sheila. but it's implied by (a) that Jack and I are separate people. you might say it is so implied by (a*). but it's not.

suppose that all you know is that someone using the moniker "Your Lover" left a note for Sheila. you don't know who this is. but you do know that Jack loves Sheila. so from these facts you assert (a). it does not logically follow from (a) that anyone other than Jack loves Sheila.

anyway, the fact is, that we use "I" in subject/predicate sentences to attribute properties not to someone-or-other but to a very specific person, namely the person who is using "I". and that is why it is fairly standard treatment to say that "I" designates the speaker or entity that generated the token. this fits in entirely with the function and logic of use of "I".

and "Someone weighs 185 pounds" is not a subject-predicate sentence. It is a generalization.

moreover you have provided no good reason at all for thinking that "I" is not a referring expression. as i've pointed out, "I" is in the same family of context dependent expressions like "You", "We", "They", "here", "now", "this" and "that". why should these other expressions be referring expressions and "I" not be?

the following are all subject-predicate sentences:

(i) I weigh 187 pounds
(ii) I was born in Los Angeles
(iii) I am currently awake
(iv) I'm drinking tea
(v) I'm the same height as Andrew

Moreover, they're all true. So why are they true? the first four predicate properties of an individual...an identifiable individual:

...weighs 187 pounds
...was born in Los Angeles
...is currently awake
...is drinking tea

The way we understand simple subject-predicate sentences is that they are true when the subject has the property the predicate is used to track. So the first predicate denotes a certain weight. so if (i) is to be true, then the weight must be a property of the subject denoted by "I". "I" is a singular term that designates one particular individual on each occasion of use. If "I" doesn't designate an individual in (i) then how do we account for the truth of (i)?

LuÃs Henrique

5th June 2011, 20:01

Would there not have to be some kind of agreed convention in the systematic abbreviation? Such as B always means "a predicate," A always means a subject, C an adjective, D adverb, E a noun, F a verb, etc.

Evidently, a convention is necessary, but your suggestion is unworkable, because, a) you are mixing parts of discourse with syntactical functions; and b) because such notation would exclude the possibility of two different subjects, or two different predicates (etc). If A is "the girl", then either A must be "the boy" in "The boy is redhaired" - which would mean that "the girl" = "the boy" - which is false -, or "the boy" would not be the subject of that sentence (which anyone can see it is).

I remember taking transitional grammar (chomsky, etc.) when I was in school. Is that part of predicate logic? sorry, transactional. well, transformationalMust have been a long time, since you can't even remind its name with ease.

But no; transformational or generative grammar is not a part of predicate logic, and they don't even belong to the same field of knowledge; generative grammar is linguistics, predicate logic is mathemathics.

Luís Henrique

LuÃs Henrique

5th June 2011, 21:04

Do you think that attempting to convince others of the truth of your statements is the only reason and way people use language?

No, I don't.

But I also don't think using language for other reasons than convincing others of the truth of one's statements is using language in a non-sencical way.

But Wittgenstein did, didn't he?

Luís Henrique

ar734

5th June 2011, 21:30

generative grammar is linguistics, predicate logic is mathemathics.

Luís Henrique

so why is predicate logic being used in a discussion about the meaning of "I" ?

LuÃs Henrique

5th June 2011, 21:35

so why is predicate logic being used in a discussion about the meaning of "I" ?

Sorry?

Luís Henrique

syndicat

5th June 2011, 22:20

Would there not have to be some kind of agreed convention in the systematic abbreviation? Such as B always means "a predicate," A always means a subject, C an adjective, D adverb, E a noun, F a verb, etc.

we don't abbreviate subjects. Subjects are what the sentence is about. we abbreviate singular terms, which designate a subject. "noun" and "verb" are grammatical terms. they have no bearing on logic. Every predicate has a verb and singular terms are sometimes nouns or have nouns in them as components or sometimes they ave pronouns. It isn't the grammatical category that determines the logical role but the role in the sentence.

there is a convention in logic. the convention is that we use letters to abbreviate predicates and singular terms. so, for example:

Jack loves Rondi and Bill loves Suzy

is a conjunction. it's made up of two simple sentences

Jack loves Rondi
Bill loves Suzy

to abbreviate these, we come up with a scheme of abbreviation such as:

Jack: j
Bill: b
Rondi: r
Suzy: s
...loves...: L

so the two simple sentences are then

L(j,r)
L(b,s)

the parens are used to group the terms with the two-place relational predicate. the original conjunction thus becomes:

L(j,r) & L(b,s)

in this abbreviation scheme i've used the convention of lower case letters for singular terms and capitals for predicates. but that's not necessary.

ar734

6th June 2011, 16:16

Jack loves Rondi and Bill loves Suzy

is a conjunction. it's made up of two simple sentences

Jack loves Rondi
Bill loves Suzy

to abbreviate these, we come up with a scheme of abbreviation such as:

Jack: j
Bill: b
Rondi: r
Suzy: s
...loves...: L

so the two simple sentences are then

L(j,r)
L(b,s)

Love is a function of j and r ? If you use the first letter of the word as a substitute then obviously there can't be any abstract use of logic to understand sentences in general.

For instance, A=pi r squared (i can't get the symbols to work) always means: the area of a circle is equal to the number pi times the radius of the circle squared, etc.

Now, I suppose you could say that the subject of a sentence is a function of the predicate, as in S=f(P); Jack is a function of love and Rondi. But how could you distinguish that sentence from Jack hates Rondi?

syndicat

6th June 2011, 17:45

Love is a function of j and r ? If you use the first letter of the word as a substitute then obviously there can't be any abstract use of logic to understand sentences in general.

what are you talking about? in

L(...,...)

"L" isn't a functor. it's a predicate. you're thinking of something like

2 is the square root of 4

(a) 2=Sq(r)

in this symbolization, "Sq(...)" is a functor, that is, it stands for a function from numbers to numbers. but in (a) "=" is the predicate.

it's also possible to represent relational sentences like "Jack loves Suzy"
with the prediate "L" in the middle, such as:

jLs

but this approach becomes problematic if you have relations of more than 2 places. That's why the usual convention in predicate logic is to put the predicate letter at the left:

L(j,s)

"(...,...)" to the right of "L" indicates that this is a two-place relation that we are representing.

LuÃs Henrique

8th June 2011, 14:55

But how could you distinguish that sentence from Jack hates Rondi?

You don't.

The purpose of such notation is to leave aside the "real world" meaning of words, and keep only the internal, logic relations between propositions. As such, up to this point, there is no actual difference between "Jack loves Rondi" and "Jack hates Rondi". They have the same logical structure.

Luís Henrique

ar734

8th June 2011, 23:25

You don't.

The purpose of such notation is to leave aside the "real world" meaning of words, and keep only the internal, logic relations between propositions. As such, up to this point, there is no actual difference between "Jack loves Rondi" and "Jack hates Rondi". They have the same logical structure.

Luís Henrique

That assumes that in language meaning and (logical) structure can be separated.

OK. What is the logical structure of "I am." Subject Predicate, S>P. Now what? Modifiers or qualifiers or quantifiers of S and P? (M)S>P(M). In order for anything like this to work, everybody has to agree on the notations and on the meaning of the notations. Also, you can end up with nonsense sentences like: "Jack Rondi."

LuÃs Henrique

9th June 2011, 01:52

That assumes that in language meaning and (logical) structure can be separated.

Yes, this is the usual assumption.

Take for instance the following reasoning:

1. All dollylocks are pumpiful.
2. All gebimbles are dollylocks.
3. Ergo, all gebimbles are pumpiful.

No one knows what those sentences mean. But we can be sure that, if 1 & 2 are true, so is 3 - it is a valid reasoning.

OK. What is the logical structure of "I am." Subject Predicate, S>P. Now what?"I am" would generally be considered an incomplete sentence; if not, it would be considered to be synonimous with "I exist". But this isn't predicate logic; in predicate logic the actual meaning of words is ignored.

Here is a good introduction to predicate logic:

http://books.google.com/books?id=hbtfn6Dx0xkC&pg=PA170&dq=predicate+logic&hl=en&ei=RhfwTe6RBcfq0gGnxZjzDA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCwQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=predicate%20logic&f=false

Yes, the subject is boring, and requires a lot of patience. And attention.

Modifiers or qualifiers or quantifiers of S and P? (M)S>P(M).It depends on what you want to do next. Predicate logic is used to analyse complex expressions and decide on their validity; this means two different steps: 1. translating natural language into a formal language, and 2. calculating what can be deduced from it in a valid way.

In order for anything like this to work, everybody has to agree on the notations and on the meaning of the notations.This is usually not a problem. Formal languages are clearly defined, and then used to calculate the validity of reasonings. There is a wide consensus on what symbols are used; and where authors differ, they clearly explain their symbols in their introductions or preliminary chapters.

Also, you can end up with nonsense sentences like: "Jack Rondi."Only if the sentence you are analysing is nonsense itself. The formalisation is designed to avoid such things.

Luís Henrique

ar734

9th June 2011, 03:30

thanks for the link. i will follow up on it.

LJJW

9th July 2011, 17:44

Apologies for the delay in replying, but I have been preoccuped with other things.

Syndicat wrote:

when i say that the argument assumes that "I" is a referring expression, this means that the argument IMPLIES that "I" is a referring expression, since it wouldn't be valid or make sense otherwise.

you apparently are unaware that "assumes" can be used to refer to a logical relation of implication:

On the contrary, I base my counter-argument on this, since it shows that an argument can be valid even if the term in question is not a referring expression.

In effect you're asking me to "justify" the data that any theory of logic must account for. you have things exactly backwards. the theory has to be consistent with the data. and your theory isn't consistent with the data.

I am asking you to justify why you think that something that does not have to be a referring expression for the argument to be valid is indeed a referring expression. You just assume, without proof, or argument, that it is. If that is 'getting things backwards' then I shudder to think what getting things 'the right way round' is.

in regard to "Informal Logic," I was asking you what you meant by it. your reference to the entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia clarifies this. The problem is, until relatively recently there was no cogent or worthwhile theory of fallacies. When I taught "critical thinking" at CSU, teachers were using texts that simply replicated Aristotle's old schema. but it's well known that this has no foundation and can't be applied consistently. When I taught this junk, i found that students couldn't consistently apply it. So i refused to teach the traditional Aristotelian stuff.

So did I -- except, mercifully, I only had to teach very small parts of it.

To put this on a more solid foundation, it was necessary to recognize argumentation as occurring in a social context, and to develop a theory of argument in the context of discussion and debate where we try to convince others of courses of action or convey information. The anthology "Fallacies" has a number of very worthwhile articles that elaborate on what I've been saying here.

I couldn't agree more. But that does not make the study Fregean Logic (and So-called 'Classical Logic), or Mathematical Logic a pointless exercise.

But this has nothing to do with our present topic. And it is simply wrong to define "informal logic" as dealing with "ordinary language" and "formal logic" as dealing with symbols....somehow in abstraction from natural language. Formal logic uses formal methods but in order to apply them to arguments as stated in a natural language, as well as applications in mathematics and digital electronics control languages...which are both taught in a natural language since all symbolism gets is meaning from a process of rigidification and abbreviation from a natural language.

Again, I agree, but I hope you are not saying that I said this:

And it is simply wrong to define "informal logic" as dealing with "ordinary language"

Because I didn't, nor did I imply it.

S:

We can see this if we go back to my original argument:

(1) Jack and I are both natives of Los Angeles

(2) hence there is someone such that Jack and (s)he are both natives of Los Angeles.

This argument is valid. (2) follows from (1). If you ask, "Who is this someone?" the person can be designated in various ways, including by that person using "I".

The fact that this argument is obviously valid shows you're wrong.

and you say that you produced a "counter-example":

(1*) Jack and someone are both natives of Los Angeles
(2*) hence someone is such that he/she are both natives of Los Angeles.

but this is not of the same logical form. try this one:

(a) my neighbor Jack and I both love Sheila
(b) hence there is someone other than Jack such that Jack and he both love Sheila.

now, your counter-example would be:

(a*) my neighbor Jack and someone both love Sheila
(b*) hence there is someone other than Jack such that Jack and he both love Sheila.

but this second argument is invalid. that's because it doesn't follow that there is someone other than Jack who loves Sheila. but it's implied by (a) that Jack and I are separate people. you might say it is so implied by (a*). but it's not.

I nowhere said my counter-example was of the same form, only that it showed that an alleged referring expression need not refer for an argument to be valid. Nothing you have said so far shows this to be incorrect.

But, the second argument is not my argument, so I can only wonder why you mentioned it.

But, what about it anyway?

(a*) my neighbor Jack and someone both love Sheila
(b*) hence there is someone other than Jack such that Jack and he both love Sheila.

I can only ask you what the 'both' in (a*) implies if not that there are indeed two separate individuals who love this woman, and thus that (b*) follows from it.

However you go on to say:

suppose that all you know is that someone using the moniker "Your Lover" left a note for Sheila. you don't know who this is. but you do know that Jack loves Sheila. so from these facts you assert (a) [Do you men (a*), here?]. it does not logically follow from (a) [(a*)?] that anyone other than Jack loves Sheila.

This is indeed one possibility, but that does not affect the fact that (b*); on the assumption that (a*) is true, and that there are two individuals mentioned or alluded to here (implied by the use of 'both'), (b*) follows.

My alleged lack of knowledge does not affect the inference itself

We can see that if we look at your valid argument:

(1) Jack and I are both natives of Los Angeles

(2) hence there is someone such that Jack and (s)he are both natives of Los Angeles.

Suppose I discover that I am not in fact a native of Los Angeles, but the argument is still valid despite my defective knowledge.

anyway, the fact is, that we use "I" in subject/predicate sentences to attribute properties not to someone-or-other but to a very specific person, namely the person who is using "I". and that is why it is fairly standard treatment to say that "I" designates the speaker or entity that generated the token. this fits in entirely with the function and logic of use of "I".

Maybe so, but i fail to see how this shows "I" is a referring expression. As Rosa showed, this can't be a referring expression; you keep failing to address what she said.

the fact is, that we use "I" in subject/predicate sentences to attribute properties not to someone-or-other but to a very specific person, namely the person who is using "I".

But, as I pointed out, we use quantified expressions in this way, which do not refer at all. For example:

LI: No one is over twelve feet tall.

This does not attribute a property to "someone-or-other", and yet it is true. So the grammatical subject does not have to refer. Same with "I".

Now, as I said earlier: if you have independent reasons for showing "I" is a referring expression, no problem. But, you have yet to produce any.

I then added:

You need to construct a philosophical case, independent of the logic you keep using, and provide a few independent reasons why "I" is a referring expression (thus copying Rosa's approach), at the same time as showing where her arguments go wrong. But I have made this point several times...

and "Someone weighs 185 pounds" is not a subject-predicate sentence. It is a generalization.

Well, it's a second-level predication, but I take your point. Even so, this is not relevant, since my examples show that we can use non-referring expressions in such sentences.

moreover you have provided no good reason at all for thinking that "I" is not a referring expression. as i've pointed out, "I" is in the same family of context dependent expressions like "You", "We", "They", "here", "now", "this" and "that". why should these other expressions be referring expressions and "I" not be?

You said this earlier, too:

Nor have you provided any argument whatever to show that "I" is not a referring expression. You keep making analogies with quantifiers. But in those cases we have a ready analysis of why the predicate can be attached to an expression that isn't a singular term. Are you going to argue that "I" is a quantifier? If not, then your use of those alleged counter-examples doesn't prove your point.

