A question a friend asked me...

[Veg_Athei_Socialist]

If atoms and particles behave in probabilistic ways, and our mind is made of atoms and particles, how can free will exist?

What would your answer be?

[Rooster]

If you're going to go down in this direction, then you'll find out that we have very little in the way of free will. There's been famous experiments that show our mind decides for us before we actually make a concious choice. Is this free will?

Oh yeah, and to answer, I think that's kinda silly. Our conciousness is born from unconscious. You couldn't explain a computer working like that.

[Meridian]

You have to look at how the terms "free will" and "will" are used in ordinary language.

When a person does something out of free will, this has nothing to do with atoms and particles, it has to do with circumstances regarding the action. It is used when they perform an action because they want to, not directly because of the influence of other things or people.

"Did you choose that meal because I'm having it as well?"
"No, I chose it out of free will."

The factors to be considered which could give rise to this person's desire for the meal are practically innumerable. However, this does not disable us from calling it the person's own desire, and the term "free will" is useful in this context for distinguishing genuine personal desire from superficial desire, or 'faking it'. In the context of the exchange above, whatever would seem the most appetizing, the cost of the meal, and many other such influences would still be at play for the person making the decision, yet as you notice, the term "free will" could be used in that instance.

[Rooster]

You have to look at how the terms "free will" and "will" are used in ordinary language.

When a person does something out of free will, this has nothing to do with atoms and particles, it has to do with circumstances regarding the action. It is used when they perform an action because they want to, not directly because of the influence of other things or people.

"Did you choose that meal because I'm having it as well?"
"No, I chose it out of free will."

The factors to be considered which could give rise to this person's desire for the meal are practically innumerable. However, this does not disable us from calling it the person's own desire, and the term "free will" is useful in this context for distinguishing genuine personal desire from superficial desire, or 'faking it'. In the context of the exchange above, whatever would seem the most appetizing, the cost of the meal, etc., and many other such influences would still be at play for the person making the decision, yet as you notice, the term "free will" could be used in that instance.

That's been kinda debuncted. If all decisions arise from the subconscious then we really have no "free will" in any sense of the word. We can maybe guide ourselves towards an over arcing goal, but the roots of that and the journey along the way, are still based on our subconscious leading us towards it. It's an uncomfortable thought, I agree, but the evidence is there none the less.

[Meridian]

That's been kinda debuncted. If all decisions arise from the subconscious then we really have no "free will" in any sense of the word. We can maybe guide ourselves towards an over arcing goal, but the roots of that and the journey along the way, are still based on our subconscious leading us towards it. It's an uncomfortable thought, I agree, but the evidence is there none the less.
Our 'subconscious' can no more lead us towards anything than our feet lead us to our destination against our will.

What I tried to show, which you seem to have missed completely, was: We sometimes do things out of free will, but this is not metaphysical. It is a useful term, which I think I showed.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, as I have argued here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=894937&postcount=2

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1575116&postcount=1

the traditional doctrine of 'determinism' vs 'free will' makes no sense at all, unless we are prepared to anthropomorphise nature.

Why such questions make no sense at all is set out in detail here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1995528&postcount=1

Meridian is on the right lines here, too.

Rooster:


That's been kinda debuncted. If all decisions arise from the subconscious then we really have no "free will" in any sense of the word. We can maybe guide ourselves towards an over arcing goal, but the roots of that and the journey along the way, are still based on our subconscious leading us towards it. It's an uncomfortable thought, I agree, but the evidence is there none the less.

Well, the doctrine of the 'subconscious' (or, if you like, the 'unconscious') is yet another example of the sort of a priori non-sense I exposed in the last of the above links.

----------------------------------

To the OP:

Having said all this, even if your friend is right, we have as yet no way of linking the alleged probabilistic processes taking place at the sub-atomic level with macroscopic events and processes. So, even if the traditional dichotomy of free will vs determinism made sense, it is not possible to say whether or not such probabilistic events have any effect on our capacity to make choices.

After all, if they did, then what you decided to do or not to do would be completely random, and not in character. In other words, you would be doing rather odd things all day long.

Anyway, we do not as yet know whether these alleged probabilities are a reflection of our lack of knowledge of the real processes at work, or are genuine phenomena. It may turn out, as Einstein certainly believed, that when we know more about how nature works at this level, these alleged probabilities will be swallowed up by some law or other.

Finally, given the additional fact that scientists regularly change their minds (the history of science is littered with examples) it is far more probable that this view (about quantum probability) is in error than it is correct.

[Billy2]

our mind is made of atoms
Brain is made of atoms & co. But what is mind made of? I'd guess it is a virtual space before I'd guess is made of atoms. Really, the field of vision atoms?

[Amphictyonis]

If you're going to go down in this direction, then you'll find out that we have very little in the way of free will. There's been famous experiments that show our mind decides for us before we actually make a concious choice. Is this free will?

Oh yeah, and to answer, I think that's kinda silly. Our conciousness is born from unconscious. You couldn't explain a computer working like that.

I just chose to click the quote button and write this message.

[pranabjyoti]

What would your answer be?
Atoms and particles can only react in a probabilistic way when there is nothing to influence them. But, does that true in case of mind. Bodily mechanisms can certainly influence the atoms and particles that constitute the 'mind'.

[ZeroNowhere]

Determinism is the interesting view that you are only free if neither you nor the world around you have any substance, and hence you cannot do anything, and don't happen to exist either. In actuality, it has nothing to do with language as actually used. Determinists have nothing to say about what 'free will' is, because they don't give it any sense, criteria or content; this is because philosophy deals with concepts, not with empirical facts, but said determinists tend to forget about this.


If you're going to go down in this direction, then you'll find out that we have very little in the way of free will. There's been famous experiments that show our mind decides for us before we actually make a concious choice.'Minds' do not decide things, people do. English is apparently a relatively complicated language, though, so it's understandable that you may be confused about it.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


Determinism is the interesting view that you are only free if neither you nor the world around you have any substance, and hence you cannot do anything, and don't happen to exist either. In actuality, it has nothing to do with language as actually used. Determinists have nothing to say about what 'free will' is, because they don't give it any sense, criteria or content; this is because philosophy deals with concepts, not with empirical facts, but said determinists tend to forget about this.

