RE: Science (was: Meridian disagreeing with NoXion)

[Meridian]

When you don't understand something, your immediate response should not be to trash it.

Rosa Lichtenstein's objections were not at all spam, they were critical arguments related to this topic. Only superficially could they be mistaken for "pure semantics", spam or similar nonsense.

A science forum, more than any other, should be open to critical scrutiny and not just meaningless praise. I read Rosa's posts and they were nothing else.

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

When you don't understand something, your immediate response should not be to trash it.

It wasn't my "immediate" response. I gave her plenty of time to actually start addressing the topic at hand.


Rosa Lichtenstein's objections were not at all spam, they were critical arguments related to this topic.

Bollocks. Nitpicking a phrase used in a popular news item is spam.


A science forum, more than any other, should be open to critical scrutiny and not just meaningless praise. I read Rosa's posts and they were nothing else.

Meaningless praise? What on Earth are you talking about?

[ZeroNowhere]

I must say, the title of this thread is a masterstroke. Anyway, it'd be good if we could keep discussion of things not related to the actual news to this thread.

[Meridian]

It wasn't my "immediate" response. I gave her plenty of time to actually start addressing the topic at hand.
I noticed it. However, I saw nothing but the topic at hand being adressed. If this were not the case I could have agreed with you about calling it spam. As you agree;


Bollocks. Nitpicking a phrase used in a popular news item is spam.
Highlighting an incorrect understanding, based on nonsensical usage of language, is nowhere near spam. Even if Rosa's objections were unwarranted, it would still lead to a discussion of the field and the basis of its findings. In science this is considered positive.


Meaningless praise? What on Earth are you talking about?
The role of a forum such as this one if critical questions and objections such as Rosa's are disallowed.

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

I noticed it. However, I saw nothing but the topic at hand being adressed. If this were not the case I could have agreed with you about calling it spam. As you agree;

Highlighting an incorrect understanding, based on nonsensical usage of language, is nowhere near spam.

It's only nonsensical if taken literally, which in the context it obviously wasn't intended to be.


Even if Rosa's objections were unwarranted, it would still lead to a discussion of the field and the basis of its findings. In science this is considered positive.

Or it could have lead to yet another boring and pointless argument about dialectics. Considering her posting history, My bet was on the latter.


The role of a forum such as this one if critical questions and objections such as Rosa's are disallowed.

I didn't see a whole lot of praise, meaningless or otherwise.

[Jazzratt]

I've read the posts in question. It was just Rosa being an aggravating nuisance rather than actually adding to the discussion, there is absolutely no reason to reinstate those posts. Also I'm fairly sure this post belongs in the members' forum.

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

I've read the posts in question. It was just Rosa being an aggravating nuisance rather than actually adding to the discussion, there is absolutely no reason to reinstate those posts. Also I'm fairly sure this post belongs in the members' forum.

Good point. Moved.

EDIT: For reference, these (http://www.revleft.com/vb/rosa-cant-take-t146716/index.html) are the posts that were trashed.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Jazz:


I've read the posts in question. It was just Rosa being an aggravating nuisance rather than actually adding to the discussion, there is absolutely no reason to reinstate those posts. Also I'm fairly sure this post belongs in the members' forum.

Not at all, I am raising legitimate concerns about the dominant Cartesian paradigm in the cognitive sciences.

My other posts in that thread were in reply to personal attacks on me. Or do you suppose that others can attack me, but I'm not allowed to defend myself?

[Blackscare]

Not at all, I am raising legitimate concerns about the dominant Cartesian paradigm in the cognitive sciences.

Well, then, maybe you could make a thread specifically about this subject, rather than derailing a topic to discuss what, in the context of this thread is minutia. This subject may be important to you, and this thread may be an example of that, to some degree, but please don't derail the discussion in order to pick-apart the wording of a mainstream science article, as they're not really known for being precise.


It's frustrating to click on a thread and see that scarcely before anyone else could respond, Rosa's stunk the place up with a huge wall of shit you don't care about and stifled discussion about the real and intended subject matter.

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

Not at all, I am raising legitimate concerns about the dominant Cartesian paradigm in the cognitive sciences.

If that's the case, then your own phone-line analogy is also guilty of this, as it suggests that there is "something" in the brain seperate from the fear response inside the brain in which it occurs.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Blackscare:


Well, then, maybe you could make a thread specifically about this subject, rather than derailing a topic to discuss what, in the context of this thread is minutia. This subject may be important to you, and this thread may be an example of that, to some degree, but please don't derail the discussion in order to pick-apart the wording of a mainstream science article, as they're not really known for being precise.

Well, just like comrades here in general attack the arguments and opinions of those who seek to show 'god' exists -- and in the threads where this is done, too -- I attack this paradigm wherever I see it rear its reactionary head, and I have the time to do it.

The problem is that it is now 'mainstream', as you point out.

But, would you desist in attacking theistic beliefs if they became 'mainstream'?

As far as 'derailing' is concerned, mine was the first reply, so how can I 'derail' a discussion that hasn't yet begun?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Noxion:


If that's the case, then your own phone-line analogy is also guilty of this, as it suggests that there is "something" in the brain seperate from the fear response inside the brain in which it occurs.

Not at all. My analogy trades on the false belief that there is indeed something in the brain, to show that there isn't. You, the phone user, are located wherever you happen to be, not in your brain.

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

Not at all. My analogy trades on the false belief that there is indeed something in the brain, to show that there isn't. You, the phone user, are located wherever you happen to be, not in your brain.

But a phone conversation involves communication between two points in space. If that connection is severed, there is no phone conversation. Considered as a system, cutting the phone line "kills" the conversation, but not the participants.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Noxion:


But a phone conversation involves communication between two points in space. If that connection is severed, there is no phone conversation.

Exactly, and that is part of the problem of the modern version of the Cartesian paradigm. It depends on locating various modules in the brain, and seeks to re-assemble 'the mind' by arguing that they all inter-communciate. If one part is destroyed, it is argued that that module (in this case 'the emotions', or perhaps the emotion of fear) no longer functions. So, it trades on that picture.

In seeking to show that the entire picture is misleading, I hoped to throw doubt on that paradigm.

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

Exactly, and that is part of the problem of the modern version of the Cartesian paradigm. It depends on locating various modules in the brain, and seeks to re-assemble 'the mind' by arguing that they all inter-communciate. If one part is destroyed, it is argued that that module (in this case 'the emotions', or perhaps the emotion of fear) no longer functions. So, it trades on that picture.

