List of political parties in Egypt - 2011

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List of political parties in Egypt

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Elections (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Elections_in_Egypt)

Presidential: 2005 (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Egyptian_presidential_election,_2005), 2011 (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Egyptian_presidential_election,_2011)
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By its constitution, Egypt (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Egypt) has a multi-party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Multi-party) system, however in practice the National Democratic Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/National_Democratic_Party_(Egypt)) is the long-time ruling party and is dominant in the Egyptian political arena. Opposition parties are allowed, but are widely considered to have no real chance of gaining power.

Law 40 of 1977 regulates the formation of political parties in Egypt. This law prohibits the formation of religious-based political parties, although there are growing political pressure groups such as Kefaya (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Kefaya) movement and the Muslim Brotherhood (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Muslim_Brotherhood), who are seeking more balance in political power.
Contents


[hide (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#)]

1 History (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#History)
2 Party law review (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#Party_law_review)
3 The known parties of Egypt (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#The_known_parties_of_Egypt)

3.1 Left-wing parties (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#Left-wing_parties)
3.2 Liberal parties (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#Liberal_parties)
3.3 Right-wing parties (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#Right-wing_parties)
3.4 Awaiting license (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#Awaiting_license)

4 Other political groups (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#Other_political_groups)
5 See also (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#See_also)
[edit (http://www.revleft.com/w/index.php?title=List_of_political_parties_in_Egypt&action=edit&section=1)] History

Emergence of political parties in Egypt in the 19th century was a reflection of social, economic and cultural interactions as well as certain historical, national and political circumstances, leading to the creation and development of modern institutions of government administration and society, such as the parliament, cabinets, political parties, syndicates, etc.

This emergence has been gradual and has gone through successive stages. Political parties have firstly been formed as secret societies that were followed by formation of political groups.

The National Party, not to be confused with the current National Democratic Party (NDP), was the first party, formed in 1907 by Mostafa Kamel (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Mostafa_Kamel). In less than ten years, there was a great variety in these parties; in their nature, formation, organization, power, their popular base and platforms. There were national parties, groups dominated by the royal palace, others formed by the occupation authority as well as ideological parties expressing certain ideologies.

In 1907 - 1920, the already-formed political parties in Egypt were a starting signal for the dissemination of further parties; however, they were restricted due to the British (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/United_Kingdom) occupation and Egyptian subordination to the Ottoman Empire (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Ottoman_Empire). The February 1922 Unilateral Declaration of Egyptian Independence (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Unilateral_Declaration_of_Egyptian_Independence) and the issuance of the 1923 Constitution (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/1923_Constitution_of_Egypt) led to the establishment of a royal constitutional rule based on party pluralism and the principles of liberal democracy.

During 1923 - 1952, Egypt (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Egypt) witnessed a remarkable experience rich in political and democratic practices, however, such an experience was marked with many defects such as the British occupation, foreign intervention in Egypt's affairs and the royal palace's interference in political life. With the outbreak of the July 1952 Revolution (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/1952_Revolution), the Egyptian regime worked to liquidate the opposition. In January 1953, an enactment was adopted on disbanding the political parties and adoption of the one-party rule. The enactment of the parties' law in 1977 demonstrated Egypt's political regime officially turned into the era of party pluralism.
[edit (http://www.revleft.com/w/index.php?title=List_of_political_parties_in_Egypt&action=edit&section=2)] Party law review



Talk of political reform has never before come naturally to the NDP, a party which has often been accused of rigging elections to secure its overwhelming parliamentary majorities. The NDP now says it wants to remove the constraints hampering the political activities of other parties in the country.
"There is thinking about reviewing the law on political parties to give more freedom for new parties to be established and more freedom of action to those which already exist," said Mohamed Kamal (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Mohamed_Kamal) a member of the Policy Secretariat.
So far the scope of the proposed reforms has not been made clear. The party also says it wants to improve the relationship between citizens and the police - an important issue in a country accused by human rights groups of the systematic use of torture in police stations (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Police_station).
[edit (http://www.revleft.com/w/index.php?title=List_of_political_parties_in_Egypt&action=edit&section=3)] The known parties of Egypt

Egyptian politics are subject to unique circumstances and often defy simple classification in terms of the political spectrum (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Political_spectrum). Groups are sometimes associated with the political left or right, especially in international circles, according to their stance on issues.
There are 24 Political parties in Egypt now :
[edit (http://www.revleft.com/w/index.php?title=List_of_political_parties_in_Egypt&action=edit&section=4)] Left-wing parties (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Left-wing_politics)


Progressive National Unionist Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Progressive_National_Unionist_Party) (Hizb al Tagammo' al Watani al Taqadommi al Wahdwawi') - Leftist party, founded 7-7-1977.
Egyptian Arab Socialist Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Egyptian_Arab_Socialist_Party) (Hizb Misr al-arabi al-ishtaraki), founded 7-7-1977.
National Democratic Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/National_Democratic_Party_(Egypt)) ('Al'Hizb Al Watani Al Democrati'), founded 1-10-1978.
The Socialist Labour Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/The_Socialist_Labour_Party) (Labour Party), founded 11-12-1978 - Suspended.
Umma Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Umma_Party_(Egypt)) (Hizb al-Umma), founded 26-5-1983.
Young Egypt Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Young_Egypt_Party) (Hizb Misr El-Fatah), founded 14-4-1990.
Arab Democratic Nasserist Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Arab_Democratic_Nasserist_Party) or Nasserist Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Nasserist_Party), founded 19-4-1992.
The Social Justice Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/The_Social_Justice_Party), founded 6-6-1993.
National Conciliation Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/National_Conciliation_Party_(Egypt)) (Hizb al-Wifak), founded 2-3-2000.
Egypt 2000 Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Egypt_2000_Party), founded 7-4-2001.
[edit (http://www.revleft.com/w/index.php?title=List_of_political_parties_in_Egypt&action=edit&section=5)] Liberal parties (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Liberalism)


