The necessity of materialism

[Mr. Contradiction]

As someone who's philosophy remains fundamentally conservative even as his politics move further and further to the left, I find it hard to accept materialism as the philosophical basis for Marxism.

Basic question: Why is it thought that materialism is necessary for Marxism? Why can one not accept that things exist outside of the bumped-into and still accept a Marxist conclusion? Does/how does one tend to follow from the other?

I understand how society becomes structured purely because of the realities of life and that it follows a certain progression, etc., but I don't understand why I need to grant someone this before I can philosophically admit an economic/political conclusion.

Or, as always, I could be really misunderstanding something.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, Historical Materialism [HM] certainly is, but philosophical materialism isn't.

That's because the latter is, plainly, a philosophical theory, and, as I have show here (http://www.revleft.com/vb/all-philosophical-theories-t148537/index.html), all such theories are non-sensical.

[HM is a scientific, not a philosophcial theory.]

[Mr. Contradiction]

[HM is a scientific, not a philosophcial theory.]

Well, let's focus on HM. I would think that as a scientific theory (or even more strictly as a sociological theory, sociologically being interpreted to mean the science of human interaction) HM would have to be universally applicable to human action (this being a criterion for a theory to be scientific, 'scientific theory' of course not meaning a theory about science but a theory from science--a relocation of social thought into science).

So to rephrase my original series of questions through that lens: to what extent, on what grounds and for what reasons is Marxist political and economic thought predicated on my acceptance of HM?

Does this make any sense, what I'm asking?

[Zanthorus]

Considering that Marx's entire critique of political economy utilises his materialist method, that is, it seeks to explain how capitalist society produces and reproduces itself, and how the 'phenomenal forms' of this (re)production condition the process of intellectual life, then yes, accepting the materialist conception of history is a precondition for accepting Marxist thought on political and economic issues.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Mr C:


So to rephrase my original series of questions through that lens: to what extent, on what grounds and for what reasons is Marxist political and economic thought predicated on my acceptance of HM?

Well, I do not wish to sound pedantic, but it isn't predicated on anything you do or do not accept. It is, however, based on HM, not on your acceptance of it.

Other than that, I don't see what you are driving at.

And I do not think this is correct, either:


HM would have to be universally applicable to human action (this being a criterion for a theory to be scientific, 'scientific theory' of course not meaning a theory about science but a theory from science

There are many sciences that are not universally applicable. For example geology can't explain the movement of the stars, nor microbiology the formation of Greenland.

[ar734]

Mr C:



There are many sciences that are not universally applicable. For example geology can't explain the movement of the stars, nor microbiology the formation of Greenland.

Strictly speaking, this is not what is meant by "universally applicable." It would be more accurate to say that geology can explain tectonic forces on any planet in the universe. Or, microbiology can explain the formation of life on Greenland or on any planet in the universe. It may be true that there is geology or biology, even on our own planet, which cannot yet be explained, but that is only because the science is not sufficiently developed, not that it is not universal.

In order for Historical Materialism to be a science it would also have to be "universal," at least universal for human society.

[graymouser]

Well, historical materialism looks at history as primarily being the result of the working of complex economic factors (class society) working among humans over time, with economy driving history in the final analysis. Taking away this fact makes the rest of Marx's work nonsense. If you posit a role for God in human society - and all classical theism does this - then you cannot be a consistent, coherent Marxist. If on the other hand you are a pure Deist or pantheist and view history as being independent of God, you could conceivably believe in some kind of God but remain a Marxist. But without that understanding of history I don't think the ideas are compatible.

[ar734]

So to rephrase my original series of questions through that lens: to what extent, on what grounds and for what reasons is Marxist political and economic thought predicated on my acceptance of HM?



I like to think of HM as the evolutionary science of history. However, I think we are still a long way from systematizing the laws, etc of history. What, for instance, are three laws of history ? as three laws of thermodynamics?

[Oswy]

As someone who's philosophy remains fundamentally conservative even as his politics move further and further to the left, I find it hard to accept materialism as the philosophical basis for Marxism.

Basic question: Why is it thought that materialism is necessary for Marxism? Why can one not accept that things exist outside of the bumped-into and still accept a Marxist conclusion? Does/how does one tend to follow from the other?