In seeking to show that the entire picture is misleading, I hoped to throw doubt on that paradigm.

Thing is, your criticism only applies to models of the brain which posit a central "meaning" module that "makes sense" of everything. Otherwise, there is nothing Cartesian about the idea that human consciousness is the emergent consquence of interacting subcomponents, any more than the idea that displaying the time is the emergent consequence of a clock's subcomponents is Cartesian.

[synthesis]

Not at all. My analogy trades on the false belief that there is indeed something in the brain, to show that there isn't. You, the phone user, are located wherever you happen to be, not in your brain.

You're saying there's a "me" distinct from "my brain"? Correct me if I'm wrong (really) but isn't that called "dualism"?

[ZeroNowhere]

You're saying there's a "me" distinct from "my brain"? Correct me if I'm wrong (really) but isn't that called "dualism"?
No, that is called 'English'.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Noxion:


Thing is, your criticism only applies to models of the brain which posit a central "meaning" module that "makes sense" of everything. Otherwise, there is nothing Cartesian about the idea that human consciousness is the emergent consquence of interacting subcomponents, any more than the idea that displaying the time is the emergent consequence of a clock's subcomponents is Cartesian.

Indeed, there is, since the modern paradigm accepts Descartes's problematic that 'mental phenomena' need explaining, and in a specific manner, too. As one author puts it:


"Descartes view of the nature of mind endured much longer than his view of matter. Indeed among educated people in the West who were not professional philosophers it is still the most widespread view of the mind. Most contemporary philosophers would disown Cartesian dualism but even those who explicitly renounce it are often profoundly influenced by it.

"Many people, for instance, go along with Descartes in identifying the mental realm as the realm of consciousness. They think of consciousness as an object of introspection; as something we see when we look within ourselves. They think of it as an inessential, contingent matter that consciousness has an expression in speech and behaviour. Consciousness, as they conceive it, is something to which each of us has direct access in our own case. Others, by contrast, can only infer to our conscious states by accepting our testimony or making causal inferences from our physical behaviour." [Kenny (1992), p.2.Bold emphases added.]

Kenny, A. (1992), The Metaphysics Of Mind (Oxford University Press).

And this way of seeing things is the dominant paradigm, as another has emphasised:


"The notions of computation and representation are not just common currency in cognitive science modelling. To put it mildly, they are the building blocks of the discipline. Alternative voices from a number of subdisciplines that call into question these notions have periodically been raised. Unfortunately, after an initial, and usually short, excitement they remain quiet. Silence is due mainly to two reasons. On the one hand, the dominant paradigm overwhelms competitors (sometimes due to 'pragmatic' considerations) with data already accounted for and results to be accounted for, and on the other hand, alternative framings are repeatedly absorbed and made innocuous. Both reasons are interrelated. Alternatives raised, by default, carry the burden of proof in such a way that the dominant paradigm is the one that chooses what phenomena are in need of explanation.... Problems start when the what limits the range of options available when it comes to answering the how." [Garzón (2008), pp.259-60.]

Garzón, F. (2008), 'Towards A General Theory Of Antirepresentationalism', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59, 3, pp.259-92.

[For those who might have forgotten, the 'representational theory of mind' is the modern Cartesian form of this paradigm.]

And we already know the original source of this paradigm (and it wasn't Descartes):


"Western conceptions of mind began in religion before moving first to philosophy, and then to science. However, for two reasons psychologists have underestimated the influence of religious ideas of the soul -- the ψυχή (psychē) of our science -- on conceptions of mind and self. First, psychology is an aggressively secular enterprise and psychologists like to think that they put religion behind them when they assume their role as scientists. A more subtle reason concerns the dominance of historical scholarship by Christian belief. When we as psychologists read about past thinkers such as Plato and Descartes, not only do we look at them as protopsychologists, we see them through the eyes of historians and classicists who until recently worked within a quietly but unequivocally held Christian framework. That framework rarely intrudes explicitly, but it filters out the rough splinters, odd conceptions, and obscure but vital disputes concerning mind and soul held from Greek times through to at least Descartes. Thus we psychologists inherit a conception of the mind subtly shaped by forces of which we know little, drain it of its specifically supernatural content (e.g., survival of bodily death), and fancy that what remains is somehow natural and therefore a proper object of science....

"Although there are differences in detail, religions around the world have a remarkably concordant picture of the mind, positing the existence of two immaterial souls for two distinct reasons.... The first, universal reason is to explain the difference between living and nonliving things. The second, less universal reason is to explain human personality....

"Greek religion and the concept of ψυχή underwent a profound change in the later fifth century BCE.... Traditional Greek religious thought had insisted on a great gulf between the human and divine worlds, downplaying the idea of personal immortality. However, in the wake of the Peloponnesian War, continuity between the human and divine worlds was the theme of various new cults, often imported from the non-Greek east. In their practices these new religions induced in worshippers ecstatic states through which they might for a time join the gods, perhaps even briefly becoming the god of their veneration. The ψυχή became a personal, immortal soul, taking after death its rightful place in the divine world of the gods. Plato was influenced by these new teachings, but steered them in a less ecstatic, more philosophical and cognitive direction.... For Plato, the proper object of the soul's attention was indeed something divine, but he taught that instead of seeking salvation through ecstatic communion with the gods, the soul should seek salvation through philosophical pursuit of eternal, transcendental Truth. In Plato's hands, the mind became identified with reason, the ability to formulate and know the universal Truths underwritten by the heavenly Forms." [Leahy (2005), pp.37-39.]

Leahy, T. (2005), 'Mind As A Scientific Object: A Historical-Philosophical Exploration', in Erneling and Johnson (2005), pp.35-78.

Erneling, C., and Johnson, D. (2005) (eds.), The Mind As A Scientific Object. Between Brain And Culture (Oxford University Press).

Which underlines what Marx had to say:


"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch." [Marx and Engels (1970), The German Ideology, pp.64-65.]

Which is why I oppose it wherever I can.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Synthesis:


You're saying there's a "me" distinct from "my brain"? Correct me if I'm wrong (really) but isn't that called "dualism"?

In fact, I am saying the obvious: your brain is part of you.

[¿Que?]

