Historical materialism and agency.

[BurnTheOliveTree]

I would like to hear people's opinions on this. If we say as historical materialists that social being determines consciousness, what is left for the idea of people determining for themselves how history proceeds?

I'm aware that the stock quote thrown around for this is "Men and women make history, but not as they please". I take that to mean that the society and conditions a person lives in aren't chosen by them, so they don't operate in a vacuum etc. But also the implication here, as I understand it, is that the material conditions only go so far as to set parameters for what is possible/likely, and within these parameters it is human agency the course of events. Is this how other people interpret the quote?

Most of us who are active on the left would not accept that history is just an inevitable unfolding according to laws, with no space for us to influence its direction. But sometimes this seems to be the thrust of Marx's thought - "Individuals are dealt with here only in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories".

What do people make of all this, is there a genuine tension, or are the two fully compatible?

[Lenina Rosenweg]

Marxism isn't deterministic.Marxism is materialist but materialist in a sense much different than anything that came before. In his Essay on Feurbach Marx said something about humanities "sensous activity" in an ongoiung relationship with nature. There is always room for human agency. Few people are able to fully break out of false consciousness but on the other hand if homo sapiens functioned like sheep, capitalists would not obtain much surplus value from us. "The worst of carpenters is better than the best of bees"

The progression to socialism isn't inevitable. The alternative to capitalism isn't nessecarily socialism, its a more barbaric form of capitalism. This already has manifested itself in Haiti and parts of West Africa.

[¿Que?]

Excellent post by Lenina. I just wish to add that to some extent, praxis is important here. Read Theses on Feurerbach. It's a short read, but a little cryptic. Nonetheless, I think it has what you're looking for.

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm

[Lyev]

I would like to hear people's opinions on this. If we say as historical materialists that social being determines consciousness, what is left for the idea of people determining for themselves how history proceeds?Working class people determining their own futures -- rather than being at the whim of a capitalist, alienated under private property -- is surely something quite fundamental that underlies communist theory. It is a 'philosophy of praxis', as Labriola (then Gramsci) said. Sometimes the more deterministic side of Marx's thought, where observations and tendencies are ossified into laws, is overemphasized too much. It was only Marx, after all, who pointed to the workers as the active agent for transcending bourgeois society whereas all the utopian socialists before him just saw their impoverishment as an indication of why capitalism was so wrong.

EDIT: I wanna just briefly this quote and a bit of elucidation (from The German Ideology): 'all collisions in history have their origin, according to our view, in the contradiction between the productive forces and the form of intercourse.' If read in a certain way or context, you might construe this for pretty basic technological determinism, what Engels and Gramsci called 'vulgar economism': where everything is reduced to mere economic and technological factor. However, it seems that Marx thought that the working class and money, as well the means of production and capital as 'productive forces'. Of course, to say that we do not have much control over our lives under capitalism in quite a general sense is very true -- we are alienated from private property, from the productive forces themelves. If we did control our lives fully and we chose our social conditions from birth, then surely there would be no need to change society in the first place.

[blake 3:17]

I'm aware that the stock quote thrown around for this is "Men and women make history, but not as they please". I take that to mean that the society and conditions a person lives in aren't chosen by them, so they don't operate in a vacuum etc. But also the implication here, as I understand it, is that the material conditions only go so far as to set parameters for what is possible/likely, and within these parameters it is human agency the course of events. Is this how other people interpret the quote?


That's pretty much how I understand it.


Most of us who are active on the left would not accept that history is just an inevitable unfolding according to laws, with no space for us to influence its direction. But sometimes this seems to be the thrust of Marx's thought - "Individuals are dealt with here only in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories".

I think of limits, not laws, though the former may be associated with conservatism. Most genuinely mass revolutionary movements combine aspects of protecting aspects of the old while doing the new.

[southernmissfan]

I think you raise an important point. If material conditions determine why things happen, you can take to a point of economic determinism that makes any sort of politics and action ultimately a futility for us. Marx balanced the fact that material conditions underpin why things happen and are the way they are while simultaneously declaring that the working class is an agent of revolutionary change. They are two at times contradictory strains of thought. Taken to one extreme, you have determinists who declare any action useless, removes themselves from the working class and usually oppose revolution when the proverbially "shit hits the fan" because the conditions aren't ripe. On the other extreme, you have a lot of the vanguardist ideologies of the 20th century who in a sense ignored and went against materialism. A lot of their theory ultimately boils down to saying if a dedicated vanguard tries super duper hard/kills enough people/has good enough leadership, they can essentially bypass material conditions and establish socialism/communism.

Change will not just happen, it must be undertaken by the workers themselves. However, material conditions are the defining factor on spurring this change and how it occurs and what form it takes. And the idea that you can essentially fast forward history and ignore the material reality and transform through sheer will alone strikes me as rather idealist and foolish on paper. In practice it is usually self-serving and ultimately the results are these "communists" carrying out the historic task of the bourgeoisie, albeit draped in red flags.

