'free will', 'determinism', 'choice' and 'responsibility'.

[Oswy]

Hi,

I'm looking for any views or Marxist arguments relating to the issue of 'free will' and 'determinism'. Elsewhere I repeatedly encounter those who offer up casual references to the poor 'making bad choices' or being 'responsible' for their conditions, etc, etc.

I'm something of a materialist and a determinist, whether we're talking about the wider physical conditions which shape human thought and action or, more specifically, the technical nature of thinking as a 'cause and effect' activity that reveals no place for a metaphysical 'free will' or 'choice' to be generated anyway.

Any opinions, examples, snippets or advice on good books or articles, very welcome!

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

As I have shown here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1997820&postcount=6

determinism is also non-sensical, as is the idea that there is something called 'free will', if the latter is conceived of in terms of a denial of determinism.

[Oswy]

As I have shown here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1997820&postcount=6

determinism is also non-sensical, as is the idea that there is something called 'free will', if the latter is conceived of in terms of a denial of determinism.

How about you offer up some kind of fairly real-world example of what you mean. Imagine that you've got some poor person 'choosing' in their mind (in conventional language) whether or not to go shoplifting in order to get some money or food. How would you characterise that specific situation in relation to this topic? I don't mind you being patronising, honest, if it helps me understand you.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Oswy:


How about you offer up some kind of fairly real-world example of what you mean. Imagine that you've got some poor person 'choosing' in their mind (in conventional language) whether or not to go shoplifting in order to get some money or food. How would you characterise that specific situation in relation to this topic? I don't mind you being patronising, honest, if it helps me understand you.

Well, what's wrong with "She went shoplifting because she needed food"?

Why do we need to bring in ideas that suggest she is some sort of automaton (which is what determinism implies)?

[Oswy]

Oswy:



Well, what's wrong with "She went shoplifting because she needed food."?

Why do we need to bring in ideas that suggest she is some sort of automaton (which is what determinism implies)?

I dunno, it just doesn't seem to help me. Maybe I should wait for some others to jump in. But, in the meantime, aren't you here introducing '(be)cause' as a need for food and 'shoplifting' as the effect?

Also, why object to the 'automaton' possibility, is that a strictly philosophical objection or an 'emotional' one?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Oswy:


I dunno, it just doesn't seem to help me. Maybe I should wait for some others to jump in. But, in the meantime, aren't you here introducing '(be)cause' as a need for food and 'shoplifting' as the effect?

No, I was giving a reason not a cause.


Also, why object to the 'automaton' possibility, is that a strictly philosophical objection or an 'emotional' one?

Well, we were referring to a human being here. If, however, you think human beings are automata, then you must also be understanding the phrase 'human being' in a new and as-yet-unexplained sense.

In which case, we will merely be bandying with words not trying to answer your question.

[Thirsty Crow]

Hi,
Elsewhere I repeatedly encounter those who offer up casual references to the poor 'making bad choices' or being 'responsible' for their conditions, etc, etc.

I think that this is the kernel of the problem at hand: certain arguments which try to legitimize the existing mode of production (when examining its consequences such as poverty and unemployment).

What happens is, in my opinion, the following: such arguments erroneously presuppose that social circumstances are exactly the same for everyone living in capitalist society (a false extension of purely legal notion of equality). Personal choices (such as: should a working class teenager study long and hard into the night or go out a have some fun with his/her peers) should be regarded within the context of the social circumstances in which a person finds himself/herself.

Does that answer your question?

[Oswy]

I think that this is the kernel of the problem at hand: certain arguments which try to legitimize the existing mode of production (when examining its consequences such as poverty and unemployment).

What happens is, in my opinion, the following: such arguments erroneously presuppose that social circumstances are exactly the same for everyone living in capitalist society (a false extension of purely legal notion of equality). Personal choices (such as: should a working class teenager study long and hard into the night or go out a have some fun with his/her peers) should be regarded within the context of the social circumstances in which a person finds himself/herself.

Does that answer your question?

