All Philosophical Theories are Non-sensical

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I have posted earlier versions of this material at RevLeft a number of times already, but reading it again I am far from convinced I made myself at all clear. Hence, I have spent the last week re-writing it.

In what follows, I have had to repeat myself more times than I would like since the points I am putting across are not at all easy -- in fact, they sailed right over the heads of some of the greatest minds in human history, and remained unacknowledged for over 2500 years.

I claim no originality here, except in the way these ideas have been presented. They have in fact been adapted from Wittgenstein's (http://www.iep.utm.edu/wittgens/) early and middle period.

Here's why philosophical theories make no sense:

Metaphysical vs Empirical Propositions

Consider a typical philosophical/metaphysical (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics) thesis:

M1: To be is to be perceived.

Contrast this with a typical empirical (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empirical) proposition (i.e., a proposition/sentence about matters of fact):

M2: Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital.

The seemingly profound nature of theses like M1 is linked to rather more mundane features of the language in which they are expressed: that is, they are connected with the fact that the main verb they use is almost invariably in the indicative (http://www.lousywriter.com/verbs_indicative_mood.php) mood.

[Sometimes, this mood is augmented/beefed-up with subjunctive (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjunctive_mood) and/or modal qualifiers (such as 'must', 'can't', 'necessary', etc.) -- which, incidentally, only add to the confusion. We will see why below.]

This apparently superficial grammatical facade hides a deeper logical form -- several in fact. This is something which only becomes plain when such sentences are examined more closely.

M1-type expressions look as if they revealed profound truths about reality since they [i]resemble empirical propositions. In the event, they turn out to be nothing at all like them.

To see this, consider again this ordinary empirical proposition:

T1: Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital.

Compare this with these similar-looking indicative (but nonetheless typically metaphysical) sentences:

T2: Time is a relation between events.

T3: Motion is inseparable from matter.

First, in order to understand T1, it is not necessary to know whether it is true or whether it is false.

Contrast this with the comprehension of T2 and T3; understanding either of these goes hand-in-hand with knowing they are both true (or, alternatively, knowing they are both false, as the case may be). Their truth thus follows either (1) from the meaning the words they contain, (2) from specific definitions or (3) from a handful of 'thought experiments' -- i.e., [I]from yet more words.

In relation to T2, (2) above might be something like "Events take place in time". With T3, it might be "Motion is a form of the existence of matter" -- as Engels and Lenin believed -- and so on. To be sure, (1)-(3) might also be prefaced by some sort of 'philosophical argument' -- but these are just more words, too; no evidence is needed. It's not possible to devise experiments to test propositions like T2 and T3. What would they even look like?

This now intimately links the truth-status of sentences like T2 and T3 with meaning, not factual confirmation, and hence not with a confrontation with material reality. Their truth-status is thus independent of, and anterior to, the search for supporting evidence -- not that such a search is relevant anyway, or, indeed, that it is ever carried out. [Again, what would you or could you look for to confirm T2 or T3?]

In contrast, understanding T1 is independent of its confirmation or disconfirmation. Indeed, it would be impossible to do either of these if T1 had not already been understood. Plainly, the actual truth/falsehood of T1-type propositions follows from the way the world happens to be, and is not solely based on the meaning of certain expressions. Their truth cannot be read-off from the words they contain, unlike T2- and T3-type sentences.

Empirical propositions are typically like this; they have to be understood first before they can be confronted with the evidence that would establish their truth-status. In contrast, metaphysical propositions carry their truth or their falsehood on their faces, as it were, and need no evidence to establish either of these. Understanding them is one and the same as knowing their truth-status. That is why it is impossible even to conceive of ways of confirming them.

So, to sum up: here we have two sorts of indicative sentences, each with a radically different logical 'relation' to the world.

Understanding the first sort (i.e., those like T1) is independent of ascertaining their truth-status, whereas their actual truth or falsehood depends on the state of the world.

With the second sort (i.e., those like T2 or T3), their truth or falsehood is not dependent on the state of the world, but follows solely from the meaning of the words they contain (or from the meaning of those in the argument from which they were 'derived'). To understand them is ipso facto to know they are true or to know they are false.

Second, metaphysical theses (like T2 and T3) were in fact deliberately constructed by philosophers in order to transcend the limitations of the material world. This approach was justified on the grounds that it allowed them to uncover underlying "essences", thus revealing nature's "hidden secrets", i.e., the fundamental principles by means of which the 'deity' had created the world. This idea then linked language with the underlying nature of reality. That idea still remains to this day, even though its theological origin has been forgotten. That is why metaphysical 'truths' are still being read off from language/thought alone, even by atheists.

Theses like these are deemed "necessarily true" (or "necessarily false"), and are thus held to express genuine knowledge of these fundamental aspects of reality -- unlike contingent (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingency_(philosophy))/empirical propositions whose actual truth-status can alter with the wind.

[After all, Tony Blair might sell his copy of Das Kapital -- or buy the book if he does not already own it. 'Philosophical knowledge' -- 'genuine knowledge' -- cannot depend on such changeable features of reality.]

Traditionally, this meant that empirical propositions like T1 were considered to be epistemologically (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology) inferior to T2- and T3-type sentences, since they were deemed incapable of revealing such fundamental knowledge. Indeed, "philosophical knowledge" (yielding absolute certainty) has always been seen as the sole preserve of T2- and T3-type sentences.

This, of course, means that whatever happens in the material world, they remained eternally true, since they are not generated from experience, but are derived from thought alone.

Metaphysical propositions thus masquerade as especially profound, 'super-empirical' truths which cannot fail to be true or cannot fail to be false, as the case may be. Plainly, they do this by aping the indicative mood, but they go way beyond it.

Thus, what they say does not just happen to be so, as is the case with ordinary empirical truths. What T2- and T3-type sentences say cannot possibly be otherwise. The world must conform to whatever they say, not the other way round. They determine the logical form of any possible world. This is not surprising given the theological origin of such ideas; after all 'god' spoke (so the Bible tells us) and reality just sprang into existence. Hence, on this view, the world is little more than condensed language. In that case, once these 'secrets' have been ascertained, they tell us how the world must be. No wonder then that such truths follow from language alone.

This also accounts for the frequent use of modal terms (like "must", "necessary" and "inconceivable") -- as in "I must exist if I can think" [Descartes (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ren%C3%A9_Descartes)], "Time must be a relation between events" [Kant (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immanuel_Kant)], "Being must be the same as and yet different from Nothing, the contradiction resolved in Becoming" [Hegel (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georg_Wilhelm_Friedrich_Hegel)] or "Existence can't be a predicate" [Russell (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bertrand_Russell)]. Everything in reality must be this or it must be that.

Contrast this with T1. If anyone were to question its truth, the following response: "Tony Blair must own a copy of Das Kapital" would be highly inappropriate -- unless, of course, T1 itself were the conclusion of an inference of some sort (such as: "Tony Blair told me he owned a copy, so he must own one"), or it was based on a direct observation statement (such as, "I saw his wife buy him a copy and give it to him, and I spotted it on his bookshelf a couple of minutes ago"). But even then, the truth or falsehood of T1 would still depend on an interface with material reality at some point.

So, with T1-type sentences, the world dictates to us whether what they say is true or false. We do not dictate to reality what it must contain, or what it must be like.

With respect to T2- and T3-type sentences, things are radically different: because their truth-values (true or false) can be determined independently and in advance of the way the world happens to be, philosophers use them to dictate to reality what it must be like.

In that case, once they have been understood, metaphysical propositions like T2 and T3 guarantee their own truth or their own falsehood. They are thus true a priori (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_priori).

So: to understand a metaphysical thesis is to know it is true (or to know it is false). That is why, to their inventors, they appear to be so certain, self-evident, and, in many cases, absolutely true. Their intimate connection with language means that questioning their veracity seems to run against the grain of our understanding, not of our experience. Indeed, they appear to be self-evident precisely because they need no evidence to confirm their truth-status; they provide their own 'evidence', and testify on their own behalf. Their veracity follows from the alleged meaning of the words they contain. They, not the world, guarantee their own truth or guarantee their own falsehood.

Unfortunately, this divorces such theses from material reality, since they are true or false independently of any apparent state of the world.

In that case, any thesis that can be judged true or judged false on conceptual/linguistic grounds alone cannot feature in a materialist account of reality, only an Idealist one. [Why that is so is explained if you follow the links posted at the end.]

Now, these assertions might appear to be somewhat dogmatic, but as we shall see, the opposite view is the one that is dogmatic, since it is based on a ruling-class view of reality -- which has to be imposed on the world -- and on a view whose validity is not sensitive to empirical test. [Why that is so will be explained below.]

Worse still, it collapses into incoherence when examined closely -- as we will also see.

The Slide Into Non-sense

The paradoxical nature of metaphysical theses illustrates the ineluctable slide into non-sense that all philosophical theories undergo whenever their proponents try to undermine either the vernacular or the logical and pragmatic (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pragmatics) principles on which it is based -- those that, for example, ordinary speakers regularly use to state contingent truths or falsehoods about the world without such a fuss.

[It is worth pointing out that "non-sense" is not the same as "nonsense (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nonsense)". The latter word has various meanings varying from the patently false (such as "Karl Marx was a shape-shifting lizard") to plain gibberish (such as "783&£$750 ow2jmn 34y4&$ 6y3n3& 8FT34n").

The former word relates to indicative sentences that turn out to be incapable of expressing a sense (no matter what we try to do with them), that is, they are incapable of being true or they are incapable of being false. Here, therefore, the indicative/fact-stating mood has been mis-used/mis-applied. So, when they are employed to state fundamental truths about reality, they seriously misfire since they can't possibly do this. (This section will explain why that is so.)

So, non-sensical sentences aren't patently false, nor are they plain gibberish.

Finally, the word "sense" is being used in the following way: it expresses what we understand to be the case if the proposition in question is true (or what fails to be the case if it is false), even if we do not know whether it is actually true or whether it is actually false.

For example, everyone (who knows English, who knows who Tony Blair and what Das Kapital are) will understand T1 (i.e., "Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital") upon hearing or reading it. They grasp its sense --, that is, they understand what the world would have to be like for T1 to be true or what the world would have to be like for T1 to be false.

More importantly, the same situation, if it obtains, will make T1 true, as it will make T1 false, if it does not obtain. (The significance of that comment will become clear below.)]

Intractable logical problems soon begin to emerge with regard to such putatively empirical, but nonetheless metaphysical sentences if an attempt is made to restrict or eliminate one or other of the paired semantic (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantics) possibilities associated with ordinary empirical propositions: i.e., truth and falsehood.

This occurs, for example, when an apparently empirical proposition is declared to be "only true" or "only false" -- or, more pointedly, 'necessarily' the one or the other -- perhaps as a "law of cognition", or, more likely, when a 'necessary' truth or 'necessary' falsehood is mis-identified as a particularly profound sort of empirical thesis, using the indicative mood (etc.).

As we will see, this tactic results in the automatic loss of both semantic options, and with that goes any sense the original proposition might have had, rendering it non-sensical.

This is because an empirical proposition leaves it open as to whether it is true or whether it is false; that is why its truth-value (true/false) cannot simply be read-off from its content, why evidence is required in order to determine its semantic status (true/false, once more), and why it is possible to understand it before its truth or falsehood is known. If that were not so, it would be impossible to ascertain its truth-status; it's not possible to confirm or confute an indicative sentence if no one understands it.

When this is not the case -- i.e., when either option (truth or falsehood) is closed-off, or when a proposition is said to be "necessarily true" or "necessarily false" -- evidence clearly becomes irrelevant. Thus, whereas the truth or falsehood of an empirical proposition cannot be ascertained on linguistic, conceptual or semantic grounds alone, if the truth or falsehood of a proposition is capable of being established solely on the basis of such linguistic/structural factors, that proposition cannot be empirical -- despite its use of the indicative mood.

If, however, such a proposition is still regarded by those who propose it as a truth, or as a Super-truth about the world, about its "essence", then it is plainly metaphysical.

[A 'Super-truth' superficially resembles an ordinary scientific truth, but is in fact nothing like it. Super-truths transcend anything the sciences can confirm or confute. T2 and T3 above are excellent examples of this. Their alleged truth depends solely on meaning not on the way the world happens to be.]

Otherwise the truth or falsehood of such propositions would be world-sensitive, not solely thought-, meaning- or concept-dependent. And that explains why the comprehension of metaphysical propositions appears to go hand in hand with knowing their 'truth' (or knowing their 'falsehood'): their truth-status is based solely on features of thought, language or meaning, not on the material world.

This means that they can't be related to the material world or anything in it, and hence they can't be used to help change it.

To recap: an empirical proposition derives its sense from the truth possibilities it appears to hold open (which options will later be decided upon one way or the other by a confrontation with the material world). That is why the actual truth-value of, say, T1 (or its contradictory, T4, below) does not need to be known before it is understood; but it is why evidence is relevant to establishing that truth-value.

T1: Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital.

T4: Tony Blair does not own a copy of Das Kapital.

In order to comprehend T1 or T4, all that is required is some grasp of the possibilities that both of these propositions hold open. T1 and T4 both have the same content, and both are made true or made false by the same situation obtaining, or not obtaining, respectively.

It is also why it is easy to imagine T1 to be true even if it is false, or false even if it is true. In general, the comprehension of empirical propositions involves an understanding of the conditions under which they would/could be true, or would/could be false; as is well-known, these are otherwise called their "truth-conditions". That, of course, allows anyone so minded to confirm their actual truth-status by comparison with the world, since they would in that case know what to look for or expect.

These non-negotiable facts about language also underpin the Marxist emphasis on the social -- and hence the communal and communicational -- nature of discourse.

[This is because they account for our ability to grasp empirical propositions before we know whether they are true, or whether they are false. This is not to argue that other uses of language are not important, but fact-stating language is intimately connected with our capacity to understand nature, and thus to control it -- and that links it with our survival on this planet. It is also the form of language that is aped by metaphysical discourse.]

This flies in the face of metaphysical and representational theories, which emphasise the opposite: that to understand a proposition goes hand-in-hand with automatically knowing it is true (or automatically knowing it is false) -- by-passing the confirmation/disconfirmation stage, thus reducing the usual 'truth-conditions' to only one option.

However, there are other serious problems faced by this approach to language over and above the fact it would make it impossible to communicate (and thus to form) knowledge.

[Representationalism will be explained in my next post, as will the fact that, if true, it would make communication impossible.]

If a proposition looks as if it were empirical, because it uses the indicative mood, and yet it can only be false (as seems to be the case with, say, L1, below, according to Lenin) then, as we will see, paradox must ensue.

Consider, therefore, the following sentences, the first of which Engels and Lenin declared "unthinkable" (in the case of L2, presumably because it is "necessarily true"):

L1: Motion sometimes occurs without matter.

L2: "Motion without matter is unthinkable." [Lenin (1972) Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, p.318. Italic emphasis in the original.]

Unfortunately for Lenin, in order to declare L1 necessarily (and always) false, Lenin had to think the offending words, "matter without motion". In order to declare it "unthinkable" those words patently had to go through his mind. That is, he had to do what he had just told us no one can do -- i.e., think these words!

But, if the truth of L1 is to be permanently excluded by holding it as necessarily false (or "unthinkable"), then, plainly, whatever would make it true has to be ruled out conclusively.

And yet, anyone doing that would have to know what L1 rules in (i.e., they would have to know what would make L1 true) so that they could comprehend what was being disqualified by its rejection (as always and necessarily false).

However, that is precisely what cannot be done if what L1 itself says is permanently ruled out on semantic/conceptual grounds, and we cannot even think it.

Consequently, if a proposition like L1 is declared necessarily false this charade (i.e., the permanent exclusion of its truth) cannot take place -- since it would be impossible to say and/or to think what could count as making it true.

But, because the truth of L1 cannot even be conceived, Lenin was in no position to say what was excluded by its rejection. He could not now say -- or think -- what he is ruling out!

His own words thus undermined what he thought he wanted to say!

Alas, this now prevents any account being given of what would make L1 false, let alone 'necessarily' false. Given this twist, and paradoxically, L1 could now be declared necessarily false only if it was not capable of being thought of as necessarily false!

That is: L1 could only be declared necessarily false if what would make it true could at least be entertained just in order to rule it out as false.

But, according to Lenin, the conditions that would make L1 true cannot even be conceived, so this train of thought cannot be joined at any point. And, if the truth of L1 cannot be conceived, then neither can its falsehood, for we would not then know what was being ruled out.

If we are incapable of thinking these words, we certainly cannot think them false.

In that case, L1 can neither be accepted nor rejected by anyone, for no one would know what its content committed them to so that it could be either countenanced or repudiated. Hence, L1 would lose any sense it had, since it could not under any circumstances be true, or under any circumstances be false.

This is in fact just another consequence of the point made earlier that an empirical proposition and its negation have the same content (they express the same possible state of affairs). If one option is ruled out, the other goes out of the window with it, which is what we have now seen happen to Lenin's words.

It is also connected with the non-sensicality of all metaphysical 'propositions', for their negations do not have the same content as the original non-negated 'proposition'. (Why that is so will be explained presently.)

["Proposition" is in 'scare quotes' here, since if it's not clear what is being proposed, then plainly nothing has yet been proposed.]

Indeed, because their negations do not picture anything that could be the case in any possible world, they have no content at all. That, of course, empties the content of the original non-negated proposition.