I understand how society becomes structured purely because of the realities of life and that it follows a certain progression, etc., but I don't understand why I need to grant someone this before I can philosophically admit an economic/political conclusion.

Or, as always, I could be really misunderstanding something.

As I understand it, materialism (contra idealism) simply posits that the reality we inhabit, the cosmos if you will, is essentially physical and that we can't understand human thoughts, motives and values (etc) as if disconnected from the physical conditions which surround them and which, ultimately, they are generated by.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

louisianaleftist:


Strictly speaking, this is not what is meant by "universally applicable." It would be more accurate to say that geology can explain tectonic forces on any planet in the universe. Or, microbiology can explain the formation of life on Greenland or on any planet in the universe. It may be true that there is geology or biology, even on our own planet, which cannot yet be explained, but that is only because the science is not sufficiently developed, not that it is not universal.

Well, that is precisely the point. You have to introduce an special sense of "universal" to make this work.


geology can explain tectonic forces on any planet in the universe

And you know this how?


microbiology can explain the formation of life on Greenland or on any planet in the universe

Have you carried out the experiments that confirm this rather brave conclusion?


only because the science is not sufficiently developed, not that it is not universal

Which is just another way of saying either that 1) microbiology and geology aren't sciences or 2) science is just a sub-branch of wishful thinking.

Science is in fact based on evidence -- not hope admixed with hyperbold speculation.


In order for Historical Materialism to be a science it would also have to be "universal," at least universal for human society.

And yet, as we have just seen, this is not so.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Oswy:


As I understand it, materialism (contra idealism) simply posits that the reality we inhabit, the cosmos if you will, is essentially physical...

Unfortunately, as I have show here (http://www.revleft.com/vb/all-philosophical-theories-t148537/index.html), this would make Marxism non-sensical.

[Oswy]

Oswy:

Unfortunately, as I have show here (http://www.revleft.com/vb/all-philosophical-theories-t148537/index.html), this would make Marxism non-sensical.

Ok, but, and I mean no disrespect, I find the kind of language and grammar you use impossible to follow and thus take a position on.

My starting position is that I'm quite into science and science tends to see the world in materialistic terms, i.e. a physical environment of matter and energy, governed by the principle of cause and effect.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Oswy:


I find the kind of language and grammar you use impossible to follow and thus take a position on

Well, let me know which parts are difficult to follow, and I'll do my best to explain them more clearly.


My starting position is that I'm quite into science and science tends to see the world in materialistic terms, i.e. a physical environment of matter and engery, governed by the principle of cause and effect.

Well, that's because, as Marx notes, the ideas that rule are always those of the ruling class.

There is no way that science can show the world is material or that cause an effect always govern everything -- since these are philosophcial questions.

What experiment could you conduct that showed, for instance, that the world is physical? Or that there are such things as causes and effects?

[Oswy]

...

Well, let me know which parts are difficult to follow...

All of them? :laugh:


What experiment could you conduct that showed, for instance, that the world is physical? Or that there are such things as causes and effects?

Ok, but put yourself in the shoes of the ordinary person, 'cause and effect' appear like a pretty obvious phenomenon, I might even say that my post was a cause that had the effect of prompting your reply. Keep it simple dude!

[Widerstand]

All of them? :laugh:

:blink:



Ok, but put yourself in the shoes of the ordinary person, 'cause and effect' appear like a pretty obvious phenomenon, I might even say that my post was a cause that had the effect of prompting your reply. Keep it simple dude!

You should really try harder to read Rosa's text, it explains this phenomenon quite well.

[Oswy]

...

There is no way that science can show the world is material or that cause an effect always govern everything -- since these are philosophcial questions.

...

Do you reject science?

My g/f once, flippantly, said that science was just rubbish, but when I said that her car, mobile phone, TV, prescribed drugs, holiday jets and home electricity supply (etc) only have effect because scientific theories 'work', she conceded my point.

[Oswy]

:blink:

You should really try harder to read Rosa's text, it explains this phenomenon quite well.

Sure, but if I can't obviously get past someone's language and terminology then it's worth asking for something a little more accessible.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Oswy:


Do you reject science?

No, not at all. I do, however, reject a certain metaphysical view of science, one that is held by the vast majority of Marxists (and others).