Yes, I think that's the kind of thing. There's also a tendency to make something of examples in which those from poor backgrounds have worked hard, shown ambition and thus demonstrated that there is no real barrier to success for the poor under capitalism if they only have the right attitude - though it is as plain as day that such 'examples' inadvertently concede they must overcome actual disadvantage.

[black magick hustla]

i don't know about the philosophical basis of the whole free will vs determinism thing but i extremely dislike the rhetoric and the pretenses of a lot of those who use free will rhetoric. this whole dumb logic that we have of crime-punishment, work ethic, and individualism is predicated on the miserable and christian idea of free will.

[Oswy]

No, I was giving a reason not a cause.

....

Ok, but you did actually use the word 'because' there and given that you seem very precise with your language it did seem to suggest a 'cause and effect' explanation.

[Black Sheep]

If we accept that there are natural laws by which all matter and energy abide, then absolute determinism exists and ""governs"" everything.

I expect Rosa to bite off chunks of my neck.

[Decolonize The Left]

If we accept that there are natural laws by which all matter and energy abide, then absolute determinism exists and ""governs"" everything.

No, it doesn't.

"Natural Laws" don't exist as all laws are human, social, conventions. The concept of natural law is an anthropomorphism at its finest. Furthermore, if there is some sort of "law" then there must be some sort of "legislator." God is, naturally (pun ruthlessly intended), the fictive supreme ruler - He watches over his kingdom of atomistic citizens as the ultimate judge and arbiter...

In nature there is no law, there is only necessity.


I'm something of a materialist and a determinist, whether we're talking about the wider physical conditions which shape human thought and action or, more specifically, the technical nature of thinking as a 'cause and effect' activity that reveals no place for a metaphysical 'free will' or 'choice' to be generated anyway.

There is no such thing as "cause and effect."

In the first place, are you willing to argue that we (as humans) have the ability to understand all the events which make up a singular "cause?" And are we able to understand when an "effect" begins and ends? Or when that "effect" is itself another "cause?"
I would think not.

In the second place, assuming that our collective ignorance is not sufficient argument, the idea of "cause and effect" is (like the idea of "natural laws") an extension of human behavior.
For prior to believing that events were determined by some natural laws, we thought all events occurred due to personal beings and their wills (polytheism). Given that our relations are results of our wills (i.e. our souls/spirits interact via willing), the projected souls of things (such as the ocean) interact via willing as well. Remember when rain was a result of the gods being pleased or displeased with our behavior?
Likewise, the notion of cause and effect is a result of this initial projection of human beliefs onto non-human happenings.

- August

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Oswy:


Ok, but you did actually use the word 'because' there and given that you seem very precise with your language it did seem to suggest a 'cause and effect' explanation.

Well, "because" is a reason giving word and a cause giving word. When I used it in the context you set put above, I was clearly using it in the former sense.

You can see the difference more clearly in this exchange:

Q: Why did you call that shape a triangle?

A: Because it has three straight interesecting edges.

This "because" is not causal.

[ed miliband]

i don't know about the philosophical basis of the whole free will vs determinism thing but i extremely dislike the rhetoric and the pretenses of a lot of those who use free will rhetoric. this whole dumb logic that we have of crime-punishment, work ethic, and individualism is predicated on the miserable and christian idea of free will.


Kinda, but then Calvinism is highly deterministic and yet it is the primary source of the whole 'Protestant work ethic' thing. The Roman Catholic Church, despite believing fully in free will, had a different attitude to work ethic/individualism (at least at that time).

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Black Sheep:


If we accept that there are natural laws by which all matter and energy abide, then absolute determinism exists and ""governs"" everything.

Well, as I pointed out in the threads to which I linked above, you find you have to attribute to inanimate matter the ability to 'abide' by certain 'laws', and, as you can see, you then end up with the odd idea that these 'laws' 'govern' nature. This suggests that inanimate matter is intelligent, and these 'laws' are in effect unyielding task masters.

So, deteminism only works if you are prepared to anthropomorphise nature or attribute to nature a sort of Cosmic Will.

And this is not surprising since this theory originally arose out of the belief that 'God' controlled everything in the universe, either through the power of 'His' will, or by investing matter with intelligence -- as, for example, Leibniz and Hegel saw (in different ways).