Liberal Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Ahrar_Party_(Egypt)) (Hizb al-Ahrar), founded 7-7-1977.
New Wafd Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/New_Wafd_Party) (Hizb al-Wafd-al-Gadid), founded 4-2-1978.
Egyptian Greens (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Egyptian_Greens), founded 14-4-1990.
The Democratic Unionist Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Democratic_Union_Party_(Egypt)) (Hizb al-Itahadi al-Democrati), founded 14-4-1990.
The People's Democratic Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/The_People%27s_Democratic_Party) (PDP), founded 15-3-1992 - Currently frozen.
Democratic Generation Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Democratic_Generation_Party) (Hizb El-Geel al-Democrati), founded 9-2-2002.
Tomorrow Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Tomorrow_Party) (Hizb al-Ghad), founded 27-10-2004.
Constitutional Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Free_Social_Constitutional_Party) (al-Hizb al-distouri), founded 24-11-2004.
Egypt Youth Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Egypt_Youth_Party), founded 2-7-2005.
Democratic Peace Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Democratic_Peace_Party), founded 2-7-2005.
Free republican Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Free_republican_Party), founded 4-7-2006.
Democratic Front Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Democratic_Front_Party_(Egypt)) (Hizb al-Gabha al-Democrati), founded 24-5-2007.
[edit (http://www.revleft.com/w/index.php?title=List_of_political_parties_in_Egypt&action=edit&section=6)] Right-wing parties (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Right-wing_politics)


Solidarity Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Solidarity_Party_(Egypt)) (Hizb Al Takaful ), founded 5-2-1995.
Conservative Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Conservative_Party_(Egypt)), founded 12-3-2006.
[edit (http://www.revleft.com/w/index.php?title=List_of_political_parties_in_Egypt&action=edit&section=7)] Awaiting license


Dignity Party (http://www.revleft.com/w/index.php?title=Dignity_Party_(Egypt)&action=edit&redlink=1) (Hizb al-Karama) - a Nasserist (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Nasserist_Party) offshoot led by journalist and MP Hamdeen Sabahi (http://www.revleft.com/w/index.php?title=Hamdeen_Sabahi&action=edit&redlink=1). Isn't granted full-license yet.
Liberal Egyptian Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Liberal_Egyptian_Party) (el Hizb el Masri el Liberali), formerly Mother Egypt Party (Hizb Masr el-Omm) - a secular, Egyptian nationalist party.
Center Party (http://www.revleft.com/w/index.php?title=Center_Party_(Egypt)&action=edit&redlink=1) (Hizb Al-Wasat)- a Muslim Brotherhood (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Muslim_Brotherhood) offshoot with moderate tendencies, led by Abul-Ela Madi.
[edit (http://www.revleft.com/w/index.php?title=List_of_political_parties_in_Egypt&action=edit&section=8)] Other political groups


Society of the Muslim Brotherhood (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Society_of_the_Muslim_Brotherhood) (Jama'at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin)
Hizb ut-Tahrir (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Hizb_ut-Tahrir) (Hizb ut-Tahrir)
Communist Party of Egypt (http://www.revleft.com/w/index.php?title=Communist_Party_of_Egypt&action=edit&redlink=1) (al-HIzb al-Sheo'ey al-Masry)
Kefaya (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Kefaya) Movement
National Association for Change (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/National_Association_for_Change) (Al-Jamyaa Al-Watanya Let-Taghyeer)
April 6 Youth Movement (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/April_6_Youth_Movement) (Harakt 6 Ebreel)
[edit (http://www.revleft.com/w/index.php?title=List_of_political_parties_in_Egypt&action=edit&section=9)] See also


List of political parties (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/List_of_political_parties)
Liberalism in Egypt (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Liberalism_in_Egypt)

Political parties in Egypt http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fe/Flag_of_Egypt.svg/22px-Flag_of_Egypt.svg.png (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Egypt)
Major partiesNational Democratic Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/National_Democratic_Party_(Egypt)) - New Wafd Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/New_Wafd_Party) - National Progressive Unionist Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/National_Progressive_Unionist_Party) - Nasserist Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Nasserist_Party) - Ahrar Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Ahrar_Party_(Egypt)) - Tomorrow Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Tomorrow_Party)


