View Full Version : Dialectics in Practice?
DarkNation
24th November 2010, 03:12
I learned a basic bit of information about Marxist Dialectics a little while ago, thinking I was behind on philosophy that deals with economy and whatnot.
So, I saw some people saying that "Marxist Dialectics" have failed, but I don't completely understand what they mean by that. Explain to me how those dialectics are practiced within socialism or economics or whatever they mean by that, and how they "failed".
28350
24th November 2010, 03:16
I second this.
People (online) ***** about whether or not dialectics is correct or not, but do people actually use dialectics to analyze a situation? Or do they just slap the word "dialectical" on their conclusion after the fact?
S.Artesian
24th November 2010, 04:24
Actually, yeah I use it, dialectic as Marx demonstrated it. It is engagement through opposition, critique of capital, based on capital's own organization; capital's own process of expanded reproduction.
Thirsty Crow
24th November 2010, 09:19
Actually, yeah I use it, dialectic as Marx demonstrated it. It is engagement through opposition, critique of capital, based on capital's own organization; capital's own process of expanded reproduction.
Actually, not only the analysis of capitalism is suitable for this "dialectic" method or approach.
Recently, ComradeOm has demonstrated how simple causal relations are of very limited use in historiography.
Simple really, Aristotelian causality is often of very limited use when discussing history. The idea that X caused Y or that A was a result of B is not much help when discussing complex processes that took place over centuries. A purely linear interpretation of history is deeply flawed. Herein lie the advantages of a simple dialectal (note: not 'dialectal materialism' or other abstract theories) approach that treats two, or more, forces as continually impacting on each other and propelling each other forward
To give an example: The Crusades are often portrayed as either a product of the Gregorian Reforms that sought to centralise the Church's authority and reach, or a cause for the increasing Papal interest in exercising temporal/secular power. The reality is that they were both. Over the course of four or five centuries the search for increased Church authority (on the part of the Papacy) and the more popular and diffuse 'Crusading spirit', if we can call it that, continually interacted with and reinforced each other*. They are two distinct strands that have to be considered side-by-side and not as a matter of cause and effect
*To be simplistic of course. There were at least half a dozen major factors at play here
Rosa Lichtenstein
24th November 2010, 09:26
Us non-mystics have been asking for a practical application of thus useless 'method' at least since I have been posting here, and we have yet to recieve a coherent reply.
And that is no surprise; there can be no practical application of non-sense any more than there can be a practical application of the following:
'Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe:
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.
"Beware the Jabberwock, my son!
The jaws that bite, the claws that catch!
Beware the Jubjub bird, and shun
The frumious Bandersnatch!"
He took his vorpal sword in hand:
Long time the manxome foe he sought --
So rested he by the Tumtum tree,
And stood awhile in thought.
And, as in uffish thought he stood,
The Jabberwock, with eyes of flame,
Came whiffling through the tulgey wood,
And burbled as it came!
One, two! One, two! And through and through
The vorpal blade went snicker-snack!
He left it dead, and with its head
He went galumphing back.
"And, has thou slain the Jabberwock?
Come to my arms, my beamish boy!
O frabjous day! Callooh! Callay!'
He chortled in his joy.
'Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe;
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.
Other than negative, of course -- to confuse.
So, it's small wonder this 'method' has presided over 150 years of almost total failure.
Rosa Lichtenstein
24th November 2010, 09:29
SA:
Actually, yeah I use it, dialectic as Marx demonstrated it. It is engagement through opposition, critique of capital, based on capital's own organization; capital's own process of expanded reproduction.
No you don't; you use a garbled version of Hegel's method (which Marx abandoned in Das Kapital) in order to concoct a jargon-dominated pseudo-explanation of Capital.
