Ontological Argument for the Existence of God

[Apoi_Viitor]

What is it (specifically Descartes' version)?

[¿Que?]

not sure, but I know it apparently tries to define god into existence, or something.

[syndicat]

i'll give Scotus's version, which is the most plausible. it starts from this premise:

1. it is possible that an uncausible producer exists.

2. anything that exists contingently ( could fail to exist) could have causes of its coming to exist or ceasing to exist.

3. hence the contingent is causible.

4. hence an uncausible producer can't exist contingently.

5. therefore either an uncausible producer is necessary or impossible.

6. from 1, such a being is not impossible.

7. hence an uncausible producer exists necessarily.

Scotus also offers various arguments to show that an uncausible producer would be ominiscient and omnipotent.

i would say that the argument is circular. you really wouldn't have any reason for thinking such a weird being is really possible unless you already believed in the sort of god that Christians believe in.

[ChrisK]

If I remember correctly, Descartes argument went like this:

1. God is an infinite and perfect Being.

2. I am a finite and imperfect being.

3. I can clearly and distinctly conceive of an infinite and perfect being.

4. Clearly, I could not conceive of this with finite and imperfect tools.

5. Therefore, this idea would have to be placed in my mind for me to understand it.

6. Therefore, God put it there and must exist.

There are numerous problems with these arguments. As Syndicat mentioned, such arguments are circular.

Further, the question arises as to if we really can conceive of such a being in reality. Try to imagine infinite. I don't know about other people, but I only see black space. That is not infinite. Also, try imagining "perfection", it is impossible. What does perfection look like?

We could also attack the definition of God as being a non-sense statement. Take the premise:

P1: God is an infinite and perfect being.

The use of the term "god" here makes infinite and perfection to be necessary qualities of "god". Take the opposite claim:

P2: God is not an infinite and perfect being.

Here is not a refutation of P1, but a redefining of what is necessarily true of "god". As such, both of these propositions are made true by their respective and differing interpretations of "god". As Rosa pointed out here (http://www.revleft.com/vb/all-philosophical-theories-t148537/index.html), such propositions are non-sense since they are true simply by the meaning of the words involved. They are neither true or false; they are non-sense.

[ChrisK]

And here's Godel's version:

Definition 1: x is God-like if and only if x has as essential properties those and only those properties which are positive
Definition 2: A is an essence of x if and only if for every property B, x has B necessarily if and only if A entails B

Definition 3: x necessarily exists if and only if every essence of x is necessarily exemplified

Axiom 1: If a property is positive, then its negation is not positive.

Axiom 2: Any property entailed by—i.e., strictly implied by—a positive property is positive

Axiom 3: The property of being God-like is positive

Axiom 4: If a property is positive, then it is necessarily positive

Axiom 5: Necessary existence is positive

Axiom 6: For any property P, if P is positive, then being necessarily P is positive.

Theorem 1: If a property is positive, then it is consistent, i.e., possibly exemplified.

Corollary 1: The property of being God-like is consistent.

Theorem 2: If something is God-like, then the property of being God-like is an essence of that thing.

Theorem 3: Necessarily, the property of being God-like is exemplified.

[Black Sheep]

1.There are different levels of stink in the world.
2.I stink.
3.I can differentiate my level of stink from other things in the world.
4.I couldn't do that unless i could compare it to a base, ultimate level of infinite stinkness.
5.So such a thing must exist
6.I call it god.

Hurray for stinky god!

[Amphictyonis]

The whole banana argument gets me every time!

Akc5w_ZqByY

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Of course, this is just the sort of a priori non-sense I have rubbished here (http://www.revleft.com/vb/all-philosophical-theories-t148537/index.html).

Comrades who deprecate such obviously bogus linguistic tricks (aimed at establishing 'fundamental truths' about reality) should turn equally suspicious eyes at the many similar arguments philosophers have concocted (in the comfort of their own heads) to establish analogously 'fundamental truths' about things like 'the mind', 'determinism', 'essences', 'abstractions', 'Being', 'contradictions', 'unity of opposites' etc., over the last 2400 years.

Those who do not should remember that for every finger you point at Descartes, or Anselm, or..., there are three pointing back at you.

[F9]

A rather weird argument, suprised from the stupidity of it the first time i heard it but i was even more suprised when i heard most people find it one of their best arguments defending their religious beliefs. So even as one of those arguments that just hurry to get a result, just to "prove" something merely from its definition with no real logic behind it, as atheists we should be ready to face it cause it comes in front of us quite often..And the best way to attack it?Attack the "definition" of god.

Also syndicat i am with the idea that you are presenting a different argument for the existence of god, and not the ontological, afaik the ontological argument is the first that CK posted.

[ZeroNowhere]

Syndicat's seemed somewhat reminiscent of Norman Malcom's version of the ontological argument, which is generally counted as an ontological argument despite departing significantly from that of, say, Descartes. For Descartes, the ontological argument came about precisely because, in order to display scepticism as nonsensical, he presented reality as a product of concepts and thought, the construction of reality through theory. This is simply the necessary consequence of such accounts, which are fairly ubiquitous even among secular philosophers. Ontological argument is actually the best, and, in a sense, only argument for God, as Hegel noted, although it is based upon idealism and hence incoherent.

I'll probably get back to this thread when I have the time.

[syndicat]

Scotus's argument differs from the others in that it wasn't purely apriori and was based on a realist (not idealist) assumptions about the world. He tried to provide an empirical argument for his first premise...that an uncausible producer is really possible. but that argument is fallacious.

based on Anselm's approach, more modern versions have started from the mere "conceivability" of God (such as Plantinga's verion). but the "conceivability" of something is NO REASON AT ALL for thinking it is really possible. that's why I say that ontological arugments end up being circular or question begging.

[Apoi_Viitor]

We could also attack the definition of God as being a non-sense statement. Take the premise:

P1: God is an infinite and perfect being.

The use of the term "god" here makes infinite and perfection to be necessary qualities of "god". Take the opposite claim:

P2: God is not an infinite and perfect being.

Here is not a refutation of P1, but a redefining of what is necessarily true of "god". As such, both of these propositions are made true by their respective and differing interpretations of "god". As Rosa pointed out here (http://www.revleft.com/vb/all-philosophical-theories-t148537/index.html), such propositions are non-sense since they are true simply by the meaning of the words involved. They are neither true or false; they are non-sense.

Could you re-explain this?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

^^^You'll find the explanation if you follow Chris's link.

[JimFar]

The curious thing about Norman Malcom is that he studied under Wittgenstein. One might have thought that would have immunized him against appeals to those sort of arguments.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Not really, his argument follows from the traditional meaning of the word 'god', and in my early days as a Wittgensteinian, I thought the argument sound for a number of years!

Fortunately, as they said in Monty Python and the Holy Grail, I got better.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Not really, his argument follows from the traditional Christian (theological) meaning of the word 'god', and in my early days as a Wittgensteinian, for a number of years I actually I thought the argument sound!

Fortunately, as one character in Monty Python and the Holy Grail said, I got better.

[turquino]

Here is not a refutation of P1, but a redefining of what is necessarily true of "god". As such, both of these propositions are made true by their respective and differing interpretations of "god". As Rosa pointed out here (http://www.revleft.com/vb/all-philosophical-theories-t148537/index.html), such propositions are non-sense since they are true simply by the meaning of the words involved. They are neither true or false; they are non-sense.
Following Quine, isn't this the case with any proposition? All statements have a kind of interconnectedness and circularity.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

No, that is not what Chris was arguing.

For Quine, if we come across a nonsensical 'proposition' we can just decide it is false. But that would imply we know what would make it true. But a non-sensical proposition can't be true, so it can't be false either.


All statements have a kind of interconnectedness and circularity

I am not sure he held they had sort of 'circularity'.

[ChrisK]

Following Quine, isn't this the case with any proposition? All statements have a kind of interconnectedness and circularity.

No. The proposition "Bob has a shotgun" is not made true solely by the use of the words involved. The truth of that proposition depends on the empirical fact of Bob actually having a shotgun.

The proposition "Bob does not have a shotgun" is the direct negation of the first proposition, but it does not change the meanings of the words..

This is not true of propositions about "God" as I have demonstrated.

[syndicat]

This is not true of propositions about "God" as I have demonstrated.

no, you haven't "demonstrated" any such thing. I suspect that for many the existence of God is based on a kind of inference to the best explanation. It may be a bad inference, but the word itself is not meaningless. a word has meaning for X if X has some ability to identify the item that word tracks. now in the case of "God", the term may have no referent, or its referent may be different than what X thinks. So if X's way of identifying God is as the ultimate cause of the physical cosmos, the only reasonable referent for this might be the physical cosmos itself, in which case "God" doesn't refer to what X thinks it does.

Tio take the example i gave from Scotus, he takes "uncausible producer" to be the most basic concept of God. A producer is something that produces effects. A particular is causible if it is possible for its traits to be causally impacted by things separate from it. if the explanation for A having F is B having G in the context of some explanatory framework, then A is affected by B's traits and is therefore causible. now, there might not be anything that "uncausible producer" refers to, or it might refer to the physical cosmos.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


no, you haven't "demonstrated" any such thing. I suspect that for many the existence of God is based on a kind of inference to the best explanation. It may be a bad inference, but the word itself is not meaningless.

Well, I think Chris meant that such propositions are senseless (in the way I have characterised here (http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1995528&postcount=1)).

But anyway, it is arguable, and I have so argued in this thread (http://www.revleft.com/vb/history-christianity-t115173/index3.html), that the word 'god' is indeed meaningless.


a word has meaning for X if X has some ability to identify the item that word tracks.

But, no one has been able to do so in terms that aren't semantically challenged in the same way, as I have shown at the above link.


now in the case of "God", the term may have no referent, or its referent may be different than what X thinks.

But, the word is far too vague and confused for anyone to be able to say whether is has a referent -- and hence it can't have one, any more than 'BuBuBu' can.


So if X's way of identifying God is as the ultimate cause of the physical cosmos, the only reasonable referent for this might be the physical cosmos itself, in which case "God" doesn't refer to what X thinks it does.

Unfortunately, that is far too vague for it to be called a referent.


To take the example i gave from Scotus, he takes "uncausible producer" to be the most basic concept of God. A producer is something that produces effects. A particular is causible if it is possible for its traits to be causally impacted by things separate from it. if the explanation for A having F is B having G in the context of some explanatory framework, then A is affected by B's traits and is therefore causible. now, there might not be anything that "uncausible producer" refers to, or it might refer to the physical cosmos.

But, these are all empty terms too, so we are no further forward.

[syndicat]

From the fact a word has no referent, it doesn't follow it has no sense.

Since "causable" and "producer" are perfectly meaningful terms...and denote many items in fact..."uncausible producer" is meaningful also...even if it has no referent.

and i don't have the patience to wade thru 18 pages to extract your pearls of wisdom.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


From the fact a word has no referent, it doesn't follow it has no sense.

Unfortunatetly, you have confused the meaning of a word and the sense of a sentence.


Since "causable" and "producer" are perfectly meaningful terms...and denote many items in fact..."uncausible producer" is meaningful also...even if it has no referent.

Well, you'll need to read the arguments I have presented in the second thread to which I linked above, and show where they go wrong, if your comments are to be taken seriously.


and i don't have the patience to wade thru 18 pages to extract your pearls of wisdom.

Stay ignorant then...:)

[syndicat]

Unfortunatetly, you have confused the meaning of a word and the sense of a sentence.


i didn't use the word "meaning" in the sentence you refer to. functional components of sentences such as noun and verb phrases contribute to the sense of the sentence. of course the word "meaning" has many meanings, as you indicated in that thread. even if we limit ourselves to those that have some bearing on the semantic content, there are several forms of meaning. now, i agree that "God" has no referent. but it can still have other forms of semantic meaning. but i certainly do not agree that "causible" has no meaning. It actually denotes a vast array of items.

[ChrisK]

no, you haven't "demonstrated" any such thing. I suspect that for many the existence of God is based on a kind of inference to the best explanation. It may be a bad inference, but the word itself is not meaningless. a word has meaning for X if X has some ability to identify the item that word tracks. now in the case of "God", the term may have no referent, or its referent may be different than what X thinks. So if X's way of identifying God is as the ultimate cause of the physical cosmos, the only reasonable referent for this might be the physical cosmos itself, in which case "God" doesn't refer to what X thinks it does.

Tio take the example i gave from Scotus, he takes "uncausible producer" to be the most basic concept of God. A producer is something that produces effects. A particular is causible if it is possible for its traits to be causally impacted by things separate from it. if the explanation for A having F is B having G in the context of some explanatory framework, then A is affected by B's traits and is therefore causible. now, there might not be anything that "uncausible producer" refers to, or it might refer to the physical cosmos.

I certainly have. I made the claim that statements about god are non-sensical, not meaningless. Tell me, at what point can the statement "God is the uncausible producer" be true or false? By claiming "God is not the uncausible producer" you have not negated the first, but redefined God.

[syndicat]

I certainly have. I made the claim that statements about god are non-sensical, not meaningless. Tell me, at what point can the statement "God is the uncausible producer" be true or false? By claiming "God is not the uncausible producer" you have not negated the first, but redefined God.

Scotus offers a series of arguments. First, he has an argument to show at least one uncausible producer exists. From the possibility of such a being it follows it exists necessarily...that part of his argument is valid. Then he offers an argument...also valid...that there can't be more than one. Then he offers arguments that he doesn't consider "demonstrative" in Aristotelian terminology that such a being would have properties such as omnniscience and omnipotence. These properties are defined in terms of the properties of knowing and having power to do something. If there is a being that has such properties, I'm sure that huge numbers of people would ordinarily agree that is what they mean by "God." His bit about "uncausible producer" is put forward by him as a hypothesis, that this is the most basic knowable-by-humans feature of such a being.

Since positing God is a kind of hypothesis, in my opinion, the word "God" gets anchored by the claim about a "creator of heaven and earth," that is, as a personal, conscious being that is creator of the physical cosmos. This hypothesis is quite understandable. It does require a certain conception of "consciousness" as something that is not essentially animal central nervous system activity.

I would argue that the hypothesis that the physical cosmos or total physical system exists necessarily and is self-creative is a simpler hypothesis. But in that case I'm arguing about the cogency or plausibility of the "God hypothesis." I'm not claiming the word "God" is "non-sensical."

As I said before, you've offered no cogent argument to show "God" is "non-sensical."

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


didn't use the word "meaning" in the sentence you refer to.

Apologies; I think I need new glasses!


functional components of sentences such as noun and verb phrases contribute to the sense of the sentence. of course the word "meaning" has many meanings, as you indicated in that thread. even if we limit ourselves to those that have some bearing on the semantic content, there are several forms of meaning. now, i agree that "God" has no referent. but it can still have other forms of semantic meaning. but i certainly do not agree that "causible" has no meaning. It actually denotes a vast array of items.

I also think the word 'god' has no meaning in a straight-forward sense that no coherent account can be given of it.

It perhaps has a meaning in senses (1), (2) and (3) below, but that does not tell us what the word means (i.e., what or who 'god' is, 'his' nature, etc. -- indeed, it can't, since it's part of theistic dogma that 'he' is ineffable -- no one can tell us what 'god' means in this sense), only that is carries emotive or psychological sigificance to certain individuals


(1) Personal Significance: as in "His Teddy Bear means a lot to him."

(2) Evaluative import: as in "May Day means different things to different classes."

(3) Point or purpose: as in "Life has no meaning."

(4) Linguistic meaning: as in "'Vixen' means 'female fox'", "'Chien' means 'dog'", or "Recidivist" means someone who has resumed their criminal career.

(5) Aim or intention: as in "They mean to win this strike."

(6) Implication: as in "Winning this dispute means that management won't try another wage cut again in a hurry."

(7) Indicate, point to, or presage: as in "Those clouds mean rain", or "Those spots mean you have measles."

(8) Reference: as in "I mean him over there", or "'The current president of the USA' means somebody different at least once every eight years."

(9) Artistic or literary import: as in "The meaning of this novel is to examine political integrity."

(10) An indication of conversational focus: as in "I mean, why do we have to accept a measly 1% rise in the first place?"

(11) An expression of sincerity or determination: as in "I mean it, I really do want to go on the march!", or "The demonstrators really mean to stop this war."

(12) The content of a message, or the import of a sign: as in "It means the strike starts on Monday", or "It means you have to queue here."

(13) Interpretation: as in "You will need to read the author's novels if you want to give new meaning to her latest play", or "That gesture means those pickets think you are a scab."

(14) Import or significance: as in "Part of the meaning of this play is to change our view of drama", or "The real meaning of the agreement is that the bosses have at last learnt their lesson."

(15) Speakers' meaning: as in "When you trod on her foot and she said 'Well done!' she in fact meant the exact opposite."

(16) Communicative meaning: as in "You get my meaning", or "My last letter should tell you what I meant", or "We have just broken code, hence the last message meant this..."

