Some World War II questions

[CynicalIdealist]

1. Would most fellow revleftists consider WWII--and for that matter the Civil War--to have been be positive? I lean towards no, but I'm wondering what you all think.

2. Why did Hitler declare war on the U.S.? Was there a genuine threat that he'd try to invade the mainland? Really?

3. Hard evidence that Japan planned on surrendering well before the U.S. dropped both atom bombs? I always get into arguments with tools who recite the same annoying, "Invading would have killed more people" line. I know I'm right on this, but I could use some help.

[Broletariat]

1. WW2 no, it was an inter-imperialist war. The Civil War yes, it opened up the South for development which would give it the necessary material pre-conditions for socialism, not to mention a by-product was abolishing slavery.

2. Uncertain but for some reason I doubt it.

3. Yes there is such hard evidence.
http://newsgroups.derkeiler.com/Archive/Soc/soc.culture.japan/2005-08/msg00120.html

http://www.cfo.doe.gov/me70/manhattan/surrender.htm

etc. You could google around and find more if you need it.

Also those who use that line of argumentation generally don't care about Soviet lives, so you could point out how the USSR basically was about to have Japan all wrapped up by themselves.

[ComradeOm]

2. Why did Hitler declare war on the U.S.? Was there a genuine threat that he'd try to invade the mainland? Really?No. Germany completely lacked the logistical ability to invade the USA. This did not mean however that Hitler did not view the US as an enemy, quite the opposite. An underlying motive for securing the lands and resources of Russia was in preparation for inevitable future conflict with the US. When Japan did attack in 1941 Hitler probably felt that he little to lose by honouring his treaties with Tokyo. The US was already heavily, if unofficially, involved in supporting the Allied war effort so open war with Germany was just hastening the inevitable


Hard evidence that Japan planned on surrendering well before the U.S. dropped both atom bombs? I always get into arguments with tools who recite the same annoying, "Invading would have killed more people" line. I know I'm right on this, but I could use some help.Nope. There's a lot of hearsay around this issue - X said Y on Z, etc - but if Japan had offered an unconditional surrender before August 1945 then of course it would have been accepted. The problem was that nobody in the Japanese Supreme Council was willing to consider this. The key term being 'unconditional surrender', a stance that the Allies had adopted at Casablanca. Even the most peace-inclined Japanese ministers envisaged a negotiated settlement that would see the Home Islands remain free of occupation. In this they tended to put their faith in the mediation of the USSR; it was the shattering of this possible avenue of escape, with the Soviet offensive into Manchuria, and not the dropping of the atomic bomb that forced Japan into a complete and unconditional surrender

[CynicalIdealist]

"Even the most peace-inclined Japanese ministers envisaged a negotiated settlement that would see the Home Islands remain free of occupation."

So Japan didn't want to be occupied by the U.S. is what you're saying? I also heard that Hirohito staying in power was another condition for Japan's surrender, correct?

[Broletariat]

I also heard that Hirohito staying in power was another condition for Japan's surrender, correct?

Correct, he stayed in power even after unconditional surrender though if I'm not mistaken.

[Devrim]

2. Why did Hitler declare war on the U.S.? Was there a genuine threat that he'd try to invade the mainland? Really?

Try to put it in context. Germany wasn't able to establish the air and navel superiority it needed to invade England. The US is a little further away from continental Europe.

Devrim

[synthesis]

Nope. There's a lot of hearsay around this issue - X said Y on Z, etc - but if Japan had offered an unconditional surrender before August 1945 then of course it would have been accepted. The problem was that nobody in the Japanese Supreme Council was willing to consider this. The key term being 'unconditional surrender', a stance that the Allies had adopted at Casablanca. Even the most peace-inclined Japanese ministers envisaged a negotiated settlement that would see the Home Islands remain free of occupation. In this they tended to put their faith in the mediation of the USSR; it was the shattering of this possible avenue of escape, with the Soviet offensive into Manchuria, and not the dropping of the atomic bomb that forced Japan into a complete and unconditional surrender

I've read that the U.S. purposefully demanded conditions with which the Japanese government would not comply in order to provide a justification for showing off their new toys. If I can find the source for this, I'll post it. I don't think that this is mutually exclusive with your post, however.