Minor partiesDemocratic Front Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Democratic_Front_Party_(Egypt)) - Democratic Unionist Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Democratic_Union_Party_(Egypt)) - Umma Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Umma_Party_(Egypt)) - National Conciliation Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/National_Conciliation_Party_(Egypt)) - Constitutional Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Free_Social_Constitutional_Party) - Egyptian Arab Socialist Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Egyptian_Arab_Socialist_Party) - Democratic Peace Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Democratic_Peace_Party) - Egyptian Greens (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Green_Party_of_Egypt) - Solidarity Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Solidarity_Party_(Egypt)) - Egypt 2000 Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Egypt_2000_Party) - Democratic Generation (El-Geel) Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Democratic_Generation_(El-Geel)_Party) - Misr El-Fatah (Young Egypt) Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Misr_El-Fatah_(Young_Egypt)_Party) - Social Justice Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Social_Justice_Party) - Egypt Youth Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Egypt_Youth_Party) - People's Democratic Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/People%27s_Democratic_Party_(Egypt)) - Socialist Labour Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Socialist_Labour_Party_(Egypt)) - Dignity Party (http://www.revleft.com/w/index.php?title=Dignity_Party_(Egypt)&action=edit&redlink=1) - Liberal Egyptian Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Liberal_Egyptian_Party) not to be confused with Liberal Party (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Ahrar_Party_(Egypt))

Banned partiesMuslim Brotherhood (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Muslim_Brotherhood#Muslim_Brotherhood_in_Egypt) - Hizb ut-Tahrir (http://www.revleft.com/wiki/Hizb_ut-Tahrir)


This page was last modified on 29 January 2011 at 18:46.




http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Egyptian_political_parties

[freepalestine]

The Socialist Roots Of The Egyptian Protests


http://www.uruknet.info/?p=74452

[Comrade Gwydion]

Wait, this is from somebody who, in this very post, claims Barack Obama to be a socialist. Is it in any way.... reliable? Usefull?

[freepalestine]

some of the info is .ie.the links.
i disagree with lots of that article,and some of the info is incorrect.
e.g. it says mubarak is a christian(lol)-he's actuallymuslim



-------------------------------------------------------------
also




Interview with Hossam el-Hamalawy
Professor Mark LeVine interviews journalist and blogger Hossam el-Hamalawy on the situation in Egypt.

Mark LeVine



http://uruknet.info/pic.php?f=27eg-b644288621_20.jpg (http://www.anonym.to/?http://uruknet.info/pic.php?f=27eg-b644288621_20.jpg)

Hossam el-Hamalawy, an Egyptian journalist and blogger [CC - 3arabawy]

January 27, 2011

Hossam el-Hamalawy, is an Egyptian journalist and blogger for the website 3arabawy (http://www.anonym.to/?http://www.arabawy.org/). Mark LeVine, professor of History at UC Irvine, managed to catch up with Hossam via Skype to get a first-hand account of events unfolding in Egypt.


Mark LeVine:
Why did it take a revolution in Tunisia to get Egyptians onto the streets in unprecedented numbers?


Hossam el-Hamalawy:
In Egypt we say that Tunis was more or less a catalyst, not an instigator, because the objective conditions for an uprising existed in Egypt, and revolt has been in the air over the past few years. Indeed, we already managed to have 2 mini-intifadas or "mini Tunisias" in 2008. The first was the April 2008 uprising in Mahalla, followed by another one in Borollos, in the north of the country.

Revolutions don't happen out of the blue. It's not because of Tunisia yesterday that we have one in Egypt mechanically the next day. You can't isolate these protests from the last four years of labour strikes in Egypt, or from international events such as the al-Aqsa intifada and the US invasion of Iraq.
The outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada was especially important because in the 1980s-90s, street activism had been effectively shut down by the government as part of the fight against Islamist insurgents. It only continued to exist inside university campuses or party headquarters.
But when the 2000 intifada erupted and Al Jazeera started airing images of it, it inspired our youth to take to the streets, in the same way we've been inspired by Tunisia today.

Mark LeVine:
How are the protests evolving?


Hossam el-Hamalawy:
It's too early to say how they will go. It's a miracle how they continued past midnight yesterday in the face of fear and repression. But having said that, the situation has reached a level that everyone is fed up, seriously fed up.
And even if security forces manage to put down protests today they will fail to put down the ones that happen next week, or next month or later this year. There is definitely a change in the level of courage of the people. The state was helped by the excuse of fighting terrorism in 1990s in order to fight all sorts of dissent in the country, which is a trick all governments use, including the US.
But once formal opposition to a regime turns from guns to mass protests, it's very difficult to confront such dissent. You can plan to take out a group of terrorists fighting in the sugar cane fields, but what are you going to do with thousands of protesters on the streets? You can't kill them all. You can't even guarantee that troops will do it, will fire on the poor.


Mark LeVine:
What is the relationship between regional and local events here?


Hossam el-Hamalawy:
You have to understand that the regional is local here. In 2000 the protests didn't started as anti-regime protests but rather against Israel and in support of Palestinians. The same occurred with the US invasion of Iraq three years later.
But once you take to the streets and are confronted by regime violence you start asking questions: Why is Mubarak sending troops to confront protesters instead of confronting Israel? Why is he exporting cement to be used by Israel to build settlements instead of helping Palestinians?
Why are police so brutal with us when we're just trying to express our solidarity with Palestinians in a peaceful manner?
And so regional issues like Israel and Iraq were shifted to local issues. And within moments, the same protesters who chanted pro-Palestinian slogans started chanting against Mubarak. The specific internal turning point in terms of protests was 2004, when dissent turned domestic.