Not so. As I have shown (http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1575116&postcount=1), determinism, if true, would mean that the universe is run by a Cosmic Will of some sort or that nature is animated by little minds.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/my-usual-philosophy-t46568/index.html

http://www.revleft.com/vb/freedom-state-mind-t56836/index.html?t=56836

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=894937&postcount=2

Moreover, as I have also shown in the 'All Philosophical Theories Are Non-Sensical (http://www.revleft.com/vb/all-philosophical-theories-t148537/index.html)' thread, determinism is based on a distortion of language, and is therefore non-sensical, too.

[ZeroNowhere]

I'm simply referring to the fact that determinists give no sense to the phrase 'free will'; if we exist and have substance, and the world around us exists, then we apparently don't have freedom, while conversely if we don't exist a determinist probably wouldn't call us 'free' either. It is at most a tautology, and at worst, and in most cases, simply the assertion that 'free will' doesn't exist without actually giving sense to this phrase. I was not referring to their conception of 'natural laws', by which even some nebulous 'cosmic will' wouldn't really help much, because whether or not this 'cosmic will' chose to enforce something would then be contingent in any case.

[Summerspeaker]

The notion of free will has always confused me, honestly. My choices come from who I am and the experiences I've had. How could this be any different?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


I'm simply referring to the fact that determinists give no sense to the phrase 'free will'; if we exist and have substance, and the world around us exists, then we apparently don't have freedom, while conversely if we don't exist a determinist probably wouldn't call us 'free' either. It is at most a tautology, and at worst, and in most cases, simply the assertion that 'free will' doesn't exist without actually giving sense to this phrase. I was not referring to their conception of 'natural laws', by which even some nebulous 'cosmic will' wouldn't really help much, because whether or not this 'cosmic will' chose to enforce something would then be contingent in any case.

Well, I am also questioning this notion of 'free will' you seejm to be operating with. If it's the flip side of determinisn, then it is no less non-sensical.


I was not referring to their conception of 'natural laws', by which even some nebulous 'cosmic will' wouldn't really help much, because whether or not this 'cosmic will' chose to enforce something would then be contingent in any case

Not if this Cosmic Will is of the Neo-Platonic persuasion.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Summerspeaker:


The notion of free will has always confused me, honestly. My choices come from who I am and the experiences I've had. How could this be any different?

Well, that is what some refer to as free will.

The problem is what this means precisely.

[Dean]

Well, the doctrine of the 'subconscious' (or, if you like, the 'unconscious') is yet another example of the sort of a priori non-sense I exposed in the last of the above links.

No, its not. The term simply refers to prejudices and ideas which are assumed without deliberately thinking about them.

And it's not "a priori."

[L.A.P.]

Brain is made of atoms & co. But what is mind made of? I'd guess it is a virtual space before I'd guess is made of atoms. Really, the field of vision atoms?

The mind is a product of the brain so the mind is indirectly made of atoms.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dean:


The term simply refers to prejudices and ideas which are assumed without deliberately thinking about them.

Then why introduce this abstract term when "prejudices and ideas which are assumed without deliberately thinking about them" is perfectly clear already?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

xx1994xx:


The mind is a product of the brain so the mind is indirectly made of atoms.

This is the fallacy of composition (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallacy_of_composition) I referred to in an earlier post.

That is, of course, quite apart from the fact that I'd like to see your proof that there is indeed something called 'the Mind', to begin with.

[ar734]

The mind is a product of the brain so the mind is indirectly made of atoms.

A building is the product of a carpenter so the building is indirectly made by (of) a carpenter.

[sologdin]

unless we are prepared to anthropomorphise nature.

it's not obvious to me why this is the case.

critique of causality has its merits, but the determinist has no need of anthropomorphism if the thesis is something like the gravitational field caused the bodies to move together. the proposition lacks precision, and we might quibble about its accuracy as a description, and it may simply be dead wrong within the terms of the physical sciences--but an objection that it anthropomorphises the field or the bodies is not readily articulatable.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Sologdin:


unless we are prepared to anthropomorphise nature.

it's not obvious to me why this is the case.

Well, I have explained why this is so if you follow the links I posted.


critique of causality has its merits, but the determinist has no need of anthropomorphism if the thesis is something like the gravitational field caused the bodies to move together. the proposition lacks precision, and we might quibble about its accuracy as a description, and it may simply be dead wrong within the terms of the physical sciences--but an objection that it anthropomorphises the field or the bodies is not readily articulatable.

But, this does not affect the argument, as you will see if you follow those links.

[sologdin]

RL--

before going further, allow me to clarify my understanding of the argument that you've produced on this question, and perhaps subject some of it to the protocols of reading, but briefly.

the following strikes me as a conclusory allegation:



since only things with minds can determine other things, and since nature is not mind, no natural event can determine any other.



unless the usage here of determinism is strictly definitional (limiting the predicate's significance to subjects who are, for want of better language, animate), then i must find the propositions that lead to the thesis.



determinism was based on a theistic view of the world, and an allegedly atheistical version of it can only be made to work by using anthropomorphic/animistic terminology, as one event determines; another, or one set of events determine; the outcome of others.


this also strikes me as conclusory allegation. it is in itself not objectionable, however, to the extent that determinism at its arche was theological. does that arche continue to determine the basis of the theory for materialists? we will see.



We do not need this ancient, mystical language to depict nature or society; we have the resources in ordinary language that allow us to depict natural and social causes to any level of detail and sophistication we need, and they do this non-mystically.


i take the above proposition to draw a distinction between causality and determinism. it is likely, then, that your argument is not humean. (either way, it's cool.)

if my reading is correct, then i can't see that my understanding is inconsistent with yours, except that yours is more supple.