As we can now see, the radical misuse of language governing the formation of what look like empirical propositions (like L2) in fact involves an implicit reference to the sorts of conditions that underlie their normal employment/reception.

L2: Motion without matter is unthinkable.

L1: Motion sometimes occurs without matter.

L3: Motion never occurs without matter.

Hence, when such sentences are entertained, even momentarily, a pretence (often genuine) has to be maintained that they actually mean something, that they are capable of being understood, and thus that they are capable of being true or capable of being false. This is done even if certain restrictions are later placed on what they seem to imply -- as in L2. In that case, a pretence has to be maintained that we understand what might make such propositions true, and their 'negations' false, so that those like L1 can be declared 'necessarily' false, or "unthinkable".

But, this entire exercise is an empty charade, for no content can be given to propositions like L2.

With respect to motionless matter, even Lenin had to admit that! Indeed, he it was who told us this 'idea' was "unthinkable".

[Recall, writing those very words meant he had to think the 'unthinkable'!]

The same comments also apply to all the 'necessary truths' that have been concocted by philosophers since Anaximander (http://www.iep.utm.edu/anaximan/) was a lad.

[This does not imply they all used the phrase "necessary truth", but the theses they cobbled-together weren't materially different from such Super-truths.]

We can see why this is so if we consider another typical metaphysical thesis and its supposed negation:

L4: Time is a relation between events.

L5: Time is not a relation between events.

As we have seen, the alleged truth of L4 is derived from the meaning of the words it contains. In that case, if its truth is denied, in, say, L5, then that would amount to a change in the meaning of the words it used.

[That is because sentences like L4 define what a given philosopher means by "time".]

So, if time isn't a relation between events, then the word "time" must now have a different meaning. And if that is so, L4 and L5 cannot represent the same state of affairs. They have a different content.

So, despite appearances to the contrary, L5 is not the negation of L4!

That is because the subject of each sentence is different.

To see this point, compare the following:

L6: George W Bush is the 43rd President of the United States.

L7: George H W Bush is not the 43rd President of the United States.

These aren't the negations of one another since they relate to two different individuals, George W Bush and his father, George H W Bush. They are true or false under entirely different conditions since they do not have the same sense, the same empirical content. They have different subjects.

The same comment applies to a metaphysical proposition (such as L4) and what appears to be its negation (i.e., L5).

If now L4 is deemed "necessarily true", then we would have to declare its alleged negation (L5) "necessarily false". But, L5 isn't the negation of L4 (since they both have different subject terms), and so -- as we discovered with Lenin's predicament above -- if we reject L4 by means of L5, we would have no idea what we were ruling out, and thus no idea what we were ruling in.

In that case, we would be in no position to declare L4 "necessarily true".

[That is because to declare a sentence "true" is ipso facto to declare it "not false". But, if we can't do that (and plainly we can't do it if we have no idea what we are ruling out since to do so changes the subject of the original sentence!), we can't then say the original sentence is true.]

The same applies if we declare, say, L4 "necessarily false", but I will omit the tedious details.]

In which case, metaphysical propositions can neither be true nor false. They thus lack a sense, [b]and there is nothing that can be done to rectify the situation.

They are thus non-sensical.

Imposed on Reality

Another odd feature of metaphysical theses is also worth highlighting: since the truth-values of defective sentences like these are plainly not determined by the world, they have to be given a truth-value by fiat. That is, they have to be declared "necessarily true" or "necessarily false", and this is plainly because their truth-status cannot be derived from the world, with which they cannot now be compared.

Or, more grandiloquently, their opposites have to be pronounced "unthinkable" by a sage-like figure -- a philosopher of some sort.

Metaphysical decrees like this are as common as dirt in traditional thought.

Such philosophical 'gems' have 'necessary' truth or 'necessary' falsehood bestowed on them as a gift. Instead of being compared with material reality to ascertain their truth-status, that is derived solely from, or compared only with other related theses (or to be more honest, these philosophical 'gems' are compared with yet more obscure jargon) as part of a terminological gesture at 'verification'. Their bona fides are thus thoroughly Ideal and 100% bogus. 'Confirmation' takes place only in the head of the theorist who dreamt them up.

The normal cannons that determine when something is true or false (i.e., a comparison with reality) have thus to be set aside, and a spurious 'evidential' ceremony substituted for it -- or, if it is carried out in advance, it is performed in the head as a sort of 'thought experiment'.

[As far as DM is concerned, this is invariably part of a very hasty and superficial consideration of the 'concepts' involved.]

[DM = Dialectical Materialism.]

In which case, these 'gems' have to be imposed on reality, since they plainly weren't derived from it.

As far as Traditional Philosophy (Metaphysics) is concerned, we know this is precisely what happened as the discipline developed; philosophers simply invented increasingly complex jargonised expressions, juggled with obscure terminology, and derived countless 'truths' from thought/language alone. [This is also how DM was developed.]

However, and alas for their inventors, none of these 'truths' can be given a sense, no matter what is done with them; as we have discovered, they are all non-sensical.

Distorted Language

We have seen how metaphysical and DM theses are based on a distorted use of the indicative mood.

[There are other serious mis-uses of language at work here. I won't enter into them in this summary or it will be too long. More details can be found if you follow the links posted at the end.]

This, of course, illustrates why Marx said the following:


The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels, (1970) The German Ideology, Students Edition, p.118. Bold emphasis added.]

Notice that philosophy is based on:


the distorted language of the actual world.

Since the indicative mood deals with what we have to say about the "actual world" we can now see how perceptive Marx was.

Traditional Thought

There are several reasons why traditional theorists attempted to derive such fundamental 'truths' from thought alone. One of them is the following:

This way of conceptualising the relationship between reality and our ideas about it depends on the ancient belief that behind appearances there exists a hidden world -- accessible to thought alone -- which is more real than the material universe we see around us.

This approach was concocted by ideologues of the ruling class, who have always viewed reality this way. They invented it because if you belong to, benefit from or help run a society which is based on gross inequality, oppression and exploitation, you can keep order in a number of ways.

The first and most obvious way is through violence. This will work for a time, but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation (among other things) -- as wee can now see happening in Egypt, for example.

Another way is to persuade the majority -- or a significant section of 'opinion formers', philosophers, theologians, administrators, 'intellectuals' and editors, etc. -- that the present order either works for their benefit, is ordained of the 'gods', or is 'natural' and cannot be fought against, reformed or negotiated with. In this way, the ruling class makes sure it's idea rule --, as, indeed, Marx noted:


The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch.'" [Ibid., pp.64-65. Bold emphasis added.]

Hence, a world-view is necessary for each ruling-class to carry on ruling in the same old way.

While the content of this ruling ideology may have changed with each new mode of production, its form has remained largely the same for thousands of years: Ultimate Truth is ascertainable by thought alone and it can therefore be imposed on reality, dogmatically.

And that is why all of traditional philosophy is dogmatic and thus non-sensical.

Sadly, this ruling-class view of reality has been appropriated by Dialectical Marxists and incorporated in Marxism. Small wonder then that it has presided over 150 years of almost total failure.

[Exactly why Dialectical Marxists have done this is explained in Essay Nine Part Two -- see link below.]

------------------------------------

More details here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2012_01.htm

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2002.htm

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_01.htm

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm

[TC]

...you do realize how logically self-refuting (not to mention, profoundly arrogant) this post is?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well done for reading it carefully in all of ten seconds!:lol:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

And, I'll need to see your proof that what I say is 'self-refuting'.

[DarkNation]

I actually like Rosa's writings. What I've been thinking about though is the definition of philosophy. I've always actually considered real philosophy to be the sort of thing Rosa writes. Just logical deductions based on what we can see. I've always felt like any sort of "philosophy" that questions the meaning of life, or something abstract like that, is contradictory, because most philosophy shows the limitations of human interpretation.

[L.A.P.]

I'm really starting to consider that Rosa is a philosopher.

[black magick hustla]

...you do realize how logically self-refuting (not to mention, profoundly arrogant) this post is?

i am taking a 400 level metaphysics class and i kindofalluded to that and she said well.....prove it

anyway, its not a new theory definitely and i don't think it is that arrogant considering there were really fuckin smart people saying this in the 20th century (wittgenstein). it comes from the idea that philosophy in general takes words from everyday discourse and treats them in a vacuum to the point that they mean nothing

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

DN:


I actually like Rosa's writings. What I've been thinking about though is the definition of philosophy. I've always actually considered real philosophy to be the sort of thing Rosa writes. Just logical deductions based on what we can see. I've always felt like any sort of "philosophy" that questions the meaning of life, or something abstract like that, is contradictory, because most philosophy shows the limitations of human interpretation.

Well, Wittgenstein calls it 'philosophy', that is, he re-defined the term so that it now meant the activity of un-ravelling the knots that form in our thinking.

I prefer the term 'anti-philosophy' since it saves on confusion.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

xx1994xx:


I'm really starting to consider that Rosa is a philosopher.

No more than someone who eradicates disease is also spreading it.

[DarkNation]

A question for Rosa: In your opinion, how do you think someone should go about deciding what they want to do in life? I ask this because it's generally something answered with philosophy, and I'd like to hear your take on how to approach the question.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Maldoror:


i am taking a 400 level metaphysics class and i kindofalluded to that and she said well.....prove it

anyway, its not a new theory definitely and i don't think it is that arrogant considering there were really fuckin smart people saying this in the 20th century (wittgenstein). it comes from the idea that philosophy in general takes words from everyday discourse and treats them in a vacuum to the point that they mean nothing

Well, I don't think smartness has anything to do with this; plenty of smart people reject it. More in fact, far more, than otherwise. As Marx said, the ideas of the ruling class always rule.

TC's comment is a familiar jibe advanced by those with a superficial understanding of early Analytic Philosophy.

Essentially, it is based on the idea that there are only two uses of the indicative mood: fact stating and philosophical thesis mongering. So, either I am stating facts, which could thus be wrong, or I am advancing a philosophical thesis of my own. If the latter, then what I have to say is equally non-sensical.

So, I have only succeeded in refuting myself.

But there are other uses of this mood, one of which features in the formulation of scientific theories, which, in general, do not state facts, but express rules we use to make sense of the world. [And rules are not the sort of thing that can be true or false, only useful or not, effective or otherwise, practical or impractical, etc.]

So, when Newton, for example, tells us that the rate of change of momentum is proportion to the applied force, he is not stating a fact (otherwise it could be false, but then its falsehood would change the meaning of 'force', and would thus be about something other than the subject of Newton's law), but establishing a rule we can use to study acceleration.

I use the indicative mood in the same way, except in this case to show that philosophical theses are non-sensical. That helps us understand this aspect of ruling-class ideology and why all too many comrades have swallowed it uncritically (when it is found in DM).

And that includes TC, but she is too scared of me to stay and argue her point.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

DN:


A question for Rosa: In your opinion, how do you think someone should go about deciding what they want to do in life? I ask this because it's generally something answered with philosophy, and I'd like to hear your take on how to approach the question.

I'm not sure the serial confusions of philosophy will be of any help here.

Careers' advice is more to the point, I think.

[DarkNation]

DN:



I'm not sure the serial confusions of philosophy will be of any help here.

Careers' advice is more to the point, I think.

I'm not asking for any philosophical analysis, I'm wondering if there is ANY other appraoch to this? How does someone decide something like their primary goal in life without the "serial confusions of philosophy"? If there's any error in what I'm asking, feel free to point it out.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

DN:


I'm not asking for any philosophical analysis, I'm wondering if there is ANY other appraoch to this? How does someone decide something like their primary goal in life without the "serial confusions of philosophy"? If there's any error in what I'm asking, feel free to point it out.

Well, this quandary could arise from several sources: 1) Not having a 'primary goal in life' because you have none at all, 2) Not having a 'primary goal in life' because you have several equally important goals, or 3) being unclear whether you suffer from 1) or 2).

I'm not sure that there are, or could be any rules that will help out here, so that is why I suggested careers' advice.

But, can you start another thread on this, since it is off-topic here?

[DarkNation]

DN:



Well, this quandary could arise from several sources: 1) Not having a 'primary goal in life' because you have none at all, 2) Not having a 'primary goal in life' because you have several equally important goals, or 3) being unclear whether you suffer from 1) or 2).

I'm not sure that there are, or could be any rules that will help out here, so that is why I suggested careers' advice.

But, can you start another thread on this, since it is off-topic here?

A'ight, I'll make a thread later, probably.

So about THIS topic. You say that the only useful deduction, I guess I should call it, is from science and that philosophy is based entirely in the realm of thought, making it non-sensical. But I think a few of the things you use to refute philosophy are possibly philosophical themselves. Your arguments are formed in words, not physical experiments, so how do you clearly differentiate between a non-sensical philosophical theory and a scientific theory? And would you say that your arguments against philosophy are logical arguments or theories?

Sorry if I word these awkwardly, I've never been too good with wording my questions.

[Amphictyonis]

Rosa- What did Marx mean by this (in your opinion).


The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it.

[Hit The North]

So, when Newton, for example, tells us that the rate of change of momentum is proportion to the applied force, he is not stating a fact (otherwise it could be false, but then its falsehood would change the meaning of 'force', and would thus be about something other than the subject of Newton's law), but establishing a rule we can use to study acceleration.

Isn't dialectics, then, about establishing rules by which to study society?

[Meridian]

Brilliant post as usual Rosa.

Also, it would be good, if a discussion is to come of this, that people read the text before attempting to comment. Otherwise you end up flaunting your own ignorance.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

DarkNation:


So about THIS topic. You say that the only useful deduction, I guess I should call it, is from science and that philosophy is based entirely in the realm of thought, making it non-sensical. But I think a few of the things you use to refute philosophy are possibly philosophical themselves. Your arguments are formed in words, not physical experiments, so how do you clearly differentiate between a non-sensical philosophical theory and a scientific theory? And would you say that your arguments against philosophy are logical arguments or theories?

I dealt with this objection in Post 11 above.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


Isn't dialectics, then, about establishing rules by which to study society?

Well, this is why I call 'dialectics' "fourth-rate metaphysics", since it is so badly worded, no one seems to know what it means -- even before we decide whether or not it is non-sensical.

So, if it is a set of rules that help us study society, it might just as well have been written in Martian.

And no wonder, it was concocted (upside down, or the 'right way up') by a card-carrying mystic and philosophical incompetent: Hegel.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Amphyctionis:


Rosa- What did Marx mean by this (in your opinion).


The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it.



The 'in various ways' is the give-away, since that leaves what he says open to this qualification:


The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels, (1970) The German Ideology, Students' Edition, p.118. Bold added.]

In other words, their 'interpretation of the world' is based on distorted language, and thus, as I would put it (but Marx clearly did not put it), it is non-sensical.

So, no wonder he contrasted philosophy with the need to change the world, since it cannot help even there!

[kalu]

When you talk about "state of the world" or "reality", are you equating them with Wittgenstein's notion of "state of affairs"? If so, what is the technical meaning of the latter? I remember reading once something about a "picture theory" but I have no clue if that's at all relevant, just a random shot in the dark.

Second question, slightly unrelated: how do you define "reality"?

To me, I take this concept neither as "obvious," in the sense that I can just use the word without taking into account all its ontological implications, nor in the sense that it is an "obvious" problem, ie. all humans everywhere must always think about what it means "to be," etc etc. I take it rather as a distinct problem formulated within the western (philosophical) canon, and periodically redefined or made to answer to new questions.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Kalu:


When you talk about "state of the world" or "reality", are you equating them with Wittgenstein's notion of "state of affairs"? If so, what is the technical meaning of the latter? I remember reading once something about a "picture theory" but I have no clue if that's at all relevant, just a random shot in the dark.

No, since Wittgenstein's account of such 'states of affairs' (in the Tractatus) does not work, or, rather, it is a highly implausible account of language.

I prefer a much looser notion of a 'state of affairs' (i.e., 'state of the world'), based on the redundancy of the truth predicate.

That is, our understanding of an empirical proposition is one and the same with knowing what would make it true, or make it false. In that case, the phrase 'state of affairs' can be jettisoned (for no loss of explanatory power) to be replaced by the content of the proposition itself. This now goes hand-in-hand with Wittgenstein's later view that our business in philosophy is not to try to explain how language works, but merely to lay open to view what we all already know by our use of language. [Which is why we can all use language without having to theorise about it.]

The picture 'theory' (although Wittgenstein does not call it a theory, and neither do I) is Ok as far as it goes, but it is based on a very limited view of language.

I chose not to go into such complications in that summary since the ideas I was putting across were difficult enough already.

I also do not try to define 'reality' since the philosophical use of this word is based on a distortion and nominalisation of the adjective 'real'. [I can explain further if you want.]

I use it above in its every day sense, when we use in sentences like:

R1: He has lost his grip on reality, and thinks he is Karl Marx.

R2: You need to take a reality check, comrade. Smashing up a few cop cars won't damage the state in any way.

And so on.


To me, I take this concept neither as "obvious," in the sense that I can just use the word without taking into account all its ontological implications, nor in the sense that it is an "obvious" problem, ie. all humans everywhere must always think about what it means "to be," etc etc. I take it rather as a distinct problem formulated within the western (philosophical) canon, and periodically redefined or made to answer to new questions.

Well, as you should have been able to guess from my post, I reject 'Ontology', and all 'ontological questions' as non-sensical.

Moreover, when human beings do thing like this:


think[ing] about what it means "to be," etc etc.

they begin to ask non-sensical questions.

So, I never ask them.