[Hit The North]

Most of us who are active on the left would not accept that history is just an inevitable unfolding according to laws, with no space for us to influence its direction. But sometimes this seems to be the thrust of Marx's thought - "Individuals are dealt with here only in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories".

What do people make of all this, is there a genuine tension, or are the two fully compatible?

Firstly I think that the quote by Marx here is a methodological claim, not a philosophical claim.

However, yes, I think there is a genuine tension between agency and determination in Marx, but this is only a reflection of his capacity to grasp the reality of human history and social life. People are the bearers - the actors out - of their social relations, but they are not the free creators of the web of social relations they find themselves in.

The tension is dialectical. Sometimes people are run by events; sometimes they take control of these events.

[syndicat]

However, yes, I think there is a genuine tension between agency and determination in Marx, but this is only a reflection of his capacity to grasp the reality of human history and social life. People are the bearers - the actors out - of their social relations, but they are not the free creators of the web of social relations they find themselves in.

The tension is dialectical. Sometimes people are run by events; sometimes they take control of these events.

another example of the mystical use of "dialetics." a confused notion is papered over with a wave of the wand: "it's dialectical".

[Jose Gracchus]

As is usual. Dialectics (and to an extent, even 'materialism') becomes in the mouths of Marxists often nothing but a buzzword that can be fit or molded to fit near any desired conclusions.

[Die Neue Zeit]

I just don't want sociologists to place Agency upon the "precariat," especially upon a stereotype for that social group (the low-income temp worker), just to compensate for the political obsolescence of the factory worker.

[Jose Gracchus]

Can you explain in greater detail?

[Die Neue Zeit]

There are blogs over the past three or four weeks that say that the precariat is the "new working class." I, of course, have spread my message paraphrasing of Marx (see the last post in the precariat thread and then Google a phrase from this) (http://www.revleft.com/vb/all-things-precariat-t148669/index.html?p=2040823). Notice that "class" isn't mentioned in the paraphrase at all.

Recall various Marxist tendencies that glorified the factory worker as the only true proletarian. Well, now there's the danger of the more politicized sociologists doing the same thing with the temp worker, and remember that such isn't the only "precariat" position.

[Lyev]

As is usual. Dialectics (and to an extent, even 'materialism') becomes in the mouths of Marxists often nothing but a buzzword that can be fit or molded to fit near any desired conclusions.
another example of the mystical use of "dialetics." a confused notion is papered over with a wave of the wand: "it's dialectical".Using the the world 'dialectical' is fairly uncontentious here. We can take it to mean that the relationship is dynamic - not immutable, subject to change and flux - and also interactive between its sum parts; there is a back-and-forth dialogue, so to speak, between agency and determination. That's pretty simple.

[ChrisK]

Using the the world 'dialectical' is fairly uncontentious here. We can take it to mean that the relationship is dynamic - not immutable, subject to change and flux - and also interactive between its sum parts; there is a back-and-forth dialogue, so to speak, between agency and determination. That's pretty simple.

Its also ridiculous. Why even call it dialectical? Why not just say that people are shaped by society, but also shape society?

By arguing for a dialectical relationship between agency and determination you are basically calling these things opposites that struggle with each other at a metaphysical level.

[Nehru]

Its also ridiculous. Why even call it dialectical? Why not just say that people are shaped by society, but also shape society?

By arguing for a dialectical relationship between agency and determination you are basically calling these things opposites that struggle with each other at a metaphysical level.

It's dialectical because there's friction between the individual and the collective. The result being, the individual shapes society and vice versa, society also shapes the individual.

[ChrisK]

It's dialectical because there's friction between the individual and the collective. The result being, the individual shapes society and vice versa, society also shapes the individual.

And what "friction" is there between the individual and the collective? How are these two in conflict? In fact, last I checked DM holds that they would have to be contradictories (which entails that they be opposites). I fail to see how this is the case.

[Hit The North]

Who mentioned DM?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Not me....:)

[Lord Hargreaves]

Marxism, as everyone knows, has this intractable tension between agency and determinism. Thats fine.

But when one is referring, as the first poster is here, to historical materialism - the explanatory framework one constructs, as a kind of historical sociology, in order to understand the transitions from previous modes of production to our own, etc. - surely the emphasis has to be on determinism rather than free agency? If you look at something with enough distance - say, with the professional disinterest of a historian studying a far distant civilization - things look as if they were destined to be that way; but, if you were living in those times yourself, its the contingency of events that hits you. So the agency/determinism debate looks far less problematic, then, if you just consider at what "scale" your view has to be

Marxism's own "dialectical" solution is of course that, precisely by our embracing determinism - by understanding the laws that govern societies - we can learn to wield and influence the structures that we "bear", and so finally become freely determining political agents, purposively creating socialism. So, it isn't determinism vs. agency; its determinism = agency.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:


Marxism's own "dialectical" solution is of course that, precisely by our embracing determinism - by understanding the laws that govern societies - we can learn to wield and influence the structures that we "bear", and so finally become freely determining political agents, purposively creating socialism. So, it isn't determinism vs. agency; its determinism = agency.