My g/f once, flippantly, said that science was just rubbish, but when I said that her car, mobile phone, TV, prescribed drugs, holiday jets and home electricity supply (etc) only have effect because scientific theories 'work', she conceded my point.

That just tells us that technologists are good at their jobs, but it has no implication for the alleged metaphysical truth of science.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Oswy:


Sure, but if I can't obviously get past someone's language and terminology then it's worth asking for something a little more accessible.

Once more: which use of language and what terminology are you referring to?

My use of language/terminology is particularly simplistic when compared with the vast majority of philosophical writers. But, I am always striving to be clearer, so if you can tell me which parts you find hard to follow, I'll do my best to clarify them.

Can't help you if you won't say...

[NecroCommie]

To put it in laymans terms:
If there is some mystical element to our lives, would it not just be easier to tell people to "cheer up" than try to change the very way our economy is structured? What I am trying to say that the moment we accept that we can have meaningful existence and/or interaction independent of the material world, we would have to admit that there would be no more real need to better the material world, as then we all could just "cheer up" and see our lives in different light ect.

[Oswy]

No, not at all. I do, however, reject a certain metaphysical view of science, one that is held by the vast majority of Marxists (and others).

That just tells us that technologists are good at their jobs, but it has no implication for the alleged metaphysical truth of science.

So when practising scientists claim that cause and effect are central to their theories and methodologies do you see them as failing to understand what they are doing?

I'm not sure about your second point. Are you saying that the theories on which, say, mobile phones appear to rely for their effectiveness, don't represent an accurate representation of actual processes in the world - even though the fact that mobile phones do work suggests at least some correspondence?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Necrocommie:


If there is some mystical element to our lives, would it not just be easier to tell people to "cheer up" than try to change the very way our economy is structured? What I am trying to say that the moment we accept that we can have meaningful existence and/or interaction independent of the material world, we would have to admit that there would be no more real need to better the material world, as then we all could just "cheer up" and see our lives in different light ect.

Sure, but that is part of HM, and has nothing to do with philosophical materialism.

[Mr. Contradiction]

Well then. I suppose the best conclusion for me is: just as contemporary biology is built upon one's understanding of evolution, Marxism is built on HM. The former strictly presupposes familiarity with the latter. If I continue to hold on to creationism, then I am going to read a modern biological text with an entirely different disposition.

And I know that it is predicated by HM itself, not my acceptance of it, But in any discussion my understanding would only be reached through my acceptance. No understanding of premises= incorrect judgment of validity of conclusion.

Finally, in the interest of openmindedness, I promise to get around to the refutation of the "metaphysical view of science", although I think I would be foolish not to remain skeptical that you have pwned philosophy itself.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Oswy:


So when practising scientists claim that cause and effect are central to their theories and methodologies do you see them as failing to understand what they are doing?

Well, do they?

I doubt it. They are more interested in creating and testing and hypotheses.

It's only philosophers (amateur and professional) who get hot under the collar about 'cause and effect'.

Of course, I might be wrong here, but I defy you to show I am.

Anyway, let us suppose I am wrong, how is this idea part of science? What experiment can you think of that will test it?

I suggest there isn't one, and that is because this idea is metaphysical -- a carry over from a Christian view of 'God's' control of nature.

So, that makes this idea just another of those 'ruling ideas' that always rule.


I'm not sure about your second point. Are you saying that the theories on which, say, mobile phones appear to rely for their effectiveness, don't represent an accurate representation of actual processes in the world - even though the fact that mobile phones do work suggests at least some correspondence?

Well given the fact that the vast majority of scientific theories have been wrong, then there is a very high probability that these are in error too.

As I have shown here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Summary_of_Essay_Ten_Part_One.htm), even false theories can produce correct results, so the fact that these theories underpin the technologies you mention is no proof they are true.

As Leibniz showed 300 years ago, through a finite number of points, a potentially infinite number of curves can be drawn. So, if Theory T(1) can be used to account for a finite set of observations and/or predictions (leading to technological innovation/improvement), then there is another set of theories {T(2), T(3), T(4),...,T(N)} that can do so too, even if we are unaware of them.