So Rosa, you are saying that the history of scientific inquiry, specifically as concerns the mind in this case, but generally all science really, is nothing more than that i.e. a history. In other words, "mainstream" science is not shaped so much by the discovery of truths through reason, logic or what have you, but by social, cultural and historical circumstance (in this case, religion)?

I don't necessarily agree or disagree. I have been wrestling with this question for quite some time. :)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

El_V:


So Rosa, you are saying that the history of scientific inquiry, specifically as concerns the mind in this case, but generally all science really, is nothing more than that i.e. a history. In other words, "mainstream" science is not shaped so much by the discovery of truths through reason, logic or what have you, but by social, cultural and historical circumstance (in this case, religion)?

Just like economics and mainstream sociology have been compromised by ruling-class ideology, the same is the case with mainstream psychology.

Here's how I have put things in a comment I posted here a while back:


Just as ancient rationalist ideas can be traced back to Aristocratic notions invented and propagated by Greek Philosophers (concerning the 'natural' hierarchical, or divine order underpinning the Universe, ideologically motivated by the need to justify social stratification and inequality, etc.), the origin of more recent representational theories of the mind can be linked to the rise of modern Bourgeois 'democracy', with its characteristic emphasis on "possessive individualism".

If this new social order was meant to be democratic (but only "within certain limits"), and based on the fabled Bourgeois Individual, then private ownership in the means of mental production made eminent good sense.

The fragmentation introduced into society by the development of Capitalism was thus mirrored in the analogous dissolution of 'consciousness' into its particulars, now dispersed across countless million isolated bourgeois heads.

But, these notions were based on an even more ancient set of dogmas, on a particular theory of language that has dominated 'Western' (and, indeed, 'Eastern') thought for over two thousand years. This approach sees the primary role of discourse (in fact, in many cases, its only role) as representational, and thus solely as a vehicle for thought. In fact, if discourse was ever seen as a means of communication, it was often regarded as a means by which speakers could communicate to others thoughts already arrived at independently of and prior to social interaction and their linguistic expression.

In fact, language was originally considered (by priests, theologians and philosophers) to be a gift of the 'gods', and thus a means whereby the latter could re-present their 'thoughts' to the 'chosen few' --, or, alternatively, 'the chosen' few could think 'divine thoughts' for the rest of us (expressed in literal, allegorical, poetic or figurative language).

As Umberto Eco points out (in relation to the 'western' Christian tradition):


"God spoke before all things, and said, 'Let there be light.' In this way, he created both heaven and earth; for with (sic) the utterance of the divine word, 'there was light'.... Thus Creation itself arose through an act of speech; it is only by giving things their names that he created them and gave them their ontological status....

"In Genesis..., the Lord speaks to man for the first time.... We are not told in what language God spoke to Adam. Tradition has pictured it as a sort of language of interior illumination, in which God...expresses himself....

"...Clearly we are here in the presence of a motif, common to other religions and mythologies -- that of the nomothete, the name-giver, the creator of language." [Eco (1997), pp.7-8. Bold emphasis added.]

Eco, U. (1997), The Search For The Perfect Language (Fontana).

Language and thought were thus vehicles for the "inner illumination" of the 'soul'; a hot-line to 'God'. Unsurprisingly then, the thoughts produced by countless generations of ruling-class ideologues invariably turned out to be those that 'coincidentally' rationalised and 'justified' the status quo.

These ancient myths also suggested to such work-shy thinkers that not only were the heavens called into being by means of language, but that language ran the entire show. However, this was not just any old language, and it certainly wasn't the vernacular; it was a specialised language full of newly crafted terminology (jargon) -- concocted by theorists in order to re-present the 'divine' order to humanity.

Later, in the work of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus -- and more recently, Descartes --, for example, language became an important vehicle for the 'soul' to converse with itself (via "inner speech"), which prompted these and subsequent philosophers to imagine they could access divine/eternal verities directly from thought alone. As noted above, 'languageless thought' was regarded as the means by which the souls of the 'select few' could draw close to 'Being'/'God' -- an idea that in fact lay behind the 'problematic' of the relation between the 'Knower' and the 'Known', later to re-surface in German Idealism (and then later still in 'Materialist Dialectics') as a key component in the alleged relationship between 'Thought' and 'Being'.

In the work of more modern and increasingly secular theorists, the mind became an inner arena, wherein the bourgeois 'Mind'/'Soul', acting now as a social atom, could not so much represent to itself 'divine verities', but instead the 'information' the senses sent its way -- in many cases with the former shaping the latter. In general, this family of theories held that such 'information' was processed by means of one or more of the following: (1) A set of 'innate' principles, (2) Privately applied rules or habits of mind, (3) A collection of (arbitrarily chosen) 'categories' and/or 'concepts', supposedly either granted to us by 'god' or necessitated by our psychological, 'logical', or more recently, our genetic make-up.

On this view, language was primarily regarded as a means by which the inner microcosm could be put in the right intellectual order so that it was capable of mirroring the outer macrocosm. Only then was language seen as a means of communication. And even then language merely served to give expression to private 'acts of intellection/meaning'. 'Social meaning' was constructed out of atomised units such as these, cobbled-together inside each individual, bourgeois skull. The social was thus an expression of the individual, not the other way round. [These days this is called 'Methodological Individualism'.]

For both Rationalist and Empiricist philosophers, in the end, truth was to be attained by examining the contents of our minds (which somehow miraculously 'emerged' from some brain state or other) -- the difference between these two traditions now revolved around stories their respective ideologues told in order to turn this subjective world into an 'objective' account of reality -- which, naturally, they now found hard to prove existed!

Give or take a few complications, this is largely how things remain to this day. The dualism of Mind/World, coupled with Representationalist theories of knowledge and cognition have kept 'western' thought permanently teetering on the edge of Idealism and Scepticism for more than two millennia.

And this predicament is not likely to alter this side of massive social change.

So, outside the Marxist tradition, language is seen secondarily as a means of communication --, and this was only so that the private thoughts of each Social Atom might be shared with other such Atoms.

This dominant paradigm pictures each 'mind' as representing the world to itself first -- perhaps constructing a private language in order to do so -- using "the light of reason", an inner "language of thought", or activating a "transformational grammar" (now "unbounded Merge" in Chomsky's work), and/or a "Language Acquisition Device", before it is able to convey its thoughts to other 'minds' in like predicament. Indeed, only because of such inner goings on could human beings be said to have any thoughts at all to convey. 'Thought', on this view, is not therefore a social phenomenon, but a private, hidden, and essentially individual process.