Except, as I have shown, 'determinism' makes no sense at all:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/my-usual-philosophy-t46568/index.html

http://www.revleft.com/vb/freedom-state-mind-t56836/index.html?t=56836

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=894937&postcount=2

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1575116&postcount=1

Free will:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=894937&postcount=2

Determinism is non-sensical:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/question-friend-asked-t148656/index.html

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1995528&postcount=1

[Lord Hargreaves]

I purposively avoided any talk of the wider metaphysical determinism vs. free will debate in philosophy, which is almost entirely irrelevant to what I said. I drew a distinction between taking the long term view of historical materialism, looking at history as governed by societal laws, versus a day-to-day emphasis on agency, making political decisions etc. Nothing particularly original or controversial about what I said, and it has nothing at all to do with nature.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

^^^But any use of the word 'determinism' involves the person engaging in it in the production of non-sensical sentences.

Unless, of course, you mean something new by this word -- if so, what is it?

[ChrisK]

Who mentioned DM?

You did.

[Amphictyonis]

A failing capitalism system will not automatically result in socialism. Declining material conditions will probably set the stage for acceptance of socialist ideology (by the masses) but only if we work our asses off to offer an alternative. Some people don't agree with me and think the capitalist system can go on forever but I don't think it can. Some people think ideology alone can usher in socialism but I don't see this happening whilst capitalism is maintaining a certian amount of complacency in advanced capitalist nations. This complacency is born out of material gain. Historical Materialism itself is broader than what I explained above it's a way of interpreting history from a more scientific perspective than the bourgeois economists/thinkers did. Another aspect was Marx's explanation of primitive accumulation which was once chalked up to random events and supernatural forces. Historical materialism also explains how our relations to the means of production determines our 'place' in overall society so to speak. It's teh cornerstone of Marxism in my opinion- not some crystal ball but a way in which to view the world.

[Lyev]

Its also ridiculous. Why even call it dialectical? Why not just say that people are shaped by society, but also shape society?A few reasons: 'dialectical relationship' is much shorter than saying 'people are shaped by society, but people also shape society'. Also, the word 'dialectical' has specific philosophical connotations that hint towards Marx's critique of German idealism and Hegel himself (f.e. 1844 E&PM).


By arguing for a dialectical relationship between agency and determination you are basically calling these things opposites that struggle with each other at a metaphysical level.I think my definition is a bit more workable than this. It's clear that agency is not the obvious 'opposite' in struggle with determination, and vice versa. I just gave a definition that seems to fit within the general framework of this discussion, and then you basically gave another definition saying what I am calling the relationship between the two said concepts. For me, that seems a little unfair.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lyev:


I think my definition is a bit more workable than this. It's clear that agency is not the obvious 'opposite' in struggle with determination, and vice versa. I just gave a definition that seems to fit within the general framework of this discussion, and then you basically gave another definition saying what I am calling the relationship between the two said concepts. For me, that seems a little unfair.

But, how is this 'dialectical', and what is gained by foisting this obscure idea on perfectly clear concepts?

[ChrisK]

A few reasons: 'dialectical relationship' is much shorter than saying 'people are shaped by society, but people also shape society'.

Then why are things that have nothing to do with people and society called dialectical?


Also, the word 'dialectical' has specific philosophical connotations that hint towards Marx's critique of German idealism and Hegel himself (f.e. 1844 E&PM).

And what connotation is that?


I think my definition is a bit more workable than this. It's clear that agency is not the obvious 'opposite' in struggle with determination, and vice versa. I just gave a definition that seems to fit within the general framework of this discussion, and then you basically gave another definition saying what I am calling the relationship between the two said concepts. For me, that seems a little unfair.

Except you did not give a definition. So I took the standard definition that someone like Engels, Hegel or Trotsky would have given.

If this is not the definition you use, then how is it dialectical?

