A question for fellow Sartreans

[Rudi]

It would appear that the problem of Bad Faith is an ineluctable fact of existence. Sartre seems to suggest that "Good faith" is impossible to achieve i.e. that the attempt of acting in good faith seems to always slip into its opposite, bad faith. For example : if one has been accused of homosexuality and the accused knows "he is" and the accused responds by defiantly or shamefully declaring yes I am a homosexual, he would be in bad faith due to the fact that, according to sartre, we cannot be gay or straight the way a rock is a rock i.e. just an in-itself without the capacity to transcend. Or if the the accused denies he is a homosexual knowing full well his sexual orientation, then he would also be in bad faith. Sartre here seems to suggest the right answer would be: " To the extent that a pattern of conduct is defined as the conduct of a homosexual and to the extent that I have adopted this conduct I am a (homosexual). But to the extent that human reality cannot be finally defined by patterns of conduct, I am not one."
Is Sartre suggesting that the best way to act is by accepting that we cannot concretely live in good faith and that the best way to act is to analyse our bad faith: to be self aware of our own bad faith i.e. to behave authentically?

Of course I would be interested in discussing the validity of sartre's claims, however, I am more interested in those who accept his claims; who may be able to propose a solution to the apparent ineluctablility of bad faith.

Cheers

[Hoipolloi Cassidy]

How do you equate the concrete example you've just given with Sartre's probing description of the gay character in Les Chemins de la Liberté?

[Billy2]

How do you equate the concrete example you've just given with Sartre's probing description of the gay character in Les Chemins de la Liberté?
I only read The Age of Reason so I might be out to lunch? Do you mean his negative portrayal of homosexuals as seedy, etc? And then how can someone ask about the justification of homosexuality in terms of Sartrean bad-faith after Sartre has slurred homosexuals? There is analogy with Sartre's portrayal of pedophiles in Nausea. The Self-Taught Man is described as pasty, socially awkward, etc; obviously defamatory of child-lovers -- and yet, Sartre did sign the 1977 petition for penal reform regarding the issue of age of consent. Sartre describes all of his characters in a realist and too well lit way, even the apparent protagonists, so being critically portrayed by Sartre doesn't necessarily mean you don't have his sympathy.


Of course I would be interested in discussing the validity of sartre's claims, however, I am more interested in those who accept his claims; who may be able to propose a solution to the apparent ineluctablility of bad faith.
The bad-faith paradox might be a little like the liar's paradoxes? Aren't there some ways to crack the liar's paradox? If you have more than one liar you can play the lies off against eachother to get to the truth? When many people all in bad-faith come together an authentic faith can be gotten at in a mediated way? Being can only be maintained in sight of other people. Maybe that's why Sartre turns to communal Marxism after his lonely Existentialism?

But actually, since starting to study Deleuze and Guattari I've sort of given up Sartre's nothingness model and reversed my metaphysics so that someone isn't never homosexual or pedophile or whatever but instead say 'yes' to everything, "I am all the names in history" (Nietzsche), "...and…and…and..." (D&G), "I am a Chinaman. I am a Japanese. I am a foreigner, a stranger. I am a sea bird" (Nijinsky), etc etc. So this makes the problem the opposite, instead of never being gay or a child-lover, someone is all that and more and more and the essences instead of being impossible are growing like unstoppable weeds off every BwO. So the problem isn't the impossibility of being even one thing, but of being only one thing.

[Dean]

I wrote on this recently, for class:


The simple reason that I think these are compatible concepts is that, as human beings, our entire being – including our desires and values – exist as chemical phenomena and relate to the world in accordance with these laws. The determinist should not throw up his hands and say that will is nothing but an illusion. It is precisely because our entire process of will (conception, choice and action) are a part of this world that it would be absurd to use the determinist position to reject free will. A common criticism of this position is that free will should be (and historically was) defined as a will “free from constraints.” But what is free from constraints? In defining free will as a model of human activity devoid of external constraints (or influence in general) the philosopher sets up a chimera. More accurately, free will should be defined as something like the ability of a reasoning creature to exert its faculties in accordance with values, interests or laws of its own creation.

Now we have confronted the issue of free will’s existence: namely, that it does exist. But for Sartre, this is not enough: for his model to work correctly, the will must be utterly free. But it is not. The emancipation of the will of man in general is the ascension to this goal. The manifestation of human activity insofar as we assert ourselves (or refuse to ‘make things of (objectify) ourselves’ as Sarte would say) is precisely the measurement which determines the rate at which free will manifests. And if existence precedes essence, I would go further and say that our existence alone provides no proof for the freedom of the will.