Rosa Lichtenstein
24th November 2010, 09:35
Menocchio:
Simple really, Aristotelian causality is often of very limited use when discussing history. The idea that X caused Y or that A was a result of B is not much help when discussing complex processes that took place over centuries. A purely linear interpretation of history is deeply flawed. Herein lie the advantages of a simple dialectal (note: not 'dialectal materialism' or other abstract theories) approach that treats two, or more, forces as continually impacting on each other and propelling each other forward
To give an example: The Crusades are often portrayed as either a product of the Gregorian Reforms that sought to centralise the Church's authority and reach, or a cause for the increasing Papal interest in exercising temporal/secular power. The reality is that they were both. Over the course of four or five centuries the search for increased Church authority (on the part of the Papacy) and the more popular and diffuse 'Crusading spirit', if we can call it that, continually interacted with and reinforced each other*. They are two distinct strands that have to be considered side-by-side and not as a matter of cause and effect
*To be simplistic of course. There were at least half a dozen major factors at play here
This is a caricature of Aristotle, and ignores his emphasis on formal, material and final causes -- concentrating on efficient causes only:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_causes
It also ignores his organicism.
And, it's also worth pointing out that you only succeed in explaining the Crusades by using concepts drawn from Historical Materialism and ordinary language, not 'dialectics'.
HEAD ICE
24th November 2010, 23:51
An example of dialectics would be the number of seconds you spend farting (quantitative change) which results in the room smelling bad (qualitative change).
Rosa Lichtenstein
25th November 2010, 03:40
Stagger:
An example of dialectics would be the number of seconds you spend farting (quantitative change) which results in the room smelling bad (qualitative change).
Well, if we can take this 'example' seriously, the 'law' you refer to is in fact so vague that it is impossible to tell if it has been -- or can be -- applied correctly or not. On that, see here:
http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm
So, this can't be a practical application of this 'law' since no one seems to know what it entails.
DarkNation
25th November 2010, 07:41
I expected this thread to end up like this. What I'm, more specifically asking, is how do we say that a certain leader used Dialectics? From what I've read recently, Lenin appeared to use Dialectics, so what exactly did that entail? Certain policies or what?
Rosa Lichtenstein
25th November 2010, 16:07
Well, he claimed to have used it here, in criticising Trotsky and Bukharin:
http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1921/jan/25.htm
But his explicit use of 'dialectics' either makes no sense, or it is suicidally impractical.
Here is what I have posted on this before:
The alleged connection between dialectics and practice does not stop there. For example, there is a passage in Lenin's work which records his avowed attempt to counter something he called an "eclectic" tendency in the Bolshevik Party.
According to Lenin, this 'deviation' involved certain comrades (to wit, Bukharin and Trotsky) in an attempt to view matters from disparate and disconnected angles, displaying an "on the one hand this, on the other that" attitude of mind. In response to this Lenin advocated the dialectical method as a necessary corrective.
The flexibility this introduces helps prevent tactical "rigidity", so we are informed. This is because it involves:
"[A]n all round consideration of relationships in their concrete development but not a patchwork of bits and pieces." [Lenin (1921) Once Again on the Trade Unions, p.90.]
It is at this point that Lenin commented on a hapless tumbler:
"A tumbler is assuredly both a glass cylinder and a drinking vessel. But there are more than these two properties and qualities or facets to it; there are an infinite number of them, an infinite number of 'mediacies' and inter-relationships with the rest of the world."
While Lenin mentioned a few of these interconnections, their "infinite number" meant it was impossible to list them all -- as, indeed, he admitted:
"[I]f we are to have true knowledge of an object we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and 'mediacies'. That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely, but the rule of comprehensiveness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity….
"[D]ialectical logic requires that an object should be taken in development, in change, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is not immediately obvious in respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too, is in flux, and this holds especially true for its purpose, use and connection with the surrounding world." [Ibid., p.93.]
However, there are several serious problems arising from the above that threaten to undermine DM-epistemology in its entirety.
DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist.
While Lenin extolled the virtues of concrete analyses, what he offers above is clearly abstract -- that is, it's a description that involves a generalisation, and one which is surely impossible to confirm. In fact, Lenin made no attempt to substantiate his main point that any randomly chosen object is connected with everything in the entire universe and has an infinite number of "mediacies".
Moreover, none of those listening to him challenged him on this (if the record is to be believed). Why was this? If science and Bolshevism are supposed to be joined at the hip, as it were, one would have thought that someone should have asked Lenin how he could possibly know all this about an innocent glass beaker. How could Lenin possibly know that all objects are inter-related in the way he alleged -- or that their connections were infinite in number (or even bigger than, say, 10^100000)?