[ComradeOm]

Then why are things that have nothing to do with people and society called dialectical?Because its a bog standard philosophical term that been in use for millennia. The word itself is derived from Greek and originally meant arguing through conversation - 'dialectical' shares the same etymological root (dialogos) as 'dialogue' - in which a position was constructed through the exchange of ideas. The modern meaning of the term retains this basic characteristic of a solution arrived at through forces simultaneously acting on each other. Contrast with the more typical Aristotelian concept of 'cause and effect' in which one body acts and the other reacts in sequence

It certainly does not necessarily refer to 'dialectical materialism' or any other such "buzzword". And if you can think of a better way to express the above concept in a single phrase then please feel free to coin and trademark it


Marxism's own "dialectical" solution is of course that, precisely by our embracing determinism - by understanding the laws that govern societies - we can learn to wield and influence the structures that we "bear", and so finally become freely determining political agents, purposively creating socialism. So, it isn't determinism vs. agency; its determinism = agency.Yet both Marx and Engels went to great lengths to specifically deny the charge of determinism. Here's an old post (http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1437459&postcount=8) on the charge of determinism

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

ComradeOM:


Because its a bog standard philosophical term that been in use for millennia. The word itself is derived from Greek and originally meant arguing through conversation - 'dialectical' shares the same etymological root (dialogos) as 'dialogue' - in which a position was constructed through the exchange of ideas. The modern meaning of the term retains this basic characteristic of a solution arrived at through forces simultaneously acting on each other. Contrast with the more typical Aristotelian concept of 'cause and effect' in which one body acts and the other reacts in sequence

Much as I hate to disagree with you, the problem with the word "dialectical" is that it has been hijacked by Hegel and subsequent dialecticians.

If this word was meant in its classical sense, no one would object (except it might be hard to see how social progress arises merely from a series of philosophical discussions/arguments/conversations), but as soon as comrades use this word with its Hegelian meaning (upside down or the 'right way up') then the question returns: in what way is this 'dialectical'?

No problem either with cause and effect, but then, cause and effect is not dialectical in the classical sense, either, only in the mystical Hegelian sense. Appropriating this obscure notion into Historical Materialism gains us nothing, but it does obscure the application of causal language there. So why use it?

[S.Artesian]

Moving back to the original question, and away from the label "dialectic," consider what Marx actually demonstrated: that the specific organizations of societies are relations between producers and nature that are simultaneously relations between the producers themselves; that each historical configuration of labor is a specific configuration based on the conditions of labor, the conversion of labor into a form of property; that these economic processes for reproducing the social relations contain the basis for the transformation, abolition, overthrow of those specific conditions of labor; that, in fact, agency is determined in the relations of labor to its doppel-ganger, its accumulated opposition, the property which is the very condition of the labor to begin with.

Short-version: class.

The agent, the class, is determined necessarily by the organization of society. Capital has to act as capital; it has to drag wage-labor with itself wherever it goes, otherwise it's not capital, and it cannot sustain accumulation.

The working class is necessarily the agent of revolution based on its position in the old economy, the old conditions of labor, and its capability of expressing a new organization of social labor.

The agents are determined. The struggle is determined by the very conditions of their social reproduction. The outcome of each or any struggle is not determined.

But the reappearance of the struggle until the conflict between the property form and social labor is abolished is determined.

Now of course Marx and Engels were absolutely confident on the eventual outcome of the struggle, on the incapability of capitalism to suppress the conflicts at the core of its very being, but that ultimate victory is not the necessity, the determinism which Marx analyzes in, and identifies as, capital.

[Hit The North]

You did.


No, I didn't.

[Hit The North]

ComradeOM:
No problem either with cause and effect, but then, cause and effect is not dialectical in the classical sense, either, only in the mystical Hegelian sense. Appropriating this obscure notion into Historical Materialism gains us nothing, but it does obscure the application of causal language there. So why use it?

Isn't this OM's point? The relationship between structure and agency cannot be reduced to a mere cause and effect relationship where history simply determines agency. In fact, any concrete struggle depends upon a constellation of factors both objective and subjective that cannot be reduced to mere cause and effect. Otherwise the charge of determinism levelled against historical materialism would be difficult to refute.

[ChrisK]

Because its a bog standard philosophical term that been in use for millennia. The word itself is derived from Greek and originally meant arguing through conversation - 'dialectical' shares the same etymological root (dialogos) as 'dialogue' - in which a position was constructed through the exchange of ideas. The modern meaning of the term retains this basic characteristic of a solution arrived at through forces simultaneously acting on each other. Contrast with the more typical Aristotelian concept of 'cause and effect' in which one body acts and the other reacts in sequence

Yes, it is a dialog. Please tell me, in what dialog have you been in, in which you and the other have spoken to each other at the same time and actually learned something. The modern "meaning" that you refer to is a misuse of the term for learning through conversation.


It certainly does not necessarily refer to 'dialectical materialism' or any other such "buzzword". And if you can think of a better way to express the above concept in a single phrase then please feel free to coin and trademark it

When a Marxist says it, it tends to.

Conflicting.

Wrong.

[ChrisK]

No, I didn't.


The tension is dialectical.

Oops. Looks like ya did.

[Hit The North]

Oops. Looks like ya did.

So if I use the word "dialectical" I'm automatically referring to Dialectical Materialism, am I?

Oops. Looks like you added two and two and came up with five.