(17) Explanation: as in "When the comrade said the strike isn't over what she meant was that we can still win!"

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


As I said before, you've offered no cogent argument to show "God" is "non-sensical."

I think that your eyesight is as bad as mine, since Chris aimed at showing indicative sentences about 'god' are non-sense, not that a certain word is non-sense.

However, if 'god' is defined as the F-er (i.e., the creator, or the 'self-existent one', or whatever), and you try to show that 'he' is not the F-er, then you are not arguing about 'god' any more than you'd be arguing about, say, triangles, if you claimed they weren't 3-edged.

So, for a believer, 'God is the F-er' is a necessary truth, and cannot be false.

But, if it can't be false, it can't be true either, and so lacks a sense. Further, if no coherent account can be given of its sense, then it's non-sensical.

That is, of course, unless believers mean something else by 'true'.

[syndicat]

However, if 'god' is defined as the F-er (i.e., the creator, or the 'self-existent one', or whatever), and you try to show that 'he' is not the F-er, then you are not arguing about 'god' any more than you'd be arguing about, say, triangles, if you claimed they weren't 3-edged.

So, for a believer, 'God is the F-er' is a necessary truth, and cannot be false.

But, if it can't be false, it can't be true either, and so lacks a sense.

So, you have ex cathedra, in a nice dogmatic fashion, denied that there is such a thing as a necessary truth. I disagree with you about that. I think it's necessary that metals conduct electricity, for example.

Necessary, however, isn't the same thing as "analytic."

Anyway, as I said, I regard the belief in God's existence as a hypothesis that people come to to explain various things. I don't think it's a good or plausible hypothesis, but it's still a hypothesis.

As we know with sense-perception, this is a cognitive and not merely physical interaction faculty. It gets calibrated through our experiences and learning so that we acquire the ability to "see" cats, someone's anger, and so on. So, similarly, some people get calibrated to have experiences which they would describe as "perceiving" God. But they can lose this ability, too...begin to have doubts and so on.

Theoretical terms can gain a sense in the context of a particular set of hypotheses...and this can be so even if it turns out nothing is denoted by that term.

[ChrisK]

Scotus offers a series of arguments. First, he has an argument to show at least one uncausible producer exists. From the possibility of such a being it follows it exists necessarily...that part of his argument is valid. Then he offers an argument...also valid...that there can't be more than one. Then he offers arguments that he doesn't consider "demonstrative" in Aristotelian terminology that such a being would have properties such as omnniscience and omnipotence. These properties are defined in terms of the properties of knowing and having power to do something. If there is a being that has such properties, I'm sure that huge numbers of people would ordinarily agree that is what they mean by "God." His bit about "uncausible producer" is put forward by him as a hypothesis, that this is the most basic knowable-by-humans feature of such a being.

I am not talking about the argument being valid. I don't particularly care if it is or isn't. What I care about is the truth value of the statements about god. The fact is, propositions that assert something are either true or false. Propositions about god claim to be necessarily true. Contradicting this requires a shift in definition, thus, all propositions about god whatsoever are "necessarily true", which means that they cannot be false. But, there are contradictory claims about God which also claim to be true. Thus, they are non-sense since they lack a truth value.


Since positing God is a kind of hypothesis, in my opinion, the word "God" gets anchored by the claim about a "creator of heaven and earth," that is, as a personal, conscious being that is creator of the physical cosmos. This hypothesis is quite understandable. It does require a certain conception of "consciousness" as something that is not essentially animal central nervous system activity.

Not according to Spinoza. God is everything according to him, and that too is non-sensical.


I would argue that the hypothesis that the physical cosmos or total physical system exists necessarily and is self-creative is a simpler hypothesis. But in that case I'm arguing about the cogency or plausibility of the "God hypothesis." I'm not claiming the word "God" is "non-sensical."

It might be simpler, but the definition is bad no matter what.


As I said before, you've offered no cogent argument to show "God" is "non-sensical."

As I said before, yes I have.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


So, you have ex cathedra, in a nice dogmatic fashion, denied that there is such a thing as a necessary truth. I disagree with you about that. I think it's necessary that metals conduct electricity, for example.

No, I provided an argument why I concluded this in that thread (http://www.revleft.com/vb/all-philosophical-theories-t148537/index.html) you skim read, meaning you have put your foot in your mouth again.


Necessary, however, isn't the same thing as "analytic."

So?


Anyway, as I said, I regard the belief in God's existence as a hypothesis that people come to to explain various things. I don't think it's a good or plausible hypothesis, but it's still a hypothesis.

I see, human beings will suffer extreme torture, kill one another and devote their entire live for an hypothesis, eh?

Except, the subject of that 'hypothesis' is a meaningless term, and the sentence expressing it is non-sensical. So, it can't be an hypothesis, any more than sentences about BuBuBu are.

You have yet to show where my arguments to that end go wrong.


As we know with sense-perception, this is a cognitive and not merely physical interaction faculty. It gets calibrated through our experiences and learning so that we acquire the ability to "see" cats, someone's anger, and so on. So, similarly, some people get calibrated to have experiences which they would describe as "perceiving" God. But they can lose this ability, too...begin to have doubts and so on.

Nice piece of a priori psychology, for which there is no evidence..


Theoretical terms can gain a sense in the context of a particular set of hypotheses...and this can be so even if it turns out nothing is denoted by that term

Indeed, and that is why your attempt to deny certain claims about 'god' misfires.

[syndicat]

Except, the subject of that 'hypothesis' is a meaningless term, and the sentence expressing it is non-sensical. So, it can't be an hypothesis, any more than sentences about BuBuBu are.

You have yet to show where my arguments to that end go wrong.



You've presented no argument in this thread. And don't ask me to skim thru an 18 page meandering thread.


Nice piece of a priori psychology, for which there is no evidence

it's not apriori but well known. why don't you read some empirical psychology?

me:
Theoretical terms can gain a sense in the context of a particular set of hypotheses...and this can be so even if it turns out nothing is denoted by that term
you:

Theoretical terms can gain a sense in the context of a particular set of hypotheses...and this can be so even if it turns out nothing is denoted by that term Indeed, and that is why your attempt to deny certain claims about 'god' misfires.

nonsequitur.

me:

Anyway, as I said, I regard the belief in God's existence as a hypothesis that people come to to explain various things. I don't think it's a good or plausible hypothesis, but it's still a hypothesis.

you:

I see, human beings will suffer extreme torture, kill one another and devote their entire live for an hypothesis, eh?


another non-squitur. but you're a hopeless case.

[syndicat]

I am not talking about the argument being valid. I don't particularly care if it is or isn't. What I care about is the truth value of the statements about god. The fact is, propositions that assert something are either true or false. Propositions about god claim to be necessarily true.


wrong. If someone says "God created me" this is about God, but even if it were true it would have to be contingent. That's because a necessity can't entail a contingent truth. Only a contingent truth can ential a contingent truth. a basic principle of modal logic:

[]P & [](P -> Q) ->[]Q

Now if Q ("I exist") is contingent, then
~[]Q

since "God created me" (P) entails "I exist" (Q)

[](P -> Q)

hence ~[]P



Contradicting this requires a shift in definition, thus, all propositions about god whatsoever are "necessarily true", which means that they cannot be false. But, there are contradictory claims about God which also claim to be true. Thus, they are non-sense since they lack a truth value.


with all due respect, this is bullshit. if someone says "God loves me" this is not "true by definition" for them.


Not according to Spinoza. God is everything according to him, and that too is non-sensical.


irrelevant. you're changing the subject. I was talking about Scotus, not Spinioza. For Spinoza "God" denotes the physical cosmos because he believes that all particulars have both mental and physical attributes. he's also a wholist so he'd say that all physical individuals are mere "moments" of the physical totality.

And you've provided no cogent argument to show that "God" is non-sensical.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


You've presented no argument in this thread. And don't ask me to skim thru an 18 page meandering thread.

Then, and once again, you'll have to stay ignorant won't you? [And you misidentified the thread, too!]


it's not apriori but well known. why don't you read some empirical psychology?

You seem to have confused the word 'empirical' with 'fictional'.

Unless, of course, you have the references to back up your rather wild claims...


nonsequitur.

So you say, but we already know you have difficulty with the word 'empirical'.


another non-squitur. but you're a hopeless case

And with the concept of a rhetorical question, it appears.

[syndicat]

I certainly have. I made the claim that statements about god are non-sensical, not meaningless. Tell me, at what point can the statement "God is the uncausible producer" be true or false? By claiming "God is not the uncausible producer" you have not negated the first, but redefined God.


you've provided no argument whatever to show this.

Soctus says that a being that has properties like uniqueness, omniscience and omnipotence is "what we call 'God'". but he provides a series of arguments to show that 1. there is an uncausible producer, 2. there can't be more than one. 3. it has properties such as omnipotence and omniscience.

he only concludes that this being "is God" after having argued that this being has the properties associated with "God" in his particular language community.

now, if it could be shown that X is an uncausible producer and doesn't have the properties associated with "God" in his language community, then, assuming this uncausible producer is unique, "the uncausible producer is God" would be false.

Now, I think no being has the properties of omniscience and omnipotence, so I'd say "God exists" is false, not non-sensical.

moreover, i'd be inclined to say necessarily false. a sentence that is necessarily false, for me, denotes nothing, that is, there is nothing in the world that corresponds to it. but it can have a sense nonetheless. "There are round square buildings in Harvard Square" is necesarily false but not nonsensical. This is because the components of the sentence do in fact track various things, such as being round. Analogously, there may be nothing that is "omnisicient" or "all knowing" but there is such a thing as knowing. Things can be causally affected by other things. So there is such a property as causibility. So "uncausibility" has a sense (and it may be that we could say it applies to the physical cosmos as a whole).

[syndicat]

I see, human beings will suffer extreme torture, kill one another and devote their entire live for an hypothesis, eh?

there may be all sorts of unreasonable and even disgusting things associated with religions, but I think religions tend to have a rational core, even if mistaken, and that's the point i was making with the "God hypothesis" idea. i think it is unlikely that religions have no rational ground at all, given that they tend to be mass phenomina. but being "rational" doesn't mean "true" or "there is a cogent case for it". a person can have a rational case of sorts for some belief and be mistaken.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


there may be all sorts of unreasonable and even disgusting things associated with religions, but I think religions tend to have a rational core, even if mistaken, and that's the point i was making with the "God hypothesis" idea. i think it is unlikely that religions have no rational ground at all, given that they tend to be mass phenomina. but being "rational" doesn't mean "true" or "there is a cogent case for it". a person can have a rational case of sorts for some belief and be mistaken.

But this doesn't even begin to engage with the nature of religious belief.

[ChrisK]

wrong. If someone says "God created me" this is about God, but even if it were true it would have to be contingent. That's because a necessity can't entail a contingent truth. Only a contingent truth can ential a contingent truth. a basic principle of modal logic:

[]P & [](P -> Q) ->[]Q

Now if Q ("I exist") is contingent, then
~[]Q

since "God created me" (P) entails "I exist" (Q)

[](P -> Q)

hence ~[]P



You ought to tell that to them. The fact is is that ontological arguments claim that "God is x" and that this is a necessary truth. Taking Anselm's argument as an example "God is a being of which no greater can exist" it can be seen that there is nothing contingent in here. What is said about God must be necessarily true.


with all due respect, this is bullshit. if someone says "God loves me" this is not "true by definition" for them.

"God is all-loving" is a necessary truth about God according to most Christians. I can say this as a former Christian and as a reader of Christian workers.


irrelevant. you're changing the subject. I was talking about Scotus, not Spinioza. For Spinoza "God" denotes the physical cosmos because he believes that all particulars have both mental and physical attributes. he's also a wholist so he'd say that all physical individuals are mere "moments" of the physical totality.

No, you are the one who claimed that God is inherently anchored with "the creator of the heavens and the earth," but Spinoza's definition does not include this.

If anything, you claiming that I changed the subject from Scotus to Spinoza proves my point. I did not change the subject, but merely demonstrated that the meaning of God depends on what people claim is a necessary quality of God.


And you've provided no cogent argument to show that "God" is non-sensical.

And you've failed to actually address my argument.

[syndicat]

You ought to tell that to them. The fact is is that ontological arguments claim that "God is x" and that this is a necessary truth. Taking Anselm's argument as an example "God is a being of which no greater can exist" it can be seen that there is nothing contingent in here. What is said about God must be necessarily true.



then what was wrong with my previous argument? you're denying the conclusion which logically follows from the premises. Any ordinary believer who understand the idea at all would agree with these two sentences:

I exist contingently
God created me

These togehter entail, as I've shown, that "God created me" is a contingent statement about God.

but you can continue to babble, repeating yourself, if you like.

Spinoza was idiosyncratic. He was not speaking as part of any religious community, unlike Scotus. In fact he was excommunicated by the Jewish community in Holland & one of them tried to kill him...for his heresy. or are you really trying to say that religious people believe the physical cosmos is what God is?

[ExUnoDisceOmnes]

Richard Dawkins does a great job with this... find the chapter on that argument:
http://www.debsh.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Richard.Dawkins.-.The_.God_.Delusion.2006.pdf

Basically we see the infinite recess fallacy.

[Revolutionair]

A bit off-topic:
Ex, I read the bottom part of page 83 at least 5 times before I noticed on page 84 that he said that page 83 is kind of void. I'm going to use that argument. :D

[ExUnoDisceOmnes]

A bit off-topic:
Ex, I read the bottom part of page 83 at least 5 times before I noticed on page 84 that he said that page 83 is kind of void. I'm going to use that argument. :D

He starts his chapters vague, but gets better and better as he goes. Highly recommended.

[syndicat]

Richard Dawkins does a great job with this... find the chapter on that argument:
http://www.debsh.com/wp-content/uplo...usion.2006.pdf (http://www.anonym.to/?http://www.debsh.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Richard.Dawkins.-.The_.God_.Delusion.2006.pdf)



notice that he treats God as a hypothesis. this is what I've been saying.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


notice that he treats God as a hypothesis. this is what I've been saying.

That just means he's as confused as you are.

[JimFar]

Yes, Dawkins does treat God as a hypothesis. There is a question as to whether religious believers actually do too. I think the answer would be that depends. Some clearly do treat God as a hypothesis, at least in certain circumstances,as when they explain the nature of living organisms in terms of their being designed by God. Under other circumstances, they clearly do not. I would say to the extent that God is treated as a hypothesis then it must be judged as false. To the extent that God is not a hypothesis then statements about God must then be judged as non-sensical.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Even those Christians who view biology the way you say, Jim, in fact use it as a Form of Representation (as us Wittgensteinains would put it) -- but it turns out to be an incomprehensible Form, since it contains a meaningless word "god".

Only very feeble-minded theists would view belief in 'god' as an hypothesis -- to such an extent, calling them 'theists' would be a misnomer.

Deists, certainly do.

[tiny]

Rosa - if "god" has no external referent that can be articulated, then what are atheists and theists doing when they discuss 'god' ?
What's going on here if meaning is absent?
They act as if they pretty much know what they're talking about, even if when pressed may not be able to articulate what exactly they mean...

Also, what do you think of the Judeo-Christian-Muslim conception - that God is personal ie a superpowerful loving or vengeful or what have you immaterial person ?

[tiny]

What's wrong with saying "God” refers to “the greatest conceivable being” ?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Tiny:


Rosa - if "god" has no external referent that can be articulated, then what are atheists and theists doing when they discuss 'god' ?

I'm sorry, but where did I mention 'referrent'?


What's going on here if meaning is absent?

And, where did I say 'meaning is absent'?


They act as if they pretty much know what they're talking about, even if when pressed may not be able to articulate what exactly they mean...

They certainly use words, but my contention is that neither they, nor anyone else, can attach any meaning to the word "god".


Also, what do you think of the Judeo-Christian-Muslim conception - that God is personal ie a superpowerful loving or vengeful or what have you immaterial person ?

Well, as soon as you try to tell us what these alternative words mean, you will soon end up using words to which you, too, can attach no meaning.


What's wrong with saying "God” refers to “the greatest conceivable being” ?

But, that sentence too contains a meaningless word, namely "god".

Any sentence of the form "God is F", no matter what "F" is, contains the meaningless word "god", and, as such, is without sense.

Notice, I am not asking what "god" refers to, but rainsing a far more radical question about a fundamentally meaningless word, which, if it is meaningles, can have no referrent.

[tiny]

I'm sorry, but where did I mention 'referrent'?


In a previous post you say :


It perhaps has a meaning in senses (1), (2) and (3) below, but that does not tell us what the word means (i.e., what or who 'god' is, 'his' nature, etc. -- indeed, it can't, since it's part of theistic dogma that 'he' is ineffable -- no one can tell us what 'god' means in this sense), only that is carries emotive or psychological sigificance to certain individuals

Quote:
(1) Personal Significance: as in "His Teddy Bear means a lot to him."