And why on earth does DL require it if it is indeed a fact?
Do scientists require grass to be green, or water wet?
[DL = Dialectical Logic.]
However, these problems do not stop there. Surely, a more pressing question for revolutionaries is whether Lenin's methodological criteria are at all practicable. Is it even sensible to take everything (or even most things) into consideration before any course of action is contemplated, let alone carried out? As should seem obvious to anyone who has ever had to make a decision at any point in their life, it is impossible to take Lenin seriously here. His advice would not actually prevent rigidity, as had been its aim; on the contrary, it would encourage eternal prevarication, and hence suicidal inaction.
Consider the following unlikely scenario: In late 1917, when Lenin was pressing the case for an insurrection, on the night before the decisive move couldn't a rather confused comrade have argued as follows?
"Comrade Lenin is being presumptuous and dogmatic -- his analysis will undoubtedly lead to serious mistakes.
"We cannot stage the action he suggests until we have first of all considered its infinite connections with everything in the universe, [I]as he himself recommends.
"In that case, I suggest we wait until we have received all the data from the recent study of Proxima Centauri, the report on the latest archaeological dig in Luxor, the weight of comrade Bukharin's entire family, the detailed report on the mating habits of Stag beetles in Mexico, the average length of every wombat born in the Southern Hemisphere in the last ten thousand years, a comprehensive analysis of the dietary habits of Mohawk Indians in the early spring of 1636, the result of the three thirty at Belmont…".
Of course, such an intervention would have been regarded as completely crazy, and rightly laughed off as totally ludicrous -- but only by those who disagreed with Lenin's advice about the absolute necessity of taking into account the "infinite" connections everything has with the entire universe, before anything is undertaken.
Clearly, the 'intervention' above was farcical because it raised issues that were patently irrelevant to the matters in hand.
But, Lenin did not mention relevance. Comrades who doubt this might like to re-check what Lenin actually said about that tumbler, and everything else, to see if they inadvertently missed that particular word first time round:
"A tumbler is assuredly both a glass cylinder and a drinking vessel. But there are more than these two properties and qualities or facets to it; there are an infinite number of them, an infinite number of 'mediacies' and inter-relationships with the rest of the world….
"[I]f we are to have true knowledge of an object we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and 'mediacies'. That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely, but the rule of comprehensiveness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity…." [Lenin (1921), pp.92-93.]
Clearly, the word "relevant" does not appear in this passage; Lenin failed to mention it.
And, as if to make things worse, he did not regard this strategy as an optional extra:
"[D]ialectical logic requires that an object should be taken in development, in change, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is not immediately obvious in respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too, is in flux, and this holds especially true for its purpose, use and connection with the surrounding world." [Ibid., p.93.]
"Dialectics requires an all-round consideration of relationships in their concrete development…. Dialectical logic demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)…." [Ibid., p.90. Bold added.]
Moreover, had Lenin mentioned relevance it would have made his other comments rather pointless. Why, for example, insist that consideration must be given to the infinite connections every object and process has if the overwhelming majority are totally irrelevant and should be ignored?
Worse still, who is to decide what counts as relevant? As seems clear, it would always be open to comrade NN to accuse comrade MM of "rigidity" if the former's set of 'relevant connections' was more inclusive than the latter's.
Again, these difficulties don't stop there. Extending the picture: As the circle of relevant considerations is allowed to increase, the number of borderline cases (each of which would now surely become an occasion for further accusations of "rigidity", if ignored) will increase even more rapidly.
The above assertion is based on the observation that if borderline cases of relevant/non-relevant considerations are to be found anywhere, they will occur along the outer margin of these ever-expanding 'circles' of interconnections (to extend the metaphor a little), as the links each non-"rigid" comrade is actively considering extend outwards. Since the latter regions are in effect 'annular rings', their areas will increase in proportion to the square of the difference between the radii of the surrounding circles. Plainly, this means that as the supposed interconnections widen, borderline cases of 'relevance' will increase even faster, being proportional to the square of the aforementioned radial differences.