[ChrisK]

You mention at the beginning that this summary is adapted from his early and middle works. Which works specifically deal with the indicative mood? Would it be in the Blue Book?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well he does not use the term 'indicative mood', as far as I'm aware (that is my gloss on things he does say), but these ideas can be found in the Tractatus, the Philosophical Remarks and the Philosophical Grammar. They also appear in the notes taken by various pupils:

Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge, 1932-1935, ed. Alice Ambrose.

Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge, 1930-1932, ed. Desmond Lee.

They also appear in parts of the Investigations.

You can also find a different version of this in Roger White's Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and in his article:

'Can Whether One Proposition Makes Sense Depend On The Truth Of Another?' in Vesey (1974), pp.14-29.

Vesey, G. (1974) (ed.), Understanding Wittgenstein (Macmillan).

I can't recommend that article too highly, and the same goes for his book, which is by far and away the best book so far published on the Tractatus. Nothing comes even close.

Also check out 'Proposition' in Hanjo Glock's A Wittgenstein Dictionary, along with other related entries in the same book.

I introduced the term 'indicative mood' based on things I learnt off my PhD tutors (but it is pretty obvious when you think about it), and I develop the background ideas to this in Essay Three Part One (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_01.htm) and Essay Four Part One (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2004.htm). I also cover these ideas in extensive detail in Essay Twelve Part One (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2012_01.htm).

[August21]

First of all, as a (marxist) philosopher I find the title ridiculous. Whatever happened to the 11th thesis on Feuerbach, which announces a new philosophy? Secondly, since when Wittgenstein entered the revolutionary zone? Matter is not language, and furthermore language originated from matter, not the other way round. Your argument implies that language has a life on its own. And you reject ontology...But language "is" according to you, but, nevertheless, when people ask what it means to be, they ask non-sensical question "so I never ask them". And that is indeed the poverty of philosophy.

[ChrisK]

First of all, as a (marxist) philosopher I find the title ridiculous. Whatever happened to the 11th thesis on Feuerbach, which announces a new philosophy?


Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.

Hmmm, no new philosophy here. He is criticizing philosophers as a whole, not saying that we need a new philosophy. Political action is needed, not philosophical pontificating.


Secondly, since when Wittgenstein entered the revolutionary zone?

1. Since he tried to immigrate to the Soviet Union.

2. Since he would discuss politics with Marxists.

3. Since Pierro Sraffa, Gramsci's friend, is credited by Wittgenstein as having helped him come up with his most important idea's in Philosophical Investigations.

4. Since Marx hinted at the idea's that Wittgenstein fully brought out.


One of the most difficult tasks confronting philosophers is to descend from the world of thought to the actual world. Language is the immediate actuality of thought. Just as philosophers have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to make language into an independent realm. This is the secret of philosophical language, in which thoughts in the form of words have their own content. The problem of descending from the world of thoughts to the actual world is turned into the problem of descending from language to life.

We have shown that thoughts and ideas acquire an independent existence in consequence of the personal circumstances and relations of individuals acquiring independent existence. We have shown that exclusive, systematic occupation with these thoughts on the part of ideologists and philosophers, and hence the systematisation of these thoughts, is a consequence of division of labour, and that, in particular, German philosophy is a consequence of German petty-bourgeois conditions. The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life.
http://marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch03p.htm


Matter is not language, and furthermore language originated from matter, not the other way round. Your argument implies that language has a life on its own.

No, her argument is that language does not have a life of its own. It is born through the collective labor of humankind. Philosophers treat language as if it exists a priori, but the reality is that language is inseparable from humankind.


And you reject ontology...But language "is" according to you, but, nevertheless, when people ask what it means to be, they ask non-sensical question "so I never ask them". And that is indeed the poverty of philosophy.

Your sentence's are falling apart here. Asking what it means to be is a strange way to use a copula. I will be posting an essay I wrote on this subject at a later date.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

In connection with your earlier question, Chris, also worthy of note are the following:

Palmer, A. (1984), 'A Meeting Of Minds', Mind 93, pp.398-409.

--------, (1988), Concept And Object. The Unity Of The Proposition In Logic And Psychology (Routledge).

--------, (1996), 'The Complex Problem And The Theory Of Symbolism', in Monk and Palmer (1996), pp.155-82.

Monk, R., and Palmer, A. (1996) (eds.), Bertrand Russell And The Origins Of Analytic Philosophy (Thoemmes Press).

Geach, P. (1976), 'Saying And Showing In Frege And Wittgenstein', Acta Filosophica Fennica 28, pp.54-70.

--------, (1980), Reference And Generality (Cornell University Press, 3rd ed.).

Slater, H. (2000) 'Concept And Object In Frege (http://www.ul.ie/~philos/vol4/frege.html)' , Minerva 4; reprinted in Slater (2007), pp.99-112.

--------, (2007), The De-Mathematisation Of Logic (Polimetrica).

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

August21:


First of all, as a (marxist) philosopher I find the title ridiculous. Whatever happened to the 11th thesis on Feuerbach, which announces a new philosophy? Secondly, since when Wittgenstein entered the revolutionary zone? Matter is not language, and furthermore language originated from matter, not the other way round. Your argument implies that language has a life on its own. And you reject ontology...But language "is" according to you, but, nevertheless, when people ask what it means to be, they ask non-sensical question "so I never ask them". And that is indeed the poverty of philosophy.

In addition to what Chris has argued, may I make the following points:

1) Marx was an anti-philosopher (as am I). On that see here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/marx-anti-philosophyi-t144875/index.html

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1924628&postcount=12

2. No one is suggesting that Wittgenstein 'entered the revolutionary zone'.

3. Having said that, Wittgenstein came closer to revolutionary politics than any major thinker since Marx himself. Again, on that see here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Wittgenstein.htm

[Use the 'Quick Links' at the top to jump to Section 1) A Bourgeois Mystic?

Most of the evidence that supports the above allegations can be found in Note 3.]

4. Hegel was a card-carrying bourgeois philosopher himself.

What about this, then?


Matter is not language, and furthermore language originated from matter, not the other way round.

Indeed, but we have to talk sense, and that can't be found in traditional philosophy, nor in dialectics (as my posts show).


Your argument implies that language has a life on its own.

You need to remember that the material I post here is just a brief summary of my essays, and as such I can't possibly cover every base in each post. However, there is nothing in what I have posted here (nor anywhere else, for that matter) that suggests I think language has a life of its own; quite the reverse in fact, as Chris pointed out.

Indeed, I have been at pains to argue here that it is traditional philosophy (and in that I include dialectics) that ends up regarding language this way. In that, I follow Marx. [On that, see the quotation from The German Ideology Chris posted.]


And you reject ontology

In fact, it self-destructs as non-sense. There is nothing substantive therefore to reject.


But language "is" according to you

Where have I ever used such an odd sentence?


when people ask what it means to be, they ask non-sensical question "so I never ask them". And that is indeed the poverty of philosophy

In fact, it illustrates the poverty of asking such non-sensical questions to begin with.

[ChrisK]

Geach, P. (1976), 'Saying And Showing In Frege And Wittgenstein', Acta Filosophica Fennica 28, pp.54-70.

--------, (1980), Reference And Generality (Cornell University Press, 3rd ed.).


Does "Saying and Showing in Frege and Wittgenstein" appear in an anthology or anything?

Also, sorry that this is a bit off topic, what do you think of James Conant's critique of Geach's interpretation of the distinction between saying and showing?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I'm afraid it doesn't as far as I know. The edition of Acta Filosophica Fennica in which it appeared was a special book-length number devoted solely to Wittgenstein, so it should be easy to obtain through your University Library.

In relation to Conant, I read it a while back, and can't recall where I read it. What is the title of his paper?

[ChrisK]

Its called "The Method of the Tractatus" and it is free in two parts:

Part one:
http://philosophy.uchicago.edu/faculty/files/conant/Method+of+Tractatus+Published+Version+Part1.pdf

Part two:
http://philosophy.uchicago.edu/faculty/files/conant/Method+of+Tractatus+Published+Version+Part2.pdf

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I'll check it out again, and see what I think. Thanks!

Er, those links don't work.:(

[ChrisK]

Hmmm, odd. Well here is his homepage:

http://philosophy.uchicago.edu/faculty/conant.html

They are listed about halfway down.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

No worries, I've actually got a copy of the book it's from.

I can see from that book that I read it back in 2002.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Ok, I've re-read the relevant parts of his paper and I'm not sure he has understood Geach aright. Geach does not even mention 'substantive nonsense', although he says we can learn from sentences which are senseless. Indeed, by his own lights, much of Conant's paper contains nonsense (in that it seeks to say what can only be shown, or which 'violates logical syntax', etc.), by means of which he hopes we can learn something! So, perhaps Conant believes in 'substantive nonsense' too?

Naturally, it would be unfair to attribute this to Conant but then the same is true of Geach, I feel.

Now I have a lot of time for the 'austere view' of the Tractatus (which Conant and others seek to defend), but it strikes me that it founders in the end on a very narrow view of nonsense and an implausible interpretation of Wittgenstein's aims when he wrote that book.

That is, of course, one reason I use the manufactured word "non-sense".

[ChrisK]

Ok, I've re-read the relevant parts of his paper and I'm not sure he has understood Geach aright. Geach does not even mention 'substantive nonsense', although he says we can learn from sentences which are senseless. Indeed, by his own lights, much of Conant's paper contains nonsense (in that it seeks to say what can only be shown, or which 'violates logical syntax', etc.), by means of which he hopes we can learn something! So, perhaps Conant believes in 'substantive nonsense' too?

Naturally, it would be unfair to attribute this to Conant but then the same is true of Geach, I feel.

Now I have a lot of time for the 'austere view' of the Tractatus (which Conant and others seek to defend), but it strikes me that it founders in the end on a very narrow view of nonsense and an implausible interpretation of Wittgenstein's aims when he wrote that book.

That is, of course, one reason I use the manufactured word "non-sense".

I'm pretty sure that substantive nonsense is Conant's own term for a type of nonsense that he posits Geach promotes.

I've been having some problems understanding what is meant by saying and showing in both Frege and Wittgenstein as well as nonsense. I've been reading through the Foundations of Arithmetic and Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege and am looking into Geach's article "Saying and Showing in Frege and Wittgenstein". Any other books or articles you would recommend?

Also, are the articles on nonsense in The Realistic Spirit by Cora Diamond good for understanding what is meant by non-sense?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Yes I am aware of this (in fact it is probably Cora Diamond's term), but Conant has no right to impose this idea on Geach, or attribute it to him.


I've been having some problems understanding what is meant by saying and showing in both Frege and Wittgenstein as well as nonsense. I've been reading through the Foundations of Arithmetic and Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege and am looking into Geach's article "Saying and Showing in Frege and Wittgenstein". Any other books or articles you would recommend?

Roger White's book (listed earlier) is perhaps the best on this.


Also, are the articles on nonsense in The Realistic Spirit by Cora Diamond good for understanding what is meant by non-sense?

Recall, 'non-sense' is my term. She does not use it.

Her book is excellent by the way, as are her other articles, but, as I pointed out earlier, these 'New Wittgensteinians', for all their sophistication, have a remarkably one-sided and limited view of nonsense.

Have you visited Rupert Read's site yet? He is one of the UK's leading 'New Wittgensteinians':

http://www.uea.ac.uk/~j339/publications.htm

He rehearses the 'austere' interpretation of the Tractatus here:

http://www.uea.ac.uk/~j339/huttomcginn.pdf

[ChrisK]

Yes I am aware of this (in fact it is probably Cora Diamond's term), but Conant has no right to impose this idea on Geach, or attribute it to him.

Ah, got it.


Roger White's book (listed earlier) is perhaps the best on this.

You've recommended this book to me so many times. I have no clue why I haven't bought it yet. Next on my list.

BTW, what do you think of Anscombe's book on the Tractatus? I got it at a used book store for really cheap and thought that as Wittgenstein's top student she should have some good information for understanding the Tractatus.

Recall, 'non-sense' is my term. She does not use it.


Her book is excellent by the way, as are her other articles, but, as I pointed out earlier, these 'New Wittgensteinians', for all their sophistication, have a remarkably one-sided and limited view of nonsense.

Excellent. I have a strong attraction to their side due to my unwillingness to both take Wittgenstein not seriously in his state aims or that he would have a complete 180 in his beliefs.


Have you visited Rupert Read's site yet? He is one of the UK's leading 'New Wittgensteinians':

http://www.uea.ac.uk/~j339/publications.htm

He rehearses the 'austere' interpretation of the Tractatus here:

http://www.uea.ac.uk/~j339/huttomcginn.pdf

I haven't, I'll have to read it.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Chris:


Next on my list.

You won't regret it.


BTW, what do you think of Anscombe's book on the Tractatus? I got it at a used book store for really cheap and thought that as Wittgenstein's top student she should have some good information for understanding the Tractatus.

It's very good, but not easy. White also recommends it, but says he disagrees with many of her interpretations.

I met her back in 1978, when she gave an excellent talk on caustion at my university. What a mind she had!

[ChrisK]

I met her back in 1978, when she gave an excellent talk on caustion at my university. What a mind she had!

Lucky. I wish I could have seen her speak.

[kalu]

That is, our understanding of an empirical proposition is one and the same with knowing what would make it true, or make it false.

This is interesting, but still a bit obscure. Couldn't you say the same about any sentence, even those dealing with "abstract" concepts? For example, I might have to choose between the following two sentences:

1: "the commodity form is merely the concrete embodiment of value itself, a 'thing'."

2: "the commodity form contains a split between exchange value and use value. the former is produced through the process of capitalist production. thus, the commodity form conceals social relations."

Within a Marxist problematique[1], 1 is "obviously" wrong, and 2 is right. But there is nothing inherent within either of those phrases that can allow us to discern their truth value. A person working with a bourgeois set of assumptions, for example, might easily say 1 is right and 2 is gibberish.

We are always working, even if 'implicitly,' within a set of questions and assumptions (which also explains Althusser's brilliant statement, "every vision contains its own form of blindness"). So what work then does the adjective "empirical" do, if not to stanch our understanding of this basic working out of different and at times incommensurable problematiques? Perhaps what I'm trying to say is that verification occurs within a theory, even if not explicitly articulated--which again, is not the same as saying that we can't speak before we theorize critically[2]. So, I disagree with the notion that statements contain their own internal, "obvious" form of verification, if that's what you're saying. I could be reading your post wrong obviously, we're engaged now in the process of translating between our different philosophical and theoretical vocabularies!

[1]A generative set of questions that can be retroactively produced through a close, "symptomatic" reading of a text's answers or propositional statements (Althusser).
[2]To connect this to the social, that critical theorizing is part of what Althusser termed "the class struggle in theory."

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Kalu:


This is interesting, but still a bit obscure. Couldn't you say the same about any sentence, even those dealing with "abstract" concepts? For example, I might have to choose between the following two sentences:

1: "the commodity form is merely the concrete embodiment of value itself, a 'thing'."

2: "the commodity form contains a split between exchange value and use value. the former is produced through the process of capitalist production. thus, the commodity form conceals social relations."

In fact, I dealt with this. The above are just more complex versions of the Newtonian sentence I considered:

T1: The rate of change of momentum is proportional to the applied force.

which is an expression of a rule, and rules are not the sort of things that are capable of being true or false, just practical or impractical, useful or useless, followed or abrogated...

And sure, it could be the case that others might see such expressions as gibberish, but that is also true of any specialised area of research. How many of us can make sense of Quantum Mechanics, for example?

Compare T1 with T2:

T2: The rate of change of momentum is equal to time.

Within a Newtonian problematic, T2 is obviously wrong, while T1 is right -- at least in the sense that T1 is dimensionally consistent whereas T2 isn't. It is possible to determine whether rules are consistent with one another (or with other rules), without conceding they are capable of being empirically true or capable of being empirically false. And this can be done independently of any confrontation with reality.


We are always working, even if 'implicitly,' within a set of questions and assumptions (which also explains Althusser's brilliant statement, "every vision contains its own form of blindness"). So what work then does the adjective "empirical" do, if not to stanch our understanding of this basic working out of different and at times incommensurable problematiques? Perhaps what I'm trying to say is that verification occurs within a theory, even if not explicitly articulated--which again, is not the same as saying that we can't speak before we theorize critically[2]. So, I disagree with the notion that statements contain their own internal, "obvious" form of verification, if that's what you're saying. I could be reading your post wrong obviously, we're engaged now in the process of translating between our different philosophical and theoretical vocabularies!

No, that is not what I am saying. I am saying what I said (which is far less obscure than anything Althusser ever wrote).

The inter-theoretical goings on in science are a matter of negotiation between scientists, but whatever they come up with (in their empirical predictions) has to be judged against an interface with the world, with matters of fact, at some point.

This is not so with philosophical theories, whatever bogus inter-theoretic machinations are engaged in.

Which is why I said:


Such philosophical 'gems' have 'necessary' truth or falsehood bestowed on them as a gift. Instead of being compared with material reality to ascertain their truth-status, the latter is derived solely from, or compared only with other related theses (or to be more honest, these 'gems' are compared with yet more obscure jargon) as part of a terminological gesture at 'verification'. Their bona fides are thus thoroughly Ideal and 100% bogus. 'Confirmation' takes place only in the head of the theorist who dreamt them up.

The normal cannons that determine when something is true or false (i.e., a comparison with reality) have thus to be set aside, and a spurious 'evidential' ceremony substituted for it -- or, if it is carried out in advance, it is performed in the head as a sort of 'thought experiment'.