Mark LeVine:
In Tunisia the labour unions played a crucial role in the revolution, as their large and disciplined membership ensured that protests could not be easily quashed and gave an organisational edge. What's the role of the labour movement in Egypt in the current uprising?


Hossam el-Hamalawy:
The Egyptian labour movement was quite under attack in the 1980s and 1990s by police, who used live ammunition against peaceful strikers in 1989 during strikes in the steel mills and in 1994 in the textile mill strikes.

But steadily since December 2006 our country has been witnessing the biggest and most sustained waves of strike actions since 1946, triggered by textile strikes in the Nile Delta town of Mahalla, home of largest labour force in the Middle East with over 28,000 workers. It started because of labour issues but spread to every sector in society except the police and military.


As a result of these strikes we've managed to get 2 independent unions, the first of their kind since 1957 property tax collectors, including more than 40,000 civil servants, and then health technicians, more than 30,000 of whom launched a union just last month outside of the state controlled unions.

But it's true that one major distinction between us and Tunisia is that although it was a dictatorship, Tunisia had a semi-independent trade union federation. Even if the leadership was collaborating with the regime, the rank and file were militant trade unionists. So when time came for general strikes, the unions could pull it together. But here in Egypt we have a vacuum that we hope to fill soon.
Independent trade unionists have already been subjected to witch hunts since they tried to be established; there are already lawsuits filed against them by state and state-backed unions, but they are getting stronger despite the continued attempts to silence them.

Of course, in the last few days the crackdown has been directed against street protesters, who aren't necessarily trade unionists. These protests have gathered a wide spectrum of Egyptians, including sons and daughters of the elite. So we have a combination of urban poor and youth together with the middle class and the sons and daughters of elite.

I think Mubarak has managed to alienate all sectors of society except his close circle of
cronies.


Mark LeVine:
The Tunisian revolution has been described as very much a "youth"-led revolt and dependent on social media technologies like Facebook and Twitter for its success. And now people are focusing on youth in Egypt as a major catalyst event. Is this a "youth intifada" and could it happen without Facebook and other new media technologies?


Hossam el-Hamalawy:
Yes, it's youth intifada on the ground. The internet plays only a role in spreading the word and the images about what goes on the ground. We do not use the internet to organise. We use the internet to publicise what we are doing on the ground hoping to inspire others into action.


Mark LeVine:
As you might have heard, in the US, the right wing talk show host Glenn Beck has gone after an elderly academic, Frances Fox Piven, because of an article she wrote calling on the unemployed to stage mass protests for jobs.
She's even gotten death threats, some from unemployed people who seem happier fantasising about shooting her with one of their many guns than actually fighting for their rights. It's amazing to think about the crucial role of trade unions in the Arab world today considering more than two decades of neoliberal regimes across the region whose primary goal has been to destroy working class solidarity. Why have unions remained so important?


Hossam el-Hamalawy:
Unions have always been proven to be the silver bullet for any dictatorship. Look at Poland, South Korea, Latin America and Tunisia. Unions were always instrumental in mass mobilisation. You want a general strike to overthrow a dictatorship, and there is nothing better than an independent union to do so.


Mark LeVine:
Is there a larger ideological program behind the protests, or just get rid of Mubarak?


Hossam el-Hamalawy:
Everyone has his or her reasons to take to the streets, but I would assume that if our uprising became successful and he's overthrown you'll start getting divisions. The poor will want to push the revolution to a much more radical position, to push the radical redistribution of wealth and to fight corruption, whereas the so-called reformers who want to put breaks and more or less lobby for change in top and curb powers of state a little bit but keep some essence of the state. But we're not there yet.


Mark LeVine:
What is the role of the Muslim Brotherhood and how will its remaining aloof from the current protests impact the situation?


Hossam el-Hamalawy:
The Brotherhood has been suffering from divisions since the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada. Its involvement in the Palestinian Solidarity Movement when it came to confronting the regime was abysmal. Basically, whenever their leadership makes a compromise with the regime, especially the most recent leadership of the current supreme guide, it has demoralised its base cadres. I know personally many young brothers who left the group, some of them have joined other groups or remained independent.
As the current street movement grows and the lower leadership gets involved, there will be more divisions because the higher leadership can't justify why they're not part of the new uprising.


Mark LeVine:
What about the role of the US in this conflict. How do people on the street view its positions?


Hossam el-Hamalawy:
Mubarak is the second largest recipient of US foreign aid aside from Israel. He's known to be America's thug in the region; one of the tools of American foreign policy and implementing its agenda of security for Israel and the smooth flow of oil while keeping Palestinians in line.
So it's no secret that this dictatorship has enjoyed the backing of US administrations since day one, even during Bush's phony pro-democracy rhetoric. So one should not be surprised by Clinton's ludicrous statements that were more or less defending the Mubarak regime, since one of the pillars of US foreign policy was to keep regimes stable at expense of freedom and civil liberties.

We don't expect anything from Obama, whom we regard as a great hypocrite. But we hope and expect the American people - trade unions, professors' associations, student unions, activist groups, to come out in support of us. What we want for the US government is to completely get out of the picture.
We don't want any sort of backing; just cut aid to Mubarak immediately and withdraw backing from him, withdraw from all Middle Eastern bases, and stop supporting the state of Israel.