I replied as follows:

Well, as my posts implied, I was relying on Rosa's arguments, which you have yet to address. She might be wrong (but I do not think so), but ignoring her (or them) is not the same as refuting her (or them).

So, as things now stand, we have her arguments that show "I" is not a referring expression (which everyone has ignored) and no arguments that show it is.

Opening rounds to her, I think...

Syndicat then added:

the following are all subject-predicate sentences:

(i) I weigh 187 pounds
(ii) I was born in Los Angeles
(iii) I am currently awake
(iv) I'm drinking tea
(v) I'm the same height as Andrew

Moreover, they're all true. So why are they true? the first four predicate properties of an individual...an identifiable individual:

...weighs 187 pounds
...was born in Los Angeles
...is currently awake
...is drinking tea

The way we understand simple subject-predicate sentences is that they are true when the subject has the property the predicate is used to track. So the first predicate denotes a certain weight. so if (i) is to be true, then the weight must be a property of the subject denoted by "I". "I" is a singular term that designates one particular individual on each occasion of use. If "I" doesn't designate an individual in (i) then how do we account for the truth of (i)?

But, the following is true only if the predicate is true of someone (or rather, if we can form a sentence using a proper name), but the subject term is not a referring expression:

L2: Someone weighs 187 pounds.

Upon being asked who weighs 187 pounds, we would have to produce a sentence like this :

L3: Jane weighs 187 pounds.

for L2 to be true.

The problem with your examples is that they do not tell us who these predicates are true of either, so that upon asking who is meant, you'd have to produce a sentence like this too.

You'd not have to do that if "I" were a referring expression.

LJJW

9th July 2011, 17:54

Luis argued as follows:

It seemed implicit.

I'm afraid, I still can't see it is "implicit". You need to explain why what she said implies this, from your earlier post:

And so, like the Wittgensteinian she is, she is arguing that "I" on one hand, and "Karl Marx" or "The President of the United States", are different because their use is different. Accordingly, she states that "I" can't serve in the role of either proper names or definite descriptions, but apparently doesn't explain why, and then immediately proceeds to point out some uses of the pronoun "I", which, in context, seems to signal that she is giving examples of the use of "I" that cannot be matched by "Karl Marx" or "The President of the United States". And so I pointed that those are examples in which "I", "Karl Marx", and "The President of the United States" are certainly grammatically interchangeably.

I can't ask her until she gets back from holiday (in fact. I have now asked her and she can't really see the point you are trying to make, nor was this part of what she was arguing), so I am relying on you to help me out here -- but from what I know of her ideas, this does not sound like something she would argue, explicitly or implicitly.

Anyway, I am sure that the expressions "I", "Karl Marx", and "The President of the United States" cannot be used interchangeably in all contexts. But those examples are not good if the intention is to demonstrate that.

Maybe not, but I'm pretty sure Rosa didn't argue for this, anyway.

I read her posts, and I don't remember any convincing explanation. To me, a convincing explanation has to start by stating what "referring expression" means in this context, and then proceed to show that "I" doesn't match such definition.

Well, this is what she posted:

Sure, it means something, but that does not show it's a referring expression.

We use Proper Names and Definite Descriptions to refer to people, buildings, towns, mountains, and rivers (among other things) -- so if I use "Mt Everest" you know what I am referring to. Now, a referring expression can also fail to refer, but no use of "I" can do this. Referring expressions are given in an act of dubbing; so we name children as a matter of law soon after they are born. Ships are named in ceremonies. Mountains are named by explorers, local people or geographers. Definite descriptions are given to help identify individuals (third parties), etc. But, when is anyone ever given the name "I"? When is it ever used to help identify a third party?

And:

Well, this is just a quirk of Indo-European languages. But even if it weren't, in "I think you should X", the word "I" isn't referring to the individual who uttered it, but drawing attention to the source of what is said. This can be seen by the fact that the person uttering it could have said "You should X" instead.

So, if "I" is a referring expression, it's one of a special kind, since it can't fail to refer to the one uttering it -- unlike genuine referring expressions which can and often do fail to refer. But, since it is not used to identify anyone, unlike referring expressions proper, it can't be a referring expression.

Now, posters here have just ignored these points.

It cannot be done by merely talking about the word "I".

But, it can't be done either except by talking about how this word is used.

I have no idea of whether it is a referring expression or not. As I said, it is a expression, and it seems to refer to something. But this is ordinary language; as we are seeing, the religion of Holy Ordinary Language needs quite extraordinary language as its foundation. Now I am willing to believe that "referring expression" has a technical - ie, non-ordinary language - meaning, of which I am not aware, and even that such technical meaning is widely accepted among the specialists in the fields of both logic and linguistic, instead of being just a Wittgensteinian quirk. And that is what I am demanding: a comprehensible explanation of what do you mean when you say "referring expression".

There are several things here that require comment:

But this is ordinary language; as we are seeing, the religion of Holy Ordinary Language needs quite extraordinary language as its foundation.

I'm sorry, but what 'religion' is this?

And, so what if extraordinary language is required to help out here? No one bothers if technical language is required in Linguistics. Anyway, the sort of semi-technical language used by Wittgenstein and Rosa is relatively easy to translate into ordinary language. For example, "referring expression" would translate out as "words we use to refer to people and things". Nothing technical in there, is there?

Finally, Wittgenstein, as far as I am aware, did not use the phrase "referring expression" (he uses "signify", "mean", "refer", "name", "describe", etc, but not "referring expression"), so this can't be "quirk" of his.

And that is what I am demanding: a comprehensible explanation of what do you mean when you say "referring expression".

Well, don't look at me. I can give you a brief explanation, but you need someone who has written a book, or completed a PhD on this. I am happy to use language without bothering with such technicalities. I have only intervened here to defend Rosa.

Wittgenstein spoke (or at least wrote) in a quite non-ordinary language; and he seems to have had a quite extraordinary concept of what "ordinary language" means.

It's important to recall that he was engaging with a 2500 year-old tradition which used technical terms all the time. In order to do that, and also to try to return philosophy to a consideration of our ordinary ways of saying things, he had to straddle both worlds. But, this is no more a problem for Wittgensteinians than it is for socialists when they use money or run businesses.

And, on what do you base this?

he seems to have had a quite extraordinary concept of what "ordinary language" means.

The Investigations, for example, is remarkably free from technical language (if one excludes his comments about mathematics). On the Tractatus is technical (but it is more compressed and clipped, than it is technical), but he was not in his 'ordinary language' phase when he wrote it.

Language is conventional. Which means that we need to make sure that we are talking about the same thing when we talk to each others. In ordinary language - as I understand it - this is usually no problem; but when talking about science or philosophy, this no longer holds. Precision is necessary.

I couldn't agree more, and I venture to suggest Rosa would agree with you, too.

Practically everything

Then I can only suggest you e-mail her. You can find her address at her site.

Well, to Wittgenstein, poetry, like religion or philosophy, belongs to the transcendental. And so it cannot be talked about, etc. - and it has no "meaning" in the way that ordinary language has, and consequently makes no "sense". But, of course, to Wittgenstein, being "non-sense" doesn't mean it is unimportant or "false" or a distraction used by the ruling classes in their struggle against us - this is an undue addition of Ms Lichtenstein. Indeed, to Wittgenstein, the transcendental is more important than the mundane; it just cannot be explained in words like Plato, Aquinas, or Hegel have tried to.

Thanks for that, but I still fail to see where Wittgenstein said this, or even implied it. I'm pretty sure he didn't even use the word "transcendental" -- or lump poetry in with it, if he did. Perhaps you have the page references?

But, of course, to Wittgenstein, being "non-sense" doesn't mean it is unimportant or "false" or a distraction used by the ruling classes in their struggle against us - this is an undue addition of Ms Lichtenstein.

I think Marx took this view too:

The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life.

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. For instance, in an age and in a country where royal power, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie are contending for mastery and where, therefore, mastery is shared, the doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the dominant idea and is expressed as an 'eternal law.' [Both of these are from the German Ideology. Bold emphasis added.]

But, I do not think Rosa ever called this a "distraction". She argues it's an ideology that attempts to justify and rationalise class oppression by means of an appeal to a hidden world, underlying 'appearances', which is accessible to thought alone (via philosophy and its 'abstractions' and obscure terminology), the existence of which is a reflection of the 'divine order', but more recently, an expression of the 'natural order' (which cannot be fought), and which the state, the Church, and class hierarchy also reflects in the visible world.

Indeed, to Wittgenstein, the transcendental is more important than the mundane; it just cannot be explained in words like Plato, Aquinas, or Hegel have tried to.

Well, this is certainly one view that could be taken of the Tractatus, but even this has been challenged by the New Wittgensteinians (I can't post any links to work of theirs or to any pages that will explain who they are and what they argue). It is far less prominent in his later work.

LuÃs Henrique

11th July 2011, 20:05

Luis argued as follows:

I'm afraid, I still can't see it is "implicit". You need to explain why what she said implies this, from your earlier post:

[snip]

I can't ask her until she gets back from holiday (in fact. I have now asked her and she can't really see the point you are trying to make, nor was this part of what she was arguing), so I am relying on you to help me out here -- but from what I know of her ideas, this does not sound like something she would argue, explicitly or implicitly.

[snip]

Maybe not, but I'm pretty sure Rosa didn't argue for this, anyway.

Usually when one says, "that cannot be a bycicle, because it has four wheels", it is implied that bycicles do not have four wheels. When the subject is not bycicles, but something so complicated that only people with a PhD can grasp it, however, it may not be obvious that it cannot have four wheels.

In this case, it pretty much seems she said something similar to "it cannot be a bycicle, look, it is blue".

Well, this is what she posted:

We use Proper Names and Definite Descriptions to refer to people, buildings, towns, mountains, and rivers (among other things) -- so if I use "Mt Everest" you know what I am referring to. Now, a referring expression can also fail to refer, but no use of "I" can do this. Referring expressions are given in an act of dubbing; so we name children as a matter of law soon after they are born. Ships are named in ceremonies. Mountains are named by explorers, local people or geographers. Definite descriptions are given to help identify individuals (third parties), etc. But, when is anyone ever given the name "I"? When is it ever used to help identify a third party?Well, Mt Everest is a proper noun. But there are other kinds of referring expressions, isn't it?

the President of the United States
the highest mountain on Earth
the man who sold the world
the most influential philosopher
the girl next door
that car
it

etc. Aren't those "referring expressions"?

(notice that if I say 'the President of the United States' I don't necessarily know who I am referring to (George Washington? George Bush?). Indeed, if I say "the most influential philosopher", I am guaranteed to provoke a dispute on who am I referring to. This does not seem to stop those phrases from being referring expressions.)

Then she says that 'I' cannot fail to refer (or so I guess; her writing style is so contorted that it could mean anything else), which seems to be an admission that 'I' actually 'refers' to something.

So actually I don't see where this takes us to.

And:

Well, this is just a quirk of Indo-European languages. But even if it weren't, in "I think you should X", the word "I" isn't referring to the individual who uttered it, but drawing attention to the source of what is said. This can be seen by the fact that the person uttering it could have said "You should X" instead.This is certainly not "looking at how words are used" - it is taking a superficial glance at it, at most. For neither 'I' nor phrases like 'the President of the United States' are used only like that, but rather in many different, complex ways. Indeed, if Mr. Obama says something like,

I think that we should put more pressure on Iran.

or, alternatively,

The President of the United States thinks we should put more pressure on Iran.

Are we going to argue that he is referring to two different people, or that he is saying different things in each of these sentences?

So, if "I" is a referring expression, it's one of a special kind, since it can't fail to refer to the one uttering it -- unlike genuine referring expressions which can and often do fail to refer. But, since it is not used to identify anyone, unlike referring expressions proper, it can't be a referring expression.Again I don't see how this follows. 'I' is not an actual referring expression because it cannot fail to refer? And how is 'I' never used to identify anyone? See:

- Who chopped the cherry tree?
- I did it.

That is, in my reckoning, the very meaning of the word 'identify'.

But, it can't be done either except by talking about how this word is used.No, but to explain why X is not Y, it is necessary to talk about both X and Y.

And, so what if extraordinary language is required to help out here? No one bothers if technical language is required in Linguistics. Anyway, the sort of semi-technical language used by Wittgenstein and Rosa is relatively easy to translate into ordinary language. For example, "referring expression" would translate out as "words we use to refer to people and things". Nothing technical in there, is there?Well, that's part of my point. If a referring expression is "words that we use to refer to people and things", it seems that 'I' is a referring expression. Now, maybe it isn't, and I would be glad to aknowledge it if some reasonable explanation was given, but up to now the strongest argument I have seen is that 'I' is not a referring expression because... it cannot fail to refer. The other arguements seem merely impressionistic, of the kind "'I' is used to draw attention to the source of what is said", which frankly seems to be vague at best, and simply wrong at worst.

Well, don't look at me. I can give you a brief explanation, but you need someone who has written a book, or completed a PhD on this. I am happy to use language without bothering with such technicalities. I have only intervened here to defend Rosa.So, is it easy to translate into ordinary language, or nearly impossible?

And it seems the case that some people use language without bothering with technicalities, but then bother others with such technicalities when its others' turn to use language.

And, on what do you base this?

The Investigations, for example, is remarkably free from technical language (if one excludes his comments about mathematics). On the Tractatus is technical (but it is more compressed and clipped, than it is technical), but he was not in his 'ordinary language' phase when he wrote it.The problem is not the technicality of language, but its unusuality. 'Ordinary language' to him means something apparently different than for anyone else, so it would be necessarily to explain it, but this isn't done. Another example is 'grammar', which he uses in a very different way from common mortals, seeming to confuse pragmatics, syntax, semantics, and lexics into one entity.

Then I can only suggest you e-mail her. You can find her address at her site.Not interested, sorry. My personal experiences with Ms Lichtenstein are of the worst possible kind, and I have absolutely no intention of renewing contact with her.

Thanks for that, but I still fail to see where Wittgenstein said this, or even implied it. I'm pretty sure he didn't even use the word "transcendental" -- or lump poetry in with it, if he did. Perhaps you have the page references?Well, maybe I am taking an excessively narrow interpretation of him at face value. Point is, to Wittgenstein there are things beyond our ability to speak, and trying to speak about them can only convey nonsence:

And this is how it is: if only you do not try to utter what is unutterable then nothing gets lost. But the unutterable will be -- unutterably -- contained in what has been uttered!

There are indeed things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest.

That those things are the matter of poetry?

Philosophy ought really to be written only as a form of poetry.

For our resident Wittgensteinians, however, what cannot be expressed doesn't exist, and is nonsencical itself - rubbish, absurd, bourgeois, mistificating, babbling, etc. So I would guess to them the "unutterable" that is unutterably contained in what is uttered in poetry is nonsence, and probably rubbish, stupid, and bourgeois too.

But, I do not think Rosa ever called this a "distraction". She argues it's an ideology that attempts to justify and rationalise class oppression by means of an appeal to a hidden world, underlying 'appearances', which is accessible to thought alone (via philosophy and its 'abstractions' and obscure terminology), the existence of which is a reflection of the 'divine order', but more recently, an expression of the 'natural order' (which cannot be fought), and which the state, the Church, and class hierarchy also reflects in the visible world.The problem is, at least in the way she writes it down, it is exceedling mechanicistic and seem to imply a conscious intent to distort things to ensure class domination. Reread Marx's quote and you will see that he absolutely doesn't share such naive approach.