And that is why we find in most forms of modern Cognitive Theory the 'mind' is pictured as a set of compartments, or processors, juggling with various 'representations' -- the work hived-off to various 'modules' now seen as specialised, deskilled mental subcontractors, the bourgeois social division of labour revealingly mirrored in the operation of our mental economy --, with each whole person and her/his 'consciousness' reduced to the sum of these fragmented parts.

The view of the 'world' this approach attributes to each one of us is no longer that which was intended by the 'gods', it is that which is contrived by our genes. As if to cap it all, of late, 'Evolutionary Psychology' (now the dominant intellectual force in this area) projects the origin of the inner bourgeois individual (which we are all supposed to carry around in our heads) back tens of thousands of years, informing us that selfishness, individualism, male dominance, the instinct to "truck and barter", and much more besides, are all hard-wired in our brains -- to such an extent that we would be foolish even to try to resist them.

Once more, we see the status quo under-written by a new set of ruling ideas, this time dressed up in the language of Neo-Darwinism, Genetics and Cognitive Science.

Each and everyone of us is thus pictured as a perfectly selfish, social atom before we even begin to speak.

The bourgeois individual is indeed alive and well, and living in a skull near you!

Worse still, this particular set of ruling ideas aims to rule all our other ideas --, it even overshadows and dominates the doctrines invented by erstwhile revolutionaries, as we have seen many times over, here at RevLeft.

Of course, the problem here is that if correct, each of these remarkably general theories would be trapped in the private world of its inventor, with no legitimate avenue of escape. Since no two theorists (or indeed human beings) can possibly share the same ideas, communication on this view would be impossible.

Naturally, this only serves to undermine further the already insecure rationale that exists for adopting representationalism in the first place.

The end result of all this is that Marx and Engels's insight that language is the product of collective labour and communal life -- so that its primary role lies in communication -- has never seriously been considered, let alone adopted, even by those who claim to be Marxists!

To that end, the ordinary language of the working class has been distorted, denigrated and depreciated (by ruling-class thinkers from ancient times onward -- and far too many revolutionaries, too) as part of a class-motivated assault on the vernacular. As Marx pointed out:


"The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970) [I]The German Ideology, p.118. Bold emphases added.]

This is partly because it is impossible to make such theories work in the vernacular....

I have gone into this in extensive detail here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page_13_03.htm

[synthesis]

In fact, I am saying the obvious: your brain is part of you.

I'd always thought that the materialist perspective was the other way around. No?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Synthesis:


I'd always thought that the materialist perspective was the other way around.

Indeed, and that's why I have argued that this allegedly materialist perspective has been compromised by ruling-class ideology. See my reply to El_V above.

[synthesis]

Synthesis:



Indeed, and that's why I have argued that this allegedly materialist perspective has been compromised by ruling-class ideology. See my reply to El_V above.

I read that post twice and I'm still confused as to what you're arguing is "materialist" and how it has been "compromised." It seems to me that in the copy-and-paste you're arguing against the use of the materialist paradigm to justify individualism, yet here and in that last thread I'm getting the impression that you are arguing against the materialist conception of the self entirely.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Synthesis:


I read that post twice and I'm still confused as to what you're arguing is "materialist" and how it has been "compromised."

Modern 'materialist' theories have accepted the bourgeios individualist view of the mind and the central problematic of Descartes's work -- which is that when it comes to cognition, we represent the world to ourselves as social atoms first and then attempt to communiscate our ideas to others second. As part of this, it also accepts the idea that there is something called 'consciousness', or 'the mind', which we are all immediately aware of, even if it attempts to give a different account of its origin.

Instead of questioning this ancient view of mind and language, it seeks to find a 'materialist' solution to it. But the 'solutions' on offer in fact undermine the social nature of discourse, destroy any possibility of communication and run counter to how we actually use language.


It seems to me that in the copy-and-paste you're arguing against the use of the materialist paradigm to justify individualism, yet here and in that last thread I'm getting the impression that you are arguing against the materialist conception of the self entirely.

Not at all. Where on earth did you get that idea? It can be found nowhere in anything I have posted.

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

So Rosa, you are saying that the history of scientific inquiry, specifically as concerns the mind in this case, but generally all science really, is nothing more than that i.e. a history. In other words, "mainstream" science is not shaped so much by the discovery of truths through reason, logic or what have you, but by social, cultural and historical circumstance (in this case, religion)?

If that's the case, then why does advanced technology work? Lasers and nuclear reactors don't work by the power of belief.

[synthesis]

Modern 'materialist' theories have accepted the bourgeios individualist view of the mind and the central problematic of Descartes's work -- which is that when it comes to cognition, we represent the world to ourselves as social atoms first and then attempt to communiscate our ideas to others second. As part of this, it also accepts the idea that there is something called 'consciousness', or 'the mind', which we are all immediately aware of, even if it attempts to give a different account of its origin.

Instead of questioning this ancient view of mind and language, it seeks to find a 'materialist' solution to it. But the 'solutions' on offer in fact undermine the social nature of discourse, destroy any possibility of communication and run counter to how we actually use language.

I still don't see what this has to do with the original article; "fear" is not necessarily social, nor does it necessarily involve how we use language and communication.


Where on earth did you get that idea?

Magic, I suppose.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Noxion:


If that's the case, then why does advanced technology work? Lasers and nuclear reactors don't work by the power of belief.

Well, we already know that practical applications do not show that a given theory is true. [Details provided on request.]

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Synthesis:


I still don't see what this has to do with the original article; "fear" is not necessarily social, nor does it necessarily involve how we use language and communication.

Well, the point is that I was challenging the dominant Cartesian Paradigm that the quotation at the beginning of the thread in question (over in science) expressed. There, fear (or its 'generation') is located in the brain. This is not so since fear typically involves the response of the whole person to the object of fear. The brain is certainly a necessary component in this, but it does not generate fear (nor is fear located there, literally or metaphorically), and for the reasons I outlined in the posts Noxion trashed (since he could not adequately answer my arguments).

And this manifestly does involve language, since any scientist who tries to explain her theory to us has to use language, and, as the aforementioned posts showed, that language has been compromised by the Platonic/Christian/Cartesian Paradigm.


"fear" is not necessarily social

Well, the language we use to express it, describe it and make sense of it is most definitely social. In that sense, fear is a social phenomenon.


Magic, I suppose.