Ultimately, Mubarak will do whatever he has to do to protect himself. He will suddenly adopt the most anti-US rhetoric if he thought that would help him save his skin. At the end of the day he's committed to his own interests, and if he thinks the US won't support him, he'll turn somewhere else.
The reality is that any really clean government that comes to power in the region will come into open conflict with the US because it will call for radical redistribution of wealth and ending support for Israel or other dictatorships. So we don't expect any help from America, just to leave us alone.




Mark LeVine is a professor of history at UC Irvine and senior visiting researcher at the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies at Lund University in Sweden. His most recent books are Heavy Metal Islam (Random House) and Impossible Peace: Israel/Palestine Since 1989 (Zed Books).
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.




:: Article nr. 74364 sent on 28-jan-2011 16:00 ECT


www.uruknet.info?p=74364 (http://www.anonym.to/?http://www.uruknet.info?p=74364)

Link: english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2011/01/201112792728200271 (http://www.anonym.to/?http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2011/01/201112792728200271.html)

[Cheung Mo]

How the fuck is the National Democratic Party left-wing? It's a fascist party.

[Zeus the Moose]

How the fuck is the National Democratic Party left-wing? It's a fascist party.

Well, the are members of the Socialist International. So was the Tunisian RCD :laugh:

[Red Commissar]

How the fuck is the National Democratic Party left-wing? It's a fascist party.

For wikipedia standards it's a "social democratic" party due to Socialist International membership so they can toss it in with "left-wing" apparently.

On an interesting note I remember when I read this same article before NDP was actually listed as a "right-wing" party so I'm guessing there might be an edit war too.

[Cheung Mo]

That was me. I did that earlier tonight.

Apparently the only requirement for SI membership is a willingness to massacre Venezuela's urban poor. :laugh:

[freepalestine]

Comrades and Brothers
Hossam El-Hamalawy
Hossam El-Hamalawy is a Cairo-based journalist and blogger.

http://www.merip.org/mer/mer242/elhamalawy.jpg
A joint Muslim Brotherhood and Revolutionary Socialist protest against the Egyptian regime, August 14, 2005. (Nora Younis)



Emad Mubarak is a busy man. Director of the Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression, and a lawyer with the Hisham Mubarak Law Center, the leftist Mubarak cannot hold a meeting without being interrupted by the ring of his cell phone. The calls these days come from student members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the officially outlawed Islamist group that is Egypt’s largest political movement. The students call to report security service abuses against them on campuses, or to request his legal counsel while they undergo interrogation by university administrators.

“Each time I receive a call, I can’t help but remember the old days and what it was like being on campus with the Brothers,” Mubarak giggles. In March 1999, he spent 22 days in Tura prison south of Cairo after Muslim Brotherhood students assaulted him and eight of his fellow socialists on campus, turning them over to the police. “Today, things are different. Leftists and Islamists can sit down and talk. Most of my clients are Muslim Brothers,” Mubarak said. “I tell them, ‘I’m a communist,’ and they are fine with that.”

From campus fistfights in the 1990s to joint demonstrations in 2005–2006, relations between the Muslim Brothers and the radical left in Egypt have come a long way. In settings where the two tendencies operate side by side, like student unions and professional syndicates, overt hostility has vanished, and there is even a small amount of coordination around tactics. Still, the cooperation remains symbolic, and leftists and Islamists have yet to join forces to undertake sustained mass actions against their common foe, the regime of President Husni Mubarak.


A New Kind of Leftist

The improvement of leftist-Islamist relations can largely be traced to two factors. First is the evolution of a new left in Egypt whose two main pillars are the Revolutionary Socialist Organization and a growing left-leaning human rights community. This new left has different attitudes toward Islamism than those held by the previous “communist waves.”[1] (http://www.merip.org/mer/mer242/hamalawy.html#_edn1) Second is the generational change within both the left and the Brotherhood cadres spurred by the revival of Egyptian street politics, thanks to the second Palestinian intifada.

Bad blood between the Egyptian left and the Brothers has a long history, from the Islamists’ coordination with King Farouq in breaking strikes in the 1940s to President Anwar al‑Sadat’s encouragement of violent Islamist assaults on leftist university students in the 1970s. Most independent leftist organizations in the 1980s and 1990s hewed to a line on political Islam similar to that of the Egyptian Communist Party—the dominant faction inside the “legal left” Tagammu‘ Party—equating Islamist organizations, reformist or radical, with fascism.The only modest exception was Ahmad Nabil al‑Hilali’s People’s Socialist Party, which briefly flirted in the late 1980s with theidea that militant Islam was a “movement for the poor” deserving of support. The majority attitude on the traditional Stalinist left translated into an alliance, sometimes overt and occasionally tacit, with the Egyptian secular intelligentsia—and with Mubarak’s regime. Needless to say, joint political action with the Brothers was never on the table. A few independent leftist lawyers like al‑Hilali and Hisham Mubarak were involved in defending Islamist detainees, but these were individual initiatives. As might be expected, the Muslim Brothers did not appreciate the “fascist” label, and they regarded the left with great distrust.