That can only mean that these laws are agents too, and are capable, all of their own, of bullying material objects, forcing them to do their bidding.



i read this line of argument to signify an objection to the colloquial language that reifies scientific theory and deploys a legal metaphor. can't say that i disagree, if i have understood. it also appears to me that this type of objection is leveled also at determinism, which reifies the inaminate, fetishizes what lacks agency. none of this is to dispute causality, or set up a theological freedom of the will, however.



You need to read what I posted, and refrain from reading into what I say, what you think I say.



i'd quibble that the proposal hereinabove underscored is an impossibility, but that's off-topic.




Do you mean it is thinking about it, acting with purpose and resolve, unfliching in its actions?

But that is how we use the word determined; in such contexts.



i follow, though i could make use of a few citations from the history of the relevant discourse that employ the usage suggested hereinabove. you'll forgive me, i hope, if such citations are more or less obvious; i promise that i am not being intentionally obtuse.



and make all that happens subject to a universal will


to the extent that modern determinism inherits theological determinism, this above is unobjectionable. if modern determinism, i.e., argues that events are guided by a superimposition, then it is indistinguishable from religion. i am not persauded, however, that determinism need the superimposition, if the determinist thesis is limited to causality. perhaps your objection is the making of distinction between causality and determinism, as suggested, supra? if so, i don't see any reason to object.


depend on twisting language, misusing it, or inventing incomprehensible jargon where ordinary words will not do.


if i am shown an example of untwisted language, then i will be pleased. but that's merely quibble.



My objection to using the word determine here is that in ordinary life, when we use this term, we employ it in circumstances that imply the use of thought, deliberation, planning or fortitude.


this bit above arises from a post that otherwise cites to wittgenstein. IIRC his arguments correctly, i do not recall that a particular signifier must needs register in a solitary language game.



spell out exactly what you mean by causation here (unless you adopt, say, regularity as way of explaining away this obscure philosophical category), you will, at some point, have to use terms that imply things are controlled by a cosmic will of some sort.



this hereinabove strikes me as non sequitur or straw man, depending on which end of the transaction with which we start; why must causality eventually rely on cosmic will?


we have thousands of words in ordinary language that can account for why things happen. You use them every day (indeed, you used some here). That is why we do not need a philosophical theory why things happen. And if scientists want to explain why things happen, as oppopsed to merely describing what takes place, they have to use these words too (or employ a metaphorical extensions to their usual use).


not following the distinction between ordinary language and philosophical theory.


Well we do not need scientists to tell us that objects fall if we do not support them, and that it is not a good idea to jump off tall buildings.


this hereinabove strikes me as non-responsive to the the interrogatory that preceded it:



So does gravity exist, in your mind? Why do masses fall towards each other, then?



the follow-up:



But, I will note that scientists cannot explain why bodies move toward one another -- sure they can describe these events with great accuracy, but they still lack an account of what exactly moves things.



this is not a significant distinction: describe v. explain, as used hereinabove. describing causality seems sufficient; what more could be added by explanation of same?


perhaps this is enough for now. FWIW, i like your writings. i will endeavor to devote more time to them as this thread progresses.

[Across The Street]

Rosa Lichtenstein: "That is, of course, quite apart from the fact that I'd like to see your proof that there is indeed something called 'the Mind', to begin with."

Rosa, you risk going off the deep end, and you may never live to see the bottom.

This thread does make me wonder where consciousness comes from though. I've read Jungs' theories on the collective unconscious and the subconscious mind, did he think these were the root of consciousness though? If so, our minds and all of our thoughts would be connected and individual actions would be the only truly free aspect of our existence. Free thought seems to have disappeared some time ago when everybody is reacting to what each person thinks instantaneously. I don't know, the OP has a difficult question that I can't answer.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Sologdin:


i am not persauded, however, that determinism need the superimposition, if the determinist thesis is limited to causality. perhaps your objection is the making of distinction between causality and determinism, as suggested, supra? if so, i don't see any reason to object.

Depends on what you mean by 'causation'. But, the use of this word suggests that a false step has already been taken, since there are many different types of causation, the amalgamation of which leads into error.


if i am shown an example of untwisted language, then i will be pleased. but that's merely quibble.

How about these?

1) The Nile is longer than the Thames.

2) Paris is in France.

3) You had a mother.


this hereinabove strikes me as non sequitur or straw man, depending on which end of the transaction with which we start; why must causality eventually rely on cosmic will?

You misread my argument. It's not causation as such that implies this (but note my earlier objection to using the word 'causation') but certain traditiomal approaches to the subject that do.


not following the distinction between ordinary language and philosophical theory.

Well, I'd like to see you go about your daily affairs using only philosophical language. However, I have said more here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1995528&postcount=1


this hereinabove strikes me as non-responsive to the the interrogatory that preceded it:

this is not a significant distinction: describe v. explain, as used hereinabove. describing causality seems sufficient; what more could be added by explanation of same?

The fact that we have two different, non-synonymous words here ought to suggest to you that they aren't at all the same.


this bit above arises from a post that otherwise cites to wittgenstein. IIRC his arguments correctly, i do not recall that a particular signifier must needs register in a solitary language game.

I don't think the word 'signifier' is helpful, since its use commits one to what Ryle used to call "The 'Fido-Fido' fallacy (http://staffwww.dcs.shef.ac.uk/people/Y.Wilks/papers/fodor/node1.html)".

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Across the Street:


Rosa Lichtenstein: "That is, of course, quite apart from the fact that I'd like to see your proof that there is indeed something called 'the Mind', to begin with."

Rosa, you risk going off the deep end, and you may never live to see the bottom.

No, it's a perfectly ordinary question to ask (if you have read Wittgenstein and/or Ryle).


This thread does make me wonder where consciousness comes from though. I've read Jungs' theories on the collective unconscious and the subconscious mind, did he think these were the root of consciousness though? If so, our minds and all of our thoughts would be connected and individual actions would be the only truly free aspect of our existence. Free thought seems to have disappeared some time ago when everybody is reacting to what each person thinks instantaneously. I don't know, the OP has a difficult question that I can't answer.