(2) Evaluative import: as in "May Day means different things to different classes."

(3) Point or purpose: as in "Life has no meaning."

(4) Linguistic meaning: as in "'Vixen' means 'female fox'", "'Chien' means 'dog'", or "Recidivist" means someone who has resumed their criminal career.

(5) Aim or intention: as in "They mean to win this strike."

(6) Implication: as in "Winning this dispute means that management won't try another wage cut again in a hurry."

(7) Indicate, point to, or presage: as in "Those clouds mean rain", or "Those spots mean you have measles."

(8) Reference: as in "I mean him over there", or "'The current president of the USA' means somebody different at least once every eight years."

(9) Artistic or literary import: as in "The meaning of this novel is to examine political integrity."

(10) An indication of conversational focus: as in "I mean, why do we have to accept a measly 1% rise in the first place?"

(11) An expression of sincerity or determination: as in "I mean it, I really do want to go on the march!", or "The demonstrators really mean to stop this war."

(12) The content of a message, or the import of a sign: as in "It means the strike starts on Monday", or "It means you have to queue here."

(13) Interpretation: as in "You will need to read the author's novels if you want to give new meaning to her latest play", or "That gesture means those pickets think you are a scab."

(14) Import or significance: as in "Part of the meaning of this play is to change our view of drama", or "The real meaning of the agreement is that the bosses have at last learnt their lesson."

(15) Speakers' meaning: as in "When you trod on her foot and she said 'Well done!' she in fact meant the exact opposite."

(16) Communicative meaning: as in "You get my meaning", or "My last letter should tell you what I meant", or "We have just broken code, hence the last message meant this..."

(17) Explanation: as in "When the comrade said the strike isn't over what she meant was that we can still win!"

So besides 1, 2, and 3, are you now adding 8 ?

You say :


that does not tell us what the word means (i.e., what or who 'god' is,

What is 'god' ? -the greatest conceivable being.

This seems to have meaning in the sense of 4 and 8.
If it does, then meaning has been attached.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Tiny:


So besides 1, 2, and 3, are you now adding 8 ?

But, where did I say the term "god" had no referrent?


What is 'god' ? -the greatest conceivable being.

I've already covered that response.


This seems to have meaning in the sense of 4 and 8.

If it does, then meaning has been attached.

I deny it has meaning in sense (8), and only admit it has a subjective meaning in senses (1) and (2).

A bit like someone who becomes attached to a certain word (say "Jabberwocky"), but which is still meaningless for all that.

The problem with the word "god" is that 'his' alleged nature, according to believers, is incomprehnsible. So, when anyone speaks of 'god', no one knows what he/she is actually talking about.

Hence, when you say things like this:


What is 'god' ? -the greatest conceivable being.

You might just as well have said:

"BuBuBu is the greatest conceivable being..." for all the good it does.

[JimFar]

So Rosa, how does your position differ (if it all) from the one that A.J. Ayer took in his book, Lanugage, Truth, and Logic? See the following excerpts:




The criterion which we use to test the genuineness of apparent statements of fact is the criterion of verifiability. We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express—that is, if he knows what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false. If, on the other hand, the putative proposition is of such a character that the assumption of its truth, or falsehood, is consistent with any assumption whatsoever concerning the nature of his future experience, then, as far as he is concerned, it is, if not a tautology, a mere pseudo-proposition.

The sentence expressing it may be emotionally significant to him; but it is not literally significant. And with regard to questions the procedure is the same. We inquire in every case what observations would lead us to answer the question, one way or the other; and, if none can be discovered, we must conclude that the sentence under consideration does not, as far as we are concerned, express a genuine question, however strongly its grammatical appearance may suggest that it does. As the adoption of this procedure is an essential factor in the argument of this book, it needs to be examined in detail. In the first place, it is necessary to draw a distinction between practical verifiability, and verifiability in principle. Plainly we all understand, in many cases believe, propositions which we have not in fact taken steps to verify. Many of these are propositions which we could verify if we took enough trouble. But there remain a number of significant propositions, concerning matters of fact, which we could not verify even if we chose; simply because we lack the practical means of placing ourselves in the situation where the relevant observations could be made.

A simple and familiar example of such a proposition is the proposition that there are mountains on the farther side of the moon. No rocket has yet been invented which would enable me to go and look at the farther side of the moon, so that I am unable to decide the matter by actual observation. But I do know what observations would decide it for me, if, as is theoretically conceivable, I were once in a position to make them. And therefore I say that the proposition is verifiable in principle, if not in practice, and is accordingly significant. On the other hand, such a metaphysical pseudo-proposition as "the Absolute enters into, but is itself incapable of, evolution and progress," [F.H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality] is not even in principle verifiable. For one cannot conceive of an observation which would enable one to determine whether the Absolute did, or did not, enter into evolution and progress. Of course it is possible that the author of such a remark is using English words in a way in which they are not commonly used by English-speaking people, and that he does, in fact, intend to assert something which could be empirically verified. But until he makes us understand how the proposition that he wishes to express would be verified, he fails to communicate anything to us. And if he admits, as I think the author of the remark in question would have admitted, that his words were not intended to express either a tautology or a proposition which was capable, at least in principle, of being verified, then it follows that he has made an utterance which has no literal significance even for himself. […]

It should now be clear that the only information which we can legitimately derive from the study of our aesthetic and moral experiences is information about our own mental and physical make-up. We take note of these experiences as providing data for our psychological and sociological generalisations. And this is the only way in which they serve to increase our knowledge. It follows that any attempt to make our use of ethical and aesthetic concepts the basis of a metaphysical theory concerning the existence of a world of values, as distinct from the world of facts, involves a false analysis of these concepts. Our own analysis has shown that the phenomena of moral experience cannot fairly be used to support any rationalist or metaphysical doctrine whatsoever. In particular, they cannot, as Kant hoped, be used to establish the existence of a transcendent god.

This mention of God brings us to the question of the possibility of religious knowledge. We shall see that this possibility has already been ruled out by our treatment of metaphysics. But, as this is a point of considerable interest, we may be permitted to discuss it at some length. It is now generally admitted, at any rate by philosophers, that the existence of a being having the attributes which define the god of any non-animistic religion cannot be demonstratively proved. To see that this is so, we have only to ask ourselves what are the premises from which the existence of such a god could be deduced. If the conclusion that a god exists is to be demonstratively certain, then these premises must be certain; for, as the conclusion of a deductive argument is already contained in the premises, any uncertainty there may be about the truth of the premises is necessarily shared by it. But we know that no empirical proposition can ever be anything more than probable. It is only a priori propositions that are logically certain. But we cannot deduce the existence of a god from an a priori proposition. For we know that the reason why a priori propositions are certain is that they are tautologies. And from a set of tautologies nothing but a further tautology can be validly deduced. It follows that there is no possibility of demonstrating the existence of a god.

What is not so generally recognised is that there can be no way of proving that the existence of a god, such as the God of Chrisianity, is even probable. Yet this also is easily shown. For if the existence of such a god were probable, then the proposition that he existed would be an empirical hypothesis. And in that case it would be possible to deduce from it, and other empirical hypotheses, certain experiential propositions which were not deducible from those other hypotheses alone. But in fact this is not possible. It is sometimes claimed, indeed, that the existence of a certain sort of regularity in nature constitutes sufficient evidence for the existence of a god. But if the sentence "God exists" entails to more than that certain types of phenomena occur in certain sequences, then to assert the existence of a god will be simply equivalent to asserting that there is the requisite regularity in nature; and no religious man would admit that this was all he intended to assert in asserting the existence of a god. He would say that in talking about God, he was talking about a transcendent being who might be known through certain empirical manifestations, but certainly could not be defined in terms of those manifestations. But in that case the term "god" is a metaphysical term. And if "god" is a metaphysical term, then it cannot be even probable that a god exists. For to say that "God exists" is to make a metaphysical utterance which cannot be either true or false. And by the same criterion, no sentence which purports to describe the nature of a transcendent god can possess any literal significance.

It is important not to confuse this view of religious assertions with the view that is adopted by atheists, or agnostics. For it is characteristic of an agnostic to hold that the existence of a god is a possibility in which there is no good reason either to believe or disbelieve; and it is characteristic of an atheist to hold that it is at least probable that no god exists. And our view that all utterances about the nature of God are nonsensical, so far from being identical with, or even lending any support to, either of these familiar contentions, is actually incompatible with them. For if the assertion that there is a god is nonsensical, then the atheist's assertion is that there is no god is equally nonsensical, since it is only a significant proposition that can be significantly contradicted. As for the agnostic, although he refrains from saying either that there is or that there is not a god, he does not deny that the question whether a transcendent god exists is a genuine question. He does not deny that the two sentences "There is a transcendent god" and "There is no transcendent god" express propositions one of which is actually true and the other false. All he says is that we have no means of telling which of them is true, and therefore ought not to commit ourselves to either. But we have seen that the sentences in question do not express propositions at all. And this means that agnosticism also is ruled out.

Thus we offer the theist the same comfort as we gave to the moralist. His assertions cannot possibly be valid, but they cannot be invalid either. As he says nothing at all about the world, he cannot justly be accused of saying anything false, or anything for which he has insufficient grounds. It is only when the theist claims that in asserting the existence of a transcendent god he is expressing a genuine proposition that we are entitled to disagree with him.

It is to be remarked that in cases where deities are identified with natural objects, assertions concerning them may be allowed to be significant. If, for example, a man tells me that the occurrence of thunder is alone both necessary and sufficient to establish the truth of the proposition that Jehovah is angry, I may conclude that, in his usage of words, the sentence "Jehovah is angry" is equivalent to "It is thundering." But in sophisticated religions, though they may be to some extent based on men's awe of natural process which they cannot sufficiently understand, the "person" who is supposed to control the empirical world is not himself located in it; he is held to be superior to the empirical world, and so outside it; and he is endowed with super-empirical attributes. But the notion of a person whose essential attributes are non-empirical is not an intelligible notion at all. We may have a word which is used, as if it named this "person," but, unless the sentences in which it occurs express propositions which are empirically verifiable, it cannot be said to symbolize anything. And this is the case with regard to the word "god," in the usage in which it is intended to refer to a transcendent object. The mere existence of the noun is enough to foster the illusion that there is a real, or at any rate a possible entity corresponding to it. It is only when we enquire what God's attributes are that we discover that "God," in this usage, is not a genuine name.

It is common to find belief in a transcendent god conjoined with belief in an after-life. But, in the form which it usually takes, the content of this belief is not a genuine hypothesis. To say that men do not ever die, or that the state of death is merely a state of prolonged insensibility, is indeed to express a significant proposition, though all the available evidence goes to show that it is false. But to say that there is something imperceptible inside a man, which is his soul or his real self, and that it goes on living after he is dead, is to make a metaphysical assertion which has no more factual content than the assertion that there is a transcends god.

It is worth mentioning that, according to the account which we have given of religious assertions, there is no logical ground for antagonism between religion and natural science. As far as the question of truth or falsehood is concerned, there is no opposition, between the natural scientist and the theist who believes in a transcendent god. For since the religious utterances of the theist are not genuine propositions at all, they cannot stand in any logical relation to the propositions of science. Such antagonism as there is between religion and science appears to consist in the fact that science takes away one of the motives which make men religious. For it is acknowledged that one of the ultimate sources of religious feeling lies in the inability of men to determine their own destiny; and science tends to destroy the feeling of awe with which men regard an alien world, by making them believe that they can understand and anticipate the course of natural phenomena, and even to some extent control it. The fact that it has recently become fashionable for physicists themselves to be sympathetic towards religion is a point in favour of this hypothesis. For this sympathy towards religion marks the physicists' own lack of confidence in the validity of their hypotheses, which is a reaction on their part from the anti-religious dogmatism of nineteenth-century scientists, and a natural outcome of the crisis through which physics has just passed.

It is not within the scope of this enquiry to enter more deeply into the causes of religious feeling, or to discuss the probability of the continuance of religious belief. We are concerned only to answer those questions which arise out of our discussion of the possibility of religious knowledge. The point which we wish to establish is that there cannot be any transcendent truths of religion. For the sentences which the theist uses to express such "truths" are not literally significant.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

As I have explained before, Ayer's account depends on the Verification Principle. Mine does not.

[Sinister Cultural Marxist]

You might just as well have said:

"BuBuBu is the greatest conceivable being..." for all the good it does.

Interestingly, one thing I remember learning about is how the Catholic Church, when converting Africans, used the local terms for "Greatest God" instead of importing the word "Deus."

If that is the case, saying "Bububu is the greatest conceivable being" would mean the same thing.

The bigger issue for a Christian, is that they do name God, ie Jesus is a particular, not some vague ontological category that can have any name thrown over him. That was always my bigger beef with the ontological argument ... it said nothing about "what God"

[Apoi_Viitor]

In Descartes' meditations he sort of had two different arguments for the existence of God. The other one was:

1. All ideas correlate to the material world.
2. I have an idea of perfection.
3. Nothing in the world is perfect.
4. Therefore my knowledge of perfection comes from a perfect entity.

I'm not quite sure how Rosa's critiques relate to this argument - since Descartes never accepts the incomprehensibility of God.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

STD:


Interestingly, one thing I remember learning about is how the Catholic Church, when converting Africans, used the local terms for "Greatest God" instead of importing the word "Deus."

If that is the case, saying "Bububu is the greatest conceivable being" would mean the same thing.

Except, "BuBuBu" is a meaningless term, so they can't have the same meaning.

[Any more than "BuBuBu" means the same as "NuNuNu".]

-------------------------------------

AV:


In Descartes' meditations he sort of had two different arguments for the existence of God. The other one was:

1. All ideas correlate to the material world.
2. I have an idea of perfection.
3. Nothing in the world is perfect.
4. Therefore my knowledge of perfection comes from a perfect entity.

I'm not quite sure how Rosa's critiques relate to this argument - since Descartes never accepts the incomprehensibility of God.

Except, Descartes has already admitted that he needs 'god' to guarantee his clear and distinct ideas never lead him astray, but since "god" is a meaningless term, he now has no such guarantee.

[That is quite apart from the fact that the above argument is not sound, nor is it even valid.]

And, I'd like to see where Descartes accepts the idea that 'god' is not incomprehensible -- which, had he held such an idea, he'd have been branded an heretic by the Catholic Church.

[But, even if did reject that idea, as far as I am aware, Descartes never actually left us a detailed description of the nature of 'god'. Until we find one in his work somewhere, we can put that claim down to the by-now-familiar Cartesian grandstanding.]

[tiny]

Tiny:



But, where did I say the term "god" had no referrent?



I've already covered that response.



I deny it has meaning in sense (8), and only admit it has a subjective meaning in senses (1) and (2).

A bit like someone who becomes attached to a certain word (say "Jabberwocky"), but which is still meaningless for all that.

The problem with the word "god" is that 'his' alleged nature, according to believers, is incomprehnsible. So, when anyone speaks of 'god', no one knows what he/she is actually talking about.

Hence, when you say things like this:



You might just as well have said:

"BuBuBu is the greatest conceivable being..." for all the good it does.

Well even if defining "god" to refer to as the greatest conceivable being gives no idea what such a being would be like; if you’re doing systematic theology, then you have that other control, namely, scripture, which supplies considerable information about this greatest conceivable being, for example, that He is eternal, almighty, good, personal, and so on.
And then there is Perfect Being theology which can aid in the formulation of a doctrine of this being by construing those attributes in as great a way as possible.

I mean, even tho the concept of a greatest conceivable being is inherently subjective, that objection just confuses "gods" being the greatest conceivable being with our discerning what properties a greatest conceivable being must possess.
But our uncertainty as to what properties the greatest conceivable being must have does nothing to invalidate the definition of “god” as “the greatest conceivable being.”

I think it is demonstrable that people’s conception of what a greatest conceivable being would be like has a core which has not varied much over history and culture since Anselm.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Tiny:


Well even if defining "god" to refer to as the greatest conceivable being gives no idea what such a being would be like; if you’re doing systematic theology, then you have that other control, namely, scripture, which supplies considerable information about this greatest conceivable being, for example, that He is eternal, almighty, good, personal, and so on.

But when we raise questions about the use of these words, we face a brick wall. For example, if we ask what the import of the use of the personal pronoun "he" is, and whether 'god' is a male, has male sex organs, and all that goes with that, has a beard, went through puberty, etc. etc., we are told that none of these apply. So, the use of "he" goes through what many have described as a death by a thousand qualifications (i.e., "God is not like this, or this, or this, or..."), to such an extent that the theological use of "he" is like no other use of "he" in any known language (outside of religious language, of course). In which case, and in the same way, words employed to try to tell us about 'god' all turn out to be empty terms, used only because it is traditional to do so.

That is why, of course, Christian mystics preferred the via negativa (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apophatic_theology).