You get this idea re-surfacing, too, in magic stories (for example, in Harry Potter). The magician just has to issue a verbal command, or wave her arms, and inanimate objects somehow understand the command, or the gesture, and know how to carry it out impeccably and unfailingly.

The questuion is: how exactly does inanimate matter understand one of these 'laws' and inerringly always manage to do what it is supposed to do?

And, who wrote these 'laws' into the fabric of the universe?


I expect Rosa to bite off chunks of my neck.

Only lovebites, sweety...:)

[Zanthorus]

In nature there is no law, there is only necessity.

Don't Wittgensteinians argue that the only 'necessity' that exists is logical necessity?

[Black Sheep]

No, it doesn't.

"Natural Laws" don't exist as all laws are human, social, conventions. The concept of natural law is an anthropomorphism at its finest. Furthermore, if there is some sort of "law" then there must be some sort of "legislator." God is, naturally (pun ruthlessly intended), the fictive supreme ruler - He watches over his kingdom of atomistic citizens as the ultimate judge and arbiter...

In nature there is no law, there is only necessity.
By laws, i mean scientific ones.The anthropomorphisation exists only in the additional use of the word.

[Hoipolloi Cassidy]

Meanwhile, you may want to check out Bottomore's Dictionary of Marxist Thought, especially under the header "Determinism."

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


Don't Wittgensteinians argue that the only 'necessity' that exists is logical necessity?

In fact, what we ask is: "How does the word 'necessary' work in everyday language?"

What you attribute to us above looks far too metaphysical.:(

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Black Sheep:


By laws, i mean scientific ones.The anthropomorphisation exists only in the additional use of the word.

Ok, but then you will have to stop using the words 'determine', 'abide' and 'govern' in this context, won't you?

[Zanthorus]

Hmm, well according to Wittgenstein himself "There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened. The only necessity that exists is logical necessity." (Tractatus, 6.37)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

HC:


Meanwhile, you may want to check out Bottomore's Dictionary of Marxist Thought, especially under the header "Determinism."

Unfortunately, it makes all the usual mistakes.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


Hmm, well according to Wittgenstein himself "There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened. The only necessity that exists is logical necessity." (Tractatus, 6.37)

And, that would be acceptable (for some) had W not gone on to write The Investigations -- or do you suppose we should all accept everything Marx wrote in his earliest work?

[Zanthorus]

Ah, I don't have a copy of the Philosophical Investigations. The Marx comparison is testing me because I don't believe that Marx ever made any significant changes to his outlook after about 1844 (He certainly deepened his analysis, but I think he was largely working with the same conceptual framework), but this is not the topic of this thread.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


The Marx comparison is testing me because I don't believe that Marx ever made any significant changes to his outlook after about 1844 (He certainly deepened his analysis, but I think he was largely working with the same conceptual framework), but this is not the topic of this thread.

That's why I said this:


or do you suppose we should all accept everything Marx wrote in his earliest work?

Emphasis added.

[Jose Gracchus]

Zanthorus, Wittgenstein himself later criticized the Tractatus in his Investigations, and regarded the former in too many ways representing the kind of philosophical hocus pocus he was out to undermine.

[Oswy]

No, it doesn't.

"Natural Laws" don't exist as all laws are human, social, conventions. The concept of natural law is an anthropomorphism at its finest. Furthermore, if there is some sort of "law" then there must be some sort of "legislator." God is, naturally (pun ruthlessly intended), the fictive supreme ruler - He watches over his kingdom of atomistic citizens as the ultimate judge and arbiter...

In nature there is no law, there is only necessity.

There is no such thing as "cause and effect."

In the first place, are you willing to argue that we (as humans) have the ability to understand all the events which make up a singular "cause?" And are we able to understand when an "effect" begins and ends? Or when that "effect" is itself another "cause?"
I would think not.