[ComradeOm]

I've read that the U.S. purposefully demanded conditions with which the Japanese government would not comply in order to provide a justification for showing off their new toys. If I can find the source for this, I'll post it. I don't think that this is mutually exclusive with your post, however.*Shrugs* The US had signed up to unconditional surrender at Casablanca. It could have perhaps wriggled its way out of this agreement with London and Moscow (although this would be trickier with Japan than, say, Finland) but the point is that there was only one "condition" of note - "the unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers", as the Instrument of Surrender put it

You might be thinking of the Potsdam Declaration which had pretty much spelt out what unconditional surrender actually meant. This was to be the abdication of the pre-war elite/government, forced disarmament and the destruction of Japan's pre-war empire. Which is more or less what Germany got as well. The problem is that the Japanese High Command had either not yet realised the scale of their defeat or still had faith in a Soviet-sponsored negotiated peace. They were the ones talking about conditions rather than face the prospect of total defeat

Edit: There is of course the argument that Truman was just itching to show off his "new toys" in order to impress/frighten the Soviets. But that's a discussion in which Japan is only tangentially, albeit tragically, involved in

[ComradeAV]

1. Would most fellow revleftists consider WWII--and for that matter the Civil War--to have been be positive? I lean towards no, but I'm wondering what you all think.

2. Why did Hitler declare war on the U.S.? Was there a genuine threat that he'd try to invade the mainland? Really?

3. Hard evidence that Japan planned on surrendering well before the U.S. dropped both atom bombs? I always get into arguments with tools who recite the same annoying, "Invading would have killed more people" line. I know I'm right on this, but I could use some help.

1)Civil war is for sure positive. WW2, yes and no. It was an inter-imperialist war, but the positive is that the soviet union defeated facism in germany. Its bad because it was the beginning of american imperialist domination in the world.
2) I dont understand why hitler did that honestly. Many US companies were doing business in germany, and most of the western countries in the beginning had no problem with germany, they were hoping they would defeat the Soviet union and stop communism. However, they figured out that they created a monster when hitler invaded france and england.

[Pretty Flaco]

Wouldn't Germany declaring war on the US be connected to their alliance with the Japanese?

[ComradeAV]

Wouldn't Germany declaring war on the US be connected to their alliance with the Japanese?

Yes.

[Pretty Flaco]

Then why are people so confused about it? The Germans wouldn't have upset their alliance with the Japanese over some American companies. They had far much more to gain.

[ComradeOm]

The Germans wouldn't have upset their alliance with the Japanese over some American companies. They had far much more to gain.Like what? The fundamental problem with the Berlin-Tokyo Axis, from a strategic perspective, is that there was no real alliance to speak of. The theatres in which Germany and Japan fought were almost entirely removed from each other with little scope for military cooperation. The initial promise of such an arrangement for Germany had been in containing the USSR and challenging the Royal Navy. The Japanese however had no intention of getting involved in Siberia and would have declared war on Britain regardless of events in Europe. By 1941 there was very little to be gained from bolstering the alliance with Japan

[MarxSchmarx]

Like what? The fundamental problem with the Berlin-Tokyo Axis, from a strategic perspective, is that there was no real alliance to speak of. The theatres in which Germany and Japan fought were almost entirely removed from each other with little scope for military cooperation. The initial promise of such an arrangement for Germany had been in containing the USSR and challenging the Royal Navy. The Japanese however had no intention of getting involved in Siberia and would have declared war on Britain regardless of events in Europe. By 1941 there was very little to be gained from bolstering the alliance with Japan

Whilst the axis alliance was publicly about containing communism and being an anti-USSR alliance, a significant, under-stated and arguably primary purpose (esp. after the Nazi/USSR non-aggression pact) was to keep America out of a war in Europe by making its Pacific flank vulnerable. Japan had in fact tested the waters in 1939 against the Soviets (under Zhukov) along the Manchurian border and realized that they could not win in Siberia - which is a big reason why they moved south instead. Although Hitler's declaration of war on the United States was a result of the German leadership's serious underestimation of American industrial capacity and military technology, it was really based on the idea that the US would get bogged down in the pacific so the main goal of the alliance was reached, esp. with Japan relatively free from a threat of soviet invasion.