Starting in the late 1980s, small circles of Egyptian students, influenced by Trotskyism, gathered to study, eventually evolving in April 1995 into an organization named the Revolutionary Socialists’ Tendency. In contradistinction to the Stalinist left, these activists put forward the slogan “Sometimes with the Islamists, never with the state” in the literature they distributed on university campuses and elsewhere.[2] (http://www.merip.org/mer/mer242/hamalawy.html#_edn2) In practice, this slogan translated into taking up the cause of Muslim Brotherhood students on campus when it came to “democratic” issues, as when state security banned Islamist candidates from running in student union elections or expelled Islamist students from school. The “galleries” (ma‘arid)—impromptu broadsheets written on cloth or cardboard and laid out in campus squares—of Revolutionary Socialist students at Cairo and ‘Ayn Shams Universities regularly carried denunciations of military tribunals’ sentences handed down to Muslim Brothers. At the same time, the Trotskyist students confronted the Muslim Brothers on issues such as freedom of expression and the rights of women and Coptic Christians. Whenever they felt the Brothers wanted to impose sex segregation in the classroom, or clamp down on campus theater and art, or whenever the Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide made sectarian comments about the Copts, the socialists’ “galleries” would carry vehement denunciations.
As a Revolutionary Socialist member who was active in the 1990s recalls: “We were a kind of leftist the Muslim Brothers hadn’t met before. They couldn’t quite figure us out at the beginning. Anyway, we were still too marginal for them to bother with. We were only a few individuals.” This began to change in 1999. On a few occasions in that year, as one socialist remembers, the Muslim Brotherhood students at Cairo University allowed the Revolutionary Socialist students to speak at rallies held on campus against the US airstrikes on Iraq. The socialist students took this unprecedented opportunity as a sign of the Muslim Brothers’ recognition that they were a force that had to be given a place on the political stage. It was a step in a long, slow process of building trust.

From a handful of members in 1995, the Revolutionary Socialists grew to a couple hundred activists on the eve of the second Palestinian intifada. Their ranks then swelled thanks to their role in the Egyptian movement of solidarity with the Palestinians, at a time when the Muslim Brothers largely abstained from street action. The radicalizing influence of the intifada among youth helped to reawaken the Egyptian tradition of street politics, which had been virtually smothered by the Mubarak regime’s fearsome security services. Cairo and several provinces witnessed their largest and most boisterous demonstrations since the 1977 uprising following President Anwar al‑Sadat’s attempt to remove state subsidies for bread and other staples. Despite the opportunities presented by the ferment on the streets, the Muslim Brotherhood pursued the policy of non-confrontation with the regime it had abided by since the 1995 crackdown on its rank and file, culminating in a series of infamous military tribunals. Not only did Brotherhood students refuse to mobilize on the street, but they also sought on several occasions to curb the militancy of demonstrations. [3] (http://www.merip.org/mer/mer242/hamalawy.html#_edn3) In October 2000, for instance, after the socialists clashed with state security and burned police vans at pro-Palestinian demonstrations, the Brothers emerged to denounce “socialist sabotage.” At other times, Islamist students tried to physically restrain students from marching outside campus gates.

The increasingly radicalized political scene created a space for the left to intervene, but also generated pressure on the Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership from the organization’s cadre. Leftist activists then at universities recall “naming and shaming” campus Brotherhood activists for their lack of participation in the mass protests. In early April 2002, precisely following the outbreak of the leftist-led, pro-Palestinian riots at Cairo University, members of the Muslim Brothers began turning out for events organized by the Egyptian Popular Committee for the Solidarity with the Palestinian intifada. “Muslim Brotherhood representatives from the syndicates starting showing up to our meetings,” says Ahmad Sayf, the director of the Hisham Mubarak Law Center, who has been hosting the committee’s meetings. “They didn’t have much choice, as they would have lost credibility in their constituencies if they hadn’t turned out. Still, they only sent representatives [usually, ‘Isam al‑‘Iryan or ‘Abd al‑Mun‘im Abu al‑Futouh, the two most popular party elders with Islamist youth] and avoided mass mobilization.” More importantly, Sayf continues, “the Brotherhood was bowing to pressure from its youth, who were not happy with a complacent stand vis-à-vis the authorities.” On April 5, 2002, a group of young Muslim Brothers published an open letter to Supreme Guide Mustafa Mashhour in the London-based daily al‑Hayat, questioning the group’s acquiescence in security crackdowns and demanding more involvement in the Palestinian solidarity movement. Sayf concludes: “The alternative was approaching the radicals in the opposition, as the ‘legal’ opposition, namely Tagammu‘, Wafd and the Nasserists, were too hostile. The radicals in the opposition, on the other hand, were happy to get whatever help the Brothers were willing to contribute.”

The Muslim Brothers initially approached Revolutionary Socialist members, regarding them as the “least hostile” among the leftist factions, to suggest that Islamists collaborate with the left in the pro-intifada and anti-war movements. The move triggered a debate among leftist circles. Sympathizers of the Egyptian Communist Party, the People’s Socialist Party, members of the Tagammu‘ bureaucracy and a faction from the human rights organizations refused any form of coordination with Islamists, though they made an exception for Magdi Hussein’s Labor Party, whose brand of Islamism is regarded as somehow “left-leaning.” The usual scene at such demonstrations was that the crowd would split into two circles, one led by leftists and Nasserists chanting leftist slogans, and another led by the Labor Party supporters chanting Islamic slogans. The Revolutionary Socialists, on the other hand, pushed for close coordination, supported by left-wing human rights activists such as members of the Hisham Mubarak Law Center and the Nadeem Center for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence.