[As far as DM is concerned, this is invariably part of a very hasty and superficial consideration of the 'concepts' involved.]

[DM = Dialectical Materialism.]

In which case, these 'gems' have to be imposed on reality, since they weren't derived from it.

As far as Traditional Philosophy (Metaphysics) is concerned, we know this is precisely what happened as the discipline developed; philosophers simply invented increasingly complex jargonised expressions, juggled with obscure terminology, and derived countless 'truths' from thought/language alone. [This is also how DM was developed.]

And please don't quote Althusser at me again, or any other French 'philosopher'. I want to hang on to my breakfast a bit longer.

[kalu]

And please don't quote Althusser at me again, or any other French 'philosopher'. I want to hang on to my breakfast a bit longer.I love quoting Althusser, especially knowing your hostility to his ideas. So, you'll either have to engage those points, or stop debating me.:)


The inter-theoretical goings on in science are a matter of negotiation between scientists, but whatever they come up with (in their empirical predictions) has to be judged against an interface with the world, with matters of fact, at some point.Okay, now you're going to have to explain how you determine what are "matters of fact." Again, this phrase you use, "interface with the world," returns us to obscurity.

[Zanthorus]

That's funny, I remember a while back when we were discussing the similarity of Rosa's views with Althusser's idea about the 'epistemological break' between the young and old Marx's, and Rosa said that Althusser had gotten closer to the heart of the matter than any of the 'dialectical mystics' had.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Kalu:


I love quoting Althusser, especially knowing your hostility to his ideas. So, you'll either have to engage those points, or stop debating me.

1) I'm not hostile to his 'ideas', they just make me barf.

2) I can live without debating with you, but it will be a struggle...


Okay, now you're going to have to explain how you determine what are "matters of fact." Again, this phrase you use, "interface with the world," returns us to obscurity.

I'm sorry, but you shouldn't have offered me option 2) above.

Stop mentioning Althusser, or forever wonder what my answer would have been. :)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


That's funny, I remember a while back when we were discussing the similarity of Rosa's views with Althusser's idea about the 'epistemological break' between the young and old Marx's, and Rosa said that Althusser had gotten closer to the heart of the matter than any of the 'dialectical mystics' had.

That was Artesian's accustation, which he continued to make until I reminded him my arguments had nothing to do with epistemology.

Now, unless you can show my ideas have got something to do with it...


and Rosa said that Althusser had gotten closer to the heart of the matter than any of the 'dialectical mystics' had

And I then proceeded to barf.http://serve.mysmiley.net/sick/sick0001.gif

[kalu]

Kalu:



1) I'm not hostile to his 'ideas', they just make me barf.

2) I can live without debating with you, but it will be a struggle...



I'm sorry, but you shouldn't have offered me option 2) above.

Stop mentioning Althusser, or forever wonder what my answer would have been. :)

:lol:Rosa, your dogmatism knows no bounds. Still, I find it a bit incoherent insofar as you have no problem getting into page-long debates with the "diamat" folks you so loath. Perhaps you occasionally like to indulge your masochistic tendencies, other times not? I on the other hand entertain critical discussion no matter my opponent's citational authorities as long as they're willing to put their conceptual vocabularies at risk, and to attempt the not-inconsiderable task of translation. That's the mark of openness, which is not the same as "relativism" or forfeiting one's commitments. Just a simple courtesy to at least "entertain" seriously other ideas, as Aristotle put it, if even simply for the purposes of re-presenting your argument to an interlocutor befuddled by your initial choice of terms.

I will rest my case with the simple fact that you've now resorted to this curious concept "material reality," upon which to rest your view of language. When, I wonder, is reality not "material"? What work does that adjective do?

I'll console myself with the simple pleasure that I've "won" by your inability to overcome a visceral displeasure in critical conversation. If that inability isn't the definition of a dogmatic thinker, then I don't know what is. Still, it's cheap coin for me, as I was actually earnest in engaging on the point of the relationship between the "empirical" and "reality."

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Kalu:


Rosa, your dogmatism knows no bounds.

Even so, it is easily dwarfed by your capacity to exaggerate.


Still, I find it a bit incoherent insofar as you have no problem getting into page-long debates with the "diamat" folks you so loath.

Eh? How did you work that one out?


Perhaps you occasionally like to indulge your masochistic tendencies, other times not? I on the other hand entertain critical discussion no matter my opponent's citational authorities as long as they're willing to put their conceptual vocabularies at risk, and to attempt the not-inconsiderable task of translation. That's the mark of openness, which is not the same as "relativism" or forfeiting one's commitments. Just a simple courtesy to at least "entertain" seriously other ideas, as Aristotle put it, if even simply for the purposes of re-presenting your argument to an interlocutor befuddled by your initial choice of terms.

Thanks for the homily. You can rest assured I took notes.


I will rest my case with the simple fact that you've now resorted to this curious concept "material reality," upon which to rest your view of language. When, I wonder, is reality not "material"? What work does that adjective do?

In fact, as I point out in the full version of this argument (which runs to nearly 100,000 words at my site), I do not prefer such language; I only use it since such terms are to be found in theory I am atttacking (Dialectical Materialism), and many of the comrades here use them.

If they upset you, just ignore them.

Even so, I am relieved you are going to 'rest your case' on this point since it is indeed your most effective one to date.:rolleyes:

Oh wait, you aren't going to 'rest your case' there, after all:


I'll console myself with the simple pleasure that I've "won" by your inability to overcome a visceral displeasure in critical conversation.

Yes and well done. You know the name of any French philosopher is like Kryptonite to me.


If that inability isn't the definition of a dogmatic thinker, then I don't know what is.

Clearly you don't, then.:)


Still, it's cheap coin for me, as I was actually earnest in engaging on the point of the relationship between the "empirical" and "reality."

They both appear in a good dictionary.

Satisfied?

[kalu]

Wow, and all that time writing a witty reply you could've just produced an honest explanation of your terms. Stupid.

[Blackscare]

Wow, and all that time writing a witty reply you could've just produced an honest explanation of your terms. Stupid.

Rosa's actually just more interested in shoving his interpretation of things down everyone else's throat, he doesn't actually want a two-way exchange to occur. Hence his insistence that you don't reference French Philosophers while turning around and shoving a tired and irrelevant obsession of his in everyone else's face. Constantly. He's either a masochist, loves arguing for the sake of arguing (hence choosing a giant, circular, and abstract arena), or actually thinks that what he's doing has any impact at all on anything anywhere (which is beyond pathetic).

I'd say that you should disengage with him but I don't much like you either, given the pretentious and verbose way that you write (not uncommon amongst people interested in philosophy, granted). So please, continue duking it out. I'm sure that this time, something productive will happen.

[August21]

First of all, allow my to apologise because I don't know how people quote other people. So, I'd like to make a couple of points concerning the responses that I got from my initial post.

First of all, I'd like to respond to ChristoferKoch, by saying that what Marx did on that thesis, was to originate a philosophy of change, rather than the usual hermeneutic philosophy that we are fed at universities. After all, theory and practice go hand in hand. Or not?

Secondly, I'd like to respond to Rosa:

1)Anti-philosophers were people like Pascal, who believed in philosophy, but nevertheless believed that there were instances (like miracles), which couldn't be explained by philosophy. That is the definition of anti-philosophy. If you have a different one, please tell us, otherwise Marx does not fit into this category. Also, you mention that philosophy is an esoteric form somewhere, I don't know where that came from, philosophy is not Buddhism.

2)Christofer mentions a few reasons why Wit. has entered the revolutionary zone. So, you should take it up with him.

3)I refuse to give any credibility to a site called anti-dialectics. Sorry. It's not even negative dialectics...

4)You seem to talk about "sense" a lot. What do you mean? Sense like in Nancy? Immediacy?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Kalu:


Wow, and all that time writing a witty reply you could've just produced an honest explanation of your terms.

And I thought you were being honest when you said:


I will rest my case

Looks like your case needs a lot more rest.:(

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Black_Really_ Scared_Now:


Rosa's actually just more interested in shoving his interpretation of things down everyone else's throat,

Yes, that's certainly possible sat at a keyboard.:lol:


he

Eh?


doesn't actually want a two-way exchange to occur.

I prefer a three-some.:)


Hence his insistence that you don't reference French Philosophers while turning around and shoving a tired and irrelevant obsession of his in everyone else's face.

You mean: like your obsession with me?


Constantly.

Eh?:confused:


He's

Who he?


either a masochist,...or

Ah, I see you are a convert to the dread 'either..or' of commonsense.:scared:


loves arguing for the sake of arguing

No I don't.


(hence choosing a giant, circular, and abstract arena),

It is in fact a hyperboloid of one sheet:

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/7f/HyperboloidOfOneSheet.png/180px-HyperboloidOfOneSheet.png


or actually thinks that what he's doing has any impact at all on anything anywhere .

On you, that's for sure.


(which is beyond pathetic)

It's not beyond your comment. Cheek!:rolleyes:


I'd say that you should disengage with him but I don't much like you either, given the pretentious and verbose way that you write (not uncommon amongst people interested in philosophy, granted). So please, continue duking it out. I'm sure that this time, something productive will happen

If only to annoy you...:)

[ChrisK]

First of all, I'd like to respond to ChristoferKoch, by saying that what Marx did on that thesis, was to originate a philosophy of change, rather than the usual hermeneutic philosophy that we are fed at universities. After all, theory and practice go hand in hand. Or not?

At this point, it is your job to point out where in these theses Marx advances a philosophy of change. If you actually read it, what he is saying is simply that philosophers have missed the point of understanding the world. Imposing a philosophy of change onto that requires that you back up your point.


1)Anti-philosophers were people like Pascal, who believed in philosophy, but nevertheless believed that there were instances (like miracles), which couldn't be explained by philosophy. That is the definition of anti-philosophy. If you have a different one, please tell us, otherwise Marx does not fit into this category. Also, you mention that philosophy is an esoteric form somewhere, I don't know where that came from, philosophy is not Buddhism.

No, that is how one show's the difference between philosophy and theology. Anti-philosophy is the rejection of philosophy as a whole.


2)Christofer mentions a few reasons why Wit. has entered the revolutionary zone. So, you should take it up with him.

I never claimed Wittgenstein was a revolutionary. I do claim that his ideas enter the revolutionary zone by virtue of how close he was to us and how his ideas have always had a place in revolutionary discourse.


3)I refuse to give any credibility to a site called anti-dialectics. Sorry. It's not even negative dialectics...

Your loss. You might have learned something if you weren't so dogmatic.


4)You seem to talk about "sense" a lot. What do you mean? Sense like in Nancy? Immediacy?

Rosa will correct me if I'm wrong, but I'm pretty sure that in this case "sense" is used in the Fregean sense of "meaning."

[Widerstand]

Wow, and all that time writing a witty reply you could've just produced an honest explanation of your terms. Stupid.

Is it really that hard to figure out what "material reality" means? Or is the difficulty to figure out how "reality" can be anything but "material"? Well then, consider this: Someone believes in an immaterial God. They believe that this immaterial God exists, that it is real. What does that tell us about how they will use the word "reality"? Will they use it as synonymous to "material reality"?


Rosa's actually just more interested in shoving his interpretation of things down everyone else's throat, he doesn't actually want a two-way exchange to occur. Hence his insistence that you don't reference French Philosophers while turning around and shoving a tired and irrelevant obsession of his in everyone else's face. Constantly. He's either a masochist, loves arguing for the sake of arguing (hence choosing a giant, circular, and abstract arena), or actually thinks that what he's doing has any impact at all on anything anywhere (which is beyond pathetic).

I'd say that you should disengage with him but I don't much like you either, given the pretentious and verbose way that you write (not uncommon amongst people interested in philosophy, granted). So please, continue duking it out. I'm sure that this time, something productive will happen.

That post is just sad. I'm not saying Rosa's refusal to debate Althusser is particularly great (though understandable, and you seem to understand it, too), but really. That was just really sad.



1)Anti-philosophers were people like Pascal, who believed in philosophy, but nevertheless believed that there were instances (like miracles), which couldn't be explained by philosophy. That is the definition of anti-philosophy. If you have a different one, please tell us, otherwise Marx does not fit into this category. Also, you mention that philosophy is an esoteric form somewhere, I don't know where that came from, philosophy is not Buddhism.

"anti" means "against" - or the female form of "you", if we talked Arab, which we don't. Anti-Philosophers therefore are those who are against philosophy. It is not us who use a weird definition of anti-philosophy, we use it like most people would understand the term.

And philosophy certainly is esoteric (http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/esoteric) (you'll find that the word originally referred to philosophy!).



3)I refuse to give any credibility to a site called anti-dialectics. Sorry. It's not even negative dialectics...

Zing! That's the fucking point! Negative dialectics is dialectics, this site isn't!

If it were called yellowbluegrass would you look at it?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Staatsfiend:


I'm not saying Rosa's refusal to debate Althusser is particularly great (though understandable, and you seem to understand it, too)

Thank you for your defence, but it's not a matter of refusing to debate Althusser. It's more a matter of why just him?

Why not any and all of the following?

Anaximander, Anaximenes, Pythagoras, Empedocles, Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Protagoras, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Zeno, Parmenides, Isocrates, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Chrysippus, Pyrrho, Diodorus Cronus, Arcesilaus, Diogenes, Zeno of Citium, Carneades, Lucretius, Posidonius, Philo of Alexandria, Seneca, Cicero, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius Sextus Empiricus, Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Augustine, Pseduo Dyonisius, Boethius, Cassiodorus, Isidore, Rhabanus Maurus, John Philoponus, John Scotus Eriugena, Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, Al-Ghazali, Maimonides, Ibn Rushd, Anselm, Abelard, Roscelin, Peter Lombard, Richard of St Victor, John of Salisbury, Roger Bacon, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, Siger of Brabant, Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, Meister Eckhart, Nicholas of Autrecourt, John Buridan, Nicholas Oresme, Thomas Bradwardine, Nicholas of Cusa, Telesio, Marsilio Ficino, Pico della Mirandola, Suarez, Henri Cornelius Agrippa of Nettesheim, Giordano Bruno, Robert Fludd, John Dee, Johannes Reuchlin, Paracelsus, Sebastian Franck, Valentin Weigel, Jacob Böhme, William Law, Pompanazzi, Ramus, Montaigne, Descartes, Geulincx, More, Cudworth, Herbert of Cherbury, Hobbes, Gassendi, Arnauld, Mersenne, Pascal, Locke, Spinoza, Leibniz, Malebranche, Berkeley, Thomasius, Wolff, Hume, Reid, Condillac, d'Holbach, Cabanis, Condorcet, Helvetius, Mendelssohn, Lessing, Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin, Friedrich Christoph Oetinger, Herder, Hamann, Jacobi, Kant, Fichte, Schlegel, Novalis, Schelling, Schleiermacher, Hegel, Fries, Herbart, Schopenhauer, Lotze, Brentano, Meinong, Husserl, Mill, Bradley, Green... to name but a few up to the beginning of the last century.

I 'refuse' to discuss those, too, and no wonder. The philosophical theories of all of these thinkers can be consigned to Hume's bonfire as non-sense and a serious waste of paper/parchment -- for the reasons I set out in my OP.

[Widerstand]

Staatsfiend:



Thank you for your defence, but it's not a matter of refusing to debate Althusser. It's more a matter of why just him?

Why not any and all of the following?

[list of names]

I 'refuse' to discuss those, too, and no wonder. The philosophical theories of all of these thinkers can be consigned to Hume's bonfire as non-sense and a serious waste of paper/parchment -- for the reasons I set out in my OP.

Well you seemed to emphasize that he was a French philosopher...?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

So are many of the ones I listed.

I can stand most of their work (that is the non-French guys -- but I do not like much of it), but Modern French 'Philosophy' puts me off my food.

[Zanthorus]

Rosa's actually just more interested in shoving his interpretation of things down everyone else's throat, he doesn't actually want a two-way exchange to occur. Hence his insistence that you don't reference French Philosophers while turning around and shoving a tired and irrelevant obsession of his in everyone else's face. Constantly. He's either a masochist, loves arguing for the sake of arguing (hence choosing a giant, circular, and abstract arena), or actually thinks that what he's doing has any impact at all on anything anywhere (which is beyond pathetic).

...I don't much like you either, given the pretentious and verbose way that you write.

This is fantastic. Here we have the philosophy board crammed full of petty insults and offhand remarks, and now one of the site's moderators makes a post throwing petty personal remarks around. This is surely the way to go about things if you want the endless debates surrounding this question to stop. Indeed, if I have a log which I want to stop burning, and only one end of the log is burning, one possible option would be to set fire to the entire log, and hence the fire would end quicker as the log was consumed. Given the similarity of the two situations, we can see that the world must have a necessary logical structure which includes the rule that if you want to stop something from happening, one brilliant way is to provoke it. In fact, here we have opposites changing into one another, the endless petty argument is sublated by personal insults into respectful and worthwhile debate, and hence thanks to Blackscare we now have the proper dialectical resolution of the problem.


First of all, allow my to apologise because I don't know how people quote other people.

In the bottom right hand corner of people's posts there is a button that looks like this: http://www.revleft.com/vb/revleft/buttons/quote.gif. If you press it, you will get the 'Reply to Thread' screen with the person's post quoted. On the right hand side of the quote button there is this button: http://www.revleft.com/vb/revleft/buttons/multiquote_off.gif. Press that for the first, second, third etc person whose post you want to quote, and then press the quote button for the last, and you can quote multiple posts at once.