In the second place, assuming that our collective ignorance is not sufficient argument, the idea of "cause and effect" is (like the idea of "natural laws") an extension of human behavior.
For prior to believing that events were determined by some natural laws, we thought all events occurred due to personal beings and their wills (polytheism). Given that our relations are results of our wills (i.e. our souls/spirits interact via willing), the projected souls of things (such as the ocean) interact via willing as well. Remember when rain was a result of the gods being pleased or displeased with our behavior?
Likewise, the notion of cause and effect is a result of this initial projection of human beliefs onto non-human happenings.

- August

I appreciate that language can have a 'loaded' quality, but when we talk of scientific 'laws' we're making reference to theories which have strongly predictive power, AFAIK. I think I have a problem with your position on two levels:

a) my own observations and experiences make it difficult not to think in cause and effect terms; I kick a football, causing it to travel through the air and with the effect of it landing somewhere else. I'm not trying to be argumentative for the sake of it, but if I'm to abandon the idea of cause and effect, any counter explanation has to be intelligible and compelling.

b) I see effective technology as strong evidence that scientific theories are at the least very close to a correct understanding of how things in the physical world occur. Things like mobile phones, TVs and the internet just wouldn't function if the scientific theories essential to their development and manufacture didn't have explanatory force. I've not met a science student yet who rejected the principle of cause and effect - it would be good if we had some science graduates in this discussion maybe.

I also don't know that it matters how far we possess actual knowledge of all specific causes and events in order to accept that the principle of cause and effect is at work in the universe, we just have to satisfy ourselves that every observation we do make supports the idea, or at least doesn't contradict it.

I appreciate you might think I'm just not being very bright, but I'm finding it hard to accept the notion, if I understand it correctly, that things 'just happen' in the physical world and we shouldn't have any more to say about it, in scientific terms or otherwise.

[Thirsty Crow]

May I notice that this discussion has strayed from the core problem of "choice", "responsibility" and "good decisions" within the context of arguments which legitimize status quo?

I guess I have a specific interst in this thread which need not overlap with others' interests. But I'd prefer if more emphasis is put on the dismantling of the kind of arguments I mentioned above.

[Oswy]

May I notice that this discussion has strayed from the core problem of "choice", "responsibility" and "good decisions" within the context of arguments which legitimize status quo?

I guess I have a specific interst in this thread which need not overlap with others' interests. But I'd prefer if more emphasis is put on the dismantling of the kind of arguments I mentioned above.

Apologies if I'm to blame for that. Ordinarily my approach to countering arguments which try to use 'choice' and 'responsibility' as evidence that, for example, the poor are to blame for their own condition, is to present a materialist and (to some degree or other) determinist explanation, one which, as far as I had understood, was based on the principle of cause and effect. For me, the unexpected rejection of materialism and cause and effect has kinda interrupted my thinking.

I'd still very much like to see how posters here would enter into arguments to counter 'popular' understandings and examples of 'choice' and 'responsibility' as they are used to justify inequality, poverty and so on - even if such counter arguments come from a position which rejects materialism and cause and effect (it's just at the moment I don't quite understand that position).

[ZeroNowhere]

Zanthorus, Wittgenstein himself later criticized the Tractatus in his Investigations, and regarded the former in too many ways representing the kind of philosophical hocus pocus he was out to undermine.He didn't reject his analysis of physical laws as such (although Engels was generally ahead of him as regards necessity and contingency).

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


He didn't reject his analysis of physical laws as such (although Engels was generally ahead of him as regards necessity and contingency).

In fact, he did come to question the nature of his monlolithic understanding of such 'laws', which he later saw as far more varied than he had hitherto imagined.

And I cannot agree that Engels was in any way 'ahead' of him here.

On what do you base that allegation?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Oswy:


b) I see effective technology as strong evidence that scientific theories are at the least very close to a correct understanding of how things in the physical world occur. Things like mobile phones, TVs and the internet just wouldn't function if the scientific theories essential to their development and manufacture didn't have explanatory force. I've not met a science student yet who rejected the principle of cause and effect - it would be good if we had some science graduates in this discussion maybe.

In what way does technology show that science is "close to a correct understanding of how things in the physical world occur".

As I pointed out to you in another thread:


As I have shown here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Summary_of_Essay_Ten_Part_One.htm), even false theories can produce correct results, so the fact that these theories underpin the technologies you mention is no proof they are true.