But, in that case, 'god' turns out to be no different from nothing.


I mean, even tho the concept of a greatest conceivable being is inherently subjective, that objection just confuses "gods" being the greatest conceivable being with our discerning what properties a greatest conceivable being must possess.

But our uncertainty as to what properties the greatest conceivable being must have does nothing to invalidate the definition of “god” as “the greatest conceivable being.”

I think it is demonstrable that people’s conception of what a greatest conceivable being would be like has a core which has not varied much over history and culture since Anselm.

Well, as I have pointed out, any sentence of the form "God is F" lacks a sense, since it contains a meaningless term, namely "god". So, it is to no avail telling us that "God is the greatest conceivable being" since we still haven't a clue what you are talking about -- and, I would add, neither have you -- and neither has anyone else, for that matter. And there is nothing anyone can do to rectify the situation. That is because it is only language about 'god' that is sematically challenged in this way (since 'he' is the uniquely incomprehensible).

Hence, and once more, you might as well try to tell us that "BuBuBu is the greatest conceivable being" for all the good it will do.


I think it is demonstrable that people’s conception of what a greatest conceivable being would be like has a core which has not varied much over history and culture since Anselm

What is undeniable is that religious language has been around for some time, but, as we can now see, it is replete with vacuous terms.

[syndicat]

in medieval scholastic Aristotelianism words like "perfection" did not have the kind of meaning they have today. in the ontological theory of that time, an "imperfection" was being causible, having a precarious existence, a causally dependent existence. These were differentiated from activity properties, like thinking.

Some activity properties imply the ability to be causally affected by other things, such as sense perception, which is an activity, but implies that something has impacted one's senses. These were called "mixed perfections".

Hence, a "perfect being" would be a being that has no imperfections or mixed perfections. Perfections that do not imply any imperfection (that is, no passive causal disposition) were called "pure" perfections. So active causal powers are perfections and passive causal powers are imperfections. So a "perfect being" could have only active causal powers and activity properties that are "pure" perfections.

Scotus uses this taxonomy of properties to argue that an uncausible producer would have only "pure" perfections.

But there is a fundamental problem with their entire set of assumptions. For example, they took knowing to be a pure perfection. But in fact it's only animals that know things and their knowledge is always dependent on causal interactions with the world. so it's not clear there are any "pure" perfections.

In this case, then, the problem isn't one of understanding what is being said. It's just that a false claim is being made.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


In this case, then, the problem isn't one of understanding what is being said. It's just that a false claim is being made.

In which case, you will find it easy to tell us what would make it true.

[syndicat]

In which case, you will find it easy to tell us what would make it true.


that's the job of anyone who wants to defend a dualistic solution to nervous system activity/consciousness relationship. since i think they are synthetically identical, I don't think that is possible.

but being impossible doesn't make a claim incomprehensible necessarily. if someone says "the balcony on 343 Mission St is both round and square" they're attributing properties to that structure that it can't both possess. I might be puzzled why they would say such a thing. And I might query them to see if they mean part of the balcony is square and part round. But even if they claimed that things can be both round and square in the same area, or red and green all over in the same surface, I know what they're saying. Even tho what they are saying is necessarily false.

i know what they're saying because "round", "square", "red", "green" are terms that do track things in reality. Same with "knowing" and "causability". If someone says a being is both knowing and uncausible, it's like claiming a wall surface is red and green all over...physically impossible but comprehensible nonetheless.

[Apoi_Viitor]

[That is quite apart from the fact that the above argument is not sound, nor is it even valid.]

Ok, but why?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


that's the job of anyone who wants to defend a dualistic solution to nervous system activity/consciousness relationship. since i think they are synthetically identical, I don't think that is possible.

Then you are in no position to declare it false (i.e., not true) since you haven't a clue what you'd be ruling out.


but being impossible doesn't make a claim incomprehensible necessarily. if someone says "the balcony on 343 Mission St is both round and square" they're attributing properties to that structure that it can't both possess. I might be puzzled why they would say such a thing. And I might query them to see if they mean part of the balcony is square and part round. But even if they claimed that things can be both round and square in the same area, or red and green all over in the same surface, I know what they're saying. Even tho what they are saying is necessarily false.

Once more, you are in no position to declare even this false, nor yet 'necessarily false', since you have no idea what you are ruling out.


i know what they're saying because "round", "square", "red", "green" are terms that do track things in reality. Same with "knowing" and "causability". If someone says a being is both knowing and uncausible, it's like claiming a wall surface is red and green all over...physically impossible but comprehensible nonetheless.

And how do you know they do not 'track things in reality'? Have you examined every last corner of the universe?

[Anyway, it's prefectly easy to imagine, and even to describe, something as 'round and square' -- and 'red and green all over', too. In fact, there is a red and green object in a display cabinet in a philosophy department not fifty miles from where I am sat right now.]

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

AV:


Ok, but why?

It's not sound since at least one of its premisses is false.


1. All ideas correlate to the material world.
2. I have an idea of perfection.
3. Nothing in the world is perfect.
4. Therefore my knowledge of perfection comes from a perfect entity.

Premiss 1, is false, even given Descartes's odd beliefs, since, for him, there is at least one idea that does not "correlate to the material world", namely his idea of perfection (admitted in premiss 3).

And, the conclusion does not follow from the premisses either. What follows, even if the premisses are all true, is that his idea of perfection does not come from the material world.

But, he has already argued that he is a non-matertial res cogitans. Hence, his idea of perfection could have come from that non-material source.

In other words, he just made his idea of perfection up (or the 'evil demon' did).

[syndicat]

Then you are in no position to declare it false (i.e., not true) since you haven't a clue what you'd be ruling out.


not so. we have a way of referring to, knowing about, the occurrence of activities such as thinking and perceiving where it isn't part of this way of knowing to necessarily acquire info about brain activity...or even know about things like nerves. now, the dualist holds that these are not identical with any physical activity. this primitive "theory" about consciousness is understandable.

i don't think that fits in with the best available theory about what conscious activity is. I think a better view of intentionality is not that it is primitive, but understood in functional biological terms, that is, internal states that serve a certain role as part of adaptive traits of animals. but that just means the dualist view is false...and necessarily so since there is no such thing as contingent identity.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


not so. we have a way of referring to, knowing about, the occurrence of activities such as thinking and perceiving where it isn't part of this way of knowing to necessarily acquire info about brain activity...or even know about things like nerves. now, the dualist holds that these are not identical with any physical activity. this primitive "theory" about consciousness is understandable.

don't think that fits in with the best available theory about what conscious activity is. I think a better view of intentionality is not that it is primitive, but understood in functional biological terms, that is, internal states that serve a certain role as part of adaptive traits of animals. but that just means the dualist view is false...and necessarily so since there is no such thing as contingent identity.

I'm sorry, but what has this got to do with the falsehood of statements/indicative sentences about the alleged perfection of 'god', which is what my objection was directed at? From earlier:


But there is a fundamental problem with their entire set of assumptions. For example, they took knowing to be a pure perfection. But in fact it's only animals that know things and their knowledge is always dependent on causal interactions with the world. so it's not clear there are any "pure" perfections.

In this case, then, the problem isn't one of understanding what is being said. It's just that a false claim is being made.

Bold added.

If you want to say such things are false (i.e., not true), then you must know what would make them true (so that you know what you are ruling out), and that is what I deny you can know.

Moreover, even if it were relevant, you have tried to sell us this a priori and confused psychology before.

No sale; in fact the goods were soiled, defective and shoddy...:(

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

^^^????:confused:

[syndicat]

If you want to say such things are false (i.e., not true), then you must know what would make them true (so that you know what you are ruling out), and that is what I deny you can know.[/quote

this phraseology..."know what would make it true"...apparently has some special significance for you...you utter it like an incantation. But what does it mean exactly? to me it sounds like some aprioristic philosophical theory at work.

[quote]
Moreover, even if it were relevant, you have tried to sell us this a priori and confused psychology before.


your usual bullshit. I've explained this to you many times before. it's not apriori.

[ChrisK]

then what was wrong with my previous argument? you're denying the conclusion which logically follows from the premises. Any ordinary believer who understand the idea at all would agree with these two sentences:

I exist contingently
God created me

These togehter entail, as I've shown, that "God created me" is a contingent statement about God.

"God created me" is certainly a contingent statement about something "God" supposedly did according to a Christian. But this does not address the definition of what "God" is.

But "God is the Creator" is a necessary truth about "God" according to any and all Christians. You consistently fail to understand and address this. You simply argue about other random statements that have nothing to do with what we are discussing.


but you can continue to babble, repeating yourself, if you like.

And you can continue argue against shadows.


Spinoza was idiosyncratic. He was not speaking as part of any religious community, unlike Scotus. In fact he was excommunicated by the Jewish community in Holland & one of them tried to kill him...for his heresy. or are you really trying to say that religious people believe the physical cosmos is what God is?

No, I'm saying the definition is not set in the way you claim it is. Is that too hard for you to understand?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


this phraseology..."know what would make it true"...apparently has some special significance for you...you utter it like an incantation.

In that case, it seems you are having difficulty with the English language -- or, rather, with parts of it that you wish to ignore.


But what does it mean exactly? to me it sounds like some aprioristic philosophical theory at work.

No philosophical theory at work here. [Anyway, you have some cheek; you are the one who wants to offer us some a priori psychology/philosophy of mind.]

If you claim something is false, you are claiming it isn't true. [Or are you using "false" in a new and as-yet-to-be explained sense?] But there is no way that you could possibly know what would make this true, which means that you are in no position to say what you are ruling out in order to be able to say that it isn't true.

Unless, of course, you know what divine perfection is, and have, perhaps, met 'god'...?


your usual bullshit.

Ah, the usual abuse. I feel so at home. :)


I've explained this to you many times before.

You attempted to 'justify' it with yet more a priori psychology (not actually backed up with any evidence), sure, but that was all.


it's not apriori.

It most certainly is, since, among other things, you are trying to re-define certain psychological verbs for us based only on speculation/science fiction -- i.e., in advance of the evidence.

Perhaps you don't understand the phrase "a priori", either?

I can recommend a few books...:)

[TheUnconventionalist]

It is a scientific fact that matter cannot be created or destroyed, so religion in the conventional monotheistic sense, or even in the mainline polytheistic sense(thinking of Hinduism), is based on scientifically impossible premises. It is scientifically impossible for the universe to be created in the material sense, as matter has always existed(and I believe this gives credence to the cyclic model of the universe expanding an contracting). I think this is why people are moving more and more to new age faith, and we see a return to nature based faiths, because maybe their is a universal spirit in the everlasting matter itself. I mean, I cannot prove it. But at least in my small human mind, it seems impossible to comprehend that matter has always existed, and that since it has always existed, that there is no supernatural significance to this development.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

TU:


It is a scientific fact that matter cannot be created or destroyed, so religion in the conventional monotheistic sense, or even in the mainline polytheistic sense(thinking of Hinduism), is based on scientifically impossible premises. It is scientifically impossible for the universe to be created in the material sense, as matter has always existed(and I believe this gives credence to the cyclic model of the universe expanding an contracting). I think this is why people are moving more and more to new age faith, and we see a return to nature based faiths, because maybe their is a universal spirit in the everlasting matter itself. I mean, I cannot prove it. But at least in my small human mind, it seems impossible to comprehend that matter has always existed, and that since it has always existed, that there is no supernatural significance to this development.

I'm sorry, but matter can be destroyed -- that's what happens in a nuclear reaction.

And no theist will be swayed by a scientific argument, and for at least two reasons:

1. Scientists are always changing their minds. What is gospel one day is in the trash can the next. The indestructibility of matter being one such.

2. More importantly, the 'god' of theism is not constrained by the 'laws' of science, since if there are any 'he/she/it' made them, controls them and can alter them at will.

The point is that theism makes no sense, and the word "god" is meaningless -- so there is nothing to discuss. Theists have yet to present us with a comprehensible set of claims.

For all the good their beliefs do them they might just as well have put the following in their holy books:


'Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe:
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.

"Beware the Jabberwock, my son!
The jaws that bite, the claws that catch!
Beware the Jubjub bird, and shun
The frumious Bandersnatch!"

He took his vorpal sword in hand:
Long time the manxome foe he sought --
So rested he by the Tumtum tree,
And stood awhile in thought.

And, as in uffish thought he stood,
The Jabberwock, with eyes of flame,
Came whiffling through the tulgey wood,
And burbled as it came!

One, two! One, two! And through and through
The vorpal blade went snicker-snack!
He left it dead, and with its head
He went galumphing back.

"And, has thou slain the Jabberwock?
Come to my arms, my beamish boy!
O frabjous day! Callooh! Callay!'
He chortled in his joy.

'Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe;
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.

http://www.jabberwocky.com/carroll/jabber/jabberwocky.html

And the same can be said for the new faiths you mention.

[MellowViper]

I side more with Spinoza's argument. I see virtually no difference between divinity and physicality.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

^^^Despite the fact that it, too, is non-sensical?

[Geraint ap Llew]

And no theist will be swayed by a scientific argument, and for at least two reasons


In that case why did the Catholic Church change its position from opposition to the theory of evolution to general acceptance of it? This being a retreat from a previous entrenched position and also something which called into question the traditional account of Genesis.
If theism makes no sense does this apply to the views advanced by theist philosophers and scientists as well as dogmatic theologians?
I would suggest that those who adopt a theist position, however, do so not because of the ontological argument or other tenuous arguments for the existence of God but because they feel they have encountered "God" or something which they feel might be called "God". We might take the classic example of St Paul, not that we need to limit ourselves to Christian examples. According to the traditional account St Paul came into contact with something powerful which he interpreted as being Jesus or God. This is more like the pattern we find in the majority of cases of people who accept theism today, it seems to me. And the fact that it is so important to them usually means they find Marxism largely irrelevant (since Marxism is atheist). Hence a lack of constructive dialogue. Since “religious” experiences happen in working-class communities as well as other types I do not think it serves any useful purpose to castigate theism as such, even though organised religion has clearly done considerable harm. Surely religious people can learn from Marxism and socialism generally, and I would argue that socialists can learn from certain kinds of theism and Buddhism as well, for that matter.
Rosa claims the word “god” is meaningless. Theists use the word “God” not “god” and I would say the problem is not that it is meaningless but that it is highly problematic, particularly for leftists and those of an anti-authoritarian cast of mind. An argument I would use is that we can observe that there are good people but this doesn’t mean that “God” is good (especially in view of the biblical account). However, we could probably infer that God is good (since presumably otherwise “It” would not be God). Obviously at some stage we need to try to define what we mean by the term “God”, and then we can decide whether or not the term is meaningless.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Geraint:


In that case why did the Catholic Church change its position from opposition to the theory of evolution to general acceptance of it? This being a retreat from a previous entrenched position and also something which called into question the traditional account of Genesis.

Well, if you have a look at the context of this thread, it centres on the alleged existence of 'god', and that is what my comments were adressed toward, not the sort of things you raise, valid though they are.


If theism makes no sense does this apply to the views advanced by theist philosophers and scientists as well as dogmatic theologians?

Indeed, but with respect to theology, it's full of incomprehensible non-sense.


I would suggest that those who adopt a theist position, however, do so not because of the ontological argument or other tenuous arguments for the existence of God but because they feel they have encountered "God" or something which they feel might be called "God". We might take the classic example of St Paul, not that we need to limit ourselves to Christian examples. According to the traditional account St Paul came into contact with something powerful which he interpreted as being Jesus or God. This is more like the pattern we find in the majority of cases of people who accept theism today, it seems to me. And the fact that it is so important to them usually means they find Marxism largely irrelevant (since Marxism is atheist). Hence a lack of constructive dialogue. Since “religious” experiences happen in working-class communities as well as other types I do not think it serves any useful purpose to castigate theism as such, even though organised religion has clearly done considerable harm. Surely religious people can learn from Marxism and socialism generally, and I would argue that socialists can learn from certain kinds of theism and Buddhism as well, for that matter.

Maybe so, but how they can identify 'god' as the source of these 'experiences' is something of a mystery, too -- after all, do they possess a divinely issued identikit picture of 'him'?

And that is quite apart from the fact that not evern believers can tell us what they mean by "god" in comprehensible terms.

[I]So even they do not know what this word means.


Rosa claims the word “god” is meaningless. Theists use the word “God” not “god” and I would say the problem is not that it is meaningless but that it is highly problematic, particularly for leftists and those of an anti-authoritarian cast of mind. An argument I would use is that we can observe that there are good people but this doesn’t mean that “God” is good (especially in view of the biblical account). However, we could probably infer that God is good (since presumably otherwise “It” would not be God). Obviously at some stage we need to try to define what we mean by the term “God”, and then we can decide whether or not the term is meaningless.

I often use the word "God", so you should not read too much into my use of "god".

Quite apart from that, too, no definition will help, since if we haven't a clue what we are talking about, we can't even begin.