First of all, I'd like to respond to ChristoferKoch, by saying that what Marx did on that thesis, was to originate a philosophy of change, rather than the usual hermeneutic philosophy that we are fed at universities.

Well, the thesis in and of itself does not tell us much, only that philosophers have interpreted the world, and the point is to change it. I think Marx's comments about philosophy elsewhere however preclude the idea that Marx was trying to bring about a new kind of philosophical thinking. In the 1844 Manuscripts in the chapter on Hegel's dialectic Marx claims as one of Feuerbach's three great discoveries the idea that philosophy is a form of alienation. This idea seems to me to be best elaborated on at great length by himself and Engels in The Holy Family. The clearest example is given in the section on the mystery of speculative construction.

Essentially, if we have a number of fruits like apples, pears, oranges and so on, these all have the common property of being 'fruit'. Now with philosophy this 'fruit' becomes not a property of apples, pears and oranges but an object in and of itself for study. With Hegel we have this idea taken to it's highest point, as 'being' is transformed into an object which when studied brings out the internal logical laws of the world. And also in the Young Hegelians and Hegelians in general we find that 'consciousness', 'spirit' and so on are transformed into objects which stand seperate from actual conscious human beings. "By this simple process, by changing the predicate into the subject, all the attributes and manifestations of human nature can be Critically transformed into their negation and into alienations of human nature."

This seems to me to be consistent with Marx's comments in TGI that when history is depicted as it really occured, philosophy loses it's medium of existence, since in actual history we have human beings as they really existed and consciousness appears as their consciousness. Similarly, if we depict the world as it really is, the properties of things are properties of things and not things in themselves to be studied by thought. This also appears to be consistent with Marx's general ideas about alienation, where the products of human beings come to stand over them as an alien power.

This also appears to be Engels' point in the introduction to Anti-Duhring where he remarks that the idea of society changing and evolving through history and of nature as changing through time which is embraced by 'modern materialism' means that "modern materialism... no longer needs any philosophy standing above the other sciences." (Intriguingly, Engels notes these as the two ways in which modern materialism is 'essentially dialectic', and here we have Engels opposing the dialectic, equated with the idea that things are in a process of flux in change, to philosophy as such) So the considered view of both Marx and Engels seems to me to be that philosophy loses it's relevance as such once we depict the actual state of affairs.

On the other hand we have in THF the idea that alongside the abstract development Hegel often presents the real development, and hence the power of his views to convince people. And this also appears in Engels, and we have Engels commenting that physicists were phillistines for not reading Kant's work on the nebular hypothesis and in general ignoring the idea of philosophers, so it seems that Marx and Engels did not regard their ideas as 'non-sense', just as they did not regard religion as something merely to be negated.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z (quoting Marx):


"By this simple process, by changing the predicate into the subject, all the attributes and manifestations of human nature can be Critically transformed into their negation and into alienations of human nature."

Unfortunately for Marx, this is a classic example of the distortion of language he rightly criticised in The German Ideology.

To anyone who disagrees: I'd like to see an example of the above subject/predicate switch that does not distort language.

[Such a switch can work with relational expressions, but not with predicative propositions. The idea that this can happen is a left-over of the bad old Term Logic (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Term_logic) (invented largely by medieval Roman Catholic theologians), which was itself a grabled form of Aristotelian Logic.]

[Zanthorus]

Rosa, the passage was Marx critiquing the subject/predicate inversion, hence him mentioning it in conjunction with that alienation thing that he wasn't too fond of.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, here is the entire passage:


In order to change love into "Moloch", the devil incarnate, Herr Edgar first changes it into a goddess. When love has become a goddess, i.e., a theological object, it is of course submitted to theological criticism; moreover, it is known that god and the devil are not far apart. Herr Edgar changes love into a "goddess", a, "cruel goddess" at that, by changing man who loves, the love of man, into a man of love; by making "love" a being apart, separate from man and as such independent. By this simple process, by changing the predicate into the subject, all the attributes and manifestations of human nature can be Critically transformed into their negation and into alienations of human nature." Thus, for example, Critical Criticism makes criticism, as a predicate and activity of man, into a subject apart, criticism which relates itself to itself and is therefore Critical Criticism: a "Moloch", the worship of which consists in the self-immolation, the suicide of man, and in particular of his ability to think.

Here is another:


“Subjectivity is a characteristic of subjects and personality a characteristic of the person. Instead of considering them to be predicates of their subjects, Hegel makes the predicates independent and then lets them be subsequently and mysteriously converted into their subjects.

"The existence of the predicate is the subject; thus the subject is the existence of subjectivity, etc. Hegel makes the predicates, the object, independent, but independent as separated from their real independence, their subject. Subsequently, and because of this, the real subject appears to be the result; whereas one has to start from the real subject and examine its objectification. The mystical substance becomes the real subject and the real subject appears to be something else, namely a moment of the mystical substance. Precisely because Hegel starts from the predicates of universal determination instead of from the real subject, and because there must be a bearer of this determination, the mystical idea becomes this bearer." [Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right]

And another:


The predicates of God handed down from Feuerbach as real forces over people, as hierarchs, are the monstrosity which is substituted for the empirical world and which “Stirner” finds in existence. So heavily does Stirner’s entire “peculiarity” depend merely on “prompting”. If “Stirner” (see also p. 63) reproaches Feuerbach for reaching no result because he turns the predicate into the subject and vice versa, he himself is far less capable of arriving at anything, [for] he faithfully accepts these Feuerbachian predicates, transformed into subjects, as real personalities ruling [the world], he faithfully accepts these phrases about relations as actual relations, attaching the predicate “holy” to them, transforming this predicate into a subject, the “holy”, i.e., doing exactly the same as that for which he reproaches Feuerbach. And so, after he has thus completely got rid of the definite content that was the matter at issue, he begins his struggle — i.e., his “antipathy” — against this “holy”, which, of course, always remains the same. Feuerbach has still the consciousness “that for him it is ‘only a matter of destroying an illusion'” — and it is this with which Saint Max reproaches him (p. 77 of “the book”) — although Feuerbach still attaches much too great importance to the struggle against this illusion. In “Stirner” even this consciousness has “all gone”, he actually believes in the domination of the abstract ideas of ideology in the modern world; he believes that in his struggle against “predicates”, against concepts, he is no longer attacking an illusion, but the real forces that rule the world. Hence his manner of turning everything upside-down, hence the immense credulity with which he takes at their face value all the sanctimonious illusions, all the hypocritical asseverations of the bourgeoisie. How little, incidentally, the “puppet” is the “real kernel” of the “tinsel”, and how lame this beautiful analogy is, can best be seen from “Stirner’s” own “puppet” — “the book”, which contains no “kernel”, whether “real” or not “real”, and where even the little that there is in its 491 pages scarcely deserves the name “tinsel”. — If, however, we must find some sort of “kernel” in it, then that kernel is the German petty bourgeois.

From the above it is clear that Marx is criticising Bauer's, Hegel's and Stirner's use of this switch, not the switch itself.

[Zanthorus]

Rosa, your original post was claiming that Marx endorsed the subject/predicate switch. Now you've quoted three brilliant examples of Marx criticising this tendency, and all you have to say is that Marx was not criticising the tendency as such, but merely it's incarnation in Bauer, Hegel and Stirner. Now it seems to me that there is simply no way Marx would have emphasised the point so many times and against so many thinkers as he did in his youth if he did not think it was important. To make a comparison, imagine if I quoted Wittgenstein critquing another philosopher, and then saying that he was not opposed to the view which the philosopher espoused as such, but merely it's incarnation as such, would you think that an adequate response? I'm fairly sure there's a fallacy somewhere here, although I can't think of the name.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


Rosa, your original post was claiming that Marx endorsed the subject/predicate switch. Now you've quoted three brilliant examples of Marx criticising this tendency, and all you have to say is that Marx was not criticising the tendency as such, but merely it's incarnation in Bauer, Hegel and Stirner. Now it seems to me that there is simply no way Marx would have emphasised the point so many times and against so many thinkers as he did in his youth if he did not think it was important. To take an example, imagine if I quoted Wittgenstein critquing another philosopher, and then saying that he was not opposed to the view which the philosopher espoused as such, but merely it's incarnation as such, would you think that an adequate response? I'm fairly sure there's a fallacy somewhere here, although I can't think of the name.

Once more, he does not criticise the switch (which had been standard logical practice for over 2000 years), just the use to which certain theorists had put it.

Had he disagreed with the switch, you can be sure he'd have said so.

[Zanthorus]

I believe Feurbach had explicitly cricitised the subject/predicate inversion. At the time Marx was outwardly a follower of Feuerbach and regarded as such by his contemporaries, so it seems that in context he would not have had much of a need to criticise the tendency as such, but only it's appearance in the work of his peers.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Z:


I believe Feurbach had explicitly cricitised the subject/predicate inversion.

Well, I'd like to see the proof of this, so I remain sceptical.


At the time Marx was outwardly a follower of Feuerbach and regarded as such by his contemporaries, so it seems that in context he would not have had much of a need to criticise the tendency as such, but only it's appearance in the work of his peers.

Except, nowhere does Marx say anything like this:


"The subject/predicate inversion is an illegitimate logical manoeuvre based on an inadequate understanding of the quantifiers involved, and the difference between referring expressions and linguistic functions."

And that is no surprise, since these limitations were only revealed when Frege began to publish his ideas in the 1880s and 1890s.

[Zanthorus]

According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:


So considered, the argument is an example of Feuerbach's “transformative method,” which he first stated in his Vorläufige Thesen and which Karl Marx thought was Feuerbach's contribution to philosophy. The method states that Hegel's philosophy is based on the reification of abstract predicates like “thought” which are then treated as agents. Since this is the clue to understanding Hegel, it follows that what is valid in Hegel can be appropriated by inverting the subject and predicate and restoring them to their proper relationship. For example, instead of construing the predicate “thinking” as an agent, one transforms the equation and asserts that thinking is the activity of existing individuals. Thought comes out of being, not being out of thought.http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ludwig-feuerbach/

(It has been a long time since I read Feuerbach so I was forced to appeal to the SEP)

I don't know about Frege, I'm not an expert on logic. Marx and Feuerbach's critique seems relatively simple and intuitive to me. According to ZeroNowhere, Luccio Colletti had discussed the issue of Marx, Feuerbach and the subject/predicate inversion in his book Marxism and Hegel. I have not yet been able to acquire a copy so I can't comment on that.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Thanks for the SIEP quote, but it seems to support what I have been saying.

I'll check out what Colletti says.

[kalu]

Kalu:



And I thought you were being honest when you said:



Looks like your case needs a lot more rest.:(

"Rest my case" was referring to the actual intellectual argument. I don't believe I said anything that would prohibit me from giving you a hard time for being a dogmatist, did I?



I'd say that you should disengage with him but I don't much like you either, given the pretentious and verbose way that you write (not uncommon amongst people interested in philosophy, granted).:lol: My apologies if my "affected" prose gets you down! Still, an unfair jab given I haven't done anything to you. This is the internet of course, where people can sound arrogant (me) or "blunt" (you). I don't really take people's posts as immediate signs of their personality, so I'll give you the benefit of the doubt. I hope you can give me the same, I'll try and even up my tone. I do find myself occasionally writing in an affected way (in all seriousness). I hope it's just the internet, either way it would be a good thing to cure. Thanks for the reality check.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Kalu:


"Rest my case" was referring to the actual intellectual argument. I don't believe I said anything that would prohibit me from giving you a hard time for being a dogmatist, did I?

You sound far too dogmatic about my alleged dogmatism for me.

By the way, your case is still looking a little too narcoleptic.

[syndicat]

1. Suppose: All philosophical theses are nonsensical.

2. (1) states a philosophical thesis.

3. if true, (1) is nonsensical.

4. therefore (1) is not true.

[Widerstand]

1. Suppose: All philosophical theses are nonsensical.

2. (1) states a philosophical thesis.

3. if true, (1) is nonsensical.

4. therefore (1) is not true.

Non-sensical is not the same as not true.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Syndicat:


1. Suppose: All philosophical theses are nonsensical.

2. (1) states a philosophical thesis.

3. if true, (1) is nonsensical.

4. therefore (1) is not true.

As usual, you leapt in with hobnail boots on, before you read the rest of the thread with due care -- or perhaps even without your glasses on -- since I covered that hackneyed objection on page one.

Shall I type this again more slowly...?

[Technocrat]

...you do realize how logically self-refuting (not to mention, profoundly arrogant) this post is?

The argument is from Wittgenstein's early and middle writings.

Didn't Wittgenstein himself reject much of what he wrote during this time in the Philosophical Investigations?

[Widerstand]

The argument is from Wittgenstein's early and middle writings.

Didn't Wittgenstein himself reject much of what he wrote during this time in the Philosophical Investigations?

I'm like at statement 450 of the Investigations, and I haven't read any other works of his yet, but so far he only mentioned the Tractatus like twice or so.

[Technocrat]

I'm like at statement 450 of the Investigations, and I haven't read any other works of his yet, but so far he only mentioned the Tractatus like twice or so.

A rejection need not be explicit, e.g. "I reject argument x from the Tractatus."

I've heard it said from professors and other scholars that Wittgenstein rejected much of his earlier work in the Investigations, although the rejection was in most cases implied rather than explicit. I personally haven't gotten around to reading Wittgenstein yet since I am working on mastering the ancient and medieval period first.

[ChrisK]

A rejection need not be explicit, e.g. "I reject argument x from the Tractatus."

I've heard it said from professors and other scholars that Wittgenstein rejected much of his earlier work in the Investigations, although the rejection was in most cases implied rather than explicit. I personally haven't gotten around to reading Wittgenstein yet since I am working on mastering the ancient and medieval period first.

That interpretation is up to dispute. The New Wittgensteinian's claim that the entire work is a continuity. Others, like Peter Geach, see many connections between all of Wittgenstein's works. Geach's view is partially laid out in an undergraduate text he co-wrote that can be viewed here (http://books.google.com/books?id=UkYS9FkZRW4C&printsec=frontcover&dq=wittgenstein+workbook&hl=en&ei=oNFETeP7LIiesQOG_sGMCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCcQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false).

[ar734]

...With T3, it might be "Motion is a form of the existence of matter" -- as Engels and Lenin believed -- and so on. To be sure, (1)-(3) might also be prefaced by some sort of 'philosophical argument' -- but these are just more words, too; no evidence is needed. It's not possible to devise experiments to test propositions like T2 and T3. What would they even look like?



Didn't Einstein prove that matter is a function of the most extreme motion in the universe, the speed of light? And didn't Newton prove that gravity or motion was a function of the mass of a body, or matter? Haven't both propositions been proven over and over again?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Technocrat:


Didn't Wittgenstein himself reject much of what he wrote during this time in the Philosophical Investigations?

No, in fact he actually wanted the Tractatus published with the Investigations so that the two books could be seen in the correct light together. What he turned away from was the idea that language can only be looked at one way, as he had thought in the Tractatus (i.e., as a representational system). So, he said the latter book was like a stopped clock. It still told the right time, but only twice a day.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LouisianaLeftist:


Didn't Einstein prove that matter is a function of the most extreme motion in the universe, the speed of light? And didn't Newton prove that gravity or motion was a function of the mass of a body, or matter? Haven't both propositions been proven over and over again?

Well, astronomers 'proved' Ptolemy's system for over a thousand years, but who accepts it now?

As one philosopher of science has pointed out:


"...[I]n the historical progression from Aristotelian to Cartesian to Newtonian to contemporary mechanical theories, the evidence available at the time each earlier theory was accepted offered equally strong support to each of the (then-unimagined) later alternatives. The same pattern would seem to obtain in the historical progression from elemental to early corpuscularian chemistry to Stahl's phlogiston theory to Lavoisier's oxygen chemistry to Daltonian atomic and contemporary physical chemistry; from various versions of preformationism to epigenetic theories of embryology; from the caloric theory of heat to later and ultimately contemporary thermodynamic theories; from effluvial theories of electricity and magnetism to theories of the electromagnetic ether and contemporary electromagnetism; from humoral imbalance to miasmatic to contagion and ultimately germ theories of disease; from 18th Century corpuscular theories of light to 19th Century wave theories to contemporary quantum mechanical conception; from Hippocrates's pangenesis to Darwin's blending theory of inheritance (and his own 'gemmule' version of pangenesis) to Wiesmann's germ-plasm theory and Mendelian and contemporary molecular genetics; from Cuvier's theory of functionally integrated and necessarily static biological species or Lamarck's autogenesis to Darwinian evolutionary theory; and so on in a seemingly endless array of theories, the evidence for which ultimately turned out to support one or more unimagined competitors just as well. Thus, the history of scientific enquiry offers a straightforward inductive rationale for thinking that there are alternatives to our best theories equally well-confirmed by the evidence, even when we are unable to conceive of them at the time." [Stanford (2001), p.9.]

P K Stanford, (2001), 'Refusing The Devil's Bargain: What Kind Of Underdetermination Should We Take Seriously?', in Barrett and Alexander (2001), pp.1-12.

Barrett, J., and Alexander, J. (2001), (eds.), PSA 2000, Part 1, Supplement to Philosophy of Science 68, 3 (University of Chicago Press).

[PSA = Philosophy of Science Association; the PSA volumes comprise papers submitted to its biennial meeting.]

So, for any given scientific theory there is a high probablity it is in error, or that there are other theories that explain nature just as well (or perhaps better), even if we are ignorant of them at the moment.