And that is precisely what the history of science has shown to be the case:


"...n the historical progression from Aristotelian to Cartesian to Newtonian to contemporary mechanical theories, the evidence available at the time each earlier theory was accepted offered equally strong support to each of the (then-unimagined) later alternatives. The same pattern would seem to obtain in the historical progression from elemental to early corpuscularian chemistry to Stahl's phlogiston theory to Lavoisier's oxygen chemistry to Daltonian atomic and contemporary physical chemistry; from various versions of preformationism to epigenetic theories of embryology; from the caloric theory of heat to later and ultimately contemporary thermodynamic theories; from effluvial theories of electricity and magnetism to theories of the electromagnetic ether and contemporary electromagnetism; from humoral imbalance to miasmatic to contagion and ultimately germ theories of disease; from 18th Century corpuscular theories of light to 19th Century wave theories to contemporary quantum mechanical conception; from Hippocrates's pangenesis to Darwin's blending theory of inheritance (and his own 'gemmule' version of pangenesis) to Wiesmann's germ-plasm theory and Mendelian and contemporary molecular genetics; from Cuvier's theory of functionally integrated and necessarily static biological species or Lamarck's autogenesis to Darwinian evolutionary theory; and so on in a seemingly endless array of theories, the evidence for which ultimately turned out to support one or more unimagined competitors just as well. Thus, the history of scientific enquiry offers a straightforward inductive rationale for thinking that there are alternatives to our best theories equally well-confirmed by the evidence, even when we are unable to conceive of them at the time." [Stanford (2001), p.9.]

Stanford, P. (2001), 'Refusing The Devil's Bargain: What Kind Of Underdetermination Should We Take Seriously?', in Barrett and Alexander (2001), pp.1-12.

Barrett, J., and Alexander, J. (2001), (eds.), [I]PSA 2000, Part 1, Supplement to Philosophy of Science 68, 3 (University of Chicago Press).

[PSA = Philosophy of Science Association; the PSA volumes comprise papers submitted to its biennial meeting.]

And T(1) can't 'correspond' to reality, either, for if it did, then reality would have to change whenever we changed our theories about it.

This is no threat to Marxism, since it still holds science as central to our ability to control nature, it just refuses to make a fetish out of it.

[As I have also shown here (http://www.revleft.com/vb/all-philosophical-theories-t148537/index.html), scientific laws are best viewed as rules we use to help us make sense of nature, and control it.]

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

MrC:


Finally, in the interest of openmindedness, I promise to get around to the refutation of the "metaphysical view of science", although I think I would be foolish not to remain skeptical that you have pwned philosophy itself.

Already done it.

[ar734]

MrC:



Already done it.

Do you think the following are scientific, proven facts or merely unproven theories?

1. E=MC²
2. The value of a commodity is determined by the amount of socially necessary labor contained in it.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LouisianaLeftist:


Do you think the following are scientific, proven facts or merely unproven theories?

1. E=MC²

2. The value of a commodity is determined by the amount of socially necessary labor contained in it.

Well E=MC² is a mathematical rule, not a theory.

And 2) is part of HM, which I fully accept as a scientific theory.

[ar734]

LouisianaLeftist:



Well E=MC² is a mathematical rule, not a theory.

And 2) is part of HM, which I fully accept as a scientific theory.

I would say 1) is the mathematical expression of a scientific fact. And, as to 2), the theory of value, isn't there an element of cause and effect in it? And how would you devise an experiment to prove it? I also agree it is scientific, but I thought your position was that science is not valid.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LouisianaLeftist:


I would say 1) is the mathematical expression of a scientific fact.

It can't be since, as I have explained here (http://www.revleft.com/vb/all-philosophical-theories-t148537/index.html), if it were, it would have to be necessarily true.

But, in that case, it could not in fact be true.

It would also imply that nature performed calculations to make sure that matter and light obeyed the rules (otherwise, how do you suppose nature always get its sums right?).


And, as to 2), the theory of value, isn't there an element of cause and effect in it? And how would you devise an experiment to prove it? I also agree it is scientific, but I thought your position was that science is not valid.

Where have I said [I]that -- or even implied it?


And how would you devise an experiment to prove it?

Prove what?

[NecroCommie]

Necrocommie:



Sure, but that is part of HM, and has nothing to do with philosophical materialism.
Yes, I know, I have been reading your anti-dialectics page lately... :blushing:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Ok, fair enough.:)