[Rowan Duffy]

No problem either with cause and effect, but then, cause and effect is not dialectical in the classical sense, either, only in the mystical Hegelian sense. Appropriating this obscure notion into Historical Materialism gains us nothing, but it does obscure the application of causal language there. So why use it?

Because there is no arrow of causation between the two. The example which Deluze and Guattari use of the flower and the bee, is instructive I think. Neither one has determined the form of the other. It can not be understood as a causal arrow because it is a bi-causal relationship through time. The form of the bee changes the form of the flower and vice versa. This is the meaning of "dialogue" not some pompous philosophers arguing about which ideal form dictates the other through a causal arrow.

[ComradeOm]

If this word was meant in its classical sense, no one would object (except it might be hard to see how social progress arises merely from a series of philosophical discussions/arguments/conversations), but as soon as comrades use this word with its Hegelian meaning (upside down or the 'right way up') then the question returns: in what way is this 'dialectical'?And who said they are? It appears to me that people have latched onto a very innocuous (and perfectly accurate) use of the term and automatically assumed that it was a reference to dialectical materialism. This is not the case

I certainly have no time for the diamat (and when I do its to largely agree with your criticisms) but I see absolutely no reason to write off a perfectly acceptable philosophical term because of it. In this case it makes perfect sense to suggest to suggest that history is best viewed not as a product of economic trends or human agency but rather a continuous interaction of the two


When a Marxist says it, it tends to.Tends to. Did you actually read the post in question? Have you actually read Bob's denials? Or did you just jump to a conclusion based on an automatic word recognition? Its very difficult to read Bob's original post and conclude that it hinges on dialectal materialism. The presence of one word does not change that

[S.Artesian]

So... does anyone want to talk about determinism and agency in Marx's analysis?

If not... let's be clear-- "conflicting" is a 'necessary' description of what happens in capital, but it is not sufficient, as this conflict is inherent, and more than inherent, this conflict is the very basis for the development of capital. This conflict is reproduced at every level of capital's reproduction, and contains the potential for the supplanting of capital by a new organization of labor based on the very thing that made capital so, temporarily, strong.

It's a bit more than "conflict," just as a revolution is a bit more than a rebellion, a protest, a disagreement.

So... if people want to use the term "dialectical" as Marx most clearly did all through his economic manuscripts, in his correspondence, and even his mathematical explorations in the last year of his life-- meaning self-organized conflict, containing the negation of the original determinants of the relation, that seems quite in keeping with how capitalism, and the struggle against it, actually manifest themselves.

If that term does not apply to the concrete aspects of capital and class struggle, then perhaps Marx's critique of capital, his analysis of class struggle, or flawed. Would love for somebody to show us those flaws, and how those flaws are based on a faulty notion of dialectic.

But nobody will.

So back to agency and determinism, please.

Or we can just go round and round in this circle jerk. As George Clinton sang in "Atomic Dog"-- A dog that chases its tail will always be busy.

[Lyev]

SA: So what does happen inside capital? Are you positing wage-labour as an intrinsic feature that constitutes capital? -- because I've always held that wage-labour and capital are two separate entities in struggle with each other. Also, when you mention that 'the conflict between the property form and social labor' is a conflict, is this specifically alluding to that now-famous passage in the Preface to The contribution to the critique of political economy? Is this where the productive forces becomes fetters on the relations of production? Actually, capital here is itself a productive force, isn't it? I think maybe an element of determinism creeps in here when private property, capital, takes on the capacity and power to control the labour-time of actual people. Can we (and if so, to what extent) say that productive forces therefore determine working people themselves? I dunno, I've always found the German ideology and the like pretty hard going, so I am not too sure about this

[S.Artesian]

SA: So what does happen inside capital? Are you positing wage-labour as an intrinsic feature that constitutes capital? -- because I've always held that wage-labour and capital are two separate entities in struggle with each other. Also, when you mention that 'the conflict between the property form and social labor' is a conflict, is this specifically alluding to that now-famous passage in the Preface to The contribution to the critique of political economy? Is this where the productive forces becomes fetters on the relations of production? Actually, capital here is itself a productive force, isn't it? I think maybe an element of determinism creeps in here when private property, capital, takes on the capacity and power to control the labour-time of actual people. Can we (and if so, to what extent) say that productive forces therefore determine working people themselves? I dunno, I've always found the German ideology and the like pretty hard going, so I am not too sure about this

Exactly. Marx specifically and explicitly regards wage-labor and industrial capital [as opposed to commercial, merchants] as intrinsic to each-other. That's kind of the whole point to his economic manuscripts. That intrinsic organization and opposition- of the means of production as private property, and labor as wage-labor- is the social relation of capital. Industrial capital cannot exist separate and apart from this intrinsic relationship, just as surplus value cannot exist apart from this intrinsic relationship.

Capital is no productive force; it is accumulated labor. The capitalists, in the need to reduce necessary labor time and aggrandize greater surplus labor time, have to augment the productivity of labor, but that augmentation, like all of capitalist production is based on accumulation from living labor power..