To see this: try to define Adhedral.

[neosyndic]

x

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Neosyndic:


you seem to qualify as ''non-sense'' anything that challenges the premises of fundamentalist materialism.

1. I am not a materialist, I'm a Historical Materialist.

2. I explained what I meant by "non-sense" (and "sense") in the thread to which I linked; here is part of it again:


Here's why philosophical theories make no sense:

Metaphysical vs Empirical Propositions

Consider a typical philosophical/metaphysical (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics) thesis:

M1: To be is to be perceived.

Contrast this with a typical empirical (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empirical) proposition (i.e., a proposition/sentence about matters of fact):

M2: Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital.

The seemingly profound nature of theses like M1 is linked to rather more mundane features of the language in which they are expressed: that is, they are connected with the fact that the main verb they use is almost invariably in the indicative (http://www.lousywriter.com/verbs_indicative_mood.php) mood.

[Sometimes, this mood is augmented/beefed-up with subjunctive (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjunctive_mood) and/or modal qualifiers (such as 'must', 'can't', 'necessary', etc.) -- which, incidentally, only add to the confusion. We will see why below.]

This apparently superficial grammatical facade hides a deeper logical form -- several in fact. This is something which only becomes plain when such sentences are examined more closely.

M1-type expressions look as if they revealed profound truths about reality since they resemble empirical propositions. In the event, they turn out to be nothing at all like them.

To see this, consider again this ordinary empirical proposition:

T1: Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital.

Compare this with these similar-looking indicative (but nonetheless typically metaphysical) sentences:

T2: Time is a relation between events.

T3: Motion is inseparable from matter.

[b]First, in order to understand T1, it is not necessary to know whether it is true or whether it is false.

Contrast this with the comprehension of T2 and T3; understanding either of these goes hand-in-hand with knowing they are both true (or, alternatively, knowing they are both false, as the case may be). Their truth thus follows either (1) from the meaning the words they contain, (2) from specific definitions or (3) from a handful of 'thought experiments' -- i.e., [I]from yet more words.

In relation to T2, (2) above might be something like "Events take place in time". With T3, it might be "Motion is a form of the existence of matter" -- as Engels and Lenin believed -- and so on. To be sure, (1)-(3) might also be prefaced by some sort of 'philosophical argument' -- but these are just more words, too; no evidence is needed. It's not possible to devise experiments to test propositions like T2 and T3. What would they even look like?

This now intimately links the truth-status of sentences like T2 and T3 with meaning, not factual confirmation, and hence not with a confrontation with material reality. Their truth-status is thus independent of, and anterior to, the search for supporting evidence -- not that such a search is relevant anyway, or, indeed, that it is ever carried out. [Again, what would you or could you look for to confirm T2 or T3?]

In contrast, understanding T1 is independent of its confirmation or disconfirmation. Indeed, it would be impossible to do either of these if T1 had not already been understood. Plainly, the actual truth/falsehood of T1-type propositions follows from the way the world happens to be, and is not solely based on the meaning of certain expressions. Their truth cannot be read-off from the words they contain, unlike T2- and T3-type sentences.

Empirical propositions are typically like this; they have to be understood first before they can be confronted with the evidence that would establish their truth-status. In contrast, metaphysical propositions carry their truth or their falsehood on their faces, as it were, and need no evidence to establish either of these. Understanding them is one and the same as knowing their truth-status. That is why it is impossible even to conceive of ways of confirming them.

So, to sum up: here we have two sorts of indicative sentences, each with a radically different logical 'relation' to the world.

Understanding the first sort (i.e., those like T1) is independent of ascertaining their truth-status, whereas their actual truth or falsehood depends on the state of the world.

With the second sort (i.e., those like T2 or T3), their truth or falsehood is not dependent on the state of the world, but follows solely from the meaning of the words they contain (or from the meaning of those in the argument from which they were 'derived'). To understand them is ipso facto to know they are true or to know they are false.

Second, metaphysical theses (like T2 and T3) were in fact deliberately constructed by philosophers in order to transcend the limitations of the material world. This approach was justified on the grounds that it allowed them to uncover underlying "essences", thus revealing nature's "hidden secrets", i.e., the fundamental principles by means of which the 'deity' had created the world. This idea then linked language with the underlying nature of reality. That idea still remains to this day, even though its theological origin has been forgotten. That is why metaphysical 'truths' are still being read off from language/thought alone, even by atheists.

Theses like these are deemed "necessarily true" (or "necessarily false"), and are thus held to express genuine knowledge of these fundamental aspects of reality -- unlike contingent (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingency_(philosophy))/empirical propositions whose actual truth-status can alter with the wind.

[After all, Tony Blair might sell his copy of Das Kapital -- or buy the book if he does not already own it. 'Philosophical knowledge' -- 'genuine knowledge' -- cannot depend on such changeable features of reality.]

Traditionally, this meant that empirical propositions like T1 were considered to be epistemologically (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology) inferior to T2- and T3-type sentences, since they were deemed incapable of revealing such fundamental knowledge. Indeed, "philosophical knowledge" (yielding absolute certainty) has always been seen as the sole preserve of T2- and T3-type sentences.

This, of course, means that whatever happens in the material world, they remained eternally true, since they are not generated from experience, but are derived from thought alone.

Metaphysical propositions thus masquerade as especially profound, 'super-empirical' truths which cannot fail to be true or cannot fail to be false, as the case may be. Plainly, they do this by aping the indicative mood, but they go way beyond it.

Thus, what they say does not just happen to be so, as is the case with ordinary empirical truths. What T2- and T3-type sentences say cannot possibly be otherwise. The world must conform to whatever they say, not the other way round. They determine the logical form of any possible world. This is not surprising given the theological origin of such ideas; after all 'god' spoke (so the Bible tells us) and reality just sprang into existence. Hence, on this view, the world is little more than condensed language. In that case, once these 'secrets' have been ascertained, they tell us how the world must be. No wonder then that such truths follow from language alone.

This also accounts for the frequent use of modal terms (like "must", "necessary" and "inconceivable") -- as in "I must exist if I can think" [Descartes (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ren%C3%A9_Descartes)], "Time must be a relation between events" [Kant (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immanuel_Kant)], "Being must be the same as and yet different from Nothing, the contradiction resolved in Becoming" [Hegel (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georg_Wilhelm_Friedrich_Hegel)] or "Existence can't be a predicate" [Russell (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bertrand_Russell)]. Everything in reality must be this or it must be that.

Contrast this with T1. If anyone were to question its truth, the following response: "Tony Blair must own a copy of Das Kapital" would be highly inappropriate -- unless, of course, T1 itself were the conclusion of an inference of some sort (such as: "Tony Blair told me he owned a copy, so he must own one"), or it was based on a direct observation statement (such as, "I saw his wife buy him a copy and give it to him, and I spotted it on his bookshelf a couple of minutes ago"). But even then, the truth or falsehood of T1 would still depend on an interface with material reality at some point.

So, with T1-type sentences, the world dictates to us whether what they say is true or false. We do not dictate to reality what it must contain, or what it must be like.

With respect to T2- and T3-type sentences, things are radically different: because their truth-values (true or false) can be determined independently and in advance of the way the world happens to be, philosophers use them to dictate to reality what it must be like.

In that case, once they have been understood, metaphysical propositions like T2 and T3 guarantee their own truth or their own falsehood. They are thus true a priori (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_priori).

So: to understand a metaphysical thesis is to know it is true (or to know it is false). That is why, to their inventors, they appear to be so certain, self-evident, and, in many cases, absolutely true. Their intimate connection with language means that questioning their veracity seems to run against the grain of our understanding, not of our experience. Indeed, they appear to be self-evident precisely because they need no evidence to confirm their truth-status; they provide their own 'evidence', and testify on their own behalf. Their veracity follows from the alleged meaning of the words they contain. They, not the world, guarantee their own truth or guarantee their own falsehood.

Unfortunately, this divorces such theses from material reality, since they are true or false independently of any apparent state of the world.

In that case, any thesis that can be judged true or judged false on conceptual/linguistic grounds alone cannot feature in a materialist account of reality, only an Idealist one. [Why that is so is explained if you follow the links posted at the end.]

Now, these assertions might appear to be somewhat dogmatic, but as we shall see, the opposite view is the one that is dogmatic, since it is based on a ruling-class view of reality -- which has to be imposed on the world -- and on a view whose validity is not sensitive to empirical test. [Why that is so will be explained below.]

Worse still, it collapses into incoherence when examined closely -- as we will also see.

The Slide Into Non-sense

The paradoxical nature of metaphysical theses illustrates the ineluctable slide into non-sense that all philosophical theories undergo whenever their proponents try to undermine either the vernacular or the logical and pragmatic (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pragmatics) principles on which it is based -- those that, for example, ordinary speakers regularly use to state contingent truths or falsehoods about the world without such a fuss.

[It is worth pointing out that "non-sense" is not the same as "nonsense (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nonsense)". The latter word has various meanings varying from the patently false (such as "Karl Marx was a shape-shifting lizard") to plain gibberish (such as "783&£$750 ow2jmn 34y4&$ 6y3n3& 8FT34n").

The former word relates to indicative sentences that turn out to be incapable of expressing a sense (no matter what we try to do with them), that is, they are incapable of being true or they are incapable of being false. Here, therefore, the indicative/fact-stating mood has been mis-used/mis-applied. So, when they are employed to state fundamental truths about reality, they seriously misfire since they can't possibly do this. (This section will explain why that is so.)

So, non-sensical sentences aren't patently false, nor are they plain gibberish.

Finally, the word "sense" is being used in the following way: it expresses what we understand to be the case if the proposition in question is true (or what fails to be the case if it is false), even if we do not know whether it is actually true or whether it is actually false.

For example, everyone (who knows English, who knows who Tony Blair and what Das Kapital are) will understand T1 (i.e., "Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital") upon hearing or reading it. They grasp its sense --, that is, they understand what the world would have to be like for T1 to be true or what the world would have to be like for T1 to be false.

More importantly, the same situation, if it obtains, will make T1 true, as it will make T1 false, if it does not obtain. (The significance of that comment will become clear below....)]

You can read the rest of my reasons, here (http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1995528&postcount=1).

You:


this is very interesting to me. i often debate fundamentalist evangelicals on the issue of God. their premise is that god is external to man and the world. this is the basis of the evangelical denial of pantheism. unfortunately, their viewpoint boils down to literal exegetics. this is easy to dismiss, it only takes pointing out the historical facts about the way the textual canon was assembled to debunk ''holiness''.

Fine, but that has nothing to do with anything I have argued.


is there a canon you follow ?

I'm not sure what you mean by 'canon'. If you mean 'set of dogmas', then no. If you mean 'set of holy books', no, too.

I'm curious why you think I would want to follow a 'canon', if that is what you meant.

Ah, but you clarify:


i am a defender of historical-critical methods in the study of religious litterature by the way, so I am curious as to what canon you base your exegesis on. the writings of Darwin ? Marx ? Soviet Psychiatric Textbooks? an anecdote: a muslim student once hurled a coca cola bottle at me during a History department lecture for suggesting that the Jesus narrative found in the holy Q'ran was actually paraphrased from Chistian New Testament apocryphal texts.

None of the above, although I have learnt much from Marx.


could you elaborate on the difference between ''sense'' and ''non-sense'' ?

See above, although it is only half the story. For the rest, you will need to follow that link.


also: from the perspective of ''marxism'', idealism is denied on the premise that it is ''as spirit'' - only inmaterial metaphysical speculation (i.e thought) with no objective substance; yet sensation is also lacking objective substance. so how do you maintain that your sensation that ''God does not exist'' prove that ''God does not exist'' (sensations having no objective existence outside the emotive, and all ?)

I think you are confusing "sense" with "sensation" -- they are not related in any way at all.

And I go further -- I claim that the word "god" is meaningless, which makes the sentence "God does not exist" just as non-sensical as the sentence "God exists".


how can you identify ''material existence'' as the source of ''sensory experience'' ?

Well, I don't


how can sensory experince prove material existence when sensory experiences have no objective susbtance ? how can you base your evidence for the existence of the material on the inmaterial ?

You need to ask these questions to someone who has claimed these things, not me.

[neosyndic]

x

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Neosyndic:


so your canon are the writings of Karl Marx on the subject of history. i tend to agree with the writings of Marx on the subject of historical materialism but i do not assume that Marx is infallible.

As I said, I have no 'canon'; and I agree with you about Marx.


and i am sorry to point this out, but in the version of ''contemporary academia'' i have dealt with in a previous stage of my life the dominant trend is not materialism of any kind. talk is about post-humanism: theistic, atheistic or neutral.

Yes, so?


you follow the texts written by Karl Marx on the subject of history. any text taken as infallible basis for a postulate of ''truth'' is a canon. all philosophical, political and theological view ponts are ultimately based on a text. someone had to write down the premises of this or that philosophical perspective somewhere so that then it can be archived and retrieved.

Once again, this bears no relation to anything I have argued here.


that said, i tend to agree with the methodological model developed by Karl Marx as it pertains the study of history because i have found that by utilising the system of cathegories Marx developed one can make sense of historical trends from a perspective that aids in the determination of how societies can progress from states of authoritarian un-democracy towards states of popular democracy. i agree that in order to achieve these type of ''progressive transitions'' the basis must be transformations in the political economy. yet, i keep in mind the imputs of Historians like the late Howard Zinn, who pointed out (correctly) that all historical writing (like journalism) is ultimately subjective due to the fact that selective editing precedes publication

I agree with much of the above.


so you represent a ''marxist'' variety of logical positivism.

I don't know how you arrived at that conclusion? Where have I appealed to the verification principle, for example?


can you explain how you view the difference between ''sense'' and ''sensation'' ?

"Sensation" is pretty clear, but "sense" I have explained in my last post. Here is the relevant section:


The Slide Into Non-sense

The paradoxical nature of metaphysical theses illustrates the ineluctable slide into non-sense that all philosophical theories undergo whenever their proponents try to undermine either the vernacular or the logical and pragmatic (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pragmatics) principles on which it is based -- those that, for example, ordinary speakers regularly use to state contingent truths or falsehoods about the world without such a fuss.

Finally, the word "sense" is being used in the following way: it expresses what we understand to be the case if the proposition in question is true (or what fails to be the case if it is false), even if we do not know whether it is actually true or whether it is actually false.[/B]

For example, everyone (who knows English, who knows who Tony Blair and what [i]Das Kapital are) will understand T1 (i.e., "Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital") upon hearing or reading it. They grasp its sense --, that is, they understand what the world would have to be like for T1 to be true or what the world would have to be like for T1 to be false.

More importantly, the same situation, if it obtains, will make T1 true, as it will make T1 false, if it does not obtain. (The significance of that comment will become clear below....)]

I am following Wittgenstein in this.


to me it seems that ''sensation'' has no objective substance. sensation is a reflect of the senses is it not ? you deny idealism on the premise that it has no objective substance; yet sensation is also lacking objective substance. but you premise your denial of ''God'' on the sensation there is ''no God''. the senses are not a reliable tool for the discernment of ''truth'' because they can be fooled (case in point: perception management science).furthermore; the sensations involved have no objective existence outside the emotive, as is the case with the idealism you deny.

Once again, "sense" as I am using it has nothing to do with 'sensation' or with the five senses.

I have highlighted the section in the above long quotation that attempts to explain what I mean.

It's a logical not an epistemological or psychological use of this word.


your reply is the reason why post-humanism is the dominant trend in contemporary academia. why all of the sudden the fundamentalist neanderthals (with all due respect to the neanderthals) are claiming that literal creationism should be taught alongside Darwin.

I don't see why.

[neosyndic]

x

[Meridian]

You deny that you follow a textual canon, but then you state that you follow a textual canon. Make up your mind.
No, you need to relax with the "canon" and "text" philosophy university bullshit. Simply because a person agrees with a relatively large portion of points made by some author, does not mean the person necessarily follows any "canon". If you think otherwise then I suggest you research the ordinary use of this word.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Neosyndic:


I read you tract. You can consider this to be my reply to it. In all I found it a very well crafted statement of ‘’marxist’’ logical positivism.

Why do you keep saying it's an example of Logical Positivism? Where is my use of the Verification Principle? Where is my Conventionalism? Where are my Protocol Sentences?


(and I place ‘’marxist’’ in quotes, not as a sign of disrespect, but because there exist a number of competing schools of interpretation relative to the textual legacy of Karl Marx). Your tract, however, fails to incorporate a reply to the issues raised by post-humanism. The main challenge to the school of materialist thinking that you represent does not come from a long ago dead ‘’god’’; it comes from the denial of cogito ergo sum.

You keep posting obscure remarks like this as if their meaning were plain, but it isn't.

And what has my post got to do with this:


it comes from the denial of cogito ergo sum

Nowhere have I denied this; in fact I go further and declare it non-sensical. It's not possible to deny non-sense.