Anyway, I'm not saying Einstein is wrong (plainly, that is up to physicists to decide, not me), so I'm not too sure why you raised this particular point.

[Technocrat]

Technocrat:



No, in fact he actually wanted the Tractatus published with the Invetigations so that the two books could be seen in the correct light together. What he turned away from was the idea that language can only be looked at one way, as he had thought in the Tractatus (i.e., as a representational system). So, he said the latter book was like a stopped clock. It still told the right time, but only twice a day.

Do you have a source for this or is this your interpretation? I'm just curious.

[JazzRemington]

Do you have a source for this or is this your interpretation? I'm just curious.

He says in the preface of Investigations:

"Four years ago [sic] I had occasion to re-read my first book (the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) and to explain its ideas to someone. It suddenly seemed to me that I should publish those old thoughts and the new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking."

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1958.

[ar734]

LouisianaLeftist:




Anyway, I'm not saying Einstein is wrong (plainly, that is up to physicists to decide, not me), so I'm not too sure why you raised this particular point.

Well, I think you were saying that certain concepts, such as the relation (?), or identity, of motion and matter, are incapable of testing by experiment. I guess I am implying that anything can be tested, either by physical or social experiment.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Ah, I see. Well, what I in fact did was ask the question how one would test whether time was a relation. I do not think I raised a question about identity. And the question I asked about motion and matter was whether or not "matter without motion is uinthinkable". The point with that query was to illustrate how incoherent it was, since to raise the question itself is to think those very words.

Now, it's a moot point whether the word "time" as it is used in Relativity Theory [RT] means the same as "time" as it is use in ordinary language, or even in philosophy. In RT, the word has been given a mathematical meaning which it does not have in ordinary language, or traditionally in philosophy.

So, if a physicist tells us this or that about 'time', that has no more bearing on the ordinary word than if someone tells us she has put her money in the bank (meaning she has buried it in the side of a river) and we take her to mean she has deposited it with Barclays.

But, let us suppose that they mean the same. In that case, the question I asked will have become a scientific question, capable of being answered by an appeal to evidence.

I do not think evidence will ever be relevant to answer questions like the following: "Is Being at the same time identical with and yet different from Nothing, the contradiction resolved in Becoming?" (Hegel (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hl431.htm)), or "Is the true more or less identical with the beautiful? (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ode_on_a_Grecian_Urn#Beauty_is_truth_debate)" -- or even "Is it true that the Nothing Noths?" (Heidegger (http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=6232828)).

And no amount of scientific evidence can turn truths about time into 'necessary truths', which is all I need.

[( R )evolution]

Well I believe that Wittgenstein in the Tractatus has latent what occurred in philosophical investigations. If we look at the second to last proposition "he who understands me throws this analytic piece of shit away" then one can understand that he was seeking to break out of the chains of analytic philosophy that he inherited from Russell/Frege (which if no one knew, is thinking philosophy is analyzing sentences....like what someone we all know does....ROSA). Remember it is Frege's realism and great works combined with some Schopenhauer idealism that produced the bastard child that is the Tractatus. But yet you seem still to be analyzing sentences like an analytic philosopher, your style is trash and bogged down. Style and representation of thought is a critical part of thought, and you arent changing anyone's mind with what you post.

Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to realize it was missed.

You are still arguing in a pretty much obsolete form and about obsolete content. I cant believe you have wasted so much time typing so much nonsense. Lets be honest, any attempt to break out of metaphysics leads right back into metaphysics. Just as much as your attempt here to lead yourself out of non-sense, leads you directly back into it.

[( R )evolution]

Metaphysical propositions thus masquerade as especially profound, 'super-empirical' truths which cannot fail to be true or cannot fail to be false, as the case may be. Plainly, they do this by aping the indicative mood, but they go way beyond it.

You are thinking of a particular type of metaphysics, not all of metaphysics. You have assumed that T2 and T3 are representatives of ALL metaphysical statements and thus you have fucked up, because they are not. I agree that it could be a critique of idealism but to throw away metaphysics (metaphysics is not synonymous with idealism) is to throw away the possibility of seeing another world outside of the hell hole that is late capitalism.

[( R )evolution]

Now what would be real sly is to ask ROSA if the proposition that 'late capitalism is a hell hole' is a metaphysical statement that should be disregarded because it cannot be proven in her distorted logic?

How about this one Rosa

No theory escapes the marketplace any more; each one is put up for sale, just one possible opinion among competing opinions, all on display, all swallowed. A thought that would oppose this condition cannot strap on blinkers; the self-righteous conviction that one’s own theory has been spared this fate is bound to sink into self-advertisement. But dialectics need not fall silent in the face of this accusation, or the concomitant accusation that it is superfluous, arbitrary. The name “dialectics” says nothing more, to begin with, than that objects do not disappear into their concept, that they are not exhausted by it, that they come into contradiction with the customary norm of adequation.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Revolution:


he who understands me throws this analytic piece of shit away

This is in fact not what he said. (which if no one knew, is thinking philosophy is analyzing sentences....like what someone we all know does....ROSA)[/QUOTE]

Well, we'll need more than just your say-so; we'll need to see the textual evidence upon which these rather brave assertions of yours are based.


But yet you seem still to be analyzing sentences like an analytic philosopher, your style is trash and bogged down.

Once more, we'll need more than your abusive language to show where I go wrong. Labelling me is not an argument (even if that label is incorrect).


Style and representation of thought is a critical part of thought, and you arent changing anyone's mind with what you post.

Not so, but even if you are right, since the ruling ideas are always those of the ruling class, that would hardly be surprising, would it?


Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to realize it was missed.

Of course it lives on, since philosophers are still happy to spout non-sense, as it seems are you. It will take massive social change to put a stop to it, just like it will take such a change to end religious alienation.

And that is even more true of dialecticians like you, about whom I have argued the following here before (in answer to the question: Why is Dialectical Materialism as world view?):


There are two interconnected reasons, I think.

1) The founders of this quasi-religion [Dialectical Marxism] weren't workers; they came from a class that educated their children in the classics and in philosophy. This tradition taught that behind appearances there is a hidden world, accessible to thought alone, which is more real than the material universe we see around us.

This way of seeing things was invented by ideologues of the ruling class, who viewed reality this way. They invented it because if you belong to, benefit from or help run a society which is based on gross inequality, oppression and exploitation, you can keep order in several ways.

The first and most obvious way is through violence. This will work for a time, but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation (among other things).

Another way is to persuade the majority (or a significant section of "opinion formers", administrators, 'intellectuals', and theorists, at least) that the present order either works for their benefit, is ordained of the 'gods', or that it is 'natural' and cannot be fought, reformed or negotiated with.

Hence, a world-view is necessary for the ruling-class to carry on ruling in the same old way. While the content of this ruling ideology may have changed with each change in the mode of production, its form has remained largely the same for thousands of years: Ultimate Truth is ascertainable by thought alone, and it can therefore be imposed on reality [I]dogmatically (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2002.htm).

So, these non-worker founders of our movement, who had been educated before they became revolutionaries to believe there was just such a hidden world that governed everything, when they became revolutionaries would naturally look for principles in that invisible world that told them that change was inevitable, and part of the cosmic order. Enter dialectics, courtesy of the dogmatic ideas of a ruling-class mystic called Hegel.

2) That allowed the founders of this quasi-religion to think of themselves as special, as prophets of the new order, which workers, alas, could not quite grasp because of their defective education and their reliance on ordinary language and 'common sense'.

Fortunately, history has predisposed these prophets to ascertain the truth about reality for the rest of us, which means that they must be our 'naturally-ordained' leaders. That in turn meant these 'leaders' were also Teachers of the 'ignorant masses', who could 'legitimately' substitute themselves for the unwashed majority -- in 'their own interests', you understand. This is because the masses are too caught up in 'commodity fetishism' to see the truth for themselves.

And that is why Dialectical Materialism is a world-view.

It is also why dialecticians cling on to this theory like grim death (and become very emotional (and abusive!) when it is attacked by yours truly), since it provides them with a source of consolation that, despite outward appearances to the contrary, and because this hidden world tells them that Dialectical Marxism will one day be a success, everything is in fact OK, and nothing in the core theory needs changing -- in spite of the fact that that core theory says everything changes! Hence, it is ossified into a dogma, and imposed on reality. A rather nice unity of opposites for you to ponder.

So, this 'theory' insulates the militant mind from the facts; it tells such comrades that reality 'contradicts' outward appearances. Hence, even if Dialectical Marxism appears to be a long-term failure, those with the equivalent of a dialectical 'third eye' can see that the opposite is in fact the case: Dialectical Marxism is a ringing success!

In that case, awkward facts can either be ignored or they can be re-configured into their opposites.

Hence:

Dialectics is the sigh of the depressed dialectician, the heart of a heartless world. It is the opiate of the party. The abolition of dialectics as the illusory happiness of the party hack is required for their real happiness. The demand to give up the illusion about its condition is the demand to give up a condition which needs illusions.

Unfortunately, these sad characters will need (materialist) workers to rescue them from themselves.

I stand no chance...

You:


You are still arguing in a pretty much obsolete form and about obsolete content. I cant believe you have wasted so much time typing so much nonsense. Lets be honest, any attempt to break out of metaphysics leads right back into metaphysics. Just as much as your attempt here to lead yourself out of non-sense, leads you directly back into it.

So, you have no arguments to show where I go wrong, eh? Just yet more dialectically-inspired abuse.

No change there then...:lol:


any attempt to break out of metaphysics leads right back into metaphysics

That's about as brainless as attempting to argue that in order to end disease one has to catch that disease, or that in trying to end capitalism one has to become a capitalist!:lol:

Which of my substantive claims are metaphysical, then?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

R:


You are thinking of a particular type of metaphysics, not all of metaphysics. You have assumed that T2 and T3 are representatives of ALL metaphysical statements and thus you have fucked up, because they are not. I agree that it could be a critique of idealism but to throw away metaphysics (metaphysics is not synonymous with idealism) is to throw away the possibility of seeing another world outside of the hell hole that is late capitalism.

Well, smarty pants, you give us an example of a metaphysical sentence that my argument does not cover.


metaphysics is not synonymous with idealism

I agree with Hegel, here (one of the few things he got right):


"Every philosophy is essentially an idealism or at least has idealism for its principle, and the question then is only how far this principle is carried out." [Hegel (1999) The Science of Logic (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlbeing.htm), pp.154-55; § 316.]

But, I have an argument that shows that all metaphysics is a form of Idealism, which you simply ignored.

Can't think why...:rolleyes:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

R:


Now what would be real sly is to ask ROSA if the proposition that 'late capitalism is a hell hole' is a metaphysical statement that should be disregarded because it cannot be proven in her distorted logic?

It's an ethical statement, and as such expresses a rule for the use of certain words that the user is (perhaps?) proposing we adopt.

And I covered rules in my OP. I recommend you read more carefully from now on


No theory escapes the marketplace any more; each one is put up for sale, just one possible opinion among competing opinions, all on display, all swallowed. A thought that would oppose this condition cannot strap on blinkers; the self-righteous conviction that one’s own theory has been spared this fate is bound to sink into self-advertisement.

It's a good job I have no theory, and do not want one, then isn't it? :)


But dialectics need not fall silent in the face of this accusation, or the concomitant accusation that it is superfluous, arbitrary. The name “dialectics” says nothing more, to begin with, than that objects do not disappear into their concept, that they are not exhausted by it, that they come into contradiction with the customary norm of adequation.

Fine, but, alas, empty words.

Your 'theory' now lies in the dust, chummy.

Can you breath life into it?

On the above showing, I suspect it's a total gonner.:)

[Broletariat]

This is in fact not what he said. [If you want me to walk you through what he actually said, and what he meant, you only have to ask.:))

I assume he's referencing the ladder quote, I would love to hear your interpretation of this statement if you don't mind Rosa.

[( R )evolution]

R:



It's an ethical statement, and as such expresses a rule for the use of certain words that the user is (perhaps?) proposing we adopt.

And I covered rules in my OP. I recommend you read more carefully from now on



It's a good job I have no theory, and do not want one, then isn't it? :)



Fine, but, alas, empty words.

Your 'theory' now lies in the dust, chummy.

Can you breath life into it?

On the above showing, I suspect it's a total gonner.:)

How is that empty words? It is describing one aspect of dialectics, I dont see it as empty. Can you explain?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Broletariat:


I assume he's referencing the ladder quote, I would love to hear your interpretation of this statement if you don't mind Rosa.

Here's the sentence:


"6.54: My propositions [Sätze -- sentences] serve as elucidations in the following way: Anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical [unsinnig], when he has used them -- as steps -- to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)

"He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright." [Pears and McGuiness translation, p.151.]

As I explained in the OP, in place of "nonsense" I prefer "non-sense", and that is clearly what Wittgenstein also intended, that is, he was referring to propositions which are incapable of expressing a sense (sinn). [He pointedly contrasts 'unsinnig' sentences with 'sinnloss' (senseless) sentences, for example.]

So, Wittgenstein's 'unsinnig' sentences [Sätze] are rules ('elucidations') in propositional (sentential) form (that is, they use the indicative mood, by and large) which he employed to try to make it clear how our language expresses a sense ('sinn'), or fails to express a sense ('sinnloss') --, or worse, can't express a sense ('unsinnig'). Once we have done that, we no longer need these rules and can throw them away.

Now rules, as I pointed out in my OP, cannot express a sense (so they are 'unsinnig'), but that does not stop us understanding them (which we plainly do once we see they aren't like empirical propositions or metaphysical pseudo-propositions, but are 'elucidations', rules).

Every single Wittgenstein commentator misses this simple point, and they then struggle to comprehend the Tractatus.

(R)evolution here just represents the rank amateur wing of this universal misconstrual of W's early work.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

R:


How is that empty words? It is describing one aspect of dialectics, I dont see it as empty.

Well, you gesture at an 'explanation', using obsure jargon (just like traditional philosophers have always done) that renders the obscure even more opaque. We are no clearer how 'dialectics' is supposed to do what you say it does,-- or even what this means, for instance:


than that objects do not disappear into their concept, that they are not exhausted by it, that they come into contradiction with the customary norm of adequation.

Good luck making that clear!


Can you explain?

Can you?

[( R )evolution]

Broletariat:



Here's the sentence:



As I explained in the OP, in place of "nonsense" I prefer "non-sense", and that is clearly what Wittgenstein also intended, that is, he was referring to propositions which are incapable of expressing a sense (sinn). [He pointedly contrasts 'unsinnig' sentences with 'sinnloss' (senseless) sentences, for example.]

So, Wittgenstein's 'unsinnig' sentences [Sätze] are rules ('elucidations') in propositional (sentential) form (that is, they use the indicative mood, by and large) which he employed to try to make it clear how our language expresses a sense ('sinn'), or fails to express a sense ('sinnloss') --, or worse, can't express a sense ('unsinnig'). Once we have done that, we no longer need these rules and can throw them away.

Now rules, as I pointed out in my OP, cannot express a sense (so they are 'unsinnig'), but that does not stop us understanding them (which we plainly do once we see they aren't like empirical propositions or metaphysical pseudo-propositions, but are 'elucidations', rules).

Every single Wittgenstein commentator misses this simple point, and they then struggle to comprehend the Tractatus.

(R)evolution here just represents the rank amateur wing of this universal misconstrual of W's early work.

Wait what? You are being pretty opaque here. Can you explain how you think Wittgenstein's "non-sense" sentences (which if we take the weight of the last prop then that applies to all previous propositions) are "rules"?

[( R )evolution]

R:



Well, you gesture at an 'explanation', using obsure jargon (just like traditional philosophers have always done) that renders the obscure even more opaque. We are no clearer how 'dialectics' is supposed to do what you say it does,-- or even what this means, for instance:



Good luck making that clear!



Can you?

It is pretty obvious what is meant by the statement. Dialectics is the recognition that a concept cannot cover or identify fully what it is the content, there is always room for the non-identical aspect. This is a different dialectics than your usual Hegelian Idealism. This is the non-identity dialectic.

So for example the concept of 'freedom' in America. A negative dialectic like the one I am proposing, would seek to identify the non-identical behind the concept of freedom (aka the untruth of identifying America as the land of free). I recognize that thought identifies but it is the constant movement and recognition of the lack behind the concept that gets one out of Hegel's error in the Absolute. If Hegel was the identity of identity and non-identity, this (Adorno's) is the non-identity of identity and non-identity. A different dialectic then I think you are use to bashing.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

R:


Wait what? You are being pretty opaque here.

I'm a model of clarity next to you and your sentences like this:


The name “dialectics” says nothing more, to begin with, than that objects do not disappear into their concept, that they are not exhausted by it, that they come into contradiction with the customary norm of adequation.


Well I believe that Wittgenstein in the Tractatus has latent what occurred in philosophical investigations.

:confused:


Can you explain how you think Wittgenstein's "non-sense" sentences (which if we take the weight of the last prop then that applies to all previous propositions) are "rules"?

In will just as soon as you explain what the above sentences of yours mean. :)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

R:


It is pretty obvious what is meant by the statement. Dialectics is the recognition that a concept cannot cover or identify fully what it is the content, there is always room for the non-identical aspect. This is a different dialectics than your usual Hegelian Idealism. This is the non-identity dialectic.

And how do 'concepts' identify anything (even partially)? Are they like little human beings? Is there a sort of identity parade in dialectical space somewhere?

So, no, the above is not at all clear.