As Leibniz showed 300 years ago, through a finite number of points, a potentially infinite number of curves can be drawn. So, if Theory T(1) can be used to account for a finite set of observations and/or predictions (leading to technological innovation/improvement), then there is another set of theories {T(2), T(3), T(4),...,T(N)} that can do so too, even if we are unaware of them.

And that is precisely what the history of science has shown to be the case:


"...[I]n the historical progression from Aristotelian to Cartesian to Newtonian to contemporary mechanical theories, the evidence available at the time each earlier theory was accepted offered equally strong support to each of the (then-unimagined) later alternatives. The same pattern would seem to obtain in the historical progression from elemental to early corpuscularian chemistry to Stahl's phlogiston theory to Lavoisier's oxygen chemistry to Daltonian atomic and contemporary physical chemistry; from various versions of preformationism to epigenetic theories of embryology; from the caloric theory of heat to later and ultimately contemporary thermodynamic theories; from effluvial theories of electricity and magnetism to theories of the electromagnetic ether and contemporary electromagnetism; from humoral imbalance to miasmatic to contagion and ultimately germ theories of disease; from 18th Century corpuscular theories of light to 19th Century wave theories to contemporary quantum mechanical conception; from Hippocrates's pangenesis to Darwin's blending theory of inheritance (and his own 'gemmule' version of pangenesis) to Wiesmann's germ-plasm theory and Mendelian and contemporary molecular genetics; from Cuvier's theory of functionally integrated and necessarily static biological species or Lamarck's autogenesis to Darwinian evolutionary theory; and so on in a seemingly endless array of theories, the evidence for which ultimately turned out to support one or more unimagined competitors just as well. Thus, the history of scientific enquiry offers a straightforward inductive rationale for thinking that there are alternatives to our best theories equally well-confirmed by the evidence, even when we are unable to conceive of them at the time." [Stanford (2001), p.9.]

Stanford, P. (2001), 'Refusing The Devil's Bargain: What Kind Of Underdetermination Should We Take Seriously?', in Barrett and Alexander (2001), pp.1-12.

Barrett, J., and Alexander, J. (2001), (eds.), PSA 2000, Part 1, Supplement to Philosophy of Science 68, 3 (University of Chicago Press).

[PSA = Philosophy of Science Association; the PSA volumes comprise papers submitted to its biennial meeting.]

And T(1) can't 'correspond' to reality, either, for if it did, then reality would have to change whenever we changed our theories about it.

This is no threat to Marxism, since it still holds science as central to our ability to control nature, it just refuses to make a fetish out of it.

[As I have also shown here (http://www.revleft.com/vb/all-philosophical-theories-t148537/index.html), scientific laws are best viewed as rules we use to help us make sense of nature, and control it.]

[Oswy]

In what way does technology show that science is "close to a correct understanding of how things in the physical world occur".


Because if the theories about the physical world upon which the operation of mobile phones rely were not very close to 'how things really are' they wouldn't work. If you prefered you could cast technology like mobile phones as scientific instruments which tested the predictive power of a set of theories, most obviously in physics.

Just out of curiosity, how would you characterise the important criteria by which a scientific theory is 'proven' or 'demonstrated' as correct (as far as 'correct' might or might not be considered acceptable to you anyway).

[Sosa]

Kinda, but then Calvinism is highly deterministic and yet it is the primary source of the whole 'Protestant work ethic' thing. The Roman Catholic Church, despite believing fully in free will, had a different attitude to work ethic/individualism (at least at that time).

You're confusing determinism with predeterminism. Not the same thing.

[Sinister Cultural Marxist]

Determinism vs free will? This isn't an either or category. Determinism is an objectified way of understanding time, free will is a subjectivized way. Neither really shows reality as it is. The Dialectical response would be to say that free will and determinism are merely two moments in the same unfolding spirit.


Because if the theories about the physical world upon which the operation of mobile phones rely were not very close to 'how things really are' they wouldn't work. If you prefered you could cast technology like mobile phones as scientific instruments which tested the predictive power of a set of theories, most obviously in physics.