Yes, that is the conflict in the preface to ACTTCoPE, restated from The German Ideology, which Marx, I believe said stood up pretty well some 25 or 30 years after being written [although never published] "to the gnawing criticism of mice."

What happens inside capital is that the need to expand profit actually devalues capital, expands use-value at a rate far above that of capital value; this is manifested in the changing organic composition, and technical composition of capital, and the tendency of the rate of profit to fall.

The barrier to further capital accumulation becomes all existing capital accumulation which the bourgeoisie must now try to incinerate and/or drive the wages of workers below the point of reproduction.

The determinism exists in the laws, patterns, necessity of capital accumulation. The agent of revolution is formed by just those same laws and necessity.

[Rafiq]

Maybe this quote means men and women create history, butnot in an idealist sense, because the, for example, laws of physics get in the way. I'm not expert on Marx, and I'm just guessing, so don't jump on me..

[ChrisK]

So if I use the word "dialectical" I'm automatically referring to Dialectical Materialism, am I?

Oops. Looks like you added two and two and came up with five.

Why on Earth would you call something a dialectical relationship?

[Dave B]

When it comes to determinism which is an old philosophical and religious chestnut it helps I think to first look at the non human material world from a scientific viewpoint.

The idea being that once a sequence of events is set in motion the outcome is predetermined by the interplay of the laws of the physical universe.

It might be too complicated for humans to understand and we may not have all the information required to predict what will happen.


But once a cue ball is sent on its way to the pack on a pool table the way the balls break will be pre-ordained, even if it is impossible to work it out.


[There is a question mark over this with quantum mechanics and the possibility of random events theoretically associated with it leaving open to chance a variety of possibilities. Even though quantum events are minuscule they have the potential to affect macroscopic events with the butterfly and typhoon theories.
But Einstien for one didn’t like that idea with his ‘God doesn’t play dice’ and thus his philosophy of determinism.]


When you move on to humans you have to logically accept that we are all part of the physical universe and that our actions, wills, wishes, wants and even personalities (by nature and nurture) are the of the same material universe and our behaviours etc are likewise predetermined.

Or in other words free will is an illusion.

However that doesn’t mean that we don’t want things or have a will that is just as material as all the other stuff.


What we probably want at a basic level is food, clothing, shelter and maybe a desire to copulate etc. and a desire to maximise those with the least effort by attempting to understand and control our physical environment in the most efficient and beneficial way to our nature.

That human nature or drive having been determined as a material success story by the particular ecological niche we evolved from, which included co-operative and intelligent manipulation of our environment.

Attempting to understand and control doesn’t rule out muddle and confusion.

The communist project is part of that ie there is a better way for humans of living together on the planet.


Thus human agency in the situation we find ourselves now can find a logical and materialistic legitimacy in that without fretting about it.

Or in other words wanting to make things better for me and us, as that is what we are.


Originally Feuerbach and Marx had thought that humans were not only egotists ie that they had had tendency maximise their basic biological wants, using intelligence to manipulate and control nature, but that they were naturally co-operative and social. And took pleasure and were fulfilled, and un-alienated, when acting to satisfy the wants and needs of others.

Stirner in his thesis ‘Ego and his Own’ pretty much reduced the material will of humans to their egotistical interests.

[Vanguard1917]

Most of us who are active on the left would not accept that history is just an inevitable unfolding according to laws, with no space for us to influence its direction. But sometimes this seems to be the thrust of Marx's thought - "Individuals are dealt with here only in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories".

I'd disagree. Marx's point is merely that, in his analysis, individuals are seen in the context of social relations.

"I paint the capitalist and the landlord in no sense couleur de rose [i.e., seen through rose-tinted glasses]. But here individuals are dealt with only in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories, embodiments of particular class-relations and class-interests. My standpoint, from which the evolution of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history, can less than any other make the individual responsible for relations whose creature he socially remains, however much he may subjectively raise himself above them."

That's not a denial of human agency and history-making potential.

[ChrisK]

And who said they are? It appears to me that people have latched onto a very innocuous (and perfectly accurate) use of the term and automatically assumed that it was a reference to dialectical materialism. This is not the case

Point taken.


I certainly have no time for the diamat (and when I do its to largely agree with your criticisms) but I see absolutely no reason to write off a perfectly acceptable philosophical term because of it. In this case it makes perfect sense to suggest to suggest that history is best viewed not as a product of economic trends or human agency but rather a continuous interaction of the two

The reason for rejection is because philosophical terms as whole are nonsensical. That is why I tend to jump when it is used. Marxism has no use for philosophy as a means of analysis. That is why historical materialism exists; it allows us to analyze class society without philosophy.

Questions of agency are useless to an understanding of class society. What is important is an understanding that humans create the conditions that shape them. This is not agency, free will, or determinism. It is a rule for understanding a class society.