“Brotherly Spirit”

In 2003 and 2004, the Muslim Brotherhood stuck to its non-confrontational policy. While the Brothers kept on sending representatives to pro-Palestinian and anti-war demonstrations, the main concern of the organization was charity work, and demonstrating within the boundaries set by the regime, in complete coordination with the security services. The regime used the group as a safety valve for dissent during the early stage of the ongoing war in Iraq, allowing the Brothers to take part in government-sponsored rallies in Cairo Stadium, as well as in the provinces. Meanwhile, the left-leaning Palestine solidarity committee evolved into an anti-war movement, convening small street actions, which exploded into running clashes with the police in downtown Cairo on March 19 and 20, 2003. The next summer, a middle-ranking Muslim Brothers activist spoke of the increasing frustration among the group’s cadre at the leadership’s “leaving the street empty for the leftists. When Kifaya came onto the scene, some Brotherhood youth wanted to follow suit.”

The anti-war movement, successor of the pro-intifada movement, evolved again by the end of 2004 into an anti-Mubarak movement, composed of two organizations. One was Kifaya (the Egyptian Movement for Change), a coalition made up primarily of members of the breakaway Nasserist faction Karama, individuals from the liberal al‑Ghad Party, figures from the Egyptian Communist Party and veterans of the 1970s student movement. The other wing was the Popular Campaign for Change, which was more Marxist in composition, and included the Revolutionary Socialists, left-wing human rights activists and independent leftists. The two organizations more or less fused together in the months to follow. Kifaya’s sometimes quixotic and theatrical street actions attracted public attention, and helped to break taboos in Egypt’s political life by issuing direct challenges—without euphemisms—to the president and his family.
Shortly after a series of Kifaya demonstrations, a group of Muslim Brotherhood activists, notably ‘Ali ‘Abd al‑Fattah of Alexandria, held talks with Revolutionary Socialists and independent leftists, resulting in the launching of the National Alliance for Change in June 2005. The alliance was tactical, and revolved around an anti-Mubarak platform, with emphasis on vigilance against the prospect of vote rigging in that year’s presidential and parliamentary elections. The fruits of this alliance did not radically alter the political scene on the ground. After announcing their intention to hold a joint demonstration with the left in ‘Abdin Square in July 2005, the Muslim Brothers failed to show up, citing security pressures. Two more joint demonstrations were organized in front of the Lawyers’ Syndicate. The first was chaotic, and the second was better organized, with consensus on slogans and banners. Since the winter 2005 parliamentary elections, the alliance has stayed out of the streets, but it remains in place as a coordination and problem-solving mechanism whenever friction arises in workplaces.

The rapprochement between Islamists and the left continued when students from the Revolutionary Socialists’ Tendency, Muslim Brothers and some independents formed the Free Student Union (FSU) in November 2005, with the aim of acting as a parallel organization to the government-dominated student unions. The FSU was centered in Helwan and Cairo Universities, with tiny presences at a few other universities, including ‘Ayn Shams. Following the rigging of the October 2006 student union elections, the Brotherhood threw its weight behind the FSU, sanctioning new branches at universities such as al‑Azhar, Mansoura and Alexandria. Though the FSU is far from achieving the ambition of its organizers—nothing less than a national grassroots student union—the places where the FSU operates have witnessed another great improvement in relations between the Brothers and the radical left. Mustafa Muhi al‑Din, a socialist activist from Helwan University, describes relations with the Brothers on campus as friendly. “They invite us to their events, and they show interest in our activities. Maybe the union here is still not strong, but there’s space for activities. We can be active and spread our message, worrying about state security, but not about hassles from the Brotherhood, and sometimes they give us a hand. We do the same. This makes things easier.” ‘Abd al‑‘Aziz Mugahid, a Brotherhood activist and president of FSU at Helwan University, speaks enthusiastically of the “brotherly spirit” on campus. “The socialists intervened to help us out in solidarity demonstrations with our sisters who were expelled from the dormitories because they wore the niqab, and they stood by us when the administration expelled more than 400 students for security reasons. These joint activities were not frequent before.”


Generational Change

The backbone of the solidarity actions with the Palestinian intifada has been students in their late teens or early twenties. As political virgins, they do not carry the baggage of the historical fighting between the leftists and Islamists, and among leftist factions.[4] (http://www.merip.org/mer/mer242/hamalawy.html#_edn4)

Meanwhile, the profile of the average young Muslim Brotherhood activist has undergone its own transformation, rendering a considerable number of the Brotherhood youth open for coordination with secular groups. “The Brotherhood cadre has changed,” says Husam Tammam, author of a recent book on the organization.[5] (http://www.merip.org/mer/mer242/hamalawy.html#_edn5) “They have become socially assimilated. They are not necessarily the sons of the poverty belts and the marginalized nowadays.” The Brotherhood’s decisive entry into electoral politics “came at the expense of their identity, forcing them to be more pragmatic,” Tammam adds. “So forget about the Islamic state, the caliphate, and so on. The more the Brothers get dragged into the political arena, the more they are integrated, and the more they try to operate according to the rules of the arena.” Tammam continues: “The Brothers have changed in their relation to art, society and vision. You can see that well among the youth. The youth voted for [Ghad candidate] Ayman Nour. This wasn’t a central order from the group’s leadership. When the youth are left without orders, they don’t necessarily follow the group’s traditional line. In my view, the last remarkable event held by the Brothers, before they took to the streets, was an event organized by the Brotherhood students called Muhammad Day that took place on Valentine’s Day. The Islamist youth thought, ‘How can we love, but in a “good” way?’ If you compare this to the behavior of the Islamist youth in 1985, it is completely different. Back then all they could think about was how to establish the Islamic state [and] revive the caliphate. They would have looked at Valentine’s Day as a waste of time. The youth today, however, do not take the same aggressive approach.”