One could create an empirical theory of gravity which states that "Planets pull objects towards their core". On the earth, this would be perfectly confirmed by a man dropping a ball.

More advanced analysis proves, however, that there is something going on behind balls falling towards the earth. In particular, it is actually the case that all mass attracts all other mass via gravity, and that in reality all things "Fall" in towards all other things... the earth is in fact falling relatively slowly towards other objects.

However, from the point of view of someone on earth, the theory that things fall towards planets works just as well as the theory that all things fall towards each other, because the mass of the earth is simply so great that the rate of falling for the earth is miniscule compared to the rate of falling for the ball.

Consider also the rotation of the earth. A heliocentric view of the universe is NOT required for the Sundial to work. The working of a sundial is confirmed perfectly by a geocentric sun which orbits the earth! The empirically confirmed "reality" of geocentrism was one of the reasons it took so long for heliocentrism to "win out"

[syndicat]

Elsewhere I repeatedly encounter those who offer up casual references to the poor 'making bad choices' or being 'responsible' for their conditions, etc, etc.

the problem here is that these are bad explanations. it's a blame the victim approach, to avoid criticisms of the system having these results.

but you don't need to bring in the concepts of "free will" and "determinism" to sensibly discuss these things.

"free will" is a Christian concept that was introduced to avoid the conclusion that God is responsible for the evils of the world if God is omnipotent and omniscient and created everything. insofar as it suggests there aren't causes of people's behavior it's nonsensical.

but you need not introduce the idea of "determinism" to have a proper explanation.

if this is a discussion of "free will vs detereminism" it should be moved to philosophy.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Oswy:


Because if the theories about the physical world upon which the operation of mobile phones rely were not very close to 'how things really are' they wouldn't work. If you prefered you could cast technology like mobile phones as scientific instruments which tested the predictive power of a set of theories, most obviously in physics.

Well, theories we now know are not true used to work, and they did so for many centuries. In contrast, theories we now accept as true at one time did not work, and they failed to do so in some cases for hundreds of years.



Also, as I pointed out, the history of science shows that there have always been competing theories (which picture the world in radically different ways) that are equally well supported by the evidence. [We also know this is an ever-present possibility from background theory -- which, of course, could be wrong, but then that possibility just adds to my argument.]

[I]This would also have the untoward consequence that, if you are right, reality itself must change when we change our theories!


Just out of curiosity, how would you characterise the important criteria by which a scientific theory is 'proven' or 'demonstrated' as correct (as far as 'correct' might or might not be considered acceptable to you anyway).

Well, I don't, I leave that to scientists. All I point out is that they are continually changing their minds, so I recommend we do not make a fetish out of their latest pronoucements.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Shiva Trishula Dialectics:


Determinism is an objectified way of understanding time, free will is a subjectivized way. Neither really shows reality as it is. The Dialectical response would be to say that free will and determinism are merely two moments in the same unfolding spirit.

Well, as I have shown here (http://www.revleft.com/vb/question-friend-asked-t148656/index.html) determinism is non-sensical, and, worse, so is dialectics (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2012_01.htm). So, I do not see how the one can help us understand the other in any way, particularly if the latter is thoroughly mystical (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/glenn_magee.htm) into the bargain.


One could create an empirical theory of gravity which states that "Planets pull objects towards their core". On the earth, this would be perfectly confirmed by a man dropping a ball.

More advanced analysis proves, however, that there is something going on behind balls falling towards the earth. In particular, it is actually the case that all mass attracts all other mass via gravity, and that in reality all things "Fall" in towards all other things... the earth is in fact falling relatively slowly towards other objects.

However, from the point of view of someone on earth, the theory that things fall towards planets works just as well as the theory that all things fall towards each other, because the mass of the earth is simply so great that the rate of falling for the earth is miniscule compared to the rate of falling for the ball.