(Her grasp of History is close to non-existant, too, which leads her into some absurds. Thinking that metaphysics is a result of class divisions, for instance. We perfectly know that primitive classless societies believed in gods, devils, ghosts, spirits, afterlife, and many other metaphysic and mystic absurds, so such explanation is just plainly and flatly false.)

Luís Henrique

syndicat

11th July 2011, 21:18

me:
when i say that the argument assumes that "I" is a referring expression, this means that the argument IMPLIES that "I" is a referring expression, since it wouldn't be valid or make sense otherwise.

you apparently are unaware that "assumes" can be used to refer to a logical relation of implication: you:

On the contrary, I base my counter-argument on this, since it shows that an argument can be valid even if the term in question is not a referring expression.your reply obviously begs the question in that you assume what needs to be shown.

me:
In effect you're asking me to "justify" the data that any theory of logic must account for. you have things exactly backwards. the theory has to be consistent with the data. and your theory isn't consistent with the data. you:
I am asking you to justify why you think that something that does not have to be a referring expression for the argument to be valid is indeed a referring expression. You just assume, without proof, or argument, that it is. If that is 'getting things backwards' then I shudder to think what getting things 'the right way round' is.the validity of that argument is part of the data. you seem to not understand the way logic works. logical theories are developed in order to capture or account for valid arguments. we start with valid inferences in ordinary language and then develop the theory to account for their validity.

moreover your reply here contradicts what you just said above:

On the contrary, I base my counter-argument on this, since it shows that an argument can be valid even if the term in question is not a referring expression.you can't seem to make up your mind whether the argument i presented is valid or not. first you say it is, then you say it isn't.

I couldn't agree more. But that does not make the study Fregean Logic (and So-called 'Classical Logic), or Mathematical Logic a pointless exercise.
except that it's well known that the classical Frege-Russell logic will validate obviously invalid arguments, such as:

(1) if jack comes to harry's party, he'll have a good time.
(2) hence, if jack and betty come to harry's party, jack will have a good time.

(1) is true because Betty doesn't know harry and thus in fact won't be present at harry's party. (2) is false because jack would be miserable if betty showed up.

but the inference of (2) from (1) is an instance of antecedent strengthening, which is provably valid in the Frege-Russell logic.

I nowhere said my counter-example was of the same form, only that it showed that an alleged referring expression need not refer for an argument to be valid. Nothing you have said so far shows this to be incorrect.except that "someone" is a quantifier, there is nothing such that "someone" refers to it. hence it's not a "referring expression".

your "counter-argument" is sophistry.

(1) Jack and I are both natives of Los Angeles

(2) hence there is someone such that Jack and (s)he are both natives of Los Angeles.

Suppose I discover that I am not in fact a native of Los Angeles, but the argument is still valid despite my defective knowledge.by parity of reasoning, then, you'd have to say the following is valid:

1. Mark Twain and Samuel Clemens both stood on top of the big rock overlooking Point Reyes.
2. therefore someone other than Mark Twain stood on top of the big rock overlooking Point Reyes.

but let us suppose Mark Twain was the only person who ever stood on top of the big rock overlooking Point Reyes. then 1 is true but 2 is false.

that's because Mark Twain=Samuel Clemens. but a person could say 1 without knowing that Mark Twain=Samuel Clemens. now, according to you, knowledge shouldn't affect validity.

use of "both" in 1 is okay even if Mark Twain=Samuel Clemens because of the presence of two proper names.

Maybe so, but i fail to see how this shows "I" is a referring expression. As Rosa showed, this can't be a referring expression; you keep failing to address what she said.it's completely improper for you to continue to make this assertion. i'm not under any obligation to try so sift through thousands of pages of text to somehow locate whatever argument she has allegedly put forth. if this argument is so important and convincing, you can lay it out here and we can judge. otherwise I'm entitled to say you're just blowing smoke.

anyway, the question is whether taking "I" as a referring expression, and having the sort of pragmatics and semantics I refer to, and is pretty standard fare in logical philosophy, is the best explanation for its role in inferences and statements. it's up to you to show it's not a good account. i'm under no obligation to provide some deductive "proof" since that isn't how things are settled in this area.

me:
the fact is, that we use "I" in subject/predicate sentences to attribute properties not to someone-or-other but to a very specific person, namely the person who is using "I". in reply you come up with this as an alleged counterexample:

LI: No one is over twelve feet tall.this is not a "subject predicate expression that attributes properties to a very specific person and not to someone-or-other". hence it doesn't satisfy the criterion i laid out above for what counts as a singular subject/predicate sentence, as opposed to a generalization. your LI is logically equivalent to: Everyone is such that they are not over 12 feet tall, and hence is a universal generalization.

me:

"Someone weighs 185 pounds" is not a subject-predicate sentence. It is a generalization. you:

Well, it's a second-level predication, but I take your point. Even so, this is not relevant, since my examples show that we can use non-referring expressions in such sentences.

it's not a "second-level predication". you keep coming up with irrelevant supposed "counterexamples" that are all generalizations or equivalent.

I am a native of Los Angeles.

is not a generalization. it attributes a property to a particular individual.

in regard to my examples:

(i) I weigh 187 pounds
(ii) I was born in Los Angeles
(iii) I am currently awake
(iv) I'm drinking tea
(v) I'm the same height as Andrew
you say:

The problem with your examples is that they do not tell us who these predicates are true of now you are being completely absurd.

If I say to a group of people, "Someone here believes the state should be overthrown" and someone asks "Who believes that?" I can answer their question by saying "I do."

in reply to Luis you did provide a quote from Rosa:

We use Proper Names and Definite Descriptions to refer to people, buildings, towns, mountains, and rivers (among other things) -- so if I use "Mt Everest" you know what I am referring to. Now, a referring expression can also fail to refer, but no use of "I" can do this. Referring expressions are given in an act of dubbing; so we name children as a matter of law soon after they are born. Ships are named in ceremonies. Mountains are named by explorers, local people or geographers. Definite descriptions are given to help identify individuals (third parties), etc. But, when is anyone ever given the name "I"? When is it ever used to help identify a third party? this is mere dogmatism. for one thing, since Donnellan's classic essay back in the late '60s, it is standard fare to distinguish two kinds of definite descriptions. this becomes very apparent when we look at the use of definite descriptions in references to events. there are some definite descriptions for which the Russellian analysis is appropriate. and in that analysis they end up not being designators but generalizations. but there are other uses where "the F" ends up being similar to "that F" in that the description F plays a kind of ancillary role as an enabler to the hearer or reader to get them to focus on or think about the intended target. if I say "the tall dude in the striped jacket just ordered a cosmo", this can refer even if the dude is actually a female dressed in male clothing with short hair. it's true if that person did just order a cosmo.

moreover if a proper name gets its reference thru a dubbing, what is used to indicate the target in the dubbing? if it's an expression like "this child", as in "I'm naming this child "Lueesha", then "this child" must refer if "Lueesha" is to refer. but "this child" is neither a definite description nor a proper name.

Moreover if we include demonstratives or indexicals, as they're also called, as referring expressions, then "here" and "now" are also referring expressions that can't fail to refer (except when used in mythical or fictional discourse). "here" always refers to the location of the speaker (tho it also sometimes has anophoric uses where it refers to a previously discussed context). "now" to the time when that token occurs. and these are quite similar to "I" in that "I" also gets its reference from the context of use, it refers to the being who generated the token (except in fictional discourse where "I" may lack a referent).

now i suppose LJJW may come back and say I need to "prove" this. but in empirical studies it's a question of coming up with a plausible account that is consistent with and accounts for the data, that is, a hypothesis. so it's a question of which hypothesis is a better account.

LuÃs Henrique

20th July 2011, 20:58

Let me expand a little more on this:

'I' is used to draw attention to the source of what is said.I took some time to realise how this is quite clearly not the case because my first language is Portuguese. But it should be obvious to those whose first language is English or French.

Suppose someone asks,

Who ate the cheese?

I can answer this question in a few different ways:

Me.
Me, I did it.
I did it.

Now it seems to me that the third option, while not exactly incorrect, isn't quite natural. And that's because the word actually used to "draw attention to the source of what is said" isn't 'I', but 'me' (which is not the case in Portuguese, where both functions are performed by the "same" word 'eu': Eu, eu comi o queijo.).

Let's now take a look on how 'I' is actually used:

Andrew voted yay, Beatrice voted nay, Charles voted nay, Daisy voted yay, and I voted nay; the proposal has been rejected.

In what sence does 'I' in such case perform any different function compared to 'Andrew', 'Beatrice', 'Charles', or 'Daisy'? Or aren't those proper names in such case referring expressions?

Am I supposed to believe in that without any proof?

Whatever 'I' does in such example, it is clearly not interchangeable with 'me':

* Am me supposed to believe in that without any proof?
* Is me supposed to believe in that without any proof?

So it is probably not "drawing attention to the source of what is said". On the other hand, it looks pretty interchangeable with proper nouns:

Is Charles supposed to believe in that without any proof?
Is Edward J. Murray supposed to believe in that without any proof?

Or definite descriptions:

Is the President of the Supreme Court supposed to believe in that without any proof?
Is the most influential philosopher supposed to believe in that without any proof?

Aren't 'Charles', 'Edward J. Murray', 'the President of the Supreme Court', or 'the most influential philosopher' referring expressions in such case? And if they are, what are they doing that 'I' in

Am I supposed to believe in that without any proof?

is not?

********************
The below should also be brought into question:

Can you imagine the scene: "The accused, called 'I', was seen entering the premisses at midnight, your honour..."? And which member of the ruling-class, or one of their lackeys, has ever said "We are offering a £10,000 reward for the capture of 'I', wanted in connection with an illegal strike..."? Or even, "The police have a responsibility to control the streets, to make sure all those 'I's on the march do not riot..."?Now see:

* The accused, called "the President of the United States", was seen entering the premisses at midnight, your honour.
* The accused, called "the girl next door", was seen entering the premisses at midnight, your honour.

So the first of those examples only proves that 'I' cannot perform a function that definite descriptions cannot perform, either. If this "proves" that 'I' is not a referring expression, it should also prove that definite descriptions are not referring expressions.

And the third example doesn't work, too, because:

* The police have a responsibility to control the streets, to make sure all those Karl Marxs on the march do not riot.
* The police have a responsibility to control the streets, to make sure all those Edwards on the march do not riot.

it only shows that 'I' cannot perform a function that proper nouns cannot perform either. If this "proves" that 'I' is not a referring expression, it should also prove that proper nouns are not referring expressions...

So the only example that actually stands to something is,

* We are offering a £10,000 reward for the capture of 'I', wanted in connection with an illegal strike.

because here 'I' actually differs from both definite descriptions and proper nouns. But part of the strange quality of "We are offering a £10,000 reward for the capture of 'I', wanted in connection with an illegal strike" is due to unrelated semantical issues - the fact that one wouldn't issue an order of capture against oneself - and part is due to the syntactical peculiarity that the first person pronoun, in English, retains some of the characteristics of Indo-European grammar (ie, it still displays remnants of a case system).

And so,

* We are offering a £10,000 reward for the capture of myself.

already sounds not so weird, because the syntactical problem was removed; and

* We are offering a reward for the biography of 'I'.

where the semantic difficulty is removed, is also is not so weird; and

We are offering a reward for the biography of myself.

Seems already pretty correct English.

So this is all another case of "looking at how words are used" but seeing something else, that cannot really be deducted from the evidence.

Luís Henrique

Nuvem

21st July 2011, 02:32

In this thread: Nothing significant is said for five pages.

LuÃs Henrique

25th July 2011, 21:52

Thanks for that, but I still fail to see where Wittgenstein said this, or even implied it. I'm pretty sure he didn't even use the word "transcendental" -- or lump poetry in with it, if he did. Perhaps you have the page references?

He certainly did:

6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)

So he believed that ethic is transcendental, because it cannot be put into words (which seems clearly counterfactual: ethics can, and often is, put into words). He also believed that "ethic and aesthetics are one and the same", which is a weird, and obviously fallacious, way to say that, regarding one of their aspects, ethics and aesthetics coincide (I hope it is not necessary to show how many aspects of ethics are completely different from aesthetics, sometimes even mutually exclusive).

Now maybe poetry is something completely different from aesthetics; maybe aesthetics has nothing to do with poetry at all. But that's not the mainstream view, in which poetry seems to be, at least, one of the subjects on which aesthetics seeks to discuss.

Luís Henrique

LJJW

27th July 2011, 15:32

Thanks for that Luis.

And I think the by 'one and the same' he meant (as the context suggests) that they are both transcendental, not that they are the same in all respects.

Now, both I and Rosa think the ethical (and the 'mystical') sections of the Tractatus are entirely worthless, so I do not really want to discuss them. They were late additions to the text, and he added them as a result of his experiences in the trenches in WW1. They bear no relation to the important sections of that work, most of which had been written before WW1.

LJJW

27th July 2011, 15:43

Luis you argued, again:

Usually when one says, "that cannot be bicycle, because it has four wheels", it is implied that bicycles do not have four wheels. When the subject is not bicycles, but something so complicated that only people with a PhD can grasp it, however, it may not be obvious that it cannot have four wheels.

In this case, it pretty much seems she said something similar to "it cannot be a bicycle, look, it is blue".

I'm sorry, but this does not look like anything she would say, or has said (as far as I can see). What is your basis for alleging this?

Well, Mt Everest is a proper noun. But there are other kinds of referring expressions, isn't it?

the President of the United States
the highest mountain on Earth
the man who sold the world
the most influential philosopher
the girl next door
that car
it
etc. Aren't those "referring expressions"?

(notice that if I say 'the President of the United States' I don't necessarily know who I am referring to (George Washington? George Bush?). Indeed, if I say "the most influential philosopher", I am guaranteed to provoke a dispute on who am I referring to. This does not seem to stop those phrases from being referring expressions.)

Well, it depends on the sentence you are using whether these are referring expressions, or not.

In "Disraeli became the favourite Prime Minister of Queen Victoria" the definite description "the favourite Prime Minister of Queen Victoria" is predicative, not referential. It would not do to replace "the favourite Prime Minister of Queen Victoria" with the name of whoever it might be thought to be referring to (by anyone who thought it was a referring expression): i.e., Disraeli. So, "Disraeli became Disraeli" makes little sense.

Contrast that with "Disraeli despised the prime minister who took office in 1880". Here "the prime minister who took office in 1880" refers to Gladstone, and it now makes sense to replace it with his name: "Disraeli despised Gladstone" makes sense.

So, the logic of definite descriptions is rather complex, certainly more so than either Russell or Wittgenstein imagined.

Then she says that 'I' cannot fail to refer (or so I guess; her writing style is so contorted that it could mean anything else), which seems to be an admission that 'I' actually 'refers' to something.

So actually I don't see where this takes us to.

Ah, she is using an informal sort of reductio here, which can be seen from what she goes on to say (which, alas, you did not quote):

Now, a referring expression can also fail to refer, but no use of "I" can do this.

That is, she is assuming, for the purpose of argument, that "I" is a referring expression, but only to show the difficulties this assumption creates.

