Sverdlov vs. Lenin vs. Stalin

[Die Neue Zeit]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yakov_Sverdlov


A close ally of Vladimir Lenin, Sverdlov played an important role in persuading leading Bolsheviks to accept the controversial decisions to close down the Constituent Assembly and to sign the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. It was claimed that Lenin provided the theories and Sverdlov made sure they worked. Later their relationship suffered as Lenin appeared to be too theoretical for practical Sverdlov, who at that time was the chief architect of the Red Terror.

Had Sverdlov survived the 1918 flu pandemic, was there the possibility of him becoming the "Stalin" figure instead of Stalin, maybe perhaps without being "too rude" (purges-wise, at worst being an Andropov or a Late Stalin)? Because of his Orgburo position(s) within the Bolshevik party, he would have been in a good "patronage"/nomenklatura position to sideline Sovnarkom's usurpation of the CEC's state role (http://www.revleft.com/vb/sovnarkom-t147483/index.html) in actual continuation of the czarist Council of Ministers, and perhaps merge the CEC with key elements of the party apparatus.

[Dimentio]

A part of Stalin's power derived from informal networks, consisting mainly of comrades from the Caucasus area. One reason that Beria got so much power was that he and Stalin talked in Ossetian instead of Russian with one another.

[Die Neue Zeit]

But Zinoviev had similar informal connections in Petrograd. Every regional party boss that became party secretary had to have such patronage.

[ComradeOm]

I see no reason to think that Sverdlov might become a Stalin. He was a conciliatory figure within the Party, who strongly rejected Lenin's demands to expel Kamenev and Zinoviev, and he showed no inclination to transform his position into a local powerbase

[Die Neue Zeit]

Reconstructing the state: personal networks and elite identity in Soviet Russia (http://books.google.ca/books?id=qTRvcrPQ--IC) by Gerald Easter might have something different to say about that. One person's "personal networks" can be another's "nepotism."

P. 68 and onwards contrast the personnel styles of Sverdlov and Krestinsky, and how Stalin's use of the former's personal networks style was crucial.

[Zederbaum]

I suppose a lot depends on how you see the mix between the wider social factors that led to the purge and to what degree the personal characteristics of Stalin played a part. It's the old question of the role of the individual in history.

Stalin fancied himself as more than a secretary and it was his opponents' great error to dismiss him as such. I'm not familiar if Sverdlov had any interest in political theory such that he would have been regarded as a party theoretician; certainly one doesn't hear of it if he did. Such was the regard for political ideas in the Bolshevik party of that era that it would have proved difficult to become the undisputed leader of the party without having proved oneself in that area. Stalin made his stab at it with "Problems of Leninism".

Maybe Sverdlov would have made an attempt to do so as well but he appears in most accounts as a very efficient assistant to Lenin who didn't have the need to satiate his ego with acclamation from the wider party so I think there's good grounds for doubting he would have bothered.

I'm inclined therefore to think that Sverdlov would not have resorted to mass slaughter that marked the 1930s. The jealousy, the inclination towards feuding, the need for acclaim that are so distinctive in Stalin, even as early as the Civil War, can have a massive influence of society when that figure is at the locus of so much power. And the absence of such characteristics could have a commensurate influence. It's one of the many “what ifs” of Soviet Russia.

I'm not sure about the claim that Sverdlov would have helped ensure the primacy of the CEC over Sovnarkom. It's true he was the leading figure after taking over from Kamenev in November 1917 but from the accounts I've read he greatly assisted Lenin in rendering that institution something of a rubber stamp for Council of People's Commissars.

The Left SRs seem to have had a greater interest in preserving soviet democracy and in holding government to account in the CEC. The split between them and the Bolsheviks contributed not only to the isolation of the latter and the scaling up of the civil war, but also of seriously undermining the chances of a democratic system emerging.

[Gorilla]

Whenever these 'what if X succeeded Lenin' scenarios come up, I never want to be the one to point out that X was Jewish (Trotsky, Zinoviev, Sverdlov) but even in the tolerant atmosphere of the early USSR I don't think that can be ignored.

[Zederbaum]

Whenever these 'what if X succeeded Lenin' scenarios come up, I never want to be the one to point out that X was Jewish (Trotsky, Zinoviev, Sverdlov) but even in the tolerant atmosphere of the early USSR I don't think that can be ignored.
I guess not, although I'm not familiar myself the extent to which it may have been a factor. If I recall correctly, Trotsky declined the post of interior minister immediately after the October Revolution due to his Jewish background.

It's worth noting that Bukharin and Rykov, the latter heading the Sovnarkom after Lenin's death, weren't Jewish.

That said, the decline in influence of Jews as Stalin rose to dominance is noticeable - and indeed was noticed by Hitler who viewed the latter as reasserting the Russians' traditional leading role in the state over that of internationally minded Jews.

It's a great compliment to late 19th and early 20th century Jewish culture that they provided so many luminaries for all shades of the socialist movement. Their internationalist outlook, which the Nazis so detested due to its undermining of nationalistic identity, was a very attractive feature and perhaps even to this day hasn't been matched.

[Savage]

^^ Didn't Lenin have some Jewish heritage (albeit less than the aforementioned)?

[Kiev Communard]

I don't think that Sverdlov would have been able to succeed Lenin. His influence in the Bolshevik Party was not so firm as to allow him to sideline the other leaders of his time. Zinoviev would have probably been realistic replacement for Stalin, but then his arrogance and unilateral style prevented him from creating such an extensive circle of influence as Stalin did.

[Ismail]

He was a conciliatory figure within the Party, who strongly rejected Lenin's demands to expel Kamenev and ZinovievSo was Stalin early on, as Ian Grey for instance points out. To give one example:

"At the meeting of the committee on October 17 (30) [1917], Trotsky advocated stern action against Kamenev and Zinoviev and branded them as traitors. He was not influenced by the fact that Kamenev was his brother-in-law; indeed, he was demonstrating that loyalty to the party stood far above personal relationships. Other members supported the case for severe punishment. It was Stalin who brought the note of moderation into the fury of the discussion... Kamenev and Zinoviev knew that they had acted irresponsibly, and they would not repeat their mistakes. Then it was decided to remove Kamenev from the editorial board of Pravda. This, too, was dropped, when Stalin resigned in protest and the committee refused to accept his resignation."
(Grey, Ian. Stalin: Man of History. 1st ed. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1979., pp. 97-98)

Even as late as 1925:

"The campaign against Trotsky, which had been going on for over a year, now reached its climax... he awaited the meeting of the Central Committee to be held January 17-20, 1925. He had written what is known as the letter of resignation in which, as in his speech to the Thirteenth Congress, he expressed his loyalty and submission to the party, but refused to make any confession of error.

At the committee meeting Zinoviev and Kamenev showed eagerness to make the final kill. Supported by others, they demanded the expulsion of Trotsky not only from the committee and Politburo but from the party itself. This, the final sentence of excommunication, was opposed by Stalin. Reporting later to the Fourteenth Party Congress, he explained that 'we, the majority of the Central Committee . . . did not agree with Comrades Zinoviev and Kamenev because we realized that the policy of cutting off heads is fraught with major blood-letting—and they want blood—dangerous and contagious; today you cut off one head, tomorrow a second, then a third; who would remain in the party?' It was a fateful pronouncement."
(Ibid. pp. 204-205.)

But yeah, I can't see Sverdlov taking power unless Stalin, Trotsky, Bukharin or Zinoviev weren't viable for whatever reasons.