Consider also the rotation of the earth. A heliocentric view of the universe is NOT required for the Sundial to work. The working of a sundial is confirmed perfectly by a geocentric sun which orbits the earth! The empirically confirmed "reality" of geocentrism was one of the reasons it took so long for heliocentrism to "win out"

1. I have already shown that this respnse is inadequate.

2. In fact, scientists now tell us that the geocentric view of the solar system is just as viable a concept as the heliocentric view -- as I have argued in an earlier thread:


For example, this is what Professor Mills (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Mills_(physicist)) had to say about Ptolemy's system:


"Another way of stating the principle of equivalence, a way that better reflects its name, is to say that all reference frames, including accelerated reference frames, are equivalent, that the laws of Physics take the same form in any reference frame…. And it is also correct to say that the Copernican view (with the sun at the centre) and the Ptolemaic view (with the earth at the centre) are equally valid and equally consistent!" [Mills (1994), pp.182-83. Spelling altered to conform to UK English.]



Mills, R. (1994), [I]Space, Time And Quanta (W H Freeman).

Here is what Nobel Laureate Max Born (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Max_Born) had to say about it:


"Thus from Einstein's point of view Ptolemy and Copernicus are equally right. What point of view is chosen is a matter of expediency. For the mechanics of the planetary system the view of Copernicus is certainly the more convenient. But it is meaningless to call the gravitational fields that occur when a different system of reference is chosen 'fictitious' in contrast with the 'real' fields produced by near masses: it is just as meaningless as the question of the 'real' length of a rod...in the special theory of relativity. A gravitational field is neither 'real' nor 'fictitious' in itself. It has no meaning at all independent of the choice of coordinates, just as in the case of the length of a rod." [Born (1965), p.345. I owe this reference to Rosser (1967).]

Rosser, W. (1967), Introductory Relativity (Plenum Press).

And here is what Fred Hoyle (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fred_Hoyle) FRS had to say:


"Instead of adding further support to the heliocentric picture of the planetary motions the Einstein theory goes in the opposite direction, giving increased respectability to the geocentric picture. The relation of the two pictures is reduced to a mere coordinate transformation and it is the main tenet of the Einstein theory that any two ways of looking at the world which are related to each other by a coordinate transformation are entirely equivalent from a physical point of view....

"Today we cannot say that the Copernican theory is 'right' and the Ptolemaic theory 'wrong' in any meaningful physical sense...." [Hoyle (1973), pp.78-79.]

"We now know that the difference between a heliocentric theory and a geocentric theory is one of relative motion only, and that such a difference has no physical significance. But such an understanding had to await Einstein's theory of gravitation in order to be fully clarified." [Hoyle (1975), p.416.]

Hoyle, F. (1973), Nicolaus Copernicus. An Essay On His Life And Work (Heinemann).

--------, (1975), Astronomy And Cosmology. A Modern Course (W H Freeman).

Of course, it could always be claimed...that Copernican theory is simpler than the Ptolemaic system, but until we receive a clear sign that nature works according to our notion of simplicity (or cares a fig about it), that argument won't wash.

This is quite apart from the fact that 'simplicity' is impossible to define in non-question-begging terms, as I pointed out above. For example, which is the simpler of these two formulae?

(1) θ = Ae^-kt

(2) θ = At^2 + Bt + C

(2) is algebraically 'simpler', but (1) is 'simpler' if we judge simplicity on the basis of the number of terms used.

On this, see Losee (2001), pp.228-29.

Losee, J. (2001), A Historical Introduction To The Philosophy Of Science (Oxford University Press, 4th ed.).

This principle has also been put to misuse many times (so it is unreliable at best). For example, George Berkeley (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Berkeley) used it to argue that matter did not exist. According to him, we need postulate minds and their ideas alone to account for everything. Sure he was selective in his use of this 'principle', but then that is the problem: it is entirely subjective what counts as more 'simple' or 'parsimonious'.

For example, is it 'simpler' or more 'parsimonious' to postulate the existence of 'Dark Matter (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dark_matter)' and 'Dark Energy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dark_energy)' to account for the missing mass in the universe, or adjust a few constants and a few equations (as they do in MOND (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modified_Newtonian_dynamics))?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Sosa:


You're confusing determinism with predeterminism. Not the same thing.