Given Lenin's analogy, this would mean that the more interconnections any given comrade includes -- in order to lower his or her 'non-rigidity coefficient', as it were --, the more (i.e., squared more!) borderline cases there will be for him/her to have to ignore because of issues of relevancy, or because of the time available.
In which case, the charge of "rigidity" would become increasingly apposite as greater numbers of such borderline 'relevancies' were progressively ignored. So, the less 'rigid' a comrade appeared to be, the more 'rigid' they would in fact become -- the more that anyone took Lenin's advice, the more "rigid" he/she would automatically appear to be! This is because (of necessity) he or she would have to ignore more borderline cases than would any other comrade who rejected Lenin's advice, and who incorporated fewer connections in his or her analysis on the basis of stricter relevancy clauses -- and, of course, because of the reasonable demands of "sound common sense".
Indeed, if the two-dimensional concentric circles mentioned above are replaced by three dimensional concentric spheres (as a more realistic image of the all-round development of knowledge), the situation would become even worse. Here the volume of each annular shell containing the next set of controversial 'irrelevances' would increase in proportion to the cube of the difference in their radii.
And if we hit this 'problem' with all our metaphorical might, and move to n-dimensional 'knowledge space' (which option we could only exclude if we wish to be accused of "rigidity", even here!), the situation would be worse still, and to the nth power!
So, the wider we expand the circle of relevant considerations, the faster borderline cases will stack up, only to be ignored perhaps by the next allegedly "rigid" comrade in line. Ironically, the more Lenin's advice is taken -- and the wider the relevance net is cast -- the greater this rigidity will seem to become, as ever-increasing numbers of such marginal cases pile up that have to be omitted on alleged grounds of "irrelevance".
Wags might even call this "the law of increasing marginal returns".
Now, it goes without saying that tactical inflexibility is a luxury unsuccessful revolutionaries will only ever enjoy posthumously. Even so, it is still possible (if not highly advisable) to ignore Lenin's advice here without implying such rigidity. Indeed, if revolutionaries had to spend an infinite (or even a large finite) amount of time considering everything before they did anything, they would of course do nothing, rigidly or non-rigidly.
In fact, had they taken Lenin's advice seriously, the Bolsheviks would still be discussing the October insurrection (with its infinite "mediacies")! Their meetings would surely have begun to resemble those of the "People's Front of Judea (Official)" portrayed in Monty Python's Life Of Brian.
Unsurprisingly, even Lenin omitted the infinite "mediacies" he said this hapless tumbler enjoyed. There is no evidence (in the written record of the meeting during which Lenin raised this (dare we say) irrelevant epistemological requirement) that he went on to list the infinite "mediacies" of anything -- or even so much as 10^10 "mediacies" of a single thing in his entire life.
Even less surprising: Those who pay lip-service to the letter of Lenin's advice have yet to list so much as 0.001% of the large finite number of "mediacies" -- mentioned in the last sentence (i.e., 10^10) -- about anything relevant to issues of concern to dialectics, let alone about sundry items of glassware.
Contrary to what Lenin asserted, this clearly means that we should base revolutionary activity on criteria that are far less impractical. In point of fact, as noted above, Lenin's suggestion invites hyper-prevarication, as more 'inclusive' (i.e., less "rigid") comrades dredged-up ever more obscure "mediacies" which must be considered before any specific action was contemplated. And this would surely happen unless such tactical decisions were hedged about with endlessly controversial and increasingly recondite relevancy clauses. Naturally, no revolutionary in his or her left mind would do this. In practice, activists rightly ignore Lenin's criteria -- advice not even he could have followed.
Small wonder then that there is no evidence that he ever did.
So, in practice (whatever else he said in theory), not even Lenin could apply 'dialectics'.
More details here:
http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%20010_01.htm
DarkNation
26th November 2010, 09:15
So, in practice (whatever else he said in theory), not even Lenin could apply 'dialectics'.