IT IS MAN WHO HAS TO PROVE HIS MATERIAL EXISTENCE, NOT A ‘’GOD’’ THAT IS LONG AGO DEAD AND BURIED AS FAR A WESTERN CIVILISATION IS CONCERNED.

You don't need to shout!

Anyway, these are fine words, but they have nothing to do with my post.

Forgive me asking this, but are you familiar with the meaning of the word "relevant"?


1. the texts written by Karl Marx on the subject of history and historiography constitute a textual canon.

For you maybe, but not for me.


2. the theory of Historical Materialism is classified as a philosophical viewpoint. one among a number of many competing viewpoints in the study of history.

So you keep saying. You are welcome to view it that way -- but it would render HM non-sensical if it were a philosophy.

I prefer to call it what it is, a scientific theory.


That you follow the texts written by Karl Marx on the subject of history (as exemplified by your auto de fe as an advocate of ‘’historical materialism’’), is in direct contradiction to the non-sensical claim that you do not ‘’follow a canon’’. (sic.) any text taken as infallible basis for a postulate of ''truth'' is a canon because it constitutes A basis for judgment; a standard or criterion. all philosophical, political and theological viewpoints are ultimately based on a text. someone had to write down the premises of this or that philosophical perspective somewhere so that then it could be archived and retrieved. At least that is the way it works this side of the printing press. Pretending that your views are not ultimately based on the interpretative reading of textual legacy of Karl Marx is the ‘’non-sense’’ around here.

How many times do you have to be told that I do not regard Marx's writings as infallible?

Indeed, I have posted criticisms of his work here and at my site.

Look, there seems to be no point in continuing this debate if you insist on mis-representing my ideas all the time.


You stated: “I claim that the word "god" is meaningless, which makes the sentence "God does not exist" just as non-sensical as the sentence "God exists"…”

Indeed, but where did I appeal to the Verification Principle? My reasons for regarding these sentences as non-sensical are not at all the same as those of the Logical Positivists.

And how I explain my use of "non-sense" is not at all the same as their explanation of "nonsense".


This statement fundamentally posits a logical positivist argument, namely that all narratives of ‘’God’’ are ‘’dead language’’ because there is ‘’no empirical basis for the existence of a God’’ ergo: that the word ‘’God’’ is meaningless. You refine it (brilliantly) by adding that the logical conclusion of the premise should be that the statement ‘’God does not exist’’ is equally meaningless. The post-humanist reply is that the fundamental issue is not God; because ‘’God is Dead’’. Rather, the fundamental issue is that the ‘’I am’’ in ''cogito ergo sum'' is meaningless, because human thoughts have no objective existence. The post-humanist reply to ‘’cogito ergo sum’’ is In Sententia Ego Sum. (In thought I am). The challenge for materialists (of any kind) is to prove the ‘’ERGO’’ in ‘’cogito ergo sum’’ by demonstrating ‘’the organic link’’ between the in-substantive, objectively non-existent cogito and the allegedly substantive Sum. As you defined yourself an advocate of ‘’historical materialism’’, I further objected that idealism is denied by ‘’marxists’’ on the premise that it is ''as spirit'' - only inmaterial metaphysical speculation (i.e thought) with no objective substance or basis in objective reality. So ‘’logically’’ if you deny idealism on the premise that it has no objective substance or objective reality, then (to be consistent), you must deny that the premise ‘’cogito ergo sum’’ constitutes an axiom; since the in-material Cogito you posit as evidence for the existence of ‘’human being’’ has no objective existence.

Maybe so, but none of it has anything to do with my posts or reasons.

I nowhere appeal to an "empirical basis for the existence of a God", nor will I -- since that sentence is non-sensical, too, because it contains an empty term, "God".

Moreover, this has nothing to, do with my ideas, either:


The post-humanist reply is that the fundamental issue is not God; because ‘’God is Dead’’. Rather, the fundamental issue is that the ‘’I am’’ in ''cogito ergo sum'' is meaningless, because human thoughts have no objective existence.

You seem to be fixated on that Cartesian phrase, but nowhere do I claim it is meaningless. I do, however, claim it is non-sensical. They are not at all the same thing.

And I nowhere say things like this:


because human thoughts have no objective existence

And that is because I reject the word 'objective' as meaningless when used philosophically.

In which case both sentences "Human thoughts have no objective existence" and "It is not the case that human thoughts have no objective existence" are both non-sensical.


The challenge for materialists (of any kind) is to prove the ‘’ERGO’’ in ‘’cogito ergo sum’’ by demonstrating ‘’the organic link’’ between the in-substantive, objectively non-existent cogito and the allegedly substantive Sum.

In fact, the challenge for us Marxists is to expose this as yet more ruling-class ideology.


As you defined yourself an advocate of ‘’historical materialism’’, I further objected that idealism is denied by ‘’marxists’’ on the premise that it is ''as spirit'' - only inmaterial metaphysical speculation (i.e thought) with no objective substance or basis in objective reality. So ‘’logically’’ if you deny idealism on the premise that it has no objective substance or objective reality, then (to be consistent), you must deny that the premise ‘’cogito ergo sum’’ constitutes an axiom; since the in-material Cogito you posit as evidence for the existence of ‘’human being’’ has no objective existence.

I'm sorry, but the above makes no more sense than this:


JABBERWOCKY

Lewis Carroll

(from Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There, 1872)

'Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe:
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.

"Beware the Jabberwock, my son!
The jaws that bite, the claws that catch!
Beware the Jubjub bird, and shun
The frumious Bandersnatch!"

He took his vorpal sword in hand:
Long time the manxome foe he sought --
So rested he by the Tumtum tree,
And stood awhile in thought.

And, as in uffish thought he stood,
The Jabberwock, with eyes of flame,
Came whiffling through the tulgey wood,
And burbled as it came!

One, two! One, two! And through and through
The vorpal blade went snicker-snack!
He left it dead, and with its head
He went galumphing back.

"And, has thou slain the Jabberwock?
Come to my arms, my beamish boy!
O frabjous day! Callooh! Callay!'
He chortled in his joy.

'Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe;
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.

And for reasons I set out in that post you read of mine on metaphysics.

You really must try to extricate yourself from using language in such a bizarre way. Just because philosophers have always done this and just because University lecturers and Professors do it too is no excuse for you to copy them.


the question is: what is the first cause of the thought that I Am ?

No, the real question is: Why do you keep asking such non-sensical questions?


You do not answer the question posed by post-humanism to materialism (of any kind): how can you identify ''material existence'' as the source of ''sensory experience'' if you can not prove the organic link between the in-substantive and objectively non-existent cogito and the allegedly exi[s]tent sum in the first place ?

So what? These 'post-humanists' -- whoever they are -- can get stuffed. I have absolutely no interest in answering such confused individuals. I'm amazed you waste so much time, effort and words on them.

As if workers' power depends on us answering these 'post humanists'!


You deny that you follow a textual canon, but then you state that you follow a textual canon. Make up your mind

Get some new glasses.
I did no such thing.


I follow the physiological definition of the term ‘’sense’’ which is the one that is relevant to post-humanism.

Oh dear, you really are fixated on this, aren't you?


“…any of the faculties by which the mind receives information about the external world or about the state of the body…” the materialist argument against spirit (God included), boils down to ‘’I cannot see it or touch it, therefore it does not exist.’’ Yet, what applies to Spirit applies to cogito; because both are objectively non-existent, by a consistent application of materialist criteria (of any kind); from there it follows that ‘’cogito ergo sum’’ is not axiomatic.

Well, you are welcome to such confused ideas, but, and once again, they have nothing to do with my posts, so I do not know what they are doing here in your alleged 'reply' to me.

What next, the migration of Yaks in Siberia? The rotational velocity of the Andromeda Galaxy? The whereabouts of Lord Lucan?


sense[sɛns]
n
1. (Life Sciences & Allied Applications / Physiology) any of the faculties by which the mind receives information about the external world or about the state of the body. In addition to the five traditional faculties of sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell, the term includes the means by which bodily position, temperature, pain, balance, etc., are perceived
2. (Life Sciences & Allied Applications / Physiology) such faculties collectively; the ability to perceive
3. (Life Sciences & Allied Applications / Physiology) a feeling perceived through one of the senses a sense of warmth
4. a mental perception or awareness a sense of happiness
5. moral discernment; understanding a sense of right and wrong
6. (sometimes plural) sound practical judgment or intelligence he is a man without any sense
7. reason or purpose what is the sense of going out in the rain?
8. substance or gist; meaning what is the sense of this proverb?
9. specific meaning; definition in what sense are you using the word?
10. an opinion or consensus
11. (Mathematics) Maths one of two opposite directions measured on a directed line; the sign as contrasted with the magnitude of a vector
make sense to be reasonable or understandable
13. (Philosophy / Logic) (Linguistics) Logic linguistics
a. the import of an expression as contrasted with its referent. Thus the morning star and the evening star have the same reference, Venus, but different senses
b. the property of an expression by virtue of which its referent is determined
c. that which one grasps in understanding an expression
14. take leave of one's senses See leave2 [8]
vb (tr)
1. (Life Sciences & Allied Applications / Physiology) to perceive through one or more of the senses
2. to apprehend or detect without or in advance of the evidence of the senses
3. to understand
4. (Electronics & Computer Science / Computer Science) Computing
a. to test or locate the position of (a part of computer hardware)
b. to read (data)
[from Latin sēnsus, from sentīre to feel]

Yes, so?

I gave you the meaning of my use of this word; if you don't like it, that's too bad.

So, please address what I have to say, or stop pretending you are replying to me.

[ChrisK]

[FONT=Times New Roman][SIZE=3][COLOR=black]I follow the physiological definition of the term ‘’sense’’

And why does that mean that Rosa is using "sense" in the physiological sense? She is telling you that philosophical theories make no sense and then you use "sense" in a different way. This is equivocating the term and is no way to argue.

[neosyndic]

x

[ChrisK]

i am not questioning that a person might agree or not with a text. i am simply pointing out that all philosophical ideas ultimately are contained in texts written by someone. to call yourself a ''historical materialist'' and pretend that you are not following the canon (textual legacy) of Marx is plain dishonest.

i posted all the possible definitions of term.

CANON (knn)
n.
1. An ecclesiastical law or code of laws established by a church council.
2. A secular law, rule, or code of law.
3.
a. An established principle: the canons of polite society.
b. A basis for judgment; a standard or criterion.
4. The books of the Bible officially accepted as Holy Scripture.
5.
a. A group of literary works that are generally accepted as representing a field: "the durable canon of American short fiction" (William Styron).
b. The works of a writer that have been accepted as authentic: the entire Shakespeare canon.
6. Canon The part of the Mass beginning after the Preface and Sanctus and ending just before the Lord's Prayer.
7. The calendar of saints accepted by the Roman Catholic Church.
8. Music A composition or passage in which a melody is imitated by one or more voices at fixed intervals of pitch and time.

[Middle English canoun, from Old English canon and from Old French, both from Latin cann, rule, from Greek kann, measuring rod, rule.]

source (http://www.anonym.to/?http://www.thefreedictionary.com/canon)

That is not how canon is used in English these days. Following a canon contains the implication of dogmatism.

[Meridian]

Yes, but you ignore that what this word actually means, how it is used, namely that when you follow a canon you follow something which has been established in a dogmatic fashion. Typically some religious rules or principles of behavior.

Marx did not make such rules, codes or principles of behavior, he generally made assertions of empirical nature. To the degree that Marx made observations, a person does not "follow" them, he/she understands them and their context, the cases where they are true/false.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Neosyndic:


i am not questioning that a person might agree or not with a text. i am simply pointing out that all philosophical ideas ultimately are contained in texts written by someone. to call yourself a ''historical materialist'' and pretend that you are not following the canon (textual legacy) of Marx is plain dishonest.

But you also added this:


any text taken as infallible basis for a postulate of ''truth'' is a canon because it constitutes A basis for judgment; a standard or criterion

So, and once again, what text do I (or Chris, or Meridian) take as "infallible"?

[neosyndic]

x

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Neosyndic:


well, they are the dominant trend in contemporary philosophy in the west, and they are gaining ascendancy. which has implications for politics, economics and cultural life that i assure you, you will not like. for example: Atheistic philosophical post-humanism has evolved into a form of nihilism that is radically egoistic and denies all ethics. ''marxism'' in any form (unfortunately) has long ago been purged from the intellectual and philosophical discussion cuircuit.

Can we have proof of this -- that is, proof that 'post-humanism' is the 'dominant' trend in contemporary philsophy?

you don't do proof do you?]


i already answered to this:your statement:

“I claim that the word "god" is meaningless, which makes the sentence "God does not exist" just as non-sensical as the sentence "God exists"…”

But you have yet to show this is based on the Verification Principle [VP].

I can only conclude that your refusal to show this means that you either do not know what the VP is, or you only have a very superficial understanding of Logical Positivism.

My money is on both.


This statement fundamentally posits a logical positivist argument, namely that all narratives of ‘’God’’ are ‘’dead language’’ because there is ‘’no empirical basis for the existence of a God’’ ergo: that the word ‘’God’’ is meaningless.

Well, you have already had it pointed out to you (twice!) that my argument is not based on the alleged fact that there is "no empirical basis for the existence of a God".

Moreover, just because the LPs end up with a conclusion that looks like mine, that no more shows that my argument is based on LP than it shows that Marxism is based on Anarchism if both Marxists and Anarchists end up with the conclusion that the state should be smashed.

In fact, I have argued in several posts in Philosophy that LP is no less non-sensical than any other Philosophical 'ism' is.

Oh dear! Here comes the stuck record again:


You refine it (brilliantly) by adding that the logical conclusion of the premise should be that the statement ‘’God does not exist’’ is equally meaningless. The post-humanist reply is that the fundamental issue is not God; because ‘’God is Dead’’. Rather, the fundamental issue is that the ‘’I am’’ in ''cogito ergo sum'' is meaningless, because human thoughts have no objective existence.

Once more, where have I said that the sentence "God does not exist" is "equally meaningless"?

In fact, as you have aready had it pointed out to you, I claim that that sentence is non-sensical. I nowhere say is is meaningless.

You seem intent on posting little other than lies about what I have in fact said.


Rather, the fundamental issue is that the ‘’I am’’ in ''cogito ergo sum'' is meaningless, because human thoughts have no objective existence

Oh dear, the same old irrelevant mantra.:lol:

Do you reallyy think that if you keep repeating this irrelevant mantra that we will all begin to nod in agreement?

Anyway, what has it got to do with anything I have argued?

[Ha, some hope of a clear answer to that one!]


so far you have failed to issue any evidence for the ''ERGO''.

I'm beginning to think you have a worryingly insecure grasp of reality; where, in any pf my posts in reply to you, have I mentioned this "ERGO", let alone tried to, or omitted to, "issue any evidence" for it?


or replied to the following: 1. that ideas and thoughts chave no objective existence. 2. that perceptions and senses do not prove anything, because perceptions and senses can be fooled (case in point: perception management science). 3. that Dubito ergo cogito ergo sum does not prove the existence of the body, only the existence of the mind. 4. Acknowledgement of cogito proves that reality is not only material, since thoughts have no material substance.

In fact, all these non-sensical ideas were covered (as a job lot) in that post of mine you skim read.


and conveniently anything that does not agree with or challenges your a -priori dogmatics is ''non-sense''. this is the way in which you shield yourself from facing challenge. fundamentalism is confortable.

Well, I have given you my arguments; you need to address them rather than posting yet more baseless accusations.


i am not going to qualify your determination to classify anything you disagree with as ''non-sensical''.

But I don't.

Or, if you think I do, let's see the proof. [Ha, some hope!]


your criteria is subjective.

So is that allegation.


Karl Marx did not call it ''historical materialism'', he called it ''materialist conception of history''. it is not a science.

As I said, you are welcome to think this, but I reagrd it as a science, as did Marx.


it is simpy a body of conceptual tools that aid in the undertanding and investigation of history and historiography; the tools originally designed by marx have been modified and refined over the years by several generations of ''marxist'' historians. there also exist a number of competing schools of interpretation regarding ''historical materialist'' philosophy based on the textual legacy of Marx.

I agree with much of that -- apart from the addition of the word "philosophy" near the end.

As I have shown in the threads I linked to in reply to 'Comrade Man', Marx was, if anything, and anti-philosopher.


how convenient !, like i said, fundamentalism is confortable.

Ok, I'm glad you are comfortable.