You then argue, Luis, as follows:

This is certainly not "looking at how words are used" - it is taking a superficial glance at it, at most. For neither 'I' nor phrases like 'the President of the United States' are used only like that, but rather in many different, complex ways. Indeed, if Mr. Obama says something like,

I think that we should put more pressure on Iran.
or, alternatively,

The President of the United States thinks we should put more pressure on Iran.
Are we going to argue that he is referring to two different people, or that he is saying different things in each of these sentences?

I do not think she said anywhere that she was going to take a comprehensive look at how we use certain expressions. Her posts are long enough as it is! Recall, this thread is about "I", not definite descriptions.

Now, to take your examples:

I think that we should put more pressure on Iran.

The President of the United States thinks we should put more pressure on Iran.

Once more, "The President of the United States" could fail to refer -- if, for example, unbeknown to Obama, there had been a coup in which he had been deposed, and the constitution of the USA had been abolished so that there was no longer any such office as "The President of the United States".

But "I" can't fail to 'refer' (always assuming it is a referring expression, of course). So, as Rosa argues, it serves rather to draw attention to the one saying whatever they are saying.

However, you do not appear to like that argument:

Again I don't see how this follows. 'I' is not an actual referring expression because it cannot fail to refer? And how is 'I' never used to identify anyone? See:

- Who chopped the cherry tree?
- I did it.
That is, in my reckoning, the very meaning of the word 'identify'.

Well, as she pointed out, if it is a referring expression it's unlike any other. But, in view of the other things she says, it can't be a referring expression.

Moreover, being able to identify someone or something is not the same a referring to them/it. [Of course, referring to him/her might assist in identifying them.] I could identify someone by, for example, shining a light on him/her, underlining her/his name, leaving his/her name off a list, getting him/her to make a noise, and a host of other things. None of these involve any obvious or necessary reference.

No, but to explain why X is not Y, it is necessary to talk about both X and Y.

Indeed. Is there anything in what I posted that suggests otherwise?

You then proceed to argue as follows, Luis:

Well, that's part of my point. If a referring expression is "words that we use to refer to people and things", it seems that 'I' is a referring expression. Now, maybe it isn't, and I would be glad to acknowledge it if some reasonable explanation was given, but up to now the strongest argument I have seen is that 'I' is not a referring expression because... it cannot fail to refer. The other arguments seem merely impressionistic, of the kind "'I' is used to draw attention to the source of what is said", which frankly seems to be vague at best, and simply wrong at worst.

But, you have yet to show that this is how "I" is used. Like Syndicat, you seem to think it is (I hope I am not putting words in your mouth here!), and you might be right, as I said. But we have yet to see a convincing argument to that end.

The other arguments seem merely impressionistic, of the kind "'I' is used to draw attention to the source of what is said", which frankly seems to be vague at best, and simply wrong at worst.

And yet that is how it is used. I'm sorry, but you have ignored her other arguments again. As she pointed out:

Well, this is just a quirk of Indo-European languages. But even if it weren't, in "I think you should X", the word "I" isn't referring to the individual who uttered it, but drawing attention to the source of what is said. This can be seen by the fact that the person uttering it could have said "You should X" instead.

So, "You should X" shows that "I" isn't a referring expression.

So, is it easy to translate into ordinary language, or nearly impossible?

Is what easy to translate?

And it seems the case that some people use language without bothering with technicalities, but then bother others with such technicalities when its others' turn to use language.

Indeed, and both Rosa and Wittgenstein would agree with you.

The problem is not the technicality of language, but its unusuality. 'Ordinary language' to him means something apparently different than for anyone else, so it would be necessarily to explain it, but this isn't done. Another example is 'grammar', which he uses in a very different way from common mortals, seeming to confuse pragmatics, syntax, semantics, and lexics into one entity.

Well, you need to remember that the Investigations isn't a novel or a work of popular literature, but a work of philosophy aimed at unravelling problems that have beset the profession for at least 2400 years. In that case, it can't fail to be unusual.

And you are right, Wittgenstein's use of "grammar" is unique to him, but then that too can be translated into ordinary terms (as he does himself in his unpublished work). And he'd say that linking (but not "confusing") "pragmatics, syntax, semantics, and lexics" is quite legitimate if we are dealing with human beings, not computers.

Here's a clear example of what he meant by 'grammar' -- I have taken this from the longer version of the essay Chris quoted in another thread (with Rosa's permission):

An example from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations illustrates the radical difference between number words and other terms we use. He encourages us to consider a customer who asks a grocer for five red apples. Now, the shopkeeper does not first go off in search of red things, nor yet collections of five things. Manifestly, he or she will first go and find apples, or even the red apples, and then count them out.

This is all part of the Fregean idea that number words attach to concepts, not objects. [Or, as Wittgenstein might have said, number words express operations carried out on objects of a certain sort qualified by count nouns, like "three apples" or "five pears" (although, as far as I am aware, he did not use the phrase "count noun").]

Hence, the shopkeeper will count apples of a certain colour: one apple, two apples..., and so on, as the concept expression "x is an apple" is successively instantiated/applied (sometimes expressed demonstratively as: "This is an apple, and this is another..."). Of course, this is not to suggest that these are the words that this fictional shopkeeper will actually use, or that he/she will use any words at all, but they will have been used in her/his childhood (training) or words like them, at some point. No one is just taught to count 'objects' -- but to count objects of a certain sort, or objects identified demonstratively, governed by the use of concept expressions (like "x is an apple", as in "This is an apple"), or count nouns. Novices who can proceed along the lines they have been trained are thus said to have grasped the use of number terms (and, indeed, of concept expressions/count nouns). Subsequently, this is carried out automatically, which is also a part of what we mean by knowing how to count -- or even how to serve in a grocer's shop!

Now, the whole point of this analysis is aimed at showing that not all words are names and not all words function in the same way. In addition it is also aimed at demonstrating that we all know this to be so (i.e., in our practices -- in, say, our reactions to requests like the one the shopkeeper faced --, but not necessarily in our deliberations about such things where we often go astray). And that is why ([B]whatever theory we hold) not one of us would dream of looking for something named by "five" first, or even by "red", and then "apples" last. On the other hand, if all words were names, we could and would do this quite often. [Wittgenstein (1958), pp.2-3; Wittgenstein (2009), pp.5e-6e.]

This alone shows that Wittgenstein was not fixated on ordinary German (or ordinary English), etc. No human being who has ever walked the planet would dream of looking for something named by "five" first, or even "red" first, and then "apples" last (always assuming they lived in a society with the requisite background, social organisation and vocabulary, etc.), whatever their language, social circumstances or ideological commitments happened to be.

Not even George W Bush (!!), or the Pope, or Andrew Carnegie, or Plotinus, or Hegel, or Rupert Murdoch, or even Stalin, would look for five red things first!

Now, this is what Wittgenstein meant by "logical grammar": features expressed in language and in our practices which illustrate how we all react in social circumstances (or otherwise), no matter what ideology/theory we subscribe to. Indeed, they are so much a part of our second nature, so much a part of what we do without thinking, that we fail to spot their significance -- which is why they went unremarked upon for millennia, until Frege and Wittgenstein pointed them out.

I'm sorry, I'd post a link that explained what a 'count noun' is if I could, but if you type that phrase into Google it will be easy to find.

Not interested, sorry. My personal experiences with Ms Lichtenstein are of the worst possible kind, and I have absolutely no intention of renewing contact with her.

Fair enough, but I know her very well, and that does not sound like her. [She has been suffering from heart problems for a few years, and that might have made her rather impatient and tetchy.]

That those things are the matter of poetry?

Well, only if poetry is not written in a language; after all you quote Wittgenstein as saying:

There are indeed things that cannot be put into words.

By the way, where did you find these quotations? You forgot to say.

For our resident Wittgensteinians, however, what cannot be expressed doesn't exist, and is nonsensical itself - rubbish, absurd, bourgeois, mistificating, babbling, etc. So I would guess to them the "unutterable" that is unutterably contained in what is uttered in poetry is nonsense, and probably rubbish, stupid, and bourgeois too.

I'd like to see where any of the 'Wittgensteinians' here (or anywhere else) have said this. Do you have the quotations to support it?

The problem is, at least in the way she writes it down, it is exceedingly mechanistic and seem to imply a conscious intent to distort things to ensure class domination. Reread Marx's quote and you will see that he absolutely doesn't share such naive approach.

Again, I can't find that in anything she has posted here. Perhaps you have the references?

Now, Marx is quite explicit:

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch.' [This is from the German Ideology. Bold added.]

Looks pretty conscious to me, if you don't mind me saying so.

(Her grasp of History is close to non-existent, too, which leads her into some absurdities. Thinking that metaphysics is a result of class divisions, for instance. We perfectly know that primitive classless societies believed in gods, devils, ghosts, spirits, afterlife, and many other metaphysic and mystic absurdities, so such explanation is just plainly and flatly false.)

But, can you find anywhere where she has said the following?

Thinking that metaphysics is a result of class divisions, for instance.

I can't.

However, you have yet to see the historical evidence she has amassed that supports what she has to say -- I have -- she hasn't published it yet. Now she may be wrong (she is human after all!), but her knowledge of history is, in my view, quite good. But even if it were poor, she takes the trouble to quote authorities in support of her claims. I know, since I helped her locate them when we were both researching this together about ten or twelve years ago.

Now, if you want to lump the following in with metaphysics, fine:

We perfectly know that primitive classless societies believed in gods, devils, ghosts, spirits, afterlife, and many other metaphysic and mystic absurdities, so such explanation is just plainly and flatly false.

But, then you'd need another word to describe what happened in Greece (in the sixth century BC) when philosophy became more systematic, and was practiced almost exclusively by members of the ruling-class, or their hangers-on. As I am sure you are aware, something rather unique happened in Greece at that time, which was different from anything that had gone before (in the 'west', at least).

I'll respond to your other comments later.

Ingraham Effingham

27th July 2011, 15:55

"I" hate wasting breath and thought on pointless semantics.

LuÃs Henrique

27th July 2011, 15:57

Thanks for that Luis.

And I think the by 'one and the same' he meant (as the context suggests) that they are both transcendental, not that they are the same in all respects.

Certainly, that was what he meant. It was not what he said, though. For a philosopher so famous for precision and clarity, it is quite a sloppy use of words, which would have not been pardoned (and indeed probably would have even earned a few epithets) if uttered by one of us - or by Hegel, Lenin, Plekhanov, or Engels, for what it is worth.

Now, both I and Rosa think the ethical (and the 'mystical') sections of the Tractatus are entirely worthless, so I do not really want to discuss them. They were late additions to the text, and he added them as a result of his experiences in the trenches in WW1. They bear no relation to the important sections of that work, most of which had been written before WW1.So we can agree that he actually said it. So, that you, or Ms Lichtenstein, select this, or anything else that Wittgenstein actually said, as worthless, belongs not to his tought, but to your or Ms Lichtenstein's reasoning.

Wittgenstein is famously difficult to interpret (his misinterpretation by the Vienna circle is famous; less famous is the fact that when the Viennese realised that they got him wrong, they seem to have again been mistaken on what they got wrong, and why...) It seems that no two interpreters value the same passages, or understand them in the same way. Again, for a philosopher lauded for clarity and precision, that's weird, but I am willing to put the fault at the interpreters, not at the original thinker. On the other hand, I am certainly not willing to give yours - or Ms Lichtenstein's - interpretation any special credit vis-a-vis any other interpretations, at least until given some solid reasons to do so. Nor am I willing to accept the usual claims of obviousness regarding such difficult matters.

Luís Henrique

LJJW

27th July 2011, 16:09

Well, no, the context actually indicates that he meant this (and I thnk the German is a little clearer). If you don't mind me saying so, I think you are being a little unfair.

But then you added this comment, Luis:

So we can agree that he actually said it. So, that you, or Ms Lichtenstein, select this, or anything else that Wittgenstein actually said, as worthless, belongs not to his tought, but to your or Ms Lichtenstein's reasoning.

If you read what I posted, I did not agree; all I said was that these sections, (and I'll add this for clarity's sake whatever Wittgenstein did or did not say) are not worth wasting time on.

You then posted this, Luis:

Wittgenstein is famously difficult to interpret (his misinterpretation by the Vienna circle is famous; less famous is the fact that when the Viennese realised that they got him wrong, they seem to have again been mistaken on what they got wrong, and why...) It seems that no two interpreters value the same passages, or understand them in the same way. Again, for a philosopher lauded for clarity and precision, that's weird, but I am willing to put the fault at the interpreters, not at the original thinker. On the other hand, I am certainly not willing to give yours - or Ms Lichtenstein's - interpretation any special credit vis-a-vis any other interpretations, at least until given some solid reasons to do so. Nor am I willing to accept the usual claims of obviousness regarding such difficult matters.

Fine, that is of course up to you, but recall that later in life Wittgenstein actually classified the Tractatus along with the other dinosaurs of philosophy partly because of its lack of clarity.

However, in his later work, he constantly strove to be clear, even if he failed to acheive the high standard he sought; which is partly why he regularly burnt his notebooks, and said they were not fit to see the light of day. [I was told this anecdote by one of his 'disciples' back in the 1970s.]

LJJW

27th July 2011, 16:15

Syndicat, you argued as follows:

your reply obviously begs the question in that you assume what needs to be shown.

I'm sorry to have to say this, and with all due respect, you have posted this comment already. My response last time (which still stands until you show where it goes wrong) went along these lines (I have edited it somewhat):

In that case you must think that quantifiers are referring expressions, since the argument I used contained a quantifier in the premiss:

(1) Jack and someone are both natives of Los Angeles.
(2) Ergo: there is someone such that he/she and Jack are both natives of LA.

This valid argument shows that a non-referring expression can occur in the premiss. Now, if you have independent grounds for showing that "I" is a referring expression, your use of an analogous argument (even if it's of a different logical form) does not establish what you claim. Given your reasoning, the above argument will only be valid if "someone" is a referring expression, which I know you do not believe.

You then argued:

the validity of that argument is part of the data. you seem to not understand the way logic works. logical theories are developed in order to capture or account for valid arguments. we start with valid inferences in ordinary language and then develop the theory to account for their validity.

Where have I even so much a hinted that I disagree with this? However, I am struggling to see its relevance, if you'll forgive my directness.

You then posted this odd statement:

you can't seem to make up your mind whether the argument i presented is valid or not. first you say it is, then you say it isn't.

And yet, I have already agreed it's valid, but that is because "I" isn't a referring expression. Alas, you have yet to show otherwise.

except that it's well known that the classical Frege-Russell logic will validate obviously invalid arguments, such as:

(1) If Jack comes to Harry's party, he'll have a good time.
(2) Hence, if Jack and Betty come to Jack's party, Jack will have a good time.

(1) is true because Betty doesn't know Harry and thus in fact won't be present at Harry's party. (2) is false because Jack would be miserable if Betty showed up.

but the inference of (2) from (1) is an instance of antecedent strengthening, which is provably valid in the Frege-Russell logic.

Well, we can debate the pro's and cons of Frege/Russell logic another time. [Although, I rather suspect you have sneaked this example past us with an enthymeme -- a suppressed premiss (which you added in a comment situated outside the argument itself).]

Be this as it may, I'm struggling to see the relevance of this to the point in hand. [And it still fails to show that the study of Frege/Russell logic is a waste of time.]