So for example the concept of 'freedom' in America. A negative dialectic like the one I am proposing, would seek to identify the non-identical behind the concept of freedom (aka the untruth of identifying America as the land of free). I recognize that thought identifies but it is the constant movement and recognition of the lack behind the concept that gets one out of Hegel's error in the Absolute. If Hegel was the identity of identity and non-identity, this (Adorno's) is the non-identity of identity and non-identity. A different dialectic then I think you are use to bashing.

I'm sorry but you (like Hegel) are treating identity as an object here, not a concept.

Hence, it is far from clear what you (or Adorno) mean by "the non-identity of identity and non-identity".

Looks like yet more non-sensical a priori dogmatics to me.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Now that you have at least made a rather poor attempt to explain yourself (and even though you failed), I can now have a go at this:


Can you explain how you think Wittgenstein's "non-sense" sentences (which if we take the weight of the last prop then that applies to all previous propositions) are "rules"?

Wittgenstein tells us himself: they are 'elucidations'; in that case he is setting up rules that make his analysis of language clear.

As he says at 4.112:


"Philosophy is not a body of doctrine. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the clarification of propositions." [Pears and McGuinness, p.49.]

[Of course, he is re-defining philosophy here, and thus breaking with a 2400 year old ruling-class tradition that still has you in its grip.]

So, his sentences are elucidatory rules.

They work analogously to Newton's laws. So, when Newton, for example, tells us that the rate of change of momentum is proportional to the impressed force, he is telling us how he proposes to use certain words, and how he proposes to make sense of nature by means of them. His laws elucidate his physics, and as such are rules (as I pointed out in my OP).

As I also argued above:


So, Wittgenstein's 'unsinnig' sentences [Sätze] are rules ('elucidations') in propositional (sentential) form (that is, they use the indicative mood, by and large) which he employed to try to make it clear how our language expresses a sense ('sinn'), or fails to express a sense ('sinnloss') --, or worse, can't express a sense ('unsinnig'). Once we have done that, we no longer need these rules and can throw them away.

Now rules, as I pointed out in my OP, cannot express a sense (so they are 'unsinnig'), but that does not stop us understanding them (which we plainly do once we see they aren't like empirical propositions or metaphysical pseudo-propositions, but are 'elucidations', rules).

------------------------------------------

Added later:

This is also like someone who elucidates how chess pieces move, how they can capture another piece, etc. In doing so he/she will explain the rules of chess in the indicative mood: "The queen moves like this, or this...". [Of course, they can also be expressed in the imperative mood, too: "Move your rook like this...", but then this is not absolutely essential.]

These rules are 'unsinnig' too, since they can't be false. "The bishop does not move diagonally" is not an alternative rule for the bishop in chess, it's not about the bishop in chess at all, since the way that piece moves defines what the word "bishop" means in chess.

Once we have grasped these rules we can in effect 'throw them away' (unless we have to explain them to someone else, or appeal to them to settle a dispute). How many times do you have to say to yourself once you have mastered the rules of chess: "The castle moves like this, the pawns like that..."?

[Hyacinth]

Excellent essay! Your presentation of the early-to-mid Wittgenstein clearly lays out the continuity between the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations, and inclines me toward the so-called 'New Wittgenstinian' interpretation (not that I place much weight on the exegetical debates).

Also, your introduction of the term 'non-sense' as distinct from 'nonsense' (something which I haven't come across in the literature) is really helpful, especially as much ink as been spilt over confusions concerning the sense in which metaphysical propositions are nonsensical.

On a tangent, I've recently been thinking about whether this sort of view is best classified as 'philosophy' or 'anti-philosophy', and am learning much more toward the latter, especially as what Wittgenstein and the logical positivists (in different ways) suggested as a replacement or reform of philosophy leaves little of the discipline in its original form intact. It is no wonder that philosophers are so hostile toward these views, and rightly so, after all, they challenge the very foundations and legitimacy of their pseudo-discipline. Most of what passes under the name of 'philosophy' belongs in the trash heaps of history (though just don't say that if you want a job in the discipline, it doesn't make your popular as I've learned).

I really don't have anything substantive to say; I just wanted to thank you for putting this argument in writing and sharing it. You should look into getting it published (not that it will change anyone's mind, people are rather attached to their intellectual superstitions).

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Thansk for that H! I will try and get it published, but it is all rather old hat now among Wittgensteinians, so they would be reluctant to publish it, and the anti-Wittgensteinians won't touch it with a barge pole.

I have set the argument out in much more detail in Essay Twelve Part One (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2012_01.htm).

Although it needs revising, too!

[ar734]

Thansk for that H! I will try and get it published, but it is all rather old hat now among Wittgensteinians, so they would be reluctant to publish it, and the anti-Wittgensteinians won't touch it with a barge pole.

I have set the argument out in much more detail in Essay Twelve Part One (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2012_01.htm).

Although it needs revising, too!

If all philosophical theories are non-sense, then all of Wittgenstein's theories (at least the "ordinary language" theory) are non-sense?

[ChrisK]

If all philosophical theories are non-sense, then all of Wittgenstein's theories (at least the "ordinary language" theory) are non-sense?

This has been responded to already.

Additionally, Wittgenstein did not hold an "ordinary language theory" he was showing how philosophers treat all words like names and abstract them into "real" mental objects for investigation. By dissolving this view, philosophical theories are shown be be based on meaningless terms and are, thus, non-sense.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LL:


If all philosophical theories are non-sense, then all of Wittgenstein's theories (at least the "ordinary language" theory) are non-sense?

As Chris has just pointed out, I have covered this hackneyed objection several times in this thread.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

MarxistMan, thanks for that, but you really did not have to post my comments again.

Finally, I'd steer clear of philosophy if I were you; the way it is taught these days is the exact opposite of the way I have expressed myself above.

And, I would hope that in a socialist society this subject is not taught at college.

[ar734]

LL:



As Chris has just pointed out, I have covered this hackneyed objection several times in this thread.

I assume you are talking about post 11: "I use the indicative mood in the same way, except in this case to show that philosophical theses are non-sensical."

You use the indicative mood to prove philosophy is non-sense; except that Wittgenstein's philosophy is not non-sense, because Wittgenstein was an anti-philosopher.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

No, I have highlighted the relevant points in the post you mentioned:



TC's comment is a familiar jibe advanced by those with a superficial understanding of early Analytic Philosophy.

Essentially, it is based on the idea that there are only two uses of the indicative mood: fact stating and philosophical thesis mongering. So, either I am stating facts, which could thus be wrong, or I am advancing a philosophical thesis of my own. If the latter, then what I have to say is equally non-sensical.

So, I have only succeeded in refuting myself.

But there are other uses of this mood, one of which features in the formulation of scientific theories, which, in general, do not state facts, but express rules we use to make sense of the world. [And rules are not the sort of thing that can be true or false, only useful or not, effective or otherwise, practical or impractical, etc.]

So, when Newton, for example, tells us that the rate of change of momentum is proportion to the applied force, he is not stating a fact (otherwise it could be false, but then its falsehood would change the meaning of 'force', and would thus be about something other than the subject of Newton's law), but establishing a rule we can use to study acceleration.

I use the indicative mood in the same way, except in this case to show that philosophical theses are non-sensical. That helps us understand this aspect of ruling-class ideology and why all too many comrades have swallowed it uncritically (when it is found in DM).

And I then said the following in answer to Broletariat in this thread:


Broletariat:


I assume he's referencing the ladder quote, I would love to hear your interpretation of this statement if you don't mind Rosa.

Here's the sentence:


"6.54: My propositions [Sätze -- sentences] serve as elucidations in the following way: Anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical [unsinnig], when he has used them -- as steps -- to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)

"He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright." [Pears and McGuiness translation, p.151.]

As I explained in the OP, in place of "nonsense" I prefer "non-sense", and that is clearly what Wittgenstein also intended, that is, he was referring to propositions which are incapable of expressing a sense (sinn). [He pointedly contrasts 'unsinnig' sentences with 'sinnloss' (senseless) sentences, for example.]

So, Wittgenstein's 'unsinnig' sentences [Sätze] are rules ('elucidations') in propositional (sentential) form (that is, they use the indicative mood, by and large) which he employed to try to make it clear how our language expresses a sense ('sinn'), or fails to express a sense ('sinnloss') --, or worse, can't express a sense ('unsinnig'). Once we have done that, we no longer need these rules and can throw them away.

Now rules, as I pointed out in my OP, cannot express a sense (so they are 'unsinnig'), but that does not stop us understanding them (which we plainly do once we see they aren't like empirical propositions or metaphysical pseudo-propositions, but are 'elucidations', rules).

Every single Wittgenstein commentator misses this simple point, and they then struggle to comprehend the Tractatus.

(R)evolution here just represents the rank amateur wing of this universal misconstrual of W's early work.

And then in reply to (R)evolution, I added this:


Now that you have at least made a rather poor attempt to explain yourself (and even though you failed), I can now have a go at this:


Can you explain how you think Wittgenstein's "non-sense" sentences (which if we take the weight of the last prop then that applies to all previous propositions) are "rules"?

Wittgenstein tells us himself: they are 'elucidations'; in that case he is setting up rules that make his analysis of language clear.

As he says at 4.112:


"Philosophy is not a body of doctrine. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the clarification of propositions." [Pears and McGuinness, p.49.]

[Of course, he is re-defining philosophy here, and thus breaking with a 2400 year old ruling-class tradition that still has you in its grip.]

So, his sentences are elucidatory rules.

They work analogously to Newton's laws. So, when Newton, for example, tells us that the rate of change of momentum is proportional to the impressed force, he is telling us how he proposes to use certain words, and how he proposes to make sense of nature by means of them. His laws elucidate his physics, and as such are rules (as I pointed out in my OP).

As I also argued above:


So, Wittgenstein's 'unsinnig' sentences [Sätze] are rules ('elucidations') in propositional (sentential) form (that is, they use the indicative mood, by and large) which he employed to try to make it clear how our language expresses a sense ('sinn'), or fails to express a sense ('sinnloss') --, or worse, can't express a sense ('unsinnig'). Once we have done that, we no longer need these rules and can throw them away.

Now rules, as I pointed out in my OP, cannot express a sense (so they are 'unsinnig'), but that does not stop us understanding them (which we plainly do once we see they aren't like empirical propositions or metaphysical pseudo-propositions, but are 'elucidations', rules).

------------------------------------------

Added later:

This is also like someone who elucidates how chess pieces move, how they can capture another piece, etc. In doing so he/she will explain the rules of chess in the indicative mood: "The queen moves like this, or this...". [Of course, they can also be expressed in the imperative mood, too: "Move your rook like this...", but then this is not absolutely essential.]

These rules are 'unsinnig' too, since they can't be false. "The bishop does not move diagonally" is not an alternative rule for the bishop in chess, it's not about the bishop in chess at all, since the way that piece moves defines what the word "bishop" means in chess.

Once we have grasped these rules we can in effect 'throw them away' (unless we have to explain them to someone else, or appeal to them to settle a dispute). How many times do you have to say to yourself once you have mastered the rules of chess: "The castle moves like this, the pawns like that..."?

So, my comments are the same, they are elucidatory rules (often in the indicative mood) that remind us how we use language in ordinary life.

Hope that makes things a little clearer.

[ar734]

No, I have highlighted the relevant points in the post you mentioned:




So, my comments are the same, they are elucidatory rules (often in the indicative mood) that remind us how we use language in ordinary life.

Hope that makes things a little clearer.

OK..rules that elucidate, or rules that explain, show that philosophy is non-sense; but the same rules show that Wittgenstein is not a non-sensical philosopher?

1. can you give me an example of a rule which shows that "cogito, ergo sum" is non-sensical?

2. do you think wittgenstein was a philosopher?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LL:


OK..rules that elucidate, or rules that explain, show that philosophy is non-sense; but the same rules show that Wittgenstein is not a non-sensical philosopher?

Well, as I have already pointed out, be wanted to re-define the discipline so that was no longer a sort of Super-science, but a practice aimed at unravelling the knots thought gets into when it tries to ask non-sensical questions.

But, he had already admitted that his comments were 'unsinnig', but then all rules are 'unsinnig' -- and that includes the rules that scientists employ.


1. can you give me an example of a rule which shows that "cogito, ergo sum" is non-sensical?

Well, I have already done this; I gave a general proof that all of traditional philosophy delivers non-sensical results -- in that the cogito purports to deliver a necessary truth, it ceases even to be true. [My OP explains why.]

And it can't be false, either:

So, "I think therefore I am not" is not the negation of "I think therefore I am" since that would be to change the meaning Descartes attributed to the "I" he uses. This is because the cogito depends on his already having defined that "I" as a "res cogitans", and if it turns out not to be such, then that amounts to a change of subject.

Hence, the cogito is incapable of being true and it is incapable of being false, and therefore it is incapable of expressing a sense (in the way I have characterised these terms); it is thus non-sensical.


2. do you think wittgenstein was a philosopher?

He certainly thought he was, but only in the sense that he wanted to change the meaning of the word "philosophy" in the way I indicated above.

I prefer to call him an anti-philosopher (since it creates less confusion) -- like Marx was and like I am.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/marx-anti-philosophyi-t144875/index.html

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1924628&postcount=12

[ar734]

LL:


But, he had already admitted that his comments were 'unsinnig', but then all rules are 'unsinnig' -- and that includes the rules that scientists employ.

Rules are non-sense. but you use the rule of indicative mood to prove philosophy (or least philosophy prior to Wittgenstein) is non-sense.

And Wittgenstein was not the first to try and develop philosophy into a science: "To show that the time process does raise philosophy to the level of scientific system would..." (Hegel, Preface, Phenom. of Mind)




So, "I think therefore I am not" is not the negation of "I think therefore I am"

This is more clear; you say, I think, that if the negation of a statement can not express a sense, then the original statement is non-sensical. That would be a rule which could provide a starting point to critique philosophy. However, once you get into negation, then you must confront the negation of the negation. Are you sure you want to go down that Hegelian road?




I prefer to call him an anti-philosopher (since it creates less confusion) -- like Marx was and like I am.

Hegel (Plato, et al.) were philosophers, Marx and you are anti-philosophers, who or what are the anti-anti-philosophers? The post-Marxists, post-modernists, post-structuralists?, who by the way, sound a lot like Wittgenstein (for instance, words have meaning only in context, or, he wants to dissolve, not just solve, philosophical problems; both ideas I think are perfectly valid and unremarkable, at least this long after the close of modernity.)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LL:


Rules are non-sense. but you use the rule of indicative mood to prove philosophy (or least philosophy prior to Wittgenstein) is non-sense.

In fact, I employ rules you use every day of your life (otherwwise you would not be able understand factual sentences) to show that no sense can be given to philosophical theses.


And Wittgenstein was not the first to try and develop philosophy into a science: "To show that the time process does raise philosophy to the level of scientific system would..." (Hegel, Preface, Phenom. of Mind)

Wittgenstein did not try to "develop philosophy into a science". What on earth suggested that odd idea to you? In fact, he openly and specifically tried to do the exact opposite.

And Hegel was far too confused to do anything other than spread yet more confusion -- as I have shown here (http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1381066&postcount=30).


This is more clear; you say, I think, that if the negation of a statement can not express a sense, then the original statement is non-sensical. That would be a rule which could provide a starting point to critique philosophy. However, once you get into negation, then you must confront the negation of the negation. Are you sure you want to go down that Hegelian road?

But the negation of something that isn't a negation to begin with cannot go down "that Hegelian road" -- even if there were anything comprehensible identifiable as the "Hegelian road" to begin with (which, of course, there isn't, as the above link shows).


Hegel (Plato, et al.) were philosophers, Marx and you are anti-philosophers, who or what are the anti-anti-philosophers?

Well Marx was an anti-philosopher in the sense he explained, if you follow the links I posted in my last reply.

I'm an anti-philosopher in the sense I explained in my OP.

I have no idea who or what the "anti-anti-philosophers" are.


The post-Marxists, post-modernists, post-structuralists?, who by the way, sound a lot like Wittgenstein (for instance, words have meaning only in context, or, he wants to dissolve, not just solve, philosophical problems; both ideas I think are perfectly valid and unremarkable, at least this long after the close of modernity.)

The post-modernists, because they are purporting to offer us a philosophical theory, are likewise propounding non-sensical theses.

They have nothing to do with Wittgenstein (despite the fact that they quote him), or with anything I have argued here (or anywhere else, for that matter).

[ar734]

LL:





Wittgenstein did not try to "develop philosophy into a science". What on earth suggested that odd idea to you? In fact, he openly and specifically tried to do the exact opposite.

In your previous post you said


Well, as I have already pointed out, be wanted to re-define the discipline so that was no longer a sort of Super-science, but a practice aimed at unravelling the knots thought gets into when it tries to ask non-sensical questions.

To re-define philosophy from a super-science to a practice aimed at unraveling knots thought gets into...that certainly sounds like reforming philosophy as a science. Historical Materialism seems to me be be such a practice. Decartes' "cogito" was a rejection (although not explicitly, they tortured scientists) of the idea that God was the source of thought and human existence. Thus, God thinks, therefore I am, becomes I (a human) think, therefore I am (as a human.)

Hegel explicitly expanded the idea of thought to define it as a science of the mind (Phenomenology of the Mind or Spirit.) Marx believed that science was based on the economic development of the mind (I produce my life socially, therefore, I am.) This led to Freud and the modern science of psychology.



The post-modernists, because they are purporting to offer us a philosophical theory, are likewise propounding non-sensical theses.

