Sovnarkom

[Die Neue Zeit]

virtually the entire radical left supported the transfer of power from the unelected provisional government to the soviet congress and transfer of local government power to the soviets. but many thought this would mean the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Congress would be the new government. except that the Bolsheviks were able to concentrate power into a smaller group and eventually rule by decree and by spring of 1918 they overthrew many of the soviets when they refused to reelect bolshevik majorities. so much for "soviet power".

What was the reason behind Sovnarkom's formation in the first place, given that its size was comparable to the CEC?

[ComradeOm]

What was the reason behind Sovnarkom's formation in the first place, given that its size was comparable to the CEC?What? The first Sovnarkom had 15 members* while the first CEC numbered 101. How is that comparable?

*Lenin, Trotsky, Rykov, Miliutin, Shliapnikov, Nogin, Lunacharsky, Antonov-Ovseenko, Krylenko, Dybenko, Lomov, Skvortsov, Teodorovich, Avilov and Stalin

[Die Neue Zeit]

Sovnarkom was much bigger than the so-called "People's Commissars."

A lot of meetings involved the commissars plus their deputies organized in their respective collegia. Add those numbers up, and you have something comparable to the later Sovmin and its own Presidium.

Already Lenin had two smaller bodies: Maly Sovnarkom and the Council of Labour and Defence:

http://books.google.ca/books?id=dV_Gufwx31UC&pg=PA54&lpg=PA54&dq=%22maly+sovnarkom%22+%22labour+and+defence%22&source=bl&ots=A5dW21Bi65&sig=l3ClO5tJfzX_6g6DHXydQOKxHNk&hl=en&ei=CXciTYToJIiasAOz_ciMCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBUQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=%22maly%20sovnarkom%22%20%22labour%20and%20defen ce%22&f=false

(pp. 53-54)

[ComradeOm]

You're confusing terms here. The Council of Peoples Commissars' was indeed comprised solely of, surprise, the Peoples' Commissars. However each commissar was also responsible to a 'collegium' (an imperfect translation) comprised of the senior personalities in the commissariat. Running the latter was very much a joint/collective effort with the commissar the first amongst equals. However these 'deputies', as you inaccurately put it, were not part of the Sovnarkom and had no voting rights in it (except in the absence of the commissar). To take an imprecise analogy, when people refer to the cabinet in a bourgeois government they do not include the senior civil servants who participate

As for the other bodies, the 'little' Sovnarkom was originally established as a purely administrative body to handle minor matters that nonetheless required top-level rubber-stamping. Its importance can be gauged by the fact that it was staffed almost exclusively by non-entities. It did expand its scope (although not until the end of the Civil War) but solely because Lenin came to rely on it. It was essentially a screening process that ensured that the 'big' Sovnarkom only concerned itself with major issues. Again, this was not policy making body

The Council of Defence (not Labour and Defence until 1920) is more interesting in that it was a major centre in which policy was made and it did contain commissars. It was however a direct response to the Civil War (although it had no responsibility for military operations) and I don't see why it should be discussed in the context of the CEC

That said, I don't see why any of this is relevant to the CEC. Leaving aside dates - both the above bodies were reactions to problems not forecasted in Nov 1917 - the importance of the Sovnarkom was that it concentrated a relatively small number of decision makers. If the CEC had taken over executive duties then it still would have had to create an administrative body and defence committee, and, assuming the collegiate principle as adhered to, it still would have included non-voting members (as, incidentally, the STO also and 'little' Sovnarkom regularly did). Combined with the enlargement of the CEC in 1918, you'd have meetings containing several hundred people trying to decide the affairs of state. The result would have been the creation of a smaller executive body to more effectively cope - a Sovnarkom!

[Die Neue Zeit]

You're confusing terms here. The Council of Peoples Commissars' was indeed comprised solely of, surprise, the Peoples' Commissars. However each commissar was also responsible to a 'collegium' (an imperfect translation) comprised of the senior personalities in the commissariat. Running the latter was very much a joint/collective effort with the commissar the first amongst equals. However these 'deputies', as you inaccurately put it, were not part of the Sovnarkom and had no voting rights in it (except in the absence of the commissar). To take an imprecise analogy, when people refer to the cabinet in a bourgeois government they do not include the senior civil servants who participate

Still, there is inefficiency when you have the collegium members voicing their concerns. I read an account on Google Books about how Lenin was very business-like in chairing Sovnarkom meetings, allotting two or three minutes only per speaker.


As for the other bodies, the 'little' Sovnarkom was originally established as a purely administrative body to handle minor matters that nonetheless required top-level rubber-stamping. Its importance can be gauged by the fact that it was staffed almost exclusively by non-entities.

Source?


The Council of Defence (not Labour and Defence until 1920) is more interesting in that it was a major centre in which policy was made and it did contain commissars. It was however a direct response to the Civil War (although it had no responsibility for military operations)

With the addition of "labour" to the name, one wonders whether Vesenkha was a redundant body by this point. You have the Labour and Defence Council, Vesenkha, and the infant that would become Gosplan all vying for supremacy over economic policy.