Again, we have been through the following several times:

except that "someone" is a quantifier, there is nothing such that "someone" refers to it. hence it's not a "referring expression".

your "counter-argument" is sophistry.

And yet, as I have explained already, many times, this shows that an argument can be valid even if the premiss does not contain a referring expression. So, it's not 'sophistry'; indeed, it highlights your need to show on independent grounds that "I" is a referring expression -- something I have been asking you to do since we began this debate, but which, for some odd reason, you refuse to do.

Once more, if you can show on independent grounds that "I" is a referring expression (and you might be right, you might not), I will concede the point, but for some strange reason you seem reluctant to do so. Informal, or formal, Logic alone won't get you there.

We seem to be going round in circles. I don't see us getting anywhere until or unless you produce these independent arguments; at least Rosa produced a few, whatever you or Luis think of them. You (singular and plural) have yet to produce a single one of your own!

You then argue as follows:

by parity of reasoning, then, you'd have to say the following is valid:

1. Mark Twain and Samuel Clemens both stood on top of the big rock overlooking Point Reyes.
2. therefore someone other than Mark Twain stood on top of the big rock overlooking Point Reyes.

but let us suppose Mark Twain was the only person who ever stood on top of the big rock overlooking Point Reyes. then 1 is true but 2 is false.

that's because Mark Twain=Samuel Clemens. but a person could say 1 without knowing that Mark Twain=Samuel Clemens. now, according to you, knowledge shouldn't affect validity.

use of "both" in 1 is okay even if Mark Twain=Samuel Clemens because of the presence of two proper names.

Ah, we can all play the let's "suppose" game.

So, let us further "suppose" that we discover that it is false that Mark Twain was Samuel Clemens, and further that Mark Twain wasn't the only person to have stood on Point Reyes. In that case, both 1 and 2 would be true, and the argument valid.

However, I nowhere said that knowledge "shouldn't affect validity". [Or, if I have, perhaps you'd be good enough to quote me. And, it all depends on what we are allowed to "suppose".]

it's completely improper for you to continue to make this assertion. i'm not under any obligation to try so sift through thousands of pages of text to someone locate whatever argument she has allegedly put forth. if this argument is so important and convincing, you can lay it out here and we can judge. otherwise I'm entitled to say you're just blowing smoke.

In fact, it's in her very first post in this thread (so, hardly "thousands of pages"!), which if you missed, I can quote again for you. I think I offered to do this earlier. [Anyway, you will find it reproduced in my previous answer to Luis. Indeed, you quoted part of it in your reply to me.]

anyway, the question is whether taking "I" as a referring expression, and having the sort of pragmatics and semantics I refer to, and is pretty standard fare in logical philosophy, is the best explanation for its role in inferences and statements. it's up to you to show it's not a good account. I'm under no obligation to provide some deductive "proof" since that isn't how things are settled in this area.

Well, lots of things (that even you question) were until recently "standard fare" in logic, but so what? Isn't this part of your criticism of Frege/Russell logic? What you need to do is produce an independent argument that supports this new "standard" line of yours.

If you'll forgive me for saying this, I find it odd you uncritically accept this "standard fare" without any supporting argument, when you are happy to question "standard fare" elsewhere.

On the other hand, of course, if you are reluctant to support your case with an independent argument, it falls by default.

But you then say this, Syndicat:

I'm under no obligation to provide some deductive "proof" since that isn't how things are settled in this area.

Well, as I am sure you are aware, it's 'normal practice' in philosophy to try to justify claims like this. The justification does not have to be deductively sound. Indeed, I'd venture to suggest that the vast majority of arguments produced by philosophers over the last 2400 years aren't deductively sound, or even valid, but that does not prevent them from being persuasive (or otherwise). Many are persuaded by Descartes' [I]cogito, but it's an invalid argument all the same. Most of Hegel's core arguments are a joke, but many here at RevLeft (and elsewhere) seem to accept them.

So, it's up to you: defend your claim or abandon it -- if you'll forgive my directness again.

this is not a "subject predicate expression that attributes properties to a very specific person and not to someone-or-other". hence it doesn't satisfy the criterion i laid out above for what counts as a singular subject/predicate sentence, as opposed to a generalization. your LI is logically equivalent to: Everyone is such that they are not over 12 feet tall, and hence is a universal generalization.

Of course, the same can be said of your example. [Which is, if you think about it, why I used the example I did.]

And, I know it's a universal generalisation, but then that simply underlines my point.

it's not a "second-level predication". you keep coming up with irrelevant supposed "counterexamples" that are all generalizations or equivalent.

I'm sorry, but you and I seem to have studied different logic texts. As far as I am aware it is indeed a "second-level predication". If you disagree, we'll just have to agree to disagree about it, won't we?

I am a native of Los Angeles.

is not a generalization. it attributes a property to a particular individual.

But, only on the assumption that "I" is a referring expression, which you have yet to support with a single independent argument.

now you are being completely absurd.

If I say to a group of people, "Someone here believes the state should be overthrown" and someone asks "Who believes that?" I can answer their question by saying "I do."

Ah, but in that case you have provided a context, which was missing before.

So, not the least bit 'absurd', after all.

this is mere dogmatism. for one thing, since Donnellan's classic essay back in the late '60s, it is standard fare to distinguish two kinds of definite descriptions. this becomes very apparent when we look at the use of definite descriptions in references to events. there are some definite descriptions for which the Russellian analysis is appropriate. and in that analysis they end up not being designators but generalizations. but there are other uses where "the F" ends up being similar to "that F" in that the description F plays a kind of ancillary role as an enabler to the hearer or reader to get them to focus on or think about the intended target. if I say "the tall dude in the striped jacket just ordered a cosmo", this can refer even if the dude is actually a female dressed in male clothing with short hair. it's true if that person did just order a cosmo.

In fact, in my rely to Luis, you will see I cover this point (about which Rosa is aware -- I know since she raises this very point in one of her unpublished essays on Hegel, which I not only have read, I helped her write) -- or one like it.

Again, if you'll forgive me making this point once more, I fail to see how this helps you show that "I" is a referring expression. [Perhaps I am missing something here?]

moreover if a proper name gets its reference thru a dubbing, what is used to indicate the target in the dubbing? if it's an expression like "this child", as in "I'm naming this child "Lueesha", then "this child" must refer if "Lueesha" is to refer. but "this child" is neither a definite description nor a proper name.

Moreover if we include demonstratives or indexicals, as they're also called, as referring expressions, then "here" and "now" are also referring expressions that can't fail to refer. "here" always refers to the location of the speaker. "now" to the time when that token occurs. and these are quite similar to "I" in that "I" also gets its reference from the context of use, it refers to the being who generated the token.

Ah, but "here" and "now" can fail to refer, but "I" can't (that is, on the assumption it is indeed a referring expression). For example, suppose I think that the Battle of Waterloo took place in a certain area of Belgium, and I point to a village on a map, and say "The Battle of Waterloo took place here, in this village". Suppose further that I discover that the said village did not exist in 1815, then my use of "here" (in relation to the village) fails to refer to the location of the said battle. A similar story can be constructed for "now".

now i suppose LJJW may come back and say I need to "prove" this. but in empirical studies it's a question of coming up with a plausible account that is consistent with and accounts for the data, that is, a hypothesis. so it's a question of which hypothesis is a better account.

Again, and I hope you will forgive me for saying this, you'd be far better off trying to shore up your case for showing "I" is a referring expression than trying to speculate about what I will or will not do next.

syndicat

27th July 2011, 18:09

Ah, but "here" and "now" can fail to refer, but "I" can't (that is, on the assumption it is indeed a referring expression). For example, suppose I think that the Battle of Waterloo took place in a certain area of Belgium, and I point to a village on a map, and say "The Battle of Waterloo took place here, in this village". Suppose further that I discover that the said village did not exist in 1815, then my use of "here" (in relation to the village) fails to refer to the location of the said battle.you've not shown that the use of "here" failed to refer. on the contrary, your statement is false in that scenario precisely because it does refer. You're predicating of that location that it is the site of the Battle of Waterloo, which was false. even if the village hadn't been built yet, the location of the village existed. moreover, your statement can be understood as saying of this village, which now exists, that the Battle of Waterloo took place there. your reference is to the village, which exists, and what you say is false because it hadn't been built yet. on either interpretation, "here" refers.

besides, you here agree that "here" is a referring expression. this is contrary to Rosa's dogma that only proper names and definite descriptions are referring expressions. "here" is neither a proper name nor a definite description.

and your bit about Mark Twain not being Samuel Clemens, well, so what? my point was that "both" can be used without it following that two separate referents are involved. and my example was successful in showing that.

the rest of what you say is just your usual sophsitry.

in regard to my argument, whose validity you now say you accept:

(1) Jack and I are both natives of Los Angeles

(2) hence there is someone such that Jack and he are both natives of Los Angeles

in predicate logic, this could be symbolized as:

(1) N(J,L) & N(I,L)
(2) hence, (Ex) (N(J,L) & N(x,L))This inference is an application of existential quantification to a singular sentence. It would not be a valid inference unless "I" refers to an item in the domain of discourse. that's because "I" is being substituted with a variable that latches onto that position in the predicate.

Consider:

(1) I am a native of Los Angeles and I love Suzy.
(2) hence there is someone such that he both is a native of Los Angeles and he loves Suzy.

if you replace "I" by "someone" you would get:

(1*) Someone is a native of Los Angeles and someone loves Suzy.
(2*) Hence there is someone such that he is a native of Los Angeles and he loves Suzy.

This is an invalid inference. the validity of the first inference depends on "I" referring to one and the same individual in each occurrence in (1).

Existential generalization involves grabbing onto the predication about a definite referent and then removing the direct reference to that referent, and making simply a general statement that something or other satisfies that predicate.

and i can replicate many other singular sentences with "I" where the logic of that sentence depends on "I" being a referring expression, such as:

(1) Jack and I are standing in the same telephone booth.
(2) hence at least two people are standing in that telephone booth.

moreover, you had responded to my argument by proposing an argument you say is parallel to my argument:

someone is a native of Los Angeles and Jack is a native of Los Angeles
hence there is someone such that both he and Jack are natives of Los Angeles.

this is supposedly to show that "I" need not be a referring expression. but by parity of reasoning, you could use this same argument to argue that "George" isn't a referring expression in this argument:

(a) George and Jack are both natives of Los Angeles
(b) so there is someone such that both he and Jack are natives of Los Angeles.

as to Rosa's alleged argument you say:

In fact, it's in her very first post in this thread (so, hardly "thousands of pages"!), which if you missed, I can quote again for you. I think I offered to do this earlier. [Anyway, you will find it reproduced in my previous answer to Luis. Indeed, you quoted part of it in your reply to me.]
yeah. i read the first page in this thread. she offers no argument. she makes the dogmatic assertion that only proper names and definite descriptions are referring expressions. dogmatism isn't a cogent argument.

besides, i responded extensively to that "argument" (actually, an assertion) of hers in my previous message.

as I've pointed out before, if we want to figure out what some piece of language tracks in the world, this is a question of coming up with a hypothesis. we are warranted in our conclusion if it's the best available explanation. you've not shown that the pragmatics account of "I" is not the best available account of how it refers (i.e. the view that it grabs as referent the person who spoke or wrote that token of "I").

and, by the way, "I" can fail to refer. if it is used in fictional discourse.

LuÃs Henrique

28th July 2011, 21:56

If you read what I posted, I did not agree; all I said was that these sections, (and I'll add this for clarity's sake whatever Wittgenstein did or did not say) are not worth wasting time on.

Nor did I say that you agree, merely that we could agree that "he said it". Now perhaps that would have been better phrased as "he said such things", ie, he said things to the effect that things about which it is impossible to talk without incurring in 'non-sence' do actually exist, and to the effect that such "unutterable" things not only exist, but are indeed the things that really matter (that poetry, or some aspects of it at least, belong to such category (which, of course, would rule out the possibility of any meaningful literary criticism) seems quite obvious to me, but, just as we could agree on that, we could as well disagree).

Now, if we understand what he was saying, or trying to say, it shouldn't be so difficult to see why he thought 'non-sence' (or some 'non-sence' at least) is important: it deals with the boundaries of what can and what cannot be rationally addressed, and, as such, is beyond actual rationality. But, in order to impress people, it is necessary to have a quid-pro-quo between 'non-sence' in Wittgenstein's terms, and "nonsence" as in ordinary language, so that we can call the works of this or that philosopher "rubbish", "garbage", or "crap". Wait, isn't that crossing between different language games what Wittgenstein exactly sought to denounce?

Luís Henrique

LuÃs Henrique

28th July 2011, 23:23

But, then you'd need another word to describe what happened in Greece (in the sixth century BC) when philosophy became more systematic, and was practiced almost exclusively by members of the ruling-class, or their hangers-on. As I am sure you are aware, something rather unique happened in Greece at that time, which was different from anything that had gone before (in the 'west', at least).

Certainly something rather unique happened in Greece about the 6th Century BC; but it certainly wasn't the invention of God, devils, ghosts, mystical experiences, and whatnot. It certainly wasn't the introduction of linguistic depravity into a pristine "ordinary language" where nothing was mistified or distorted, either.

If you look at societies like ancient Egypt or Mesopotamia, you will see that class stratification and class domination can thrive without philosophy - so the beggining of philosophy cannot be mechanistically reduced to a consequence of social stratification.

What took place in Greece, two and a half millenia ago, then?

In many ways, quite the opposite of Ms Lichtenstein pseudo-historical tale. People started thinking about the world, about their society, and about their language, in unprecedented ways, including the revolutionary ideas that tradition wasn't necessarily always correct, that human intelect could actually picture the world in a meaningful way, that society could be understood, and that different societies can be compared, and that language has an internal structured that can be analysed and understood. Such ideas lead to a method (or various methods) of speculative investigation, which was, or were, labeled "philosophy". That such methods were not scientific (that would have to wait two more millenia), and that much of the speculation they indulged in is false, misguided, or even ridiculous, goes without saying, but it marked the actual start of independent thought and analysis, not the end of a golden era of scientific materialism and non-confused use of words.

Luís Henrique

LuÃs Henrique

31st July 2011, 00:32

Well, it depends on the sentence you are using whether these are referring expressions, or not.

Ah, excellent point. But it makes your task a little bit more difficult: it makes clear that pointing to examples in which 'I' is used as something else than a referring expression is insufficient - for it could well be that that would only apply to the kind of sentence you are giving as an example.
(
By the way, some people here seem to believe that what you are doing - trying to prove a negative - is impossible:
You seriously don't understand the fallacy of being required to prove a negative?

Funny that a guy who claims to know logic is so intent on disproving a negative.
)
But, back to the topic, to actually make your point, you would need either a complete and thorough analysis of how 'I' is used, showing that is actually never used as a referring expression, or a valid argument showing that the use of 'I' as a referring expression is impossible. I have seen neither up to now. Instead, you seem to insist in this argument by Ms Lichtenstein, that seems to imply that one instance where 'I' may not be a referring expression proves that is never a referring expression:

Well, this is just a quirk of Indo-European languages. But even if it weren't, in "I think you should X", the word "I" isn't referring to the individual who uttered it, but drawing attention to the source of what is said. This can be seen by the fact that the person uttering it could have said "You should X" instead.

But that this is a particular case, that cannot be generalised, is shown by

I gave you a chessboard.
I called you a rookie chessplayer.
I beat you in that chess game.