In fact, when the details are worked out (http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1575116&postcount=1), they amount to the same thing.

[syndicat]

Zanthorus, Wittgenstein himself later criticized the Tractatus in his Investigations, and regarded the former in too many ways representing the kind of philosophical hocus pocus he was out to undermine.


well, sort of. the problem with the Tractatus was that the "picture" theory of reference doesn't make any sense, and is not well founded. It unravels if you pull on the loose threads.

but there have been more recent views of reference based on ideas drawn from evolutionary theory and linguistics and sociology that have been able to justify something akin to the framework of the Tractatus. I'm referring to the approach of Ruth Garrett Millikan.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


well, sort of. the problem with the Tractatus was that the "picture" theory of reference doesn't make any sense, and is not well founded. It unravels if you pull on the loose threads.

Well, he did not hold to a 'picture theory of reference', so no wonder your straw man version falls apart.

[Oswy]

the problem here is that these are bad explanations. it's a blame the victim approach, to avoid criticisms of the system having these results.

but you don't need to bring in the concepts of "free will" and "determinism" to sensibly discuss these things.

"free will" is a Christian concept that was introduced to avoid the conclusion that God is responsible for the evils of the world if God is omnipotent and omniscient and created everything. insofar as it suggests there aren't causes of people's behavior it's nonsensical.

but you need not introduce the idea of "determinism" to have a proper explanation.

if this is a discussion of "free will vs detereminism" it should be moved to philosophy.

Well, I tend not to use the term 'determinism' but rather invite consideration of the circumstances which limit and shape a person's ability to act and think, circumstances which are not actually under their control. The thing is I can't help thinking that what I'm doing by making reference to the extent that an individual's conditions and experiences, which could just as easily be called their trajectory through 'the system', limits and shapes thought and action, that I'm nonetheless arguing for determinism. The problem is that I don't feel like I have any 'ordinary' language that I can respond with which doesn't to me seem like I'm making a case for determinism (and, for the moment at least, I'm not letting go of determinism anyway).

I dunno, maybe I'm not making much sense and should read some philosophy on this stuff first.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Oswy:


The thing is I can't help thinking that what I'm doing by making reference to the extent that an individual's conditions and experiences, which could just as easily be called their trajectory through 'the system', limits and shapes thought and action, that I'm nonetheless arguing for determinism. The problem is that I don't feel like I have any 'ordinary' language that I can respond

Well, when you refer to "an individual's conditions and experiences" (and I presume also his/her class position) they will provide us with the sort of background against which we can make sense of that individual's motives, intentions and reasons -- all of which are expressible in ordinary language.

This, of course, means that we can determine why an individual did what he/she did from the reasons they give, their circumstances and their class position. That is the only way that the word 'determine' can gain a grip here.

[Oswy]

Well, when you refer to "an individual's conditions and experiences" (and I presume also his/her class position) they will provide us with the sort of background against which we can make sense of that individual's motives, intentions and reasons -- all of which are expressible in ordinary language.

Ok, but I'm reading your words and seeing 'the sort of background against which we can make sense of that individual's motives' and I'm thinking, that's just a roundabout way of seeing 'background' as a cause, the effect of which is 'that individual's motives'.

I think I'll just have to concede that for the time being, I'm stuck :blushing:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Oswy:


Ok, but I'm reading your words and seeing 'the sort of background against which we can make sense of that individual's motives' and I'm thinking, that's just a roundabout way of seeing 'background' as a cause, the effect of which is 'that individual's motives'

Why are you reading everything through these lenses? Our language, and the way we comprehend one another, is far more sophisticated than can be shoe-horned into cause and effect talk.

Motives certainly can be seen in this way (but it oversimplifies), but reasons can't. I have explained why here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page_13_03.htm

Use the 'Quick Links' at the top to jump to Section 7: 'Critical Realism in Crisis.'


I think I'll just have to concede that for the time being, I'm stuck

Well, you are stuck since you are trying to see everything in terms of cause and effect -- or perhaps even in terms of simple causes and effects. Our social lives, and the way we integrate into then, are far too complex to be reduced so easily to such talk.