That said, I don't see why any of this is relevant to the CEC. Leaving aside dates - both the above bodies were reactions to problems not forecasted in Nov 1917 - the importance of the Sovnarkom was that it concentrated a relatively small number of decision makers. If the CEC had taken over executive duties then it still would have had to create an administrative body and defence committee, and, assuming the collegiate principle as adhered to, it still would have included non-voting members (as, incidentally, the STO also and 'little' Sovnarkom regularly did). Combined with the enlargement of the CEC in 1918, you'd have meetings containing several hundred people trying to decide the affairs of state. The result would have been the creation of a smaller executive body to more effectively cope - a Sovnarkom!

Explain the Presidium of the CEC then.

[ComradeOm]

Still, there is inefficiency when you have the collegium members voicing their concerns*Shrugs* That's how they rolled. It was felt very important to introduce collective ruling (kollegial'nost) at all levels of the state. Hence members of these collegia were free to come into conflict with their commissar and appeal to either the Sovnarkom or (IIRC) the CEC


Source?IIRC Huskey's Executive Power and Soviet Politics contained a good summary of both bodies


With the addition of "labour" to the name, one wonders whether Vesenkha was a redundant body by this point. You have the Labour and Defence Council, Vesenkha, and the infant that would become Gosplan all vying for supremacy over economic policy.Early Soviet bureaucracy was a mess in all fields. Coordinating commissions were a primitive way of cutting through the bureaucracy and exerting some central control. As such the STO was useful in that it drew together the heads of the relevant economic departments to decide major policy directions


Explain the Presidium of the CEC then.What of it? The presidium merely shows that the CEC was unable to carry out its own limited, and increasingly inconsequential, duties without delegation to a higher body. Now you suggest that it should have taken on a vastly greater workload as well?

[Die Neue Zeit]

There should have instead been a Presidium combining legislative and executive power. I only started reading Huskey's stuff (will read more after the workday is over), but he said Sovnarkom was a continuation of the czarist Council of Ministers.

Either a Presidium of the CEC or a much smaller CEC itself would have given legitimacy to the new executive organ. That organ could get its hands dirty in Maly Sovnarkom paperwork as well as perform prestiguous functions:


1. Convenes the sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.;
2. Interprets laws of the U.S.S.R. in operation, issues decrees;
3. Dissolves the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in conformity with article 47 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. and orders new elections;
4. Conducts referendums on its own initiative or on the demand of one of the Union Republics;
5. Annuls decisions and orders of [...] the Councils of People's Commissars of the Union Republics in case they do not conform to law;
6. In the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., relieves of their posts and appoints People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. on the recommendation of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., subject to subsequent confirmation by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.;
7. Awards decorations and confers titles of honor of the U.S.S.R.;
8. Exercises the right of pardon;
9. Appoints and removes the higher commands of the armed forces of the U.S.S.R.;
10. In the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., proclaims a state of war in the event of armed attack on the U.S.S.R., or whenever necessary to fulfill international treaty obligations concerning mutual defense against aggression
11. Orders general or partial mobilization;
12. Ratifies international treaties;
13. Appoints and recalls plenipotentiary representatives of the U.S.S.R. to foreign states;
14. Receives the credentials and letters of recall of diplomatic representatives accredited to it by foreign states;
15. Proclaims martial law in separate localities or throughout the U.S.S.R. in the interests of the defense of the U.S.S.R. or for the purpose of ensuring public order and state security.

[Jose Gracchus]

What functional differences would there be between the VTsIK and your hypothetical Presidium of the CEC-come-Communal Council? In organizational and regulatory status, how would it be any different? What mechanisms of election, proportionality, recall, review, etc. would there be? To me this seems to be a question of semantics and bureaucratic reorganization, than one of substantive administrative constitutional change. What evidence do you have, should you establish those differences, that they are crucial to different political and administrative outcomes (and thereby, desirable)?

[Die Neue Zeit]

Wouldn't the Presidium be formed by the VTsIK?

Anyway, to avoid label debates, I'll just say Small Body and Big Body in my response below. :D

Considering the lack of knowledge re. demarchy, the Small Body would have been formed by and fully accountable to the Big Body. However, the Small Body would combine the powers of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers (or even the smaller executive bodies with the latter, such as its own Bureau, relabelled "Presidium" in 1949 to accommodate a Bureau of the Presidium :D ) - not to mention smaller state policy-making bodies like Lenin's Council of Labour and Defence, Stalin's State Defense Committee, and Brezhnev's Defence Council.

There was a Soviet tradition whereby joint meetings would be held by the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the Council of Ministers. The most notable instance of this happening was on the eve of Stalin's death.

A fully empowered Small Body would dispense of this redundancy, since it's clear that Sovnarkom made the CEC redundant and that the former's smaller policy-making bodies made the latter's Presidium redundant.

But yeah, it's more of a bureaucratic reorganization thing, except for the Big Body. The Big Body should have met as frequently as parliaments do to keep the Small Body in check, and not on a half-yearly basis. The strike committee model doesn't address the need for frequent meetings. You just meet one day then strike the next several days.