Where no such simplification is possible; indeed, in the given example, the replacement of "I think you should X" for "you should X" is only possible because it is a composite sentence, with two subjects and two predicates; for instance, "I think you should play chess". And, indeed, that this is the case can be shown by the fact that "you should X" can be otherwise paraphrased in a similar way:

God thinks you should play chess.

Where it is quite difficult to argue that 'God' isn't a referring expression, albeit an empty one.

On the other hand, I have "looked into how words are used", and pointed to you an example where 'I' is used in a list among what seem to be referring expressions:

Andrew voted yay, Beatrice voted nay, Charles voted nay, Daisy voted yay, and I voted nay; the proposal has been rejected.It is my impression that 'Andrew', 'Beatrice', 'Charles', and 'Daisy', in this example, are referring expressions, for in

Andrew voted yay, Beatrice voted nay, Charles voted nay, Daisy voted yay, and Edward voted nay; the proposal has been rejected.

they seem to be referring expressions (or are they not, and, in such case, what are they?)

Now, lists usually include only words and/or phrases of the same kind:

Andrew, Beatrice, Charles, and the President of the Supreme Court went to the movies.
Andrew went to the movies, to the soccer game, and to a rock concert.
Andrew likes chocolate, tea, and a good nice book by Agatha Christie.
Andrew sang, talked, danced, and proposed marriage to Susan.

But:

*Andrew, Beatrice, Charles, and sang went to the movies.
*Andrew went to the movies, to the soccer game, and to really.
*Andrew sang, talked, danced, and Susan.

So, if 'Andrew', 'Beatrice', 'Charles', 'Daisy', and 'Edwards' are referring expressions in

Andrew, Beatrice, Charles, Daisy, and Edward went to the movies.

why would 'I' not be a referring expression in

Andrew, Beatrice, Charles, Daisy, and I went to the movies.

?

Luís Henrique

syndicat

31st July 2011, 04:19

Andrew, Beatrice, Charles, Daisy, and I went to the movies.and from this statement we can infer that at least five people went to the movies together in this group...that would not be valid if "I" were not a referring expression.

LuÃs Henrique

6th August 2011, 22:58

and, by the way, "I" can fail to refer. if it is used in fictional discourse.

Very good point. Somewhat related to this, there is the fact that one can be wrong while referring to him/herself - in the past tense:

I went to the movies last Saturday.

But it was on Friday, not on Saturday, and so I am wrong. About myself.

If we are going to look at how words are used, we should look beyond the first glance.

Luís Henrique

Edit: Indeed, one can be wrong about himself even in the present tense:

I have a stomach ache.

But it is the esophagus that is in pain, and so the speaker is wrong about himself.

Fawkes

7th August 2011, 02:35

syndicat

7th August 2011, 03:24

I'm gonna venture a guess and say that the word "I" refers to whomever the speaker/writer intends for it to refer to. This intention is generally discerned through either explicit declaration or assumed implication.

no. speaker intention can't determine reference. i can't use "New York City" as a name of Jack's sister and be understood by people. If I say "I was born in Las Vegas," intending "I" to refer to Jones who was born in Las Vegas, that can't make "I" refer to Jones. It still refers to me. That's because individuals don't get to run their own language. Language is a public social practice.

Fawkes

7th August 2011, 03:41

no. speaker intention can't determine reference. i can't use "New York City" as a name of Jack's sister and be understood by people. If I say "I was born in Las Vegas," intending "I" to refer to Jones who was born in Las Vegas, that can't make "I" refer to Jones. It still refers to me. That's because individuals don't get to run their own language. Language is a public social practice.

This intention is generally discerned through either explicit declaration or assumed implication.

People wouldn't assume Jack's sister was named "New York City" because that word is rarely used in that context. If you said to the listener that Jack's sister was to be referred to as "New York City", you can use it as a name and be understood. "I" is generally assumed to refer to the speaker (assumed implication) unless the speaker makes it known that it is referencing something else (explicit declaration). Individuals don't run their own language, but they can dictate how it is interpreted.

syndicat

7th August 2011, 06:58

People wouldn't assume Jack's sister was named "New York City" because that word is rarely used in that context. If you said to the listener that Jack's sister was to be referred to as "New York City", you can use it as a name and be understood. "I" is generally assumed to refer to the speaker (assumed implication) unless the speaker makes it known that it is referencing something else (explicit declaration). Individuals don't run their own language, but they can dictate how it is interpreted.

don't be ridiculous. in order to try to stipulate some meaning for some word, you have to use words where the reference is already determined by the common social practice. and nobody is going to say "I"m going to use "I" to refer to Jane over there." that sentence itself is self-contradictory.

Hit The North

7th August 2011, 12:15

LuÃs Henrique

7th August 2011, 15:33

"I" is one of the words people use to refer to themselves in the first-person. They may also use the word "Me". Occassionally, as in a famous Seinfeld episode, they may refer to themselves in the third person, as in Jimmy saying, "Jimmy is angry!" But that tends to create confusion.

There are a few phrases that can be used as synonims of 'I':

the writer of these lines
the one who speaks to you
yours truly
this journalist (if used by a journalist; replace at will with your prefered profession or self-descriptor of any kind)

The writer of these lines thinks that this discussion shows that some people like to tell others to look at how words are used, but don't like to look at how words are used themselves.

Yours truly believes that "look at how words are used" is a method of investigation in Wittgenstein, but merely a method to evade any definition and clarification of their words when used by pseudo-Wittgensteinians.

This communist believes this board gives more importance to an apolitical philosopher like Wittgenstein than he actually deserves.

This historian thinks that Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy is completely ahistorical.

etc.

This poster believes it is obvious that any of this sentences could be effectively replaced by sentences featuring 'I' as a subject (though of course some of them above convey more information if it isn't done).

Luís Henrique

LuÃs Henrique

7th August 2011, 15:37

don't be ridiculous. in order to try to stipulate some meaning for some word, you have to use words where the reference is already determined by the common social practice. and nobody is going to say "I"m going to use "I" to refer to Jane over there." that sentence itself is self-contradictory.

In ordinary language, granted. That's more or less what a writer of fiction does, however, when s/he writes a piece in the first person.

Luís Henrique

syndicat

7th August 2011, 17:21

In ordinary language, granted. That's more or less what a writer of fiction does, however, when s/he writes a piece in the first person.not really. they don't stipulatively define "I" to refer to something other than the speaker. the word "I" in that case doesn't refer to anything at all.

a fictional use is a pretend use. language is not being used in its descriptive, representational way, except to the extent there are aspects of the descriptions in the work of fiction that refer to actual things and situations.

LuÃs Henrique

7th August 2011, 17:42

I'm gonna venture a guess and say that the word "I" refers to whomever the speaker/writer intends for it to refer to. This intention is generally discerned through either explicit declaration or assumed implication.

Not to come across as "anti-intellectual", but isn't this making a bit of a mountain out of a mole hill?

Indeed, but whether mole hill or mountain, it is time to raze it down, before it become even bigger.

Luís Henrique

Meridian

7th August 2011, 22:32

I have a stomach ache.

But it is the esophagus that is in pain, and so the speaker is wrong about himself.
It isn't the esophagus that is in pain, it is the person making the utterance.

LuÃs Henrique

8th August 2011, 03:21

It isn't the esophagus that is in pain, it is the person making the utterance.

Maybe, but the pain is in the esophagus, not in the stomach, and so the person is mistaken about herself.

Luís Henrique

syndicat

8th August 2011, 19:33

Pain is a perception of the body, that is, of areas that are "in pain". Pains of internal organs can be sort of vague and you might make a mistaken judgement about the area that you are perceiving in that pain experience. And I think that is the relevant point here.

Meridian

8th August 2011, 20:26

LuÃs Henrique

8th August 2011, 22:03

You can't make a mistaken judgement to yourself about whether you are in physical pain. This is like; you can't be unsure about whether you are seeing something. You can be unsure about what it is that you are seeing, or whether what you are seeing really exists.Take the stereotypical psychiatric patient, who believes he is Napoleon Bonaparte. Now let's hear him:

I am Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of France.

Is he right? Or is he mistaken about himself? He is not lying - he actually believes his fantasy.

So, yes, one can be wrong about oneself. Perhaps even about "feeling pain" - think about the hypocondriacs.

Luís Henrique

Fawkes

9th August 2011, 06:11

language is not being used in its descriptive, representational way, except to the extent there are aspects of the descriptions in the work of fiction that refer to actual things and situations.

Yes it is, it is descriptive and representational of some situation, feeling, place, etc. Just because something is immaterial doesn't mean it is any less actual.

syndicat

9th August 2011, 18:42

Yes it is, it is descriptive and representational of some situation, feeling, place, etc. Just because something is immaterial doesn't mean it is any less actual. so someone writes a science fiction novel about aliens living on the back side of the moon. he has a character called "Nnniii". and he has this fictional 12-legged character uttering sentences with "I". and you'd say "I" and "Nnnniii" actually refer to something real? Why do we say this is a work of fiction then? is there actually a 12-legged creature on the moon?

Meridian

10th August 2011, 19:17

Take the stereotypical psychiatric patient, who believes he is Napoleon Bonaparte. Now let's hear him:

I am Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of France.

Is he right? Or is he mistaken about himself? He is not lying - he actually believes his fantasy.

So, yes, one can be wrong about oneself. Perhaps even about "feeling pain" - think about the hypocondriacs.

Of course you can be wrong about yourself, have I argued otherwise?

What I argued was the following; he can't be incorrect in establishing his own belief to himself. His belief may be incorrect, but that it is his belief may not.

That is like how even a person suffering from hallucinations does in fact see them. Rubbing at the eyes does not change that fact, perhaps it is something impeding their vision, but then that simply changes the reason for the fact that the person saw what they saw. The same if 'it's all in their head', and hypocondria.

There's a difference between hypocondriasis and feigning disease in order to get attention (or for other reasons), Münchausen syndrome (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M%C3%BCnchausen_syndrome). Those with hypocondria seriously believe they have illnesses, which may not be true. But their belief is not what may not be true.

Tjis

12th August 2011, 16:50

'I' refers to the image the speaker has of themselves.
For the ones being spoken to 'I' refers to the image they have of the speaker.
Similar for all other pronouns.

It doesn't refer to someone's physical form, history, world view or any such facts cause even in a conversation where such things are not known (when posting on a forum for example) 'I' makes sense.
It also doesn't refer to an objective absolute true self or identity, because all that we know (including what we know about ourselves) is based on experience and is therefore subjective.

syndicat

12th August 2011, 19:30

It doesn't refer to someone's physical form, history, world view or any such facts cause even in a conversation where such things are not knownwhy is a person's knowledge relevant? if joey and a veterinarian talk about bob, joey's dog, they both refer to the same thing even tho their level of knowledge about dogs is very different. language is a social practice. each individual doesn't run their own language. therefore language reference isn't based on this or that person's conceptions or knowledge.

Tjis

12th August 2011, 20:13

why is a person's knowledge relevant? if joey and a veterinarian talk about bob, joey's dog, they both refer to the same thing even tho their level of knowledge about dogs is very different.
Even though joey and the vetinarian have different knowledge about dogs, they still have a mutual set of knowledge through which they can relate about dogs and about Bob in particular. They both know what dogs generally look like and who Bob is, and they know (or at least expect) that the other knows this as well.
If either one had never heard of the concept 'dog', or had never heard about Bob, they couldn't possibly have a meaningful conversation involving those concepts as a given. It is because they have this knowledge that they can.

language is a social practice. each individual doesn't run their own language.
I agree.

therefore language reference isn't based on this or that person's conceptions or knowledge.
How does that follow?
Just because language isn't created or defined by individuals, it is certainly spoken by them. When any individual speaks, it is spoken from the vantage point of that individual. Each person has their own understanding of concepts such as 'I', or 'dog' or 'Bob' and an idea of the degree to which they are understandable by others. It is not grabbed out of some abstract social sphere.

When two people speak, both have knowledge and understanding that is separate. They have an idea of the knowledge and understanding of the other, and use that to have a meaningful conversation, but it is not the same as literally sharing knowledge or understanding. When referring anything, such as 'I' or 'Bob', the speaker will understand it as one thing and the listener will understand it as another thing, but both are similar enough to be mutually understandable.

syndicat

12th August 2011, 23:09

Just because language isn't created or defined by individuals, it is certainly spoken by them. When any individual speaks, it is spoken from the vantage point of that individual. Each person has their own understanding of concepts such as 'I', or 'dog' or 'Bob' and an idea of the degree to which they are understandable by others. It is not grabbed out of some abstract social sphere. if the subjective knowledge or beliefs of each person is what determines reference, then there could be no communication precisely because people's opinions and knowledge differ.

"dog" is used to track certain kinds of animals because it is determined to do so by a social practice....not because of the opinions or knowledge of this or that person. the social practices create in each of us certain expectations as to what someone is talking about when they use noun or verb phrases. thus language has an essential social existence, not reducible to the subject consciousness of each person.

the social practice in the use of "I" is that it refers to the speaker (and the same in written communication, the writer).

Tjis

13th August 2011, 00:00

if the subjective knowledge or beliefs of each person is what determines reference, then there could be no communication precisely because people's opinions and knowledge differ.

"dog" is used to track certain kinds of animals because it is determined to do so by a social practice....not because of the opinions or knowledge of this or that person.
I never mentioned opinions. Please don't twist my words. Knowledge about word meaning is not an opinion. It is knowing what concept is widely understood to be expressed by what sequence of symbols (audible, in writing or whatever).
Knowledge between people might be different, but at the same time there's plenty of common ground. For example, a veterinarian will know a lot about dogs. A toddler won't. But both know it's a furry animal with four legs that goes 'woof' (if they both speak English).

the social practices create in each of us certain expectations as to what someone is talking about when they use noun or verb phrases. thus language has an essential social existence, not reducible to the subject consciousness of each person.
What is determined by social practice is a form of knowledge. That this knowledge came about by social practice is irrelevant. It is still a piece of knowledge held by individuals.

There is nothing 'essential' about social existence. Social existence is merely an abstraction of the interplay between human beings. It has no essence of its own.
Imagine you were the last person on earth. You'd still be able to speak your language even though there no longer is anyone to speak it with. Social existence is gone but language remains. You can do that because you have the knowledge to do so yourself. It is not external, not some abstract truth. It is knowledge.

the social practice in the use of "I" is that it refers to the speaker (and the same in written communication, the writer).
Yes. And that particular piece of knowledge is shared by pretty much everyone that knows English, which is why we can use 'I' meaningfully in communication.

When someone speaks, they translate what's in their mind into words they expect will be understood by the one they're speaking to.
When someone hears speaking, they translate the words that are said to the concepts that fit them according to social expectations.

Both participants in a conversation have their own knowledge about both language and the various things language can express, and if this knowledge overlaps enough then they are mutually understandable.

Nowhere is there such a thing as a language existing in and of itself, where words have meanings independent of the people that speak the language.

syndicat

13th August 2011, 00:20

When someone speaks, they translate what's in their mind into words they expect will be understood by the one they're speaking to.
When someone hears speaking, they translate the words that are said to the concepts that fit them according to social expectations.

you're psychologizing way too much. people just speak. they don't first think and then go thru some internal process of "translation". nor do they "translate" when they hear the words. when you hear someone say "The cat is up there on the roof" you look up. That's because your hearing the words itself gives you the understanding that the dog is on the roof. Communicating with language enables us to perceive facts that we don't experience directly because of what people tell us or what we read.