Of course, you are helping yourself to this word (i.e., 'consciousnss') without once showing that there is indeed such a thing:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/consciousness-and-passage-t100438/index.html

http://www.revleft.com/vb/why-do-we-t98047/index.html

http://www.revleft.com/vb/self-t105849/index.html

http://www.revleft.com/vb/consciousness-t135419/index.html

[Rafiq]

Because we don't have free will.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Rafiq:


Because we don't have free will.

The question now is: Who forced you to post this?

[sologdin]

RL--



Depends on what you mean by 'causation'. But, the use of this word suggests that a false step has already been taken, since there are many different types of causation, the amalgamation of which leads into error.


causality in the sense (ordinary, perhaps) that one event produces another.

but, to your objection, an objection: no matter what i mean by causality (what i think is not relevant--the thesis under examination is yours, after all), if, as noted above, there are several usages of the term, i ask that you respond to my original question, relying on one of the unamalgamated types (i assume that if amalgamation leads to error, there must be at least one unamalgated type that is not erroneous--otherwise, the objection would have been "no, causality is generally error").

my original query:



perhaps your objection is the making of distinction between causality and determinism, as suggested, supra?


i don't see why i should have to guess which interpretation of causality is unobjectionable; if there is an significance of the term that is unobjectionable in this context, it can readily be adopted provisionally.



How about these?

1) The Nile is longer than the Thames.

2) Paris is in France.

3) You had a mother.


twisted suggested something that has been deformed, brought out of its proper or just or natural state (all adjectives that are objectionable, yes)--perhaps through the intention of another, or perhaps not. if these three statements above are untwisted, fair enough. is the metaphor useful? (it's one of tolkien's central metaphors in the lord of the rings, e.g.).



You misread my argument. It's not causation as such that implies this (but note my earlier objection to using the word 'causation') but certain traditiomal approaches to the subject that do.


the proposition that i have misread is argumentum ad hominem. the proposition under examination is:



you will, at some point, have to use terms that imply things are controlled by a cosmic will


following upon a request that another interlocutor define causation. the statement is not qualified by "certain traditional approaches." if the prior proposition has been amended, however, then my objection is withdrawn.



Well, I'd like to see you go about your daily affairs using only philosophical language. However, I have said more here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1995528&postcount=1


i am all in favor of the posting of URL in discussions such as this; if something has been written once, there's no reason to compel its repetion. that said, the URL above leads to a lengthy article, whereas the query to which it responds regards a distinction between ordinary language and philosophical theory. i don't expect the distinction to be terse--but certainly it might be roughly drawn in a few sentences?




The fact that we have two different, non-synonymous words here ought to suggest to you that they aren't at all the same.


this is non-responsive, and slightly uncivil--though i assume, after review, that my inept presentation miscommunicated.

the original query, by another interlocutor:
So does gravity exist, in your mind? Why do masses fall towards each other, then?



So does gravity exist, in your mind? Why do masses fall towards each other, then?


the response:



Well we do not need scientists to tell us that objects fall if we do not support them, and that it is not a good idea to jump off tall buildings.

But, I will note that scientists cannot explain why bodies move toward one another -- sure they can describe these events with great accuracy, but they still lack an account of what exactly moves things.



my impression, and question:



this hereinabove strikes me as non-responsive [...] this is not a significant distinction: describe v. explain, as used hereinabove. describing causality seems sufficient; what more could be added by explanation of same?


the allegation is that, i assume, describe and explain are non-synonymous words, and therefore they are not the same. my objection is that they need not be non-identical in the given context--what, i.e., is added to descrption by explanation when someone is asking if gravity exists?



I don't think the word 'signifier' is helpful, since its use commits one to what Ryle used to call "The 'Fido-Fido' fallacy (http://staffwww.dcs.shef.ac.uk/people/Y.Wilks/papers/fodor/node1.html)".


i doubt that one is committed to the alleged fallacy by use of the term signifer. uncritical use of the term might be consistent with the fallacy, sure.

that said, the objection was tendered in response to an argument about LW; i do not regard the objection as material to the request; the objection therefore appears frivolous. i do however withdraw what might be perceived as untoward saussurean language and replace it with some properly germanic:



this bit above arises from a post that otherwise cites to wittgenstein. IIRC his arguments correctly, i do not recall that a particular signifier word must needs register in a solitary language game.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

slogdin:


causality in the sense (ordinary, perhaps) that one event produces another.

That's a very restrictive sense of caustion. Anyway, how can one event 'produce' anyhthing? Are they like conjurers, or farmers?


but, to your objection, an objection: no matter what i mean by causality (what i think is not relevant--the thesis under examination is yours, after all), if, as noted above, there are several usages of the term, i ask that you respond to my original question, relying on one of the unamalgamated types (i assume that if amalgamation leads to error, there must be at least one unamalgated type that is not erroneous--otherwise, the objection would have been "no, causality is generally error").

I don't mean to be obtuse, but what question was that?


twisted suggested something that has been deformed, brought out of its proper or just or natural state (all adjectives that are objectionable, yes)--perhaps through the intention of another, or perhaps not. if these three statements above are untwisted, fair enough. is the metaphor useful? (it's one of tolkien's central metaphors in the lord of the rings, e.g.).

Well, in fact, I prefer Marx's words:


The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), The German Ideology, p.118. Bold emphasis added.]

You:


the proposition that i have misread is argumentum ad hominem. the proposition under examination

1) In what way is it argumentum ad hominem?

2) Anyway, in many cases, argumentum ad hominem is OK, despite what poor logic books/websites have to say.


i am all in favor of the posting of URL in discussions such as this; if something has been written once, there's no reason to compel its repetion. that said, the URL above leads to a lengthy article, whereas the query to which it responds regards a distinction between ordinary language and philosophical theory. i don't expect the distinction to be terse--but certainly it might be roughly drawn in a few sentences?

I did in fact say I had gone into this in more detail at that link, so you were forewarned.