[neosyndic]

What is Posthumanism? (http://www.sciy.org/2010/05/07/what-is-posthumanism-by-cary-wolfe/)

Theory is not all that (http://community.livejournal.com/theoryisnotcrew)


Recent trends in theoretical psychology (http://books.google.se/books?id=qsGWaToccxkC&pg=PA247&lpg=PA247&dq=post-humanism+philosophy+trends&source=bl&ots=1Mpt_omrnB&sig=FMDkLz-8_GxkPUDtdWw9kGu4NWc&hl=sv&ei=z96NTfWyBYSRswbp6OT5CQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CDMQ6AEwBDgK#v=onepage&q&f=false)

Post-Humanism and its reelvance to culture (http://blogs.monografias.com/sistema-limbico-neurociencias/2010/04/30/posthumanism-and-its-relevance-to-culture-a-book-review/)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Neosyndic:


in business, philosophy, and psychology of religion departments it is definitely either a dominant or emergent trend. here are some links:

So, it's not dominant in philosophy, as you earlier alleged:


they are the dominant trend in contemporary philosophy in the west

And who cares what they get up to in such 'departments'?


i am not entirely in agreement with the perspective that a statement only has meaning if there is a practical means to determine if the statement is true. this perspective does not account for what we do not know, but nevertheless might exist (the unknown unknown). case in point: Quantum Physics. that we do not yet have the technologicasl means to determine how quantum physics works does not negate the existence of physical processes at the level of quanta.

1. Fine, but that is not my argument anyway.

2. How does this show that my arguments are based on LP?


case in point: Quantum Physics. that we do not yet have the technologicasl means to determine how quantum physics works does not negate the existence of physical processes at the level of quanta

Who said it does? Not me.


there is enough influence of logical positivism in the structure of your arguments and the logic you follow that it could be qualified as an example of Logical positivism.

In fact, the influience goes the other way. Had you read that post of mine with due care you would have seen this:


In what follows, I have had to repeat myself more times than I would like since the points I am putting across are not at all easy -- in fact, they sailed right over the heads of some of the greatest minds in human history, and remained unacknowledged for over 2500 years.

I claim no originality here, except in the way these ideas have been presented. They have in fact been adapted from Wittgenstein's early and middle period.

So, Wittgenstein influenced my ideas, not the LPs.

And, as you will no doubt recall, the LPs read the Tractatus, and read into it their VP, which is nowhere to be found in that book, nor anything remotely like it.

So, my ideas have nothing to do with LP, despite the superficial similarities.


your theories are hybrid. your theories are hybrid. i agree. but in any case, your theories are just one set of theories among millions of theories.

I don't have a theory, nor do I want one.

[And by "theory" I mean "philosophical theory".]


the history of science and philosophy contains many theories once regarded as ''successful'' but which latter on where proven to be false. when Relativity, Chaos Theory and Quantum Physics emerged these forced the revision of what we consider to be ''scientific truth''.

So? What has this got to do with my posts?

My ideas are not even part of a scientific theory, either.


while it is possible that you argued against orthodox logical positivism, you still keept to enough of it that your theories can be considered to be a subset of it. but perspective is subjective, which works for you because then you can claim to not be a logical positivist while in fact you are.

But, as we have seen, there is no LP in any of my work.

It's like arguing that because both Ptolemy and Newton explained the motion of the planets (in their own ways), Newton was really a Ptolemaist!

Are you really reduced to that level of argument!


claiming that X or Y is ''non-sensical'' implies that it is meaningless. for a statement to have meaning it must make sense.

Not so, this is based on a very clear distinction between the sense of a sentence and the meaning of words.

As I have explained elsewhere:


Voloshinov and the other comrades mentioned above seem to have ignored the important distinction between the meaning of words and the sense of sentences. This is in fact a failing they share with the majority of Philosophers who have written on this subject --, that is, up until just over a hundred years ago. Beginning with ideas that were first seriously mooted in Frege's work, Philosophers working in the Analytic tradition have generally (but not unanimously) maintained the opinion that an account of language that ignores the above distinction is radically flawed.

This observation, of course, is not based on supposition, nor is it mere dogma. We all recognise it to be the case when we are reminded of it. Even competent speakers of a language would fail to comprehend what was said to them if it contained words they had never encountered before; and they would remain in that state until the meaning of these words had been explained to them. In stark contrast, all of us readily understand sentences we have never heard before (saving, of course, those which contain such novel words). This indicates that word-meaning and sentence-sense cannot be the same, otherwise this would not happen.

For example, the words in the previous paragraph could be reassembled in different combinations, and, providing this new arrangement satisfied certain syntactic and pragmatic constraints, they would be readily understood by most competent speakers of English. However, if the names "Tony Blair" and "Leon Trotsky" were mixed up to give "Leon Blair" and "Tony Trotsky" no one would know who was being referred to -- even if they knew who the original characters were.

Moreover, if the following sentence were uttered:

V9: "Tony Blair's wrist watch has just been eaten by a Koala Bear",

the vast majority of English language speakers would understand it even though that sentence (in all probability) has never been written, spoken or heard before by anyone; and they would comprehend it without knowing whether it was true or whether it was false, since they would know under what circumstances it could be either one of these. In short, they would understand its sense. [This theme is expanded upon greatly in Essay Twelve Part One (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2012_01.htm).]

Contrast V9 with the following:

V10: Bogomil.

Now, it's highly likely that most English speakers have never encountered this word before. Even though it contains familiar letters, no one would understand it until its meaning had been explained to them, or they looked it up in a dictionary. If this word appeared in a sentence, that sentence would similarly remain incomprehensible until this word's meaning had been clarified -- unless, of course, that had been worked out by means of an educated guess, perhaps.

This difference between words and sentences shows that the sense of the latter and the meaning of the former are distinct logical features of our use of language.

All traditional (and most modern) theories of meaning*founder on this fact alone.

Nevertheless, this is not an obscure feature of language, something that only those who study Linguistics or Analytic Philosophy are aware of. All of us appreciate its validity (and recognise its force) when it is pointed out to us since we depend on it to communicate everyday of our lives. We all understand sentences we have never encountered before, and we all fail to comprehend words we have never met before. The fact that this distinction had been ignored for thousands of years (and is still ignored today) by traditional theorists shows how divorced from ordinary life -- and how wedded to atomistic theories of language -- such thinkers had (and have) become (and this is so for reasons examined in Essay Twelve (summary here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Rest_of_Summary_of_Twelve.htm))) at my site.

Naturally, this means that serious errors were introduced into thought by previous generations of Philosophers who ignored the vernacular and operated with a fetishised view of language.

More details here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page_13_03.htm).

So, you radically misconstrue my argument.


Oh dear, the same old irrelevant mantra.

Oh dear, not satisfied with your stuck record, you now copy me!


as to the issue of ''the materialist conception of history''; it is just one historiographic theory among many competing theories. i choose to follow it because i consider that i have a ''class interest'' in doing so, not because i believe it to be scientific truth. i follow those who argue that the method of historical materialism should be appliked to historical materialism as an intellectual and philosophical tradition and to the analysis of current events.

Once more, I agree with much of the above -- how many more times do you need telling?

[neosyndic]

Rosa Lichtenstein,

I did write dominant. Let me rephrase then: Post-humanism has impacted all humanities studies, inclusive philosophy. I highlighted the business, philosophy, and psychology of religion areas because it is in these that the implications for political and cultural impacts are most evident. To clarify: I am concerned with developing a narrative of left post-humanism, as apparently all the narratives of post-humanism, so far, have been articulated from perspectives that are at odds with the popular democratic goals of the global left. It is possible that such a language can not be developed., of course. But I will continue to try.

I do care about what they might be up to because it is in the academic world that one can discern the state of what you call ‘’bourgeois ideology’’. I subscribe to the theory that is necessary to be aware of intellectual trends that have practical impacts in the political and economic life of societies. You are welcome to think otherwise.

No. It might not be your argument directly, but your fixation with arbitrary designations of ‘’sense’’ and ‘’non-sense’’ leads one to the impression that you hold to the perspective that a statement only has meaning if there is a practical means to determine if the statement is true. You do not have to say it directly, but your methods imply it. (or seem to).

Sensory imput does not prove anything. Senses do not prove anything. It does not matter if you redefined ‘’sense’’ and ‘’non-sense’’ to mean what suits you; I still hold that your perspective does not account for what we do not know, but nevertheless might exist (the unknown unknown). This I why I pointed to: Quantum Physics. that we do not yet have the technological means to determine how quantum physics works does not negate the existence of physical processes at the level of quanta. I get the impression that by your standards of judgement to say that Quanta exists would be considered ‘’non sense’’.

I read you tract. I have repeated this over and over again. That I do not agree with your conclusions and your premises is another matter. I have a different viewpoint. I am entitled to having a different viewpoint if I please. I am not required to agree with you or your theories. Like I keep saying, your theories are your own subjective viewpoint. Just another viewpoint among millions of viewpoints out there.

the ‘’superficial similarities’’ are enough to classify your theories as a variable of Logical Positivism. This is a rhetorical trick on your part. It is a subjective judgement. You say they are not similar, I disagree. They are similar enough. As I said before: while it is possible that you argued against orthodox logical positivism, you still keept to enough of it that your theories can be considered to be a subset of it. but perspective is subjective, which works for you because then you can claim to not be a logical positivist while in fact you are.

You are very clever. Whatever you want to call them, all your viewpoints represent your own subjective interpretation of texts that you have utilised to build up your narratives. You can pretend otherwise all you want, ultimately you consulted a text and you interpreted it before you built your theories (‘’philosophical’’ or otherwise). I am sorry, but no one is an authority on ‘’truth’’.

You claim that Historical Materialism is ‘’a science’’. You have claimed that you are a follower of ‘’historical materialism’’. Your theories are based on texts written by Marx referent to history and historiography. ‘

You are very arrogant to compare yourself with Newton and Ptolemy ! your texts are not that great. The process by which science ended up making sense of planetary motion passed through many individuals throughout history. All of them are ultimately part of a greater process of development of scientific ideas.

Yes so. a ‘’distinction’’ that you invented for your own purposes. ''non-sensical'' implies meaninglessness. for a statement to have meaning it must make sense. I go by the socially accepted definition of the term ‘’meaning’’.

Meaning:
1. Something that is conveyed or signified; sense or significance.
2. Something that one wishes to convey, especially by language: The writer's meaning was obscured by his convoluted prose.
3. An interpreted goal, intent, or end: "The central meaning of his pontificate is to restore papal authority" (Conor Cruise O'Brien).
4. Inner significance: "But who can comprehend the meaning of the voice of the city?" (O. Henry).
adj.
1. Full of meaning; expressive.
2. Disposed or intended in a specified manner. Often used in combination: a well-meaning fellow; ill-meaning intentions.
Synonyms: meaning, acceptation, import, sense, significance, signification
These nouns refer to the idea conveyed by something, such as a word, action, gesture, or situation: Synonyms are words with the same or nearly the same meaning. In one of its acceptations value is a technical term in music. The import of his statement is ambiguous. The term anthropometry has only one sense. The significance of a green traffic light is widely understood. Linguists have determined the hieroglyphics' signification.

LINK TO SOURCE OF DEFINITION. (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/meaning)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Neo:


Post-humanism has impacted all humanities studies, inclusive philosophy. I highlighted the business, philosophy, and psychology of religion areas because it is in these that the implications for political and cultural impacts are most evident. To clarify: I am concerned with developing a narrative of left post-humanism, as apparently all the narratives of post-humanism, so far, have been articulated from perspectives that are at odds with the popular democratic goals of the global left. It is possible that such a language can not be developed., of course. But I will continue to try.

I do care about what they might be up to because it is in the academic world that one can discern the state of what you call ‘’bourgeois ideology’’. I subscribe to the theory that is necessary to be aware of intellectual trends that have practical impacts in the political and economic life of societies. You are welcome to think otherwise.

Indeed, but then you have yet to show it impacts on the class war in any way.

But, even if it did, the fact they are all non-sensical defuses the lot.

Or do you think you can win an argument with those who support this soon to be 'dominant' trend?

If not, why all the fuss?


No. It might not be your argument directly, but your fixation with arbitrary designations of ‘’sense’’ and ‘’non-sense’’ leads one to the impression that you hold to the perspective that a statement only has meaning if there is a practical means to determine if the statement is true. You do not have to say it directly, but your methods imply it. (or seem to).

No, that is not what my argument is about. It has absolutely nothing to do with practicalities. That is Michael Dummett's argument, not mine.


Sensory input does not prove anything. Senses do not prove anything. It does not matter if you redefined ‘’sense’’ and ‘’non-sense’’ to mean what suits you; I still hold that your perspective does not account for what we do not know, but nevertheless might exist (the unknown unknown). This I why I pointed to: Quantum Physics. that we do not yet have the technological means to determine how quantum physics works does not negate the existence of physical processes at the level of quanta. I get the impression that by your standards of judgement to say that Quanta exists would be considered ‘’non sense’’.

Once more, you are arguing with a figment of your own imagination -- my posts have nothing to do with the senses. I do not know how many times you need to be told.


I read you tract. I have repeated this over and over again. That I do not agree with your conclusions and your premises is another matter. I have a different viewpoint. I am entitled to having a different viewpoint if I please.

Of course you are, but if you insist on arguing with an invention of your own making, not the content of my posts, then you should stop trying to debate with me.


the ‘’superficial similarities’’ are enough to classify your theories as a variable of Logical Positivism.

That's about as brainless as saying the superficial similarities between Ptolemy and Newton mean that Newton was a Ptolemaist!


This is a rhetorical trick on your part. It is a subjective judgement. You say they are not similar, I disagree. They are similar enough.

You keep saying so, but you have yet to provide any reasons.


You are very clever.

Cleverness has nothing to do with this; it's reasons and argument, as opposed to wild accusations, that count in philosophy.


Whatever you want to call them, all your viewpoints represent your own subjective interpretation of texts that you have utilised to build up your narratives. You can pretend otherwise all you want, ultimately you consulted a text and you interpreted it before you built your theories (‘’philosophical’’ or otherwise). I am sorry, but no one is an authority on ‘’truth’’.

So, they still do not constitute a 'canon', since I do not accept them as "infallible", which is how you characterised 'canons'.


I am sorry, but no one is an authority on ‘’truth’’.

Who said they have?

Not me.


You claim that Historical Materialism is ‘’a science’’. You have claimed that you are a follower of ‘’historical materialism’’. Your theories are based on texts written by Marx referent to history and historiography. ‘

I have never claimed to be a follower of anyone or anything.

Why do you have to invent stuff all the time?


You are very arrogant to compare yourself with Newton and Ptolemy

You really are odd. Where did I compare myself to these two? What I said was that your attempt to link me to LP was as brainless as trying to link Ptolemy with Newton on the basis that they both studied the planets.


! your texts are not that great.

So? Who said they were? Not me.


The process by which science ended up making sense of planetary motion passed through many individuals throughout history. All of them are ultimately part of a greater process of development of scientific ideas.

But, according to you, they'd all be Ptolemaists because of this common thread! :lol:


Yes so. a ‘’distinction’’ that you invented for your own purposes. ''non-sensical'' implies meaninglessness. for a statement to have meaning it must make sense. I go by the socially accepted definition of the term ‘’meaning’’.

So, you keep saying, -- but I note you ignored my argument to the contrary.

And thanks for the material you lifted from that dictionary, but since when have dictionaries settled philosophical arguments?

[Technocrat]

The Ontological argument is one of the best-refuted arguments there is.

It goes: "God is the most perfect being by definition. Something that exists is more perfect than something that does not exist. Therefore, God must exist."

This was well-refuted even in medieval days. A Monk named Anselm retorted "There is a fictional Island named Islandia that is perfect. Since Islandia is perfect, Islandia must exist."

Kant would admit that existence is not a property of perfection. The existence of something perfect is instead a question as to whether or not anything like that actually exists.

Pretty obvious, really. :rolleyes:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

^^^It's not quite as easy to dispose of as that.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/

[Technocrat]

^^^It's not quite as easy to dispose of as that.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/

Rosa, what I said above was by no means intended to be a complete answer to the question, but it is a sufficient basis for such an answer. I just didn't feel like posting an essay-length response, if that's okay.

I tend to try to simplify things as much as possible. Perhaps that makes me simple-minded. :)

[RED DAVE]

A Monk named Anselm retorted ... .Uhh, Comrade, I may be wrong, but I think Anselm actually originated the ontological argument. :D

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontological_argument#Anselm.27s_argument

RED DAVE

[ChrisK]

Uhh, Comrade, I may be wrong, but I think Anselm actually originated the ontological argument. :D

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontological_argument#Anselm.27s_argument

RED DAVE

Correct. It was Gaunilo of Marmoutiers who wrote the perfect island retort.