But both know it's a furry animal with four legs that goes 'woof'

People can use "dog" to refer to dogs without even knowing that. A person on an island where there are no dogs may have first heard of them when Burko mentions someone in another country who has a dog as a pet. So the hearer knows only that "dog" refers to animals of some kind.

Because people have very great differences in knowledge about the things that words refer to, it's not plausible to suppose that what they know is what determines the reference of the words.

What determines the reference of "dog" to certain animals is the fact that there is a social practice of using "dog" to track these animals in the world. To refer to dogs people must have some minimal concept of dogs, but they need not have the same knowledge or conception of dogs as others.

LuÃs Henrique

31st August 2011, 21:40

Perhaps this thread is methodologically wrong. Perhaps we should have asked, a few pages ago, if 'I' is not a referring expression, then what it is?

Luís Henrique

syndicat

1st September 2011, 00:01

yeah, it has to have a social function. if "I" doesn't refer then, how can

I am 5 foot 9 inches

be true or false? If "I" isn't a referring expression, what is the predicate "am 5 foot 9 inches" doing there?

LuÃs Henrique

1st September 2011, 15:04

What I argued was the following; he can't be incorrect in establishing his own belief to himself. His belief may be incorrect, but that it is his belief may not.

Is that true? How many people seem utterly convicted that they are going to Heavens when they die, and that this material existence is shit when compared with Heaven... and yet, when faced with the material possibility of death, they suffer and panic just like everyone else? Do they believe in Heavens? Do they believe that they believe in Heavens? And isn't it possible that they believe that they believe in Heavens, but actually don't? Wouldn't they be mistaken about their belief?

If we are going to take in serious the famous quote about "behaviour shows belief", isn't it possible that people behave contrarywise to their stated beliefs - and that they are not actually lying, but merely mistaken about their own beliefs?

That is like how even a person suffering from hallucinations does in fact see them. Rubbing at the eyes does not change that fact, perhaps it is something impeding their vision, but then that simply changes the reason for the fact that the person saw what they saw. The same if 'it's all in their head', and hypocondria.

Ah, but there are many different situations conflated here. I see the screen of my computer, and I actually believe in what I see; if I saw a green invisible unicorn walking on my desk, though, I would probably rub my eyes, for I wouldn't believe I was actually seeing it (and so, I would be in doubt on whether I was seeing it or not). On the other hand, if I was a schyzophrenic, and green unicorns were compatible with my pathology, I might find it completely natural.

Think of how many times you saw the stage magician pick a rabbit from a hardhat. Did you see that? When I say, "I saw the magician taking the rabbit from the hat", am I using the word "see" in the same way I use it when I say "What you saw was not a rabbit being producted ex-nihilo, but merely a stage trick that gives you that impression"?

Luís Henrique

LuÃs Henrique

1st September 2011, 15:13

Perhaps this thread is methodologically wrong. Perhaps we should have asked, a few pages ago, if 'I' is not a referring expression, then what it is?

Perhaps even better - what are the possibilities? Words and phrases can be referring expressions, predicates, quantifiers... and what else? Because, as far as I can see, 'I' may not not fit perfectly the definition of referring expression in all cases, but sure as hell it doesn't look as it can ever be a predicate or a quantifier.

Luís Henrique

Meridian

1st September 2011, 18:09

Is that true? How many people seem utterly convicted that they are going to Heavens when they die, and that this material existence is shit when compared with Heaven... and yet, when faced with the material possibility of death, they suffer and panic just like everyone else? Do they believe in Heavens? Do they believe that they believe in Heavens? And isn't it possible that they believe that they believe in Heavens, but actually don't? Wouldn't they be mistaken about their belief?

If we are going to take in serious the famous quote about "behaviour shows belief", isn't it possible that people behave contrarywise to their stated beliefs - and that they are not actually lying, but merely mistaken about their own beliefs?
People often come to change their beliefs. People also often act in discord with their beliefs. Being afraid, panicking, and so on, are not beliefs, but they may be responses, like many, that we can say are stupid when considering a person's beliefs.

You said it yourself in your hypothetical situation, "isn't it possible that they believe that they believe in Heavens, but actually don't?". A person may falsely present their belief, only in relation to what it actually happens to be. But if they actually 'believe they believe' so and so, and this is not them masquerading their thoughts, then they do believe that, at that time. "Believe they believe" is simply unnecessary, unless you are talking about uncertainty.

Say, if a person believed he was Napoleon. That is a different situation from a person who only said to others he believed he was Napoleon, but actually believed he was John. Now, of course you can have a person who genuinely believed he was Napoleon but then came to change his belief into thinking he was John.

Ah, but there are many different situations conflated here. I see the screen of my computer, and I actually believe in what I see; if I saw a green invisible unicorn walking on my desk, though, I would probably rub my eyes, for I wouldn't believe I was actually seeing it (and so, I would be in doubt on whether I was seeing it or not). On the other hand, if I was a schyzophrenic, and green unicorns were compatible with my pathology, I might find it completely natural.

Think of how many times you saw the stage magician pick a rabbit from a hardhat. Did you see that? When I say, "I saw the magician taking the rabbit from the hat", am I using the word "see" in the same way I use it when I say "What you saw was not a rabbit being producted ex-nihilo, but merely a stage trick that gives you that impression"?
I think you're answering your own question here. I do think you are using the word in another way in the last sentence. You are not really talking about what I did see (a rabbit popping out of a hat, for example), but what occurred. The impression would refer to "the impression which was in my eyes", what I caught.

If we did not generally use the word "saw" in this different manner, I would be right to correct the last sentence with: "No, what I saw was a rabbit being 'producted ex-nihilo'".

LuÃs Henrique

2nd September 2011, 16:14

People also often act in discord with their beliefs.

In which case it cannot be valid to say that behaviour shows belief: they can be at odds with each other.

You said it yourself in your hypothetical situation, "isn't it possible that they believe that they believe in Heavens, but actually don't?". A person may falsely present their belief, only in relation to what it actually happens to be. But if they actually 'believe they believe' so and so, and this is not them masquerading their thoughts, then they do believe that, at that time. "Believe they believe" is simply unnecessary, unless you are talking about uncertainty.Well, I suppose that we will have to agree to disagree. To me it is clear that people believe they believe some things, but whe actually analysing what they do, it looks very much that they don't believe in such things. Jorge Luís Borges has this famous sentence, "most Argentinians believe in the other world, but are not interested in it; with me it is the opposite, in that I don't believe, but am interested". The attitude he attributes here to the "most Argentinians" seems to illustrate what I mean. If someone believes that they will spend the rest of eternity in some place (or in some process, like metempsychosis), it is at least strange that they are not interested in such.

Say, if a person believed he was Napoleon. That is a different situation from a person who only said to others he believed he was Napoleon, but actually believed he was John. Now, of course you can have a person who genuinely believed he was Napoleon but then came to change his belief into thinking he was John.And there is the possibility, that is common among paranoids, that they represent themselves as Napoleon, even when they are alone in their beds - but when such identity is challenged, they react in anger, so demonstrating that at some level they actually disbelieve it (and indeed, it might well be that rigidity and fanatism in defense of someone's beliefs is directly linked to deep doubts about such beliefs. Like, for instance, homophobia is so often related to suppressed homosexuality).

I think you're answering your own question here. I do think you are using the word in another way in the last sentence. You are not really talking about what I did see (a rabbit popping out of a hat, for example), but what occurred. The impression would refer to "the impression which was in my eyes", what I caught.Indeed; so we do have two different uses for the verb "to see", and this would precisely be one of these instances in which Wittgensteinian analysis should help us disentangling the mess. Instead, we have people claiming things like "one cannot be mistaken over the fact that they are seeing what they are seeing", which obviously choses one of these uses, ignoring the other, and leads to a conclusion that is evidently false in the other sence of the verb "to see" - without, I fear, considering the double use of the verb.

Let's call the use of "to see" in which one actually 'sees' the stage magician producing the rabbit from the depths of the hard hat "use 1", and the use in which what one 'sees' is a trick, designed to fool the public eyes, "use 2". And now, I wonder: does use 1 actually convey something that exists? Use 1, of course, refers to something that isn't merely subjective, but what is the use of "seeing" something that doesn't actually happen? What does it mean to say that one "cannot be mistaken" about something that has such shaky relation to the external world?

If we did not generally use the word "saw" in this different manner, I would be right to correct the last sentence with: "No, what I saw was a rabbit being 'producted ex-nihilo'".Indeed, but the fact is that we use 'to see' in both those different ways, and the claim of the Wittgensteinian method is that it helps us avoiding philosophical confusions by clearly showing the differences between different uses of words.

Luís Henrique

Meridian

4th September 2011, 14:41

The attitude he attributes here to the "most Argentinians" seems to illustrate what I mean. If someone believes that they will spend the rest of eternity in some place (or in some process, like metempsychosis), it is at least strange that they are not interested in such. In many cases I think people can believe lackadaisically. Similar to how for example many people will simply believe that capitalism can lead to wealth for all members of a society, without any particular investigation of how this could occur. They have been told so and have little apparent reason not to accept it.

I think the case is rather that they express their belief when questioned, which has most likely been developed through implications, though they might never have actually 'made up their mind' about it, or even thought about it directly.

Indeed; so we do have two different uses for the verb "to see", and this would precisely be one of these instances in which Wittgensteinian analysis should help us disentangling the mess. Instead, we have people claiming things like "one cannot be mistaken over the fact that they are seeing what they are seeing", which obviously choses one of these uses, ignoring the other, and leads to a conclusion that is evidently false in the other sence of the verb "to see" - without, I fear, considering the double use of the verb.
Indeed, Wittgenstein always said to consider the grammatical differences in uses of a single word (to differentiate the 'sign' from its 'symbol').

However, "one cannot be mistaken over the fact that one is seeing something" is not false simply due to there existing multiple uses of the term "to see", many of which we have not covered. I chose one of these uses, namely that of the impression of colors and shapes, which is implicitly given in how the sentence is formed.

"Do you see the blue bird over there?"
"I am seeing multiple boats in the water"
"As I closed my eyes I saw several orange shapes"
"Woah, dude, I am seeing colors fading in and out everywhere, and crocodiles climbing on the walls"

Let's call the use of "to see" in which one actually 'sees' the stage magician producing the rabbit from the depths of the hard hat "use 1", and the use in which what one 'sees' is a trick, designed to fool the public eyes, "use 2". And now, I wonder: does use 1 actually convey something that exists?
I don't understand the question! A statement with 'use 1' would go something like this:
"I saw the magician pulling a rabbit from his hat".

This statement would be true if the person saw that. As I illustrated with my examples above, it is not within stated or necessarily implied that anything else is the case (that something 'exists').

What does it mean to say that one "cannot be mistaken" about something that has such shaky relation to the external world?
It has no relation to "the external world". You can't be mistaken about whether you are seeing something, as in whether you have the impression that you see it. It's use is for example that it is folly to tell someone that they did not in fact see what it is they claim they see (besides if you hold them to be lying), unless you also mean to tell them that what they saw made the impression of what they claim but was something else ("use 2").

A madman sees what he sees!

Indeed, but the fact is that we use 'to see' in both those different ways, and the claim of the Wittgensteinian method is that it helps us avoiding philosophical confusions by clearly showing the differences between different uses of words.
I think it's the best method available, but like a tool it will bring varying degrees of success depending mostly on the dedication of those who wield it. It's not a magic wand but a different way of looking at 'philosophical knots', or perhaps simply the acknowledgement that those might exist.

LuÃs Henrique

4th September 2011, 15:45

I think it's the best method available, but like a tool it will bring varying degrees of success depending mostly on the dedication of those who wield it. It's not a magic wand but a different way of looking at 'philosophical knots', or perhaps simply the acknowledgement that those might exist.

And when used like a magic wand it will result in absurd - and often dogmatic - opinions. A particular temptation - that of taking ontological conclusions from methodological considerations - should be avoided. Lest you end up with something that relates to Wittgenstein's method in a similar way that "diamat" relates to dialectical materialism.

Luís Henrique

LuÃs Henrique

7th September 2011, 15:30

I think it's the best method available

It would then be nice to learn what the method consists in. Impressionist accounts such as "looking at how words are used" certainly don't substitute for an adequate description.

Luís Henrique

LuÃs Henrique

14th September 2011, 19:41

Well, I suppose that we will have to agree to disagree.

And, if we look at PhI § 260, it is likely that you disagree with Keynes' God, too.

Luís Henrique

LJJW

7th March 2012, 20:38

Agaim, I'm sorry for the long delay in replying:

you've not shown that the use of "here" failed to refer. on the contrary, your statement is false in that scenario precisely because it does refer. You're predicating of that location that it is the site of the Battle of Waterloo, which was false. even if the village hadn't been built yet, the location of the village existed. moreover, your statement can be understood as saying of this village, which now exists, that the Battle of Waterloo took place there. your reference is to the village, which exists, and what you say is false because it hadn't been built yet. on either interpretation, "here" refers.

And yet, 'here' still failed to refer since it fails to refer to the site of the battle. It might refer to something else, but that is a separate matter.

besides, you here agree that "here" is a referring expression. this is contrary to Rosa's dogma that only proper names and definite descriptions are referring expressions. "here" is neither a proper name nor a definite description.

Where did she say that only proper names and definite descriptions are referring expressions? That doesn't sound at all like her, and I have known her on and off for well over 20 years. May I suggest that you check your sources?

and your bit about Mark Twain not being Samuel Clemens, well, so what? my point was that "both" can be used without it following that two separate referents are involved. and my example was successful in showing that.

I hold no brief for this example; I merely used it since you did. The point was that if you can suppose what you like, so can I.

the rest of what you say is just your usual sophsitry.

Well, it is if you can show it is, rather than merely assert it is. But you don't. I can only wonder why.

in regard to my argument, whose validity you now say you accept:

If you check back, you will see I have accepted its validity all along. I merely questioned your inference that it is valid only because the 'I' was a referring expression, which you simply assume, but have yet to demonstrate.

This inference is an application of existential quantification to a singular sentence. It would not be a valid inference unless "I" refers to an item in the domain of discourse. that's because "I" is being substituted with a variable that latches onto that position in the predicate.

Well, as I said earlier, I'll need to see detailed sematics, formation rules, and rules of inference (etc.) for this odd use of 'I' before I buy that one. Failing that, perhaps you can refer me to a classical logic textbook that sets 'I' up in ths way?

But, since this is supposed to be an informal argument, I'm not too sure why you refer to 'existential quantification' here. Have you back-sassesd and now become a classical logician?

But, even supposing you are right, that will simply mean that you have forced an interpretation on 'I' that it might not have -- unless, of course you can show on independent grounds that 'I' is a referring expression.

Depite being asked many times, you seem not to want to do this.

As I noted earlier, logic can't decide here, it can only work out the consequences of decisions we have already taken -- in this case you have decided on a priori grounds that 'I' is a referring expression.

But, as my counter-examples have shown, not even this works, since we can use 'someone' in the same way, even though it isn't a referring expression.

Consider:

(1) I am a native of Los Angeles and I love Suzy.
(2) hence there is someone such that he both is a native of Los Angeles and he loves Suzy.

if you replace "I" by "someone" you would get:

(1*) Someone is a native of Los Angeles and someone loves Suzy.
(2*) Hence there is someone such that he is a native of Los Angeles and he loves Suzy.