Not even Lenin could apply dialectics? Why attack it so much if it can't be used? Or do you see it to simply cause illogical tendencies? Lenin's idea about the tumbler does seem pretty overdone, but I'm not well educated in these types of things, so I tend to ask a lot of questions.
Widerstand
26th November 2010, 10:35
Not even Lenin could apply dialectics? Why attack it so much if it can't be used? Or do you see it to simply cause illogical tendencies? Lenin's idea about the tumbler does seem pretty overdone, but I'm not well educated in these types of things, so I tend to ask a lot of questions.
No one "applied" dialectics. Even in dialectical logic that's a misnomer, since dialectics styles itself as a logic of movement, so any single instance of it's application would ultimately result to reducing it to an isolated, static state, which would not be dialectical. You could say Lenin gave a dialectical analysis in his theory, as in, he described the dialectical characteristics of the things he analyzed/wrote about. Even, then, the dialectical terminology is bothersome, as it claims to grasp things in their totality and movement, as opposed to static, isolated states (which dialecticians claim Arestotelian philosophy to do), yet what it actually does is focus on three isolated, static states - thesis, antithesis, synthesis.
Overall, I wouldn't bother with dialectics. They make for nice mind games and all, but you neither need them to understand any writings, nor to do any analysis really. In fact, the notion that one would need dialectics for anything appears quite absurd, seeing as how no one can either tell you what it is, let alone how to understand or use this self-styled "tool."
Rosa Lichtenstein
26th November 2010, 10:48
DarkNation:
Not even Lenin could apply dialectics? Why attack it so much if it can't be used?
If you look carefully, I actually point out that it's only use is negative. As I have argued here several times, it is in fact the ideology of opportunist and substitutionist (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_01.htm) elements within Marxism. Here is how I made this point (in answer to the question: Why is Dialectical Materialism a World-view?):
There are two interconnected reasons, I think.
1) The founders of this quasi-religion [Dialectical Marxism] weren't workers; they came from a class that educated their children in the classics and in philosophy. This tradition taught that behind appearances there is a hidden world, accessible to thought alone, which is more real than the material universe we see around us.
This way of seeing things was invented by ideologues of the ruling class, who viewed reality this way. They invented it because if you belong to, benefit from or help run a society which is based on gross inequality, oppression and exploitation, you can keep order in several ways.
The first and most obvious way is through violence. This will work for a time, but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation (among other things).
Another way is to persuade the majority (or a significant section of "opinion formers", administrators, 'intellectuals' and theorists, at least) that the present order either works for their benefit, is ordained of the 'gods', or that it is 'natural' and cannot be fought, reformed or negotiated with.
Hence, a world-view is necessary for the ruling-class to carry on ruling in the same old way. While the content of this ruling ideology may have changed with each change in the mode of production, its form has remained largely the same for thousands of years: Ultimate Truth is ascertainable by thought alone, and it can therefore be imposed on reality dogmatically (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2002.htm).
So, these non-worker founders of our movement, who had been educated before they became revolutionaries to believe there was just such a hidden world that governed everything, when they became revolutionaries would naturally look for principles in that invisible world that told them that change was inevitable, and part of the cosmic order. Enter dialectics, courtesy of the dogmatic ideas of a ruling-class mystic called Hegel.
2) That allowed the founders of this quasi-religion to think of themselves as special, as prophets of the new order, which workers, alas, could not quite grasp because of their defective education and their reliance on ordinary language and 'common sense'.
Fortunately, history has predisposed these prophets to ascertain the truth about reality for the rest of us, which means that they must be our 'naturally-ordained' leaders. That in turn meant these 'leaders' were also Teachers of the 'ignorant masses', who could 'legitimately' substitute themselves for the unwashed majority -- in 'their own interests', you understand. This is because the masses are too caught up in 'commodity fetishism' to see the truth for themselves.
And that is why Dialectical Materialism is a world-view.
It is also why dialecticians cling on to this theory like grim death (and become very emotional (and abusive!) when it is attacked by yours truly), since it provides them with a source of consolation that, despite outward appearances to the contrary, and because this hidden world tells them that Dialectical Marxism will one day be a success, everything is in fact OK, and nothing in the core theory needs changing -- in spite of the fact that that core theory says everything changes! Hence, it is ossified into a dogma, and imposed on reality. A rather nice unity of opposites for you to ponder.