Forgive me palming you off once more, but we had a thread in this a few months back:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/marx-wittgenstein-and-t144863/index.html


this is non-responsive, and slightly uncivil--though i assume, after review, that my inept presentation miscommunicated.

I'm sorry, I did not mean to sound uncivil, but, as Wittgenstien noted, we all tend to miss distinctions that lie right under our noses.


the allegation is that, i assume, describe and explain are non-synonymous words, and therefore they are not the same. my objection is that they need not be non-identical in the given context--what, i.e., is added to descrption by explanation when someone is asking if gravity exists?

I'm sorry, but I could not follow this.

May I add, that it's not up to me to say whether gravity exists. That is surely the job of scientists.


i doubt that one is committed to the alleged fallacy by use of the term signifer. uncritical use of the term might be consistent with the fallacy, sure.

I maintain a healthy scepticism here, I'm afraid.


this bit above arises from a post that otherwise cites to wittgenstein. IIRC his arguments correctly, i do not recall that a particular word must needs register in a solitary language game.

Well, I'm sorry once more, but this is a bit too obscure for me to respond to.

Did you mean that a given word -- such as 'explain' -- has to (or maybe must not?) feature in an isolated language game?

I've no idea to be honest.

Anyway, I think that the concept of 'language games' was one of Wittgenstein's worst ideas, so it's not the sort of thing I care to comment on.

[Rafiq]

Rafiq:



The question now is: Who forced you to post this?

The OP

[Broletariat]

I fear I may not be following your argument entirely Rosa so help me out a little or just link me to a post I should re-read.

Basically determinism is crap because it projects agency on to nature or some cosmic will or some such right? How does it follow then that the free-will mess is garbage as well, it looks like free will just says that we have agency?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Rafiq:


The OP

Then I suspect you have a rather odd understanding of the word 'forced'.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Broletariat:


Basically determinism is crap because it projects agency on to nature or some cosmic will or some such right? How does it follow then that the free-will mess is garbage as well, it looks like free will just says that we have agency?

No, it's a non-sensical theory since all philosophical theories are (http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1995528&postcount=1). And it can only be made to seem to work if we are prepared to attribute Nature with a Cosmic Will of some sort.


How does it follow then that the free-will mess is garbage as well, it looks like free will just says that we have agency?

This, too, is a philosophical theory, and suffers the same fate as determinism -- it is non-sensical.

[Broletariat]

Broletariat:



No, it's a non-sensical theory since all philosophical theories are (http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1995528&postcount=1). And it can only be made to seem to work if we are prepared to attribute Nature with a Cosmic Will of some sort.



This, too, is a philosophical theory, and suffers the same fate as determinism -- it is non-sensical.
Would you mind explaining why in as much detail as you did for determinism? This is a bit like math for me and I need to see a few problems worked out before I get it :)

After further reflection, is the free-will idea non-sensical for the reason that it implies something had to imbue us with that agency? I really am trying to learn here about this.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

^^^Will do, but I'm posting little here at RevLeft at present, so can you wait a day or so?

[Broletariat]

^^^Will do, but I'm posting little here at RevLeft at present, so can you wait a day or so?
Of course, take your time.

Thanks a bunch by the way this is all really helpful.

[Decolonize The Left]

I fear I may not be following your argument entirely Rosa so help me out a little or just link me to a post I should re-read.

Basically determinism is crap because it projects agency on to nature or some cosmic will or some such right? How does it follow then that the free-will mess is garbage as well, it looks like free will just says that we have agency?

Given that I am not as theoretically adept as Rosa, I shall attempt to explain what I understand her argument to be, as I agree with her on all accounts.

Basically, determinism makes no sense as it is anthropomorphizing nature (i.e. it ascribes human characteristics to non-human things/events). So when the determinist says "all events are determined by previous events" they are saying that there is some "cause" behind all events which it cannot explain except to appeal to the same argument - hence it is bound for infinite regress.
Rosa can expand in more detail on this, but as I understand it this is the basic outline.

So why no free will?
Well free will encounters even more problems than determinism. In the first place, it requires a definition of the "will." The free will believer can only appeal to saying things like "I just chose to write this, so will clearly exists, it's only a matter of determining whether or not it's free."
Yet this is problematic as the individual clearly cannot pinpoint the moment in which s/he "chose" to write, type, or say, anything! Hence they are speaking of a general time in which chose occurred. Furthermore, they have no explanation for a "self" which "wills" at all except to again refer to the previous statement - that it's happening right now! Then they need to explain how this mysterious "will" is bound by terms of "freedom" and "slavery" if it is to be free at all. In short, there must be some sort of mystery world where the will exists and is engaged with other wills in political scenarios of freedom (or not). Yet they cannot tell you where this world is, again, they must say "it's happening right now as I type." All these arguments refer to themselves for justification, and self-justifying arguments are nonsensical.

In short, there is no "self" - there is no "will" - there is no "free will." These are all metaphysical language games based around the distortion of logic stemming back to the notion of "a world of ideas (or forms)." They all depend upon the supposed existence of a world other than this one where things exist independently of reality.

I assume I have not adequately argued Rosa's point, so I'll leave it to her to mend my claims as necessary. I can only hope I've helped in some way.

- August

[Meridian]

So why no free will?
Well free will encounters even more problems than determinism. In the first place, it requires a definition of the "will." The free will believer can only appeal to saying things like "I just chose to write this, so will clearly exists, it's only a matter of determining whether or not it's free."
Yet this is problematic as the individual clearly cannot pinpoint the moment in which s/he "chose" to write, type, or say, anything! Hence they are speaking of a general time in which chose occurred. Furthermore, they have no explanation for a "self" which "wills" at all except to again refer to the previous statement - that it's happening right now! Then they need to explain how this mysterious "will" is bound by terms of "freedom" and "slavery" if it is to be free at all. In short, there must be some sort of mystery world where the will exists and is engaged with other wills in political scenarios of freedom (or not). Yet they cannot tell you where this world is, again, they must say "it's happening right now as I type." All these arguments refer to themselves for justification, and self-justifying arguments are nonsensical.