I take it that this means that you now agree I am not defending -- or expressing -- an individualist perspective here.

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

Noxion:



Well, we already know that practical applications do not show that a given theory is true. [Details provided on request.]

Maybe not totally true in all of the niggling little details, but true enough to be able to do stuff, which is what really matters at the end of the day.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Noxion:


Maybe not totally true in all of the niggling little details, but true enough to be able to do stuff, which is what really matters at the end of the day.

No, totally false, in fact.

For example, Laplace used Caloric Theory to derive a precise theory of sound that wasn't superceded for over a hundred years. And it was totally false.



Sadi Carnot developed his principle of the Carnot cycle, which still forms the basis of heat engine theory, solely from the caloric viewpoint.

However, one of the greatest confirmations of the caloric theory was Pierre-Simon Laplace's theoretical correction of Sir Isaac Newton’s pulse equation. Laplace, a calorist, added a constant to Newton’s equation, which we refer to today as the adiabatic index of a gas. This addition not only substantially corrected the theoretical prediction of the speed of sound, but also continued to make even more accurate predictions for almost a century afterward, even as measurements of the index became more precise.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caloric_theory

Ptolemy's system also made accurate predictions for many centuries. In fact, the allegedly superior Copernican system was no more accurate than the older, geocentric theory had been. Indeed, Ptolemy's system was refined progressively in line with observation for over a thousand years, and it became more accurate as a result. Despite that, it was no nearer to what we might now regard as the 'truth'.

And, correct theories can sometimes fail, and they can do so for many years. For instance, Copernican Astronomy predicted stellar parallax, which was not observed until 1838 with the work of Friedrich Bessel, three hundred years after De revolutionibus orbium coelestium was published.

There are many more examples...

[Sean]

RevLeft Members Forum A forum for members to discuss and ask questions about established board policy or make complaints about board or Admin/Mod decisions. Proposals to alter board policy can only be made by Committed Users in a specific Proposal forum. Warning Points (Infractions) and Moderator & Admin actions are logged in this forum.
It seems like there's now a healthy debate going on from the posts that were trashed. How about the trashed posts get brought back out, stuck onto the beginning of this thread and then moved somewhere else. If this isn't a scientific discussion you better believe its not a discussion about mod decisions anymore. I've just wasted 20 minutes of my life reading your walls of text searching for even a glimmer of either side of this getting to the fucking point, something that hasn't and will not happen. Get out. All of you, and take your discussion with you.:D

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

No, totally false, in fact.

For example, Laplace used Caloric Theory to derive a precise theory of sound that wasn't superceded for over a hundred years. And it was totally false.

Then science moved on, discovering the atomic/molecular nature of matter and how that is involved in the transfer of heat energy. I'm not seeing the problem.


Ptolemy's system also made accurate predictions for many centuries. In fact, the allegedly superior Copernican system was no more accurate than the older, geocentric theory had been. Indeed, Ptolemy's system was refined progressively in line with observation for over a thousand years, and it became more accurate as a result. Despite that, it was no nearer to what we might now regard as the 'truth'.

Ptolemy's model violated what we would now call the principle of parsimony as well as what we now call the Copernican Principle. It's not just that our knowledge of the universe improves, but also our methods for gathering it.


And, correct theories can sometimes fail, and they can do so for many years. For instance, Copernican Astronomy predicted stellar parallax, which was not observed until 1838 with the work of Friedrich Bessel, three hundred years after De revolutionibus orbium coelestium was published.

This just shows up the importance of exhaustive observations/experiments, trying to push the boundaries of our methods and equipment.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Noxion:


Then science moved on, discovering the atomic/molecular nature of matter and how that is involved in the transfer of heat energy. I'm not seeing the problem.

Science always 'moves on'. The evidence from the History of Science (in which the vast majority of theories have turned out false -- see below) suggests that this will continue to happen. There is no evidence it won't.

And, of course, the inventors of atomic theory got it wrong, too. Who now believes in the indivisible atoms of Dalton? Then the early theories of the atom went out of the window. Who now believes in the 'current bun' atom of Cavendish, or the solar system theory of Rutherford? Now the Standard Model is under pressure....

In fact, some theorists now question the existence of sub-atomic particles, preferring to talk of probability waves.

So, it looks like the prediction above based on the history of science is coming true before our eyes.


Ptolemy's model violated what we would now call the principle of parsimony as well as what we now call the Copernican Principle. It's not just that our knowledge of the universe improves, but also our methods for gathering it.

Not so; the 'principle of parsimony' does not work. No one has been able to specify what it is in non-question-begging terms.

For example, this is what Professor Mills (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Mills_(physicist)) had to say about Ptolemy's system:


"Another way of stating the principle of equivalence, a way that better reflects its name, is to say that all reference frames, including accelerated reference frames, are equivalent, that the laws of Physics take the same form in any reference frame…. And it is also correct to say that the Copernican view (with the sun at the centre) and the Ptolemaic view (with the earth at the centre) are equally valid and equally consistent!" [Mills (1994), pp.182-83. Spelling altered to conform to UK English.]



Mills, R. (1994), [I]Space, Time And Quanta (W H Freeman).

Here is what Nobel Laureate Max Born (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Max_Born) had to say about it:


"Thus from Einstein's point of view Ptolemy and Copernicus are equally right. What point of view is chosen is a matter of expediency. For the mechanics of the planetary system the view of Copernicus is certainly the more convenient. But it is meaningless to call the gravitational fields that occur when a different system of reference is chosen 'fictitious' in contrast with the 'real' fields produced by near masses: it is just as meaningless as the question of the 'real' length of a rod...in the special theory of relativity. A gravitational field is neither 'real' nor 'fictitious' in itself. It has no meaning at all independent of the choice of coordinates, just as in the case of the length of a rod." [Born (1965), p.345. I owe this reference to Rosser (1967).]

Rosser, W. (1967), Introductory Relativity (Plenum Press).

And here is what Fred Hoyle (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fred_Hoyle) FRS had to say:


"Instead of adding further support to the heliocentric picture of the planetary motions the Einstein theory goes in the opposite direction, giving increased respectability to the geocentric picture. The relation of the two pictures is reduced to a mere coordinate transformation and it is the main tenet of the Einstein theory that any two ways of looking at the world which are related to each other by a coordinate transformation are entirely equivalent from a physical point of view....