So, this 'theory' insulates the militant mind from the facts; it tells such comrades that reality 'contradicts' outward appearances. Hence, even if Dialectical Marxism appears to be a long-term failure, those with the equivalent of a dialectical 'third eye' can see that the opposite is in fact the case: Dialectical Marxism is a ringing success!
In that case, awkward facts can either be ignored or they can be re-configured into their opposites.
Hence:
Dialectics is the sigh of the depressed dialectician, the heart of a heartless world. It is the opiate of the party. The abolition of dialectics as the illusory happiness of the party hack is required for their real happiness. The demand to give up the illusion about its condition is the demand to give up a condition which needs illusions.
Unfortunately, these sad characters will need (materialist) workers to rescue them from themselves.
I stand no chance...
Small wonder then that this 'theory/method' has presided over 150 of almost total failure. More details here:
http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm
http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%20010_01.htm
Or do you see it to simply cause illogical tendencies? Lenin's idea about the tumbler does seem pretty overdone, but I'm not well educated in these types of things, so I tend to ask a lot of questions.
It's not so much illogical as non-sensical -- that is, it is impossible to make any sense of it
Moreover, I used the example I chose from Lenin since there are in fact very few examples of the alleged practical use of this 'theory/method' in the dialectical classsics. Other examples are no less confused, however.
but I'm not well educated in these types of things, so I tend to ask a lot of questions.
And that's why we have a Learning section.:)
Rosa Lichtenstein
26th November 2010, 10:55
Widerstand:
No one "applied" dialectics. Even in dialectical logic that's a misnomer, since dialectics styles itself as a logic of movement, so any single instance of it's application would ultimately result to reducing it to an isolated, static state, which would not be dialectical. You could say Lenin gave a dialectical analysis in his theory, as in, he described the dialectical characteristics of the things he analyzed/wrote about. Even, then, the dialectical terminology is bothersome, as it claims to grasp things in their totality and movement, as opposed to static, isolated states (which dialecticians claim Arestotelian philosophy to do), yet what it actually does is focus on three isolated, static states - thesis, antithesis, synthesis
1) You are right that DM-fans argue that Aristotelian logic depends on a static view of reality, but even here they are mistaken (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2004.htm).
2) However, the summary of the dialectic method you give -- thesis, antithesis, synthesis -- is in fact Kant and/or Fichte's method, not Hegel's:
http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=707195&postcount=7
S.Artesian
26th November 2010, 16:15
Let's not miss the point-- Marx's breakthrough-- his extraction of the "rational kernel" of Hegel's dialectic is not in dialectics as a methodology but rather in the substance of dialectic being real human history, that history being the social organization of the labor process.
So if we keep that in mind-- there are plenty who demonstrated, rather than used, dialectic-- Marx and Engels in their analysis of the 1848 revolutions, and their elaboration of "permanent revolution;" Trotsky in his elaboration of permanent revolution; although who struggled with the implications of uneven and combined development-- even if when mistakes, errors were made.
Dialectic is not a method. It is the analysis, demonstration, resolution of the driving force in human history, which is the conflict between labor and the conditions of labor.
Rosa Lichtenstein
26th November 2010, 16:24
SA:
Let's not miss the point-- Marx's breakthrough-- his extraction of the "rational kernel" of Hegel's dialectic is not in dialectics as a methodology but rather in the substance of dialectic being real human history, that history being the social organization of the labor process.
So if we keep that in mind -- there are plenty who demonstrated, rather than used, dialectic-- Marx and Engels in their analysis of the 1848 revolutions, and their elaboration of "permanent revolution;" Trotsky in his elaboration of permanent revolution; although who struggled with the implications of uneven and combined development-- even if when mistakes, errors were made.