In short, there is no "self" - there is no "will" - there is no "free will." These are all metaphysical language games based around the distortion of logic stemming back to the notion of "a world of ideas (or forms)." They all depend upon the supposed existence of a world other than this one where things exist independently of reality.

I assume I have not adequately argued Rosa's point, so I'll leave it to her to mend my claims as necessary. I can only hope I've helped in some way.

- August
I don't see a problem with statements like "I decided by my own free will that I will no longer smoke cigarettes" or similar, though. Of course there are reasons for the person making the decision, but the term is still clarifying, in the sense that the person is not forced by another human being, a machine or any other obvious constraint to commit the action. In other words, the term is not being used in a non-sensical manner.

[Broletariat]

I don't see a problem with statements like "I decided by my own free will that I will no longer smoke cigarettes" or similar, though. Of course there are reasons for the person making the decision, but the term is still clarifying, in the sense that the person is not forced by another human being, a machine or any other obvious constraint to commit the action. In other words, the term is not being used in a non-sensical manner.

I think this is an example of normal everyday people making philosophical language actually mean something EG "Isn't that the truth."

Thanks a lot August by the way.

[Decolonize The Left]

I don't see a problem with statements like "I decided by my own free will that I will no longer smoke cigarettes" or similar, though. Of course there are reasons for the person making the decision, but the term is still clarifying, in the sense that the person is not forced by another human being, a machine or any other obvious constraint to commit the action. In other words, the term is not being used in a non-sensical manner.

Yes it is nonsensical, as you could easier say: "I decided not to smoke cigarettes." This sentence makes more sense, and requires less justification. You could also say "I stopped smoking cigarettes." This would be even easier to justify as it is a simple declarative.

By adding in "by my own free will" you are complicating your own situation.

- August

[Meridian]

Yes it is nonsensical, as you could easier say: "I decided not to smoke cigarettes." This sentence makes more sense, and requires less justification. You could also say "I stopped smoking cigarettes." This would be even easier to justify as it is a simple declarative.

By adding in "by my own free will" you are complicating your own situation.

- August
But, there being easier ways to say something (and that they are easier or that they perform the same function could be disputed) does not mean that the sentence in question is nonsensical. As you point out, "it was my own decision to do it" is somewhat similar to "I did it out of my own free will". However, if they mean the same and the latter is nonsensical, then so is the former. I don't think they mean exactly the same.

If we are to follow RL's terminology, I think part of the point is that "sense" is being used in a special and rather strict fashion, and that a sentence is either sensical or non-sensical; it's not a matter of degrees. I contend that the term "free will" and its counterparts in other languages does have a role in ordinary language, a role in which it is not misused, but in fact is understandable by anyone capable in that language. In my own language it is quite common to say "out of my own will", which sounds dramatic in English, but I don't see how it is non-sensical.

You are on the right tracks with comparing "free will" to "own decision", though of course the terms have different uses as well in which the comparison between these two might not be fitting. I think Rosa Lichtenstein responded well to Rafiq stating that we don't have free will, questioning who had forced him to post that.

[ExUnoDisceOmnes]

This thread does make me wonder where consciousness comes from though. I've read Jungs' theories on the collective unconscious and the subconscious mind, did he think these were the root of consciousness though? If so, our minds and all of our thoughts would be connected and individual actions would be the only truly free aspect of our existence. Free thought seems to have disappeared some time ago when everybody is reacting to what each person thinks instantaneously. I don't know, the OP has a difficult question that I can't answer.

I've heard it argued, mainly from evolutionists, that thought is a product of four levels of memory.

First, genetic memory (which would include the constitution of the brain). However, it has been proven that this can be easily overcome by the other three levels.

The second, if I remember correctly, is muscle/subconscious memory. Essentially you perform an act and get three options of results.
a: A negative result, which results in your body reacting negatively if you perform that act again.
b: A neutral result, which results in avoidance of the action as useless.
c: A positive result, (i.e. picking up a rock results in insects) which causes you to perform that act again when you desire the same result.

Third is your standard recall memory. This develops at a young age and allows you to consciously recount your own experiences.

Fourth is collective memory, those memories and thoughts recorded by other people over time and shared between living individuals. This is the greatest resource of humanity and is what allows us to develop (otherwise our first three levels of memory would have to recreate those experiences autonomously).

The culmination of these four memory types is what causes you to make the decisions that you do. Essentially, you have a predetermined will, but that can be easily overruled by experiences in memory levels 2-4. "Free will" can only be considered relative to those experiences you've had and the physical imprint that they've left on your brain. So, yes, you can make decisions and you can shape your future decisions, but you are largely influenced physically to choose in the way that you do. It is this way because through the four levels of memory, the best decisions are the most likely decisions to be made (based on your experiences, the experiences of others, and the mental composition of those who managed to pass on their genes before you). Biologically, this makes us more likely to survive.

So, essentially, it depends on how you define free will, because it is clear that you condition yourself for the decisions which you make. For example, I'm sure that most of us wouldn't fund a Nazi group because the connections in our brains and our levels of memory tell us not to. But does this constitute a lack of free will? It's an interesting thought.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Apologies for the further delay in honouring my promise to you, Broletariat. I will honour it in the next few days. I can only spend a few minutes a day here at present.

[Broletariat]

Apologies for the further delay in honouring my promise to you, Broletariat. I will honour it in the next few days. I can only spend a few minutes a day here at present.


Yea it's cool, I understand having a life outside of educating people from the internet :P

[Decolonize The Left]

But, there being easier ways to say something (and that they are easier or that they perform the same function could be disputed) does not mean that the sentence in question is nonsensical. As you point out, "it was my own decision to do it" is somewhat similar to "I did it out of my own free will". However, if they mean the same and the latter is nonsensical, then so is the former. I don't think they mean exactly the same.

They are related, in that free will is a series of assumptions based upon the assumption of decision-making. So first you have to assume that there exists a "choice." In short, unless you accept that "choice" is merely a linguistic tool to indicate action vs. non-action, choice becomes an event in itself (which it isn't).
So if you assume that choice is an event in itself, then you naturally have to figure out how it came about and, get this, whether or not it was freely made.