“Existence precedes essence” only within the conditions of our methodology. We do not set out to study the human before we rise up from our embryonic phase. Nothing is derived from nothing, or ex nihilo nihil fit. My existence is not the consequence of itself; my existence, and my subsequent striving to know my essence, are derived from essential capacities of the human being. I can create, and recreate myself – within the particular bounds of my existence.[1] (http://www.revleft.com/vb/#_ftn1)

In particular, Sartre notices the objectification of human will. He cites a waiter who justifies his activity on the grounds that he must act as such or he will lose his job. Or the woman who, as a result of social norms, is afraid to reject sexual advances. The objectification of human will is, in other words, the transformation of human action into a dead thing; an object.

To take his position seriously, we would have to believe that nothing short of pure, brute force can be considered a constraint or limit on free will. And yet, human beings can and do objectify their existence, or allow constraints on their will. Sartre remarks that this objectification is a “retreat” from free will, and that may be the case. But that does not change the fact that he is describing the very instance where human beings relinquish their freedom, and so his “totally free will” is simply not applicable.
Precisely because "nothing comes from nothing," existence does not precede essence, and if there is an essence (i.e. to humans or individuals) than their will exists within those constraints. It reminds me of noble teachers convincing students that they can "be whatever they want in life." It can be very empowering (or damaging occasionally), but its simply not true.

[Hoipolloi Cassidy]

Sartre is homophobic in Les Chemins de la Liberté the way he's anti-semitic in Réflections sur la question juive and counter-revolutionary in Le Diable et le Bon Dieu: if you start (as Dean does) from an Enlightenment definition of Freedom then, yes, there is an impossible internal contradiction to resolve - as Sartre describes it in each of his characters: the gay man, the Jew, the Medieval knight.

The difference is, that Sartre and his characters are attempting to move past that definition, looking towards a definition of freedom that many of us would acknowledge as genuinely Marxist, that is, as genuinely breaking with bourgeois epistemology. Most Anglo-Saxon leftists, when they encounter Sartre, realize that they have an affinity with him. Problem is, it’s like ships that pass in the night: Sartre is moving away from the bourgeois definition of freedom; they’re heading straight for it.

[Apoi_Viitor]

Is it just me, or does Sartre's notion of "good" and "bad" faith sound like something you would find in Emerson's works? Or maybe even the philosophies of various right-wing libertarian thinkers...

But I think the answer to your question lies in the difference between Emerson and Sartre. Emerson believed that each individual had an essence or a true self, and that they should act according to that essence, rather than accept the social roles placed upon them. However, Emerson thought that in order to act according to your essence, you occasionally had to act in a "socially normal" manner, because that may be what your essence desired. Sartre, saw the whole 'essentialism' thing as a ploy, and believed humans could define themselves as they desired. He was against acting in any "bad faith", because he believed that the second you do so, you lose your freedom. For Sartre, the response to your question (about homosexuality) would be, "Maybe, maybe not." Because the second you answer either "yes" or "no", you are immediately turned into an object.

Anyways, I've always believed Sartre's goal was to destroy the 'essentialism' that was ever-present in previous philosophical thought. Unfortunately, his attempt to do so, resulted with him raising the subject to the forefront of his philosophical discourse. This is problematic, because his focus tends to ignore the structural elements that have a role in shaping the subject, which is the basic 'essence' of Marxist thought. Although, apparently Sartre went through a change later in his life, and focused on the structures and institutions which restrict human freedom

[Hoipolloi Cassidy]

the structural elements that have a role in shaping the subject, which is the basic 'essence' of Marxist thought.
If you assume that Marxism is an essentialism then you're going to see Sartre as betraying all essentialism - which he does, of course.

In addition - and this is directed at some of the earlier critiques - if one conveniently omits Sartre's debt to Bergson (taken for granted in his milieu), then one can overlook that for Sartre, Being is Becoming, "L'Être est un Devenir." Next I guess somebody's going to complain that Sartre is a dendrophobe because of the tree scene in La Nausée.

[Apoi_Viitor]

If you assume that Marxism is an essentialism then you're going to see Sartre as betraying all essentialism - which he does, of course.

When I said, that is the "essence" of Marxist thought, I meant that is the goal of Marxist thought. And I said, its goal was to show how structures influence and define the subject.


This is problematic, because his focus tends to ignore the structural elements that have a role in shaping the subject, which is the basic 'essence' of Marxist thought. Although, apparently Sartre went through a change later in his life, and focused on the structures and institutions which restrict human freedom

[Hoipolloi Cassidy]

When I said, that is the "essence" of Marxist thought, I meant that is the goal of Marxist thought. And I said, its goal was to show how structures influence and define the subject.

Fair enough - you don't reintroduce idealism into Marxism, which puts you in a minority among Anglo-Saxon Marxists. I could argue that essentialism has a way of sneaking in anyhow, so your slip of the tongue was worth noting, but that's beside the point.


Although, apparently Sartre went through a change later in his life, and focused on the structures and institutions which restrict human freedom.