Dialectic is not a method. It is the analysis, demonstration, resolution of the driving force in human history, which is the conflict between labor and the conditions of labor
Except we already know, since Marx told us (see below), that the 'dialectic method' you mystics use is not the same as the 'dialectic method' he used:
http://www.revleft.com/vb/scrapping-dialectics-would-t79634/index4.html
http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1158574&postcount=73
http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1158816&postcount=75
http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1161443&postcount=114
http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1163222&postcount=124
http://www.revleft.com/vb/dialectics-and-political-t118934/index.html
Hence, while Marx's method has practical applications, yours does not.
And, of course, contrary to what you assert, it is a method:
"After a quotation from the preface to my 'Criticism of Political Economy,' Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:
'The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own.... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx's book has.'
"Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?" [Marx (1976) Capital Volume One, pp.101-02. Bold emphases added.]
Comrades will no doubt note that in the above passage, not one single Hegelian concept is to be found -- no "contradictions", no change of "quantity into quality", no "negation of the negation", no "unity and identity of opposites", no "interconnected Totality" --, and yet Marx calls this the "dialectic method", and says of it that it is "my method". So, Marx's "method" has had Hegel completely excised --, except for the odd phrase or two here and there with which he merely "coquetted". In that case, Marx's "dialectic method" more closely resembles that of Aristotle, the Scottish Historical School (of Smith, Ferguson, Millar, Hume, Robertson and Stewart) -- and Kant.
S.Artesian
27th November 2010, 19:16
Some might find this interesting: http://www.asahi-net.or.jp/~mu3t-oois/mpd-e.html (http://www.asahi-net.or.jp/%7Emu3t-oois/mpd-e.html)
Rosa Lichtenstein
27th November 2010, 21:48
^^^Thanks, but the author of that article has clearly swallowed the traditional fable that also holds you in its grip -- that Marx didn't completely excise Hegel (upside down or the 'right way up') from 'the dialectic method' he used in Das Kapital.
So, we are still waiting for a single example of the practical application of the 'dialectic method' (that is, other than negative), as you mystics understand it.
Black Sheep
29th November 2010, 13:39
I do not understand why the mere apparent existence of opposing forces,interests,etc imply or back up the dialectical materialist world view.
Rosa Lichtenstein
29th November 2010, 17:47
^^^And neither do those who tell us they accept this 'theory' -- or if they do, they refuse to say.
Lyev
2nd December 2010, 22:49
Rosa, I wonder, and maybe this has been covered in previous threads, do you consider Marx a Hegelian? Because, in the preface to the 2nd German edition of Capital (I think that's the right one; the one where he "coquettes"), he claims his 'method' is the direct opposite to Hegel's. In other words, he most certainly isn't a Hegelian, in my opinion; what do you think?
Rosa Lichtenstein
2nd December 2010, 22:56
Lyev:
Rosa, I wonder, and maybe this has been covered in previous threads, do you consider Marx a Hegelian? Because, in the preface to the 2nd German edition of Capital (I think that's the right one), he claims his 'method' is the direct opposite to Hegel's - in other words, he most certainly isn't a Hegelian, in my opinion; what do you think?
Well, as I have argued here several times, Marx ended all speculation on this score when he published a summary of 'the dialectic method':
"After a quotation from the preface to my 'Criticism of Political Economy,' Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:
'The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own.... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx's book has.'
"Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?" [Marx (1976) Das Kapital, pp.101-02. Bold emphases added.]
In the passage Marx quotes not one single Hegelian concept is to be found -- no "contradictions", no change of "quantity into quality", no "negation of the negation", no "unity and identity of opposites", no "interconnected Totality" --, and yet Marx calls it "dialectic method", and says it's "my method". So, Marx's "method" has had Hegel completely excised --, except for the odd phrase or two here and there with which he merely "coquetted". In that case, Marx's "dialectic method" more closely resembles that of Aristotle, Kant and the Scottish Historical School (of Smith, Ferguson, Millar, Robertson, Hume and Stewart).
And, of course, one can't get more 'opposite' to Hegel than leave him out completely.
More details here:
http://www.revleft.com/vb/scrapping-dialectics-would-t79634/index4.html
http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1158574&postcount=73
http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1158816&postcount=75
http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1161443&postcount=114
http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1163222&postcount=124
http://www.revleft.com/vb/dialectics-and-political-t118934/index.html
So, yes, I agree with you.
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