Tammam’s observations are echoed by leftists who shared jail cells with young Brothers during the spring 2006 crackdown on the movement in solidarity with Egyptian judges exposing fraud and voter intimidation in the 2005 elections. Blogging about his encounter with Muslim Brotherhood detainees, independent secular leftist ‘Ala’ Sayf wrote: “They were from this new breed of Islamist that reads blogs, watches al‑Jazeera, sings sha‘bi (popular) songs, talks about intense love stories and chants ‘down with Mubarak.’ And being young, most of them did not have any experience with prison before. Waiting to know whether they’ll get 15 or 45 days’ detention for starters, waiting to know whether they’ll be sent to one of the just-horrible prisons or one of the too-horrible prisons, and in the middle of it all we got the news that I would be released the next day.” And with the news of his release, “All of a sudden, they transformed from just Brothers into comrades! They hugged me, they clapped, they shook my hand, they laughed and they were genuinely happy for my release.… When you speak of the 22 who were released this week, don’t say 22 out of 30 were released, say 22 out of 600…facing the same charges and fighting the same tyrants.” The Muslim Brothers’ official website invited ‘Ala’ Sayf to write a message to the Brotherhood youth. On July 24, he wrote them, calling on them to be “more adventurous,” and advocating more militant street action.

Today, the majority of factions on the left still stand opposed to (or express caution about) joint actions with the Islamists, most notably the newly evolving Democratic Left (a reformist tendency centered around al‑Busla magazine), the Egyptian Communist Party, the People’s Socialist Party and a faction of the human rights community. But the Brothers and those comrades who will work with them remain engaged in mutual confidence building. The Muslim Brothers’ leadership is staunchly gradualist, and always on the lookout for compromises with the Egyptian regime. That stance will likely impede a further rapprochement with the radical left, unless the Brotherhood’s base of youth attains a greater say in when, and how, their powerful organization bestirs itself.


[B]Endnotes

[1] (http://www.merip.org/mer/mer242/hamalawy.html#_ednref1) Leftist historians divide the history of Egyptian communism into “waves.” The first wave began in 1919 with the founding of the Egyptian Socialist Party, which later became the Egyptian Communist Party, only to be destroyed by the Wafd government’s crackdowns in 1924. The second wave started in the late 1930s with the formation of communist study circles that evolved into several organizations and factions, with brief periods of unity; it ended with the dissolution of the Egyptian Communist Party in 1965. The third wave commenced in 1968 with the revival of the student and worker movements, received a crushing defeat in 1977 and officially died with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The (current) fourth wave started in 1995, with the launching of the Revolutionary Socialist Tendency.

[2] (http://www.merip.org/mer/mer242/hamalawy.html#_ednref2) The slogan was coined by Chris Harman, an International Socialist Tendency theoretician based in Britain, in his book, The Prophet and the Proletariat, accessible online at http://www.marxists.de/religion/harman/index.htm. The book was translated into Arabic, and distributed widely by the Revolutionary Socialists in 1997.

[3] (http://www.merip.org/mer/mer242/hamalawy.html#_ednref3) See Hossam el-Hamalawy, “Street Politics,” Cairo Times, September 26, 2002; and Hossam el-Hamalawy, “Post-War Middle East,” Islam Online, April 30, 2003.

[4] (http://www.merip.org/mer/mer242/hamalawy.html#_ednref4) El-Hamalawy, “Street Politics.”

[5] (http://www.merip.org/mer/mer242/hamalawy.html#_ednref5) 5 Husam Tammam, Tahawwulat al‑Ikhwan al‑Muslimin (Cairo: Madbouli, 2005).


http://www.merip.org/navbar_new/transparent_1_1.gif
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer242/hamalawy.html

[Red Commissar]

That was me. I did that earlier tonight.

Apparently the only requirement for SI membership is a willingness to massacre Venezuela's urban poor. :laugh:

Speaking of which NDP has been expelled from the Socialist International.

http://www.socialistinternational.org/images/dynamicImages/files/Letter%20NDP.pdf


We are, as of today, ceasing the membership of the NDP, however we remain determined to cooperate with all the democrats in Egypt striving to achieve an open, democratic, inclusive and secular state.

21 years late morons.

[Cheung Mo]

Speaking of which NDP has been expelled from the Socialist International.

http://www.socialistinternational.org/images/dynamicImages/files/Letter%20NDP.pdf



21 years late morons.

Meh. As long as Accion "Democratica" and New LieBlair are around, the SI is a joke.