Well, how late in life would that have been? 1939? 1943? You can focus on Sartre as philosopher or on Sartre as a novelist and get radically different views - which is what we're doing here. Sartre himself, at the end of his life, argued that he was a novelist par-dessus tout. That should make some of our philosophy-bashing friends on this list very happy, though I doubt it will.

Cordially,

[Apoi_Viitor]

Fair enough - you don't reintroduce idealism into Marxism, which puts you in a minority among Anglo-Saxon Marxists. I could argue that essentialism has a way of sneaking in anyhow, so your slip of the tongue was worth noting, but that's beside the point.

I fail to see how I even suggested that essentialism was part of Marxism. I was commenting on how Sartre's desire to eradicate essentialism from his philosophy lead him to promote the primacy and freedom of the subject. And I suggested that this was contradictory to orthodox Marxism, which rejected essentialism by showing how 'essences' were the product of structural and institutional systems...



Well, how late in life would that have been? 1939? 1943? You can focus on Sartre as philosopher or on Sartre as a novelist and get radically different views - which is what we're doing here. Sartre himself, at the end of his life, argued that he was a novelist par-dessus tout. That should make some of our philosophy-bashing friends on this list very happy, though I doubt it will.

Cordially,

I don't know the difference between Sartre the philosopher and Sartre the novelist, however I believe the change I am referring to occurred in the 60's or so.

[Hoipolloi Cassidy]

As Kant put it (in the conclusion to the Prolegomena), a mechanistic argument constitutes a form of essentialism in itself - one wishes a few more Marxists understood that. There's an instance of this argument at the beginning and end of Sartre's play, The Devil and the Good Lord. At the beginning, Goetz decides to join the proletariat in their struggle by casting the dice - his girlfriend makes the wonderfully double-edged comment that "He cheated!" At the end, Goetz decides to join the struggle out of his own, tormented free will.

I believe your second point does apply to Sartre's actual political engagement, less so to his theory of engagement. Sartre wasn't much of a résistant (unlike Camus), so his arguments about the abstract freedom of the slave (or the victim of the Nazis) do have that "abstract," "academic" quality at times. As I implied above, it's not an accident that Being and Nothingness appeared in 1943 - or am I being overly deterministic?

[Billy2]

Is it just me, or does Sartre's notion of "good" and "bad" faith sound like something you would find in ... the philosophies of various right-wing libertarian thinkers...
For sure. Because they both start with freedom as the super final everything. I like Pastor Steven Anderson's raving sermons for this reason; I don't personally think Jesus rose from the dead, or that homosexuals ought to go to Hell, but I love Pastor Anderson on freedom. Christians have ended up being big heroes of free-speech since their proselytizing, and also their message, are sometimes very unpopular. The Christians have to spurn social convention and try to do God's bidding, which turns out to be pretty much the same as "to thine own self be true" or "from each according to the dictates of their own conscience"; in a dualistic mind-set, the Christians end up writing some really insightful stuff about freedom and free-will if we just confuse my self and God a little bit. Sartre is a big hero of capitalism as long as we keep everything dualistic: motivational guru Tony Robbins basically rewrites Sartre and dumbs it down for popular inspiration for entrepreneurs. Same sort of thing happens with Leftist apologists of Muslim fundamentalism: the leftists know they're against capitalism and all that and since the Muslims are too, fundamentalist arguments start to make sense, as long as everything stays neatly dualistic.

Anyways, I've always believed Sartre's goal was to destroy the 'essentialism' that was ever-present in previous philosophical thought. Unfortunately, his attempt to do so, resulted with him raising the subject to the forefront of his philosophical discourse. This is problematic, because his focus tends to ignore the structural elements that have a role in shaping the subject, which is the basic 'essence' of Marxist thought.
I'm satisfied with compatibilism, contradictory as it may seem. Giving up either Sartrean insistence on free will, or Marxist insistence on deterministic social and material conditions leaves too much not making sense. I like quirky expressions like "choose your fate" that combine both views. It's sort of like those trick-of-the-eye pictures where you can see an old lady, or a young lady.

[Dean]

I'm satisfied with compatibilism, contradictory as it may seem. Giving up either Sartrean insistence on free will, or Marxist insistence on deterministic social and material conditions leaves too much not making sense. I like quirky expressions like "choose your fate" that combine both views. It's sort of like those trick-of-the-eye pictures where you can see an old lady, or a young lady.

I don't see how this makes sense. We are free, but not from ourselves. Don't pretend that you're anything but your own body and its functions and you can easily see that you have free will.

There is no such thing as a completely free anything. So the insistence that free will be totally free should be thrown out. If it is to mean something, it has to be limited.

And that limitation is embodied in the material conditions which frame free will, as well as the human beings whose existence defines that will.