[ComradeOm]

Although Hitler's declaration of war on the United States was a result of the German leadership's serious underestimation of American industrial capacity and military technology, it was really based on the idea that the US would get bogged down in the pacific so the main goal of the alliance was reached, esp. with Japan relatively free from a threat of soviet invasion.Something that would have been accomplished without German interference ;). Now Berlin might not have expected the US to pursue a 'Germany first' strategy, but if they simply wanted the US distracted or bogged down then all they need do was shut up and not draw Washington's attention. It would not be a surprise if US aid to the UK was then reduced as America turned to the Pacific

Nor do I think that Berlin underestimated the US's capabilities. Well, obviously they did, but not that much. Hitler had long been aware of the industrial might of the US and had returned to this theme repeatedly in his 'second book'. What he did underestimate was the Soviet Union. In Dec 1941 it was reasonable to expect the war in the East to last another few months, a year or two tops, by which point Germany would be able to turn towards the inevitable showdown with the US, after marshalling all the industrial resources of Europe under one banner

[MarxSchmarx]

Although Hitler's declaration of war on the United States was a result of the German leadership's serious underestimation of American industrial capacity and military technology, it was really based on the idea that the US would get bogged down in the pacific so the main goal of the alliance was reached, esp. with Japan relatively free from a threat of soviet invasion. Something that would have been accomplished without German interference ;). Now Berlin might not have expected the US to pursue a 'Germany first' strategy, but if they simply wanted the US distracted or bogged down then all they need do was shut up and not draw Washington's attention. It would not be a surprise if US aid to the UK was then reduced as America turned to the Pacific

I don't know, something about this seems like 20/20 hindsight - I think this gives too much credit to Hitler. One might argue they thought that forcing the Americans to fight on two fronts would reduce their efficacy in both arenas just as much as risking them being freed of having to worry about their Pacific flank. The likelier explanation seems to be that Hitler realized that with Japan now at war with the US in addition to the UK and France, it was only a matter of time before the Americans declared war on Germany given there was common cause between the US, UK and France in the Pacific, and there was a perceived advantage to Germany to being the first to declare war.



Nor do I think that Berlin underestimated the US's capabilities. Well, obviously they did, but not that much. Hitler had long been aware of the industrial might of the US and had returned to this theme repeatedly in his 'second book'. What he did underestimate was the Soviet Union. In Dec 1941 it was reasonable to expect the war in the East to last another few months, a year or two tops, by which point Germany would be able to turn towards the inevitable showdown with the US, after marshalling all the industrial resources of Europe under one banner

Hitler certainly underestimated the strength of the USSR, and in particular it's capacity for resistance. Although unlike the battles against the Americans, it is pretty clear that in the case of the USSR German tactical mistakes and gratuitous brutality played no small part in their ultimate defeat. Perhaps it was that he overestimated Japanese prowess viz. the USA, but he along with the Japanese leadership clearly felt the Americans could not fight a two fronted war, and was quickly proven quite wrong.

[punisa]

Interesting topic.
I believe the declaration of war against the US was merely to keep the strong alliance with the Japan.
Do you think that there was any chance that Hitler could've had actually dominated the world? What if the Germany managed to crush USSR before the winter? If the operation Barbarossa started in let's say April, things might have been very different in the east.

[Comrade Wolfie's Very Nearly Banned Adventures]

Interesting topic.
I believe the declaration of war against the US was merely to keep the strong alliance with the Japan.
Do you think that there was any chance that Hitler could've had actually dominated the world? What if the Germany managed to crush USSR before the winter? If the operation Barbarossa started in let's say April, things might have been very different in the east.

It's very hard to draw a conclusion as to what would have happend if there was a Germany victory in the East, as the Nazis had little interest in controlling the USSR beyond the Urals, and with the majority of Soviet industry being in western Russia it would have been unlikely that the USSR would be able to put up much resistance should it loose these vital industries.

I'd suggest that there would have been either:

1. the Soviets bitterly sign a peace treaty giving much of European Russia to the Nazis, the capital is moved to Vladivostok or some other large Eastern city and the rump Soviet state is besset by internal conflict and secessionist movements by the asian republics.

2. The Nazis simply hold at the Urals and with little industry the USSR is left to conduct sporadic guerilla attacks inside Nazi held Russia and a few minor assaults on German assets with the surviving remenants of the Soviet Armed forces.

However, what Hitler would do now is very unclear, seeming abbandoning any attempt to take the UK and an allied victory in Africa leaves a Nazi 'Fortress Europe' surrounded by Allied held territory. However without the USSR to tie up the majority of the Wehrmach an allied landing a-la D-Day and Operation Husky seems unlikely to be successful.

Japan would eventually loose, it lacked the industrial base to win any conflict with the US. Japan was hoping for a negotiated peace, but the USA was very, very unlikely to ever accept defeat.