"Today we cannot say that the Copernican theory is 'right' and the Ptolemaic theory 'wrong' in any meaningful physical sense...." [Hoyle (1973), pp.78-79.]

"We now know that the difference between a heliocentric theory and a geocentric theory is one of relative motion only, and that such a difference has no physical significance. But such an understanding had to await Einstein's theory of gravitation in order to be fully clarified." [Hoyle (1975), p.416.]

Hoyle, F. (1973), Nicolaus Copernicus. An Essay On His Life And Work (Heinemann).

--------, (1975), Astronomy And Cosmology. A Modern Course (W H Freeman).

Of course, it could always be claimed, as you do, that Copernican theory is simpler than the Ptolemaic system, but until we receive a clear sign that nature works according to our notion of simplicity (or cares a fig about it), that argument won't wash.

This is quite apart from the fact that 'simplicity' is impossible to define in non-question-begging terms, as I pointed out above. For example, which is the simpler of these two formulae?

(1) θ = Ae^-kt

(2) θ = At^2 + Bt + C

(2) is algebraically 'simpler', but (1) is 'simpler' if we judge simplicity on the basis of the number of terms used.

On this, see Losee (2001), pp.228-29.

Losee, J. (2001), A Historical Introduction To The Philosophy Of Science (Oxford University Press, 4th ed.).

This principle has also been put to misuse many times (so it is unreliable at best). For example, George Berkeley (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Berkeley) used it to argue that matter did not exist. According to him, we need postulate minds and their ideas alone to account for everything. Sure he was selective in his use of this 'principle', but then that is the problem: it is entirely subjective what counts as more 'simple' or 'parsimonious'.

For example, is it 'simpler' or more 'parsimonious' to postulate the existence of 'Dark Matter (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dark_matter)' and 'Dark Energy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dark_energy)' to account for the missing mass in the universe, or adjust a few constants and a few equations (as they do in MOND (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modified_Newtonian_dynamics))?

It's also worth re-calling that this point that no one knows what 'Dark Matter' or 'Dark Energy' are, nor have they been observed yet.

Those who know the history of science will be quite content at this point to apply the 'pessimistic meta-induction' mentioned above, and predict these will go the way of the following over the next few years:

The fifth element, homunculi, the music of the spheres, the spheres themselves, mermaids, humours, cosmic vortices, substantial forms, effluvia, witches, demons, mermaids, the Ether, Phlogiston, Caloric, the Immobile Continents, the Planet Vulcan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vulcan_(hypothetical_planet)) (not the one on Star Trek!)...,

which scientists used to believe in, once.

As Stanford noted (you have seen this quotation before):


"...[I]n the historical progression from Aristotelian to Cartesian to Newtonian to contemporary mechanical theories, the evidence available at the time each earlier theory was accepted offered equally strong support to each of the (then-unimagined) later alternatives. The same pattern would seem to obtain in the historical progression from elemental to early corpuscularian chemistry to Stahl's phlogiston theory to Lavoisier's oxygen chemistry to Daltonian atomic and contemporary physical chemistry; from various versions of preformationism to epigenetic theories of embryology; from the caloric theory of heat to later and ultimately contemporary thermodynamic theories; from effluvial theories of electricity and magnetism to theories of the electromagnetic ether and contemporary electromagnetism; from humoral imbalance to miasmatic to contagion and ultimately germ theories of disease; from 18th Century corpuscular theories of light to 19th Century wave theories to contemporary quantum mechanical conception; from Hippocrates's pangenesis to Darwin's blending theory of inheritance (and his own 'gemmule' version of pangenesis) to Wiesmann's germ-plasm theory and Mendelian and contemporary molecular genetics; from Cuvier's theory of functionally integrated and necessarily static biological species or Lamarck's autogenesis to Darwinian evolutionary theory; and so on in a seemingly endless array of theories, the evidence for which ultimately turned out to support one or more unimagined competitors just as well. Thus, the history of scientific enquiry offers a straightforward inductive rationale for thinking that there are alternatives to our best theories equally well-confirmed by the evidence, even when we are unable to conceive of them at the time." [Stanford (2001), p.9.]

P. K. Stanford, (2001), 'Refusing The Devil's Bargain: What Kind Of Underdetermination Should We Take Seriously?', in Barrett and Alexander (2001), pp.1-12.

Barrett, J., and Alexander, J. (2001), (eds.), PSA 2000, Part 1, Supplement to Philosophy of Science 68, 3 (University of Chicago Press).

[PSA = Philosophy of Science Association; the PSA volumes comprise papers submitted to its biennial meeting.]

What about Alan Guth's 'Inflation Theory'? Here is what the New Scientist had to say:


"Ptolemy, the ancient Greek astronomer, is renowned in scientific circles for thinking up a cosmological system in which the sun and planets orbit the Earth. It had to be tweaked to fit every new astronomical observation, and the end result was an elaborate system of epicycles. When Copernicus showed that the observations fitted more elegantly with a theory in which the Earth went around the sun, Ptolemy's work became redundant. Now when scientists call a system Ptolemaic, they mean it is clunky, over-elaborate and in need of a revolution.

"One theory facing such an accusation is inflation, the idea that something caused the universe to blow up rapidly moments after the big bang. When Alan Guth proposed it in 1980, inflation solved almost all the problems with big bang cosmology. It still does -- but physicists are beginning to doubt whether it really is the answer." [New Scientist 2569, 07/06/08, p.5.]

But if 'Inflation' goes out of the window, 'Big Bang Theory' is in big trouble, too, as it is if the Standard Model dies a decent death soon. [Does this even look like 'mature science'?]

And so the sorry tale goes on.

So, if the History of Science teaches us anything, it's that few scientific theories should be trusted to remain in place for long, and none at all forever.


This just shows up the importance of exhaustive observations/experiments, trying to push the boundaries of our methods and equipment.

Indeed, and that includes observing what the History of Science teaches us.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Incidentally, anyone mystified how all this began should check this thread out:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/rosa-cant-take-t146716/index.html

Which was removed by Noxion from this thread:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/brain-damaged-woman-t146665/index.html

Which thread, comrades will no doubt note, no one wanted to discusss (other than yours truly).

[Apoi_Viitor]

If that's the case, then why does advanced technology work? Lasers and nuclear reactors don't work by the power of belief.

While the facts and evidences that underlie scientific knowledge may very well be true, our understanding, our focus, and our application of these truths are governed by the relations of power in a given society.