[S.Artesian]

Point taken.



The reason for rejection is because philosophical terms as whole are nonsensical. That is why I tend to jump when it is used. Marxism has no use for philosophy as a means of analysis. That is why historical materialism exists; it allows us to analyze class society without philosophy.

True, but that doesn't mean historical materialism does not utilize, "express" a dialectic. Marx repeatedly and consistently says and demonstrates that he does.


Questions of agency are useless to an understanding of class society. What is important is an understanding that humans create the conditions that shape them. This is not agency, free will, or determinism. It is a rule for understanding a class society.

So... is there an agent to history? Is there an agent to "world-historical" transformations of economies? Is there an agent to revolution?

If so, how is that agent determined. If not how does revolution come about?

Short version: Is there such a thing as class-for-itself?

[Thirsty Crow]

Questions of agency are useless to an understanding of class society.This would make sense only if you separated concrete political action/practice and historical materialism. In other words, I do think that (Marxist) theory and (working class movement's) practice are not amenable to such a separation (expressed in the classical "formula" of "unity of theory and practice").
Agency plays a vital role here (recall Marx's observation that "the emancipation of the working class must be the act of the working class itself").
What is important is an understanding that humans create the conditions that shape them. This is not agency, free will, or determinism. It is a rule for understanding a class society.

Of course that it is important to understand what you've just described. But this can only function as a "first step" after which comes a more nuanced understanding of the functions of different groups within a historically determined situation. I believe that this refers to the concept of "agency".

[ChrisK]

True, but that doesn't mean historical materialism does not utilize, "express" a dialectic. Marx repeatedly and consistently says and demonstrates that he does.

Of course he utilize's a dialectic. I would never say he doesn't. What this highlights is the difference between the use of dialectic (he tends to use it is the Aristotelean methodological sense) and calling a relationship "dialectical".


So... is there an agent to history? Is there an agent to "world-historical" transformations of economies? Is there an agent to revolution?

If so, how is that agent determined. If not how does revolution come about?

Short version: Is there such a thing as class-for-itself?

These questions are non-sense. Basically, I really doubt they need to be answered for a proletarian revolution to happen.

Actually on second look, the last two questions are relevant.


how does revolution come about?

By the working class recognizing themselves as a class and using their power to rise up and fight for their best interests. In this case, their interests aim at a communist end.


Is there such a thing as class-for-itself?

Yes.

[ChrisK]

This would make sense only if you separated concrete political action/practice and historical materialism. In other words, I do think that (Marxist) theory and (working class movement's) practice are not amenable to such a separation (expressed in the classical "formula" of "unity of theory and practice").
Agency plays a vital role here (recall Marx's observation that "the emancipation of the working class must be the act of the working class itself").

This is not a question of agency. Agency is a philosophical question of why we act (ie are our actions free or determined).

What you are talking about is the question of who can lead the workers revolution (the workers), which has nothing to do about why/how we act.


Of course that it is important to understand what you've just described. But this can only function as a "first step" after which comes a more nuanced understanding of the functions of different groups within a historically determined situation. I believe that this refers to the concept of "agency".

No, that refers to the concept of sociology. I have no problems with social science, just philosophy.

[S.Artesian]

Of course he utilize's a dialectic. I would never say he doesn't. What this highlights is the difference between the use of dialectic (he tends to use it is the Aristotelean methodological sense) and calling a relationship "dialectical".

Except of course, everywhere Marx uses, or describes a dialectic he explicitly states he talking about dialectical relationships.




These questions are non-sense. Basically, I really doubt they need to be answered for a proletarian revolution to happen.

Actually on second look, the last two questions are relevant.

By the working class recognizing themselves as a class and using their power to rise up and fight for their best interests. In this case, their interests aim at a communist end.

Well, good, the questions are not non-sensel. So what determines the agency? What makes the proletariat revolutionary? Could it be its relationship to capital? Simultaneously reproducing and in the reproduction creating the basis for negating capital, the social relations of capital?

[ChrisK]

Except of course, everywhere Marx uses, or describes a dialectic he explicitly states he talking about dialectical relationships.

Yes, his unfortunate misapplication of the term. He still, for the most part, uses it the other way.


Well, good, the questions are not non-sensel.

By being philosophical, they are.


So what determines the agency?

Depends, are you asking the non-sense question "what determines how humans are" or are you asking...


What makes the proletariat revolutionary?

Which you answer as


Could it be its relationship to capital? Simultaneously reproducing and in the reproduction creating the basis for negating capital, the social relations of capital?

Which is for the most part correct. I have minor issues on the words used (due to the confusion they might create), but yes, this is the answer.

What is asked here is not a question of agency, but a question of sociological class.

BTW, excellent last issue of Insurgent Notes!

[iskrabronstein]

Point taken.