So 'decision-making' is related to 'free will' in that the former is a precursor to the latter. This is why I indicated that you could eliminate free will and maintain decision-making, or eliminate them all.


If we are to follow RL's terminology, I think part of the point is that "sense" is being used in a special and rather strict fashion, and that a sentence is either sensical or non-sensical; it's not a matter of degrees. I contend that the term "free will" and its counterparts in other languages does have a role in ordinary language, a role in which it is not misused, but in fact is understandable by anyone capable in that language. In my own language it is quite common to say "out of my own will", which sounds dramatic in English, but I don't see how it is non-sensical.

The term 'free will' does have a role in common language, much like the term "soul." This doesn't make either of them actual or valuable or even sensible.

For I could equally well construct a term which I then wrote into a story about human existence, and if this story was believed to be true by enough people, and it was taught as true for enough years, then it would be a part of common language.


You are on the right tracks with comparing "free will" to "own decision", though of course the terms have different uses as well in which the comparison between these two might not be fitting. I think Rosa Lichtenstein responded well to Rafiq stating that we don't have free will, questioning who had forced him to post that.

I believe Rosa's point was that just as the term "free will" is meaningless, so is denying the term in favor of another explanation. For once we are speaking of "free will" or "determinism" we are involved in a metaphysical debate which is nonsensical in itself.

- August

[ar734]

I believe Rosa's point was that just as the term "free will" is meaningless, so is denying the term in favor of another explanation. For once we are speaking of "free will" or "determinism" we are involved in a metaphysical debate which is nonsensical in itself.

- August

Well, if "free will" and "determinism" are non-sensical, then what has replaced them? Are you suggesting that free will and determinism have negated themselves and have developed into something new? cf. Hegel, Lichtenstein, et. al.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LouisianaLeftist:


Well, if "free will" and "determinism" are non-sensical, then what has replaced them? Are you suggesting that free will and determinism have negated themselves and have developed into something new? cf. Hegel, Lichtenstein, et. al.

Why do they need replacing?

And, as I have explained here many times, I'm not seeking to develop a newer and better theory, since I reject all such theories as non-sensical.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Broletariat, I'll respond to your request later today.

[ar734]

LouisianaLeftist:



Why do they need replacing?

And, as I have explained here many times, I'm not seeking to develop a newer and better theory, since I reject all such theories as non-sensical.

But not "such theories" as historical materialism? How is it possible to distinguish determinism and HM? Or separate human freedom from socialism?

[Broletariat]

But not "such theories" as historical materialism? How is it possible to distinguish determinism and HM? Or separate human freedom from socialism?
Because determinism is philosophical and HM is scientific. Your third question simply doesn't make sense.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LouisianaLeftist:


But not "such theories" as historical materialism? How is it possible to distinguish determinism and HM?

Well, as Broletariat has pointed out, this is the Philosophy section, and so I was referring to philosophical theories -- not scientific theores like HM.


Or separate human freedom from socialism?

Where have I done that?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

OK, Broletariat, here is the answer to your earlier query.

Now, I can't possibly examine every different version of determinism, so I will concentrate on a simplified deterministic proposition:

D1: Cause A determines event B.

The import of this is that whenever A occurs, unless there are other intervening causes, B must happen. This is also meant to explain why, whenever A occurs, B takes place rather than C, or D. A is said to determine B in this way: A governs/controls the occurrence of B such that B has to happen, not C or D.

Now, if anyone accepts the truth of D1, this will not have followed from any evidence. All that any evidence could show is that whenever A occurs, B follows, not that A determined B in the senses outlined above. Evidence cannot show that B has to happen whenever A occurs, only that it does happen.

So, D1 is an a priori truth -- that is, not only is its truth established in advance of the evidence, no evidence is even relevant to establishing its truth.

Hence, despite the fact that D1 is in the indicative mood (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grammatical_mood), and appears to tell us about matters of fact, it is radically different from empirical propositions.

In an earlier post (http://www.revleft.com/vb/all-philosophical-theories-t148537/index.html) I explained the difference between these sorts of propositions in this way:


Consider a typical philosophical/metaphysical thesis:

M1: To be is to be perceived. [Berkeley]

Contrast this with a typical empirical proposition (i.e., a proposition/sentence about matters of fact):

M2: Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital.

The seemingly profound nature of theses like M1 is linked to rather more mundane features of the language in which they are expressed: that is, they are connected with the fact that the main verb they use is almost invariably in the indicative mood.

[Sometimes, this mood is augmented/beefed-up with subjunctive and/or modal qualifiers (such as 'must', 'can't', 'necessary', etc.) -- which, incidentally, only add to the confusion. We will see why below.]

This apparently superficial grammatical facade hides a deeper logical form -- several in fact. This is something which only becomes plain when such sentences are examined more closely.

M1-type expressions look as if they revealed profound truths about reality since they resemble empirical propositions. In the event, they turn out to be nothing at all like them.

To see this, consider again this ordinary empirical proposition:

T1: Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital.

Compare this with these similar-looking indicative (but nonetheless typically metaphysical) sentences:

T2: Time is a relation between events.

T3: Motion is inseparable from matter.

First, in order to understand T1, it is not necessary to know whether it is true or whether it is false.

Contrast this with the comprehension of T2 and T3; understanding either of these goes hand-in-hand with knowing they are both true (or, alternatively, knowing they are both false, as the case may be). Their truth thus follows either (1) from the meaning the words they contain, (2) from specific definitions or (3) from a handful of 'thought experiments' -- i.e., from yet more words.

In relation to T2, (2) above might be something like "Events take place in time". With T3, it might be "Motion is a form of the existence of matter" -- as Engels and Lenin believed -- and so on. To be sure, (1)-(3) might also be prefaced by some sort of 'philosophical argument' -- but these are just more words; no evidence is needed. It's not possible to devise experiments to test propositions like T2 and T3. What would they even look like?