"Let me take a very simple example, which I will not analyze, but which is this: How was it possible that men began, at the end of the eighteenth century, for the first time in the history of Western thought and of Western knowledge, to open up the corpses of people in order to know what was the source, the origin, the anatomical needle, of the particular malady which was responsible for their deaths?
The idea seems simple enough. Well, four or five thousand years of medicine in the West were needed before we had the idea of looking for the cause of the malady in the lesion of a corpse.
If you tried to explain this by the personality of Bichat, I believe that would be without interest. If, on the contrary, you tried to establish the place of disease and of death in society at the end of the eighteenth century, and what interest industrial society effectively had in quadrupling the entire population in order to expand and develop itself, as a result of which medical surveys of society were made, big hospitals were opened, etc.; if you tried to find out how medical knowledge became institutionalized in that period, how its relations with other kinds of knowledge were ordered, well, then you could see how the relationship between disease, the hospitalized, ill person, the corpse, and pathological anatomy were made possible." (Foucault)

...science is a body of knowledge which is underpinned by the shared assumptions of those engaged in it...scientific discourse is not distinct from political or cultural knowledge; in fact, discourse in science derives its power from the social structures that support it, not from its intrinsic value as a reflection of reality. Scientific progress is not, then, a slow evolution similar to our common conception of biological change, but is marked by ruptures and discontinuities, which are driven by modifications

"in the rules of formation of statements which are accepted as scientifically true. Thus it is not a change of content (refutation of old errors, recovery of old truths), nor is it a change of theoretical form (renewal of paradigm, modification of systematic ensembles). It is a question of what governs statements, and the way in which they govern each other so as to constitute a set of propositions which are scientifically acceptable, and hence capable of being verified or falsified by scientific procedures..." (Foucault and Rabinow 54).

"For a long time the idea has existed that the sciences, knowledge, followed a certain line of "progress", obeying the principle of "growth", and the principle of the convergence of all these kinds of knowledge. And yet when one sees how the European understanding, which turned out to be a world-wide and universal understanding in a historical and geographical sense, developed, can one say that there has been growth? I, myself, would say that it has been much more a matter of transformation.
Take, as an example, animal and plant classifications. How often have they not been rewritten since the Middle Ages according to completely different rules: by symbolism, by natural history, by comparative anatomy, by the theory of evolution. Each time this rewriting makes the knowledge completely different in its functions, in its economy, in its internal relations. You have there a principle of divergence, much more than one of growth. I would much rather say that there are many different ways of making possible simultaneously a few types of knowledge. There is, therefore, from a certain point of view, always an excess of data in relation to possible systems in a given period, which causes them to be experienced within their boundaries, even in their deficiency, which means that one fails to realise their creativity; and from another point of view, that of the historian, there is an excess, a proliferation of systems for a small amount of data, from which originates the widespread idea that it is the discovery of new facts which determines movement in the history of science." (Foucault)

[synthesis]

Well, the point is that I was challenging the dominant Cartesian Paradigm that the quotation at the beginning of the thread in question (over in science) expressed. There, fear (or its 'generation') is located in the brain. This is not so since fear typically involves the response of the whole person to the object of fear. The brain is certainly a necessary component in this, but it does not generate fear (nor is fear located there, literally or metaphorically), and for the reasons I outlined in the posts Noxion trashed (since he could not adequately answer my arguments).

Ah, okay. I think I may have misunderstood you. In terms of the distinction between "me" (as a conception of consciousness) and "my brain," I thought you were referring to the idea that the former is separable from the latter.


And this manifestly does involve language, since any scientist who tries to explain her theory to us has to use language, and, as the aforementioned posts showed, that language has been compromised by the Platonic/Christian/Cartesian Paradigm.

Your argument is that "fear" is not being considered as a social phenomenon? How would you explain this to a 15-year-old? (I have read some Wittgenstein, so I think I get the basis of your argument, but not your conclusion.)


I take it that this means that you now agree I am not defending -- or expressing -- an individualist perspective here.

I think the first part of this post explains why I got the impression that you were arguing against the materialist conception of the self. When I said "it seems... you're arguing against the use of the materialist paradigm to justify individualism," it was vaguely phrased - I didn't mean you were trying to justify individualism, but that you were arguing against people who seek to justify it through materialism.

(Thanks for the feedback on the essay, by the way - I need to get better at responding to people like that.)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Synthesis:


In terms of the distinction between "me" (as a conception of consciousness) and "my brain," I thought you were referring to the idea that the former is separable from the latter.

Well, as I hope you can now see, I reject the theoretical use of the word 'consciousness', since it is different from the Platonic/Christian/Cartesian 'soul' in name only.


Your argument is that "fear" is not being considered as a social phenomenon? How would you explain this to a 15-year-old? (I have read some Wittgenstein, so I think I get the basis of your argument, but not your conclusion.)

1. Depends on the 15 year old in question, and what he/she already knows.

2. I'm neither accepting nor rejecting, proposing or denying that fear is a social phenomenon (except in the sense I mentioned earlier) since that would be to adopt a philosophical position in relation to it. As you no doubt know, it is central to Wittgenstein's method to avoid formulating philosophical theories -- quite the opposite, in fact, his method is aimed at undermining the lot.


I think the first part of this post explains why I got the impression that you were arguing against the materialist conception of the self. When I said "it seems... you're arguing against the use of the materialist paradigm to justify individualism," it was vaguely phrased - I didn't mean you were trying to justify individualism, but that you were arguing against people who seek to justify it through materialism.

Ok, I'm sorry I wasn't too clear.


(Thanks for the feedback on the essay, by the way - I need to get better at responding to people like that.)

Er, what 'feedback' is this?

[synthesis]

Well, as I hope you can now see, I reject the theoretical use of the word 'consciousness', since it is different from the Platonic/Christian/Cartesian 'soul' in name only.

Are you contrasting the "theoretical" use of the word, with, say, an empirical use of the word, as it relates to neurology, for example?


1. Depends on the 15 year old in question, and what he/she already knows.

2. I'm neither accepting nor rejecting, proposing or denying that fear is a social phenomenon (except in the sense I mentioned earlier) since that would be to adopt a philosophical position in relation to it. As you no doubt know, it is central to Wittgenstein's method to avoid formulating philosophical theories -- quite the opposite, in fact, his method is aimed at undermining the lot.

So how might you succinctly describe your objection to the original article?


Er, what 'feedback' is this?