They have nothing to do with Wittgenstein (despite the fact that they quote him), or with anything I have argued here (or anywhere else, for that matter).

If Wittgenstein argued for the anti-philosophy then he cannot deny his paternity of the post-modernites. If you want to deconstruct Western philosophy then you should not be surprised that deconstruction becomes the dominant mode of philosophy.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LL:


To re-define philosophy from a super-science to a practice aimed at unraveling knots thought gets into...that certainly sounds like reforming philosophy as a science. Historical Materialism seems to me be be such a practice. Decartes' "cogito" was a rejection (although not explicitly, they tortured scientists) of the idea that God was the source of thought and human existence. Thus, God thinks, therefore I am, becomes I (a human) think, therefore I am (as a human.)

I do not think what I said implies this especially when I quoted Wittgenstein saying the following:


"Philosophy is not a body of doctrine. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the clarification of propositions." [Pears and McGuinness, p.49.]

You:


Historical Materialism seems to me be be such a practice. Decartes' "cogito" was a rejection (although not explicitly, they tortured scientists) of the idea that God was the source of thought and human existence. Thus, God thinks, therefore I am, becomes I (a human) think, therefore I am (as a human.)

HM is indeed a science, but then it's not a philosophy.


Decartes' "cogito" was a rejection (although not explicitly, they tortured scientists) of the idea that God was the source of thought and human existence. Thus, God thinks, therefore I am, becomes I (a human) think, therefore I am (as a human.)

I disagree. When Descartes considers the question whether or not his 'clear and distinct ideas' (such as the cogito) will lead him astray, he answers that 'god' would not allow this. So, the cogito does depend on his belief in 'god'.


Hegel explicitly expanded the idea of thought to define it as a science of the mind (Phenomenology of the Mind or Spirit.)

Sure, that is what the servile Hegelian tradition will tell you, but Hegel is far too confused for any clear results to be derived from what he said.


Marx believed that science was based on the economic development of the mind (I produce my life socially, therefore, I am.) This led to Freud and the modern science of psychology.

If so, Marx's work would be non-sensical, too.

Fortunately it isn't.


If Wittgenstein argued for the anti-philosophy then he cannot deny his paternity of the post-modernites.

1. He did not live to see postmodernism, so he was in no position to deny or refuse to deny this.

2. And he needn't have done so had he lived. PM can no more be attributed to Wittgenstein than Stalinism can be attribted to Marx.


If you want to deconstruct Western philosophy then you should not be surprised that deconstruction becomes the dominant mode of philosophy.

I do not wish to 'deconstruct' anything, neither did Wittgenstein.

And, what have my alleged aims got to do with this: "you should not be surprised that deconstruction becomes the dominant mode of philosophy".

Are you really trying to say that I am responsible (since 2005 when my essays were first published) for a "dominant mode of philosophy" that began maybe 20 or 30 years earlier?

Do you suppose I have access to a time machine, or that backwards causation was perhaps operating here?

Anyway, it's not a "dominant mode". It might be in Literary and Critical Studies, Sociology, Film Studies, and History (if it is), but it's not in Analytic Philosophy, which is still the dominant tradition in the field. There, metaphysics still rules the roost.

[ar734]

LL:


I do not wish to 'deconstruct' anything, neither did Wittgenstein.



I suppose we could agree that philosophy, art, politics, etc. are based, fundamentally, on an economic structure. If we live, at least in the West, in an era of monopolistic, finance capitalism, how has that system produced, directly or indirectly, the thinking of a Wittgenstein?

I'm not trying to argue with you; I would really like to know.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LL:


I suppose we could agree that philosophy, art, politics, etc. are based, fundamentally, on an economic structure. If we live, at least in the West, in an era of monopolistic, finance capitalism, how has that system produced, directly or indirectly, the thinking of a Wittgenstein?

In fact, in that he was writing at a time when the proletariat for the first time entered history internationally as an organised force, he championed the ordinary language and common understanding of workers. Hence the revolutionary nature of his ideas, for they broke with 2500+ years of ruling-class ideology (in philosophy).

[Not that he'd have put it this way, but it's the truth nonetheless.]

So, the system yuo mention did not produce him; he was rebelling against it, in his own way.

On his left-wing, almost Marxist ideas, see here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Wittgenstein.htm

Use the 'Quick links' at the top to skip to Section One; the information can be found in Note 3.

[ar734]

LL:



In fact, in that he was writing at a time when the proletariat for the first time entered history internationally as an organised force, he championed the ordinary language and common understanding of workers. Hence the revolutionary nature of his ideas, for they broke with 2500+ years of ruling-class ideology (in philosophy).



I can see a connection between the reality (Russia, 1917) of the working class as a ruling class and Wittgenstein's ordinary (working class) language. Did he have any comments on the Russian revolution, or the Soviet Union, China, etc? According to wikipedia he fought on the russian front in WW I. It seems odd that he would have been completely non-political. I was surprised to learn that he and Hitler went to the same school in Vienna. I guess he never realized it.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LL:


I can see a connection between the reality (Russia, 1917) of the working class as a ruling class and Wittgenstein's ordinary (working class) language. Did he have any comments on the Russian revolution, or the Soviet Union, China, etc? According to wikipedia he fought on the russian front in WW I. It seems odd that he would have been completely non-political. I was surprised to learn that he and Hitler went to the same school in Vienna. I guess he never realized it.

Ok, here is what I have posted at my site on Wittgenstein and the left:


Most revolutionaries seem to regard Analytic Philosophy as something of a conservative or ideological phenomenon, with Wittgenstein's work perhaps being seen as a particularly good example of this. That view has partly been motivated by the widely held opinion that Wittgenstein was a conservative and that he pandered to mystical and religious ideas.

That this received picture is incorrect can be seen by reading Alan Janik's essays "Nyiri on the Conservatism of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy" -- which was a reply to Nyiri (1998) --, and "Wittgenstein, Marx and Sociology", both reprinted in Janik (1985), pp.116-57. See also Crary (2000).

In fact, not only were many of Wittgenstein's friends and pupils prominent Marxists -- e.g., Piero Sraffa, Maurice Dobb, Nicholas Bakhtin, George Thomson, Maurice Cornforth, David Hayden-Guest, and Roy Pascal (cf., Monk (1990), pp.343, 348; Rhees (1984), pp.x, 48; and Sheehan (1993), pp.303, 343) --, but one of his foremost 'disciples' (Rush Rhees) at one point contemplated joining the UK-RCP (i.e., the 1940s Trotskyist version, not that recent right-wing joke of the same name, now happily defunct), and asked Wittgenstein for advice on this. [Cf., Rhees (1984), pp.200-09.]

Rhees and Monk record the many sympathetic remarks Wittgenstein made about Marxism, about workers, about revolutionary activity, and the Russian revolution. While these are not in themselves models of 'orthodoxy', they reveal how close Wittgenstein came to adopting a very weak form of class politics in the 1930s -- certainly closer than any other major philosopher had done since Marx himself; cf., Rhees (1984), pp.205-09. [Cf., also Norman Malcolm's Introduction to Rhees's book, pp.xvii-xviii, Monk (1990), pp.343-54, and Monk (2007).]

In fact, Monk reports a comment made by George Thomson on Wittgenstein's attitude to Marxism: "He was opposed to it in theory, but supported it in practice", and notes another friend who remembers Wittgenstein saying that he was "a communist, at heart" (Monk (1990), p.343). He concludes:


"There is no doubt that during the political upheavals of the mid-1930s Wittgenstein's sympathies were with the working class and the unemployed, and that his allegiance, broadly speaking, was with the left….

"Despite the fact that Wittgenstein was never at any time a Marxist, he was perceived as a sympathetic figure by the students who formed the core of the Cambridge Communist Party, many of whom ([David] Hayden-Guest, [John] Cornford, Maurice Cornforth, etc.) attended his lectures." [Monk (1990), pp.343, 348.]

In Rhees's book, Fania Pascal -- who was another Marxist friend of Wittgenstein's, married to Communist Party intellectual Roy Pascal, translator of The German Ideology into English --, reports that Wittgenstein had actually read Marx (cf., Rhees (1984), p.44), but, the source of this information appears to be John Moran [Cf., Moran (1972)]. Garth Hallett's otherwise comprehensive survey omits reference to this alleged fact. [Cf., Hallett (1977), pp.759-75.] But if, as we will see, he had read Lenin, and all his close friends were Marxists, it is a safe bet that he had also read Marx.

Rhees and Monk also note that when Wittgenstein visited Russia he met Sophia Yanovskaya, who was Professor of Mathematical Logic at Moscow University and one of the co-editors of Marx's Mathematical Manuscripts. [Cf., Yanovskaya (1983), in Marx (1983).] She apparently advised him to "read more Hegel" (which suggests he had already read some). [Monk (1990), p.351, and Rhees (1984), p.209.] In fact, Yanovskaya even went as far as to recommend Wittgenstein for the chair at Kazan University (Lenin's old college) and for a teaching post at Moscow University (Monk (1990), p. 351). These were hardly posts one would have offered to just anyone in Stalin's Russia in the mid-1930s, least of all to someone unsympathetic toward Communism.

[DM = Dialectical Materialism.]

Monk suggests that Yanovskaya formed the (false) impression that Wittgenstein was interested in DM (ibid.), but Drury (another of Wittgenstein's pupils) informs us that Wittgenstein had a low opinion of Lenin's philosophical work (but, exactly which part this refers to we do not know; but this does indicate that Wittgenstein had at least read Lenin since he never passed comments on second-hand reports of other writers' work), but the opposite view of his practical endeavours:


"Lenin's writings about philosophy are of course absurd, but at least he did want to get something done." [Drury, quoting Wittgenstein from recollection, in Rhees (1984), p.126.]

Fania Pascal also records Wittgenstein's friendship with Nicholas Bakhtin (ibid., p.14), and notes that at one time he expressed a desire to go and live in Russia, as we have seen (ibid., pp.26, 29, 44, 125-26, 198-200). In fact he actually visited Russia in September 1935 (cf., Monk (1990), pp. 347-53), when he met the above Professor Yanovskaya. Like many other Cambridge intellectuals at the time his desire to live in the USSR was motivated by his false belief that under Stalin it was a Workers' State. In this regard, of course, his intentions are more significant than his mistaken views. One only has to contrast Wittgenstein's opinion of Russia with that of, say, Bertrand Russell -- his former teacher -- to see how sympathetic in comparison Wittgenstein was to revolutionary Marxism, even if, like many others, he finally mistook the latter for Stalinism. [Cf., Drury's memoir in Rhees (1984), p.144, and Russell (1962).] John Maynard Keynes (another of Wittgenstein's friends) wrote the following in a letter to the Russian ambassador Maisky (who had in fact once been a Menshevik) about Wittgenstein's plans to live in Russia:


"I must leave it to him to tell you his reasons for wanting to go to Russia. He is not a member of the Communist Party, but has strong sympathies with the way of life which he believes the new regime in Russia stands for." [John Maynard Keynes to Maisky, quoted in Rhees (1984), p.199. Also quoted more fully in Monk (1990), p.349.]

In his biography of Wittgenstein, Ray Monk plays down Wittgenstein's proposed move, and, relying on Fania Pascal's view of Wittgenstein's motives, interprets it as a reflection of his attachment to a Tolstoyian view of the Russian peasantry and the 'dignity of manual labour'. While this clearly was a factor, it cannot explain Wittgenstein's positive remarks about the gains he believed workers had made because of the revolution -- and, given what happened to the Russian peasantry in Stalin's Russia in the 1930s, this is surely the least likely explanation! On this, Rhees is clearly a more reliable guide; he knew Wittgenstein better than almost anyone else. Moreover, it sits rather awkwardly with Keynes's comments above; there Keynes notes that Wittgenstein was sympathetic to "the way of life which he believes the new regime in Russia stands for" -- notice the comment about the regime, and not just the way of life.

[The full details of Wittgenstein's desire to live in Russia, and his visit, can be found in Monk (1990), pp.340-54.]

Moreover, his closest friend before he met Rhees was Francis Skinner, who had wanted to volunteer to fight in Spain as part of the International Brigade (he was finally rejected on health grounds).

In addition, Wittgenstein thought that Alan Turing (who was also one of his 'part time' pupils for a brief period in the 1930s) believed that he (Wittgenstein) was trying to introduce "Bolshevism" into Mathematics, because of his criticisms of the irrational fear of contradictions among mathematicians. [Cf., Monk (1990), pp.419-20; see also Hodges (1983), pp.152-54.]

As Wittgenstein himself said:


"Turing does not object to anything I say. He agrees with every word. He objects to the idea he thinks underlies it. He thinks we're undermining mathematics, introducing Bolshevism into mathematics. But not at all." [Wittgenstein (1976), p.76.]

On this, and Wittgenstein's 'radical Bolshevism', see Ray Monk's on-line essay, here (http://sammelpunkt.philo.at:8080/435/).


"The changes Wittgenstein wished to see are...I believe, so radical that the name 'full-blooded Bolshevism' suggests itself as a natural way to describe the militant tendency of his remarks." [Monk (1995).]

See also Monk (2007).

Finally, but perhaps most importantly, Wittgenstein himself declared that his later Philosophy had been inspired by his regular conversations with Piero Sraffa (Gramsci's friend). The extent of Sraffa's influence is still unclear (however, see below), but Wittgenstein himself admitted to Rhees that it was from Sraffa that he had gained an "anthropological" view of philosophical problems. [Cf., Monk (1990), pp.260-61. Cf., also Malcolm (1958), p.69, von Wright (ND), pp.28, 213, and Wittgenstein (1998), p.16.]

In the Preface to what is his most important and influential work, Wittgenstein had this to say:


"Even more than this…criticism I am indebted to that which a teacher of this university, Mr P. Sraffa, for many years unceasingly practiced on my thoughts. I am indebted to this stimulus for the most consequential ideas of this book." [Wittgenstein (1958), p.viii. Bold emphasis added.]

This is quite remarkable: the author of what many believe to be the most original and innovative philosophical work of the 20th century -- and one that, if correct, brings to an end 2500 years of traditional Philosophy -- claims that his most "consequential" ideas were derived from a man who was an avowed Marxist!

Attempts to reconstruct Sraffa's influence on Wittgenstein are in their early stages, and they are not likely to progress much further unless some hard evidence turns up; to date, these attempts are based largely on supposition and inference. On this, see Sharpe (2002), Davis (2002) and Rossi-Landi (2002), pp.200-04.

Now, it is not being maintained here that Wittgenstein was a closet revolutionary, only that he has been rather badly misrepresented; a demonstrably erroneous view of his political leanings has been fostered by some of his 'disciples', who have (or have had) their own political agendas in mind.

However, a somewhat controversial book published a few years ago -- i.e., Cornish (1999) -- assembles all the available evidence (and there is a considerable amount, even if some of it is circumstantial) indicative of Wittgenstein's attitude toward revolutionary politics; cf., Cornish (1999), pp.40-87. [I will not pass comment on Cornish's other views since they are not relevant to the aims of this Essay.]

In addition to conservative misrepresentations of Wittgenstein's views, there is an equally spurious idea that his work is identical to the "Oxford Ordinary Language Philosophy" of Ryle, Austin, Warnock, Strawson, Urmson and Hampshire. Beyond a few superficial similarities, Wittgenstein's work bears no resemblance at all to "Oxford Philosophy". On this, see Cavell (1971a) and Dummett (1960).

You can find links and references which appear, or are mentioned, in the above if you follow the link I posted in my last reply:


On his left-wing, almost Marxist ideas, see here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Wittgenstein.htm

Use the 'Quick links' at the top to skip to Section One; the information can be found in Note 3.

The references can be found at the end of that essay.

[ar734]

LL:

While this clearly was a factor, it cannot explain Wittgenstein's positive remarks about the gains he believed workers had made because of the revolution -- and, given what happened to the Russian peasantry in Stalin's Russia in the 1930s, this is surely the least likely explanation!



I'm reminded of what Gertrude Stein said about remarks not being literature. How can he not have written a single word, not even in a letter, about socialism, Marxism, the Russian Revolution, WW I as a capitalist enterprise, of Lenin, Stalin, even Hitler?

It's been a while since I've read Investigations and I will pick up a copy...but, Wittgenstein as revolutionary?... I suspect that is a bit of a stretch.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LL:


Wittgenstein as revolutionary?... I suspect that is a bit of a stretch.

That's why I added this:


Now, it is not being maintained here that Wittgenstein was a closet revolutionary, only that he has been rather badly misrepresented; a demonstrably erroneous view of his political leanings has been fostered by some of his 'disciples', who have (or have had) their own political agendas in mind

His published work has been edited by those disciples.


How can he not have written a single word, not even in a letter, about socialism, Marxism, the Russian Revolution, WW I as a capitalist enterprise, of Lenin, Stalin, even Hitler?

He did, that's why I added this comment:


Rhees and Monk record the many sympathetic remarks Wittgenstein made about Marxism, about workers, about revolutionary activity, and the Russian revolution. While these are not in themselves models of 'orthodoxy', they reveal how close Wittgenstein came to adopting a very weak form of class politics in the 1930s -- certainly closer than any other major philosopher had done since Marx himself; cf., Rhees (1984), pp.205-09. [Cf., also Norman Malcolm's Introduction to Rhees's book, pp.xvii-xviii, Monk (1990), pp.343-54, and Monk (2007).]

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I have now re-written the OP, and expanded it slightly, here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Summary_of_Essay_Twelve-Part-01.htm