The reason for rejection is because philosophical terms as whole are nonsensical. That is why I tend to jump when it is used. Marxism has no use for philosophy as a means of analysis. That is why historical materialism exists; it allows us to analyze class society without philosophy.

Questions of agency are useless to an understanding of class society. What is important is an understanding that humans create the conditions that shape them. This is not agency, free will, or determinism. It is a rule for understanding a class society.

Yet I think that by rejecting analysis of the varying, conflicting bourgeois ideological hegemonies that manifest within the parameters set by the material form of capitalist society, you are unable to effectively explain or predict the particular trends and policies that help to shape the nature and power of the state. The ideological hegemonies that gain influence within a bourgeois state have indirect, but definite influence on policy thought and political action within that society; to argue against this is in fact, in my opinion, to embrace the very determinism that Marxism flirts with.

I find a lot to agree with in Gramsci's characterization of hegemonic structure: it is humans themselves who have material agency, but the conditions of its exercise are both limited materially by the structure of class society and ideologically by the ideological hegemonies that strive for dominance in that society. Revolutions, thus, are the moment when these structures are overturned and transformed: social change cannot occur without catalyzing ideological and philosophical change.

I think only this level of analysis, which allows for the tailoring of structural analysis to each discrete form of bourgeois society can begin to approximate the complexity of existing reality. Consequently, the ability to account for philosophical and political differences between bourgeois states, or even between varying time-periods within the same bourgeois state is mandatory. I do not think philosophy can be rejected out of hand.

[ChrisK]

Yet I think that by rejecting analysis of the varying, conflicting bourgeois ideological hegemonies that manifest within the parameters set by the material form of capitalist society, you are unable to effectively explain or predict the particular trends and policies that help to shape the nature and power of the state. The ideological hegemonies that gain influence within a bourgeois state have indirect, but definite influence on policy thought and political action within that society; to argue against this is in fact, in my opinion, to embrace the very determinism that Marxism flirts with.

You've written a whole lot of nothing here. Also, I do not embrace determinism as it is non-sense; as is free will.


I find a lot to agree with in Gramsci's characterization of hegemonic structure: it is humans themselves who have material agency, but the conditions of its exercise are both limited materially by the structure of class society and ideologically by the ideological hegemonies that strive for dominance in that society. Revolutions, thus, are the moment when these structures are overturned and transformed: social change cannot occur without catalyzing ideological and philosophical change.

And how on Earth does this prove that questions of agency are necessary for revolution?


I think only this level of analysis, which allows for the tailoring of structural analysis to each discrete form of bourgeois society can begin to approximate the complexity of existing reality. Consequently, the ability to account for philosophical and political differences between bourgeois states, or even between varying time-periods within the same bourgeois state is mandatory. I do not think philosophy can be rejected out of hand.


What is "existing reality"?
Why is this mandatory?
I do not reject it out of hand. I reject it on linguistic and Marxist grounds.

[S.Artesian]

I think Chris is pointing out in his response to Iskra.. that if we're seeking to attach a notion of either free will or determinism to Marx, or if we're trying to "fit" Marx's critique of capital into concepts of free will and/or determinism, we are essentially wasting our time and everybody else's.

If I have that right, then the next thing I have to say is that I couldn't agree more with Chris, despite our other obvious disagreements.

These questions of "free will" and "determinism" are immaterial for Marx, literally; have nothing to do with what he, Marx, is "all about" in his critiques of the material conditions of social reproduction; and represent a regression from Marx to... well maybe, religion, or maybe epistemology, or Descartes. You know, the old "I think, therefore I am" hocus-pocus.

All of that disappears with Marx. Human life is material; the material of that life is the appropriation of nature. In the appropriation of nature through production, human beings establish social relations of production to each other. These social relations then determine the organization of human life.

Free-will? Determinism? Of little relevance. And the little relevance they have is as expressions of alienation, estrangement from the actual reproduction of social life.

This is not an argument for some sort of proletkult of Marxism, where everything is simply reduced, and linearly, to class relations. It is simply recognizing what Marx's "project" is, the [necessary] specificity of that project, and how that specificity is the project's greatest strength in that at all points and times, Marxist analysis, historical materialism, focuses on the relations between classes, not questions based on the abstraction of human beings as isolated, individual actors.

[ChrisK]

^^^
Couldn't have said it better myself

[Oswy]

...

The tension is dialectical. Sometimes people are run by events; sometimes they take control of these events.

What I struggle with is the specifics of what a person 'taking control' might mean which can't then be reduced to material, and thus determinist, forces. It's not that I want to be a champion of determinism, far from it, but if human thoughts are only generated through human brains and human brains are essentially physical structures subject to cause and effect processes, this suggests that every thought or act of human 'agency' has an antecendent matrix of, ultimatekly, physical causes. I just can't get around coming back to the issue of 'where' or 'how' this thing called 'agency' manifests itself, at the most basic level.