About Dawkins? It was a while ago.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Synthesis:


Are you contrasting the "theoretical" use of the word, with, say, an empirical use of the word, as it relates to neurology, for example?

In fact, the latter has been compromised by the former.


So how might you succinctly describe your objection to the original article?

In Wittgenstein's words, in fact:


"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a 'young science'; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory). For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case conceptual confusion and methods of proof.)" [Wittgenstein (1958) Philosophical Investigations, §xiv, p.232e.]

You:


About Dawkins? It was a while ago.

Ah, I see.

I have yet to add several comments to that thread. I would have done so had this thread not kicked off.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

For anyone interested, you can see yet another psychologist/philosopher -- Owen Flanagan -- take these 'metaphors' literally in this week's New Scientist (18th December, 2010), page 44.

http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20827911.300-an-advertisement-for-maddog-brain-modularity.html

In fact, hardly an issue goes by without someone else doing likewise. Indeed, in this issue, on page 14, we are informed that parts of your brain can 'predict' things!

http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20827914.100-liar-liar-brain-circuit-predicts-others-honesty.html

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

For those who think this is just a matter of 'semantics', Physicist David Peat (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F._David_Peat) had this to say about the careful use of language in Quantum Mechanics:


"It hasn't been a great couple of years for theoretical physics. Books such as Lee Smolin's (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lee_Smolin) The Trouble with Physics (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Trouble_with_Physics) and Peter Woit's (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Woit) Not Even Wrong (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Not_Even_Wrong) embody the frustration felt across the field that string theory (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/String_theory), the brightest hope for formulating a theory that would explain the universe in one beautiful equation, has been getting nowhere. It's quite a comedown from the late 1980s and 1990s, when a grand unified theory (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Unified_Theory) seemed just around the corner and physicists believed they would soon, to use Stephen Hawking's (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephen_Hawking) words, 'know the mind of God'. New Scientist even ran an article called 'The end of physics'.

"So what went wrong? Why are physicists finding it so hard to make that final step? I believe part of the answer was hinted at by the great physicist Niels Bohr (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niels_Bohr), when he wrote: 'It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out about nature. Physics concerns what we can say about nature.'

"At first sight that seems strange. What has language got to do with it? After all, we see physics as about solving equations relating to facts about the world -- predicting a comet's path, or working out how fast heat flows along an iron bar. The language we choose to convey question or answer is not supposed to fundamentally affect the nature of the result.

"Nonetheless, that assumption started to unravel one night in the spring of 1925, when the young Werner Heisenberg (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Werner_Heisenberg) worked out the basic equations of what became known as quantum mechanics. One of the immediate consequences of these equations was that they did not permit us to know with total accuracy both the position and the velocity of an electron: there would always be a degree of irreducible uncertainty in these two values.

"Heisenberg needed an explanation for this. He reasoned thus: suppose a very delicate (hypothetical) microscope is used to observe the electron, one so refined that it uses only a single photon of energy to make its measurement. First it measures the electron's position, then it uses a second photon to measure the speed, or velocity. But in making this latter observation, the second photon has imparted a little kick to the electron and in the process has shifted its position. Try to measure the position again and we disturb the velocity. Uncertainty arises, Heisenberg argued, because every time we observe the universe we disturb its intrinsic properties.

"However, when Heisenberg showed his results to Bohr, his mentor, he had the ground cut from under his feet. Bohr argued that Heisenberg had made the unwarranted assumption that an electron is like a billiard ball in that it has a 'position' and possesses a 'speed'. These are classical notions, said Bohr, and do not make sense at the quantum level. The electron does not necessarily have an intrinsic position or speed, or even a particular path. Rather, when we try to make measurements, quantum nature replies in a way we interpret using these familiar concepts.

"This is where language comes in. While Heisenberg argued that 'the meaning of quantum theory is in the equations', Bohr pointed out that physicists still have to stand around the blackboard and discuss them in German, French or English. Whatever the language, it contains deep assumptions about space, time and causality -- assumptions that do not apply to the quantum world. Hence, wrote Bohr, 'we are suspended in language such that we don't know what is up and what is down'. Trying to talk about quantum reality generates only confusion and paradox.

"Unfortunately Bohr's arguments are often put aside today as some physicists discuss ever more elaborate mathematics, believing their theories to truly reflect subatomic reality. I remember a conversation with string theorist Michael Green (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Green_(physicist)) a few years after he and John Schwartz (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Henry_Schwarz) (sic) published a paper in 1984 that was instrumental in making string theory mainstream. Green remarked that when Einstein was formulating the theory of relativity he had thought deeply about the philosophical problems involved, such as the nature of the categories of space and time. Many of the great physicists of Einstein's generation read deeply in philosophy.

"In contrast, Green felt, string theorists had come up with a mathematical formulation that did not have the same deep underpinning and philosophical inevitability. Although superstrings were for a time an exciting new approach, they did not break conceptual boundaries in the way that the findings of Bohr, Heisenberg and Einstein had done.

"The American quantum theorist David Bohm (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Bohm) embraced Bohr's views on language, believing that at the root of Green's problem is the structure of the languages we speak. European languages, he noted, perfectly mirror the classical world of Newtonian physics. When we say 'the cat chases the mouse' we are dealing with well-defined objects (nouns), which are connected via verbs. Likewise, classical physics deals with objects that are well located in space and time, which interact via forces and fields. But if the world doesn't work the way our language does, advances are inevitably hindered.

"Bohm pointed out that quantum effects are much more process-based, so to describe them accurately requires a process-based language rich in verbs, and in which nouns play only a secondary role....

"Physics as we know it is about equations and quantitative measurement. But what these numbers and symbols really mean is a different, more subtle matter. In interpreting the equations we must remember the limitations language places on how we can think about the world...." [Peat (2008), pp.41-43. Bold emphases added.]

Peat, D. (2008), 'Trapped In A World View (http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg19726373.300-is-there-a-language-problem-with-quantum-physics.html)?', New Scientist 197, 2637, pp.42-43. [The on-line version of this article has a different title.]

In which case, a sloppy approach to language can only make a bad situation worse.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Meridian has just sent me a link to an interview with Peter Hacker (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Hacker) (a leading Wittgensteinian) which underlines many of the points I have tried to make in this thread:

http://www.philosophypress.co.uk/?p=1583

Except, I distance myself from his comments on the evolution of 'consciousness'.