This is an invalid inference. the validity of the first inference depends on "I" referring to one and the same individual in each occurrence in (1).

Sure, but then I'd not argue this way; I'd do this:

(1*) Someone is a native of Los Angeles and he/she loves Suzy.
(2*) Hence there is someone such that he/she is a native of Los Angeles and he/she loves Suzy.

Syndicat:

Existential generalization involves grabbing onto the predication about a definite referent and then removing the direct reference to that referent, and making simply a general statement that something or other satisfies that predicate.

Sure, in a formal system, but your example isn't in a formal system.

and i can replicate many other singular sentences with "I" where the logic of that sentence depends on "I" being a referring expression, such as:

(1) Jack and I are standing in the same telephone booth.
(2) hence at least two people are standing in that telephone booth.

But that is susceptible to my counter-example again:

(1) Jack and someone is are standing in the same telephone booth.
(2) hence at least two people are standing in that telephone booth.

This is valid even if 'someone' does not refer.

moreover, you had responded to my argument by proposing an argument you say is parallel to my argument:

someone is a native of Los Angeles and Jack is a native of Los Angeles
hence there is someone such that both he and Jack are natives of Los Angeles.

this is supposedly to show that "I" need not be a referring expression. but by parity of reasoning, you could use this same argument to argue that "George" isn't a referring expression in this argument:

(a) George and Jack are both natives of Los Angeles
(b) so there is someone such that both he and Jack are natives of Los Angeles.

Maybe so, but I'd not argue that way, since 'George' is already A referring expression, and we know that on independent grounds. You can't say that about 'I'. You have yet to show on independent grounds it is a referring expression. In fact, you haven't even tried!

as to Rosa's alleged argument you say:

yeah. i read the first page in this thread. she offers no argument. she makes the dogmatic assertion that only proper names and definite descriptions are referring expressions. dogmatism isn't a cogent argument.

In fact, she doesn't use the word 'only'. You made that up.

besides, i responded extensively to that "argument" (actually, an assertion) of hers in my previous message.

I'm sorry, but I looked several times, and I couldn't see it. I wonder if you'd be so kind as to post it again, since i do not want to be unfair to you.

as I've pointed out before, if we want to figure out what some piece of language tracks in the world, this is a question of coming up with a hypothesis. we are warranted in our conclusion if it's the best available explanation. you've not shown that the pragmatics account of "I" is not the best available account of how it refers (i.e. the view that it grabs as referent the person who spoke or wrote that token of "I").

Well, we have yet to see the proof that this 'hypothesis' is correct. Perhaps you need to address that major hole in your argument.

and, by the way, "I" can fail to refer. if it is used in fictional discourse.

Give me an example.

LJJW

7th March 2012, 21:20

Luis Henrique:

Nor did I say that you agree, merely that we could agree that "he said it". Now perhaps that would have been better phrased as "he said such things", ie, he said things to the effect that things about which it is impossible to talk without incurring in 'non-sence' do actually exist, and to the effect that such "unutterable" things not only exist, but are indeed the things that really matter (that poetry, or some aspects of it at least, belong to such category (which, of course, would rule out the possibility of any meaningful literary criticism) seems quite obvious to me, but, just as we could agree on that, we could as well disagree).

Ok. But such things were added to the Tractatus as an afterthought, because of his experiences in WW1. They certainly aren't integral to the substantive points he wished to make, and can be dropped with no loss to that book.

Now, if we understand what he was saying, or trying to say, it shouldn't be so difficult to see why he thought 'non-sence' (or some 'non-sence' at least) is important: it deals with the boundaries of what can and what cannot be rationally addressed, and, as such, is beyond actual rationality. But, in order to impress people, it is necessary to have a quid-pro-quo between 'non-sence' in Wittgenstein's terms, and "nonsence" as in ordinary language, so that we can call the works of this or that philosopher "rubbish", "garbage", or "crap". Wait, isn't that crossing between different language games what Wittgenstein exactly sought to denounce?

Well, I don't disagree with much of this, but you will need to read the passages where he speaks about 'nonsense'. There, I think you will see he is not alluding to ineffable truths inaccessible to rational thought, but merely that if language is used in certain ways, we end up with nonsensical sentences.

If you can, get hold of the following book: Beyond the Tractatus Wars edited by Rupert Read and Matthew Lavery (Routledge, 2011), and check out the article by Roger White. He goes through all this in minute detail.

And, where did Wittegenstein say that one could not cross between different language games?

Certainly something rather unique happened in Greece about the 6th Century BC; but it certainly wasn't the invention of God, devils, ghosts, mystical experiences, and whatnot. It certainly wasn't the introduction of linguistic depravity into a pristine "ordinary language" where nothing was mistified or distorted, either.

Certainly Rosa does not assert this. I am surprised you keep alleging it. Now, I have seen the evidence she has amassed, which she will publish in the next few years, that shows how and why early Greek philosophers began to misuse language in order to construct the abstract theses they then imposed on the world.

In the meantime, if you can, get hold of Eric Havelock's 'The Linguistic Task of the Presocratics', in Kevin Robb (ed.), Language and Thought in Early Greek Philosophy (1983), from where Rosa derived some of her ideas.

I'd add links, but I do not have enough posts yet!

If you look at societies like ancient Egypt or Mesopotamia, you will see that class stratification and class domination can thrive without philosophy - so the beggining of philosophy cannot be mechanistically reduced to a consequence of social stratification.

A point Rosa makes, too!

What took place in Greece, two and a half millenia ago, then?

In many ways, quite the opposite of Ms Lichtenstein pseudo-historical tale. People started thinking about the world, about their society, and about their language, in unprecedented ways, including the revolutionary ideas that tradition wasn't necessarily always correct, that human intelect could actually picture the world in a meaningful way, that society could be understood, and that different societies can be compared, and that language has an internal structured that can be analysed and understood. Such ideas lead to a method (or various methods) of speculative investigation, which was, or were, labeled "philosophy". That such methods were not scientific (that would have to wait two more millenia), and that much of the speculation they indulged in is false, misguided, or even ridiculous, goes without saying, but it marked the actual start of independent thought and analysis, not the end of a golden era of scientific materialism and non-confused use of words.

Well, we can go into this another time, but I must ask you to refrain from describing Rosa's ideas as 'pseudo-historical' until you have seen her ideas in full.

Would you be happy with someone who rejected all you had to say after reading only a few sentences of one of your posts?

Ah, excellent point. But it makes your task a little bit more difficult: it makes clear that pointing to examples in which 'I' is used as something else than a referring expression is insufficient - for it could well be that that would only apply to the kind of sentence you are giving as an example.

Indeed, and I'd be happy to concede this point just as soon as I see an argument to the effect that 'I' is a referring expression. All we have had up to present are rather weak gestures to that end.

But that this is a particular case, that cannot be generalised, is shown by

I gave you a chessboard.
I called you a rookie chessplayer.
I beat you in that chess game.

Indeed, and Rosa wasn't making a general point -- but how does this show 'I' is a referring expression?

And, indeed, that this is the case can be shown by the fact that "you should X" can be otherwise paraphrased in a similar way:

God thinks you should play chess.
Where it is quite difficult to argue that 'God' isn't a referring expression, albeit an empty one.

But, you already know on independent grounds that 'god' is a referring expression (although I would question this, but we can go into that another time); this is not so with 'I'.

On the other hand, I have "looked into how words are used", and pointed to you an example where 'I' is used in a list among what seem to be referring expressions:

Andrew voted yay, Beatrice voted nay, Charles voted nay, Daisy voted yay, and I voted nay; the proposal has been rejected.

It is my impression that 'Andrew', 'Beatrice', 'Charles', and 'Daisy', in this example, are referring expressions, for in

Andrew voted yay, Beatrice voted nay, Charles voted nay, Daisy voted yay, and Edward voted nay; the proposal has been rejected.
they seem to be referring expressions (or are they not, and, in such case, what are they?)

But, compare the above with this:

Andrew voted yay, Beatrice voted nay, Charles voted nay, Daisy voted yay, and someone else voted nay; the proposal has been rejected.

But, 'someone else' isn't a referring expression. So, a mere list demonstrates nothing, I'm afraid.

The rest of what you say seems to be an elaboration of the above argument, so I will stop here.

LuÃs Henrique

9th March 2012, 16:15

And, where did Wittegenstein say that one could not cross between different language games?

Well, this seems to be the point being made by introducing Wittgenstein into discussion. When you use words out of their normal context, you end with nonsencical results.

Certainly Rosa does not assert this. I am surprised you keep alleging it. Now, I have seen the evidence she has amassed, which she will publish in the next few years, that shows how and why early Greek philosophers began to misuse language in order to construct the abstract theses they then imposed on the world.To me, it seems that she quite asserts that philosophy is unique in its misuse of words, and that alienation starts with philosophy.

Well, we can go into this another time, but I must ask you to refrain from describing Rosa's ideas as 'pseudo-historical' until you have seen her ideas in full.

Would you be happy with someone who rejected all you had to say after reading only a few sentences of one of your posts?Sorry, but the way she puts it is a pseudo-historical tale:

There are several reasons why traditional theorists attempted to derive such fundamental 'truths' from thought alone. One of them is the following:

This way of conceptualising the relationship between reality and our ideas about it depends on the ancient belief that behind appearances there exists a hidden world -- accessible to thought alone -- which is more real than the material universe we see around us.

This approach was concocted by ideologues of the ruling class, who have always viewed reality this way. They invented it because if you belong to, benefit from or help run a society which is based on gross inequality, oppression and exploitation, you can keep order in a number of ways.

The first and most obvious way is through violence. This will work for a time, but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation (among other things) -- as wee can now see happening in Egypt, for example.

Another way is to persuade the majority -- or a significant section of 'opinion formers', philosophers, theologians, administrators, 'intellectuals' and editors, etc. -- that the present order either works for their benefit, is ordained of the 'gods', or is 'natural' and cannot be fought against, reformed or negotiated with. In this way, the ruling class makes sure it's idea rule --, as, indeed, Marx noted:

Quote:
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch.'"
Hence, a world-view is necessary for each ruling-class to carry on ruling in the same old way.

While the content of this ruling ideology may have changed with each new mode of production, its form has remained largely the same for thousands of years: [I]Ultimate Truth is ascertainable by thought alone and it can therefore be imposed on reality, dogmatically.

And that is why all of traditional philosophy is dogmatic and thus non-sensical.

So perhaps in other places she develops her reasoning in a way that is not pseudo-historical, but in what I have read of hers, it surely is exactly that: a gross and clumsy simplification of much more complex phenomena, that she seems to not grasp correctly; indeed, little better than a conspirational theory of history.

And concerning what I would feel towards someone who rejected all I had to say after reading only a few sentences of one of my posts... it happens all the time. Sometimes those someones also add insulting content to their rejections - as for instance Ms. Lichtenstein always makes a point of doing - and sometimes they don't. It doesn't make me happy, but though thing. Either I will explain myself again, expecting the person will realise their mistake, or I will leave it at that. When they are purposefully insulting, I will probably not forget, though.

Indeed, and I'd be happy to concede this point just as soon as I see an argument to the effect that 'I' is a referring expression. All we have had up to present are rather weak gestures to that end.

Indeed, and Rosa wasn't making a general point -- but how does this show 'I' is a referring expression?Of course she was making a general point - that 'I' can never be a referring expression. But she does that by faulty logic - by implying that, because 'I' is not a referring expression in a given context, then it canot be a referring expression in any possible context.

But, you already know on independent grounds that 'god' is a referring expression (although I would question this, but we can go into that another time); this is not so with 'I'.This is false. 'God' may be a referring expression (as in "God created the world"), but it may be something very different, (as in "God, that was awful").

So the problem is not to know whether 'I' is a referring expression or not, but whether it can be such in some contexts.

But, compare the above with this:

Andrew voted yay, Beatrice voted nay, Charles voted nay, Daisy voted yay, and someone else voted nay; the proposal has been rejected.

But, 'someone else' isn't a referring expression. So, a mere list demonstrates nothing, I'm afraid.Well, there are a few possibilities here:

1. Maybe 'I' is not a referring expression in that context. That would prove only what we already know: that in certain contexts, 'I' is not a referring expression. But it cannot tell us anything about any and all contexts.

2. Maybe a list of referring expressions can include something that is not a referring expression. But this wouldn't prove that 'I' isn't a referring expression in the example, much less that it cannot be one in other contexts.

3. Or may be 'someone else' is a referring expression in that example.

Now, how to deal with that?

It is obvious that the fifth, or the last, item in a list in which the four first items are referring expressions can be just a fifth referring expression:

Andrew voted yay, Beatrice voted nay, Charles voted nay, Daisy voted yay, and Edward voted nay; the proposal has been rejected.
Andrew voted yay, Beatrice voted nay, Charles voted nay, Daisy voted yay, and the lady in a blue dress voted nay; the proposal has been rejected.
Andrew voted yay, Beatrice voted nay, Charles voted nay, Daisy voted yay, and that awful reformist friend of yours voted nay; the proposal has been rejected.
Andrew voted yay, Beatrice voted nay, Charles voted nay, Daisy voted yay, and the leader of our Party voted nay; the proposal has been rejected.

And it is also clear that the fifth, or last, item in a list in which the four first items are referring expressions can be some word or phrase that is not clearly a referring expression:

Andrew voted yay, Beatrice voted nay, Charles voted nay, Daisy voted yay, and someone else voted nay; the proposal has been rejected.
Andrew voted yay, Beatrice voted nay, Charles voted nay, Daisy voted yay, and I voted nay; the proposal has been rejected.

Let's provisorily call 'I' and 'someone else' "dubious cases". One thing that should be noted is that 'I' and 'someone else' function in a different manner concerning the order they can occur in a list that contain, besides themselves, only referring expressions:

Andrew voted yay, Beatrice voted nay, Charles voted nay, I voted nay, and Daisy voted yay; the proposal has been rejected.

but

*Andrew voted yay, Beatrice voted nay, Charles voted nay, someone else voted nay, and Daisy voted yay; the proposal has been rejected.

So it would seem that 'I' and 'someone else' are different dubious cases: 'someone else' must take the last position is such lists, but 'I', like actual referring expressions, can take any place, first, last, or any in-between. This is reinforced by the fact that we probably cannot find a non-residual category into which both 'I' and 'someone else' reasonably fit. If you were kind enough to point out what precisely 'someone else' is in the example, we would quite certainly see that 'I' is not in the same class. Or if you could point out what precisely 'I' is in the same example, it would be something quite different from what 'someone else' can be.

Now, 'someone else' can be replaced by a few synonims, such as 'a further person whose name I don't remember', which behaves in a similar way:

Andrew voted yay, Beatrice voted nay, Charles voted nay, Daisy voted yay, and a further person whose name I don't remember voted nay; the proposal has been rejected.
*Andrew voted yay, Beatrice voted nay, Charles voted nay, a further person whose name I don't remember voted nay, and Daisy voted yay; the proposal has been rejected.

'I', on the contrary, cannot be replaced by such, but only by its own synonims:

Andrew voted yay, Beatrice voted nay, Charles voted nay, Daisy voted yay, and yours truly voted nay; the proposal has been rejected.

which in turn cannot replace 'someone else'.

So, what is 'someone else', in the given examples? And what is 'I' in the given examples?

Luís Henrique