[neosyndic]

That is not how canon is used in English these days. Following a canon contains the implication of dogmatism.

not so. the definition i provided demonstrates the existing social convention on the use of the term.

to claim that historical materialism is a ''science'' assumes an apriori agreement with the dogmatic ideological premise that ''historical materialism'' constitutes ''scientific truth''. not all ''marxists'' agree with this. certainly so, outside the confines of the far left, the contention that historical materialism is ''science'' would be considered laughable.

historical materialism amounts to a methodological tool for the study of history and historiography from a working class perspective.

the choice to deploy it is subjective. as i stated before:

i choose to subscribe to the premises of historical materialism because i judge that it is the best tool available for the study of history as it concerns those who have committed themselves to the achievement of a global shift from a capitalist to a socialist mode of production. i could have judged otherwise, but because i am conscious of my class status as an undocumented worker and i live under state persecution; i subscribe to the premise that I have a ''class interest'' in looking at history from the perspective of historical materialism. It is an outlook on history consistent with my present ‘’class status’’. I choose to subscribe to the theory that class status is not an automatic determinant for subjective political postures; that subjective political postures are chosen as an act of free will.

i notice that you are a sympathiser of the Socialist Worker's Party in the U.K. : when Anthony Cliff utilised both historical materialism and dialectical materialism to construct his theory of the nature of the soviet state as ''state capitalist'', he arrived at that conclusion because he made a councious choice to deploy the tools Marx left in his textual legacy.
i.e before Cliff was ready to debunk canonical Hismat and Diamat he read Marx and Trotsky extensibly over a long period of many years and he also participated in ''the struggle'' by building the SWP against washington, moscow and the UK labour party. the interaction of Anthony Cliff with the pertinent texts from Marx and Trotsky in context of participating in ''the struggle'' is what ultimately produced the theory of state capitalism, not Anthony Cliff per se. i do not agree en toto with ''State Capitalism theory'', but certainly so; Cliff demonstrated that the mechanistic notions of Hismat and Diamat associated with official 'Marxist-Leninism' where seriously flawed. To use an analogy that you will not like :p: in terms of methodological approach (viewed from the perspective of practical applications), Cliff's deployment of Historical Materialism and Dialectical Materialism against official Hismat and Diamat had an effect upon the field of Marxist Theory as that which Luther's 95 Thesis (http://justificationbyallegiance.blogspot.com/2009/03/martin-luthers-69th-thesis.html) had upon medieval Catholic Canon Law and Western Theology.

Karl Marx meant for ''marxists'' to use ''marxism'' on ''marxism''; this is why he stated that he was not a ''marxist''...

[neosyndic]

Unlike Mister Rosa I present myself as I AM here (http://roseoftokio.blogspot.com/) ;)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Neo:


To Mister Rosa et all,

i choose to not subscribe to Mister Rosa's re-definition of the terms ''sensical'' and ''non-sensical''. i choose to follow universally accepted definitions of these terms. the attempt by Mister Rosa to impose his subjectively constructed re-definitions of the terms involved on the debates in this forum is a deliberate act of intellectual dishonesty.

Fine, but that will only mean you can't engage with my arguments -- just your own inventions.


Yet, the fact that a number of posters do agree to follow Mister Rosa's re-definitions as basis for arguing in favour of His subjectively constructed theories indicates that there is no agreement in this forum on the definitions of the terms: ''canon'', ''sense'' and ''meaning''. i then reserve the intellectual right to choose between the re-definitions of these terms as presented by Mister Rosa and the universally accepted definitions. therefore; i choose to follow the universally accepted definitions and not those Mister Rosa is attempting to impose:

Except, you, not me, added to these 'universally accepted definitions', the following:


any text taken as infallible basis for a postulate of ''truth'' is a canon because it constitutes

Bold added.

Now, since you have failed (you haven't even tried) to show that I regard anybody's work as "infallible", then according to your, not my, 'definition', I have no 'canon'.

You have been told this several times, but you just keep posting the same odd allegations -- in which case, I can only conclude you are either a troll, or you do not know, from moment to moment, what you believe.

And thanks for those definitions, but the last time you posted similar definitions, I pointed out that no philosophical argument can be resolved by consulting a dictionary.

But, even if they could, they have nothing to do with my argument.

So, that was just wasted effort on your part.

And, I have absolutely no doubt you'll do it again -- that is because you seem to be suffering from an odd delusion that no one will notice you have failed to address my argument if you keep saying the same thing, over and over.

And here comes the mantra:


the emergence of post-humanism impacts the class war in the sense that it is the basis for the emergence of at least two forms of nihilism (Atheistic post-human egoism and the post-humanist variable dominionist theology), far more dangerous than the ''national socialism'' and ''fascism'' of the 20th century.

Maybe so, but with you to defend workers' interests, we might just as well give in now.

All you have to offer are vague comments about the 'canon' and the cogito.

That would have had Hitler and his henchmen quaking in their boots.:lol:


the contribution of Ptolemy was as advanced as he could get to in the field of astronomy given the nature of the economic mode of production and the state of technology in his times. the contribution of Newton was an evolutionary leap in the field given the more advanced mode of production and the more advanced technology in context of his times.

So? What has that got to do with what I posted? Here it is again:


But, as we have seen, there is no LP in any of my work.

It's like arguing that because both Ptolemy and Newton explained the motion of the planets (in their own ways), Newton was really a Ptolemaist!

Do you have problems processing the English language, by any chance?


over all Mister Rosa's subjectively constructed theories are a contemporary analogue to the ideology of Lysenkoism: ''the manipulation or distortion of the scientific process as a way to reach a predetermined conclusion as dictated by an ideological bias, often related to social or political objectives.''

Once more, I do not have a theory, nor do I want one.


I post the following for the benefit of others looking at this thread:

It is already known in socialist debate circles online that MISTER ''Rosa Linchestein'' [sic] is a Eurocentric Racist. You can read about it for yourselves if you wish HERE.

I'm afraid I'll have to report that slur to the moderators.


unless Mister Rosa decides to admit his gender identity and take off the mask, i will no longer directly reply to his postings from this point forward.

I suppose you think you'll be missed.:lol:

And thanks for that link to a site that openly publishes lies about me -- so-called 'Socialist Unity'.

[ChrisK]

not so. the definition i provided demonstrates the existing social convention on the use of the term.

No, it shows what academics decided to put in a dictionary. As a native English speaker I can confidently say what a canon is, especially since it is a common part of my vocabualry.


to claim that historical materialism is a ''science'' assumes an apriori agreement with the dogmatic ideological premise that ''historical materialism'' constitutes ''scientific truth''. not all ''marxists'' agree with this. certainly so, outside the confines of the far left, the contention that historical materialism is ''science'' would be considered laughable.

Not at all. Why should it be that considering it science means it is true? I agree with aspects of physics without asserting its truth.

Further, science deals in rules not truthes. Statements like "F=ma" or "A body in motion tends to stay in motion" are rules that can be applied in a given situation. They are also good rules since they seem to work most of the time.


historical materialism amounts to a methodological tool for the study of history and historiography from a working class perspective.

Which supports my position. It is a good set of rules for viewing history because it seems to given good analysis of history.


the choice to deploy it is subjective. as i stated before:

i choose to subscribe to the premises of historical materialism because i judge that it is the best tool available for the study of history as it concerns those who have committed themselves to the achievement of a global shift from a capitalist to a socialist mode of production. i could have judged otherwise, but because i am conscious of my class status as an undocumented worker and i live under state persecution; i subscribe to the premise that I have a ''class interest'' in looking at history from the perspective of historical materialism. It is an outlook on history consistent with my present ‘’class status’’. I choose to subscribe to the theory that class status is not an automatic determinant for subjective political postures; that subjective political postures are chosen as an act of free will.

I agree with what you say here.


i notice that you are a sympathiser of the Socialist Worker's Party in the U.K. : when Anthony Cliff utilised both historical materialism and dialectical materialism to construct his theory of the nature of the soviet state as ''state capitalist'', he arrived at that conclusion because he made a councious choice to deploy the tools Marx left in his textual legacy.
i.e before Cliff was ready to debunk canonical Hismat and Diamat he read Marx and Trotsky extensibly over a long period of many years and he also participated in ''the struggle'' by building the SWP against washington, moscow and the UK labour party. the interaction of Anthony Cliff with the pertinent texts from Marx and Trotsky in context of participating in ''the struggle'' is what ultimately produced the theory of state capitalism, not Anthony Cliff per se. i do not agree en toto with ''State Capitalism theory'', but certainly so; Cliff demonstrated that the mechanistic notions of Hismat and Diamat associated with official 'Marxist-Leninism' where seriously flawed. To use an analogy that you will not like :p: in terms of methodological approach (viewed from the perspective of practical applications), Cliff's deployment of Historical Materialism and Dialectical Materialism against official Hismat and Diamat had an effect upon the field of Marxist Theory as that which Luther's 95 Thesis (http://justificationbyallegiance.blogspot.com/2009/03/martin-luthers-69th-thesis.html) had upon medieval Catholic Canon Law and Western Theology.

I don't dislike the analogy. I don't see what this has to do with what I claim. If anything I tend to agree (except with the dialectical materialism part).


Karl Marx meant for ''marxists'' to use ''marxism'' on ''marxism''; this is why he stated that he was not a ''marxist''...

Yep.

[neosyndic]

x

[ChrisK]

again, appealing to anti-intellectual populism might be fine in terms of agit-prop.

Where have I been supporting anti-intellectualism?


but when it comes to philosophical issues: historical materialism cannot be considered ''science'' because as a methodological tool for the analysis of history it aims to advance a socialist political aganda. the a-priori ideological bias negates the possibility of it being a science. furthermore, all history is subjectivity because the construction of historical narratives implies a selective editing process that predates publication. this was the reason why Howard Zinn wrote ''A People's History of the United States'' and why among the SWP-UK library we find a tome called ''A Peoples History of the World''. in both cases leftist historians sought to bring to light portions of the historical narrative editorially deselected by what socialists call ''historians at the service of the ruling class''. History, journalism, philosophy, political ideology, theology - all of it is ultimately subjectivity.

How is this any different from the differences between Newtonian and Relativistic physics?


why should adopting re-definition of the terms ''sense'' and ''no-sense'' be considered ''truth'' when the mechanistic model for judgement associated with the model you are promoting does not account for relativity or uncertainty ?

I'm sorry, what?


''rules'' can be rendered obsolete as new discoveries are made.

Yes, and?


only if you look at science from an epistemiological perspective. the alternative is the hermeneutical approach (the theory and methodology of interpretation, not only of scriptural text and narratives; but also of raw data in context of discerning the physics of recently discovered realms of natural phenomena where the laws of classical physics do not apply).

I look at science from a rule stating perspective.


the statement "...A body in motion tends to stay in motion" are rules that can be applied in a given situation...''

how do you account for motion of particles in the realm of quanta ?
how do you reconcile the theory of relative motion in four dimensional space-time with quanta phenomena ?
how does your model account for uncertainty (as in the uncertainty principle involving measurement of pairs) ?

assuming that differences in initial conditions relative to phenomena yield different outcomes; how does your model answer the questions posed by Quantum Chaos ? (the manner in which classical and quantum mechanics interact in the borderline between ''our realm'' - a matter of perception, because there is really no ''boundary'' - and that of quanta.)

I don't know. Ask a physicist.

There is a reason why I said "in a given situation." This rule applies in a certain set of conditions.


perhaps here you could deploy your definitions of ''sense'' and ''non-sense'' and the mechanical model associated with these to demonstrate the effectiveness of your model in solving the puzzle of Quantum gravity theory and Quantum Chaos ?

Why would I do that? That is not the point of the distinction between "sense" and "non-sense".


if you where to answer this i would be the first to make a u-turn and become an advocate of ''historical materialism as science'' bacause the model developed to assert this conclusion, as based on a re-definition of the terms ''sense'' and ''non-sense',' was able to explain the above.

Well, that is not the point of historical materialism. Nor is that the point of the linguistic distinctions between "sense" and "non-sense".


that is science.

there can be no a-priori political bias and you must be willing to make the u-turn.

What are my a priori assumptions.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

If Neosyndic doesn't like my definition of 'non-sense', we can easily to replace it with the following:

If, concerning a given indicative sentence, no coherent account can be given of the conditions under which it could be true, or under which it could be false, then it shall be called a 'neo-syndical' sentence.

Since all metaphysical sentences are neo-syndic (proof here (http://www.revleft.com/vb/all-philosophical-theories-t148537/index.html), but replace 'non-sense' wth 'neo-syndic', and 'sense' with 'conditions under which a sentence could be true, or under which it could be false), including the theses found in DM, they can't feature in a scientific (or in any other) description of the natural and social world -- other than to demonstrate how not to proceed.

Ok?:)

[neosyndic]

x

[ZeroNowhere]

I am impressed by this in-depth discussion of the ontological argument.

[ChrisK]

your statement: "...No, it shows what academics decided to put in a dictionary. As a native English speaker I can confidently say what a canon is, especially since it is a common part of my vocabualry..."

your bias towards colloquial usage is an example of anti-intellectual populism. colloquial usage of words is relative to time and place. also your biased emphasis on native English speakers denotes an ethnocentric bias in favour of ''native'' anglophones. i surmise you mean ''british'' ones (as in ''the queens english'') , not north american and so-called ''australian'' ones. which makes your statement eurocentric. leaving aside the issue of anglophone africans; or african-american ebonics. which ''natives'' and why ?

How is that anti-intellectual? Socio-linguistics would support my view of language. Actually, so would Linguistic Anthropology.

A native speaker is a person who is born in a place that speaks the language. IE, I was born in America so I am a native English speaker. The same could be said of a person born in Mexico is a native Spanish speaker.


that historical materialism, as an analytical and methodological tool could be deployed to explain the emergence of relativistic physics as an advance over newtonian physics does not make it a science. historical materialism is not science because it aims to advance a socialist political aganda. the a-priori ideological bias negates the possibility of it being a science. it is a methodological tool (as in hammer) and nothing more.

You didn't answer my question. I'm saying that sciences are made up of competing methodological tools. Newtonian physics is a methodological tool, just as much as Relativistic physics is.


i was asking how the mechanistic model for the discernment of ''sense'' and ''non-sense'' you defend can be deployed to explain phenomena related to relativity or uncertainty.

By virtue of mostly applying to assertive statements. There is a reason I defend an ordinary language criticism of philosophy.


in context of stating that ''rules'' can be rendered obsolete as new discoveries are made, i was hoping you could explain what intrinsic self correcting mechanism exists in the theory you defend that would render it adaptable to the observation of phenomena whose behaviour might be construed as logically counter-intuitive.

That is actually self-evident. I am analyzing language, which changes. Thus, when the rules of grammar change, my analysis changes.

When there are no classes, then historical materialism will not apply to understanding history anymore.


then you should have no trouble answering the previous question. what makes the theory you defend adaptable to the observation of phenomena whose behaviour might be construed as logically counter-intuitive ?

By making rules for understanding those phenomena. That is the job of science.


for the ''rules'' associated with your theory to be ''scientific'' these must be applicable. i was just curious as to the practical applications of your model; specifically as related to your re-definitions of the terms ''sense'' and ''non-sense'' and the mechanical model associated with these in solving the puzzle of Quantum Chaos ?

You have not read up on these issues have you? Rosa has given you the link that will explain this distinction and it has nothing to do with physics.


then you can not claim that the theory you defend is scientific. historical materialism is a methodological tool and nothing more.

Physics is made up of methodological tools and nothing more.


on what grounds do defend the premise that historical materialism is science ?

It is a methodological method that states rule. Just like any other science.


a priori assumption (ah pree ory) n. from Latin, an assumption that is true without further proof or need to prove it. It is assumed the sun will come up tomorrow. However, it has a negative side: an a priori assumption made without question on the basis that no analysis or study is necessary, can be mental laziness when the reality is not so certain.

SOURCE OF DEFINITION (http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/a+priori+assumption)

Why would you give me that definition? I know a priori, I'm a philosophy major. I'm asking what my a priori assumptions are.

[syndicat]

A native speaker is a person who is born in a place that speaks the language. IE, I was born in America so I am a native English speaker. The same could be said of a person born in Mexico is a native Spanish speaker.



no. it is not where one is born but being acculturated to a particular language group...usually thru the language of your family when you're at the age where children soak up language, ie. 2 to 4 years old.

in the case of Mexico there are plenty of people whose native language is not Spanish. there are many indigenous American Indian languages in Mexico.

historical materialism isn't a "method." if it were a peculiar method not followed in a scientific community, that would undermine its creditility. rather, it is a thesis about the stucture cause of changes in basic mode of production.

Marx says that a "period of revolution"...when it becomes possible for a society to be transformed in its mode of production...tends to occur during a period when the "social relations of production"...the current set of relations governing social production..."fetter" the "further development of the productive forces."

So Marx is saying that, in regard to basic social change, the underlying structure cause will lie in the "mode of production", which consists of the forces of production and the social realtions of production. these two aspects of the "mode of production" have a tendency to become in conflict. thus Marx is claiming that economic structure causes are the basic structure causes in explanations of social change. other kinds of events and social movemernts and so on can play a role, but it is in the context of a particular kind of economic system and the outcome can only be explained by seeing it in this context.

so Marx's theory of history isn't a "method" but a thesis about the causality of social change.