This now intimately links the truth-status of sentences like T2 and T3 with meaning, not factual confirmation, and hence not with a confrontation with material reality. Their truth-status is thus independent of, and anterior to, the search for supporting evidence -- not that such a search is relevant anyway, or, indeed, that it is ever carried out. [Again, what would you, or could you, look for to confirm T2 or T3?]

In contrast, understanding T1 is independent of its confirmation or disconfirmation. Indeed, it would be impossible to do either of these if T1 had not already been understood. Plainly, the actual truth/falsehood of T1-type propositions follows from the way the world happens to be, and is not solely based on the meaning of certain expressions. Their truth cannot be read-off from the words they contain, unlike T2- and T3-type sentences.

Empirical propositions are typically like this; [I]they have to be understood first before they can be confronted with the evidence that would establish their truth-status. In contrast, metaphysical propositions carry their truth or their falsehood on their faces, as it were, and need no evidence to confirm either of these. Understanding them is one and the same as knowing their truth-status. That is why it is impossible even to conceive of ways of confirming them.

So, to sum up: here we have two sorts of indicative sentences, each with a radically different logical 'relation' to the world.

Understanding the first sort (i.e., those like T1) is independent of ascertaining their truth-status, whereas their actual truth or falsehood depends on the state of the world.

With the second sort (i.e., those like T2 or T3), their truth or falsehood is not dependent on the state of the world, but follows solely from the meaning of the words they contain (or from the meaning of those in the argument from which they were 'derived'). To understand them is ipso facto to know they are true or to know they are false.

So, the truth of D1 follows from the meaning of the words it contains, or those of the words in any supporting argument, and not from the way the world happens to be -- otherwise evidence would be relevant.

This makes D1 a necessay truth -- that is, its truth follows necessarily from the meaning of the words it contains.

If D1 were to be false, the meaning of its words will have changed, otherwise D1 would be true and not false.

So, with respect to D1-type sentences, things are radically different: because their truth-values (true or false) can be determined independently, and in advance of the way the world happens to be, philosophers use them to dictate to reality what it must be like.

With empirical propositions, like T1, the world dictates to us whether they are true or whether they are false.

T1: Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital.

But as I also explained, if a proposition is necessarily true, it cannot in fact be true.

Consider again D1.

D1: Cause A determines event B.

For this to be declared true, we should have to know what was being ruled out. That is, we should have to know that the truth of D2 was being ruled out:

D2: Cause A does not determine event B.

But if the truth of D1 follows from the meaning of the words it contains -- specifically "Cause A" and "determine" (as explained at the beginning of this post), then if D2 is true it must be using these words in a different way.

If so, D2 and D1, despite appearances to the contrary, must have a different subject matter. In that case, the truth of D2 has no connection with D1, and so, when we declare D1 true, we can have no idea what we are ruling out (since we are no longer ruling out D2).

We might think we are ruling out the truth of D2 by accepting D1 as true, but as we have just seen, these two sentences have no connection with one another since the meaning of the words they contain has changed.

But, if we have no idea what we are ruling out, we can no longer say D1 is true -- otherwise we'd know what was being ruled out.

[The same points apply if we substitute 'necessarily true' for 'true' throughout in the above, but I have left that out to make what I have to say less convoluted.]

Hence, in declaring D1 necessarily true, it ceases even to be true.

[The same applies mutatis mutandis (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutatis_mutandis) if D1 is declared necessarily false, but I will omit that part of the argument.]

Hence, D1 can't be true and it can't be false. It is thus non-sensical.

Recall what I said about non-sense and sense in that earlier post:


It is worth pointing out that "non-sense" is not the same as "nonsense". The latter word has various meanings varying from the patently false (such as "Karl Marx was a shape-shifting lizard") to plain gibberish (such as "783&£$750 ow2jmn 34y4&$ 6y3n3& 8FT34n").

The former word relates to indicative sentences that turn out to be incapable of expressing a sense (no matter what we try to do with them), that is, they are incapable of being true or they are incapable of being false. In their case, therefore, the indicative mood has been mis-used/mis-applied. So, when they are employed to state fundamental truths about reality, they seriously misfire since they can't possibly do this.

So, non-sensical sentences aren't patently false, nor are they plain gibberish.

Finally, the word "sense" is being used in the following way: it expresses what we understand to be the case if the proposition in question is true (or what fails to be the case if it is false), even if we do not know whether it is actually true or whether it is actually false.

For example, everyone (who knows English, who knows who Tony Blair and what Das Kapital are) will understand T1 (i.e., "Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital") upon hearing or reading it. They grasp its sense --, that is, they understand what the world would have to be like for T1 to be true or what the world would have to be like for T1 to be false.

Of course, determinism is a much more involved theory than I have made out here, but those additional complications do not alter its core ideas -- they are likewise non-sensical, and for the same reasons.

And this conclusion also applies to the misuse of 'free will', if it is being used metaphysically, -- that is, as part of a philosophical argument aimed at undermining, or at negating determinism. The negation of non-sense is also non-sense.

Hope that makes things a little clearer.

[ar734]

LouisianaLeftist:



Well, as Broletariat has pointed out, this is the Philosophy section, and so I was referring to philosophical theories -- not scientific theores like HM.



Where have I done that?

[separate human freedom from socialism]....I thought you said free will was non-sensical.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LouisianaLeftist:


thought you said free will was non-sensical.

In fact, what I said was this:


And this conclusion also applies to the misuse of 'free will', if it is being used metaphysically, -- that is, as part of a philosophical argument aimed at undermining, or at negating determinism. The negation of non-sense is also non-sense.

Moreover, human (political or social) freedom is not the same as 'free-will' (our ability to decide, for instance).

For example, consider someone in prison; he/she can still make decisons, but she/he is not politically/socially free.

Or, consider a worker; she is free to sell her labour power (she can decide to do so, or refuse to do so), but she is not free to control the exploitation relations that dominate her.

That is not to say the two are not connected, but they would not be connected if they were the same.